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Rights of the accused

Rights of the accused...........................................................................................................1
1. Criminal due process ....................................................................................................2
2. Self incrimination..........................................................................................................5
3. Custodial Investigation...............................................................................................10
4. Bail ..............................................................................................................................20
5. Presumption of innocence .........................................................................................27
6. Right to be heard........................................................................................................33
7. Assistance of counsel .................................................................................................33
8. Nature and cause of accusation.................................................................................37
9. The Trial ......................................................................................................................41
10. Trial in absentia.......................................................................................................44
11. Right of confrontation ............................................................................................46
12. Compulsory process................................................................................................47
13. Prohibited punishments .........................................................................................50
14. Double jeopardy .....................................................................................................53
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1. Criminal due process
1.1. No person shall be held to answer for an offense without due process of law
(Sec. 14(1), Art III)
1.2. limitations
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1.2.1. limited only to criminal proceedings
1.2.2. limited purely to procedural requirements
1.3. requisites of criminal due process
1.3.1. accused be tried by impartial and competent court
1.3.2. in accordance to procedure prescribed by law and
1.3.3. with proper observance of all the rights accorded him under the constitution
and applicable statutes
1.4. Instances of denial of due process
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1.4.1. Denial of right to preliminary investigation (Patanao vs Enage 121 SCRA 228)
1.4.1.1. Preliminary investigation is only a statutory right
1.4.1.2. Not among the rights prescribed under the Constitution
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1.4.1.3. Denial without valid waiver constitutes denial of due process
1.4.2. Denial of motion to dismiss where evidence against accused is extremely
tenuous (very weak) to sustain a prima facie case (no probable cause exists) -
Salonga v. Panes
1.4.3. When the trial was not conducted in accordance with the rudiments of fair
play, such as when the judge has an pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case
1.4.4. When there is a mistrial because of mob rule or interference or pressure
from a high ranking official preventing the defense or rigging the decision
1.4.5. When there is prejudicial trial by publicity on the duty of government
1.4.6. When the charge was based on an unpublished law, order, regulation, or
ordinance. The law expressly provides for publication of enacted laws, ordinances,
or regulations in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines or in the OG,
before it can have force and effect upon the people governed by it.
1.4.7. Denial of appeal where it is permitted by statute or the constitution
2. Self incrimination
2.1. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art III, Sec 17)
2.2. Based on humanitarian ang practical considerations
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2.2.1. Humanitariian because it prevents the State from exacting testimony that
might convict accused.
2.2.2. Practical because such compulsion perjures the accused for his own
protection
2.3. Availability
2.3.1. In all criminal prosecutions
2.3.2. all other government proceedings
2.3.3. civil actions
2.3.4. administrative or legislative investigations
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2.4. Who can claim
2.4.1. accused
2.4.2. a witness to whom incriminating questions are addressed
2.5. Scope
2.5.1. Covers
2.5.1.1. it covers against incriminating questions
2.5.1.2. Held against testimonial compulsiion only
2.5.1.3. The prohibition covers compulsion for the production of documents,
papers and effects in evidence against the accused, except when the State has
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the right to examine the same, such as books of accounts of corporations under
the police power.
2.5.1.4. Where accused was compelled to furnish a specimen of his hand writing
in evidence against him for falsification charge, the SC held this is covered by the
prohibition, writing is not merely a mechanical act but requires application of
intelligence and attention. (Beltran vs. Samson)
2.5.2. Does not cover
2.5.2.1. Does not cover compulsion to submit to physical examination to
determine involvement in a crime charged.
2.5.2.2. An accused charged with rape was examined for gonorrhea, the SC held
the examination was no different from fingerprint examination for identification
purposes. (US vs. Tan Teng)
2.5.2.3. It was held that the prohibition applies only to the use of physical or
moral compulsiion to extort testimony from accused, it does not exclude body
of accused as evidence when it may be material (Holt vs US)
2.5.2.4. Does not cover all other questions that are relevant and otherwise
allowed
2.5.2.5. It does not cover questions that may relate to past criminality whether
prescribed, acquitted or convicted
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2.5.2.6. Does not cover questions where previous immunity has been granted
under a statute
2.6. When available
2.6.1. Only when the incriminating question is asked of ordinary witness
2.6.1.1. An ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand
(Chavez, vs CA)
2.6.2. in case of the accused, he can refuse at the outset and to take the stand as a
witness for the prosecution, on the reasonable presumption that his interrogation
will be for the purpose to incriminate him (Chavez vs. CA)
2.7. Waiver
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2.7.1. The right may be waived
2.7.2. waived directly or failure to invoke it
2.7.3. Provided waiver is intelligently, unequivocal, certain, willingly made
2.7.4. An accused who voluntarily submits an incriminating documents is deemed
to have waived the privilege.
2.7.5. An accused who takes the stand and offers testimony on direct, he may be
asked on cross examination incriminating questions on matters he testified to on
direct
3. Custodial Investigation
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3.1. Art III, Sec 12
3.1.1. Sec 12 stresses the right of the person under investigation to ""competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice""
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3.1.2. to be provided free if he cannot afford counsel de parte
3.1.3. These rights may be waived subject to the condition that it must be in
writing and in the presence of counsel, who has presumably advised him,
including the waiver of counsel's services (People vs. Galit)
3.2. It means any questioning intiated by law enforcement officers after a person is
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way (Miranda vs. Arizona)
3.3. In RA 7438, custodial investigation shall include the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person suspected with an offense without prejudice to any liability of
the inviting officer for violation of the law
3.4. admissability of extra judicial confession
3.4.1. it must be voluntary
3.4.2. assisted by competent and independent counsel
3.4.3. must be in writing
3.4.4. it must be express
3.5. Miranda doctrine (Miranda vs. Arizona)
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3.5.1. a) Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent
3.5.2. b) that any statement he does make may be used in evidence against him
3.5.3. c) that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed
3.5.4. d) the defendant may waive his rights but waiver must be done voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently
3.5.5. e) However, if he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
investigation that he wishes to consult with an attorney before further speaking,
there can be no questioning.
3.5.6. f) If he is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated the police may not question him
3.5.7. g) The mere fact that he answered some questions on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further questions until he
has consulted with his attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
3.6. Confession inadmissible in violation of right against self incrimination (People vs
Buscato)
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3.6.1. Their conviction was reversed on grounds that the physical, mental,, and
moral coercion exerted upon their persons rendered the confessions inadmissible
as contrary to the right against self incrimination (People vs. Buscato)
3.7. A desirable end must not be accomplished by unconstitutional means (People vs
Bagasala)
3.7.1. The imperative requirements of truth and humanity condemn the use of
force and violence to extract information from unwilling victims. Crimes must be
punished and the guilty must not escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be
attained by unconstitutional means. (People vs Bagasala)
3.8. The interrogating officer must exercise patience in explaining the custodial
rights (People vs. Ramos)
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3.8.1. As mandated, it is not enough that the police merely inform the accused of
his constitutional right to silence and to counsel... the interrogating officer must
have patience in explaining these rights to him (the court observed the appellant
has only finished Grade 6, which indicates he is not fully educated enough to
understand fully and fairly the significance of his constitutional rights to silence
and to counsel). Conviction was reversed (People vs Ramos)
3.9. The manner of informing the accused must satisfy the requirements of the law
(People vs Galit, Morales vs. Enrile)
3.9.1. The manner of informing the accused through a lengthy statement of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel followed by the question of whether
he was ready to make his statement, to which the accused replied in a
monosyllabic answer, ""Opo"", does not satisfy the requirements of the law that
the accused be informed of his rights (People vs Galit, citing Morales vs. Enrile)
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3.10. Confession by a person whose sanity is dubious and where intelligence is not
only limited but impaired must be disapproved (People vs. Capitin)
3.10.1. A reading of the supposed confession shows there was the mechanical
advise of the suspect's rights including assistance of counsel, followed by the
sacramental query as to whether or not she was waiving her rights to such
assistance and followed by a stereotype answer in statements of this nature. The
question was unacceptable, the answer thereto, is likewise unacceptable, as it
could not have been possibly composed by accused appellant in her state of mind
at the time (assuming she was sane) and given her limited knowledge of Tagalog
(a 22 year old housemaid with her deficiencies in Tagalog, has killed her own child
and was under strong emotional stress). If confessions written in advance by
police officers for persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment is
outlawed, the same disapprobation applies where a confession was signed by a
person whose sanity is dubious, where the intelligence was not only limited but
impaired. (People vs Capitin)
3.11. The swearing officers should have the confessant physically examined by
independent doctors before administering the oath, to discourage attempts to
secure confessions through violence (People vs. Barros)
3.12. When does right to counsel attach? (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
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3.12.1. The right to counsel attached upon the start of an investigation, i.e., the
investigation officer begins to ask questions to elicit information or confession
from the accused (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
3.13. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation
3.13.1. A police line up is not part of the custodial investigation and the right to
counsel is not required. However, after the start of the custodial investigation, any
identification of an accused without the presence of counsel made in a police line
up is inadmissible. (Gamboa vs. Cruz)
3.14. The right to counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People
vs Compil)
3.14.1. Where the accused was arrested in Quezon, subjected by the police to
informal inculparoty interrogation that continued during their trip back to Manila,
where his formal investigation was conducted at the police station and was
without assistance of counsel until the following day, the SC held that his right to
counsel began when the interrogation started in Quezon (People vs. Compil)
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3.15. The operative act of custodial investigation (People vs Compil)
3.15.1. The operative act is when the question is no longer a general inquiry but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting
incriminatory statements (People vs Compil)
3.16. The constitution requires an effective and vigilant counsel (People vs Lucero)
3.16.1. In People vs Lucero, the SC held that the Constitution requires not just any
kind of counsel, but an effective and vigilant counsel. In the case, the counsel
merely signed a confession to authenticate regularity when in fact such confession
was made under duress during interrogation by military escorts. The lawyer failed
to perform his duty when he merely asks if such confession was freely made and
did not ascertain the matter if such was the case before signing the same.
3.17. A re-enactment of the cirme in the absence of counsel is inadmissible
evidence against accused. (People vs. Suarez)
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3.18. The waiver of the suspect's custodial rights without assistance of counsel is
invalid (People vs Bonola)
3.19. The taking of confession before advising the suspect of his custodial rights is
inadmissible in evidence against him (People vs Andan)
3.20. The right to counsel is not unlimited where the accused repeatedly asked for
postponement of his trial on grounds he was still looking for a lawyer de parte. The
court should appoint counsel de officio for him. (People vs Serzo)
3.21. The right to counsel is absolute subject only to the limitation that it be
exercised within a reasonable time
3.21.1. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial, and even appeal, the
accused has the option to be represented by counsel of his choice. In the event
that accused refuses or neglects to exercise this right during arraignment and trial,
the court should appoint one for him. While the right to counsel is absolute, the
accused's option to exercise it is limited and cannot be sanctioned to trifle with
the Rules or prejudice the right of the State to prosecute and the offended party
to speedy and adequate justice. (People vs. Serzo)
3.22. Under RA 7399, victims of unjust imprisonment, arbitrary or illegal detention
or of violent crimes may file a claim for damages with the Board of Claims under the
DOJ. For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the award shall be not more
than P1,000.oo per month of detention/imprisonment. In all other cases, the award
shall not exceed 10,000.oo or the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical
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treatment, loss of wage, loss of support, or other expenses directly related to the
injury, whichever is lower, without prejudice to the right of claimants to seek other
remedies under existing laws.
4. Bail
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4.1. All persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. (Art III, Sec. 13)
4.2. Definition
4.2.1. Bail is the security given for the provisional release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him or a bondsmand conditioned upon his appearance
before any court as may be required.
4.3. Bail as a matter of right
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4.3.1. Rule 114 of the Rules provide that all persons in custody shall be entitled to
bail as a matter of right except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of
guilt is strong.
4.3.2. Even if the crime imputed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, th]e accused
is still entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt is NOT strong. It is for the prosecution
to prove the contrary although it is not necessary at this point to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. (Pareja vs Gomez)
4.4. Exception to right to bail
4.4.1. The exception to bail applies to any offense which under prevailing laws at
the time of its commission and at the time of application for bail, may be punished
by reclusion perpetua or death, even if a lesser penalty may be imposed upon
conviction owing to mitigating circumstances that may be disclosed later (People
vs. Marcos)
4.4.2. However, an accused is entitled to bail if for example, he is charged with
murder (capital offense) and evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing
for bail indicates only a case of homicide (Bernardez vs. Valera)
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4.5. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution has reversed the ruling in Garcia-Padilla
vs. Enrile where it provides the right to bail is preserved even if the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
4.6. When bail is cancelled and accused placed in confinement
4.6.1. Where the accused is convicted of a capital offense or of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, his bail shall be cancelled, and shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal (People vs. Cortez)
4.7. Hearing for petition for bail is required to satisfy due process (Gerardo vs. CFI)
4.7.1. May be done summarily or held in the course of the trial itself. A separate
hearing is not necessary (Gerardo vs. CFI)
4.8. Probability of escape is not ground for denial of bail (Zafra vs. City Warden)
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4.8.1. The remedy is to increase the bail subject to the prohibition that it must not
be excessive. (Zafra vs. City Warden)
4.8.2. After conviction, denial of bail is proper on grounds of risk of absconding
(Zafra vs. City warden)
4.9. On humanitarian grounds, bail may be granted even when the evidence of guilt
of the offense was strong in view of the illness of the accused which required his
hospitalization (Dela Rama vs. People's Court)
4.10. Primary considerations in fixing the amount of bail (not exclusive) - Rule 114
4.10.1. Financial capability of accused
4.10.2. The nature and circumstances of the offense
4.10.3. The penalty for the offense charged
4.10.4. The character and reputation of the accused
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4.10.5. his age and health
4.10.6. The weight of the evidence against him
4.10.7. The probability of his appearing in trial
4.10.8. The forfeiture of other bonds by him
4.10.9. The fact of his being a fugitive from justice when arrested
4.10.10. The pendency of other cases in which he is under bond
4.11. Bail not intended as punishment (Yap vs. CA)
4.11.1. The respondent court fixed the bail for appellant in the sum of P5,500,000.
equivalent to his civil liability as found by the trial court. The SC reduced the bail
to P200k, saying that bail is not intended as punishment nor as satisfaction of civil
liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. (Yap
vs. CA)
4.12. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines
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4.12.1. A person granted bail while facing estafa charges wanted to leave for
abroad to attend to certain business matters. He was denied permission, on
appeal to the SC the denial was sustained on the ground that if he were allowed
to leave without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the
courts (Manotoc vs. CA)
5. Presumption of innocence
5.1. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved (Art. III, Sec. 14(a))
5.2. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt (People vs. Dramayo)
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5.2.1. The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
5.2.2. It is the duty of the prosecution to establish the defendant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
5.2.3. otherwise, he is entitled to acquittal
5.2.4. Conviction will depend not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution.
5.3. Even up the odds in the interest of justice
5.3.1. The presumption of innocence to be fully adhered to requires that there be
evidence sufficient to remove every vestige of reasonable doubt (US vs. Reyes)
5.3.2. Moral certainty not absolute certainty is required by the law to convict of
any criminal charge and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense (US vs. Lasada)
5.3.3. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies,
not even called upon to offer evidence on their behalf. (People vs Dramayo)
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5.3.4. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence (People vs Malilay, also citing above cases)
5.4. The evidence of the defendant was weak, but the evidence of prosecution was
weaker (People vs. Sunga)
5.4.1. In People vs Sunga, a prosecution for rape, the SC held that although the
defense of appellant was weak, he nevertheless could not be convicted because of
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The evidence of the prosecution is
weaker.
5.5. The constitutional provision is expilcit
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5.5.1. Explicit is the constitutional provision that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso (of a
statute) contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate
is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. (Dumlao case)
5.6. An ambiguous evidence cannot justify condemnation of appellant (People vs
Tempongko)
5.6.1. The guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt...
The defense is weak, to be sure, but for all the persuasive arguments of the
SolGen and the private prosecutor, this Court remains unconvinced that the
appellant raped the complainant. The appellant may have been lying and there is
evidence to this, but we are not prepared to accept, to the point of moral
certainty, that the complainant is telling the truth. The ambiguous evidence of the
prosecution cannot justify our condemning the appellant to prison where there
are whispers of doubt that he is guilty. (People vs. Tempongko)
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5.7. It may be overcome by contrary presumptions based on the experience of
human conduct (People vs. Labara)
5.7.1. Unexplained flight may lead to an inference of guilt
5.7.2. Failure of accused to explain his possession of stolen property may give rise
to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who stole it (US vs Espia)
5.7.3. Under the RPC, failure of an accountable officer to produce funds or
property entrusted to him constitutes prima facie evidence of misappropriation to
personal uses (Art 217)
5.8. How about the presumption of regularity of official functions?
5.8.1. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions
cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an
accused, particularly when the prosecution's evidence is weak. xxx the onus
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probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the
innocence of the accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt
(People vs Mirantes)
5.9. After the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of
innocence must yeild to what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated
(People vs. Villaluz)
5.9.1. It is incumbent on the accused who admitted the killing to establish his case
of self defense instead of relying merely on the weakness of the prosecution
(People vs. Regulacion)
5.10. On the right to remain silent
5.10.1. No inference of guilt may be drawn against an accused for his failure to
make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused shall not in
any manner prejudice or be used against him. (People vs. Arciaga)
5.10.2. While accused have a right to remain silent, they run the risk of an
inference from the non-production of evidence (People vs Solis)
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5.10.3. Failure of accused to testify may prejudice him if the prosecution has
already established a prima facie case against him (People vs Resano)
5.10.4. The duty to apprise the accused of the right to be silent rests with the
defense counsel, not with the court (People vs Tampus)
6. Right to be heard
6.1. ... and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel...
6.2. Such a right is indispensable in any criminal prosecution where the stakes are
the liberty or even the life of the accused who must for this reason be given the
chance to defend himself.
6.3. The SC set aside the conviction of three co-accused after finding they were
denied due process because they were not given a chance to testify and to present
additional evidence on their behalf. (People v. Lumague)
7. Assistance of counsel
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7.1. The right to counsel begins from the time a person is taken into custody and
placed under investigation for the commission of a crime (People vs. Lino)
7.2. The reason why the accused is entitled to be heard by himself and counsel.
7.2.1. An ordinary layman, let alone one who is ignorant or unlettered, is without
knowledge of the intricacies of courtroom procedures. That is why the accused is
entitled to be heard in his defense not only by himself but also with the assistance
of counsel. He shall be appointed a counsel de officio if he cannot afford the
services of a retained lawyer.
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7.2.2. A counsel de officio should still, despite objection of accused, be appointed
by the court to represent him.
7.3. The right to counsel is essential in criminal proceedings
7.3.1. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel... Even the most intelligent man may have no
skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. It is for this reason that the right to counsel
is deemed important that it has become a constitutional right and is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure, it is not enough for the court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de officio for him if he is poor or if he so desires, grant him reasonable
time to procure an attorney of his own (People vs. Holgado)
7.4. The duty of the court is not ended with such appointment, as it should also see
to it that counsel de oficio is doing his duty by the defendant.
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7.4.1. Counsel de oficio should not merely make the motions of defending the
accused but exert his utmost efforts as if he were representing a paying client.
7.4.2. The SC has reversed convictions based on pleas of guilty made on advice of
counsel de oficio presumably seeking to avoid the inconveniences of
unremunerated services. (People vs. Hondolero)
7.4.3. Thus, the judge should take extra care in informing the accused of his rights
and the consequences of his plea of guilty, and in ascertaining the presence of
different circumstances taken into account in imposing the proper penalty (People
vs. Alde)
7.4.3.1. Justice Makasiar scolded the trial court for its pro forma appointment of
a counsel de ofico, who in turn did not exert his best efforts for the protection of
his non-paying client, and its own failure to explain to defendant the
consequences of his plea of guilty. The judgment was set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings (People vs. Magsi)
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7.4.4. In People vs. Malunsing, a defendant in a murder case had lost confidence in
his former counsel and made manifest his intention to retain counsel de parte.
Nevertheless the court appointed the same lawyer as his counsel de oficio. As the
case proceeded, no evidence was adduced in behalf of the defendant. On appeal
of his conviction, the SC remanded the case for new trial in view of the violation of
the constitutional rights of the accused.
7.5. Note that the right to be silent and to the assistance of counsel may be waived
during custodial investigation under Art III, Sec. 12 (1). The right to counsel does not
cease after trial but continues even when the case is appealed (People vs Rio)
8. Nature and cause of accusation
8.1. to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him...
8.2. The defendant is entitled to know the nature and cause of accusation against
him so he can adequately prepare for his defense. He cannot defend if he has to
guess at the charge leveled against him because of the ambiguous language of the
complaint or information.
8.3. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated
in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of
the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person
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of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and to
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Rule 110 Sec. 8, Rules of Court)
8.4. The description and not the designation of the offense is controlling. Hence even
if there be an erroneous designation, the accused may still be validly convicted of
the crime described in the information.
8.4.1. In Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, a prosecutor entrapped by the NBI was
charged with and convicted of violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The SC agreed with him that the said law was inapplicable but rejected his
submission that he could not also be convicted of bribery under the RPC because
this would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him. ""Wrong,"" said justice Abad Santos. ""A reading of the
information... clearly makes out a case of bribery.""
8.4.2. A person charged with rape, of which he was later absolved, could not be
convicted of qualified seduction which was not included in the information. A
separate charge should be filed alleging all the elements of qualified seduction.
(People vs. Ramirez; People vs. Quintal)
8.4.3. The conviction was rape by intimidation, whereas the information charge
the accused with raping his daughter while she was asleep and unconscious,
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violates his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him. (People vs. Abino)
8.4.4. The conviction was for having indirectly caused the death of the
complainant, (who took her own life two days after the alleged incident of rape),
whereas the information alleges rape. The SC held: The judgment indicates the
accused was convicted of homicide. If this is so, the lower court is in grave error
for he was never charged with said offense; he was accused of and tried for rape.
(People vs Montes)
8.4.5. A person charged with homicide by drowning could not be convicted with
homicide by stabbing which was not the crime alleged in the information (People
v. Ortega)
8.5. Void for vagueness rule
8.5.1. Where the statute itself is couched in such indefinite language, such that it
is not possible for men of ordinary intelligence to determine therefrom what acts
or omissions are punished and hence, should be avoided.
8.5.2. To charge an accused for penalties under a statute couched in vague
language constitutes denial of the right to be informed of the charge against him,
and to due process as well.
8.5.3. Reasonable degree of certainty and not absolute precision for a statute to
be upheld.
40
8.5.3.1. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.
The vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld-not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude...
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity is permissible, as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)
8.6. The purpose of arraignment is to inform the accused why he is being
prosecuted.
8.6.1. An arraignment assures [the defendant] that he be fully acquainted with the
nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under which it is
allegedly committed. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
(Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan)
41
8.7. The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means,
whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him
denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and
fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was
determined was not safeguarded. (People vs Crisologo)
9. The Trial
9.1. to have a speedy, impartial and public trial... (Sec 14 (2))
9.2. impartial trial
9.2.1. requires the cold neutrality of an impartial judge to ensure that justice is
done to the defendant. (Gutierrez vs Santos)
9.2.2. It was held as part of the rule that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial (Fernandez vs. Presbitero)
9.2.3. It is beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair and just (Mateo vs Villaluz)
9.2.4. Convictions are based not on mere appearance of the accused (tadtad ng
tattoo), but on his actual commission of the offense, to be ascertained with the
42
pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or
malice and always with justice (People vs. Opida)
9.3. public trial
9.3.1. Publicity is necessary to avoid abuses that may be committed by the court
to the prejudice of the defendant.
9.3.2. The people have the right to attend the proceedings to see whether or not
the constitutional safeguards for the benefit of the accused are being observed.
9.3.2.1. This rule is not absolute. The court can bar the public in certain cases,
like rape trials.
9.4. speedy trial
43
9.4.1. Defined as one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppresive delays (Flores
vs People, 61 SCRA 331)
9.4.2. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi judicial, or administrative bodies. (Art III, Sec. 16, Bill of Rights)
9.4.3. We lay down the legal proposition that where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest
beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus, to compel a dismissal of
the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom (Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650)
9.4.4. The respondent court's delay of more than one year in resolving petitioner's
motion to dismiss the charges against him violated the right to speedy trial,
considering all pertinent pleadings required by the Sandiganbayan had already
been submitted (Cojuanco vs. Sandiganbayan)
9.4.5. It was held, since the prosecution, by repeated motions for postponement
caused the delay of the proceedings from the time the information was filed in
Feb 1996, from which time the test of violation of the right to speedy trial is to be
counted, the dismissal of the case, on motion of the accused, amounts to
acquittal. (Padilla vs. Apas, 487 SCRA 29)
44
9.4.6. Speed is not the chief objective of a trial... more than the mere convenience
of the courts or the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby are more important than a race to end the trial. (Amberti v. CA)
9.4.7. The right to speedy trial, which begins from the filing of the information,
cannot be quantified in a specified number of days... but must be examined in
light of surrounding circumstances such as the unavailability of witnesses.(Martin
vs. Ver, 123 SCRA 745)
9.5. The right to be present at trial is personal and can be waived.
9.5.1. However, the rule is subject to qualification, for purposes of identification,
the accused may be required to be present at the hearing where the prosecution
intends to introduce witnesses who will identify him. (People vs. Presiding Judge,
People vs. Macaraeg, 141 SCRA 37)
9.5.2. She had by repeated failure to attend the hearings waived her right to the
trial, adding that speedy justice is as much a prerogative of an accused as of
complainant (People vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957)
10. Trial in absentia
45
10.1. Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights provide ""after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
10.2. Requisites
10.2.1. a) the accused has already been arraigned
10.2.2. b) he has been duly notified of the trial
10.2.3. c) his failure to appear is unjustified
10.3. In the old case of People vs Avacena, the case of the defendant was
suspended on grounds that his presence is required at certain stages of the trial.
Thus, his escape operate to his advantage. Now, the doctrine has been qualified by
Sec. 14, which allows trial in absentia. Thus, escape will operate as a waiver of his
right to be present and not interrupt his trial. Also the requirement of due notice
will be deemed received by him on the fact of his escape. The fact of his escape will
46
make his failure to appear unjustified because he has by escaping placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection of the law (People vs. Salas)
10.4. A judgment of conviction will be set aside if it appears the accused was tried
and convicted in his absence before he had been formally arraigned. (Borja vs
Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422)
10.5. Arraignment is an indispensable pre-requisite to trial in absentia, to accord an
accused due process. (Borja vs Mendoza)
10.6. The court has the power to forfeit the bail bond if the accused fails to appear
at his trial (Rule 114, Sec 18)
10.7. The trial court committed a grave error in reconsidering its original order and
deferred confiscation of bail bond of accused, who had already gone abroad and
could not attend his trial, as being premature until judgment is rendered. (People
vs. Prieto)
11. Right of confrontation
11.1. to meet the witnesses face to face...
11.2. To give the accused an opportunity of cross examination (US vs Javier)
11.3. To prevent convictions based on depositions or ex parte affidavits which are
regarded as hearsay and excluded by the Rules of Court.
47
11.4. An affidavit implicating the accused as a drug pusher was rejected as mere
hearsay by the SC because the affiant had not been presented in court and so could
not be cross examined by the defense. (People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312)
11.5. A conviction based on mere affidavits and denying the defense the right to..
cross examine the affiants was annulled by the SC. (Combate vs. San Jose 135 SCRA
693)
11.6. the witness must be presented in court
11.6.1. to enable the accused to confront him on cross examination
11.6.2. to enable the court to observe his demeanor and guage the credibility of
his testimony
11.7. Depositions and ex parte affidavits are inadmissible unless the person making
them are presented in court for examination on their statements by the judge and
the accused. Evidence of this nature is hearsay and excluded by the rules.
11.8. if a prosecution witness dies before his cross examination can be completed,
his direct testimony cannot be stricken off the record, provided the material points
of his direct testimony had been covered on cross.(People vs. Seneres)
12. Compulsory process
48
12.1. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf...
12.2. Accused is entitled to issuance of
12.2.1. subpoena
12.2.1.1. for the purpose of securing the attentance of witnesses
12.2.2. subpoena duces tecum
49
12.2.2.1. for the purpose of production of evidence in his behalf
12.2.3. Failure to comply consitutes contempt and a witness may be arrested so
he can give the needed evidence.
12.3. There is denial of the right to compulsory process where the court, instead of
taking steps to compel the attendance of a witness, held the defense responsible for
bringing her to trial and that her testimony will be dispensed with if she fails to
appear in the proceeding. (People vs Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388)
12.4. Where medical evidence can be adduced through other witnesses and
hospital records, the refusal of the trial court to grant leave to serve written
interrogatories on a doctor who already left for abroad can be sustained (Fajardo vs.
Garcia, 99 SCRA 514)
12.5. Exceptional circumstances on conditional examination (Rule 119)
12.5.1. Where the testimony is material and the witness is so sick as to afford
reasonable ground to believe that he will not be able to attend the trial
50
12.5.2. Where the witness resides more than 100 kilometers from the place of
trial and has no means to attend the same
12.5.3. Other similar circumstances exists that would prevent him from attending
the trial
12.6. The right to compulsary processes must be invoked during trial. Failure to do
so constitutes a waiver that cannot be undone on appeal. (US vs. Garcia, 10 Phil.
384)
13. Prohibited punishments
13.1. Sec 19(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it....
13.2. To be violative, the penalty must be inhuman and barbarous and shocking to
the conscience (People vs. Dionisio)
13.3. Torture is a cruel punishment because it involves a deliberate design to
increase the suffering of a prisoner in a manner so flagrant and oppressive as to
revolt the moral sense of the community.
13.4. When is punishment degrading and inhuman
51
13.4.1. A prostitute required to go naked in public in expiation of her crime
13.4.2. A thief to wear a stigmatizing emblem of his calling in public
13.5. The death penalty
13.5.1. is not allowed except as penalty for heinous crimes as provided in RA
7659.
13.6. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
13.6.1. The punishment must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the
community, not merely harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty
to be obnoxious to the Constitution (People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil 674)
13.6.2. A punishment cruel, degrading and inhuman also violates the due process
clause which requires the equivalence between the degree of the offense and the
degree of the penalty.
52
13.6.3. There are penalties not normally proportionate to the offense in some
instances are imposed without violating the fundamental law, such as where the
offense has become rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective
deterrent.
13.7. Excessive fines
13.7.1. this prohibition is addressed to the legislature and to the courts
13.7.2. In determination of the fine to be imposed,
13.7.2.1. take into account the financial condition of the convict. to prevent the
fine from becoming excessive and discriminatory.
13.7.3. A fine is imposed as a penalty and not as payment for a specific loss or
injury, and since its lightness or severity depends upon the culprit's wealth or
means, it is only just and proper that the latter be taken into account in fixing the
amount (People vs Ching Kuan, 74 Phil. 23)
13.7.4. Obviously, to impose the same amount of fine for the same offense upon
two persons thus differently circumstanced would be to mete out to them a
53
penalty of unequal severity and hence, unjustly discriminatory (People vs. Ching
Kuan)
14. Double jeopardy
14.1. Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
14.2. Definition
54
14.2.1. The right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution again of any
person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
14.2.2. The object is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be put to the dangers and anxiety
of a second charge against him for the same offense.
14.3. Requisites of
14.3.1. a) a valid coomplaint or information
14.3.2. b) filed before competent court
14.3.3. c) to which the defendant had pleaded
14.3.4. d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
14.4. Complaint or information (not defective)
55
14.4.1. An invalid complaint or information cannot lead to a valid judgment and
hence will not place the accused under jeopardy
14.4.2. Where the original information is defective and on motion of accused the
case is dismissed, the correct information may be validly refiled without the
accused placed in jeopardy.
14.4.3. However, if, without the express consent of the accused, the information
is dismissed on the ground that it is defective, when in fact it is not so, another
prosecution based on the same allegation will constitute double jeopardy.
14.5. Competent court (Jurisdiction)
56
14.5.1. A court devoid of jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment
14.5.2. Thus a person charged in a court without jurisdiction cannot plead double
jeopardy when tried anew for the same offense by a competent court as the first
prosecution never placed him in jeopardy.
14.5.3. Where a charge for estafa was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction
and subsequently a charge for the same offense was commenced in a court with
57
competent jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the defendant
had not been in danger of conviction in the original prosecution. (People vs.
Galano)
14.5.4. Where the defendant was convicted in the first proceedings which was
not recorded and on appeal the defendant was convicted anew in a court with
concurrent original jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not attach because the first
proceeding was void for lack of record. Double jeopardy requires a valid previous
proceedings. (People vs. Brecinio)
14.5.5. Where a court martial and a civil court have concurrent jurisdiction, a
decision by one court will bar another prosecution for the same offense in the
other court. (Crisologo vs People)
14.5.6. Where an information is motu proprio dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by
a court which is actually competent to hear it, the dismissal will inure to the
benefit of the accused, who is entitled to plead double jeopardy. (US v. Regala, 28
Phil. 57)
14.5.7. Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, (Olaguer doctrine) - held
that military courts have no jurisdiction to try cases of civilians which fell under
the competence of ordinary civil courts even during the period of martial law. No
jeopardy in retrial in competent civil courts because of absence of jurisdiction of
courts martial to try and convict prisoners. There is jeopardy if there is a valid
previous proceeding. Absent a valid previous proceeding, retrial in competent civil
courts will not result in double jeopardy.
14.5.8. Tan vs. Barrios, 160 SCRA 702 - The Olaguer doctrine applies prospectively
only to future cases and cases still pending when that decision was promulgated.
No retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of Olaguer
decision.
14.6. Valid plea (after arraignment)
58
14.6.1. A defendant is never place in jeopardy until after he shall have pleaded to
the charge against him during arraignment.
14.6.2. Where a defective complaint was dismissed before arraignment of
defendant and an amended complaint was later filed, double jeopardy does not
attach because there was no valid previous indictment. (US vs. Solis, 6 Phil 676)
14.6.3. The accused pleaded guilty during arraignment. Thereafter, defendant
testified to prove mitigating circumstances. The trial court acquitted the
defendant. The government appealed. The defendant interposed the defense of
double jeopardy. The SC held there had been no standing plea at the time the trial
court rendered its judgment of acquittal because the testimony of accused had
the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. Thus double jeopardy did not attach with
respect to the appeal. (People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119)
14.7. Termination of case
59
14.7.1. General rule: a dismissal with the express consent of the defendant will
not bar another prosecution for the same offense because said consent amounts
to waiver of his right against double jeopardy.
14.7.2. To be effective, the consent must be expressly given. Mere silence or
failure to object to the dismissal are excluded. (People vs Ylagan)
14.7.3. In the morning, the prosecutor moved for dismissal of the case for
frustrated murder on ground of lack of jurisdiction because intent to kill was not
alleged in the information. Counsel for the defense manifested he had no
objection to the dismissal. The court granted the motion. In the afternoon of the
same day, accused filed a manifestation making of record his opposition to the
dismissal of the case. The motion was denied. The prosecutor later filed a new
information for the same offense. The accused moved to quash on double
jeopardy. The motion was granted holding the dismissal was erroneous, and not
made with the express consent of defendant. The SC held that the oral
manifestation of counsel of accused that he had no objection to dismissal of the
case was equivalent to a declaration of conformity to its dismissal or to an express
consent to its termination within the meaning of Section 9 Rule 117.
60
14.7.4. Where the motion to dismiss by accused was granted on grounds of
insufficient information, he cannot invoke double jeopardy on grounds that the
original information was sufficient when the case is refiled on a corrected
information (People vs. Reyes, 98 Phil. 646)
14.7.5. Neither can he, upon dismissal on motion for lack of jurisdiction, question
his prosecution on same offense before another court, on grounds that the first
court had jurisdiction after all. The SC will not permit him to make a mockery of
justice by taking inconsistent positions (People vs Acierto, 92 Phil. 534)
14.7.6. The question to be resolved is whether the state can reserve the power to
re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has
absolved him of the offense? We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the
government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a
person is acquitted on a criminal charge, he can no longer be detained or re-
arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basiic and elementary that it
needs no elaboration (Toyoto vs. Ramos, 139 SCRA 316)
14.7.7. Appeal of prosecution
14.7.7.1. The prosecution can appeal where the accused is deemed to have
waived or estopped from invoking his right against double jeopardy.
61
14.7.7.2. Exception: double jeopardy is available to the accused where
dismissal of prosecution against him, even with his express consent, was based
on insufficiency of evidence(Pp vs. City Court of Silay) or denial of his right to
speedy trial (Pp vs. Anano 97 phil 28)
14.7.7.3. The order of dismissal of the charge for falsification was based on the
merits (on the ground that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt) and,
although erroneous (the dismissal) amounted to an acquittal which therefore
could not be appealed by the government (People vs. City Court of Silay)
14.7.7.4. The prosecutor was not ready because his witness was absent. The
accused insisted on their right to speedy trial. The judge on his own volition
provisionally dismissed the case without the defendant's express consent. The
SC held the case could not be reviewed (on appeal) because double jeopardy
had attached. (Esmena vs. Pogoy, 100 SCRA 861)
14.7.7.5. A motion to quash was filed before defendant makes his plea, can be
appealed as he has not yet been placed in jeopardy (Rule 117)
14.7.7.6. The accused was acquitted without giving the prosecution its day in
court, amount to denial of due process may be validly appealed (Pp vs. Navarro
63 SCRA 264)
14.7.7.7. An order of dismissal or an acquittal made with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction may be appealed (People vs Pablo,
98 SCRA 289)
14.7.7.8. Where a person tried for theft was acquitted of the separate charge of
grave coercion may be appealed (Pp v. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277)
14.8. Crimes covered
62
14.8.1. If the four elements of double jeopardy are present the accused may not
be prosecuted anew for the original offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the original
information or complaint.
14.8.1.1. A person acquitted of murder cannot be prosecuted again for the
same murder, or for homicide, as this is embraced in the first offense.
14.8.1.2. If the original prosecution for homicide fails, he cannot again be
indicted, this time for murder, as this embraces the original charge.
14.8.1.3. The effect of prosecuting first the lesser offense where a larger
offense has been committed and could be prosecuted would be to split the
larger offense into its lesser parts, thus bringing the man into jeopardy for each
of such parts. This is unthinkable. The State in electing to prosecute the first one
waives, in legal effect, all the others. (People vs. Besa, 74 Phil 57)
14.9. Doctrine of supervening event
63
14.9.1. Under the doctrine of supervening event, the accused may be prosecuted
for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character of the
first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted.
14.9.1.1. A person convicted of physical injuries may still be prosecuted for
homicide, if the victim dies later (Diaz v. US)
14.9.1.2. The accused was charged with slight physical injuries. He pleaded not
guilty. The charge was later changed to serious physical injuries when it
appeared that the wounds inflicted, after healing, had left permanent scars on
64
the face of the victim. The SC held that there was no double jeopardy as the
deformity did not exist and could not have been apprehended at the time the
first information was filed. (People vs. Adil, 76 SCRA 462)
14.9.2. Instances in Rule 117 where the conviction of accused shall not bar
another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged
in the first complaint or information:
14.9.2.1. a) a graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from
the same act or omission constituting the former charge.
14.9.2.2. b) the facts constituting the graver offense became known or were
discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information or
14.9.2.3. c) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in Sec.
1(f) of Rule 116.
14.10. Inseparable offenses
65
14.10.1. Where one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the
same act, they cannot be the subject of separate prosecutions.
14.10.1.1.A person indicted for smoking opium cannot be charged also with
possessing opium (US vs. Pho Chi, 20 Phil. 140)
66
14.10.1.2.One convicted of less physical injuries cannot be later charged with
assault on a person in authority committed on the same occasion and against
the same victim (Tacas vs. Cariaso, 72 SCRA 528)
14.10.2. However, it is possible for one act to give rise to several crimes, in which
case separate prosecutions for each crime may be filed, provided the elements of
the several crimes are not identical.
14.10.2.1.Example; a person while driving without a license involved in an
accident may be prosecuted both for damage to property and violation of the
Motor Vehicles Law (People vs. Guanco, 47 OG 4179)
14.10.2.2.A pardonee who commits the crime of falsification and thus violates
the condition of his pardon can be prosecuted for both offenses without denial
of the right against double jeopardy.(Culanag vs Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA
1123)
14.10.2.3.The carrying of an unlicensed firearm during election period
constitutes two offenses arising from the same act that can be separately
prosecuted (Tapales vs CA, 120 SCRA 471)
67
14.10.2.4.Conviction of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code does not bar
prosecution for estafa (People vs. Saley, 291 SCRA 715)
14.10.2.5.When the subsequent information charges another and different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited
double jeopardy. In the case, it appears clear to us, the first offense charged is
that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penailzed under a special
statute, while the second offense charged was that of murder punished under
the RPC. These two offenses in themselves are different one from the other,
such that in principle the subsequent filing of the second charged is not to be
regarded as having place appellant in prohibited second jeopardy. (People vs.
Tac-an)
14.10.2.6.A plea of double jeopardy cannot be accorded merit where two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law however closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. Protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. Where two different
laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same technical offense.(same facts), if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.(Perez vs CA 168
SCRA 236)
14.10.2.7.Common elements between consented abduction and qualified
seduction; (1) the offended party is a virgin, and (2) she must be over 12 and
under 18 years of age. However, two elements differentiate the two crimes. In
consented abduction; (1) the taking away of the offended party must be with
her consent and (2) the taking away must be with lewd design. In qualified
abduction (1) the crime was committed by abuse of authority, confidence, or
relationship (2) the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman. (Perez vs.
CA)
14.11. An act violating a law or ordinance
68
14.11.1. Two kinds of double jeopardy (Yap vs. Luterom[1959])
14.11.1.1.The first sentence provide, no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense
14.11.1.1.1. This prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense
14.11.1.1.2. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act, provided he is charged with different offenses or
69
the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include the
crime charged in the other case.
14.11.1.2.The second sentence provide, if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
14.11.1.2.1. This prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same act
14.11.1.2.2. The second sentence applies even if the offenses charged are not
the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and
the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one
of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the
other case involving the same offense,even if there has been neither
conviction or acquittal in either case.