Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ABSTRACT
In this paper we attempted that culture has an important and effective role in
negotiation. This article displays why culture is so important and how culture affects
negotiation. To this context we decided to compare two overwhelming cultures (US
and Russian) which have clear distinguishing features. There is no single explanation
of culture but there are very important studies about culture which approach to the
topic from various sides. One of the outstanding studies belongs to Geert Hofstede,
which is well known by academy and another belongs to Brett. To be able to explain
the cultural diversities and their effects on negotiation we used Hofstede’s and Brett’s
findings and model.
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INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
Negotiation with which it is possible to come face in every step of life is one
another form and process of social interactions. Participants in this process
which includes two or more parties try to resolve incompatible goals (Brett,
2000). These participants can be individuals who are bargaining in any simple
shopping situation, companies, or governments. As we can guess simply these
participants will not be members of a same society and also same culture in
globalizing world.
From this aspect when we try to understand process of negotiation we can not
ignore the effect of culture. Culture is the distinguishing feature of a society.
According to us culture plays big part in identifying norms of a society. In this way it is
inevitable to attach the effect of culture to negotiation process. So the question is
“does culture affect negotiation processes?” To be able to understand the effect of
culture on negotiation, it is useful to have a mental model of negotiation.
In this paper by the help of studies about culture of Hofstede and Brett we
explained the importance of culture in negotiation and gave a comparison of two
societies’ negotiation behaviors which have explicit differencies from each other.
In the first part we discussed the relation between culture and negotiation. In
the second part we tried to explain the place and importance of culture in light of
studies of Hofstede and Brett. Hofstede and Brett made an extensive but also a
simple classification. In third and fourth parts we gave the distinguishing features of
US and Russian negotiation behaviors. In fifth and last part we compared these
nations’ negotiation behaviors.
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Culture is a collection of features of society and by this way the unique
character of a social group. It includes the values and creates the norms shared by
members of that group. It is the economic, social, political, and religious institutions
that direct and control current group members and socialize new members (Brett,
2000). All of these subjects of culture can affect social interactions like negotiations.
By building up norms, cultural values direct group members’ attention to what is more
and less important. Cultural norms define what is appropriate and inappropriate
behavior. Cultural values and norms provide the philosophy underlying the society’s
institutions. At the same time cultural institutions preserve cultural values and norms,
give them authority, and provide a context for social interaction (Brett, 2000).
National culture resides in deeply-rooted values, and its distinctions are found
to vary widely (Vochita, 2008). It is possible that there may be different cultures as
number of nations on the world. All these cultures have different cultural values,
norms, and institutions. But it is difficult to set a relation all these features with
negotiation.
Researches show that there are different cultural applications between the
smallest allocation units even in the same country. From this point of view it is not
difficult to envisage the differencies between countries, societies.
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the aim of the minority group) and, in turn, the satisfaction of demands coming from
the other party (which is the aim of the state) (Herman and Vervaeck, 2009).
Information which were given untill here were about culture and negotiation
separately. How we can combine these two concepts? Why did many researchers
study on this topic? We can answer this questions in the way that every person is a
uniqe part of his society and carries distinguishing features of his society. Generally
culture includes all these features more or less. If negotiation is a process with which
we can face in any time, like subject of negotiation, place, atmosphere, time etc. of
negotiation culture of people is important too. It is a fact that world is globalizing but
this will never create one single and common culture. How people live, what they
believe in, whether they are individualistic or not, whether they are hierarchical or not
etc. will always be important and will have effect on negotiation process.
Here we must ask this question; “If cultural features vary, how can we execute
the importance of culture?” By generalizing the features of cultures like Hofstede and
Brett did we can reach satisfying information. Without using generalization in order to
obtain enough information and even to start a research would be impossible because
individuals don’t always show the same characteristics of their culture. By
generalizing we assume that there are different cultures and these cultures negotiate
differently.
Cultural values that our research indicates are relevant to norms and
strategies for negotiation include individualism versus collectivism, egalitarianism
versus hierarchy, and direct versus indirect communications. Other values, no doubt,
are also relevant (Brett, 2000).
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Individualism versus Collectivism: Individualism versus collectivism refers to
the extent to which a society treats individuals as autonomous, or as embedded in
their social groups (Schwartz, 1994). In individualistic cultures, norms and institutions
promote the autonomy of the individual. Individual accomplishments are rewarded
and revered by economic and social institutions, and legal institutions protect
individual rights. In collectivist cultures, norms and institutions promote
interdependence of individuals through emphasis on social obligations. Sacrifice of
personal needs for the greater good is rewarded and legal institutions place the
greater good of the collective above the rights of the individual. Political and
economic institutions reward classes of people as opposed to individuals. The way a
society treats people affects the way people self-construe and the way they act
toward and interact with each other.
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unlikely to be aligned and competitive behaviour may ensue. In Prisoners’ Dilemma
games negotiators with individualistic motivational orientations do not change their
behaviour depending upon with whom they are interacting (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).
However, in some recent multi-party negotiation research, some individualists
changed to a cooperative strategy, perhaps because they were confronted with the
possibility of an impasse, suggesting that individualists may be pragmatic.
Negotiators with cooperative motivational orientations vary their behavior, depending
on the orientation of the other negotiator. They cooperate when they are dealing with
other cooperative negotiators, but in dyads will compete when dealing with
negotiators with individualist or competitive orientations.
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norms for interaction, primarily by channelling conflict that does break out to
superiors.
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The decision by the high status third party reinforces his/her authority without
necessarily conferring differentiated status on the contestants as would be the case
in a negotiation in which one party won and the other lost. Conflict within egalitarian
cultures also poses a threat to the social structure, but the egalitarian nature of the
culture empowers conflicting members to resolve the conflict themselves. Egalitarian
cultures support direct, face-to-face negotiations, mediation or facilitation by a peer,
and group decision making, to resolve conflict. An agreement between two disputing
parties may not distribute resources equally. One party may claim more and the other
less. Yet, differentiated status associated with successful claiming in one negotiation
may not translate into permanent changes in social status. There are two reasons for
this. First, there are few avenues in egalitarian societies for precedent setting.
Second, social status is only stable until the next negotiation. Thus, one implication
for negotiations of the cultural value, egalitarianism versus hierarchy, is the way
conflict is handled in a culture. A second implication is the view of power in
negotiations. Negotiators from egalitarian and hierarchical societies have rather
different views of the bases of power in negotiations.
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Consistent with the transitory notion of social structure that is characteristic of
egalitarian societies, power in negotiations in egalitarian cultures tends to be
evaluated with respect to the situation under negotiation and the alternatives if no
agreement can be reached. Every negotiator has a BATNA (best alternative to
negotiated agreement). BATNAs are not fixed. If, in analyzing the alternatives, the
negotiator is dissatisfied with her BATNA, she may invest in action to improve her
BATNA by seeking another alternative. In transactional negotiations, parties’
BATNAs are frequently unrelated. The buyer has an alternative seller with whom to
negotiate and the seller has an alternative buyer with whom to negotiate. However, in
dispute resolution negotiations one party may be able to impose its BATNA on the
other. For example, in a dispute over the terms of a contract, the defendant may not
simply be able to walk away from a negotiation that has reached an impasse, but will
have to defend himself in court, which is the claimant’s BATNA. Negotiators in
egalitarian cultures refer to BATNA or any other source of power in transactional
negotiations relatively infrequently, so long as negotiations are moving toward
agreement. These negotiators prefer to focus on the issues under negotiation,
sharing information about priorities and interests, and noting similarities and
differences.
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High versus Low context Communication: High versus low context
communication refers to the degree to which within-culture communications are
indirect versus direct. In high-context cultures little information is in the message
itself. Instead, the context of the communication stimulates pre-existing knowledge in
the receiver.
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Heuristic trial-and-error search is an indirect information sharing approach. It
occurs in negotiations when parties trade proposals back and forth across the
bargaining table. When one party rejects the other’s proposal, and offers its own, the
first party may infer what was wrong with the proposal from the way the second party
changed it in making its own proposal. Multi-issue proposals provide a great deal of
indirect information about preferences and priorities because the integrative trade-
offs are contained within the proposal. Our research shows that negotiators from low-
context cultures who share information directly are as capable of negotiating
integrative agreements as negotiators from high-context cultures who share
information indirectly.
The cultural value for high - versus low - context communication may also be
related to the willingness of parties in conflict to confront and negotiate directly
versus to avoid confrontation and conceal ill feelings, or to confront indirectly by
involving third parties. Most of the research regarding confrontation versus avoidance
is survey research of preferences for conflict management processes or descriptions
of actual conflict management behaviours. Attributions for these preferences are as
frequently made to collectivism as to high-context communication. The cultural value
for egalitarianism versus hierarchy also serves as a context for confrontation versus
nonconfrontation in negotiations. In research comparing Hong Kong Chinese and US
intra-cultural negotiators, we placed parties in a simulated, face-to-face dispute
resolution setting, perhaps an uncomfortable setting for the Hong Kong Chinese. We
found that during the 45-minute negotiation, the Hong Kong Chinese negotiators
resolved fewer issues and were more likely to involve a third party than were the US
negotiators.
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When people from two different cultural groups negotiate, each brings to the
table his or her way of thinking about the issues to be negotiated and the process of
negotiation. Some of that thinking is affected by the negotiator’s cultural group
membership and the ways in which issues are typically assessed and negotiations
carried out within that cultural group. Figure 1 represents inter-cultural negotiations
as a function of differences between parties with respect to preferences on issues
and negotiation strategies.
Cultural values may result in preferences on issues that are quite distinct. For
example, negotiators from cultures that value tradition may be less enthusiastic about
economic development that threatens to change valued ways of life, than negotiators
from cultures that value change and development. The same values that generate
cultural differences in preferences may also act as cultural blinders. Members of one
culture expect preferences to be compatible, and cannot understand the rationality of
the other party, whose views on the same issue are at odds with their own. It is
generally always unwise in negotiation to label the other party as irrational. Such
labelling encourages persuasion to get the other party to adopt the first’s view of the
situation, rather than the search for trade-offs that are the foundation of integrative
agreements. There is opportunity in differences, or what is represented in Fig. 1 as
integrative potential.
Cultural values and norms also may affect negotiators’ strategic negotiation
processes. For example, negotiators from cultures where direct, explicit
communications are preferred may share information by stating and reciprocating
preferences and priorities, by commenting on similarities and differences, and by
giving direct feedback. Negotiators from cultures where the norm is to communicate
indirectly and infer meaning may share information by making multi-issue proposals
and inferring priorities from subtle changes in proposals. In our research contrasting
US and Japanese negotiators, we found that the Japanese were using a relatively
large number of proposals, compared to the US negotiators, and the US negotiators
were using a whole array of direct communications relatively more frequently than
the Japanese.
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Figure 1 suggests that when the strategies negotiators bring to the table clash,
the negotiation process is likely to be less efficient, and agreements are likely to be
suboptimal. We found, for example, that Japanese intracultural negotiators, using
indirect communications, and US intra-cultural negotiators, using direct
communications, reached similarly efficient agreements. However, when Japanese
expatriate managers negotiated with US managers, agreements were suboptimal.
Japanese intercultural negotiators understood the US negotiators’ priorities, because
the US negotiators were haring information directly. The US negotiators did not
understand the Japanese negotiators’ priorities, even though the inter-cultural
Japanese negotiators shut down their culture’s normative indirect approach to
information sharing and tried to adapt to the US strategy of direct information sharing.
There is not much research on what happens when negotiators’ initial strategic
approaches to bargaining are different, much less when those strategies are linked to
cultural differences. In the negotiations literature generally, there is more theorizing
than empirical research on incompatible negotiation strategies. This theorizing tends
to argue that negotiators must adapt to each other and develop a common “frame” or
approach to negotiations, if an agreement is to be reached. Weiss (1994) argues that
the party who is most familiar with the other’s culture should adapt. This pattern of
adaptation is consistent with our US-Japanese research. However, we note that the
adaptation was not sufficient to generate joint gains. Weiss’s perspective also
ignores other criteria, like parties’ relative power, that might be used as a basis for
adaptation. Then again there is the problem of how much adaptation is necessary.
Research has identified cultural differences with respect to power, goals, and
information sharing in negotiation. Is adaptation uniform across all areas of cultural
differences, or is it easier to adapt information sharing strategies than power
strategies? Is the adaptation short-lived for the single negotiation, or does the
enhanced negotiation strategy continue to be available to the adapting negotiator?
Do negotiators even realize that they are adapting?
INTER-CULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS
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CULTURE #1 OUTCOME CULTURE#2
The U.S. is among the countries considered to have “low context” cultures, in
which the mass of the message is in what is explicitly stated-not the context in which
it is stated (Acuff, 1990).
American negotiators tend to speak clearly and plainly. However, the
American preference for plain speaking can sometimes cause unintended offense to
other negotiators whose national culture prefers indirectness, subtlety, and
avoidance of confrontation. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule (Koh, 1996).
So we can generally say that the U.S. negotiators mean what they explicitly
tell. They do not prefer indirect ways of showing the issue from various approaches,
instead they often take a shortcut and cut straight into the issue.
American negotiators generally believe in the aphorism, “Lead, follow, or get
out of the way.” They think that the negotiating game is played mainly at the
negotiating table. They sometimes feel that the pre- and post- activities (such as
dinner) or the relationship are not really a part of the playing field (Acuff, 1990).
From this point of view we can assume that the U.S. negotiation style is result-
oriented and aims ‘the job well done’ strategy. The U.S. negotiators do not take the
negotiation as part of a social activity and perceive it only as a task and a part of their
professional life.
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The word “no” is seen by an American negotiator as the refusal of his proposal
or idea, not the person (Acuff, 1990).
We can say that unlike the Easterners, the US negotiators do not take the
rejection of their proposals personally, they assess the issue from the professional
point of view.
American negotiators are the most impatient people in the world. This
characteristic is carried over into our negotiating style to such an extent that the rest
of the world recognizes this trait in our negotiators and takes advantage of it at every
opportunity. Impatience is such an ingrained, subconscious tendency in most
Americans that they don’t even realize the rest of the world marches to the tune of a
different drummer. Different perceptions of time cause many misunderstandings
during negotiations (McDonald, 1996).
So we can assume that time and being punctual and not deviating from the
timetable is very essential in U.S. negotiation style and the U.S.
To the extent of pre-preparation, the U.S. are usually best prepared at the
conference table. The U.S. negotiators go to extraordinary lengths, often starting
many months in advance of a conference, to prepare position papers, briefing books,
and background documentation. The U.S. negotiators attempt to anticipate every
issue that might arise during the negotiations and develop a response to that
situation, ready to be used at the conference. All position papers prepared for
intergovernmental negotiations are approved in advance by each agency in the
executive branch that has an interest in that subject. This is time and effort well spent
and is reflected repeatedly in the final positive results of the negotiations (McDonald,
1996).
The U.S. negotiators are one of the most arrogant negotiators in the world.
The U.S. superpower status is of course a part of this image. This power-based
arrogance is often projected by U.S. negotiators across the conference table at
international gatherings. Often such arrogance is seen by others as a second nature.
The U.S. seem to project the belief that they are superior to other peoples because
they have allegedly led the world for fifty years and assume that they are the best in
everything they do. ManyAmericans are actually surprisedwhen they are accused by
non-Americans of possessing this characteristic and frequently take exception to this
criticism, thereby making matters worse (McDonald, 1996).
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In the Cold War Era negotiating with the United States in that era meant there
was often room for compromise in order not to strengthen the hand of the Eastern
bloc. Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, that situation has changed. The
combination of unrivaled power and freedom of action has given the United States
the opportunity to assume the position of a global hegemon. U.S. negotiators are—
said participants—domineering, insistent, and uncompromising. They are less
concerned to negotiate, in the sense of exchanging views and trading concessions,
than to dictate terms or to persuade their counterparts of the rightness or potency of
the American position. Unilateralism has become both a policy and an attitude. Even
cordial and conspicuously polite U.S. representatives tend to adopt a take-it-or-leave-
it position. Furthermore, this hegemonic status has aggravated a long-standing U.S.
trait: namely,the inclination to moralize, to treat negotiation as an opportunity to
reveal unimpeachable truth rather than to understand and respect the other side’s
worldview (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2002).
Most Americans have limited experience with regard to other cultures. This
shortcoming can often lead to mistakes, misunderstandings and subsequent
embarrassment on the part of the Americans. Such restricted experience often leads
to a feeling of insecurity on the part of the Americans and may result in their making
a limited outreach towards other delegates. Rarely is this misinterpreted by others as
shyness, but rather as a lack of interest. It may also be considered to be part of an
American superiority complex (McDonald, 1996).
But, if one is a professional negotiator, then part of the preparation for an
effective negotiation is to learn enough about the culture of one’s adversary to at
least avoid simple errors of behavior, attribution, and body language (Koh, 1996)
We may assume that this feature of the U.S. negotiating style is its most
endangering characteristics regarding the normal execution of negotiations. There
are some cultures in the world where disrespecting the culture would result in
immediate breaking of the negotiations.
The U.S. negotiators are not good listeners. This goes hand in hand with
impatience and arrogance. Because the U.S. negotiators have not developed good
listening skills, which require patience, they are assumed to be superficial and
uninterested in other points of view, and therefore arrogant (McDonald, 1996).
This feature could also endanger the negotiation process when assessed with
our approach stated above.
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The U.S. negotiation style is legalistic which means considering the details.
The majority of American negotiators are lawyers. This means that they are usually
dedicated to the task at hand, and legalistic. Legalistic, in this context, means
concerned with detail. The U.S. negotiating style is less interested in general
principles, or with the larger picture, and is more interested in the fine print of the
agreement. It also means that when an agreement is reached, the U.S. consider it
final. It is not subject to being re-opened or re- negotiated.. Because U.S. law schools
teach students to go out and win, the U.S. negotiators are trained in the win-lose
concept of negotiations; I win – you lose. International negotiations today are more
and more frequently based on a consensus building approach, or a win-win
philosophy (McDonald, 1996).
A U.S. negotiator’s opening position is never his final position. He expects his
opponent to make a counterproposal or a counteroffer. He is anxious to reach an
agreement and will, therefore, make concessions to his opponent, expecting – not
unreasonably – that his adversarywill behave in like manner. Americans are
sometimes completely exasperated at international forums when their adversaries do
not behave as they do (Koh, 1996).
U.S. negotiators have more authority to make decisions, during negotiations,
than most other delegations. This means that they can often make decisions on the
spot, at the conference table. This flexibility is due to the fact that a good negotiator is
trusted by his headquarters. He has also built some negotiating flexibility into the
U.S. position, before leaving for the conference. In addition, U.S. delegations are
larger than most other delegations because they include subject matter experts, who
often have the answers to substantive questions at their fingertips. This enables the
United States to project a positive image and to adapt the U.S. position, more quickly
and more easily than other delegations, in order to meet a new situation or a
particular issue that has just arisen (McDonald, 1996).
So we can assume that when dealing with U.S. negotiators we can start in a
comfortable position from which we can proceed very fast unless there is no conflict.
U.S. negotiators are risk-takers. They are often prepared to put forward new
and innovative ideas, suggestions for compromise, even specific language that can
move the conference towards agreement. This is often done without prior approval
from headquarters and represents the risk the Head of Delegation is prepared to
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take, in order to reach consensus. This trait is widely recognized and highly
respected by other delegations (McDonald, 1996).
We can see that the U.S. negotiators generally use initiative. However, this
feature of U.S. negotiation style could be used as an advantage by the adversary
party. If the U.S. side is put under pressure to take more risks in order to obtain more
goals, they could be left with a sum of risks which could not be accepted by their
superiors at the end.
U.S. negotiators tend to be more pragmatic than doctrinaire. They focus on
advancing their country’s interests rather than principles which they cherish (Koh,
1996).
The U.S. point of view is usually a practical, pragmatic one. U.S. negotiators
are rarely interested in high-flown rhetoric, long, flowery speeches or a dogmatic,
ideological point of view. U.S. negotiators want to get on with discussing the
substance of the issues on the agenda and try to reach some practical conclusion
about the matter at hand (McDonald, 1996).
From this point, it will not be wrong to repeat our assumption that the U.S.
negotiation style is without exception result-oriented.
U.S. negotiators are cooperative. They are aware of the importance of inter-
agency coordination in the development ofU.S. position papers. At the conference
itself they recognize the necessity of working with and cooperating with other
delegations, the conference secretariat, the press, nongovernmental organization
representatives and the private business sector. They also recognize the authority of
the head of their delegation and acknowledge the importance of the delegation’s
need to speak with one voice on an issue (McDonald, 1996).
In this point we would like to re-phrase McDonald’s statements in the way that
without rejecting the cooperative nature of the U.S. negotiating style, this cooperation
should not be perceived as cooperation in subject matters of the negotiation. The
U.S. are cooperative in playing by the rules of the procedures which the negotiation
process and rule-making authority (if there is any) requires.
U.S. negotiators are recognized as being friendly, out-going, and having a
sense of humor. This trait is particularly important. Being friendly helps to build a
sense of trust among negotiators. Having a sense of humor, at the right time, is
essential because it can be used to break tension and often helps to move a difficult
negotiating process along, towards a satisfactory conclusion (McDonald, 1996).
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This characteristics could be counted as one of the least positive features of
the U.S. negotiation style.
To conclude, we can say that the U.S. negotiation style has some features
which enables the U.S. to obtain a strong positiona and a possible successful
outcome in the negotiation. However, the negative sides of the U.S. negotiating style
could cause the U.S. negotiators many problems in a world where the U.S. global
hegemony is being discussed and challenged by a long time emerging super power.
Secrecy vs. openness: During its long history Russia was under foreign attack
and intervention many times. In 20th century USSR authorities cultivated the hostile
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attitude towards western countries, which unfortunately cannot be extirpated very
quickly. This can explain the distrust towards foreigners and unwillingness of Russian
businessmen to disclose the information to their partners. The total KGB control and
the violence done by the authorities forced people to be more closed and secret. The
businessmen prefer not to disclose their wages, the companies’ financial structure is
not transparent, which may (and actually does) result in illegal activities.
Attitude towards law and contracts: For many decades Russian laws were the
enemies of capitalism and market economy and it was very difficult to establish the
new legal system quickly. Even now after 19 years of changes it is very far from
being perfect. In the West the partners rely on the legal environment in which
business is performed, whereas in Russia people are unsure that the law can protect
them (Drnevich, 2004).
Russians deeply resent the loss of superpower status and the triumph of their
rivals. At the same time, they recognize the potential gains--particularly financial--of
interaction with the West. Complicating the achievement of those benefits is the
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pluralism of their society and government. Since the foreign ministry is not
necessarily the lead agency in negotiations, the bureaucracy cannot be counted on
to deliver on any deal.
Jerrold Schecter traces the stages of Russian negotiation that closely mirror
bargaining by the Soviet Union. The Russians begin with cautious prepositioning by
which negotiators cultivate relationships with counterparts. Their opening moves can
be aimed at bringing opposing positions out in the open. Moreover, Russian
negotiators want to look good at home and are likely operating under tight
instructions. Their opening position is usually extreme. The next period can be long
as Russians probe for weaknesses. Once satisfied that there is no more to gain they
move rapidly to a conclusion (Korolkova, 2006).
The author closes by saying, "Only negotiators who understand the cultural
and emotional baggage their Russian counterparts are carrying can hope to be
effective and achieve their goals." Based on this observation he offers specific
advise: be sensitive, but not oversensitive, to Russian problems; treat Russian
counterparts with respect; stand tall and maintain dignity; insist on agreed rules (for
example, leave nothing to goodwill or unwritten agreements); use incentives,
especially financial, for cooperation; and implement problem-solving mechanisms
early. While these pointers reflect common sense, they do not preclude dealing with
negotiators who cannot--as opposed to will not--deliver on commitments.
•They negotiate like they play chess; they plan several moves ahead.
Opponents should think of the consequences of each move before making it.
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•Russian negotiators often represent not themselves, but part of their
government at some level.
•Russian negotiation teams are often composed of veterans or experts;
consequently, they are very experienced.
•Sudden changes or new ideas cause discomfort, as they have to seek
consensus from higher up.
•Negotiations often relate the subject under discussion to other issues
outside the scope of the negotiations. This may not be clear to the other side.
•Russians often regard willingness to compromise as asign of
weakness.
•Their preferred tactic in case of deadlock is to play patience and “sit it
out”; they will only abandon this tactic if the other side shows great firmness.
•The general tendency is to push forward vigorously if the other side
seems to retreat, to pull back when meeting stiff resistance.
•Delivery stile is often theatrical and emotional, intended to convey
clearly their intent.
•Like Americans, they can use “thought talk” if they are in a stronger
position.
•They maintain discipline in the meeting and speak with one voice.
When Americans or Italians speak with several voices, the Russians become
confused about who has real authority.
•Russians often present an initial draft outlining all their objectives. This
is only their starting position and far from what they expect to achieve.
•They often make minor concessions and ask for major ones in return.
•They may build into their initial draft several “throwaways” things of little
importance which they can concede freely, without damaging their own
position.
•They usually ask the other side to speak first, so they may reflect on the
position given.
•They are sensitive and status conscious and must be treated as equals
and not “talked down to.”
•Their approach to an agreement is conceptual and all-embracing, as
opposed to American and German step-by-step settlement.
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•Acceptence of their conceptual approach often leads to difficulties in
working out details later and eventual implementation.
•They are suspicious of anything that is conceded easily. In the Soviet
Union days, everything was complex.
•Personal relationships between the negotiating teams can often
achieve miracles in case of apparent official deadlock.
•Contracts are not as building in the Russian mind as in Western minds.
Like Asian, Russians see a contract as binding only if it continues to be
mutually beneficial (Lewis, 2005).
According to this list we can see that Russian negotiators are not easy people
to deal with. There is no reason to believe that the development of entrepreneurism
in Russia, giving added opportunities and greater breadth of vision to those who
travel in the West, will make Russians any less effective around the negotiating table.
Westerners may hold strong cards and may be able to dictate conditions for some
length of time, but the ultimate mutual goal of win-win negotiations will only be
achieved through adaptation to current Russian mentality and world attitudes.
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JAPANESE POLITENESS AUTHORITY FLOWS
FRENCH PROTOCOL DOWN
AUTHORITY FLOWS UP ASIAN AMBIGUITY
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5. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO CULTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
US AND RUSSIAN NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOURS
As we mentioned before the negotiation style and the style of doing business
in general is influenced by the culture. In order to characterise Russian culture we
decided to use the cultural dimensions framework of Hofstede: Hofstede has
identified five dimensions of culture in his world-famous study of national influences.
1. Power Distance
2. Uncertainty Avoidance
3. Individualism - Collectivism
4. (Masculinity - Femininity)
5. (Long Term Orientation - Short-Term Orientation)
For each country an index can be found according to Hofstede, and thus a
cross country comparison can be performed. The following figures can be found in
academic literature.
RUSSIA
Power Distance : 90
Individualism : 50
Uncertainty Avoidance : 90
Masculinity : 40
As for the orientation in time, from our own experience and background, we
would say the Russian negotiators are rather short-term oriented, which is probably
caused by the great instability of the environment.
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U.S.A.
Power Distance : 40
Individualism : 91
Uncertainty Avoidance : 46
Masculinity : 62
What can we figure out about Russian culture according to this data? The
power distance is very high (90) compared to Austria (11) which is very low also
compared to the U.S.A. (40). A high power distance means how much the unequal
distribution of wealth and power is accepted and common in a society. Since money,
power and hierarchies play a vital role in Russia, the high power distance can be
observed during business negotiations and in everyday life.
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responsibility, harmony and obeying are in the foreground. A high power distance in
Russia yields a lower individualism since the individual is part of a strong hierarchy
and thus enjoys less freedom of decision-making in business.
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other hand are honest, pragmatic, friendly, easy-going, practical, punctual,
humorous, naive, tolerant, result-oriented, insensitive to cultural differences,
arrogant, impatient, risk-taker, flexible and well prepared.
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6. REFERENCES
BOOKS
ARTICLES
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Andrew Monaghan, "An Enemy at the Gates or From Victory to Victory?
Russian Foreign Policy", International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 4, 2008
Isaiah Berlin, "The Silence in Russian Culture", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1,
1957
Janet Martinez, Lawrence Susskind, "Parallel Informal Negotiation: An
Alternative to Second Track Diplomacy", International Negotiations, 2000
31
Luminita Vochita, "The Role of Culture in International Negotiations", Annals of
the University of Petroşani, Economics 8 (2), 2008
United States Institute of Peace, "U.S. Negotiating Behavir", Special report 94,
2002
Yuliya Korolkova, "Intercultural Aspects of Negotiation: Russian Negotiation
Style”, Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration
THESIS
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