1. G.R. No.

L-15853 July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCI!A DELI"O, respondent.
GU!IERRE" DA#ID, J.$
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with
respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on eptem!er ", #$%%, was !ased on the ground of fraud, it
!eing alleged, among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her
marriage to plaintiff, herein petitioner Fernando A&uino, on Decem!er '(, #$%), concealed from the
latter that fact that she was pregnant !* another man, and sometime in April, #$%%, or a!out four months
after their marriage, gave !irth to a child. In her answer, defendant claimed that the child was conceived
out of lawful wedloc+ !etween her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorne*'s for !oth parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant ,rovincial
Fiscal -ose .oco to represent the tate in the proceedings to prevent collusion. /nl* the plaintiff
however, testified and the onl* documentar* evidence presented was the marriage contract !etween the
parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented an* evidence despite the reservation made !* her
counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
/n -une #", #$%", the trial court 0 noting that no !irth certificate was presented to show that the child
was !orn within #12 da*s after the marriage !etween the parties, and holding that concealment of
pregnanc* as alleged !* the plaintiff does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage 0
dismissed the complaint. Through a verified 3petition to reopen for reception of additional evidence3,
plaintiff tried to present the certificates of !irth and deliver* of the child !orn of the defendant on
April '", #$%%, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce !efore the
trial court thru e4cusa!le negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
/n appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has !een e4cusa!le neglect in plaintiff's
ina!ilit* to present the proof of the child's !irth, through her !irth certificate, and for that reason the
court a quo erred in den*ing the motion for reception of additional evidence. /n the theor*, however, that
it was not impossi!le for plaintiff and defendant to have had se4ual intercourse during their engagement
so that the child could !e their own, and finding un!elieva!le plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or
even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court, nevertheless,
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
/n 5arch #(, #$%$, plaintiff filed a motion pra*ing that the decision !e reconsidered, or, if such
reconsideration !e denied, that the case !e remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the
motion, plaintiff attached as anne4es thereof the following documents6
#. Affidavit of Cesar A&uino 7Anne4 A8 7defendant's !rother9in9law and plaintiff's !rother, with
whom defendant was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom
defendant has !egotten two more children, aside from her first !orn, in common9law relationship8
admitting that he is the father of defendant's first !orn, Catherine :ess A&uino, and that he and
defendant hid her pregnanc* from plaintiff at the time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
'. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo 7Anne4 3:38 admitting her pregnanc* !* Cesar A&uino,
her !rother9in9law and plaintiff's own !rother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her
having hidden this fact from plaintiff !efore and up to the time of their marriage;
<. Affidavit of Al!ert ,owell 7Anne4 3C38 stating that he +new Cesar A&uino and defendant lived
together as hus!and and wife !efore Decem!er '(, #$%), the date of plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
). :irth Certificate of defendant's first !orn, Catherine :ess A&uino showing her date of !irth to
!e April '", #$%%;
%. :irth Certificate 7Anne4 3D38 of Carolle Ann A&uino, the second child of defendant with Cesar
A&uino, her !rother9in9law;
". :irth Certificate 7Anne4 3=38 of Chris Chari!el A&uino, the third child of Cesar A&uino and
defendant; and
(. ,ictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as earl* as #$%' to as late as >ovem!er,
#$%), the >ovem!er, #$%) photo itself does not show defendant's pregnanc* which must have !een
almost four months old at the time the picture was ta+en.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant
,rovincial Fiscal of Rizal, who was representing the .overnment, to answer the motion for reconsideration,
and deferred action on the pra*er for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As !oth the defendant
and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it 3does not !elieve the veracit* of the contents
of the motion and its anne4es3, the Court of Appeals, on August ", #$%$, denied the motion. From that
order, the plaintiff !rought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot !e
sustained.
?nder the new Civil Code, concealment !* the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant !* a man other than her hus!and constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.
7Art. 1%, par. 7)8 in relation to Art. 1", par. 7<8. In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat 7(' ,hil., #$8 cited in the
decision sought to !e reviewed, which was also an action for the annulment of marriage on the ground of
fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnanc* of the defendant was held to !e
un!elieva!le, it having !een proven that the latter was alread* in an advanced stage of pregnanc* 7(th
month8 at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot appl* to the case at !ar. @ere
the defendant wife was alleged to !e onl* more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to
plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to sa* that her pregnanc* was readil* apparent, especiall*
since she was 3naturall* plump3 or fat as alleged !* plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the
%th month of pregnanc*, the enlargement of a woman's a!domen is still !elow the um!ilicus, that is to sa*,
the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the a!domen so that it is hardl* noticea!le and ma*, if
noticed, !e attri!uted onl* to fat formation on the lower part of the a!domen. It is onl* on the "th month
of pregnanc* that the enlargement of the woman's a!domen reaches a height a!ove the um!ilicus, ma+ing
the roundness of the a!domen more general and apparent. 7ee Aull, Clinical /!stetrics, p. #''8 If, as
claimed !* plaintiff, defendant is 3naturall* plump3, he could hardl* !e e4pected to +now, merel* !*
loo+ing, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so !ecause she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs. =ven ph*sicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman
herself who shows and gives her su!Bective and o!Bective s*mptoms, can onl* claim positive diagnosis of
pregnanc* in <<C at five months. and %2C at si4 months. 7DI C*clopedia of 5edicine, urger*, etc.
,regnanc*, p. #28.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossi!le for plaintiff and defendant to have had se4ual
intercourse !efore the* got married and therefore the child could !e their own. This statement, however,
is purel* conBectural and finds no support or Bustification in the record.
?pon the other hand, the evidence sought to !e introduced at the new trial, ta+en together with what has
alread* !een adduced would, in our opinion, !e sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged !* plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied the motion pra*ing for new trial simpl* !ecause
defendant failed to file her answer thereto. uch failure of the defendant cannot !e ta+en as evidence of
collusion, especiall* since a provincial fiscal has !een ordered of represent the .overnment precisel* to
prevent such collusion. As to the veracit* of the contents of the motion and its anne4es, the same can
!est !e determined onl* after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we thin+ that Bustice would !e
!etter served if a new trial were ordered.
Eherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a &uo for new
trial. Eithout costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
2. G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
R!u"#$% o& t' ('$#$!!$)s, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
(ADILLA, J.*
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboana the plaintiff Joel Jimene! pra"s for a
decree annullin his marriae to the defendant #emedios Ca$i!ares contracted on % &uust 195' before a (ude of
the municipal court of Zamboana Cit", upon the round that the office of her enitals or vaina )as to small to allo)
the penetration of a male oran or penis for copulation* that the condition of her enitals as described above e+isted
at the time of marriae and continues to e+ist* and that for that reason he left the con(ual home t)o nihts and one
da" after the" had been married. ,n 1- June 1955 the )ife )as summoned and served a cop" of the complaint. .he
did not file an ans)er. ,n /9 .eptember 1950, pursuant to the provisions of article 11 of the Civil Code, the Court
directed the cit" attorne" of Zamboana to in2uire )hether there )as a collusion, to intervene for the .tate to see that
the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. ,n 17 3ecember 1950 the Court entered an
order re2uirin the defendant to submit to a ph"sical e+amination b" a competent lad" ph"sician to determine her
ph"sical capacit" for copulation and to submit, )ithin ten da"s from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the
result thereof. ,n 1- 4arch 1957 the defendant )as ranted additional five da"s from notice to compl" )ith the order
of 17 3ecember 1950 )ith )arnin that her failure to undero medical e+amination and submit the re2uired doctor5s
certificate )ould be deemed lac6 of interest on her part in the case and that (udment upon the evidence presented
b" her husband )ould be rendered.
&fter hearin, at )hich the defendant )as not present, on 11 &pril 1957 the Court entered a decree annullin the
marriae bet)een the plaintiff and the defendant. ,n /0 &pril 1957 the cit" attorne" filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the round, amon others, that the defendant5s impotenc" has not been
satisfactoril" established as re2uired b" la)* that she had not been ph"sicall" e+amined because she had refused to
be e+amined* that instead of annullin the marriae the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and
compelled her to undero a ph"sical e+amination and submit a medical certificate* and that the decree souht to be
reconsidered )ould open the door to married couples, )ho )ant to end their marriae to collude or connive )ith each
other b" (ust allein impotenc" of one of them. 7e pra"ed that the complaint be dismissed or that the )ife be
sub(ected to a ph"sical e+amination. 8endin resolution of his motion, the cit" attorne" timel" appealed from the
decree. ,n 1% 4a" 1957 the motion for reconsideration )as denied.
9he 2uestion to determine is )hether the marriae in 2uestion ma" be annulled on the strenth onl" of the lone
testimon" of the husband )ho claimed and testified that his )ife )as and is impotent. 9he latter did not ans)er the
complaint, )as absent durin the hearin, and refused to submit to a medical e+amination.
4arriae in this countr" is an institution in )hich the communit" is deepl" interested. 9he state has surrounded it )ith
safeuards to maintain its purit", continuit" and permanence. 9he securit" and stabilit" of the state are larel"
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and ever" member of the communit" to prevent the brinin about of a
condition that )ould sha6e its foundation and ultimatel" lead to its destruction. 9he incidents of the status are
overned b" la), not b" )ill of the parties. 9he la) specificall" enumerates the leal rounds, that must be proved to
e+ist b" indubitable evidence, to annul a marriae. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriae in 2uestion )as
decreed upon the sole testimon" of the husband )ho )as e+pected to ive testimon" tendin or aimin at securin
the annulment of his marriae he souht and see6s. :hether the )ife is reall" impotent cannot be deemed to have
been satisfactoril" established, becase from the commencement of the proceedins until the entr" of the decree she
had abstained from ta6in part therein. &lthouh her refusal to be e+amined or failure to appear in court sho)
indifference on her part, "et from such attitude the presumption arisin out of the suppression of evidence could not
arise or be inferred because )omen of this countr" are b" nature co", bashful and sh" and )ould not submit to a
ph"sical e+amination unless compelled to b" competent authorit". 9his the Court ma" do )ithout doin violence to
and infrinin in this case is not self-incrimination. .he is not chared )ith an" offense. .he is not bein compelled to
be a )itness aainst herself.
1
;Impotenc" bein an abnormal condition should not be presumed. 9he presumption is
in favor of potenc".;
/
9he lone testimon" of the husband that his )ife is ph"sicall" incapable of se+ual intercourse is
insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them toether as husband and )ife.
9he decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lo)er court for further proceedins in
accordance )ith this decision, )ithout pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, e!es, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez "a#id, and "izon,
JJ. concur.
3. G.R. No. 179620 Au%u&' 26, 2008
(ANUEL G. AL(ELOR, petitioner,
vs.
!E ON. REGIONAL !RIAL COUR! OF LA) *I+A) CI!,, -RANC 25., /01 LEONIDA !.
AL(ELOR, respondents.
D E C I ) I O N
RE,E), R.!., J.$
5ARRIA.=, in its totalit*, involves the spouses' right to the communit* of their whole lives. It li+ewise
involves a true intertwining of personalities.
#
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
'
of the Court of Appeals 7CA8 den*ing the petition
for annulment of Budgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court 7RTC8, Aas ,iFas,
:ranch '%). The CA dismissed outright the Rule )( petition for !eing the wrong remed*.
!23 F/4'&
,etitioner 5anuel .. Almelor 75anuel8 and respondent Aeonida Trinidad 7Aeonida8 were married on -anuar*
'$, #$1$ at the 5anila Cathedral.
<
Their union !ore three children6 7#8 5aria ,aulina Corinne, !orn on
/cto!er '2, #$1$; 7'8 >apoleon 5anuel, !orn on August $, #$$#; and 7<8 5anuel @omer, !orn on -ul* ),
#$$).
)
5anuel and Aeonida are !oth medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician,
respectivel*.
%
After eleven 7##8 *ears of marriage, Aeonida filed a petition with the RTC in Aas ,iFas Cit* to annul their
marriage on the ground that 5anuel was ps*chologicall* incapacitated to perform his marital o!ligations.
The case, doc+eted as A,92292#<' was raffled off to :ranch '%).
During the trial, Aeonida testified that she first met 5anuel in #$1# at the an Aazaro @ospital where
the* wor+ed as medical student cler+s. At that time, she regarded 5anuel as a ver* thoughtful person
who got along well with other people. The* soon !ecame sweethearts. Three *ears after, the* got
married.
"
Aeonida averred that 5anuel's +ind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the pu!lic e*e, 5anuel was
the picture of a perfect hus!and and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Aeonida
descri!ed 5anuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasona!l* meticulous, easil* angered. 5anuel's unreasona!le
wa* of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their fre&uent fights as a couple.
(
Aeonida
complained that this was in star+ contrast to the alleged lavish affection 5anuel has for his mother.
5anuel's deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision9ma+ing were
incomprehensi!le to Aeonida.
1
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homose4ualit*. @er suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed 5anuel's peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him
in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.
$
he also found several
pornographic homose4ual materials in his possession.
#2
@er worse fears were confirmed when she saw
5anuel +issed another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. >ogales.
##
Ehen she confronted 5anuel,
he denied ever*thing. At this point, Aeonida too+ her children and left their conBugal a!ode. ince then,
5anuel stopped giving support to their children.
#'
Dr. Galentina del Fonso .arcia, a clinical ps*chologist, was presented to prove Aeonida's claim. Dr. del
Fonso .arcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a !atter* of ps*chiatric tests on
Aeonida. he also had a one9time interview with 5anuel and face9to9face interviews with 5a. ,aulina
Corrinne 7the eldest child8.
#<
he concluded that 5anuel is ps*chologicall* incapacitated.
#)
uch incapacit*
is mar+ed !* antecedence; it e4isted even !efore the marriage and appeared to !e incura!le.
5anuel, for his part, admitted that he and Aeonida had some pett* arguments here and there. @e,
however, maintained that their marital relationship was generall* harmonious. The petition for annulment
filed !* Aeonida came as a surprise to him.
5anuel countered that the true cause of Aeonida's hostilit* against him was their professional rivalr*. It
!egan when he refused to heed the memorandum
#%
released !* Christ the Hing @ospital. The memorandum
ordered him to desist from converting his own l*ing9in clinic to a primar* or secondar* hospital.
#"
Aeonida's
famil* owns Christ the Hing @ospital which is situated in the same su!division as 5anuel's clinic and
residence.
#(
In other words, he and her famil* have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinit*.
5anuel !elied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. @e denied maltreating them. At
most, he onl* imposed the necessar* discipline on the children.
@e also defended his show of affection for his mother. @e said there was nothing wrong for him to return
the love and affection of the person who reared and loo+ed after him and his si!lings. This is especiall*
apt now that his mother is in her twilight *ears.
#1
5anuel pointed out that Aeonida found fault in this
otherwise health* relationship !ecause of her ver* Bealous and possessive nature.
#$
This same overl* Bealous !ehavior of Aeonida drove 5anuel to avoid the compan* of female friends. @e
wanted to avoid an* further misunderstanding with his wife. :ut, Aeonida instead conBured up stories
a!out his se4ual preference. he also fa!ricated tales a!out pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast dou!t on his masculinit*.
'2
To corro!orate his version, he presented his !rother, -esus .. Almelor. -esus narrated that he usuall*
sta*ed at 5anuel's house during his wee+l* trips to 5anila from Iriga Cit*. @e was a witness to the
generall* harmonious relationship !etween his !rother 5anuel and sister9in9law, Aeonida. True, the* had
some &uarrels t*pical of a hus!and and wife relationship. :ut there was nothing similar to what Aeonida
descri!ed in her testimon*.
'#
-esus further testified that he was with his !rother on the da* Aeonida allegedl* saw 5anuel +issed
another man. @e denied that such an incident occurred. /n that particular date,
''
he and 5anuel went
straight home from a trip to :icol. There was no other person with them at that time, e4cept their
driver.
'<
5anuel e4pressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso .arcia's findings !* presenting his own e4pert
witness. @owever, no ps*chiatrist was presented.
R!C D5&6o&5'5o0
:* decision dated >ovem!er '%, '22%, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following
disposition6
E@=R=F/R=, premised on the foregoing, Budgment is here!* rendered6
#. Declaring the marriage contracted !* herein parties on '$ -anuar* #$1$ and all its effects
under the law 0ull /01 7o51 89o: '23 ;3%50050%;
'. Dissolving the regime of communit* propert* !etween the same parties with forfeiture of
defendant's share thereon in favor of the same parties' children whose legal custod* is awarded to
plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
<. /rdering the defendant to give monthl* financial support to all the children; and
). ,ursuant to the provisions of A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C6
a. Directing the :ranch Cler+ of this Court to enter this -udgment upon its finalit* in the
:oo+ of =ntr* of -udgment and to issue an =ntr* of -udgment in accordance thereto; and
!. Directing the Aocal Civil Registrars of Aas ,iFas Cit* and 5anila Cit* to cause the
registration of the said =ntr* of -udgment in their respective :oo+s of 5arriages.
?pon compliance, a decree of nullit* of marriage shall !e issued.
/ /RD=R=D.
')
7=mphasis supplied8
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article <", !ut Article )% of the Famil* Code.
It ratiocinated6
4 4 4 a careful evaluation and in9depth anal*sis of the surrounding circumstances of the allegations
in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof 7sic8 reveals that in this case 7sic8
there is more than meets the e*es 7sic8.
:oth legall* and !iologicall*, homose4ualit* 4 4 4 is, indeed, generall* incompati!le with hetero
se4ual marriage. This is reason enough that in this Burisdiction 7sic8 the law recognizes marriage as
a special contract e4clusivel* onl* !etween a man and a woman 4 4 4 and thus when homose4ualit*
has trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation
IArticle )%7<8 in relation to Article )"7)8 or Article %%, par. ", Famil* CodeJ. This is of course in
recognition of the !iological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a
homose4ual and forces himself to live a normal heterose4ual life, there will surel* come a time
when his true se4ual preference as a homose4ual shall prevail in haunting him and thus Beopardizing
the solidit*, honor, and welfare of his own famil*.
'%
5anuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. ?ndaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of Budgment with the CA.
'"
5anuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in e4cess of the lower court's Burisdiction; that it
had no Burisdiction to dissolve the a!solute communit* of propert* and forfeit his conBugal share in favor
of his children.
CA D5&6o&5'5o0
/n -ul* <#, '22(, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows6
E@=R=F/R=, the present ,etition for Annulment of -udgment is here!* D=>I=D. The Court
AFFIR5 in toto the Decision 7dated >ovem!er '%, '22%8 of the Regional Trial Court 7:ranch
'%)8, in Aas ,iFas Cit*, in Civil Case >o. A,92292#<'. >o costs.
'(
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remed* !* filing the e4traordinar* remed* of petition
for annulment of Budgment. aid the appellate court6
It is o!vious that the petitioner is &uestioning the propriet* of the decision rendered !* the lower
Court. :ut the remed* assuming there was a mista+e is not a ,etition for Annulment of -udgment
!ut an ordinar* appeal. An error of Budgment ma* !e reversed or corrected onl* !* appeal.
Ehat petitioner is ascri!ing is an error of Budgment, not of Burisdiction, which is properl* the
su!Bect of an ordinar* appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the Burisdiction of the lower court !ut he claims e4cess in the e4ercise
thereof. 3Excess3 assuming there was is not covered !* Rule )( of the #$$( Rules of Civil ,rocedure.
The Rule refers the lac+ of Burisdiction and not the e4ercise thereof.
'1
I&&u3&
,etitioner 5anuel ta+es the present recourse via Rule )%, assigning to the CA the following errors6
I
T@= @/>/RA:A= C/?RT /F A,,=AA =RR=D I> >/T TR=ATI>. T@= ,=TITI/> F/R
A>>?A5=>T /F -?D.5=>T A A ,=TITI/> F/R R=GI=E I> GI=E /F T@= I5,/RTA>C=
/F T@= I?= I>G/AG=D A>D I> T@= I>T=R=T /F -?TIC=;
II
T@= @/>/RA:A= C/?RT /F A,,=AA =RR=D I> ?,@/ADI>. T@= D=CII/> /F T@= TRIAA
C/?RT A R=.ARD T@= /RD=R D=CAARI>. T@= 5ARRIA.= A >?AA A>D G/ID /> T@=
.R/?>D /F ,=TITI/>=R' ,KC@/A/.ICAA I>CA,ACITK;
III
T@= @/>/RA:A= C/?RT /F A,,=AA =RR=D I> ?,@/ADI>. T@= D=CII/> /F T@= TRIAA
C/?RT A R=.ARD T@= /RD=R T/ F/RF=IT T@= @AR= /F ,=TITI/>=R I> @I @AR=
/F T@= C/>-?.AA A=T.
'$
Ou9 Rul50%
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction.
.enerall*, an appeal ta+en either to the upreme Court or the CA !* the wrong or inappropriate mode
shall !e dismissed.
<2
This is to prevent the part* from !enefiting from one's neglect and
mista+es.o<3739, l5=3 :o&' 9ul3&, 5' 4/9953& 439'/50 3>436'5o0&. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
rules of procedures is to achieve su!stantial Bustice as e4peditiousl* as possi!le.
<#
Annulment of Budgment under Rule )( is a last remed*. It can not !e resorted to if the ordinar* remedies
are availa!le or no longer availa!le through no fault of petitioner.
<'
@owever, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,
<<
this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise6
Rul3& o8 69o431u93& /93 50'30131 'o 69o:o'3, 0o' 'o 1383/', &u;&'/0'5/l ?u&'543 /01,
'23938o93, '23y &2oul1 0o' ;3 /66l531 50 / 739y 95%51 /01 '342054/l &30&3. !23 3>436'5o0 5&
'2/' <25l3 '23 Rul3& /93 l5;39/lly 4o0&'9u31, '23 69o75&5o0& <5'2 93&634' 'o '23 9ul3& o0 '23
:/0039 /01 6395o1& 8o9 639834'50% /663/l& /93 &'954'ly /66l531. A& /0 3>436'5o0 'o '23
3>436'5o0, '23&3 9ul3& 2/73 &o:3'5:3& ;330 93l/>31 o0 3@u5'/;l3 4o0&5139/'5o0& . Also, in some
cases the upreme Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, !ut onl* when to do so would serve the
demands of su!stantial Bustice and in the e4ercise of e&uit* Burisdiction of the upreme
Court.
<)
7=mphasis and underscoring supplied8
For reasons of Bustice and e&uit*, this Court has allowed e4ceptions to the stringent rules governing
appeals.
<%
It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice Bustice for technicalit*.
<"
After discovering the palpa!le error of his petition, 5anuel see+s the indulgence of this Court to consider
his petition !efore the CA instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule "%.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that 5anuel imputed grave a!use of discretion to the lower court
for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homose4ualit*. This is not the first time that this
Court is faced with a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,
<(
petitioner Delia R. >erves elevated
to the CA a Civil ervice Commission 7CC8 decision suspending her for si4 7"8 months. The CC ruled
>erves, a pu!lic school teacher, is deemed to have alread* served her si49month suspension during
the pendency of the case. >evertheless, she is ordered reinstated without !ac+ wages. /n appeal, >erves
stated in her petition, inter alia6
#. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article ID9A, ection ( of the Constitution of the
,hilippines and under Rule "% of the Rules of Court.
'. :ut per upreme Court Revised Administrative Circular >o. #9$% 7Revised Circular >o. #9$#8
petitioner is filing the instant petition with this @onora!le Court instead of the upreme
Court.
<1
7?nderscoring supplied8
The CA dismissed >erves' petition for certiorari for !eing the wrong remed* or the inappropriate mode of
appeal.
<$
The CA opined that 3under the upreme Court Revised Administrative Circular >o. #9$% 4 4 4
appeals from Budgments or final orders or resolutions of CC is !* a petition for review.3
)2
This Court granted >erves petition and held that she had su!stantiall* complied with the Administrative
Circular. The Court stated6
That it was erroneousl* la!eled as a petition for certiorari under Rule "% of the Rules of Court is onl*
a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. 4 4 4
5ore importantl*, the appeal on its face appears to !e impressed with merit. @ence, the Court of
Appeals should have overloo+ed the insu!stantial defects of the petition 4 4 4 in order to do
Bustice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct a!out procedural rules,
which should !e li!erall* construed in order to promote their o!Bect and assist the parties in
o!taining Bust, speed*, and ine4pensive determination of ever* action or proceeding. As it has !een
said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate su!stantial Bustice, or !ar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are Bustified in e4empting a particular case from
the operation of the rules.
)#
7?nderscoring supplied8
imilarl*, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,
)'
petitioner -o* .. Tan availed of a wrong remed* !*
filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinar* appeal. In the
interest of Bustice, this Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule "%.
This Court found that !ased on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave a!use of
discretion in rendering a Budgment !* default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great inBustice. The
Court elucidated in this wise6
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of Bustice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to rela4 the same in the interest of
su!stantial Bustice.
)<
7?nderscoring supplied8
5easured !* the foregoing *ardstic+, Bustice will !e !etter served !* giving due course to the present
petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule "%, considering that what is at
sta+e is the validit* or non9validit* of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,
))
citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated6
4 4 4 The dismissal of appeals on purel* technical grounds is frowned upon. Ehile the right to
appeal is a statutor*, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our Budicial s*stem
and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a part* of the right to appeal, !ut
rather, ensure that ever* part*9litigant has the amplest opportunit* for the proper and Bust
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
)%
Indeed, it is far !etter and more prudent for a court to e4cuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of Bustice.
)"
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of 5anuel's counsel that preBudiced his right to
appeal. @is counsel, Att*. Christine Dugenio, repeatedl* availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance.
he also erroneousl* filed a petition for annulment of Budgment rather than pursue an ordinar* appeal.
These manifest errors were clearl* indicative of counsel's incompetence. These gravel* wor+ed to the
detriment of 5anuel's appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel !inds the client. till, this Court
has recognized certain e4ceptions6 7#8 where rec+less or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law; 7'8 when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's li!ert* and
propert*; or 7<8 where the interest of Bustice so re&uire.
)(
The negligence of 5anuel's counsel falls under the e4ceptions. ?ltimatel*, the rec+less or gross
negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. @e should not !e made to
suffer for his counsel's grave mista+es. @igher interests of Bustice and e&uit* demand that he !e allowed
to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
)1
this Court e4plained thus6
It is settled that the negligence of counsel !inds the client. This is !ased on the rule that an* act
performed !* a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authorit* is regarded as an act of
his client. @owever, where counsel is guilt* of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of dut*,
which resulted in the client's !eing held lia!le for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived
of his da* in court and the Budgment ma* !e set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher
interests of Bustice and e&uit* demand that petitioners !e allowed to present evidence on their
defense. ,etitioners ma* not !e made to suffer for the law*er's mista+es. !25& Cou9' <5ll /l</y&
;3 15&6o&31 'o %9/0' 93l538 'o 6/9'53& /%%953731 ;y 639851y, 89/u1, 934=l3&& 50/''30'5o0 /01
1o<095%2' 504o:63'3043 o8 l/<y39&, <2542 2/& '23 4o0&3@u3043 o8 13695750% '2359 4l530'&, o8
'2359 1/y 50 4ou9'.
)$
7=mphasis supplied8
Clearl*, this Court has the power to e4cept a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
demands of Bustice re&uire it. Eith more conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the
sacrosanct institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a part* the fullest
opportunit* to esta!lish the merits of one's action.
%2
The client was li+ewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial
Buildings, Inc.
%#
and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.
%'
aid the Court in :engson6
:ut if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to Bustice
and !ecomes a great hindrance and chief enem*, its rigors must !e rela4ed to admit e4ceptions
thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of Bustice. In other words, the court has the power to e4cept
a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of Bustice re&uire it.
%<
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
5anuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. ,ersistent in his &uest, he
fought !ac+ all the heav* accusations of incapacit*, cruelt*, and dou!ted masculinit* thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Aeonida's petition for nullit* had 3no !asis at all !ecause the supporting
grounds relied upon 4/0 0o' l3%/lly :/=3 / 4/&3 u0139 A9'54l3 36 o8 '23 F/:5ly Co13.3 It went further
!* citing Republic v. Molina6
%)
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcila!le differences, incessant &uarrels
andLor !eatings, unpredicta!le mood swings, infidelities, vices, a!andonment, and difficult*,
neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital o!ligations do not suffice to esta!lish
ps*chological incapacit*.
%%
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set in
5olina. Ehat Aeonida attempted to demonstrate were 5anuel's homose4ual tendencies !* citing overt
acts generall* predominant among homose4ual individuals.
%"
he wanted to prove that the perceived
homose4ualit* rendered 5anuel incapa!le of fulfilling the essential marital o!ligations.
:ut instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court 0ull58531 the marriage !etween 5anuel and Aeonida
on the ground of vitiated consent !* virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court
reasoned out6
As insinuated !* the tate 7p. (%, T>, #% Decem!er '22<8, when there is smo+e surel* there is
fire. Although vehementl* denied !* defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to
esta!lish with certaint* that defendant is reall* a homose4ual. This is the fact that can
!e 131u431 from the totalit* of the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
:efore his marriage, defendant +new ver* well that people around him even including his own close
friends 1ou;'31 his true se4ual preference 7T>, pp. <%9<", #< Decem!er '222; pp. (<9(%, #%
Decem!er '22<8. After receiving man* forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant a!out the rumor she
heard !ut defendant did not do an*thing to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of
all his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people !ut nothing happened after that. There
ma* have !een more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases
against and !e effected !* these people and so, putting more premiums on defendant's denials,
plaintiff Bust the same married him. Reasons upon reasons ma* !e advanced to either e4culpate or
nail to the cross defendant for his act of initiall* concealing his homose4ualit* to plaintiff, !ut in
the end, onl* one thing is certain 9 even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smo+e of dou!t
a!out his real preference continued and even got thic+er, reason wh* o!viousl* defendant failed to
esta!lish a happ* and solid famil*; and in so failing, plaintiff and their children !ecame his innocent
and unwilling victims.
Kes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, li+e herein defendant, he is meticulous over even small
details in the house 7sic8 li+e wrongl* folded !ed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
+nowing what clothes or Bewelr* shall fit his wife 7pp. ((91#, T>, #% Decem!er '22<8; !ut these
admissions of defendant ta+en in the light of evidence presented apparentl* showing that he had
e4tra fondness of his male friends 7sic8 to the e4tent that twice on separate occasions 7pp. )9(,
T>, #) Fe!ruar* '22#8 he was allegedl* seen !* plaintiff +issing another man lips9to9lips plus the
homose4ual magazines and tapes li+ewise allegedl* discovered underneath his !ed 7=4hi!its 3A3 and
3538, the dou!t as to his real se4 identit* !ecomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
thereof of defendant ma* !e the name of the game in this case; !ut the simple reason of
professional rivalr* advanced !* the defendant is certainl* not enough to Bustif* and o!scure the
&uestion wh* plaintiff should accuse him of such a ver* untoward infidelit* at the e4pense and
humiliation of their children and famil* as a whole.
%(
=videntl*, no sufficient proof was presented to su!stantiate the allegations that 5anuel is a homose4ual
and that he concealed this to Aeonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the pu!lic
perception of 5anuel's se4ual preference without the corro!oration of witnesses. Also, it too+ cognizance
of 5anuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his se4ualit*.
=ven assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that 5anuel is a homose4ual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage with Aeonida. The law is clear 9 a marriage ma* !e annulled when the consent
of either part* was o!tained !* fraud,
%1
such as concealment of homose4ualit*.
%$
>owhere in the said
decision was it proven !* preponderance of evidence that 5anuel was a homose4ual at the onset of his
marriage and that he deli!eratel* hid such fact to his wife.
"2
It is the concealment of homose4ualit*, and
not homose4ualit* per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent part*. uch concealment presupposes
!ad faith and intent to defraud the other part* in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential re&uisite of a valid marriage. To !e valid, it must !e freel* given !* !oth parties.
An allegation of vitiated consent must !e proven !* preponderance of evidence. The Famil* Code has
enumerated an e4clusive list of circumstances
"#
constituting fraud. @omose4ualit* per se is not among those
cited, !ut its concealment.
This distinction !ecomes more apparent when we go over the deli!erations
"'
of the Committees on the
Civil Code and Famil* Aaw, to wit6
-ustice Caguioa remar+ed that this ground should !e eliminated in the provision on the grounds for
legal separation. Dean .upit, however, pointed out that in Article )", the* are tal+ing onl* of
3concealment,3 while in the article on legal separation, there is actualit*. -udge Di* added that in
legal separation, the ground e4isted after the marriage, while in Article )", the ground e4isted at
the time of the marriage. -ustice Re*es suggested that, for clarit*, the* add the phrase 3e4isting
at the time of the marriage3 at the end of su!paragraph 7)8. The Committee approved the
suggestion.
"<
To reiterate, homose4ualit* per se is onl* a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as
a valid ground to annul a marriage.
")
Concealment in this case is not simpl* a !lan+et denial, !ut one that is
constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the ?nited tates, homose4ualit* has !een considered as a !asis for divorce. It indicates that
&uestions of se4ual identit* stri+e so deepl* at one of the !asic elements of marriage, which is the
e4clusive se4ual !ond !etween the spouses.
"%
In Crutcher v. Crutcher,
""
the Court held6
?nnatural practices of the +ind charged here are an infamous indignit* to the wife, and which
would ma+e the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would !ecome impossi!le for her to
discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural
course of things, the* would cause mental suffering to the e4tent of affecting her health.
"(
@owever, although there ma* !e similar sentiments here in the ,hilippines, the legal overtones are
significantl* different. Divorce is not recognized in the countr*. @omose4ualit* and its alleged
incompati!ilit* to a health* heterose4ual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage !ond in
our Burisdiction. At most, it is onl* a ground to separate from !ed and !oard.
Ehat was proven in the hearings a quo was a relativel* !lissful marital union for more than eleven 7##8
*ears, which produced three 7<8 children. The !urden of proof to show the nullit* of the marriage rests
on Aeonida. adl*, she failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedl* resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found
inVillanueva v. Court of Appeals.
"1
In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to
!aseless portra*als of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. aid the Court6
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especiall* if the* coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generall* !inding on this Court. Ee affirm the findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freel* and voluntaril* married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus 9
Appellant anchored his pra*er for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freel* consent to !e married to the appellee. @e cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasona!le and well9grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safet*. 4 4 4
The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntaril* to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedl* !eing harassed, appellant wor+ed as a securit* guard in a
!an+. .iven the rudiments of self9defense, or, at the ver* least, the proper wa* to +eep himself
out of harm's wa*. 4 4 4
Appellant also invo+ed fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to !elieve !* appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when the* were married. Appellant's e4cuse that he could not
have impregnated the appellee !ecause he did not have an erection during their tr*st is flims* at
!est, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is !ereft of an* reference to his ina!ilit* to
copulate with the appellee. 4 4 4
4 4 4 4
4 4 4 The failure to coha!it !ecomes relevant onl* if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
an* of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lac+ of parental consent, insanit*, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence 4 4 4. ince the appellant failed to Bustif* his failure to coha!it
with the appellee on an* of these grounds, the validit* of his marriage must !e upheld.
"$
Geril*, the lower court committed grave a!use of discretion, not onl* !* solel* ta+ing into account
petitioner's homose4ualit* per se and not its concealment, !ut !* declaring the marriage void from its
e4istence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional polic* to protect and strengthen the famil* as the
!asicautonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the famil*.
(2
The tate and the pu!lic
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration !*
fa!ricated evidence.
(#
Thus, an* dou!t should !e resolved in favor of the validit* of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and ife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property.
Article $" of the Famil* Code, on regimes of a!solute communit* propert*, provides6
Art. $". The administration and enBo*ment of the communit* propert* shall !elong to !oth spouses
Bointl*. In case of disagreement, the hus!and's decision shall prevail, su!Bect to recourse to the
court !* the wife for a proper remed*, which must !e availed of within five *ears from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise una!le to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse ma* assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encum!rance without the
authorit* of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the a!sence of such
authorit* or consent, the disposition or encum!rance shall !e void. @owever, the transaction shall
!e construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and
ma* !e perfected as a !inding contract upon the acceptance !* the other spouse or authorization
!* the court !efore the offer is withdrawn !* either or !oth offerors.
A similar provision, Article #')
('
prescri!es Boint administration and enBo*ment in a regime of conBugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, !oth spouses e4ercise administration and enBo*ment of the propert*
regime, Bointl*.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the communit* propert* of 5anuel and
Aeonida. In the same !reath, the trial court forfeited 5anuel's share in favor of the children. Considering
that the marriage is upheld valid and su!sisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of 5anuel's share in the
propert* regime is unwarranted. The* remain the Boint administrators of the communit* propert*.
AEREFORE, the petition is GRAN!ED. The appealed Decision is RE#ER)ED and )E! A)IDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DI)(I))ED.
)O ORDERED.
G.R. No. 137+90 M,-%' 26, 2001
.. /LORENCE MALCAM(O-SIN, petitioner,
vs.
(0ILI(( 1. SIN, respondent.
(ARDO, J.*
9he Famil" Code emphasi!es the permanent nature of marriae, hailin it as the foundation of the famil".
1
It is this
inviolabilit" )hich is central to our traditional and reliious concepts of moralit" and provides the ver" bedroc6 on
)hich our societ" finds stabilit".
/
4arriae is immutable and )hen both spouses ive their consent to enter it, their
consent becomes irrevocable, unchaned even b" their independent )ills.
7o)ever, this inviolabilit" depends on )hether the marriae e+ists and is valid. If it is void ab initio, the ;permanence;
of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. &rticle %0 of the Famil" Code is the
(ustification.
%
:here it applies and is dul" proven, a (udicial declaration can free the parties from the rihts, obliations,
burdens and conse2uences stemmin from their marriae.
& declaration of nullit" of marriae under &rticle %0 of the Famil" Code re2uires the application of procedural and
substantive uidelines. :hile compliance )ith these re2uirements mostl" devolves upon petitioner, the .tate is
li6e)ise mandated to activel" intervene in the procedure. .hould there be non-compliance b" the .tate )ith its
statutor" dut", there is a need to remand the case to the lo)er court for proper trial.
T$e Case
:hat is before the Court
-
is an appeal from a decision of the Court of &ppeals
5
)hich affirmed the decision of the
#eional 9rial Court, <ranch 151, 8asi Cit"
0
dismissin petitioner Florence 4alcampo-.in5s =hereafter ;Florence;>
petition for declaration of nullit" of marriae due to ps"choloical incapacit" for insufficienc" of evidence.
T$e %acts
,n Januar" -, 1917, after a t)o-"ear courtship and enaement, Florence and respondent 8hilipp 9. .in =hereafter
;8hilipp;>, a 8ortuese citi!en, )ere married at .t. Jude Catholic 8arish in .an 4iuel, 4anila.
7
,n .eptember /', 199-, Florence filed )ith the #eional 9rial Court, <ranch 151, 8asi Cit", a complaint for
;declaration of nullit" of marriae; aainst 8hilipp.
1
9rial ensued and the parties presented their respective
documentar" and testimonial evidence.
,n June 10, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence5s petition.
9
,n 3ecember 19, 1995, Florence filed )ith the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of &ppeals.
1'
&fter due proceedins, on &pril %', 1991, the Court of &ppeals promulated its decision, the dispositive portion of
)hich reads?
;I@ 97A BIC79 ,F &BB 97A F,#AC,I@C, the &ppeal is 3I.4I..A3. 9he 3ecision appealed from is
&FFI#4A3. Cost aainst the &ppellant.;
11
,n June /%, 1991, petitioner filed )ith the Court of &ppeals a motion for reconsideration of the afore2uoted decision.
1/
,n Januar" 19, 1999, the Court of &ppeals denied petitioner5s motion for reconsideration.
1%
7ence, this appeal.
1-
T$e Court&s uling
:e note that throuhout the trial in the lo)er court, the .tate did not participate in the proceedins. :hile Fiscal Jose
3anilo C. Jabson
15
filed )ith the trial court a manifestation dated @ovember 10, 199-, statin that he found no
collusion bet)een the parties,
10
he did not activel" participate therein. ,ther than enterin his appearance at certain
hearins of the case, nothin more )as heard from him. @either did the presidin Jude ta6e an" step to encourae
the fiscal to contribute to the proceedins.
9he Famil" Code mandates?
2AR1ICLE .3. I) ,## %,ss o& ,))u#4)t o- 5%#,-,t$o) o& ,"so#ut )u##$t6 o& 4,--$,g, the Court shall
ordert' !-os%ut$)g ,tto-)6 o- &$s%,# ,ss$g)5 to $t to ,!!,- o) "',#& o& t' St,t to t,7 st!s to
!-8)t %o##us$o) "t9) t' !,-t$s ,)5 to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed :$t,#$%s ou-s;.
2I) t' %,ss -&--5 to $) t' !-%5$)g !,-,g-,!', )o <u5g4)t s',## " ",s5 u!o) , st$!u#,t$o) o&
&,%ts o- %o)&ss$o) o& <u5g4)t.2
It can be arued that since the lo)er court dismissed the petition, the evil souht to be prevented =i.e., dissolution of
the marriae> did not come about, hence, the lac6 of participation of the .tate )as cured. @ot so. 9he tas6 of
protectin marriae as an inviolable social institution re2uires viilant and !ealous participation and not mere pro'
forma compliance. 9he protection of marriae as a sacred institution re2uires not (ust the defense of a true and
enuine union but the e+posure of an invalid one as )ell. 9his is made clear b" the follo)in pronouncement?
2:3; 1' t-$,# %ou-t 4ust o-5- t' !-os%ut$)g ,tto-)6 o- &$s%,# ,)5 t' So#$%$to- G)-,# to ,!!,- ,s
%ou)s# &o- t' st,t. No 5%$s$o) s',## " ',)55 5o9) u)#ss t' So#$%$to- G)-,# $ssus ,
%-t$&$%,t$o), 9'$%' 9$## " =uot5 $) t' 5%$s$o),
17
"-$&#6 st,t$)g t'-$) '$s -,so)s for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. 1' So#$%$to--G)-,# s',## 5$s%',-g t'
=u$8,#)t &u)%t$o) o& t' 5&)so- 8$)%u#$ %o)t4!#,t5 u)5- C,)o) 109+ :$t,#$%s ou-s;.2
13
1' -%o-5s ,- "-&t o& ,)6 8$5)% t',t t' St,t !,-t$%$!,t5 $) t' !-os%ut$o) o& t' %,s )ot <ust ,t
t' t-$,# #8# "ut o) ,!!,# 9$t' t' Cou-t o& A!!,#s ,s 9##. Ot'- t',) t' 24,)$&st,t$o)2 &$#5 9$t' t'
t-$,# %ou-t o) No84"- 16, 199., t' St,t 5$5 )ot &$# ,)6 !#,5$)g, 4ot$o) o- !os$t$o) !,!-, ,t ,)6 st,g o&
t' !-o%5$)gs.
In epublic of t$e P$ilippines #. Erlinda (atias "agdag,
19
)hile )e upheld the validit" of the marriae, )e
nevertheless characteri!ed the decision of the trial court as ;prematurel" rendered; since the investiatin prosecutor
)as not iven an opportunit" to present controvertin evidence before the (udment )as rendered. 9his stresses the
importance of the participation of the .tate.
7avin so ruled, )e decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this bein )ithin the province of the trial court
upon proper re-trial.
)biter "ictum
For purposes of re-trial, )e uide the parties thus? In epublic #s. Court of Appeals,
/'
the uidelines in the
interpretation and application of &rticle %0 of the Famil" Code are as follo)s =omittin uideline D1E in the enumeration
as it )as alread" earlier 2uoted>?
;=1> 9he burden of proof to sho) the nullit" of the marriae belons to the plaintiff. &n" doubt should be
resolved in favor of the e+istence and continuation of the marriae and aainst its dissolution and nullit". 9his
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our la)s cherish the validit" of marriae and unit" of the
famil". 9hus, our Constitution devotes an entire &rticle on the Famil", reconi!in it ;as the foundation of the
nation.; It decrees marriae as leall" ;inviolable,; thereb" protectin it from dissolution at the )him of the
parties. <oth the famil" and marriae are to be ;protected; b" the state. 9he Famil" Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriae and the famil" and emphasi!es their permanence, inviolabilit" and solidarit".
;=/> 9he root cause of the ps"choloical incapacit" must be? a> medicall" or clinicall" identified, b> alleed in
the complaint, c> sufficientl" proven b" e+perts and d> clearl" e+plained in the decision. &rticle %0 of the
Famil" Code re2uires that the incapacit" must be ps"choloical F not ph"sical, althouh its manifestations
andGor s"mptoms ma" be ph"sical. 9he evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
)as mentall" or ps"chicall" =sic> ill to such an e+tent that the person could not have 6no)n the obliations he
)as assumin, or 6no)in them, could not have iven valid assumption thereof. &lthouh no e+ample of such
incapacit" need be iven here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofe*usdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a ps"choloical illness and its incapacitatin
nature full" e+plained. A+pert evidence ma" be iven b" 2ualified ps"chiatrists and clinical ps"choloists.
;=%> 9he incapacit" must be proven to be e+istin at ;the time of the celebration; of the marriae. 9he
evidence must sho) that the illness )as e+istin )hen the parties e+chaned their ;I do5s.; 9he manifestation
of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
;=-> .uch incapacit" must also be sho)n to be medicall" or clinicall" permanent or incurable. .uch incurabilit"
ma" be absolute or even relative onl" in reard to the other spouse, not necessaril" absolutel" aainst
ever"one of the same se+. Furthermore, such incapacit" must be relevant to the assumption of marriae
obliations, not necessaril" to those not related to marriae, li6e the e+ercise of a profession or emplo"ment
in a (ob. 7ence, a pediatrician ma" be effective in dianosin illnesses of children and prescribin medicine to
cure them but ma" not be ps"choloicall" capacitated to procreate, bear and raise hisGher o)n children as an
essential obliation of marriae.
;=5> .uch illness must be rave enouh to brin about the disabilit" of the part" to assume the essential
obliations of marriae. 9hus, ;mild characterioloical peculiarities, mood chanes, occasional emotional
outbursts; cannot be accepted as root causes. 9he illness must be sho)n as do)nriht incapacit" or inabilit",
not refusal, nelect or difficult", much less ill )ill. In other )ords, there is a natal or supervenin disablin
factor in the person, an adverse interal element in the personalit" structure that effectivel" incapacitates the
person from reall" acceptin and thereb" compl"in )ith the obliations essential to marriae.
;=0> 9he essential marital obliations must be those embraced b" &rticles 01 up to 71 of the Famil" Code as
reards the husband and )ife as )ell as &rticles //', //1 and //5 of the same Code in reard to parents and
their children. .uch non-complied marital obliation=s> must also be stated in the petition, proven b" evidence
and included in the te+t of the decision.
;=7> Interpretations iven b" the @ational &ppellate 4atrimonial 9ribunal of the Catholic Church in the
8hilippines, )hile not controllin or decisive, should be iven reat respect b" our courts.;
T$e %allo
:7A#AF,#A, the Court #AHA#.A. and .A9. &.I3A the appealed decision of the Court of &ppeals in C&-C.#.
CH @o. 51%'-, promulated on &pril %', 1991 and the decision of the #eional 9rial Court, <ranch 151, 8asi Cit" in
Civil Case @o. %19', dated June 10, 1995.
Bet the case be #A4&@3A3 to the trial court for proper trial.
@o costs.
., ,#3A#A3.
"a#ide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, +apunan and ,nares'Santiago, JJ ., concur.
5. G.R. No. L-13553 F3;9u/9y 23, 1960
JO)E DE OCA(*O, petitioner,
vs.
)ERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
Joselito J. Coloma for petitioner.
-ENG"ON, J.$
Action for legal separation !* -ose de /campo against his wife erafina, on the ground of adulter*. The
court of first instance of >ueva =ciBa dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was
confession of Budgment, plus condonation or consent to the adulter* and prescription.
Ee granted certiorari to consider the application of articles #22 and #2# of the >ew Civil Code, which for
convenience are &uoted herewith6
ART. #22.0The legal separation ma* !e claimed onl* !* the innocent spouse, provided there has
!een no condonation of or consent to the adulter* or concu!inage. Ehere !oth spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot !e claimed !* either of them. Collusion !etween the parties to
o!tain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. #2#.0>o decree of legal separation shall !e promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or !*
confession of Budgment.
In case of non9appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorne* to
in&uire whether or not a collusion !etween the parties e4ists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorne* shall intervene for the tate in order to ta+e care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fa!ricated.
The record shows that on -ul* %, #$%%, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it
descri!ed their marriage performed in #$<1, and the commission of adulter* !* erafina, in 5arch #$%#
with -ose Arcalas, and in -une #$%% with >elson /rzame.
:ecause the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. #2# a!ove, directed
the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion e4isted !etween the parties. The fiscal
e4amined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The
plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimon* of Gicente 5edina, =rnesto de /campo, Cesar
=nri&uez, 5ateo Damo, -ose de /campo and Capt. erafin .u!at.
According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that 3plaintiff and defendant were
married in April %, #$<1 !* a religious ceremon* in .uim!a, >ueva =ciBa, and had lived thereafter as
hus!and and wife. The* !egot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In 5arch, #$%#, plaintiff
discovered on several occasions that his wife was !etra*ing his trust !* maintaining illicit relations with
one -ose Arcalas. @aving found the defendant carr*ing marital relations with another man plaintiff sent
her to 5anila in -une #$%# to stud* !eaut* culture, where she sta*ed for one *ear. Again, plaintiff
discovered that while in the said cit* defendant was going out with several other men, aside from -ose
Arcalas. Towards the end of -une, #$%', when defendant had finished stud*ing her course, she left
plaintiff and since then the* had lived separatel*.
3/n -une #1, #$%%, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man !* the
name of >elson /rzame. ,laintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformit* provided she is not charged with adulter* in a criminal action.
Accordingl*, plaintiff filed on -ul* %, #$%%, a petition for legal separation.3
The Court of Appeals held that the hus!and's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's
adulter* with -ose Arcalas had prescri!ed, !ecause his action was not filed within one *ear from 5arch
#$%# when plaintiff discovered her infidelit*. 7Art. #2', >ew Civil Code8 Ee must agree with the Court of
Appeals on this point.
#
As to the adulter* with >elson /rzame, the appellate court found that in the night of -une #1, #$%%, the
hus!and upon discovering the illicit connection, e4pressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation
and defendant readil* agreed to such filing. And when she was &uestioned !* the Fiscal upon orders of the
court, she reiterated her conformit* to the legal separation even as she admitted having had se4ual
relations with >elson /rzame. Interpreting these facts virtuall* to mean a confession of Budgment the
Appellate Court declared that under Art. #2#, legal separation could not !e decreed.
As we understand the article, it does not e4clude, as evidence, an* admission or confession made !* the
defendant outside of the court. It merel* prohi!its a decree of separation upon a confession of Budgment.
Confession of Budgment usuall* happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of
plaintiff to Budgment or files a pleading e4pressl* agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
'
This is not occur.
Ket, even supposing that the a!ove statement of defendant constituted practicall* a confession of
Budgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adulter* independently of such statement, the decree ma*
and should !e granted, since it would not !e !ased on her confession, !ut upon evidence presented !* the
plaintiff. Ehat the law prohi!its is a Budgment !ased e4clusivel* or mainl* on defendant's confession. If a
confession defeats the actionipso facto, an* defendant who opposes the separation will immediatel* confess
Budgment, purposel* to prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she 3li+e also3 to !e legall* separated from
her hus!and, is no o!stacle to the successful prosecution of the action. Ehen she refused to answer the
complaint, she indicated her willingness to !e separated. Ket, the law does not order the dismissal.
Allowing the proceeding to continue, it ta+es precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lac+ of opposition to the agreement.
>eedless to sa*, when the court is informed that defendant e&uall* desires the separation and admitted
the commission of the offense, it should !e dou!l* careful lest a collusion e4ists. 7The Court of Appeals
did not find collusion.8
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.
. . . !etween hus!and and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to !e
represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid
defense, for the purpose of ena!ling the other to o!tain a divorce. This agreement, if not e4press,
ma* !e implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for den*ing the divorce. 7.riffiths vs.
.riffiths, "$ >. -. =&. "1$ "2 Atl. #2$$; andoz vs. andoz, #2( /re. '1', '#) ,as. %$2.8.
In this case, there would !e collusion if the parties had arranged to ma+e it appear that a matrimonial
offense had !een committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to !ring a!out a legal
separation even in the a!sence of grounds therefor.
@ere, the offense of adulter* had reall* ta+ing place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
havefalsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, !ecause her stor* might send her to Bail the moment her
hus!and re&uests the Fiscal to prosecute. he could not have practiced deception at such a personal ris+.
In this connection, it has !een held that collusion ma* not !e inferred from the mere fact that the guilt*
part* confesses to the offense and thus ena!les the other part* to procure evidence necessar* to prove
it. 7Eilliams vs. Eilliams, I>. K.J )2 >. =. 7'd8 #2#(; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, ')" >. K. uppl. '<#;
Con*ers, vs. Con*ers, '') . E. I'dJ "11.8.
And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and ma+es no defense, is not !* itself collusion.
7,ohlman vs. ,ohlman, I>. -.J )" Atl. Rep. "%1.8.
Ee do not thin+ plaintiff's failure activel* to search for defendant and ta+e her home 7after the latter
had left him in #$%'8 constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with /rzame. It will
!e remem!ered that she 3left3 him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her
dates with other men. Conse&uentl*, it was not his duty to search for her to !ring her home. @ers was the
o!ligation to return.
Two decisions
<
are cited wherein from apparentl* similar circumstances, this Court inferred the
hus!and's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. @owever, upon careful e4amination, a vital
difference will !e found6 in !oth instances, the hus!and had a!andoned his wife; here it was the wife who
3left3 her hus!and.
Eherefore, finding no o!stacles to the aggrieved hus!and's petition we here!* reverse the appealed
decision and decree a legal separation !etween these spouse, all the conse&uent effects. Costs of all
instances against erafina Florenciano. o ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
6. G.R. No. L-32632 /"-u,-6 29, 1972
/OR1>NA1O 1>ASON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CO>R1 o& A((EALS, J>DGE /ERNANDO A. CR>Z, LEONOR LIMAS ,)5 REGIS1ER O/ DEEDS O/ RIZAL
:)o9 C,#oo%,) C$t6;, respondents-appellees.
Pedro C. (endiola for petitioner'appellant.
Castro (. Baltazar for respondents'appellees.

?ILLAMOR, J.: .p
9his is an appeal from the (udment of the Court of &ppeals in C&-C.#. @o. --5/%-# den"in the petition
forcertiorari filed b" Fortunato 9uason.
9his case, ma" be traced bac6 to 4a" /7, 1951, )hen Fortunato 9uason filed B#C @o. 11/07 )ith the Court of First
Instance of #i!al, 8asi <ranch, aainst the spouses Florencio 4acarae and Beonor Bimos. 9he case )as
dismissed on .eptember 1, 1951. In the meantime, 4acarae died. &fter the dismissal of the case, the )ido), Beonor
Bimos, as6ed 9uason to vacate the parcel of land =consistin of around 10' s2uare meters> sub(ect matter of the
case, since he )as occup"in the same )ithout pa"in an" rental.
,n 4a" -, 190', 9uason filed Civil Case @o. 01'- )ith the same court =Caloocan Cit" <ranch> aainst Bimos. &fter
almost ten "ears, or on Jul" 19, 1909, a decision )as promulated b" the trial court dismissin 9uason5s complaint
and orderin him to vacate the premises and to surrender their possession to Bimos.
9uason received notice of the decision on &uust 7, 1909, and therefore had up to .eptember 0, 1909, )ithin )hich
to perfect an appeal. ,n &uust 11, 9uason filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. ,n &uust /9, he filed a first
motion for e+tension of t)ent" da"s )ithin )hich to file a record on appeal. 9he motion )as ranted. ,n .eptember
/0, a second motion for e+tension of ten da"s )as filed. ,n ,ctober %, believin that 9uason had filed his second
motion for e+tension one da" late, Bimos filed a motion to dismiss 9uason5s appeal. ,n ,ctober -, the trial court
ranted the second motion for e+tension of time, to e+pire on ,ctober 0. ,n ,ctober 7, 9uason filed a third motion for
e+tension of ten da"s. ,n ,ctober 1', Bimos filed a supplemental motion to dismiss the appeal on the round that
)hen 9uason filed his third motion for e+tension on ,ctober 7, the decision had alread" become final* hence, the
period for filin a record on appeal )as no loner e+tendible. In the meantime, the court ranted the third motion for
e+tension in an order dated ,ctober 1. ,n ,ctober 15, 9uason filed a record on appeal. ,n the same date, Bimos
filed a motion to reconsider the order of ,ctober 1 rantin 9uason5s third motion for e+tension.
,n @ovember 19, 1909, the court issued an order dismissin 9uason5s appeal on the round that ;DiEt appears from
an e+amination of the record that )hen the plaintiff filed his ;Irent 4otion for Bast A+tension to File #ecord on
&ppeal; on ,ctober 7, 1909, the period )ithin )hich he should have filed the same, to )it, on ,ctober 0, 1909, has
alread" elapsed and, therefore, there )as nothin more to e+tend.; 9uason moved to reconsider, but on 3ecember
17, 1909, the court issued an order den"in his motion and orderin the issuance of a )rit of e+ecution.
9uason )ent to the Court of &ppeals on certiorari. &s alread" stated, that court denied the petition. 7ence this appeal.
8etitioner-appellant5s aruments in the present appeal boil do)n to the follo)in? =1> ,n ,ctober 0, 1909, the last da"
for the filin of a record on appeal, he arrived at the court a fe) minutes after -?'' 8.4. to file his third motion for
e+tension. 9he cause of his dela" )as the unusuall" heav" traffic from .an Juan, #i!al, to Caloocan Cit". & cler6 in
the court advised him to return the ne+t da". &ccordinl", on ,ctober 7, 1909, at 9?1' &.4., he filed the motion. 7e
therefore incurred a dela" of onl" nine hours and ten minutes, and considerin that the dela" )as caused b"
misfortune, accident, mista6e or e+cusable nelience, the trial court should not have denied his third motion. =/> 9he
trial court havin ranted petitioner-appellant5 motion for e+tension in its order of ,ctober 1, 1909, and petitioner-
appellant havin, pursuant to said order, alread" filed a record on appeal on ,ctober 15, 1909, the court could no
loner recall or reconsider its ,ctober 1 order on @ovember 19, 1909, or after the lapse of one month and eleven
da"s. =%> 9he record on appeal )as filed )ithin the relementar" period, because the three motions of respondent-
appellee Bimos =motion to dismiss the appeal filed on ,ctober %, 1909, supplemental motion filed on ,ctober 1' and
motion for reconsideration filed on ,ctober 15> )ere resolved onl" on @ovember 19, 1909* hence, the period for filin
the record on appeal )as suspended from ,ctober % to @ovember 19, 1909, and because of this the filin thereof on
,ctober 15, 1909, )as seasonable.
9he appeal is )ithout merit.
8etitioner-appellant5s filin on ,ctober 7, 1909, of his third motion for e+tension of time to file a record on appeal, )as
one da" late, because the oriinal period, as t)ice e+tended, e+pired the da" before. &n application for e+tension of
time must be filed prior to the e+piration of the period souht to be e+tended =Calima, et al. v. Court of &ppeals, et al.,
B-/1'-0, Januar" %1, 1900, 10 .C#& 1-', 1-%* Hivo, etc. v. &rca, etc., et al., B-/1519, &pril %', 1905, 1% .C#& 771,
77->. 9hus on ,ctober 7, 1909, the trial court no loner had the po)er to rant petitioner-appellant an e+tension of
time, for, the period )ithin )hich to perfect an appeal havin alread" elapsed, the court lost all (urisdiction over the
case, and had no alternative but to order the e+ecution of the final (udment =Calima, et al. v. Court of &ppeals, et
al., supra>.
&ccident is invo6ed as an e+cuse. &ssumin, for the sa6e of arument, that petitioner-appellant5s dela" on ,ctober 0,
1909, in arrivin in court to file his motion )as due to accident, still, considerin his o)n admission that he arrived
onl" ;a fe) minutes after -?'' 8.4.,; he could have filed said motion that ver" da" b" sendin the same in Caloocan
Cit" itself =)here he )as then> b" reistered mail.
.ince the trial court had lost (urisdiction over the case, its order of ,ctober 1, 1909, rantin petitioner-appellant5s
third motion for e+tension, )as null and void and of no leal effect. @o abuse of discretion could therefore be
attributed to said court )hen, after its attention had been called to its mista6e, it issued an order in effect
reconsiderin and settin aside its erroneous order. ,n the contrar", it )as the proper course of action to ta6e.
In-i#o, etc. #s. Arca, etc., et al., supra, )e sustained the order of the respondent (ude )ho reconsidered and set
aside a previous order to transmit the record of the case to this Court, after it )as pointed out to him that the notice of
appeal )as filed one da" late, and that, conse2uentl", the (udment had alread" become final and e+ecutor".
8etitioner-appellant5s contention that the filin b" respondent-appellee Bimos of her three motions on ,ctober %, 1'
and 15, 1909, interrupted the runnin of the period to a record on appeal for fort"-seven da"s, i.e., from ,ctober %,
1909 to @ovember 19, 1909, )hen the trial court finall" resolved the motions deserves scant consideration. 9he
,ctober % motion )as one to dismiss the appeal on the round that petitioner-appellant5s second motion for e+tension
)as filed one da" late. 9hat second motion for e+tension )as, ho)ever, ranted in the court5s order of ,ctober -,
1909. Conse2uentl", respondent-appellee Bimos5 ,ctober % motion must be deemed to have been disposed of b"
that order, and an" reference thereto in the order of @ovember 19, 1909, )as unnecessar" and superfluous. 9he
,ctober 1' motion )as one to dismiss petitioner-appellant5s appeal on the round that the filin of a third motion for
e+tension on ,ctober 7, 1909, )as one da" late. .ince, as alread" stated above, the third motion )as indeed filed
late, and the trial court5s (udment had alread" become final, respondent-appellee Bimos5 motion could not have had
the effect of suspendin the period for perfectin petitioner-appellant5s appeal* )hat had alread" run out could no
loner be suspended. 9he same thin is true )ith the ,ctober 15 motion of respondent-appellee Bimos, )hich )as for
the reconsideration of the court5s order of ,ctober 1 rantin petitioner-appellants third motion for e+tension. 9hat
order, as )e have said above, is null and void, havin been issued after the court had lost (urisdiction.
In addition to the foreoin considerations, it must be mentioned here as )as stated b" the Court of &ppeals in its
appealed decision F that the issues of late filin of petitioner-appellant5s third motion for e+tension due to accident,
and of interruption of the runnin of the period to file a record on appeal, )ere not raised b" petitioner-appellant in the
trial court. 9here, petitioner-appellant insisted that his third motion )as filed on ,ctober 0, 1909, and that the record
on appeal )as filed )ithin the e+tended period. 8etitioner-appellant5s failure to la" the said issues before the trial
court made his recourse to the Court of &ppeals on certiorari doubl" indefensible, for 2uestions )hich courts of first
instance are re2uired b" la) to decide should not be summaril" ta6en from them and presented to a hiher court
)ithout first ivin them an opportunit" of deliberatel" passin on such 2uestions themselves =7errera, etc. v.
<arretto, etc., et al., /5 8hil., /-5, /7/>.
8#A4I.A. C,@.I3A#A3, the (udment appealed from is affirmed, )ith costs aainst petitioner-appellant.

7. *ADILLA-RU(-A)A #). RU(-A)A BG.R.NO. 166738, AUGU)! 1., 2009C
,etitioner Rowena ,adilla9Rum!aua 7petitioner8 challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,
I#J
the decision dated -une '%, '22)
I'J
and the resolution dated -anuar* #1, '22%
I<J
of the Court of
Appeals 7CA8 in CA-G.R. C# No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision
I)J
of the Regional
Trial Court 7RTC8 declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent =dward Rum!aua 7respondent8 null
and void on the ground of the latterMs ps*chological incapacit*. The assailed resolution, on the other hand,
denied the petitionerMs motion for reconsideration.

AN!ECEDEN! FAC!)

The present petition traces its roots to the petitionerMs complaint for the declaration of nullit* of
marriage against the respondent !efore the RTC, doc+eted as Civil Case >o. ("(. The petitioner alleged
that the respondent was ps*chologicall* incapacitated to e4ercise the essential o!ligations of marriage as
shown !* the following circumstances6 the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one
roof after finding wor+; he failed to e4tend financial support to her; he !lamed her for his motherMs
death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to !e wor+ing in Davao,
although he was coha!iting with another woman in >ovaliches, Nuezon Cit*.

ummons was served on the respondent through su!stituted service, as personal service proved
futile.
I%J
The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion e4isted !etween the
parties and to ensure that no fa!rication or suppression of evidence would ta+e place.
I"J
,rosecutor 5elvin
,. TiongsonMs report negated the presence of collusion !etween the parties.
I(J

The Repu!lic of the ,hilippines 7Republic8, through the office of the olicitor .eneral 7OSG8, opposed
the petition.
I1J
The /. entered its appearance and deputized the ,rovincial ,rosecutor of >ueva Gizca*a
to assist in all hearings of the case.
I$J

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentar* evidence to su!stantiate her charges.

The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neigh!ors in Dupa4 del >orte,
>ueva Gizca*a. ometime in #$1(, the* met again and !ecame sweethearts !ut the respondentMs famil*
did not approve of their relationship. After graduation from college in #$$#, the respondent promised to
marr* the petitioner as soon as he found a Bo!. The Bo! came in #$$<, when the ,hilippine Air Aines 7 PAL8
accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that the*
first have a Osecret marriageP in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed; the* were
married in 5anila on Fe!ruar* '<, #$$<. The petitioner and the respondent, however, never lived
together; the petitioner sta*ed with her sister in Fairview, Nuezon Cit*, while the respondent lived with
his parents in >ovaliches.

The petitioner and respondent saw each other ever* da* during the first si4 months of their
marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the petitioner for fear that pu!lic +nowledge
of their marriage would affect his application for a ,AA scholarship. even months into their marriage,
the coupleMs dail* meetings !ecame occasional visits to the petitionerMs house in Fairview; the* would have
se4ual tr*sts in motels. Aater that *ear, the respondent enrolled at F=ATI?niversit* after he lost his
emplo*ment with ,AA.
I#2J

In #$$), the partiesM respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondentMs
mother tried to convince him to go to the ?nited tates, !ut he refused. To appease his mother, he
continued living separatel* from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her
!irthda* in #$$' and li+ewise failed to send her greeting cards on special occasions. The respondent
indicated as well in his visa application that he was single.

In April #$$%, the respondentMs mother died. The respondent !lamed the petitioner, associating his
motherMs death to the pain that the discover* of his secret marriage !rought. ,ained !* the respondentMs
action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent. The* eventuall* reconciled through
the help of the petitionerMs father, although the* still lived separatel*.

In #$$(, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a Bo! in Davao. A *ear later,
the petitioner and her mother went to the respondentMs house in >ovaliches and found him coha!iting with
one C*nthia Gillanueva 7Cynthia8. Ehen she confronted the respondent a!out it, he denied having an affair
with C*nthia.
I##J
The petitioner apparentl* did not !elieve the respondents and moved to to >ueva Gizca*a
to recover from the pain and anguish that her discover* !rought.
I#'J

The petitioner disclosed during her cross9e4amination that communication !etween her and
respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimon*, the petitioner also presented a certified true
cop* of their marriage contract;
I#<J
and the testimon*, curriculum vitae,
I#)J
and ps*chological report
I#%J
of
clinical ps*chologist Dr. >ed* Aorenzo Ta*ag 7Dr. Tayag8.

Dr. Ta*ag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the
petitioner6 a Revised :eta =4amination; a :ender Gisual 5otor .estalt Test; a Rorschach ,s*chodiagnostic
Test; a Draw a ,erson Test; a achMs entence Completion Test; and 55,I.
I#"J
he thereafter prepared a
ps*chological report with the following findings6

!E)! RE)UL!) AND E#ALUA!ION

,s*chometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual
level. Aogic and reasoning remained intact. he is seen to !e the t*pe of woman who
adBusts fairl* well into most situations especiall* if it is within her interests. he is
pictured to !e faithful to her commitments and had reservations from negative
criticisms such that she normall* adheres to social norms, !ehavior9wise. @er age
spea+s of maturit*, !oth intellectuall* and emotionall*. @er one fault lies in her
compliant attitude which ma+es her a su!Bect for manipulation and deception such
that of respondent. In all the *ears of their relationship, she opted to endure his
irresponsi!ilit* largel* !ecause of the mere !elief that someda* things will !e much
!etter for them. :ut upon the advent of her hus!andMs infidelit*, she graduall* lost
hope as well as the sense of self9respect, that she has finall* ta+en her tool to !e
assertive to the point of !eing aggressive and ver* cautious at times Q so as to fight
with the frustration and insecurit* she had especiall* regarding her failed marriage.

R3&6o0130' 50 '25& 4/&3, 5& 9373/l31 'o o639/'3 50 / 739y &3l8-430'3931
:/0039 /& 23 ;3l5373& '2/' '23 <o9l1 937ol73& /9ou01 25:. 5& 3%o430'95&: :/13
5' &o 3/&y 8o9 25: 'o 13435'8ully u&3 o'239& 8o9 25& o<0 /17/043:30' <5'2 /0
3>'93:3 /59 o8 4o08513043 /01 1o:50/043. 3 <oul1 1o /4'5o0& <5'2ou' /0y
93:o9&3 o9 %u5l' 833l50%& 'o</91& o'239& 3&6345/lly 'o '2/' o8 63'5'5o039.

RE(ARD)

Aove happens to ever*one. It is du!!ed to !e !oundless as it goes !e*ond the
e4pectations people tagged with it. In love, Oage does matter.P ,eople love in order to
!e secure that one will share hisLher life with another and that heLshe will not die
alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die Q it is
a choice one had to face when love is not the love heLshe e4pected.

In the case presented !* petitioner, it is ver* apparent that love reall*
happened for her towards the *oung respondent Q who used OloveP as a disguise or
deceptive tactic for e4ploiting the confidence she e4tended towards him. @e made
her !elieve that he is responsi!le, true, caring and thoughtful Q onl* to reveal himself
contrar* to what was mentioned. @e lac+ed the commitment, faithfulness, and
remorse that he was a!le to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner
loo+ li+e an innocent fool. @is character traits reveal him to suffer >arcissistic
,ersonalit* Disorder 9 declared to !e grave, severe and incura!le.
I#(J
I=mphasis
supplied.J


!23 R!C Rul50%

The RTC nullified the partiesM marriage in its decision of April #$, '22'. The trial court saw merit
in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Ta*ag, and concluded as follows6
4 4 4 4

Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife. Respondent
imposed limited or !loc+ IsicJ out communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions,
li+e petitionerMs !irthda*s and GalentineMs Da*; going out onl* on occasions despite their
living separatel* and to go to a motel to have se4ual intercourse.

It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case
which show the ps*chological incapacit* of respondent, at the time of the cele!ration of the
marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital
responsi!ilities 7ee Articles "1 to (#, Famil* Code8. This incapacit* is Odeclared grave,
severe and incura!le.P

E@=R=F/R=, in view of the foregoing, the marriage !etween petitioner Rowena
,adilla Rum!aua and respondent =dwin Rum!aua is here!* declared annulled.

/ /RD=R=D.
I#1J


!23 CA D345&5o0

The Repu!lic, through the /., appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
I#$J
The CA decision of -une
'%, '22) reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the nullification of the partiesM marriage.
I'2J

In its ruling, the CA o!served that Dr. Ta*agMs ps*chiatric report did not mention the cause of the
respondentMs so9called Onarcissistic personalit* disorder;P it did not discuss the respondentMs childhood
and thus failed to give the court an insight into the respondentMs developmental *ears. Dr. Ta*ag li+ewise
failed to e4plain wh* she came to the conclusion that the respondentMs incapacit* was Odeep9seatedP and
Oincura!le.P

The CA held that Article <" of the Famil* Code re&uires the incapacit* to !e ps*chological,
although its manifestations ma* !e ph*sical. 5oreover, the evidence presented must show that the
incapacitated part* was mentall* or ph*sicall* ill so that he or she could not have +nown the marital
o!ligations assumed, +nowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must !e
shown as downright incapacit* or ina!ilit*, not a refusal, neglect, or difficult* to perform the essential
o!ligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered !ecause the respondent adamantl*
refused to live with her !ecause of his parentsM o!Bection to their marriage.

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, !ut the CA denied her motion in its resolution
of -anuar* #1, '22%.
I'#J

!23 *3'5'5o0 /01 '23 I&&u3&

The petitioner argues in the present petition that Q

#. the /. certification re&uirement under Republic v. Molina
I''J
7the Molina case8 cannot !e
dispensed with !ecause A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C, which rela4ed the re&uirement, too+ effect onl*
on 5arch #%, '22<;

'. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her
e4pert witness and cure the defects in her testimon*, as well as to present additional evidence,
would temper Bustice with merc*; and

<. Dr. Ta*agMs testimon* in court cured the deficiencies in her ps*chiatric report.

The petitioner pra*s that the RTCMs and the CAMs decisions !e reversed and set aside, and the case
!e remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this pra*er, that the CAMs
decision !e set aside and the RTCMs decision !e reinstated.

The Repu!lic maintained in its comment that6 7a8 A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C was applica!le although it
too+ effect after the promulgation of Molina; 7!8 invalidating the trial courtMs decision and remanding the
case for further proceedings were not proper; and 7c8 the petitioner failed to esta!lish respondentMs
ps*chological incapacit*.
I'<J

The parties simpl* reiterated their arguments in the memoranda the* filed.

!E COUR!E) RULING

Ee resolve to 130y the petition for l/4= o8 :395'.

!.". #o. $%&''&'$&(C is applicable

In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorne* or fiscal and the /.; the*
are to appear as counsel for the tate in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullit* of
marriages6

718 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorne* or fiscal and the olicitor
.eneral to appear as counsel for the state. No 1345&5o0 &2/ll ;3 2/0131 1o<0 u0l3&& '23
)ol545'o9 G3039/l 5&&u3& / 439'5854/'5o0, <2542 <5ll ;3 @uo'31 50 '23 1345&5o0, ;9538ly
&'/'50% '239350 25& 93/&o0& 8o9 25& /%933:30' o9 o66o&5'5o0, /& '23 4/&3 :/y ;3, 'o '23
63'5'5o0. The olicitor .eneral, along with the prosecuting attorne*, shall su!mit to the
court such certification within fifteen 7#%8 da*s from the date the case is deemed
su!mitted for resolution of the court. The olicitor .eneral shall discharge the e&uivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon #2$%. I=mphasis supplied.J


A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C
I')J
99 which this Court promulgated on 5arch #%, '22< and dul* pu!lished 99 is
geared towards the rela4ation of the /. certification that Molina re&uired. ection #1 of this remedial
regulation provides6

=C. #1. Memoranda. Q The court ma* re&uire the parties and the pu!lic prosecutor, in
consultation with the /ffice of the olicitor .eneral, to file their respective memoranda in
support of their claims within fifteen da*s from the date the trial is terminated. It ma*
re&uire the /ffice of the olicitor .eneral to file its own memorandum if the case is of
significant interest to the tate. >o other pleadings or papers ma* !e su!mitted without
leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will !e considered
su!mitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April #$, '22' should !e vacated for prematurit*,
as it was rendered despite the a!sence of the re&uired /. certification specified in Molina. According
to the petitioner, A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C, which too+ effect onl* on 5arch #%, '22<, cannot overturn the
re&uirements ofMolina that was promulgated as earl* as Fe!ruar* #<, #$$(.

The petitionerMs argument lac+s merit.

The amendment introduced under A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C is procedural or remedial in character; it
does not create or remove an* vested right, !ut onl* operates as a remed* in aid of or confirmation of
alread* e4isting rights. The settled rule is that procedural laws ma* !e given retroactive effect,
I'%J
as we
held in De Los Santosv. Vda. de Mangubat:
I'"J

,rocedural Aaws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues 9 the* ma* !e given
retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and
this will not violate an* right of a person who ma* feel that he is adversel* affected,
insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C, as a remedial measure, removed the mandator* nature of an /.
certification and ma* !e applied retroactivel* to pending matters. In effect, the measure cures in an*
pending matter an* procedural lapse on the certification prior to its promulgation. /ur rulings in Antonio v.
Reyes
)%*+
and Navales v. Navales
I'1J
have since confirmed and clarified that A.5. >o. 2'9##9#29C has dispensed
with the Molina guideline on the matter of certification, although Article )1 mandates the appearance of the
prosecuting attorne* or fiscal to ensure that no collusion !etween the parties would ta+e place. Thus, what is
important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial re&uirement that he !e certified to !e
present. From this perspective, the petitionerMs o!Bection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lac+s merit.

! ,emand of the Case to the ,TC is Improper

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courtsM decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for
further reception of evidence are procedurall* permissi!le. he argues that the inade&uac* of her evidence during
the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Att*. Richard Ta!ago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC
would allow her to cure the evidentiar* insufficiencies. he posits in this regard that while mista+es of counsel !ind a
part*, the rule should !e li!erall* construed in her favor to serve the ends of Bustice.

Ee do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not
procedurall* proper at this stage. ection # of Rule <( provides that an aggrieved part* ma* move the trial court to
set aside a Budgment or final order alread* rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In
addition, a motion for new trial ma* !e filed onl* on the grounds of 7#8 fraud, accident, mista+e or
e4cusa!le negligence that could not have !een guarded against !* ordinar* prudence, and !* reason of
which the aggrieved part*Ms rights have pro!a!l* !een impaired; or 7'8 newl* discovered evidence that,
with reasona!le diligence, the aggrieved part* could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and
that would pro!a!l* alter the result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inade&uac* of the evidence presented !* her former
counsel as !asis for a remand. he did not, however, specif* the inade&uac*. That the RTC granted the
petition for declaration of nullit* prima facie shows that the petitionerMs counsel had not !een negligent in
handling the case. .ranting arguendo that the petitionerMs counsel had !een negligent, the negligence that
would Bustif* a new trial must !e e4cusa!le, i.e. one that ordinar* diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparentl* adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro
Integrated Steel Corporation where we e4plained6
I'$J

:lunders and mista+es in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result
of the ignorance, ine4perience or incompetence of counsel do not &ualif* as a ground for new
trial. If such were to !e admitted as valid reasons for re9opening cases, there would never
!e an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could !e emplo*ed to allege and show that
the prior counsel had not !een sufficientl* diligent, e4perienced or learned. This will put a
premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors !* counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.

Thus, we find no Bustifia!le reason to grant the petitionerMs re&uested remand.

-etitioner failed to establish the
respondent.s psychological incapacity

A petition for declaration of nullit* of marriage is anchored on Article <" of the Famil* Code which
provides that Oa marriage contracted !* an* part* who, at the time of its cele!ration, was ps*chologicall*
incapacitated to compl* with the essential marital o!ligations of marriage, shall li+ewise !e void even if
such incapacit* !ecomes manifest onl* after its solemnization.P In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
I<2J
the Court first
declared that ps*chological incapacit* must !e characterized !* 7a8 gravit*; 7!8 Buridical antecedence; and
7c8 incura!ilit*. The defect should refer to Ono less than a mental 7not ph*sical8 incapacit* that causes a
part* to !e trul* incognitive of the !asic marital covenants that concomitantl* must !e assumed and
discharged !* the parties to the marriage.P It must !e confined to Othe most serious cases of personalit*
disorders clearl* demonstrative of an utter insensitivit* or ina!ilit* to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.P

Ee laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article <" of the
Famil* Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said6
7#8 The !urden of proof to show the nullit* of the marriage !elongs to the plaintiff.
An* dou!t should !e resolved in favor of the e4istence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullit*. This is rooted in the fact that !oth our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validit* of marriage and unit* of the famil*. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Famil*, recognizing it Oas the foundation of the nation.P It
decrees marriage as legall* Oinviola!le,P there!* protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. :oth the famil* and marriage are to !e OprotectedP !* the state.
The Famil* Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the famil* and
emphasizes their permanence, inviola!ilit* and solidarit*.
7'8 The root cause of the ps*chological incapacit* must !e 7a8 medicall* or
clinicall* identified, 7!8 alleged in the complaint, 7c8 sufficientl* proven !* e4perts
and 7d8 clearl* e4plained in the decision. Article <" of the Famil* Code re&uires that
the incapacit* must !e ps*chological 9 not ph*sical, although its manifestations andLor
s*mptoms ma* !e ph*sical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentall* or ps*chicall* ill to such an e4tent that the person could not have +nown
the o!ligations he was assuming, or +nowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no e4ample of such incapacit* need !e given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must !e identified as a ps*chological illness and its incapacitating nature full* e4plained.
=4pert evidence ma* !e given !* &ualified ps*chiatrists and clinical ps*chologists.
7<8 The incapacit* must !e proven to !e e4isting at Othe time of the cele!rationP of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was e4isting when the parties
e4changed their OI do's.P The manifestation of the illness need not !e perceiva!le at such
time, !ut the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
7)8 uch incapacit* must also !e shown to !e medicall* or clinicall* permanent or
incura!le. uch incura!ilit* ma* !e a!solute or even relative onl* in regard to the other
spouse, not necessaril* a!solutel* against ever*one of the same se4. Furthermore,
such incapacit* must !e relevant to the assumption of marriage o!ligations, not necessaril*
to those not related to marriage, li+e the e4ercise of a profession or emplo*ment in a Bo!. 4
4 4
7%8 uch illness must !e grave enough to !ring a!out the disa!ilit* of the part* to
assume the essential o!ligations of marriage. Thus, Omild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional out!urstsP cannot !e accepted as root causes. The
illness must !e shown as downright incapacit* or ina!ilit*, not a refusal, neglect or
difficult*, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disa!ling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personalit* structure that effectivel*
incapacitates the person from reall* accepting and there!* compl*ing with the o!ligations
essential to marriage.
7"8 The essential marital o!ligations must !e those em!raced !* Articles "1 up to (#
of the Famil* Code as regards the hus!and and wife as well as Articles ''2, ''# and ''% of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. uch non9complied marital
o!ligation7s8 must also !e stated in the petition, proven !* evidence and included in the te4t
of the decision.
7(8 Interpretations given !* the >ational Appellate 5atrimonial Tri!unal of the
Catholic Church in the ,hilippines, while not controlling or decisive, should !e given great
respect !* our courtsR
718 The trial court must order the prosecuting attorne* or fiscal and the olicitor
.eneral to appear as counsel for the state. >o decision shall !e handed down unless the
olicitor .eneral issues a certification, which will !e &uoted in the decision, !riefl* stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case ma* !e, to the petition. The
olicitor .eneral, along with the prosecuting attorne*, shall su!mit to the court such
certification within fifteen 7#%8 da*s from the date the case is deemed su!mitted for
resolution of the court. The olicitor .eneral shall discharge the e&uivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon #2$%.

These Guidelines incorporate the !asic re&uirements we esta!lished in Santos. To
reiterate, ps*chological incapacit* must !e characterized !*6 7a8 gravit*; 7!8 Buridical antecedence; and
7c8 incura!ilit*.
I<#J
These re&uisites must !e strictl* complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullit* of
marriage !ased on ps*chological incapacit* must !e confined onl* to the most serious cases of personalit*
disorders clearl* demonstrative of an utter insensitivit* or ina!ilit* to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Furthermore, since the Famil* Code does not define Ops*chological incapacit*,P fleshing out
its terms is left to us to do so on a case9to9case !asis through Burisprudence.
I<'J
Ee emphasized this
approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting
I<<J
when we e4plained6

It was for this reason that we found it necessar* to emphasize in Ngo Te that each
case involving the application of Article <" must !e treated distinctl* and Budged not on the
!asis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations !ut according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case9to9case !asis, guided !*
e4perience, the findings of e4perts and researchers in ps*chological disciplines, and !*
decisions of church tri!unals.

In the present case and using the a!ove standards and approach, we find the totalit* of the
petitionerMs evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is ps*chologicall* unfit to discharge the
duties e4pected of him as a hus!and.

/. *3'5'5o039E& '3&'5:o0y 151 0o' 69o73 '23 9oo' 4/u&3, %9/75'y /01 504u9/;5l5'y o8 93&6o0130'E&
4o015'5o0

The petitionerMs evidence merel* showed that the respondent6 7a8 reneged on his promise to
coha!it with her; 7!8 visited her occasionall* from #$$< to #$$(; 7c8 forgot her !irthda* in #$$', and did
not send her greeting cards during special occasions; 7d8 represented himself as single in his visa
application; 7e8 !lamed her for the death of his mother; and 7f8 told her he was wor+ing in Davao when in
fact he was coha!iting with another woman in #$$(.

These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the Ops*chological incapacit*P that the law
re&uires, and should !e distinguished from the Odifficult*,P if not outright OrefusalP or OneglectP in the
performance of some marital o!ligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,
I<)J
we ruled that
it was not enough that respondent, alleged to !e ps*chologicall* incapacitated, had difficult* in compl*ing
with his marital o!ligations, or was unwilling to perform these o!ligations. ,roof of a natal or supervening
disa!ling factor Q an adverse integral element in the respondent's personalit* structure that effectivel*
incapacitated him from compl*ing with his essential marital o!ligations Q had to !e shown and was not
shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondentMs stu!!orn refusal to coha!it with the petitioner was
dou!tlessl* irresponsi!le, !ut it was never proven to !e rooted in some ps*chological illness. As the
petitionerMs testimon* reveals, respondent merely refused to coha!it with her for fear of Beopardizing his
application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his famil*. The respondentMs failure
to greet the petitioner on her !irthda* and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts
of !laming petitioner for his motherMs death and of representing himself as single in his visa application,
could onl* at !est amount to forgetfulness, insensitivit* or emotional immaturit*, not necessaril*
ps*chological incapacit*. Ai+ewise, the respondentMs act of living with another woman four *ears into the
marriage cannot automaticall* !e e&uated with a ps*chological disorder, especiall* when no specific
evidence was shown that promiscuit* was a trait alread* e4isting at the inception of marriage. In fact,
petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when the* were going stead* and for
a time after their marriage; their pro!lems onl* came in later.

To !e sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of
these imperfections, however, does not necessaril* warrant a conclusion that he had a ps*chological
malad* at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapa!le of fulfilling his duties and o!ligations. To
use the words ofNavales v. Navales6
I<%J

Article <" contemplates downright incapacit* or ina!ilit* to ta+e cognizance of and to assume
!asic marital o!ligations. 5ere Odifficult*,P OrefusalP or OneglectP in the performance of marital
o!ligations or Oill willP on the part of the spouse is different from Oincapacit*P rooted on some
de!ilitating ps*chological condition or illness. I01331, 59934o045l/;l3 1588393043&, &3>u/l 508513l5'y
o9 639739&5o0, 3:o'5o0/l 5::/'u95'y /01 5993&6o0&5;5l5'y, /01 '23 l5=3, 1o 0o' ;y '23:&3l73&
</99/0' / 850150% o8 6&y42olo%54/l 504/6/45'y u0139 A9'54l3 36, /& '23 &/:3 :/y o0ly ;3 1u3 'o
/ 639&o0F& 938u&/l o9 u0<5ll50%03&& 'o /&&u:3 '23 3&&30'5/l o;l5%/'5o0& o8 :/995/%3 /01 0o' 1u3
'o &o:3 6&y42olo%54/l 5ll03&& '2/' 5& 4o0'3:6l/'31 ;y &/51 9ul3.


;. D9. !/y/%E& 6&y42olo%54/l 936o9' /01 4ou9' '3&'5:o0y

Ee cannot help !ut note that Dr. Ta*agMs conclusions a!out the respondentMs ps*chological
incapacit* were !ased on the information fed to her !* onl* one side Q the petitioner Q whose !ias in favor
of her cause cannot !e dou!ted. Ehile this circumstance alone does not dis&ualif* the ps*chologist for
reasons of !ias, her report, testimon* and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed a!ove.
I<"J
For, effectivel*, Dr. Ta*ag onl*
diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third part* account; she did not actuall* hear, see and
evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctorMs pro!es.

Dr. Ta*ag, in her report, merel* summarized the petitionerMs narrations, and on this !asis
characterized the respondent to !e a self9centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who O!elieves
that the world revolves around himP; and who Oused love as aRdeceptive tactic for e4ploiting the
confidence IpetitionerJ e4tended towards him.P Dr. Ta*ag then incorporated her own idea of OloveP; made
a generalization that respondent was a person who Olac+ed commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,P and
who engaged Oin promiscuous acts that made the petitioner loo+ li+e a foolP; and finall* concluded that the
respondentMs character traits reveal Ohim to suffer >arcissistic ,ersonalit* Disorder with traces of
Antisocial ,ersonalit* Disorder declared to !e grave and incura!le.P

Ee find these o!servations and conclusions insufficientl* in9depth and comprehensive to warrant
the conclusion that a ps*chological incapacit* e4isted that prevented the respondent from compl*ing with
the essential o!ligations of marriage. It failed to identif* the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personalit* disorder and to prove that it e4isted at the inception of the marriage. >either did it e4plain
the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was reall* incapa!le of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacit* of a ps*chological, not ph*sical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid
!ut conclude that Dr. Ta*agMs conclusion in her Report Q i.e., that the respondent suffered O>arcissistic
,ersonalit* Disorder with traces of Antisocial ,ersonalit* Disorder declared to !e grave and incura!leP Q
is an unfounded statement, not a necessar* inference from her previous characterization and portra*al of
the respondent. Ehile the various tests administered on the petitioner could have !een used as a fair
gauge to assess her own ps*chological condition, this same statement cannot !e made with respect to the
respondentMs condition. To ma+e conclusions and generalizations on the respondentMs ps*chological
condition !ased on the information fed !* onl* one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsa* evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

,etitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Ta*agMs su!se&uent testimon* in court cured whatever
deficiencies attended her ps*chological report.

Ee do not share this view.

A careful reading of Dr. Ta*agMs testimon* reveals that she failed to esta!lish the fact that at the
time the parties were married, respondent was alread* suffering from a ps*chological defect that
deprived him of the a!ilit* to assume the essential duties and responsi!ilities of marriage. >either did
she ade&uatel* e4plain how she came to the conclusion that respondentMs condition was grave and
incura!le. To directl* &uote from the records6

ATTK. RIC@ARD TA:A./6

N6 I would li+e to call *our attention to the Report alread* mar+ed as =4h. O=9
(P, there is a statement to the effect that his character traits !egin to
suffer narcissistic personalit* disorder with traces of antisocial personalit*
disorder. Ehat do *ou meanS Can *ou please e4plain in la*manMs word, 5adam
EitnessS

DR. >=DK A/R=>T/ TAKA.6

A6 Actuall*, in a la*manMs term, narcissistic personalit* disorder cannot accept
that there is something wrong with his own !ehavioral manifestation. IsicJ
The* feel that the* can rule the world; the* are eccentric; the* are
e4emplar*, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is clearl*
manifested !* the fact that respondent a!used and used petitionerMs love.
Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empath*; cannot give love
simpl* !ecause the* love themselves more than an*!od* else; and thirdl*,
narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and gratification
without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.

N6 Can *ou please descri!e the personal IsicJ disorderS

A6 Clinicall*, considering that la!el, the respondent !ehavioral manifestation
under personalit* disorder IsicJ this is alread* considered grave, serious, and
treatment will !e impossi!le IsicJ. As I sa* this, a +ind of developmental
disorder wherein it all started during the earl* formative *ears and !rought
a!out !* one familiar relationship the wa* he was reared and cared !* the
famil*. =nvironmental e4posure is also part and parcel of the child disorder.
IsicJ

N6 Kou mean to sa*, from the formative I*earsJ up to the presentS

A6 Actuall*, the respondent !ehavioral manner was IpresentJ long !efore he
entered marriage. I?nJfortunatel*, on the part of the petitioner, she never
realized that such !ehavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes
patholog*. IsicJ

4 4 4 4

N6 o in the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now l*ing
IsicJ with some!od* else, how will *ou descri!e the character of this
respondent who is living with some!od* elseS

A6 This is where the antisocial personalit* trait of the respondent IsicJ !ecause
an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering activities, who do not
have an* feeling of guilt at the e4pense of another person, and this IisJ again
a !u*9product of deep seated ps*chological incapacit*.

N6 And this ps*chological incapacit* !ased on this particular deep seated IsicJ,
how would *ou descri!e the ps*chological incapacit*S IsicJ

A6 As I said there is a deep seated ps*chological dilemma, so I would sa*
incura!le in nature and at this time and again IsicJ the ps*chological patholog*
of the respondent. /ne pla*s a maBor factor of not !eing a!le to give meaning
to a relationship in terms of sincerit* and endurance.

N6 And if this ps*chological disorder e4ists !efore the marriage of the
respondent and the petitioner, 5adam EitnessS

A6 Clinicall*, an* disorder are usuall* rooted from the earl* formative *ears
and so if it ta+es enough that such ps*chological incapacit* of respondent
alread* e4isted long !efore he entered marriage, !ecause if *ou anal*ze how
he was reared !* her parents particularl* !* the mother, there is alread* an
unhealth* s*m!iosis developed !etween the two, and this creates a maBor
emotional havoc when he reached adult age.

N6 @ow a!out the gravit*S

A6 This is alread* grave simpl* !ecause from the ver* start respondent never
had an in+ling that his !ehavioral manifestation connotes patholog* and second
ground IsicJ, respondent will never admit again that such !ehavior of his
connotes again patholog* simpl* !ecause the disorder of the respondent is not
detrimental to himself !ut, more often than not, it is detrimental to other
part* involved.

4 4 4 4

,R/=C?T/R 5=AGI> TI/>./>6

N6 Kou were not a!le to personall* e4amine the respondent hereS

DR. >=DK TAKA.6

A6 =fforts were made !* the ps*chologist !ut unfortunatel*, the respondent
never appeared at m* clinic.

N6 /n the !asis of those e4aminations conducted with the petitioning wife to
annul their marriage with her hus!and in general, what can *ou sa* a!out the
respondentS

A6 That from the ver* start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning
to their relationship. If *ou anal*ze their marital relationship the* never lived
under one room. From the ver* start of the ImarriageJ, the respondent to
have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their famil* +new
of their marriage IsicJ. Respondent completel* refused, completel*
relin&uished his marital o!ligation to the petitioner.

4 4 4 4


C/?RT6

N6 :ecause *ou have interviewed or *ou have &uestioned the petitioner, can *ou
reall* enumerate the specific traits of the respondentS

DR. >=DK TAKA.6

A6 /ne is the happ*9go9luc+* attitude of the respondent and the dependent
attitude of the respondent.

N6 =ven if he is alread* eligi!le for emplo*mentS

A6 @e remains to !e at the merc* of his mother. @e is a happ*9go9luc+* simpl*
!ecause he never had a set of responsi!ilit*. I thin+ that he finished his
education !ut he never had a sta!le Bo! !ecause he completel* relied on the
support of his mother.

N6 Kou give a more thorough interview so I am as+ing *ou something specificS

A6 The happ*9go9luc+* attitude; the overl* dependent attitude on the part of
the mother merel* !ecause respondent happened to !e the onl* son. I said
that there is a unhealth* s*m!iosis relationship IsicJ developed !etween the
son and the mother simpl* !ecause the mother alwa*s pampered completel*,
pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own sense of
assertion or responsi!ilit* particularl* during that stage and there is also
presence of the simple l*ing act particularl* his responsi!ilit* in terms of
handling emotional im!alance and it is clearl* manifested !* the fact that
respondent refused to !uild a home together with the petitioner when in fact
the* are legall* married. Thirdl*, respondent never felt or completel* ignored
the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilt* hurting the petitioner
!ecause on the part of the petitioner, +nowing that respondent indulge with
another woman it is ver*, ver* traumatic on her part *et respondent never had
the guts to feel guilt* or to atone said act he committed in their relationship,
and clinicall* this falls under antisocial personalit*.
I<(J

In terms of incura!ilit*, Dr. Ta*agMs answer was ver* vague and inconclusive, thus6
4 4 4 4

ATTK. RIC@ARD TA:A./

N6 Can this personall* !e cured, madam witnessS

DR. >=DK TAKA.

A6 Clinicall*, if persons suffering from personalit* disorder cura!le, up to this
ver* moment, no scientific could !e upheld to alleviate their +ind of
personalit* disorder; econdl*, again respondent or other person suffering
from an* +ind of disorder particularl* narcissistic personalit* will never admit
that the* are suffering from this +ind of disorder, and then again 4u9/;5l5'y
<5ll /l</y& ;3 / @u3&'5o0. IsicJ
I<1J


This testimon* shows that while Dr. Ta*ag initiall* descri!ed the general characteristics of a
person suffering from a narcissistic personalit* disorder, she did not reall* show how and to what e4tent
the respondent e4hi!ited these traits. he mentioned the !uzz words that Burisprudence re&uires for
the nullit* of a marriage Q namel*, gravit*, incura!ilit*, e4istence at the time of the marriage,
ps*chological incapacit* relating to marriage Q and in her own limited wa*, related these to the medical
condition she generall* descri!ed. The testimon*, together with her report, however, suffers from ver*
!asic flaws.

First, what she medicall* descri!ed was not related or lin+ed to the respondentMs e4act condition
e4cept in a ver* general wa*. In short, her testimon* and report were rich in generalities !ut disastrousl*
short on particulars, most nota!l* on how the respondent can !e said to !e suffering from narcissistic
personalit* disorder; wh* and to what e4tent the disorder is grave and incura!le; how and wh* it was
alread* present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondentMs
awareness of and his capa!ilit* to underta+e the duties and responsi!ilities of marriage. All these are
critical to the success of the petitionerMs case.

Second, her testimon* was short on factual !asis for her diagnosis !ecause it was wholl* !ased on
what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all e4amine
the respondent, onl* the petitioner. >either the law nor Burisprudence re&uires, of course, that the
person sought to !e declared ps*chologicall* incapacitated should !e personall* e4amined !* a ph*sician or
ps*chologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.
I<$J
If a ps*chological disorder can !e
proven !* independent means, no reason e4ists wh* such independent proof cannot !e admitted and given
credit.
I)2J
>o such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have !een gathered in this case,
particularl* a!out the respondentMs earl* life and associations, and a!out events on or a!out the time of
the marriage and immediatel* thereafter. Thus, the testimon* and report appear to us to !e no more
than a diagnosis that revolves around the one9sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and
were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground e4ists to Bustif* the nullification of the marriage.
Ee sa* this !ecause onl* the !aser &ualities of the respondentMs life were e4amined and given focus; none
of these &ualities were weighed and !alanced with the !etter &ualities, such as his focus on having a Bo!,
his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first si4 months of the
marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and &ualities the petitioner
!rought into her marriage, for e4ample, wh* the respondentMs famil* opposed the marriage and what
events led the respondent to !lame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all
correct. To !e sure, these are important !ecause not a few marriages have failed, not !ecause of
ps*chological incapacit* of either or !oth of the spouses, !ut !ecause of !asic incompati!ilities and
marital developments that do not amount to ps*chological incapacit*. The continued separation of the
spouses li+ewise never appeared to have !een factored in. >ot a few married couples have li+ewise
permanentl* separated simpl* !ecause the* have Ofallen out of love,P or have outgrown the attraction that
drew them together in their *ounger *ears.

Thus, on the whole, we do not !lame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to
the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitionerMs evidence in its present state
is woefull* insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitionerMs marriage to the respondent should
!e nullified on the ground of the respondentMs ps*chological incapacit*.

The Court commiserates with the petitionerMs marital predicament. The respondent ma* indeed !e
unwilling to discharge his marital o!ligations, particularl* the o!ligation to live with oneMs spouse.
>onetheless, we cannot presume ps*chological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to
compl* with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, 5' 5& 0o' 30ou%2 'o 69o73 '2/' / &6ou&3 8/5l31 'o
:33' 25& 93&6o0&5;5l5'y /01 1u'y /& / :/99531 639&o0G 5' 5& 3&&30'5/l '2/' 23 :u&' ;3 &2o<0 'o ;3
504/6/;l3 o8 1o50% &o 1u3 'o &o:3 6&y42olo%54/l 5ll03&&. !23 6&y42olo%54/l 5ll03&& '2/' :u&' /88l54' /
6/9'y /' '23 50436'5o0 o8 '23 :/995/%3 &2oul1 ;3 / :/l/1y &o %9/73 /01 639:/030' /& 'o 1369573 '23
6/9'y o8 25& o9 239 /</9303&& o8 '23 1u'53& /01 93&6o0&5;5l5'53& o8 '23 :/'95:o05/l ;o01 23 o9 &23
</& '230 /;ou' 'o /&&u:3.
I)#J

AEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DEN, the petition and AFFIR( the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated -une '%, '22)and -anuar* #1, '22%, respectivel*, in CA9..R. CG
>o. (%2$%.

)O ORDERED.
8. G.R. No. L-30977 J/0u/9y 31, 1972
CAR(EN LA*U" ),, 93693&30'31 ;y 239 &u;&'5'u'3 (ACARIO LA*U", petitioner9appellant,
vs.
EUFE(IO ). EUFE(IO /l5/& EUFE(IO ), U,, respondent9appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.

RE,E) J.-.L., J./p
,etition, filed after the effectivit* of Repu!lic Act %))2, for review !* certiorari of an order, dated '$
-ul* #$"$, of the -uvenile and Domestic Relations Court of 5anila, in its Civil Case >o. '2<1(, dismissing
said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen /. Aapuz *,
which occurred during the pendenc* of the case, a!ated the cause of action as well as the action itself.
The dismissal order was issued over the o!Bection of 5acario Aapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff
7and petitioner herein8 who sought to su!stitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final
Budgment.
/n #1 August #$%<, Carmen /. Aapuz * filed a petition for legal separation against =ufemio . =ufemio,
alleging, in the main, that the* were married civill* on '# eptem!er #$<) and canonicall* on <2
eptem!er #$<); that the* had lived together as hus!and and wife continuousl* until #$)< when her
hus!and a!andoned her; that the* had no child; that the* ac&uired properties during their marriage; and
that she discovered her hus!and coha!iting with a Chinese woman named .o @io+ at #<#$ isa treet,
5anila, on or a!out 5arch #$)$. he pra*ed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among
others, would order that the defendant =ufemio . =ufemio should !e deprived of his share of the
conBugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent =ufemio . =ufemio alleged affirmative
and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving mone* and other properties, counter9
claimed for the declaration of nullit* ab initio of his marriage with Carmen /. Aapuz *, on the ground of his
prior and su!sisting marriage, cele!rated according to Chinese law and customs, with one .o @io+, alias
>go @io+.
Issues having !een Boined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. :ut !efore
the trial could !e completed 7the respondent was alread* scheduled to present surre!uttal evidence on $
and #1 -une #$"$8, petitioner Carmen /. Aapuz * died in a vehicular accident on <# 5a* #$"$. Counsel for
petitioner dul* notified the court of her death.
/n $ -une #$"$, respondent =ufemio moved to dismiss the 3petition for legal separation3
1
on two 7'8
grounds, namel*6 that the petition for legal separation was filed !e*ond the one9*ear period provided for
in Article #2' of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen a!ated the action for legal separation.
/n '" -une #$"$, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to su!stitute the deceased Carmen !* her
father, 5acario Aapuz. Counsel for =ufemio opposed the motion.
/n '$ -ul* #$"$, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.
2
In the !od* of the order,
the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for su!stitution had to !e resolved on the
&uestion of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the
negative. ,etitioner's moved to reconsider !ut the motion was denied on #% eptem!er #$"$.
After first securing an e4tension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued !*
the Buvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on #) /cto!er #$"$.
The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed !* respondent, who pra*ed for the
affirmance of the said order.
3
Although the defendant !elow, the herein respondent =ufemio . =ufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not
pursue them after the court !elow dismissed the case. @e ac&uiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims !* pra*ing for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not onl* the petition for legal
separation !ut also his counterclaim to declare the =ufemio9Aapuz marriage to !e null and void ab initio.
:ut petitioner Carmen /. Aapuz * 7through her self9assumed su!stitute 0 for the lower court did not
act on the motion for su!stitution8 stated the principal issue to !e as follows6
Ehen an action for legal separation is converted !* the counterclaim into one for a
declaration of nullit* of a marriage, does the death of a part* a!ate the proceedingsS
The issue as framed !* petitioner inBects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one
for declaration of nullit* of a marriage, which is without !asis, for even petitioner asserted that 3the
respondent has ac&uiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim3 7,etitioner's :rief, page ''8. >ot onl*
this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullit* of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adBudication. The* are not insepara!le nor was the action
for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullit* !* the counterclaim, for legal
separation pre9supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullit* has a voida!le marriage as a pre9
condition.
The first real issue in this case is6 Does the death of the plaintiff !efore final decree, in an action for
legal separation, a!ate the actionS If it does, will a!atement also appl* if the action involves propert*
rightsS .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the !ed9and9!oard separation of the
spouses 7there !eing no a!solute divorce in this Burisdiction8 is purel* personal. The Civil Code of the
,hilippines recognizes this in its Article #22, !* allowing onl* the innocent spouse 7and no one else8 to claim
legal separation; and in its Article #21, !* providing that the spouses can, !* their reconciliation, stop or
a!ate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation alread* rendered. :eing personal in
character, it follows that the death of one part* to the action causes the death of the action itself
0 actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... Ehen one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, !ecause the marriage is
dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse ta+es place
during the course of the suit 7Article ')), ection <8. The action is a!solutel* dead 7Cass.,
-ul* '(, #1(#, D. (#. #. 1#; Cass. re&., 5a* 1, #$<<, D. @. #$<<, <<'.38
.
.
5arriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action
for divorce is a proceeding !rought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that
relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the a!sence of a statute to the contrar*,
the death of one of the parties to such action a!ates the action, for the reason that death
has settled the &uestion of separation !e*ond all controvers* and deprived the court of
Burisdiction, !oth over the persons of the parties to the action and of the su!Bect9matter
of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the
death of either part* to a divorce proceeding, !efore final decree, a!ates the action. #
Corpus -uris, '21; Eren v. 5oss, ' .ilman, ('; Danforth v. Danforth, ### Ill. '<"; 5atter of
.randall, #$" >.K. #'(, 1$ >.=. %(1; #<) Am t. Rep. 1<2; #( Ann. Cas. 1(); Eilcon v.
Eilson, (< 5ich, "'2, )# >.E. 1#(; tric+land v. tric+land, 12 Ar+. )%', $( . E. "%$;
5cCurle* v. 5cCurle*, "2 5d. #1%, )% Am. Rep. (#(; :eg!ie v. :eg!ie, #'1 Cal. #%%, "2 ,ac.
""(, )$ A.R.A. #)#.
5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance 7-ohnson vs. :ates,
Ar+. #2# E )#'; # Corpus -uris '218.
A review of the resulting changes in propert* relations !etween spouses shows that the* are solel* the
effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, the* can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it
occurs prior to the decree. /n the point, Article #2" of the Civil Code provides6 .
Art. #2". The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects6
7#8 The spouses shall !e entitled to live separatel* from each other, !ut the marriage !onds
shall not !e severed; .
7'8 The conBugal partnership of gains or the a!solute conBugal communit* of propert* shall
!e dissolved and li&uidated, !ut the offending spouse shall have no right to an* share of the
profits earned !* the partnership or communit*, without preBudice to the provisions of
article #(";
7<8 The custod* of the minor children shall !e awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
otherwise directed !* the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court ma*
appoint a guardian;
7)8 The offending spouse shall !e dis&ualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse !*
intestate succession. 5oreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will
of the innocent one shall !e revo+ed !* operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conBugal partnership of gains 7or
of the a!solute communit* of propert*8, the loss of right !* the offending spouse to an* share of the
profits earned !* the partnership or communit*, or his dis&ualification to inherit !* intestac* from the
innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentar* provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made !* the innocent one, are all rights and disa!ilities that, !* the ver* terms of the Civil Code article,
are vested e4clusivel* in the persons of the spouses; and !* their nature and intent, such claims and
disa!ilities are difficult to conceive as assigna!le or transmissi!le. @ence, a claim to said rights is not a
claim that 3is not there!* e4tinguished3 after a part* dies, under ection #(, Rule <, of the Rules of
Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a su!stitute of the deceased part*.
ec. #(. Death of party. After a part* dies and the claim is not there!* e4tinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
!e su!stituted for the deceased, within a period of thirt* 7<28 da*s, or within such time as
ma* !e granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in ection #, Rule 1(, of the Revised Rules of Court6
=CTI/> #. Actions which ma* and which ma* not !e !rought against e4ecutor or
administrator. >o action upon a claim for the recover* of mone* or de!t or interest thereon
shall !e commenced against the e4ecutor or administrator; !ut actions to recover real or
personal propert*, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an inBur* to person or propert*, real or personal, ma* !e
commenced against him.
>either actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can !e deemed fairl* included in the
enumeration..
A further reason wh* an action for legal separation is a!ated !* the death of the plaintiff, even if
propert* rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
!eing the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into e4istence, so that !efore the
finalit* of a decree, these claims are merel* rights in e4pectation. If death supervenes during the
pendenc* of the action, no decree can !e forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the e4pected conse&uential rights and claims would necessaril* remain un!orn.
As to the petition of respondent9appellee =ufemio for a declaration of nullit* ab initio of his marriage to
Carmen Aapuz, it is apparent that such action !ecame moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and
there could !e no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automaticall* dissolved
the &uestioned union. An* propert* rights ac&uired !* either part* as a result of Article #)) of the Civil
Code of the ,hilippines " could !e resolved and determined in a proper action for partition !* either the
appellee or !* the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the !igamous marriage had not !een void ab initio !ut onl* voida!le under Article 1<,
paragraph ', of the Civil Code, !ecause the second marriage had !een contracted with the first wife
having !een an a!sentee for seven consecutive *ears, or when she had !een generall* !elieved dead, still
the action for annulment !ecame e4tinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as
provided in Article 1(, paragraph ', of the Code, re&uiring that the action for annulment should !e
!rought during the lifetime of an* one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the li&uidation of an*
conBugal partnership that might have resulted from such voida!le marriage must !e carried out 3in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse3, as e4pressl* provided in ection ' of the
Revised Rule (<, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACC/RDI>.AK, the appealed Budgment of the 5anila Court of -uvenile and Domestic Relations is here!*
affirmed. >o special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.