Using Neural Networks for Extended Detection

AbstractExtended Detection (ED) has become required

especially when protecting high valued assets. Physical
Protection Systems (PPS) usually integrate Detection, Delay, and
Response (DDR) elements in a manner to assess threats at well
defined perimeters. Situational Awareness (SA) beyond PPS
perimeters requires the use of longer range sensors systems such
as Radars or Unattended Ground Sensors which cover relatively
large areas. Gathering such sensor data, especially in high noise
environments poses a serious challenge to building reliable ED
systems. The use of Neural Networks to merge sensor data and
identify potential threats can make SA systems available for
broader use.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a methodology for implementing
neural networks to identify threats in Extended Detection (ED)
systems. ED systems are commonly used to detect forest fires,
border intrusions, and the movement of large vessels in
harbors. ED systems usually cover large areas and have to
operate with significant background noise which interferes
with detection and assessment.
To combat nuisance alarms, ED systems often merge
different sensor phenomenologys (i.e; acoustic / magnetic,
heat / light, etc) to increase the reliability of detecting a real
threat from a false alarm. The problem with this approach is
the need for large numbers of sensors deployed over an
extended area. Power consumption and the cost of
communications are critical components of any ED system.
Another significant concern is how to assess the data being
communicated. If the ED system consists of hundreds or
thousands of sensors, the amount of data being communicated
requires significant processing to assess what is occurring in
the field.
The use of Neural Network algorithms to collect and
process sensor data and then communicate results from an
aggregate of sensors data provides an attractive option for
reducing the amount of raw data which has to be
communicated.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Typical PPS provide highly reliable detection over a well
regulated space. ED systems also use DDR elements but they
do not perform as well as DDR elements in PPS systems. In
general Detection is the most important aspect of an ED
system. Depending on the application, assessed detection can
be accomplished if the infrastructure is available to support
cameras and communications to an alarm display. In high
noise environments assessment can be significantly degraded
by a false alarms and nuisance alarms which erode confidence
in using the ED system.

Adding neural network processing to ED systems can
effectively filter out nuisance and false alarms by training
the network to work in a particular environment.



Figure 1 Extended Detection Systems Shortfall and Solutions
A. What is a Neural Network?
Neural Networks (NN) and in particular Artificial Neural
Networks (ANN) are inspired by biological neural networks.
ANN operate on the principal of cooperation between multiple
inter-connected processing nodes working together to solve a
problem.

For example, remote smart sensor networks which can
detect light, heat, sound, and pressure have been deployed
over large remote areas to aid in early fire detection.
The sensor referred to as motes are equipped with
communications (usually RF) to broadcast their state. Over
large areas the number of sensors deployed can be in the
hundreds or thousands. Gathering data from each individual
sensor to determine the overall state of system is neither
practical or effective. The use of ANN has greatly increased
the effectiveness of the ED systems by providing a framework
for collecting, analysing, and reporting data which effectively
describes the state of the system in near real time.

This is accomplished by deploying the motes as a collection
of smaller networks which work together to detect and assess
conditions in their area. Various techniques are used to
manage sensor activations and communications to increase
sensor life and to provide redundant communications paths
back to an alarm processing station.



Figure 2 Extended Detection Systems
A similar example is used to detect ship movements in
harbors [1]. Using a network of wave detectors, ship
movements can be detected and measured to determine, speed,
direction and in some cases the size of the ship.





Figure 3 Wave Analysis

In this example a three axis accelerometer sensors with an
iMote2 detection network were used to capture and relay data.
Spatial and temporal correlations characteristics in field trials
were used to develop a detection algorithm. The algorithm
was used to distinguish between ocean waves and ship
generated waves. Correlation techniques across the sensor
field were developed to increase the reliability of detection
and to minimize false positive alarms.

Figure 4 Ship Intrusion Detection Systems




Figure 5 Sensor Grid for Water Detection

Sensors are laid out in a grid. As the ship moves through
the sensor field, direction and speed data are collected and
correlated across the sensor nodes which provides inputs
from the motes to a Head Node (HN) which aggregates and
processes data. HN then provide neural network processing to
identify the target and pass that information to an Alarm, &
Control Display system.

Using these techniques, the author asserts that neural
networks can be deployed to support typical PPS especially in
the area of Extended Detection. The next section will outline
the approach.



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III. PPS AND NEURAL NETWORKS
A. Physical Protection Systems
Typical PPS have a well-defined boundary with detection,
assessment, and response elements coordinated to effectively
protect assets. The challenge is to extend this protection zone
to areas beyond the well-defined boundary in a reliable and
effective manner.


Figure 5: Typical PPS
B. Extended Detection
ED limitations include:
Illumination
Detection
Assessment
Communications
Response













Figure 6: Typical PPS Exhibit Greater DDR than ED Systems

Effective ED requires methods to work around these
limitations. Examples of methods for looking beyond the
fence include:

Video Motion Detection
Radars
Underground Sensors
o Magnetic
o Sound
o Heat
o Light
Above ground Sensors
o Magnetic
o Sound
o Heat
o Light

Factors which influence ED are:
Size of the Area being covered
Environmental Conditions
Communications
o Network
Power

Assuming these infrastructure needs can be met the next
challenge for ED is to process the various streams of sensor
data in a reliable manner to identify threats.

Typical PPS measure performance by calculating the
probability of detection (P
D
) which is defined as the product
of the probability of assessment (P
A
) multiplied by the
probability of sensing (P
S
):

P
D
= P
S
P
A


Probability of assessment is defined as the likelihood of
an accurate determination of the cause of an intrusion sensor
alarm, thus leading to a proper response. Probability of
sensing is defined as the probability that an intrusion
detection sensor will sense an unauthorized action.

Defining ED performance requirements for P
D
are
obviously much lower than for PPS which typically
demonstrate a P
D
of 0.90 at a 95% confidence level [2].
Using a P
D
of 0.5 at a 95% as a threshold for ED systems is
recommended as a figure of merit.
C. Training the Network

The key to providing an effective ANN for threat detection
is to train the sensor network to recognize those threats.


Figure 7 Training the ANN


ANNs can be trained in two ways using supervised learning
or unsupervised learning. The easiest way is to think of the
ANN as a child picking up cues from its environment. Just
as a child learns in a structured environment such as a
classroom, the child learns in other environments such as
playgrounds. The type of learning and how quickly the
child process and absorbs information is the key to
understanding how much learning has occurs.

For supervised learning to occur, several datasets are
needed which are structured in a manner to teach the ANN
what is right and what is wrong. In the case of and ED
system, this would be data indicating what kinds of
movements and activities indicate an actual threat from
background type activities which are expected in the area
being monitored. Exposing the ANN to various types of
inputs which resolve to a particular solution (either threat is
present or it is not present) drives the ANN to develop
solutions sets which over time can reliably detect similar
inputs and identify them as right.

One way of doing this is to deploy the sensor network and
run field tests where inputs similar to threats are generated.
These signatures are then encoded as threat vectors with a
specific result. The beauty of the system is that it can treat all
the inputs from various sensors as a single data stream for
processing the ANN as a whole or as individual data streams
for various portions of the network (i.e.; radars, sonars, heat,
light, etc). The challenge is generating credible data sets to
train the network.

Unsupervised learning is similar to supervised learning, but
in this case, much like the child at play, the system monitors
its environment and clusters data in areas or volumes which
correspond to similar behaviour. The ANN then trains itself
and develops its own conclusions as to what the input data
stream is trying to identify.

In either case, the ANN is usually limited to identifying
behaviours which it has been exposed to. Seldom do ANNs
exhibit the ability to make reliable detections on data inputs
which are dissimilar to the ones they were trained on.



Figure 8 ANN can only process what it has learned

This is viewed as a major flaw of ANNs where in many
cases they are viewed as not being agile to extend their
learning of specific domains. If the ANN is expected to work
under different circumstances, it must be trained to do so, and
extensive testing must be conducted to ensure the ANN
identifies targets reliably.

IV. EVALUATION
Adapting ANNs for PPS would directly correlate to the ED
systems described above. ED around a PPS should we
simpler since the areas under surveillance are smaller to cover
and the availability of Delay and Response elements are
available to respond to events. The ED system is then there to
enhance the PPS.
The example provided is an evaluation of using ANN for
ship intrusion detection (SID) system discussed earlier. The
sensing elements motes were placed in buoys in the harbor
and were arranged into sub-networks called clusters with a
head node to process input sensor data and determine if ship
detection had or had not occurred.

A. Water Side Detection Example
Signal processing for SID was based on the following
parameters:

Ship waves and ocean waves have a different energy
spectrum

Ocean wave without ship waves has a high single
peak concentration.

Ocean waves combining with ship waves have
multiple peaks and wide crests without distinct peaks

The wave analysis (see Figure 3.) was based on
measurements of a transverse wave patterns, their frequency
and how the sensor clusters measured the propagation of the
wave as the ship passed through the sensor field.
B. SID Performance Results













Figure 9: SID Performance

System performance was based on the calculation of an
anomaly frequency which was indicative of ship movement.
As the anomaly frequency increases for lower threshold
measurements (indicative of individual node detection) the
successful detection ratio tops at ~ 0.5. As the threshold
increases along with the number of nodes detecting movement
(indicative of cluster detection) the false alarms decreases
significantly and as the anomaly frequency increases so does
the successful detection ratio with values greater than 0.7.

V. FUTURE WORK
Future work would look at extending this detection
algorithm to land based PPS investigating various
combinations of sensor networks such as:
Radars
Sonars
Underground Sensor
Video Motion Detection




Figure 10: PPS with ED System
Using the ED architecture to collect data and an ANN to
process data, a separate Situational Awareness (SA) console
can be deployed to manage displays and if available video
from the ED system. It is important that the SA system not
interfere with the functions of the PPS of system. In Fig. 9
the PPS system still retains its boundary Detection and
Assessment capabilities which report to the PPS AC&D
system.


VI. CONCLUSION
Extending the use of ANNs for PPS as part of ED systems
can provide new option for increasing surveillance capabilities
and providing PPS with additional tools for early detection
and response to threats.


REFERENCES
[1] A Technical Review of SID (Ship Intrusion Detection): With Wireless
Sensor Networks by H Luo, K Wu, Z Guo, L Gu, Z Yang (ICDCS June
20 24, 2011)
[2] Clopper, C., and Pearson, E.S. The Use of Confidence or Fiducial
Limits Illustrated in the Case of the Binomial, Biometrika (1934)