To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 1

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Future Expansion of Nuclear Power

Man-Sung Yim
Department of Nuclear Engineering
North Carolina State University


ABSTRACT

This paper examines the relationships between the future expansion of nuclear power and the prospect for
world nuclear nonproliferation. For this purpose, recent changes and developments in international
political environment, nonproliferation regimes, business practices surrounding civilian nuclear power
industry, and technological advancements were examined. Based on these examinations, the paper
attempts to answer the question, What should be done for future nuclear power development not to result
in further increase in proliferation risk?.

I. Introduction

With the worlds continuing concern over global warming, nuclear energy is receiving renewed interest.
Nuclear energy is one of the few economically viable base load electricity generation technologies with
no direct greenhouse gas emissions. Presently, about 440 nuclear power plants are in operation in 34
countries around the world providing about 16% of world electricity
1
. Nuclear power avoids the
production of about 8% of the present level of CO
2
emissions in the energy sector
2
.

The nuclear power industry in the U.S. has struggled for the last quarter century
3
. No new nuclear power
plant has been built since 1970s. The publics attitude toward nuclear technology has been mixed with
interest in times of fuel or power shortages, fear of accidents and concern over nuclear waste
management. The nuclear industry, backed by performance improvements and reduction in
operating/production cost, is currently engaged with various activities that are very much futuristic. There
is a consortium of nuclear vendors and utilities under the support of U.S. Department of Energy preparing
for the construction of a new nuclear power plant by 2010
4
. New reactor designs, including the
development of new generation reactors
5
, have actively been researched. Most of the newly proposed
reactor designs are based on inherent/passive safety concepts with improved economy
6
. Within the
nuclear industry, these developments are considered a presage of nuclear renaissance in the U.S.
Expectation among the U.S. nuclear industry is that these new development will lead into world
expansion of civilian nuclear power program.


1
The TOPS Task Force of the NERAC, Technological Opportunities To Increase the Proliferation Resistance of
Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS), p.5, J anuary 2001.
2
V. M. Mourogov, Role of nuclear Energy for Sustainable Development, Progress in Nuclear Energy, 37, 1-4, 19-
24, 2000; In terms of world primary energy sources, nuclear power contributes to about 6% of the total.
3
Capital intensiveness, licensing uncertainty, and unfavorable political climate discouraged investments in nuclear
option in liberalized markets.
4
Near Term Deployment Group, A Roadmap to Deploy New Nuclear Power Plants in the United States by 2010,
Volume I Summary Report, Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science and Technology, 2001.
5
US DOE Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear
Energy Systems, GIF-002-00, December 2002.
6
Safety of a nuclear reactor is guaranteed even in the event of a severe accident without requiring operator
interventions. With these new reactors, the target accident frequency (i.e., core damage frequency) is about two
orders of magnitude lower than that of the current reactor fleet. Efforts have been expended to reduce the capital
cost of a nuclear plant construction project by employing modular design concepts and reducing construction time.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 2
Over the last 50 years of nuclear technology development, many changes have occurred, in particular in
the U.S. Civilian nuclear power technology, which was a spin-off from nuclear weapon development, has
matured into a huge commercial enterprise. The publics attitude toward nuclear power has gone through
various changes
7
. Development of the technology, which was initially carried out by the U.S. government
or the companies heavily subsidized by the government, is now managed and controlled by multinational
business corporations. The market for civilian nuclear power technology, which was created by
government policy, has become very much liberalized. Commercial interests have become a much
stronger driving force behind the use of nuclear technology. The developing world, once mostly isolated
from the technology, is becoming a more important player for the future. Energy demand is expected to
rise sharply in the developing world as many countries aspire for better quality of life. The
developers/vendors, by becoming a multinational entity through various mergers, have become much less
constrained by the U.S. government policy. Concern over proliferation, which was addressed by
establishing a clear boundary between civilian and military applications, has been renewed through recent
incidents in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Although the vast majority of States have committed to forgo the
manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons, the recent incidents are showing that the current
nonproliferation regime has defects in preventing clandestine development of nuclear weapons. More
significantly, these incidents confirm the possibility of nuclear proliferation under the cover of civilian
nuclear power development.

The international political environment, in particular over the last decade, has become very complex and
unpredictable. During the cold war, many states, under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. and Soviet Union,
did not feel the need for nuclear weapons. Most states did not pursue nuclear weapons due to the
perceived cost, difficulty, and in some cases the taboo associated with it
8
. However, this view may be
changing. There is only one dominant state in the international system. Smaller and weaker states feel
more responsible for their own security. A new sense of allies or enemies may be developing
9
. There are
several regions in the world where serious security conflicts are still on-going. Some states may
reconsider nuclear weapons to meet their security needs under the changing international political
dynamics. To some states, a key motivation for nuclear weapon development is to deter intervention by
the U.S. Possible dispersion of nuclear weapons by some states to sub-national terrorist groups adds
another dimension to the worlds nuclear proliferation concern
10
.

Current developments within the U.S. nuclear power industry which may be aiming at world nuclear
power expansion remind us the dilemma that the nuclear industry faced during the early days of civilian
nuclear technology development: Can a peaceful use of nuclear power be expanded without affecting the
worlds nuclear proliferation? At the same time, the surrounding conditions for civilian nuclear power
development have changed from those in the 1950s. These conditions include the international political
environment, business practices, advancement in nuclear power technology, and the world nuclear
nonproliferation regimes. This paper is an attempt to answer the question considering these changes. In
this regard, the following questions are asked and examined in the paper as necessary steps:
1) What is the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation?;
2) What has been done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with the development of nuclear
energy?;
3) Is the expansion of nuclear power realistic?;

7
Public attitude toward nuclear power started with interest, hope and changed to concern, fear, anxiety and later
maybe indifference. Presently, public attitude is more or less neutral.
8
S. J . Diehl and J . C. Moltz, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, ABC-CLIO, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, 2002.
9
L. Scheinman, Reflections on Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime, Proceedings of 44
th
Annual Meeting,
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, 2003.
10
After the 9-11 event, terrorist groups ambition to acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction
is well known.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 3
4) How do the recent developments in the civilian nuclear power industry affect world nuclear
nonproliferation?;
5) What should be done for future nuclear power expansion not to result in further increase in
proliferation risk?

This paper is not intended to address all aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. The focus of the paper is on
the relationship between civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear proliferation. The threat under
consideration is a nation, like Iran, that may contemplate possible nuclear weapon development through
the establishment of a civilian nuclear power program. An underlying premise in this discussion is that
spreading of nuclear weapons is detrimental to world peace and international security.

II. What is the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation?

Nuclear weapons can be built only if enough weapon-usable nuclear material is available. The weapon-
usable nuclear materials include all isotopes capable of being assembled into a fast critical mass which
then undergoes explosive prompt fission reactions
11
. These include all isotopes of plutonium, uranium-
233,235, neptunium-237, proactium-231, americium-241,243, curium-244,245,246, berkelium-247, and
californium-251. The nuclei that are readily able to undergo fission and sustain a chain reaction, such as
uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239, and plutonium-241, are called fissile
12
nuclei. Plutonium-239,
uranium-235, and uranium-233 are most commonly used as nuclear weapon materials. Uranium-235 or
uranium-233 can be implemented into a gun-type design, for which the assembly is rather simplistic and
weapon testing is not a requirement for efficacy verification. Use of plutonium-239 requires an
implosion-type design which demands sophistication in the skills and knowledge of the bomb designer
and testing for verification. The other nuclides (e.g., neptunium-237) can be assembled into a bomb
although advanced skills and knowledge in bomb design are required.

Acquiring nuclear weapon-usable material can be pursued in three different routes
13
: (a) Enrichment of
uranium-235 to weapons grade concentrations through isotope separation; (b) Chemical reprocessing of
spent fuel from reactors to extract plutonium-239, uranium-233, or other weapon-usable fissile materials;
(c) Diversion, theft, seizure, purchase, or receipt of fissile nuclear materials. A civilian nuclear power
program can potentially be linked to all of these routes if uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing is
involved. It has been shown that reactor-grade plutonium from civilian nuclear reactors is a potentially
explosive material and that the difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward
types (e.g., Fat Man-type) are not appreciably greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to
be met for the use of weapons-grade plutonium
14
. Thus it is possible to build an entirely credible national
weapons capability with use of only reactor-grade material
15
.

Proliferation takes place when the fissile materials from the civilian nuclear power program are diverted
and know-how from the civilian nuclear programs is used for military purposes. Training and education
of people to support nuclear power program is linked to nuclear proliferation as many of the skills and
capabilities of nuclear scientists and engineers are common between civilian and military program.

11
International Workshop on Technology Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global
Nuclear Power Systems, March 29-30, 2000, Washington, DC.
12
R. F. Mozley, The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation, University of Washington Press, Seattle,
WA, 1998; Fissile refers to nuclei that leads to fission following the absorption of a zero-energy neutron. Nuclei
such as uranium-238, which do not fission unless struck by an energetic neutron, are said to be fissionable but
nonfissile. Those that can be converted into fissile nuclei by the absorption of a neutron, such as uranium-238 and
thorium-232, are called fertile nuclei.
13
H. Feiveson, Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Fuel Cycles, Annual Review of Energy, 3: 357-394, 1978.
14
J . C. Mark, Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium, Science and Global Security, 4, 111-128, 1993.
15
See Feiveson (Note 13).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 4

As of 2004, the world has accumulated 1450 metric tons of plutonium as global stockpiles
16
. Among this,
250 metric tons of plutonium were produced at weapons facilities. The rest were produced through
civilian activities. 195 metric tons of plutonium have been separated from spent nuclear fuel from the
civilian reactors. Continued accumulations of plutonium in spent fuel and of separated plutonium
resulting from reprocessing can be perceived as increasing the proliferation risk associated with the global
expansion of nuclear energy
17
.

It may be true that, if a country wants nuclear weapons, it would prefer a dedicated route to material
production over the diversion of material from a civilian nuclear power program. The dedicated route
would be cheaper, less time consuming and possibly yield higher quality weapons material. However,
examination of nuclear proliferation history indicates that using a dedicated route has not been practiced
among potential proliferators. Except for the early nuclear weapons states such as the U.S., Soviet Union,
U.K. and China where weapons programs predated civil applications, most of the states with nuclear
ambition have used civilian nuclear power programs as cover for any on-going weapons work. The list of
these countries includes France, Brazil, South Africa, Argentina, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan,
Pakistan, India, and Israel
18

19
. Pursuing a dedicated route would be very difficult under the current world
nonproliferation regimes.

Due to its capital cost intensive nature and requirement for a large manpower support, establishing a
civilian nuclear program requires a long-term financial and political commitment. Additionally, pursuing
detonation capability and delivery capability requires a significant amount of investment for an extended
period of time. According to Erickson
20
, it would be difficult for any state with a gross national product

16
G. Perkovich, J . Cirincione, R. Gottemoeller, J . B. Wolfstahl, J . T. Matthews, Universal Compliance, A Strategy
for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Draft, J une 2004.
17
Hassberger, J ., T. Isaacs, and R. N. Schock, A Strategic Framework for Proliferation Resistance: A Systematic
Approach for the Identification and Evaluation of Technology Opportunities to Enhance the Proliferation Resistance
of Civilian Nuclear Energy Systems, UCRL-J C-142356, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2001.
18
In France, nuclear weapon development was closely interconnected with the civilian program; France provided a
plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant to Israel for civilian purpose under the cover of substantial
secrecy. No safeguards requirements were in place; In India, from the inception, military and civilian nuclear energy
programs were closely interconnected; Also in Pakistan, military and civilian nuclear energy programs were
substantially integrated; enrichment technology was commercially obtained from Urenco; In South Africa, a nuclear
energy program began initially as civilian. Foreign assistance was used to build up an indigenous technical base for
its weapons program; Civilian nuclear technologies acquired from abroad were used as a basis for the nuclear
weapons program in Iraq; In Iran, the nuclear program was initially civilian. Technologies relevant to a nuclear
weapons program were obtained through China, Russia, and Pakistan. The civilian program provided a cover for
weapon work; Under the cover of a civilian nuclear energy program, a covert nuclear weapons program was pursued
in Taiwan; In South Korea, a secret nuclear weapons program was begun simultaneously with the construction of its
first civilian nuclear power plant. Under U.S. pressure, Seoul pledged not to establish either enrichment or
reprocessing capabilities; Argentinas civilian nuclear program was the oldest and most successful in South
America, which also served as a cloak for what appears to have been a nuclear weapons effort. The weapons
program was abandoned in the 1980s as the military government regime changed to a civilian one; In Brazil, the
military ran an unsafeguarded parallel program which was cancelled later under a civilian government; Sweden
originally had an integrated program for both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons; Yugoslavia pursued a secret
nuclear weapons program terminated in 1987, and still retains a base of expertise and nearly 50 kilograms of fresh
80% enriched HEU fuel; In North Korea, a secret extensive nuclear weapons program has been underway under the
cover of civilian applications for over 30 years.
19
Bunn, M., Civilian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Programs: The Record, International Topical
Workshop on Proliferation-Resistance in Innovative Reactors and Fuel Cycle, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Como, Italy, J uly 2-6, 2001.
20
S. A. Erickson, Economics and Technological Trends Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation, The Nonproliferation
Review, pp. 40-54, Summer 2001.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 5
(GNP) significantly less than that of about ~$100 billion to devote enough annual governmental funding
to a nuclear weapon program to actually achieve positive results within a reasonable time frame (i.e., 10
years). But once a country possesses an established civilian nuclear power program, it can change the
dynamics of proliferation. Presence of trained nuclear scientists and engineers within the state will make a
difference in the cost of a nuclear weapon program. An established civilian nuclear program creates a
bureaucracy that can then affect the politics and decision making within that state surrounding the
decisions on nuclear weapons
21
. Once complicated nuclear plants and supporting infrastructure are
formed in these states, they can influence state policy that wants to take advantage of their expensive
nuclear establishment for prominence, pride, and security. Therefore, a states bureaucracy and politics
surrounding its nuclear establishment plays a larger role in defining the relationship between nuclear
power and nuclear proliferation. Establishing commercial nuclear program can become both a conduit and
mask to a weapons program that a government might not otherwise be willing to undertake
22
.

Nuclear proliferation is not a matter solely determined by a mastery of technical details. Overcoming
financial constraints does not necessarily dictate the course of a proliferation attempt. Technology or
finance is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for nuclear proliferation. There are over 20
countries in the continents of North and South America, Africa, and Asia with $50 billion or over GNP in
2002 that have not developed nuclear weapons. There are over 35 countries in the world that possess the
civilian nuclear capability. But other than the first nuclear club countries (i.e., U.S., Russia, U.K., France,
and China), only 4 or 5 countries (e.g., Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) currently are known to
possess nuclear weapons. Regardless of how a country acquires civilian nuclear technical capability (so
called latent capacity
23
), the most important step in the process of nuclear proliferation is the acquisition
of functional nuclear weapons. This could come about only from an explicit proliferation decision by a
government to transform a latent capacity into an operational capacity
24
. At the most fundamental level,
the proliferation decision by a state is controlled by the political motivation
25
.

Those countries that were at least once involved in activities toward nuclear proliferation had political
motivations to become a nuclear weapon state. These motivational factors can be international political
power/prestige incentives, military/security incentives, and domestic political incentives
26
. The
international political power/prestige incentive is related to a countrys desire to obtain regional or global
power status/pretensions due to the belief that nuclear weapons somehow magnify a nations image. This
incentive may not be a common desire in todays world but was behind the Nuclear Weapon States
(NWS) and India
27
. When a state perceives that nuclear weapons are necessary for its national security to
provide deterrence against larger states and groups of states, military/security incentives exist. The
potential proliferant country may perceive some likelihood of future security disputes with a country
owning nuclear weapons (e.g., India vis--vis the Peoples Republic of China
28
, Pakistan vis--vis India)
or an adversary country with overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. Future attempts for
nuclear proliferation are likely to be dominated by this incentive among the current non-NWS. Domestic

21
G. Perkovich, Nuclear Power in India, Pakistan, and Iran, Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
P. Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brasseys, Washington, DC, 2002.
22
See Feiveson (note 13).
23
S. M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1984.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
A former Indian Air Force chief of staff stated in the 70s that India was not taken seriously by other states. In his
view, becoming a nuclear weapons state would rectify that and perhaps eventually lead to a permanent seat on the
U.N. Security Council, which he felt India deserves on all counts T.V. Paul, The Systemic Bases of Indias
Challenge to Global Nuclear Order, The Nonproliferation Review, 6 pp. 1-11, Fall 1998.
28
See Erickson (note 20).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 6
political incentives exist when national decision makers perceive nuclear weapon development as a way
to divert domestic energies away from domestic problems, or as a way of economic gain
29
.

A proliferation decision by a government is clearly a political act that depends on a complex balance of
both incentives and disincentives and bureaucracies within the country
30
. For most countries whether
they own civilian nuclear power programs or not, political issues surrounding their security would
dominate the decision to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapon development. Their decision will also be
affected by the degree to which the nuclear-weapon states are willing to apply security assurance or,
conversely, diplomatic pressure. Their decision will also be strongly affected by the time and degree of
illicit activity required to obtain nuclear weapons materials. The longer it takes to obtain the weapons
material, and the more stringent the safeguards agreements are that have to be broken, the greater the
challenges to these countries will be. This is where the technological advancement in proliferation
resistance makes a difference. This is where the interactions between civilian and military program
become most salient with regards to nuclear proliferation.

Most countries owning nuclear power technology have drawn clear physical boundaries between military
and civilian nuclear programs. Developing civilian nuclear capability does not bear direct relationship
with nuclear weapon development. But civilian nuclear capability can provide a cover for clandestine
weapon development work. As long as political ambition for nuclear ambition exists, driven by security
concerns, a civilian nuclear power establishment provides necessary tools for nuclear proliferation.

III. What has been done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons with commercial development of
nuclear energy?

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with the development and utilization of civilian nuclear
technology was a major concern at the beginning of commercial atomic age. People involved with
nuclear technology development were well aware of the devastating destructive capabilities of nuclear
weapons which were confirmed at the bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in J apan. Since then, with the
evolving changes in the international environment surrounding nuclear power development, U.S. efforts
for nonproliferation have gone through five different stages
31
. These stages include: 1) Nuclear
Monopoly (1945-1953); 2) Atoms for Peace, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1954-1974); 3) Tighten export control and restrict plutonium
economy (1974-1991); 4) Strengthen NPT (1991-2001); and 5) the current post 9-11 era (2001-
present) which is yet to be defined.

The first stage is the period of Nuclear Monopoly which is characterized by U.S. efforts to promote
international control over atomic energy
32
. Maintaining secrecy of the Manhattan project was crucial
during World War II to prevent the enemy from acquiring any information about nuclear bomb making.
World uranium resources were thoroughly controlled by the U.S. and its allies. After the war, the
victorious powers agreed to establish a UN Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to bring nuclear energy

29
There may also be economic incentives for a country with an established civilian nuclear power industry to pursue
proliferation. It could be to improve their economic situation by either selling the weapons or technology developed
or by using the weapons or technology as a political bargaining chip to coerce economic aid from the U.S. or other
countries.
30
See Feiveson (note 13).
31
Foran, V. I., A. Herpel, ; et al., U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, The National Security
Archive, 2003; Sanders, B., A Short History of Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Law Bulletin, No. 62,
December 1998, Nuclear Energy Agency.
32
H. Muller, D. Fischer, and W. Kotter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order, Oxford University Press, New
York, NY, 1994; W. C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation, Oelgerschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, Inc.,
Cambridge, MA, 1982.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 7
and the spread of nuclear weapons under international control. Through the new UNAEC in 1946, the US
proposed a bold comprehensive effort, called Baruch Plan, to address the dilemma of how to utilize
peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while avoiding the danger of nuclear proliferation
33
. The Plan called
for destruction of all nuclear weapons, once such a control system had been established. However, the
Soviet Union, which was secretly engaged in nuclear weapon development, was against the Plan. They
asked for destruction of existing weapons first before the international control of nuclear materials. The
two states approach could not come to an agreement. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act of the U.S. puts an
effective end to all nuclear collaboration. The U.S. tried to maintain the monopoly over the nuclear
information through secrecy even with its closest allies. This period ends with President Eisenhowers
Atoms for Peace speech in December 1953.

Atoms for Peace (AFP) was a movement made by the U.S. government after realizing that the use of
nuclear technology could no longer be contained within the existing circle. There were emerging
possibilities of nuclear export efforts by the USSR, French and British governments. The U.S. saw the
need for taking a lead in the upcoming commercial race which was materialized through the Atoms for
Peace Initiative (AFPI). Thus AFP was largely driven by U.S. commercial interest
34
. The original U.S.
AFPI proposed assisting other nations to develop peaceful uses for nuclear technology in return for a
pledge not to use the knowledge and materials to produce nuclear weapons. The AFPIs assumption that
any nation could be permitted to deploy a complete fuel cycle, however, remains very much
controversial. In particular, the promise of the access to enrichment and reprocessing technology has been
the source of contention.

The AFP period is characterized by nearly unrestricted development of nuclear energy by other nations.
Many nations joined the bandwagon to gain access to the privileged technology, although they were not
economically or politically ready. There was an assumption that a nuclear weapons capability could not
be obtained solely through a civilian nuclear power program. In his Atoms for Peace speech, President
Eisenhower proposed that the governments principally involved in nuclear research and development
make joint contributions to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Statute of the IAEA was
approved in October 1954 and entered into force in July 1957. The IAEA began to safeguard nuclear
operations in 1959 (on a very modest scale). Non-proliferation gradually gained interest with the concern
over radioactive fallouts and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) passed in
1963 and the first nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) was established in Latin America, the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, in 1967. In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was finalized by the UN and
went into effect on March 5, 1970. Within the NPT framework, countries were divided into two groups:
the five states that had already tested nuclear weapons (the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and
China so called Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)), and the rest of the world that had not yet deployed
these weapons. The non-weapon states were given security guarantees against nuclear attack. NWS
committed themselves into eventual nuclear disarmament. The period ends abruptly with Indias atomic
explosion in May 1974.

The third stage (Tightening export control and restrict plutonium economy) is characterized by the
competition between export control policy and honoring the NPT promise for unrestricted access to
civilian nuclear power technology. Indias explosion in 1974 reminded the world of the potential global
spread of nuclear weapons. Up until 1974, the primary organization restricting international exports of

33
Ibid (see Potter): The Baruch Plan was based on internal government report directed by undersecretary of state
Dean Acheson and TVA Chairman David Lilienthal, with the majority of the input coming from Robert
Oppenheimer. Under the Baruch Plan, the ownership and control of all sensitive material/facilities by a so-called
International Atomic Development Agency was called for.
34
T. E. Perry, The Origins and Implementation of the 1992 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Agreement, Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2002.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 8
nuclear technology was the NPT Exporters Committee (known as the Zangger Committee, named after its
first chairman, established in 1971). The Committee had developed a so-called trigger list of sensitive
exports. States receiving these technologies were to accept safeguards and periodic inspections of these
technologies. Inspection of other related national nuclear facilities was not explicitly required. Alarmed
by the Indian explosion and with the expected growth in nuclear facilities worldwide, reappraisal of the
adequacy of export controls led to the establishment in 1975 of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, or
London Club)
35
. A common set of voluntary standards for international nuclear transfers to non-nuclear
weapon states was established in 1977 by the NSG
36
. Restraint in the export of sensitive technology
such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing plants was put into practice as part of the
standards. On April 16, 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established to limit
the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction
37
.

In 1976, the U.S. developed a new safeguards export policy that significantly changed the practice of the
U.S. commercial nuclear industry. Serious discussions about the U.S. civilian nuclear fuel cycle were
made during this period, from which a strategic decision not to pursue a closed nuclear fuel cycle and to
abandon spent nuclear fuel reprocessing came. Following that decision, the U.S. government has since
closed all research activities on fast breeders. The Carter Executive Order stated
38
that the U.S. will not
reprocess spent fuel nor export enrichment/reprocessing technology. Going beyond the order, the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) was enacted in 1978
39
. The Act was an end to nuclear trade with non-
nuclear weapons state whose nuclear facilities were not subject to full-scope safeguards. The Act required
U.S. permission for the reprocessing, enrichment or re-export of nuclear materials received from the U.S.
This unilateral attempt has been unpopular abroad. France, U.K. and Germany nonetheless continued the
commercial development of reprocessing technology. The U.S., at the same time, began a dialogue called
the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) by engaging U.S. partners and developing nations on the
technical aspects of nuclear proliferation
40
. A very extensive report was produced from this exercise
41
.
However, the report failed to vindicate the Carter philosophy. Rather than delegitimizing plutonium
recycling, the report provided some credibility to supporters of plutonium recycling by concluding that
there was no single fuel cycle superior to all others with regard to its proliferation resistance. A
companion U.S. effort called NASAP (Nonproliferation Alternatives System Assessment Program)
42

concluded slightly differently as: (1) All nuclear fuel cycles entail some proliferation risk; there is no
technical fix, (2) There are substantial differences in proliferation resistance among fuel cycles if they are
deployed in non-nuclear-weapon states, (3) Technical and institutional proliferation resistance features
can help, and (4) The vulnerability to threats by sub-national groups varies among fuel cycles. These

35
U.S. General Accounting Office, Nonproliferation, Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control
Regimes, GAO-03-43, Report to Congressional Committees, October 2002: The NSGs part 1 guidelines provide
an annexed list of 89 items of nuclear materials and equipment (similar to the trigger list of Zangger Committee).
NSG part 2 guidelines include 67 items consisting of exports of nuclear-related, dual-use equipment, materials, and
related technology (e.g., machine tools, beryllium, lasers, laser amplifiers, oscillators, and flash x-ray equipment).
36
G. T. Gardner, Nuclear Nonproliferation, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1994.
37
A. F. Wolf, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A Listing of Events, in Arms Control and
Nonproliferation, L. T. Carter (ed.), Nova Science Publishers, Huntington, NY, 2000.
38
Remarks by President Carter on Nuclear Power Policy, April 7, 1977, reprinted in Nuclear Proliferation
Factbook (1977), pp. 112-119.
39
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) - Public Law 95-242, US Statues, Vol. 92, p.120 (March 10,
1978).
40
See Muller, et al. (note 32).
41
Report from the Commission to the Council: International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, Document COM (80)
316 Final (11 June 1980).
42
DOE, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power, Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems
Assessment Program, United States Department of Energy, Washington DC (June 1980).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 9
conclusions still remain valid. Discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in 1991 ended the third
stage.

The fourth stage is characterized by revising and strengthening NPT. It began with the reexamination of
the export control regime, motivated by the Iraqi event. The 1990-91 Gulf War revealed a very extensive
nuclear weapon program in Iraq, despite its being a member of NPT. The incident showed that the current
NPT regime could not prevent the danger of proliferation through clandestine development. In 1992, the
NSG established additional guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and
technology. Subsequent efforts to better address the nonproliferation issue led to IAEA Director General
Hans Blixs request
43
: In order to detect clandestine activities three fundamental requirements must be
met: (1) the IAEA must have the unequivocal right to inspect suspect locations at short notice; (2)
member states must provide the IAEA with intelligence data so that it would know where to look; and (3)
the IAEA must have the full backing of the Security Council to enforce its rights of inspection. These
were implemented into a strengthened IAEA safeguards system by mid-1992. Shortly after, through the
testing of the newly implemented system, North Koreas nuclear ambition was disclosed. In 1995, the
NPT was extended indefinitely and a Strengthened Safeguards program was fully approved. The
Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/540) was approved in 1997. Provisions made in
the Additional Protocol include: Information about, and inspector access to, fuel cycle-related research
and development; information on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies
and inspectors access to manufacturing and import locations; the collection of environmental samples
beyond the declared locations when deemed necessary by the IAEA, and administrative arrangements that
improve the process of designating inspectors; and the issuance of multi-entry visas and IAEA access to
modern means of communications.

Overall, NPT has assisted in developing a global political environment that prevents nuclear
proliferation
44
. Although India, Israel, and Pakistan remain outside, states that signed the treaty have in
principle not only placed all of their nuclear activities under international monitoring, but have also
agreed to create a nonproliferation culture. There is a large popular antipathy toward nuclear weapons
present in many states.

During this period, extensive clandestine nuclear weapons development programs in Iran and North
Korea were discovered, raising serious concern over the NPTs effectiveness. The NPT relies on willing
signers and voluntary compliance while current verification provisions are insufficient. Under the current
NPT arrangements, countries can acquire the technology for uranium enrichment and plutonium
separation without explicitly violating the treaty. Then they can leave the treaty without penalty. Cleary,
IAEA has been very much limited in determining whether states are pursuing undeclared nuclear weapons
program. IAEA is not entitled to have any enforcing power either.

The Clinton administrations statement in 1993 reaffirmed the U.S. policy on abstaining from commercial
reprocessing. Pakistan tested and declared nuclear status in 1998 along with Indias serial testing. During
this period, the Wassenaar Arrangement was established in J uly 1996 as a multilateral export control
regime. The Wassenaar Agreement was to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Control (COCOM), which controlled exports to Soviet-bloc countries during the Cold War
45
. The
Agreements main goal is to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting

43
These requests were made at a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in July 1991. Nucleonics Week,
8 Aug. 1991, p.9; Nucleonics Week, 19 Sep. 1991, pp.12-13.
44
See Erickson (note 20).
45
See Wolf (note 37).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 10
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and
technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations.
46
.

The current fifth stage, post 9-11 era, is yet to be defined. International relations and security dynamics
have become more complex, less predictable, and more decentralized than before. The nature and source
of threat has become more diverse
47
. National interest is being defined more narrowly. After the Afghan
and Iraqi war, countries which could potentially face the U.S. as an enemy state may seek nuclear
weapons as a way of deterring military invasion by the U.S. The current Bush administrations policy to
support regime change (even through an unilateral war) against rogue states is considered a serious
security threat to some states (e.g., North Korea). This provides further incentive for nuclear weapon
development
48
. At the same time, efforts in futuristic nuclear power development are well underway. The
Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group
49
, May 2001, recommends: 1) expansion of
nuclear energy in the United States, 2) Development of advanced nuclear fuel cycles and next generation
technologies, and 3) Development of advanced reprocessing and fuel treatment technologies. The third
recommendation represents a request for a major shift in current U.S. policy on nuclear fuel cycle.

Recent developments in Iran and North Korea raise a concern of making the fissile materials available to
the nuclear black market or the hands of terrorist groups. With terrorism on the rise, and the evolution of
dictatorial and unstable states like Pakistan and North Korea into nuclear powers, the threshold for first
nuclear use may be on decline. The fact that Pakistan, India, and Israel
50
possess nuclear weapons and
they are outside the NPT regime leaves the world uneasy and undermines the worlds nonproliferation
efforts
51
.

The current international nonproliferation regime lacks clear guidance on what happens when a state
violates its nonproliferation undertakings
52
. Taking punitive actions (e.g., sanctions or military action)
against violators is increasingly difficult. The Iraq war by the U.S. and its allies has proven itself very
costly. Under the current world political climate, with no clear shared vision, it is becoming increasingly
difficult for the U.N. Security Council to take swift and effective action. The IAEA is an inspection
agency with no enforcement powers and is rather technically focused and very under-funded. Given the
current developments in North Korea and Iran, policy decisions in the next few years will shape the
course of world nuclear proliferation in the future.

The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative
53
and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540
54
are important
steps toward international collaboration. The Proliferation Security Initiative, with eleven nations

46
M. Beck, C. Craft, S. Gahlaut, and S. J ones, Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls, Center for
International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, September 2002: The Wassenaar Agreeement is an
informal agreement of 33 states thus each national government regulates its own exports. It has no list of target
countries or restricted entities, although it does (since December 2001) target terrorist groups and organizations, as
well as individual terrorists..
47
See Scheinman (note 9).
48
This may be true with North Korea.
49
National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, Washington, DC, May 2001.
50
Israel has maintained a policy of opacity on nuclear weapons Israel has never advertised or even admitted its
nuclear status up to now even though the country developed nuclear weapons in the 1960s.
51
For example, terrorist organizations and radical fundamentalist groups are active and operating in Pakistan.
52
See Perkovich, et al. (note 16).
53
The Proliferation Security Initiative was announced by President Bush in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003 to
undertake effective measures for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery system, and related
materials. PSI core group includes Australia, France, Germany, Italy, J apan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
U.K., and U.S.
54
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540, Adopted at its 4956
th
meeting, on 28 April 2004.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 11
participating as core group (China and Russia are not in the core group), is a multinational effort to
enhance and expand the efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
system, and related materials to and from countries of proliferation concern, following the Interdiction
Principles
55
. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously on April 28, 2004, calls for all
states to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation and adopt national legislative measures to
that effect
56
. It also provides international authorization for seizure of illegal material transfers by making
them subject to Chapter VII of the UN Charter which permits the Security Council to use sanctions or
military force in response to international security threats
57
.

Many parts of the world are currently covered by Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ), such as Treaties
of Tlatelolco (Latin America), Rarotonga (South Pacific), Bangkok (Southeast Asia), and Pelindaba
(Africa). At the same time, the most controversial hot spot areas in the world, i.e., Northeast Asia with
J apan, South Korea and North Korea, the Middle East, and the old SSRs (Soviet Socialist Republics),
have not been included in any of the NWFZ.

The current multilateral export control regimes are not prepared for future proliferation challenges
58
. In
the absence of binding and consistent interpretations of the guidelines, countries can adjust their export
policies to meet their economic or policy goals that may be in conflict with the intent of the multilateral
export control regimes. Without high-level political support, the goal of export control can be easily
defeated by the economic interests of companies backed by political leaders
59
. Because the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement work by consensus, effective implementation of any
new resolutions for export control of nuclear and dual-use technologies and equipment is difficult
60
.

IV. Is nuclear power expansion realistic?

Civilian nuclear power technology development in the U.S. parallels the development of high technology
and environmental awareness of the public. In the early days of the environmental awakening era in the
U.S., environmental activists played a critical role. To them, nuclear energy was "a surrogate issue for
more fundamental criticism of U.S. institutions"
61
. Nuclear technology was considered a symbol of
commitment to growth, consumption, and high technology among the environmental activists in the 70s
62
.

55
Fact Sheet, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, J anuary 11, 2005: The Statement of Interdiction
Principles (SOP) was agreed among the founding PSI countries on September 4, 2003. The Principles include:
adopting streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information, work to strengthen the relevant national
legal authorities to accomplish the objectives and work to strengthen international law and frameworks, and not
transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD.
56
See Perkovich, et al. (note 16).
57
Ibid: To facilitate compliance with the laws criminalizing proliferation behavior, the Security Council or relevant
specialized institutions such as the IAEA need to develop a declaration system that will help distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate trade across state borders.
58
See Perkovich, et al. (note 16): The regimes emerged out of a network of a small number of like-minded countries
where informal consultative arrangements worked. Now the outgrown regime membership is very diverse with
different security outlooks and interests. The growth was not supported by corresponding development in formality
and institutionalization of the regime.
59
See Beck, et al. (note 46).
60
Member states lack transparency in their export control systems and decision making and are inefficient at
information sharing. Members are failing to deal effectively with increased dual-use trade and technology transfers.
The systems are hampered by the voluntary nature and lack of enforcement and penalization measures. Current
system only calls for states to share decisions to deny export requests between member states.
61
S. Rothman and S. R. Lichter, Elite Ideology and Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy, American Political
Science Review, 81, 81, 1987
62
R. E. Kasperson, G. Berk, D. Pijawka, A. B. Sharaf, J. Wood, Public Opposition to Nuclear Energy: Retrospect
and Prospect, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 5, 31, 11-23, 1980.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 12
A network of environmental groups provided the leadership to anti-nuclear organizations at state and
local levels. Concerns on the safety of reactor operation, nuclear waste disposal, and possible diversion of
nuclear material capable of use in weapons manufacture, sometimes in the form of horror stories, were the
more visible counts in these opposition movements involving the public. Exploiting the wave of distrust
in institutions which had been heightened by the Vietnam war and Watergate tragedies along with the
timely occurrence of the Three Mile Island accident, the anti-nuclear movement was extremely
successful. Lately, with emergence of global warming issue and nuclear powers contribution to abate
greenhouse gas emissions, the anti-nuclear sentiment has become lessened.

More recent surveys of public attitude toward nuclear power show the turnaround trend for nuclear
energy. The 2003 NEI study
63
showed that 7 out of 10 Americans believe nuclear energy should play a
role in our energy future. And 57 percent would find it acceptable to add a new reactor next to the nearest
existing nuclear power plant if a new source of electricity supply were needed. Support for new nuclear
plants jumped 18 percentage points to 58 percent in the Northeast and 11 percentage points in the
Midwest, where 66 percent said it would be acceptable to build a new reactor at the site of the nearest
nuclear plant. This increase in support may be related to the blackout in the Northeast and Midwest
during the month of August in 2003. The energy crisis in California during 2001 might also have
contributed to this swing. More recently, high oil and gasoline prices and their effect on the economy
may have also had a impact on American attitudes toward nuclear power. These recent developments
work in favor of the nuclear power industry, providing support for futuristic development.

The nuclear industry has reached a critical turning point with the passage of site approval of the Yucca
Mountain repository along with the renewed interest in nuclear energy in the country. Many of the current
members of the public have never experienced the anti-nuclear movements nor the nuclear risks personally.
This is an opportune time for the nuclear industry to gain trust and credibility from the public. Gaining trust
and credibility requires repetitive demonstrations of a transparent corporate behavior respecting the views
of vulnerable parties and empathizing with the interests of the public
64
. They need to maintain consistent
levels of successful operational performance.

Recent performance of the nuclear power plant fleet in the U.S. tops near-record level 90% capacity
factor. Many of the U.S. utilities are vying for life-time extension through re-licensing and purchasing old
units. So far the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has renewed the licenses for 23 reactors
nationwide. Following these trends, the U.S. Department of Energy has started several initiatives such as
Generation IV reactor development and Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiatives (AFCI). Generation IV
represents truly advanced systems and its design goals include not only safety/reliability enhancement but
also minimum waste impact, proliferation resistance and physical protection, and economics. Generation
IV is an international undertaking with potentially multiple deployment scenarios and locations. Eight
other countries (including U.K., Switzerland, South Korea, South Africa, J apan, France, Canada, Brazil,
and Argentina) are collaborating under the Generation IV International Forum. AFCI represents the
governments recognition of nuclear waste problems. Given the expected difficulty in securing high-level
radioactive disposal capacity, the U.S. DOE is investigating, under AFCI, the possibility of nuclear waste
recycling and transmutation to minimize the impact on waste disposal.

Another activity of significance that affects the future of development of nuclear power is the Nuclear
Hydrogen Initiative. Hydrogen offers significant promises as a future energy technology, in particular in
the transportation sector. A large scale use of hydrogen in the U.S. transportation sector will significantly

63
Public Support for Building Nuclear Power Plants Increases Following August Electricity Blackouts,
Perspective on Public Opinion, NEI, November 2003.
64
La Porte, T. R. and D. S. Metlay, Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit of Trust, Public
Administration Review, 56, 4, 341-347, 1996.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 13
reduce dependence on foreign oil import, thus improving energy security
65
. But, hydrogen as an energy
source is not naturally available and has to be manufactured by breaking up molecules such as water,
methane, or sugar. Currently a commercial large-scale method of hydrogen production involves the
conversion of methane into hydrogen through a steam reforming process. This process is efficient but has
the environmental drawback of producing large quantities of carbon dioxide as a by-product. Nuclear
energy has the potential to play a major role in this. Nuclear heat supplied through an intermediate heat
exchanger to a hydrogen-producing thermochemical plant promises high efficiency and avoids the use of
carbon-based fuels. The goal of the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative is to demonstrate the commercial-scale,
economically feasible production of hydrogen using advanced high-temperature nuclear reactors by the
year 2017.

These activities have provided a boost for the morale of the nuclear professionals. There is a high hope
for a larger contribution of nuclear power in the future in the U.S. and in the world. In terms of domestic
development in the future, several issues are at stake and will affect the course of future development.
First of all, U.S. electricity generation is so much market driven and the federal government has such a
weak impact on influencing the domestic energy mix picture. If the generating cost of nuclear power
remains competitive as projected for a while, revival of nuclear energy in the U.S. is very much likely.
The longer- term commercial deployment of new advanced nuclear reactors will primarily depend on the
cost reduction provided by the new designs.

Current U.S. policy on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle does not allow reprocessing and related fast reactor
applications since the 1976 Carter executive order
66
. According to the projections made in a recent fuel
cycle economics study
67
, there is no viable economy around the use of plutonium in the U.S. For the
nuclear option to be a source of energy for sustainable development, breeder reactors need to be a part of
the fuel cycle. With lack of government leadership and public support, commercial development in the
U.S. of fast reactors and related commercial plutonium market or related closed fuel cycle development is
unlikely in a near future. That may force the technology to remain with an open (once-though) nuclear
fuel cycle for a while. For domestic expansion of nuclear power to become a reality, the nuclear power
industry needs to resolve the spent fuel disposition challenge.

If the nuclear fuel cycle remains open/once-through in the U.S., the issue of long-term uranium supply
should also be examined. Current abundance in uranium supply and its low price
68
is due to optimistic
demand growth projection and availability of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from weapons stockpiles.
Based on the Reasonably Assured Resources in the Redbook
69
, it can be predicted that world resources
would last only about 35 years at the current consumption rate of 64,000 tonnes of natural uranium per
year. However, as discovery of new resources continues along with improvements in mining technology,
the cost of previously high-cost deposits is being lowered. By including less well-proven, speculative and
higher cost resources (<130 $ /kgU), the current uranium resources base increases to 11 million tonnes
70
.

65
Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, U.S. Department of Energy,
March 2003.
66
Clinton administration reaffirmed this commitment in 1993. The administration Fact Sheet states that the U.S.
does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for
either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes. The U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is still nominally
guided by this statement.
67
M. Bunn, S. Fetter, J . P. Holdren, and B. van der Zwaan, The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of
Spent Nuclear Fuel, Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, December 2003.
68
The spot price of uranium has considerably decreased since the end of the 1970s. In 1992, uranium cost about
US$18 per kilogram (US$8 per pound) of U
3
O
8
; in 1979, the spot price was over US$88 per kilogram (US$40 per
pound) of U
3
O
8
.
69
Uranium Resources, Production and Demand, the OECD NEA and the IAEA, 1999.
70
Ibid.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 14
If the inventories of depleted uranium stored at enrichment plants are included in the estimate, the
uranium resources base further increases. The 1.2 million tones of uranium currently stored at enrichment
plants could supplant a few hundred thousand tones of natural uranium if demand required
71
. Presence of
uranium in sea water also presents a well-quantifiable amount of uranium resource (~4 billion tones).
Although the recovery of uranium from seawater is highly speculative, it provides the resource that can be
tapped into if the recovery cost becomes realistic
72
. Given these observations, uranium supply may not be
a limiting factor for the future of nuclear industry even if the nuclear fuel cycle remains once-through.

Demands for nuclear power appear to be increasing as interests from the developing countries grow.
Many of the developing countries dont have an appropriate infrastructure for energy production to
support the desired industrial development. They may not also have access to abundant natural resources
for energy production. The International Atomic Energy Agency forecasts that electricity demands
outside the U.S. will grow at an annual rate of less than three percent through 2015
73
. By 2020, worldwide
growth in electricity demand will be highest in the developing world, particularly among the expanding
economics of Asia
74
. Worldwide electric capacity additions are projected to approach 3,503 gigawatts
electric (GWe) from about 1500 GWe at present. Various projections indicate global electricity
consumption growth to reach between 4000 and 6500 GWe by 2050
75
.

The choice of resources for some of this new capacity is limited. Differing estimates are available as to
how much of this electricity demand would be provide by nuclear power. For example, six different
scenarios are available from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy
Council with the projected increase in nuclear electricity generation ranging from 10 to 485% by 2050.
These estimates depend upon differing assumptions about economic growth and other electricity sources.
Availability, maturity, and cost of alternative renewable technologies
76
, such as solar and wind power
77
,

71
Generation-IV Roadmap, Report of the Fuel Cycle Crosscut Group, March 18, 2001
(http://www.ne.goe.gov/reports/GeNIVRoadmapFCCG.pdf).
72
See Note 71: The sea water uranium provides an upper limit on the cost of uranium for futuristic fuel cycle
analysis. Estimates of recovery costs have been in the neighborhood of $200/kgU to $1000/kgU. At these high
uranium prices, economics of spent fuel recycling could become reasonable with the increasing value of plutonium
to secure further supply of nuclear fuels and leading into sustainable development. As fuel cycle contributes only
about 20% to the overall cost of electricity with nuclear option, wide range of fuel cycle approaches could be
explored with relatively weak influence on economics to minimize uranium consumption. This view would be
different in Europe (U.K., Germany, France), Canada, or Asia (China, J apan) where spent fuel recycling is currently
practiced and the value of plutonium would be higher (especially in France). Nuclear industry is primarily a
government enterprise in these countries. Long-term energy policy, rather than market, controls the future direction
of nuclear program in these countries.
73
G. Marcus, Considering the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants, Progress in Nuclear Energy, 37, 1-4, 5-
10, 2000.
74
Two-thirds of any forecasted increase is projected to be in the developing world: International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council, Global Energy Perspectives, Vienna, 1998.
75
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/World Energy Council, Global Energy Perspectives,
Vienna, 1998; Electric Power Research Institute, Electricity Technology Roadmap: Powering Progress, Palo Alto,
CA, 1999.
76
Based on the World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.htm accessed on October 9,
2004) estimation, US electricity generation cost (fuel, maintenance and capital cost combined) would be 3.73 c/kWh
for nuclear, 3.27 c/kWh for coal and 5.87 c/kWh for gas on the basis of 2001 dollar, assuming that capital costs in
USA are 55% of total for nuclear, 45% of total for coal and 16% of total for gas. The most recent OECD
comparative study [OECD/ IEA NEA 1998, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity] shows that at a 5% discount
rate, in 7 of 13 countries considering nuclear energy, it would be the preferred choice for new base-load capacity
commissioned by 2010. At a 10% discount rate the advantage over coal would be maintained in only France, Russia
and China. A new report from the University of Chicago [University of Chicago, August 2004, The Economic
Future of Nuclear Power], funded by the US Department of Energy, compares the levelised power costs of future
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 15
are an importance factor in this regard. Competing options for electricity generation that could become
more attractive in the future include clean coal technology, wind power, and photovoltaic power
78
. Coal is
abundant and still reasonably cheap although there is a sign of coal price increase
79
. Coal is expected to
remain a major player for a while. The primary challenge facing renewables is relatively high unit costs.
Significant progress of cost reduction and technology improvement have been made over the last three
decades, especially with wind turbines. Much progress is expected, to the extent that renewables could
become major contributors to the U.S. and global energy needs over the next several decades. The Shell
International, for example, projects
80
that by 2020 renewable energy sources supply a fifth of electricity in
many OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) markets and nearly a tenth of
global primary energy. However, electric utilities in OECD countries have indicated that up to 10 to 15%
of electricity generation from dispersed, intermittent sources could be managed easily, but generation
beyond that share could affect system reliability (e.g. Denmark experience)
81
. For renewable sources to
play a major role in electricity generation, they should become capable of covering base-load demand.
For renewable sources to be a base-load option, they require a reliable and cost-effective backup or
energy storage facility without unduly increasing environmental emissions. Whether the renewable
sources such as wind power would replace a significant portion of current generating capacity is yet to be
seen. Depending upon what type of option is used for backup
82
, renewables and nuclear power can be
competitive or complementary to each other.

Having nuclear power can provide an immediate boost for the needed infrastructure development. This is
evidenced in the examples of energy resource deficient countries such as France, J apan, and South Korea.
For the last three decades, uranium supply has been abundant. To many countries, nuclear energy appears
a guarantee of energy independence. Nuclear power provides a good alternative to diversify their energy
mix, especially to reduce greenhouse gas emission under the Kyoto Protocol. Nuclear power also comes
with a side benefit of improving self-esteem with nuclear scientific and technological development.

To support the development of nuclear power capability, a mature legal and regulatory system is needed
backed by financial commitment. Given this reality, not many countries in the developing world would
opt to pursue nuclear technology at least in the near term. Several countries in the developed world (e.g.,
Netherlands, Norway, Australia) could start a new civilian power program if the necessary political
support is provided. Several large developing countries that are well below the industrialized country HDI

nuclear, coal, and gas-fired power generation in the USA. Various nuclear options are covered, and for ABWR or
AP1000 they range from 4.3 to 5.0 c/kWh on the basis of overnight capital costs of $1200 to $1500/kW, 60 year
plant life, 5 year construction and 90% capacity. Coal gives 3.5 - 4.1 c/kWh and gas (CCGT) 3.5 - 4.5 c/kWh,
depending greatly on fuel price.
77
The Cost of Generating Electricity, The Royal Academy of Engineering, London, UK, March 2004; The study
looked at electricity generation costs from new plant in the UK, using "a robust approach to compare directly the
costs of intermittent generation with more dependable sources of generation". Accordingly the cost of standby
capacity for wind, as well as carbon values up to 30 per tonne CO
2
(110/tC) were added for coal and gas. Wind
power was shown to be more than twice as expensive as nuclear power. Without the carbon increment, coal, nuclear
and gas CCGT ranged 2.2-2.6 p/kWh and coal gasification IGCC was 3.2 p/kWh - all base-load plant. Adding the
carbon value (up to 2.5 p) took coal close to onshore wind (with back-up) at 5.4 p/kWh - offshore wind is 7.2
p/kWh, while nuclear remained at 2.3 p/kWh. Nuclear figures were based on a conservative 1150/kW (US$
2100/kW) plant cost (include. decommissioning).
78
The price of natural gas has been volatile and is expected to result in lower demand for its use.
79
Trends in U.S. Domestic Coal Markets Are Higher Prices and Higher Price Volatility Here to Stay?, PINCOCK
Perspectives, Issue No. 58, September 2004..
80
Energy Needs, Choices, and Possibilities, Scenario to 2050, Global Business Environment, Shell International
Limited, London, UK, 2001.
81
Renewable Energy: Market and Policy Trend in IEA Countries, OECD/IEA, 2004.
82
Competitive if renewables are used as base-load with gas turbines/combined cycle/hydro as backup or electric
storage; Complementary if renewables provide base-load capacity with nuclear as backup.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 16
(human development index) and aspire to advance by rapid economic growth (such as China, India,
Pakistan, and Indonesia) may engage in an aggressive nuclear development
83
. Most of these countries
currently own civilian nuclear power technology (except Indonesia). Several of the large advanced
developing countries (such as Mexico, Brazil, and Iran, that already own civilian nuclear technology) are
expected to engage with nuclear capacity expansion. Several of the developing eastern European
countries, such as Ukraine, Slovenia, and Kazakhstan, are strongly interested in nuclear development:
Some of them (e.g., Ukraine and Kazakhstan) own the technology as an inheritance from the USSR era.
Other developing countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and
Venezuela, may be interested in the nuclear option as economic and political progress is made in the
country
84
. Many large developing countries, with particular concentration in Africa, are not likely to be
candidates for nuclear power for some time due to limitations in financial and technology resources.
According the scenarios in a MIT study
85
, there would be 28 to 32 countries in 2050, with a total of 115-
224 GWe of nuclear capacity, which today do not have any commercial nuclear reactors. Of these, 17
(94-181 GWe) would be in developing countries.

Whether these scenarios will be realized or not is highly dependent on political development and the level
of trust toward the government in each respective country. Turkey and Philippines were pursuing civilian
nuclear technology but both countries efforts are on hold at the moment. In Turkey, issues such as
earthquake risk at the proposed site, proliferation concerns, and high cost led to the cancellation of the
Akkuyu project in 2000 after 8 years of extensive effort
86
. In Philippines, the effort to build civilian
nuclear power plant began in 1971. However, concerns over safety, economic viability, and corruption
charges against the contractors and suppliers of the plants equipments and against the Marcos
Administration led to public opposition and Aquino Administrations decision to decommission the
nuclear power plant. In 1997, the Philippine Government decided to convert the completed Bataan
nuclear power plant into a combined gas cycle plant.

The potential for world expansion of nuclear power exists. But more immediate expansion of nuclear
power is likely to continue among the current owners of nuclear technology. China, India, South Korea,
South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina are likely to be in this category. In this case, nuclear proliferation
concern mainly lies within the current circle of civilian nuclear power owners. If the time horizon is 30-
40 years or so from now, perhaps many developing countries could be very interested in large-scale
nuclear power as their economies expand and the demand for increased energy supply continues. But the
challenges and difficulties in establishing a civilian nuclear power program in a developing world should
not be overlooked.

V. How do the recent developments in the civilian nuclear power industry affect world nuclear
nonproliferation?

One of the notable changes surrounding the nuclear power industry is appearance of multinational
business corporations. In 1970s, worlds commercial nuclear system vendors represented each respective
country, including U.S. corporations such as Westinghouse, General Electric (GE), Babcox and Wilcox
(B&W), and Combustion Engineering. Other countries such as U.K., France, and West Germany each
had a government owned or controlled company, i.e., BNFL (UK), Framatome (France), and
Siemens/KWU (West Germany). Today, the list is quite different. Of the vendors operating in the U.S.,
B&W is owned by Framatome (France), and Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering are owned by
BNFL (UK). The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) is a product of a cooperative venture

83
The Future of Nuclear Power, An Interdisciplinary MIT Study, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 2003
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Recently, Turkey is seriously reconsidering a civilian nuclear power option.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 17
between J apans Toshiba and Hitachi and GE Nuclear Energy from the U.S. More recently, Framatome
and Siemens have joined their nuclear businesses under a new company name, AREVA. In the future,
Russia, China, J apan and likely South Korea will join the competition in the market. The deregulation of
the utility sectors in the U.S. and in other parts of the world has resulted in numerous acquisitions and
joint ventures involving international collaborations
87
.

With liberalized markets, and with weak government control in the U.S., commercial interest is an ever-
stronger driver behind current nuclear power development. Along with domestic expansion, there is a
strong desire to expand the market into the new developing world. U.S. policy over nuclear development
is likely to have less and less impact on world business practices. Unless there is a real economic
incentive, proliferation resistance is not likely to have a major role in the future development of nuclear
power.

Progress has been made by the nuclear industry in developing more proliferation resistant technologies.
Major examples of these recent developments
88
include 1) the modular, long-lived nuclear-battery
reactors (which removes the need for refueling), 2) employment of UREX
89
or pyroprocessing for the
separation and subsequent destruction of plutonium, 3) use of inert matrix fuel (IMF) which features
negligible or no net production of plutonium, 4) use of a fuel form with extremely high chemical barrier
characteristic (thus making it very difficult to extract fissile material from spent fuel), 5) use of thorium-
based fuels with uranium denaturing (any newly bred U-233 is denatured/contaminated with U-238).

Our main question regarding these developments is Do these new developments make a drastic
difference in preventing potential proliferation attempts?. The modular, long-lived nuclear-battery
reactor
90
is designed in such a way that there is no need to open the reactor system during its lifetime,
eliminating all in-country fuel handling and storage operations. Fresh and spent-fuel handling is limited
to the actual installation and replacement of the entire reactor unit, presumably under strict international
control
91
. The scale of skills, expertise and knowledge that can be obtained from the purchase and
operation of the reactor is much more limiting than those expected from the purchase of more
conventional nuclear plants. The nuclear battery reactor requires the transportation of the entire fresh core
with about 20% enriched fuel in it. This implies that there is enough fissile material for weapon making if
the core is stolen or diverted. Due to the fact this is a new system for which little accumulated experience
is available, unexpected need for maintenance cannot be precluded
92
. This may mean that there could be a
need to access the reactor system during operation (although not requiring fuel handling).


87
Beginning a new era in nuclear regulation, Remarks of Richard Meserve, Chairman of US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission at the 2000 American Nuclear Society Annual Meeting, June 5, 2000, San Diego, California.
88
See TOPS (note 1): Proliferation resistance is defined as those technical characteristics of a nuclear energy system
that impede the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear material, or misuse of technology, by States (or non-
state) actors, in order to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
89
UREX stands for uranium extraction.
90
The encapsulated nuclear heat source reactor proposed by UC Berkeley, entitled STAR (small, transportable,
autonomous reactor) is a major example. This reactor concept is being developed under US DOE support by a
collaboration between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and UC Berkeley.
91
J .A. Hassberger, Application of Proliferation Resistance Barriers to Various Existing and Proposed Nuclear Fuel
Cycles, UCRL-ID-147001. October 2001.
92
According to NRC experience, the most expensive systems to repair are the ones that were not intended to be
replaced: E. Lyman, The Limits of Technical Fixes, Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P.
Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brasseys, Washington, DC, 2002.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 18
The UREX process was developed for actinide separation in response to the concern over high purity
plutonium production with PUREX
93
. In this process, the plutonium is not separated into a pure stream
but always contains some neptunium, and the process could be configured such that this stream might
include other higher actinides as well. Separation of uranium for disposal and transmutation
94
of actinides
are the main purpose of this approach to reduce the environmental impact and repository capacity needs.
Presence of neptunium provides a stream signature from a daughter product of neptunium that can be
used to increase real-time detection capability
95
. However, neptunium is still a weapon-usable material.

Pyroprocessing refers to a spent fuel reprocessing based on high temperature-based melting, e.g, molten-
salt based electrochemical technology. In this process, spent fuel gets dissolved in a molten salt bath with
an electric current passing through it. The spent fuel constituents, i.e., uranium, plutonium and fission
products, are removed from the salt through deposition on different cathodes. The plutonium removed
from the salt in this manner contains some uranium, other transuranic elements and some fission product
contamination. The product would not be desirable for a terrorist seeking fissile material for a bomb. It
would be hard to have access to the material due to the presence of high radiation levels. But, it is in
principle possible to alter the pyroprocessing technology to produce pure plutonium. It is harder to
accurately measure and keep track of the fissile materials in the process.

IMF is a non-fertile fuel, or fuel with no U-238 thus is incapable of producing plutonium. Diluents such
as zirconium oxide or magnesium oxide make up the fuel volume instead. The approach is effective in
burning plutonium in a reactor. But use of IMF requires the loading of plutonium into a non-fertile fuel
rod, making the plutonium available to the user
96
.

Use of fuel forms with very high chemical barrier characteristics has been implemented to an HTGR
(High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor) whether it is PBR (Pebble Bed Reactor) design or prismatic
reactor design. This approach features high proliferation resistance due to the difficulty in chemical
processing required for the carbide forms, the mechanical processing, and to the dilute nature of both
fresh and spent fuel, and the fact that there is no commercially demonstrated technology to date for
processing the fuel
97
. But, in both prismatic HTGR and PBR, if the chemical barrier can be overcome, an
entire core of fresh fuel, although relatively dilute in uranium, contains some 10 critical masses of U-235.
In the case of PBR, the reactor features a continuous on line refueling. The individual fuel pebbles move
through the reactor relatively quickly, making many passes through the reactor before being fully spent,
and remain in the reactor for about 60 days. If the transit system is modified, weapon-useable materials
can be obtained without accessing the core. Due to low content of plutonium, about 200,000 pebbles
need to be diverted to obtain a critical mass
98
.

Use of thorium-based fuels with denaturing of uranium, so-called the Radkowski Thorium Fuel (RTF),
features a LWR (Light Water Reactor) using a heterogeneous thorium seed-blanket core
99
. The thorium-

93
PUREX stands for plutonium and uranium extraction.
94
Transmutation is defined as a nuclear reaction process to convert one element into another. As applied to nuclear
waste, transmutation involves irradiation of wastes by neutrons to convert long-lived radionuclides into a stable or
short-lived nuclide. Thus the process aids natural decay by effectively shortening half-lives.
95
An Evaluation of the Proliferation Resistant Characteristics of Light Water Reactor Fuel with the Potential for
Recycle in the United States, Complied by A. Waltar and R. P. Omberg, Blue Ribbon Panel Final Report to the
Advanced Nuclear Transformation Technology sub-committee of Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee
(NERAC), November 2004.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid
98
H. Feiveson, The Search for Proliferation-Resistant Nuclear Power, Position Statement from Federation of Atomic
Scientists.
99
Ibid.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 19
based fuel could be retrofitted into existing light water reactors. By reducing the quantities of U-238 (the
fertile material that breeds plutonium) in the core, it breeds significantly less plutonium than current
uranium fuel cycles
100
. As the fuel is burned, the thorium is converted to U-233 but is contaminated/
denatured with U-238
101
. The fuel mix is designed to ensure that the concentration of the mixture of U-
233 and U-235 remains below the HEU limit (nominally 20% U235 equivalent). The higher burn-ups
degrade the isotopics of plutonium in the spent fuel and reduce the overall actinides inventories. The
reactor would generate about 1/5 the plutonium generated in todays light water reactors per kilowatt-
hour of electricity produced. Also the decay heat emission is much higher due to the larger concentration
of Pu-238, presenting a higher radiation barrier. But, because thorium is not a fissile material, the initial
enrichment of uranium must be increased, requiring the fresh uranium component of the fuel to be
enriched to nearly 20%. The denatured material and reduced Pu-239 contents cannot preclude the use of
the plutonium for weapons.

Use of breeder reactors without separating plutonium from other actinides has also been considered. The
approach reduces the proliferation vulnerability by reducing the effectiveness of the fissile materials.
However, many of the minor actinides themselves are weapon-usable
102
. It has been noted
103
that making
nuclear weapons out of an increasing number of fissile isotopic compositions is possible as nuclear
weapon design and engineering expertise combined with sufficient technical capability become more
common.

These observations imply that the latest technologies provide enhancement in proliferation resistance but
cannot prevent a determined proliferator from acquiring fissile materials. The next question deserving
deliberations is, Is the proliferation resistance of new technological developments robust enough to
reduce existing safeguards and security requirements with confidence? One of the key desirable qualities
for effective safeguards is timely and accurate warning, i.e., the ability to detect diversions with accuracy
and sufficiently early before the diverter has acquired substantial quantities
104
. Do these new technologies
allow this timely and accurate warning?

In principle, the nuclear-battery reactor eliminates the need for in-country fuel handling and storage
operation, except for fresh and spent-fuel handling during the actual installation and replacement of the
entire reactor unit. As long as the installation and replacement of reactor unit and any necessary fuel
handling is conducted under strict international control, the system features an excellent safeguardability.
The UREX process when it is combined with smaller material balance zone facilitating near real-time
material accounting can significantly enhance safeguards effectiveness. Pyroprocessing can be employed
on-site with a nuclear reactor, thus largely eliminating the need for spent fuel transportation. But since it
is hard to accurately measure and keep track of the fissile materials in the process, the system may not
enhance safeguardability. The IMF design involves the existence of pure plutonium stream which implies
that safeguardability is not much different from existing systems (i.e., PUREX reprocessing). The
thorium-based fuel may reduce the need for on-site dry storage of spent fuel but is not expected to
enhance safeguardability. The Prismatic-HTGR features a higher level of remote fuel handling which
improves safeguards capability. Also the fact that nearly the entire core must be diverted to obtain
roughly a critical mass of plutonium with the prismatic HTGR helps safeguards effort. Use of a pebble-
bed HTGR involves continuous refueling with low detectability for spent fuel pebbles with the small

100
See Hassberger (note 91).
101
Ibid.
102
Summary of the Workshop on Proliferation Resistant Nuclear Power Systems, UCRL-J C-137954, p. 14,
Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, J une 2-4, 1999.
103
E. Lyman, The Limits of Technical Fixes, Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P. Leventhal, et
al. (eds.), Brasseys, Washington, DC, 2002.
104
See Hassberger, et al. (note 17).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 20
pebble size. Thus, monitoring the diversion attempt seems difficult. However, since proliferation requires
a large number of pebbles to be diverted, the diversion attempt will require a very high rate of new fuel
supply. This would provide a warning signal. In particular, if this diversion takes place early in a cycle to
have the right plutonium content, an early warning signal could be available.

Some of these new technologies are likely to allow the reduction in existing safeguards and security
requirements. By providing enhanced deterrence and better opportunity for the international community
to intervene, new technological developments would make any diversion attempts more difficult to
pursue, both technically and politically
105
. Thus, proliferation resistance slows down the process of latent
proliferation
106
. Technology does affect a potential proliferators balance of incentives and
disincentives
107
.

VI. What should be done for world nuclear power expansion not to result in further increase in
proliferation risk?

The U.S. is arguably the most motivated actor on the international scene with respect to opposing
proliferation. Russia, China, and other U.S. allies may see proliferation as more of a threat to the U.S.
than to themselves, as the U.S. is more of a likely target of future attack. However, it would be a mistake
for other nations to consider that nonproliferation is not worthy of their commitment. There is the distinct
danger of collateral damage for any global neighbors from the effects of weapons use as radioactive
fallout will not stop at state borders. Refugee flows can themselves impose huge burdens on neighboring
states. In the event of a successful nuclear attack made on the soil of the U.S., the pressure on the
government to make a vengeful response would be very great. If the sponsor of the attack is identified,
U.S. retaliation might inflict millions of casualties. If the attacker is not identified, known enemies
believed to have nuclear capabilities or to have sponsored other acts of anti-U.S. terrorism might be the
target of massive attack in order to deter further attacks. In that event, the possession of nuclear weapons
might prove to be a fatal liability for sponsors of terrorism. Possibility of a prolonged global economic
depression is another collateral consequence of nuclear terrorism. If, for instance, a terrorist group
procured an atomic bomb and detonated it from within a shipping container in a U.S. port city, the result,
apart from the horrendous human and economic immediate damage, would almost certainly be the
complete suspension of international trade by the U.S. for an indefinite period. With the globalization of
the world economy, the economic consequences would be incalculable and felt all over the world.

For expansion of nuclear power to occur, there has to be better world nuclear nonproliferation regimes
that strengthen and fortify the wall between civilian and military applications. Any future expansion of
nuclear power should not result in increased proliferation risk. The immediate expansion of nuclear
capacity is expected to occur within the current owners of civilian nuclear power. The likely new owner
states, through the expansion of nuclear power to the developing world, are not expected to be involved
with major regional security conflicts
108
. Most of these new owner states would find it difficult to justify
the investment in nuclear weapons unless their national and regional security deteriorates significantly.
With an effective nonproliferation regime already in place, managing the addition of new owners is not
expected to be a major challenge to world nuclear nonproliferation.


105
See Feiveson (note 13).
106
Ibid: Latent proliferation is the movement of a country through development of its commercial nuclear power
program toward the possession of nuclear weapons, without an explicit or visible decision actually to obtain the
weapons.
107
Ibid: A country may not decide to acquire nuclear weapons if the costs, hazards, and uncertainties of success
were sufficiently high.
108
They are mostly in southeastern Asia, northern Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe. These regions are not
hot spots, although the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the regions cannot be precluded.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 21
In this regard, the worlds nonproliferation efforts should be focused on those countries with existing
latent capability. Effectively enforcing safeguards requirements to the existing civilian nuclear power
states is essential in this regard. At the same time, every effort must be made to ensure that any new
export be equipped with appropriate proliferation resistance and be carefully monitored.

Given the rising role of commercial interests among the nuclear system vendors, with less constraints
exerted on them by becoming multinational corporations, controlling and monitoring the export behavior
of nuclear vendors is important. Currently there is no incentive for improving or enhancing proliferation
resistance from a selling companys perspectives. The company will normally be competing against
companies from other nations that may not have an equal standard of proliferation resistance
109
. The
developing nations most likely to be considered proliferation risks by the global community are not likely
to be willing to pay more for a nuclear plant design with improved proliferation resistance.

The incentive to promote improved proliferation resistance must be generated by the governments of the
exporting nations because they have the most concern about the issue
110
. One possibility to explore in this
regard is to develop a safeguards fee system
111
for IAEA. The fee system would be based on the
safeguards requirements of the importing system which would be determined based on the design features
of the exporting reactor system. The fee must be incorporated into life-cycle cost analysis and be paid by
the importing countries to IAEA
112
. Practical implementation of the system requires a quantifiable metric
to represent proliferation resistance of a system with a supporting international consensus
113
. The U.S.
DOE has undertaken an effort called the PRPP (Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection)
project
114
to develop the needed metric with supporting consensus. To be effective, the fee system
should include all existing nuclear technology owner states under NPT.

IAEAs policing capability must be strengthened. The IAEAs budget was frozen for about fifteen years
while the inspection burden increased greatly. The amount of material under safeguards increased by 57%
between 1992 and 1998 alone; the IAEAs FY04 budget for verification was $100 million which could be
compared unfavorably to the $174 million as the City of Denver police department budget for the same
period. With the current funding structure of IAEA, it is difficult to expect major improvements in their
inspection efforts. The IAEA needs substantially increased funding if it is to play its role effectively. The
safeguards fee system mentioned above can be an alternative to resolve this issue. The IAEA should focus

109
Ibid.
110
See TOPS (note 1).
111
See Erickson (note 20).
112
The higher the proliferation resistance of the sold nuclear system, the lower the safeguards fee would be to be
paid to IAEA.
113
How to define acceptable proliferation resistance is a major related issue in this discussion. One of the metrics
used to define proliferation resistance is the spent fuel standard as suggested by the 1994 National Academy of
Science (NAS) study [National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium,
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1994]. It is
used to indicate the degree of inaccessibility of plutonium for weapons use in civilian spent fuel. Although the NAS
study did not endorse the spent fuel standard as acceptable, the study mentions that if the spent fuel standard is
accepted, then the approaches that would leave the plutonium in a form substantially more accessible for recovery
and use in weapons than plutonium in commercial spent fuel can be rejected. Even if the spent fuel standard were to
be accepted, a remaining question is how to compare the proliferation resistance of a new technology to that of the
standard. This effort still requires a metric that can be quantified. Currently several methods have been proposed to
quantify proliferation resistance including pathway-dependent PRA-based vulnerability assessment, multi-attribute
utility analysis, fuzzy-logic based barrier quantification methods, etc. There is no consensus on the use of these
methods to date.
114
J . Roglans, R. Bari, and P. Peterson, Development of an Assessment Methodology for Proliferation Resistance
of Generation IV Systems, International Workshop on Methodologies for quantitative assessment of nuclear fuel
cycle technological proliferation resistance, Obninsk, Russia, June 3-5, 2003.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 22
its policing activities on states that present the most risk, and using fewer resources inspecting low-risk
installations. In this regard, developing a country specific proliferation vulnerability index that captures
the maturity of nonproliferation culture
115
could be considered to assist allocation of IAEA budget and
distribution of safeguards effort. Along with these, Additional Protocol to the existing safeguards
agreement should be mandatory for all states
116
.

The idea of establishing a system for international control of sensitive materials has been suggested by
many scholars. Some believe
117
that the Baruch Plan (Acheson-Lilienthal plan, i.e., international control
of nuclear power and fissile material) still offers a framework for a peaceful nuclear future. Developing
world consensus on finding a trustworthy guard will be a major challenge in this case. One alternative
might be empowering IAEA beyond its current status. This will still be very much controversial as the
scope goes beyond civilian nuclear power programs.

Examination of current world use of nuclear energy indicates that there are only a few countries with a
full fuel cycle capability. Most of the countries using nuclear energy are taking advantage of the fuel
cycle capabilities of a few countries that are mostly nuclear weapons states
118
. This indicates that
marketing the entire fuel cycle to potential nuclear buyers is not necessary. This was also made clear in
President Bushs speech on February 11 , 2004
119
. In this regard, internationalization of sensitive parts of
the nuclear fuel cycle as proposed by the Director General of IAEA deserves further thoughts. The
Director General of the IAEA has indicated that sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle the production
of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste
would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control.
120
. Under this, all
uranium enrichment should be done in facilities under international control monitored by agencies such as
the IAEA or the UN, with national governments working jointly
121
. This arrangement requires fuel
guarantee to member states. Suggested options for this fuel guarantee
122
include using a commercial
consortium of fuel providers or empowering IAEA to act as managing agent for stocks of fuels or

115
Nonproliferation culture is reflective of the countrys socioeconomic status. The status is related to economic
conditions and pay for workers and guards and the political stability of responsible governmental authorities
115
.
Several of the qualitative measures such as gross domestic product, per capita income, cost of living, and
unemployment rate, can be used to represent this socioeconomic status related culture. Consideration must also be
given regarding whether the country has the political stability, maturity and motivation to commit to
nonproliferation and whether the country has sufficient personnel and resources to handle this special technology in
the special way it requires. Relative comparisons of the culture can be an important indicator for the importing
countrys vulnerability.
116
G.W. Bush, Address on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, Remarks at the National Defense
University in Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004; Curbing Nuclear Proliferation, an interview with El Baradei,
Arms Control Today, pp. 3-6, November, 2003; See Perkovich, et al. (note 16).
117
Rhodes, R., Nuclear Power and Proliferation, in Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P.
Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brasseys, Washington, DC, 2002; Miller, M., Attempts to Reduce the Proliferation Risks
of Nuclear Power: Past and Current Initiatives, in Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, P.
Leventhal, et al. (eds.), Brasseys, Washington, DC, 2002.
118
Exceptions to this are Brazil, which is developing a front end capability, and Iran, which seems to be on a course
for weapons development masked by a decision to develop an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle.
119
See Bush (note 116): The President said that the world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear
plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The worlds leading nuclear exporters should ensure
that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce
enrichment and reprocessing. This requires fuel supply guarantees to countries that abstain from production and
verify commitments not to acquire enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
120
M. ElBaradei, Saving Ourselves from Self-Destruction, New York Times, February 12, 2004, sec. A, p. 27.
121
IAEA, Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, IFCCIRC/640, February 2005.
122
See Perkovich, et al. (note 16).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 23
guarantor of fuels
123
. Similar arrangement could be possible for spent fuel reprocessing through creation
of a new international consortium for reprocessing service under the supervision of IAEA
124
.

Current nonproliferation efforts seem to overemphasize the role of technology. Technology has promises
and limitations in preventing proliferation. A determined state can overcome technical barriers should
persistent infrastructure support be available. Proliferation is mainly driven by a security concern aided
and affected by technical and economic resources. Developing a civilian nuclear power program is driven
by a countrys economic need aided and affected by technical and economic resources. Although there is
no explicit connection for the motivational factors between the two, there is an overlap for the resource
requirement for the two. Once the necessary technical and economic resources are spent to establish
civilian nuclear power program, the situation could affect the motivational factors. Motivational issues
must be addressed to effectively control the connections between the two,

As indicated in the review of proliferation history, lack of motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is a key
in nonproliferation
125
. If security threat to a state is reduced, possible benefits of proliferation can be
marginalized
126
. World leaders must support political reforms necessary to remove the perceived need for
nuclear weapons along with demonstration of the commitment to nuclear disarmament
127
. In this regard,
the current U.S. effort in developing nuclear earth penetrator weapons (EPWs) might be perceived as a
lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament. Whether Russia or China is engaged in similar weapons
development is currently unknown. Investigations on EPWs have indicated
128
that nuclear earth
penetrators would more likely disperse than destroy buried stockpiles of (chemical and biological)
weapon materials. In the case of buried stockpiles of chemical agents, the effects of nuclear weapon
explosion itself are expected to be much greater than the effects from the dispersal of buried weapon
materials.


123
See IAEA (note 121); In the case of the commercial consortium of fuel providers, fuel producing states or
companies would form supply groups to commercially outcompete domestic fuel production programs. Multiple
fuel providing entities could offer reinforcing contracts to prospective buyers and if one company dropped out,
others would be obligated to fulfill the contract. The fuel could be sold or leased (depending on the recipient states
ability to manage spent fuel). Such an arrangement would require a new level of cooperation and coordination
between competing companies.
124
See IAEA (note 121).
125
See Erickson (note 20).
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid: A renewed commitment to nuclear weapons reductions on the part of the NWSs is important. It may be a
propitious time for all the NWS to seriously reduce their nuclear arms as the clear sense of enemy country is
diminishing and the security threats are becoming more diffuse. The externalities of nuclear weapons, including the
ecological damage from the facilities that make the special nuclear materials (SNM) and the risk of global nuclear
war, makes them an expensive luxury or, more accurately, a liability. U.S. must take a leadership in Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and restraining from further developing and testing new nuclear weapons. If the U.S.
develops new nuclear weapons, it would stimulate not only states that have wanted to acquire nuclear weapons but
also the states that have wanted to remain non-nuclear. Hesitation in U.S. effort in nonproliferation makes it very
difficult to use moral suasion on non-nuclear weapons states to adhere to the NPT. Uncertainties about the strength
of commitment to multilateral regimes and accompanying arms control strategies would be detrimental to the future
of world nonproliferation. As agreed by most of the American public [S. Kull, Survey says: Americans Back Arms
Control, Arms Control Today, pp. 22-26, June 2004] our goal should be to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons
through an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating
theirs too. We need to work with Russia and other countries to restore the momentum toward verifiably and
irreversibly reducing the amounts of nuclear weapons and materials.
128
National Research Council, Effects of Earth Penetrator and Other Weapons, The National Academies Press,
Washington, DC. 2005; R. W. Nelson, Nuclear Bunker Busters Would More Likely Disperse Than Destroy Buried
Stockpiles of Biological and Chemical Agents, Science and Global Security, 12:62-89, 2004.
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 24
World leaders must reward the state that contributes energetically to nonproliferation
129
. The salience of
nuclear weapons in international affairs should be diminished. They must reassure the world neighbors
that their strategic interests can be met without nuclear weapons. It needs to be understood that owning
nuclear weapon capability comes with not only its own liability risk but also physical risks to the owner
state
130
.

One of the main requirements for effective control of the motivational factors is having the culture of
nonproliferation. Culture of nonproliferation requires a politically mature and stable society
131
. Without
appropriate cultural and political support, possibility of nuclear material diversion by a national or an
individual action exists. Although civilian nuclear technology is not directly related to weapons work, the
expertise, equipment, and facilities can be used to develop facilities for weapon development. Many of
the people who deal with material, facilities, equipment, and computer models related to making nuclear
weapons
132
learn the skills necessary and useful for nuclear weapon making by engaging in civilian
nuclear power programs. Training these people to practice highest levels of moral values in their
professional activities and to refrain from any clandestine engagement for illicit weapon development
must be exercised.

Institutionalizing this sense of responsibility
133
has been exercised within the nuclear community through
development of a special canon of ethics
134
. But simply writing a canon of ethics does not reinforce the
culture of nonproliferation. The idea must be actively communicated among the nuclear professionals.
Presently there are no formal training requirements on ethical issues for nuclear professionals. Formally
institutionalizing a training program (say by the IAEA) on ethical issues in the use of nuclear technology
would be desirable for all nuclear professionals in all NPT member states. If the holders of the knowledge
practice their own code of ethics, the barrier that technical expertise plays will be effective
135
. If the
situation is the opposite, the technical barriers will no longer be limiting, defeating the purpose of many
of the technical and technological development for proliferation resistance.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Use of nuclear energy has been controversial from the beginning as the technology has potential for both
peaceful and destructive purposes. The potential of the technology for energy generation was first

129
Ibid: A states contribution to the nonproliferation regime in prospective decisions should be considered to
expand the permanent membership of the Security Council. The state should be rewarded when the U.S. determines
state visits, political-economic favoritism, and other forms of positive U.S. engagement. Cooperative research
should be expanded with fully compliant non-nuclear weapon states to develop designs for safer and proliferation-
resistant nuclear reactors. As much as possible, U.S. should provide states who are adhering to nonproliferation
commitment formal security assurances through political and military commitment.
130
See Erickson (note 20): By attempting to own nuclear weapons, a nation may become a more prominent target
from a larger potential adversary country. The physical risks include the possibility of nuclear accidents at weapons
facilities, environmental catastrophes, and the prospect that nuclear weapons or weapons-grade materials could fall
into the wrong hands and be misused.
131
Politically mature and stable society is also a desirable necessary condition for civilian nuclear power
establishment. As was experienced in Philippines (see section IV), premature development of civilian nuclear power
program could lead into a major financial debacle.
132
See Hassberger, et al. (note 17).
133
A. M. Weinberg, Do Nuclear Engineering Educators Have a Special Responsibility?, Annals of Nuclear
Energy, Vol. 4, p. 337, 1977.
134
Currently several Code (or Charter) of Ethics exist within the nuclear professionals community. , i.e., from the
World Nuclear Association (http://www.world-nuclear.org/aboutwna/charter.htm), the World Council of Nuclear
Workers (http://www.wonuc.org/peace/cuk-ethic01.htm), and the American Nuclear Society
(http://www.ans.org/about/coe/).
135
See Hassberger, et al. (note 17).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 25
manifested in the form of a most potent bomb during a world war. Nuclear energy was once viewed as a
promise of an inexhaustible source of energy for sustained human development. As Weinberg mentioned,
nuclear energy was a Faustian bargain
136
in which we accept an inexhaustible and non-directly polluting
energy source at the cost of potential for destructive power and long-term waste impact requiring a high
degree of care and surveillance. Weinberg asserted
137
that we are immoral if we do not exert every
humanly possible effort to uncover, assess, and remedy whatever deficiencies we can find in nuclear
energy.

With the renewed interest in nuclear export to the developing world, we need to be reminded that Atoms
for Peace encouraged a one-sided emphasis on nuclear technology
138
regardless of the real needs of the
less developed countries in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Without the worlds commitment to nonproliferation,
continued expansion of nuclear power use into the developing world could be sowing seeds for nuclear
proliferation.

Although the possibility of nuclear power expansion to the developing world exists, proliferation
risk/concern with civilian nuclear power expansion lies mostly with the countries currently owning
nuclear power technology in unstable regions. Implementing effective safeguards system and creating
political conditions to reduce the desire to acquire nuclear weapons in these nations would remain the
most important tasks for nuclear nonproliferation.

Recent developments in proliferation resistant technologies will make diversion of fissile material from
the new commercial nuclear reactors very difficult by providing enhanced deterrence and better
opportunity for the international community to intervene. Use of these technologies should be encouraged
whenever possible.

Given the rising role of commercial interests among the nuclear system vendors, with fewer constraints
exerted on them by becoming multinational corporations, the importance of controlling and monitoring
the export behavior of nuclear vendors was noted. These companies must exercise the highest degree of
integrity in export sales decisions. Incentive for enhancing proliferation resistance from a selling
company must be generated and provided by the governments of the exporting nations. One possibility
noted was to develop a safeguards fee system for IAEA, based on the projected safeguards requirements
for each system and country.

Reinforcing effective safeguards requires providing adequate resources and effective distribution of them
for IAEAs policing activities. The safeguards fee system can address the resource acquisition issue.
Prioritization of IAEA resource distribution for policing activities can be augmented by using an idea of
developing country specific vulnerability index. Consensus needs to be achieved among the nations for
these approaches to be practical. To improve the practice in nuclear export control, sharing information
on actual exports granted is needed to help all states track what others are buying. To this end, a
centralized database for information sharing should be pursued among participant states.

It has also been noted that technological barriers cannot prevent a determined state from a proliferation
attempt. An integrated approach to address human, political, institutional, and technical factors is required
to avert the spread of nuclear weapons
139
. The people who man the enterprise must have qualities that
match the demands placed on them by the nature of nuclear energy, thus requiring professionalism and

136
A. M. Weinberg, 1972, Rutherford Centennial Lecture at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, December 1972.
137
Ibid.
138
A. M. Weinberg, Foreign Affairs, p407, April 1971.
139
See TOPS (note 1).
To be published in Progress in Nuclear Energy 26
dedication of those who are entrusted with the nuclear enterprise
140
. Within the nuclear community,
culture and ethics of nonproliferation must be enhanced and fortified through active communications
among the professionals. Formally institutionalizing a training program on ethical issues in the use of
nuclear technology should be considered for all nuclear professionals in all NPT member states. The
worlds nuclear community must demonstrate continued commitment to clear severance between the
civilian and military applications.

A states bureaucracy and politics surrounding the nuclear establishment plays a larger role in defining
the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear proliferation further. World international security
conflicts are not likely to subside but rather increase with potential upcoming escalation in cultural, racial,
and religious conflicts. Given the competing security, economic, and political interests in national policy
making surrounding the role of nuclear weapons, world nonproliferation efforts face the challenge of
maintaining political commitment to nonproliferation
141
. To see any real progress in worlds nuclear
nonproliferation, the world powers (in particular the NWS) need to work together to support political
reforms to remove the perceived need for nuclear weapons.

Acknowledgments

This paper was written while the author was appointed as Sam Nunn International Security Fellow at the
Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology. Continued support and
encouragement from Profs. J ohn Endicott, William Hoehn, and Sy Goodman at the Sam Nunn School and
Dr. Allison McFarlane at MIT are very much appreciated. The author is very grateful for the excellent
comments from the anonymous reviewers and the editor (Dr. Donald Dudziak). He would also like to
thank the J ohn D. and Catherine T. McArthur Foundation for the funding support.







140
See Weinberg (note 136).
141
See Scheinman (note 9).