6.

Cognitive Pragmatics
6.1. Pragmatism and Pragmatics
6.1.1. Pragmatism
6.1.2. Pragmatics
6.1.2.1. Speech Acts
6.1.2.2. Relevance Theory
6.2. Cognitive Pragmatics
6.3. Overview
6.1. Pragmatism and Pragmatics
6.1.1. Pragmatism
t is! pro"a"ly! less di##ic$lt to ass$me that some people might identi#y pragmatics with
pragmatism than to ma%e the same people see how the two are inter&related' whence the
necessity o# a parallel presentation.
(irst developed in the 1)
th
cent$ry "e Charles Sanders Peirce as a theory o# veri#ication!
pragmatism was then given a psychological and almost mystical t$rn "y *illiam +ames
and a social&scienti#ic! social&democratic one "y +ohn ,ewey! with Richard Rorty at the
end! in the 2-
th
cent$ry! who added his literary t$rn. S$spicions toward the epistemological
and ontological pro"lems de#ining the philosophical tradition in general! pragmatism is
#$ndamentally anti&essentialist and s$stains that ideas .philosophical! general or
partic$lar/ derive their meaning #rom their $tility and th$s "ecome g$ides to "ehavior' as
in0$iring animals sit$ated in an interactive c$lt$ral environment! people need to recogni1e
the primacy o# action over contemplation! the primacy o# pra2is over theoria .prassein3to
act! to do' pragma3deed! matter/.
*hat might "e termed classical pragmatism was associated in America with
progressivism and derived many o# its tenets #rom ,arwinism aro$nd the middle o# the 1)
th
cent$ry' *illiam +ames! 4eorge 5er"ert 6ead and +ohn ,ewey all see personal
development as adaptive "ehavior' they are #ollowed "y s$ch logical positivists and
empiricists as R. Carnap and Ch. 6orris #or whom meaning is the 7cash&val$e8 o# an idea.
92perimentalism and veri#ication occ$py an essential place with *. :. O. ;$ine! #or whom
no amo$nt o# in#ormation can determine which o# the many concept$al #ramewor%s we $se
to interpret o$r e2perience is "etter or tr$er apart #rom o$r pro"lems and p$rposes'
immediately! a pro"lem&centered model #or thin%ing is developed thro$gh an e2perimental
model "y Peirce! who signi#icantly disting$ishes tr$th #rom meaning! and %nowledge #rom
"elie#. At a"o$t the same time! +ames narrows the gap "etween meaning and tr$th .tr$e is
7what is good in the way o# "elie#8/ and "rings in the psychological empiricism o# <oc%e!
5$me! and 6ill in his e##ort toward a s$"=ecti#ication o# pragmatism. 5e proposes a
holistic! pro"a"ilistic! #ield theory o# the mind .conscio$sness is a "looming! "$11ing
con#$sion! whence also the stream&o#&conscio$sness so m$ch made o# "y a n$m"er o#
writers at the "eginning o# the 2-
th
cent$ry/! which is no longer a passive recorder! "$t a
7#ighter #or ends.8
,ewey comes with a shi#t #rom individ$al interpretation to collective reconstr$ction and
simply views h$mans as pro"lem&solving animals! as already s$ggested here' ,arwin>s
adaptationism tells him that the world o# wor% and e2perimental method! s$ppressed "y
aristocratic politics and philosophy! is to "e li"erated and rationally trans#ormed "y
democratic c$lt$re! and hence "y a philosophy that assimilates theoretical to practical and
prod$ctive reason' very m$ch li%e organs! ideas are tools and instr$ments
.7instr$mentalism8/ o# adaptation. ,rawing on 5egel>s philosophy o# individ$ation
.identi#ying participatory democracy thro$gh sociali1ation/! he sees the essence o#
Americanism in this com"ination o# individ$alism with democracy' socially cooperative
persons living in a democratic society will necessarily "ecome more highly individ$al and
a$tonomo$s than the isolated and merely re#lective egos o# class&strati#ied societies. As #ar
as logic is concerned .1)-3! St$dies in <ogical Theory/! together with the Chicago
philosophers .6ead/! ,ewey sees it as a tool o# discovery! mediating "etween pro"lematic
sit$ation and pro"lem&solving response' techne has primacy over pra2is! and pra2is over
theoria.
Rorty>s literary t$rn "eings a"o$t an emphasis on literat$re rather than philosophy as
provider o# images and stories that reveal the tr$th a"o$t o$r nat$re and the world'
literary people rather than philosophers have a special insight into important 0$estions
and pro"lems' novelists and poets have more important things to tell $s than philosophers
do! while narrative as s$ch is pre#era"le to arg$ment and theory' 'the traditionally
conceived philosophy is an o"solete game that might as well "e called o##' philosophy
sho$ld rather "l$r into literary and c$lt$ral criticism and cede the moral high gro$nd to
novelists and poets. n conse0$ences o# Pragmatism .1)?2/ Rorty even spea%s o# a
7postphilosophical c$lt$re8 in which edi#ying .i.e. literary/ philosophers li%e @ier%egaard!
Aiet1sche! 5eidegger! and (o$ca$lt replace the systematic philosophers in their p$rs$it o#
a"sol$te certainty' the #ormer are concerned with c$lt$re! history! aesthetic e2perience and
sel#&trans#ormation! while conveying their ideas ironically and metaphorically! in
aphorisms! satires! narratives and poetic meditations rather than in logical arg$ments'
what we need are storytellers whose writing gives e2amples o# sel#&trans#ormation! as well
as poets and poetic philosophers who generate new metaphors #or imagining o$rselves in
the world. t was images o# #reedom conveyed thro$gh maga1ines and movies that #inally
"ro$ght down the Berlin *all .Contingency! rony! and Solidarity/ so all we can do is try
to ma%e the advantages o# li"eral val$es imaginatively vivid' li"eralism rests on
imagination! no theoryC there is no theoretical way to reconcile p$"lic story with o$r
private stories! so we cannot ma%e o$r p$"lic li"eral val$es "lend with o$r private
aesthetic ones. n $niversities themselves science has grad$ally t$rned into one genre o#
literat$re .see T$rner>s literary mind as the #$ndamental mind/! while o"=ective
scholarship and rational disc$ssion have "een replaced "y an aggressive c$lt$ral
relativism. (ollowing +ames rather than ,ewey! Rorty sees #ragments o# the #ield o#
e2perience as made meaning#$l "y the invention and deployment o# ever more novel
voca"$laries! all o# which! #rom serio$s scienti#ic theories! to novels! plays! and poems have
prima #acie e0$al epistemic stat$s. As we can easily see! cognitivism ta%es over in "oth
sciences and the arts! which! o# co$rse! also acco$nts #or the development o# pragmatics.
6.1.2. Pragmatics
Thro$gho$t its development! pragmatics has o"vio$sly "een steered "y the philosophical
practice o# pragmatism! especially in terms o# the a"ove mentioned distinction "etween
tr$th and meaning and the democracy o# meaning' as a matter o# #act! most o# the
de#initions and characteri1ations o# pragmatics will implicitly or e2plicitly point in that
direction.
Th$s! a "ranch o# ling$istics! developed in the 1)D-s! pragmatics is concerned with
lang$age in $se! and is o#ten disc$ssed in it relationship with semantics' 'th$s! i# semantics
e2amines the relationship "etween a word and its sense and with sentence meaning in
general! pragmatics deals with spea%er>s meaning and how that is achieved in some %ind o#
conte2t .re#erents and disco$rse entities/' in #act! the st$dy o# how conte2t in#l$ences
interpretation is a"sol$tely essential! and this conte2t may incl$de "oth the spea%er>s
intention and the receiver>s $nderstanding o# the message' otherwise! i# semantics covers
the literal meaning o# an idea! pragmatics re#ers to the implied meaning o# that idea'
decoding processes are a matter o# semantics! there#ore! while in#erence processes "elong to
pragmatics. Th$s! it might "e said that pragmatics is concerned with "ridging the
interpretative gap "etween sentence meaning and spea%er meaning! with conte2t in&
"etween and all aro$nd! i.e. all o# the psychological! environmental! social or disco$rse
#actors that one cares to "ring in. Another way to p$t it is that pragmatics is concentrated
on the dynamic aspect o# meaning in conte2t. Tho$gh the terms pragmaticosEpragmatic$s
come #rom ancient 4reece and Rome! the pragmatic interpretation o# ver"al
comm$nication only dates "ac% to Charles 6orris> (o$ndations o# the Theory o# Signs
.1)3?/! and it %ept a"sor"ing more and more adherents $ntil! in 1)?D! the nternational
Pragmatic Association was #o$nded in Antwerp' its wor%ing doc$ment descri"ed it as the
intellect$al e##ort o# loo%ing into lang$age $se #rom all dimensions. t has also come to
#oc$s on interlang$age and on how non&native spea%ers comprehend and prod$ce
comm$nicative acts in another lang$age! with m$ltiple implications in .#oreign/ lang$age
teaching practices. Among its topics o# in0$iry are! #irst o# all! what came to "e descri"ed
as speech acts! then dei2is! conventional implicat$res! conte2t o# co$rse! irony! intention!
agency! disco$rse str$ct$re! metaphor! relevance theory! etc.
6.1.2.1. Speech Acts
Tho$gh it seems that the #irst comprehensive and systematic wor% on speech acts had "een
done "y the phenomenologist Adol# Reinach .1)13/! it was the British philosopher +ohn
<angshaw A$stin .1)11&1)6-/ who! starting #orm the distinction "etween the realm o#
semantics .what is really said/ and that o# pragmatics .what is accomplished "eyond
sayingF! who was especially interested in how people can $se words to do di##erent things
.li%e descri"e something! as% a 0$estion! ma%e a re0$est or order! ma%e a promiseG/'
what words can do depends not only on their literal! dictionary meanings! "$t mostly on
the spea%er>s intention and the conte2t in which they are $sed' so! the re#erence o# the
words is one thing! while the speech acts per#ormed with them is another.
One other distinction A$stin proposes in 5ow to ,o Things with *ords .1)62/ is the one
"etween constatives .simply saying something that is either tr$e or #alse/ and per#ormatives
.per#ormingHsim$ltaneo$sly with the sayingHacts o# the same %ind named "y the ver"'
per#ormatives there#ore are "oth $tterances and actions! and are neither tr$e nor #alse .to
nominate! to #ire! to sentence! to "et! to g$arantee! to warnG/' so they can "e! at most!
7#elicito$s8 and 7in#elicito$s.8
So! once again! there are two levels! which consist in saying something and in doing a
n$m"er o# things "y saying something' and th$s! the third distinction is that "etween the
act o# saying something! what one does in saying it! and what one does "y saying it' the #irst
is the loc$tionary act! the second is the illoc$tionary act! and the third is the perloc$tionary
act .the loc$tionary act in 7Bring yo$r dictionaries ne2t time8 is that the st$dents are as%ed
"y the lect$rer to "ring along their dictionaries' the illoc$tionary act is a warning that they
might have to write a test paper' and the perloc$tionary act is that the st$dents got a
message a"o$t what and how they have to contri"$te to the s$"=ect' 7step "ac%8 is simply
telling someone to step "ac%! "$t it also has the conte2t$al #$nction o# warning him a"o$t
some danger! and it #$rther ma%es the listener "ecome alerted to a #alling o"=ect/.
A$stin>s American st$dent at O2#ord .9ngland/! +ohn R. Searle #oc$ses on illoc$tionary
acts .Speech ActsC An 9ssay in the philosophy o# <ang$age! 1)6)/ and develops a theory o#
constit$tive r$les #or these acts' his main premise! very m$ch li%e A$stin>s! is that
$nderstanding an $tterance is not merely a matter o# decoding it! "$t m$ch! m$ch more.
These r$les are classi#ied as propositional content r$les! preparatory r$les! sincerity r$les!
and essential r$les' the propositional content r$les p$t conditions o# the propositional
content o# illoc$tionary acts .a #$t$re action! a conditional one! an imperativeG/'
preparatory r$les tell what the spea%er will imply in the per#ormance o# an illoc$tionary
act ."elie#! normality! nat$ralnessG/' sincerity r$les o"vio$sly tell something a"o$t the
psychological state o# the spea%er .=o%e! ironyG/' essential r$les tell $s what the action
really consists in.
<ater Searle proposes a classi#ication o# illoc$tionary acts into #ive categoriesC
representative or assertive .7t>s raining8Hspea%er committed to the tr$th o# the
propositional content/! directive .the spea%er is commanding someone to 7get o$t8/!
commissive .commitment to the act! promisingH7>ll do itI8/! e2pressive .7>m gladG!8
7>m sorryG8/! and declarative .he represents himsel# as per#orming the very action o# the
ver"H7 "apti1e theeG8/.
@ent Bach and 6ichael 5arnish .<ing$istic Comm$nication and Speech Acts! 1)D)/! on
the premise that each type o# illoc$tionary act is individ$ated "y the type o# attit$de
e2pressed .with cas$al constraints on the content as well/! #ind only #o$r ma=or categories
o# illoc$tionary actsC constatives .statements/! directives .re0$ests/! commissives
.promises/! and ac%nowledgements .apology/. A more detailed presentation wo$ld show
that constatives and commissives are "orrowed #rom A$stin! directives and
ac%nowledgements .e2pressive/ #rom Searle! with a more speci#ic voca"$lary #or eachC
constativesHa##irm! allege! anno$nce! answer! attri"$te! claim! classi#y! con#irm! deny!
disagree! disclose! disp$te! identi#y! in#orm! insist! predict! ran%! report! state! stip$late'
directivesHadvise! admonish! as%! "eg! dismiss! e2c$se! #or"id! instr$ct! order! permit!
re0$est! re0$ire! s$ggest! $rge! warn' commissivesHagree! g$arantee! invite! o##er!
promise! swear! vol$nteer' ac%nowledgementsHapologi1e! condole! congrat$late! greet!
than%! accept.
6.1.2.2. Relevance Theory
*hat 5er"ert Pa$l 4rice .1)13&1)??/ really proposes .in his posth$mo$s collection o#
papers on meaning! lang$age! and comm$nication titled St$dies in the *ay o# *ords!
1)?)/ is a theory o# conversation i# we may say so! "ased $pon the types o# distinction
mentioned a"oveC "etween what words mean! what the spea%er really says while $sing
these words! and what the spea%er intends to comm$nicate .hence the concept o#
conversational implicat$res/. There is no implication witho$t a common %nowledge o#
several things a"o$t the topic and tenor o# a conversation! so that 4rice introd$ces the
presence o# a Cooperative Principle "etween spea%er and listenerEs! a principle that is
implemented "y some ma2ims and s$"ma2ims .even s$perma2ims/ that re#er to 0$antity
.in#ormativenessC yo$r contri"$tion sho$ld "e as in#ormative as necessary! neither more!
nor less/! 0$ality .tr$th#$lnessC state what is tr$e! not what yo$ "elieve to "e tr$e! and
gro$nd yo$r statement on evidence/! relation ."e relevant/! and manner .clarity!
perspic$ity/C some s$"ma2ims re#er to the avoidance o# o"sc$rity! am"ig$ity!
disorderliness! and proli2ity and to the #act that the spea%er sho$ld #acilitate the
appropriate reply.
4rice also identi#ies three characteristics o# implicat$res .cancela"le! non&detacha"leH
yo$ cannot say e2actly the same thing in di##erent words and have the same implicat$res&&!
and calc$la"leHcan "e wor%ed o$t/' #$rther on he disting$ishes "etween partic$lari1ed
conversational implicat$res and generali1ed ones. 5is main #oc$s thro$gho$t remains on
spea%er>s meanings! i.e. comm$nicative intentions! which are characteri1ed in three waysC
they are always oriented toward some addresseeC they are th$s intended as to "e recogni1ed
"y the addressee .cooperative principle/' and their satis#action consists precisely in "eing
recogni1ed "y the addressee.
Contemporary pragmatic theory is almost totally neo&4ricean! in that it accepts his
three important contri"$tionsC what the spea%er says is one thing and what he implicates is
another' there is a set o# principles .ma2ims/ governing ling$istic comm$nication' the
comm$nicative intention needs to "e recogni1ed "y the receiver. *hat neo&pragmatists owe
to 4rice mostly is a second in#erential model o# comm$nication developing "etween sender
and receiver 'as intention&recognition and discovery .as compared to the Sa$ss$rean model
o# sender&code&channel&decoding&receiver/. Ao do$"t an $tterance is a ling$istically coded
piece o# evidence! and the element o# decoding is essential! "$t the meaning recovered "y
this decoding is ony part o# the in#erence process that yields and interpretation o# the
spea%er>s meaning. So! what in#erential pragmatics does is to show how the recipient in#ers
the sender>s meaning on the "asis o# certain evidence! and one o# 4rice>s central claims is
that any $tterance almost a$tomatically creates e2pectations that g$ide the hearer toward
the spea%er>s meaning. 4rice also insists on the #act that an inp$t is relevant to an
individ$al when its processing .in a conte2t o# availa"le ass$mptions/yields a positive
cognitive e##ect! s$ch that the greater the positive cognitive e##ect achieved "y the hearer in
processing and inp$t! the greater its relevance will "e' and! conversely! the greater the
processing e##ort re0$ired! the less relevant the inp$t. *hich means that relevance may "e
assessed in terms o# cognitive e##ects on one hand! and o# processing e##ort on the other.
,an Sper"er and ,eirdre *ilson .RelevanceC Comm$nication and Cognition! 1)?6!
1))J/ see relevance as a psychological phenomenon "asic to the lives not only o# h$mans!
"$t o# all animals that are a"le to pic% among choices in their environment .an animal may
get c$es #rom the environment and th$s enrich its in#ormation/ so that the phenomenon o#
relevance in lang$age is only one mani#estation o# a more general one.
*hat they "asically thin% is! #irst! that comm$nication involves intentions on the part o#
the spea%er that go "eyond what is "eing coded in the lang$age! and! second! that
in#erences on the part o# the listener go "eyond decoding that lang$age. *hat Sper"er and
*ilson really do is to replace 4rice>s cooperative principle and his conversational ma2ims
with this principle o# relevance' in #act! with two principles o# relevanceC
(irst .Cognitive/ Principle o# RelevanceC
75$man cognition tends to "e geared to the ma2imi1ation o# relevance!8 which "asically
means that h$man cognitive processes are nat$rally aimed at processing the most relevant
in#ormation in the most relevant way or! complementarily at the achievement o# as many
conte2t$al! cognitive e##ects as possi"le #or as little processing e##ort as possi"le' spea%ers
will always try! "y a variety o# means! to ens$re that their $tterances have the ma2im$m
cognitive e##ects! while! at this end! the hearer interprets an $tterance choosing the conte2t
that ma2imi1es its cognitive e##ects. Sper"er and *ilson write here a"o$t ostensive
in#erential comm$nication! i.e. the intention is "oth in#ormative .the intention to in#orm an
a$dience o# something/ and comm$nicative .the intention to in#orm an a$dience o# one>s
in#ormative intention/.
The Second .Comm$nicative/ Principle o# RelevanceC
Together with the concept o# optimal relevance! this comm$nicative principle is the %ey to
the Sper"er&*ilson relevance theory' it states that 79very act o# ostensive comm$nication
comm$nicates a pres$mption o# its optimal relevance8' i.e. every $tterance! as a matter o#
#act! conveys a pres$mption o# its own relevance. By optimal relevance is meant that an
ostensive stim$l$s is relevant i#! and only i#! it is relevant eno$gh to "e worth the a$dience>s
processing e##ort and! at the same time! it is the most relevant one compati"le with the
spea%er>s a"ilities and pre#erences.
6.2. Cognitive Pragmatics
*ith A$stin and Searle! 4rice and Sper"er&*ilson! we have already come into the realm o#
cognitive pragmatics. Any cognitive theory o# lang$age $se will provide insight in the ways
speech acts are $nderstood! planned and per#ormed! as well as into the appropriateness o#
speech acts in certain conte2ts' how this appropriateness is assigned "y spea%ers and
listeners in comm$nicative conte2ts is! again! one important tas% o# cognitive pragmatics.
Th$s! it may not "e s$rprising to note here that pragmatic conditions in general have a
cognitive "asis! and that among these conditions #rames play an important role .they also
correspond! with vario$s writers! to scripts! scenarios or schemata/! as well as analysis and
%nowledge o# conte2t! o# co$rse .they may "e intentional or #ormal! private! p$"lic! or
in#ormal/.
A more systematic approach wo$ld lead $s into loo%ing at two main periods or trends in
the evol$tion o# pragmatic theoriesC traditional pragmatics on one hand! with its emphasis
on socio&c$lt$ral norms #or comm$nicative processes .lang$age as a social prod$ct/! and
cognitive pragmatics! with its insistence on vario$s %inds o# principles .lang$age as a
cognitive a"ility/. (rom this perspective! with his cooperative principle! 4rice isHis not a
real cognitivistHat least a prec$rsor o# cognitive approaches' and so are Sper"er and
*ilson with their #irst .cognitive/ principle! and second .comm$nicative/ principle. And #or
that matter! so is Stephen <evinson .Pres$mptive 6eanings. The Theory o# 4enerali1ed
Conversational mplicat$re! 2---/! with his ;&! 6&! and &principles #or in#erring
conversational implicat$res! each with its Spea%er>s 6a2im .S6/ and Recipient Corrolary
.RC/C The ;&principleC S6H,o not provide a statement that is in#ormationally wea%er
than yo$r %nowledge o# the world allows! i.e. what the in#ormationally strongest
paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the #acts' RCHTa%e it that the spea%er made
the strongest statementEalternate consistent with what he %nows' The 6&principleC S6H
ndicate an a"normal! non&stereotypical sit$ation "y $sing mar%ed e2pressions that
contrast with those yo$ wo$ld $se to descri"e the corresponding normal! stereotypical
sit$ationC RCH*hat is said in an a"normal way indicates an a"normal sit$ation! or
mar%ed messages indicate mar%ed sit$ations' The &principleC S6Hthe ma2im o#
6inimi1ation! 7Say as little as necessary!8 i.e. prod$ce the minimal ling$istic in#ormation
s$##icient to achieve yo$r comm$nicational ends' RCHthe 9nrichment r$le! i.e. ampli#y
the in#ormational content o# the spea%er>s $tterance "y #inding the most speci#ic
interpretation! $p to what yo$ =$dge to "e the spea%er>s m&intended point! $nless he! the
spea%er! has "ro%en the ma2im o# 6inimi1ation "y $sing a mar%ed or proli2 e2pression.
*hat we are witnessing here is the movement o# pragmatics #rom its place o# origin in
philosophy to a new location within cognitive science' the recovery o# the spea%er meaning!
"oth e2plicitly and implicitly comm$nicated! #alls now into the domain o# a cognitive&
scienti#ic view o# pragmatics as a mental processing system responsi"le #or interpreting
comm$nicative imp$lses' pragmatics has "ecome a capacity o# the mind! sort o# an
in#ormation&processing system #or interpreting the phenomena o# h$man comm$nicative
"ehavior' what is still e2pected is evidence #rom children>s comm$nicative development
.we>ll ret$rn/! #rom investigations on h$mans with comm$nicative di##ic$lties and de#icits!
#rom psycholing$istic e2periments on comprehension and #rom other mental capacities
responsi"le #or o$r "elie#s! desires! and intentions. As a res$lt! semantics is in a process o#
grad$ally #alling into a "ac%gro$nd where its role is diminished to that o# an evidential!
rather than a #$lly determining one in the identi#ication o# what the spea%er e2plicitly
comm$nicated.
And th$s! cognitive pragmatics properly spea%ing is concerned with the mental
processes involved in intentional comm$nication and one o# its main tas%s is that o#
descri"ing and e2plaining the str$ct$re and properties o# the %nowledge that $nderlies
lang$age $se' in other words! those characteristics o# the mind that allow h$man "eings to
comm$nicate with each other' so! the main 0$estion is what #oes on in the mind o# an agent
who engages in a comm$nicative interaction with anotherK .A$stin! Searle! and 4rice very
m$ch in the "ac%gro$nd/. # in this respect yo$ read an a$thor li%e 6a$ri1io Tirassa
.Brain and <ang$age! 1)6?C L1)&LL1/ who writes a"o$t 7comm$nicative competence and
the architect$re o# the mindE"rain8 yo$ may come $pon the s$pposition that the "rain
areas involved in comm$nication are not the same as those involved in lang$age .the
Broca&*ernic%e area/! a dissocia"ility "etween comm$nication and lang$age that might
mean that comm$nication is an independent #ac$lty! representing a distinct innate
competence' "$t this still remains to "e proved. This is a larger iss$e in mentalist theories
o# pragmatics! that are "asically disting$ished #rom one another on whether they ta%e
comm$nication as a competence or per#ormance .as distinct #rom the same processes in
Choms%yan ling$istics/.
(rom another perspective! cognitive pragmatics has developed an int$ition o#
*ittgenstein>s .Philosophical nvestigations! 1)J3/ according to which comm$nication as a
"ehavior game is "ased $pon a shared plan "etween the actors' comm$nication is th$s
sit$ated .Rita B. Ardito! Br$no 4. Bara! 9nrico Blan1ieri! etc/ and mani#ests itsel# on the
"orderline "etween cognitive processes and phenomena st$died "y social psychology.
Ardito et all. ntrod$ce the concepts o# scene! scenery! and scenario side "y side with
sit$ation! starting #rom the premise that not only the idea o# cooperation .4rice/ is a %ey
element #or the comm$nicative interaction! "$t also that o# shared "elie#! i.e. the two agents
need to share not only intentions and desires! "$t also "elie#s .B,H"elie#s! desires!
intentionsHhas already "ecome a #amiliar acronym/. As #ar "ac% as 1)?D! <. S$chman
.Plans and Sit$ated Action! Cam"ridgeC CMP/ had introd$ced this notion o#
comm$nication as plan recognition and shared %nowledge in the conte2t o# sit$ated
comm$nication! with the interesting o"servationC
7it appears that much in the construction of situated language that has been taken to
reflect problems of speaker performance, instead reflects speaker competence in responding to
cues provided by the listener. (p.71/
Ardito et all. #ind that this shared&plan approach is not eno$gh in $nderstanding the
comple2ities o# sit$ation! and th$s appeal to a n$m"er o# re&de#initions or new concepts in
order to re#lect the in#l$ences o# the environment and o# vario$s other actions' sit$ation is
the relative position or com"ination o# circ$mstances at a certain moment! and it th$s
considers the directly perceived world and possi"le actionsHthe perceived conte2t .the
perception o# a room! an elevator! a street cornerG/! the here and now' also concrete and
real is the scene! the place o# an occ$rrence or action! the world and its a##ordances! the
conte2t in an o"=ective sense .a %itchen and whatever it contains! a lect$re roomG/' the
scenario re#ers to a possi"ly sim$lated! a hypothetical state o# a##airs! the metarepresented
scenery' scenery was adopted also #or the representational level o# the world and the plans
.representation o# a place and the possi"ilities o# action it o##ers potentially/. Their premise
in introd$cing these cognitive concepts is that a complete theory o# sit$ated comm$nication
re0$ires a consideration o# the interaction "etween environment and actions at all levelsC
o"=ective! as perceived! representational and metarepresentational' the aim is that o# giving
an acco$nt o# the interaction "etween mental states involved in comm$nication and the
vario$s s$"=ective representations o# the state o# the world.
Other attempts in cognitive pragmatics propose s$ch things as a cognitive coherence
theory as a new comm$nication layer over already classical B, agents .Philippe Pas0$ier
et al.! 2--J/ or a pragmatics o# manip$lation .which involves many interesting cognitive
processesC <o$is de Sa$ss$re et al.! 2--J/! "$t the general #eeling is that many s$ch theories
contain many intricate and de"ata"le elements! and! what is worse! even their own
#$ndamentals .we have partly noted/ are #ar #rom reaching a consens$s' a lot o# wor% still
remains to "e done! "oth in empirical research! as well as in the complementary areas o#
philosophy or arti#icial intelligence or what has come to "e termed as ne$ropragmatics.
6.3. Overview
Two s$"tle distinctions are in orderC that "etween semantics .word and its sense and
sentence meaning/ and pragmatics .spea%er>s meaning and how that is achieved in conte2tC
re#erence and disco$rse entities/ and "etween pragmatism and pragmatics. Pragmatism
maintains that ideas derive their meaning #rom their $tility and th$s "ecome g$ides to
"ehavior' pragmatics also disting$ishes "etween tr$th and meaning and maintains that
ideas have "oth literal and implied meanings' and these implied meanings can "e
circ$mscri"ed "y ta%ing into acco$nt as many psychological! environmental! social! and
disco$rse #actors as possi"le.
Speech acts and relevance theory prepare the way to present&day cognitive pragmatics!
which is "asically concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional
comm$nication and with e2plaining the str$ct$re and properties o# the %nowledge that
$nderlies lang$age $se' since it has to appeal to elements! principles! methods and insights
coming #rom philosophy! arti#icial intelligence st$dies and ne$ropragmatics! m$ch wor% in
the #ield still remains to "e done! especially in developing an integrated theory o# social and
in#erential approaches.
,RA4OS A:A,AA9 &COG!"!#$ %C!$C$ &' "($ ()*&!"!$%! 9d.
NMniversitas OO8! aPi! 2-1-