1

Human Security Mapping: A New Method for

Measuring Vulnerability
J





1aylor Owen
2




Although gaining legitimacy in many academic and policy communities, the concept o human security
has no single accepted deinition, no uniersal oreign policy mandate and no consensus-commanding
analytic ramework or its measurement. 1his is in part do to a perceied conceptual ambiguity coupled
with an inherent paradox in its measurement - the broader the spectrum o human security measured,
the more diicult data collection and aggregation become. 1his paradox has orced the existing
measuring methodologies to be either broad and conceptually accurate, but o questionable easibility
and reliability, or narrow and easible, but not representatie o the ull range o insecurities. In response
to this diiculty, a measuring methodology is proposed and tested in Cambodia, centred around a new
perception o space. Selecting indicators based on their regional releance and aggregating them using
their common denominator, location, allows the methodology to be conceptually broad, analytically
accurate and practically easible. Using a Geographic Inormation System, this methodology documents
threats, allows or analysis o spatial correlations, and may proe aluable to both humanitarian and
deelopment agencies seeking to locate and identiy high priority beneiciaries, and to understand the
impacts o speciic threats on processes o social and economic recoery rom armed conlicts.



1
\ork or this project was unded by the Canadian International Deelopment Agency and the Canadian
Department o loreign Aairs. Research was conducted as a MA student at the Liu Institute or Global Issues
at the Uniersity o British Columbia and as a research assistant in the Center or the Study o Ciil \ar at the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo.
2
1aylor Owen is a DPhil Candidate at Oxord Uniersity and a Post Graduate lellow in the \ale Genocide
Studies Program. le can be reached at taylorprio.no.
2

1able of Contents
J. Conceptual Background................................................................................... 3
1.1 lrom 1raditional Security to luman Security ................................................3
1.2 Deining luman Security ...................................................................................3
1.2.1 Narrow Conception............................................................................4
1.2.2 Broad Conception...............................................................................4
1.3 Utility o luman Security...................................................................................6
1.4 Measuring luman Security ................................................................................6

2. Overview of Case Study and Conceptual Approach........................................ 8
2.1 Choice o Case Study: Cambodia ......................................................................8
2.2 Brie Background o Cambodia.........................................................................9
2.3 A New Deinition o luman Security..............................................................10
2.4 lrom Deinition to Measurement .....................................................................11

3. Methodology and Case Study .......................................................................... J2
3.1 Stage One: 1hreat Assessment...........................................................................13
3.2 Stage 1wo: Data Collection and Organization................................................13
3.3 Stage 1hree: Data Visualization and Analysis.................................................15

4. Iuture of Research........................................................................................... 22

S. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 23

Bibliography......................................................................................................... 24

Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 2S









3
J. Conceptual Background

1.1 rov 1raaitiovat ecvrit, to vvav ecvrit,

Up until 1989, what we now reer to as traditional security` or national security` dominated
the ield o international security. In this iew o security, the state acts as the reerent object
responsible or the preseration o territorial integrity, domestic order, international aairs
and most importantly, the protection o its citizens rom armed threats. In this iew, the
primary threat to the state, and subsequently to its people, is the use o orce by other states,
with interstate war being the main concern.
1he early 1990s marked an important departure in the ield o security studies, as
security threats could not be read anymore through Cold \ar lenses and both international
and local actors redeined rules o engagement. Greater emphasis was gien to the domestic
dimensions o ciil wars and, as in the extreme cases o the Serbian goernment's attack on
the Kosoar Albanians and the Rwandan lutu's genocide o the 1utsis, responsibility was
put on the state or the insecurity o the ery people it was meant to protect.
\hat has become clear is that despite the macro leel stability created by the east-
west military balance o the Cold \ar, citizens were not sae. 1hey may not hae suered
rom outright nuclear attack, but they were being killed by the remnants o proxy wars, the
enironment, poerty, disease, hunger, iolence and human rights abuses. Ironically, the
aith placed in the realist worldiew, and the security it proided, masked issues threatening
the indiidual. Once the central oci o security, the protection o the person was all too
oten negated by an oer-attention on the state. Allowing key issues to all through the
cracks, traditional security` simply ailed at its primary objectie: protecting the indiidual.
1his new type o instability led to the challenging o the notion o traditional security
by such concepts as cooperatie, comprehensie, societal, collectie, international or human
security ,Baylis, 199,. Although these concepts moe away rom a ocus on inter state
relations, human security takes the most dramatic step by making the reerent object the
indiidual, rather than the state. \hile it acknowledges the continued importance o the state
as a key contributor to the security o indiiduals, human security argues that the security o
indiiduals goes well beyond simple state security. 1his shit rom a state ocus to and
indiidual ocus is necessary due to the aoresaid ailures o the traditional security paradigm,
and also in order to direct research and policy towards the issues most threatening peoples`
lies.

1.2 Defivivg vvav ecvrit,

Security can no longer be narrowly deined as the absence o armed conlict, be it
between or within states. Gross abuses o human rights, the large-scale displacement
o ciilian populations, international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms
traicking and enironmental disasters present a direct threat to human security,
orcing us to adopt a much more coordinated approach to a range o issues.` United
Nations Secretary General, Koi Annan ,2000,.

Although all agree that the ocus o human security should be on the indiidual rather than
the state, there is considerable ambiguity oer the exact deinition o human security. 1he
debate may be characterised by two schools o thought, each with their own idea o what
should and should not be considered a threat to human security. 1hese schools can be called
4
the varror and the broaa conceptions o human security, based primarily on how much o the
possible human security spectrum ,actors that can harm an indiidual, they eel should be
included.

1.2.1 ^arror Covcetiov

On one end o the spectrum addressing deinitions o human security is the narrow`, or
what has become known as the Canadian Approach ,McRae and lubert, 2001,. By using a
deinition that primarily ocuses on iolent threats, the Canadian Approach clearly separates
human security rom the much broader and already established ield o international
deelopment. Indeed, the Canadian goernment acknowledges the UNDP conception
,described below, as merely a phase in the deelopment o human security, but enisions a
much more ocused deinition, one centered on iolent threats, as an instrument o policy
,Acharya, 2001,.
1he Canadian deinition, thereore, restricts the parameters o human security to a
ocus on the threat o iolence to the indiidual. 1his can come rom a ast array o threats,
including the use o landmines, ethnic discord, state ailure, drug trade, or traicking in small
arms. 1his must, as ormer oreign minister Lloyd Axworthy ,2001, points out, be countered
primarily by the use o sot power`, such as diplomatic resources, economic persuasion, and
the use o intelligence and inormation technology.
\hile a igorous debate oer deinitions and ambiguity in the human security
paradigm is perused in the literature, a strong argument or the narrow conception is simply
the number o successul international initiaties using its parameters. In act, most o the
signiicant policy adances achieed in the name o human security hae used this narrow
deinition. lor instance, the International Conentional or the Ban o Landmines, the
International Criminal Court, as well as the recent international NGO ocus on child
soldiers, small arms and armed groups, hae all been undertaken using a Canadian ,narrow,
perspectie.

1.2.2 roaa Covcetiov

Although, some recent projects hae used the narrow conception o human security, most o
the proposed deinitions are rooted in the broad, or United Nations Deelopment Program
,UNDP,, school o thought. Although critics rightully point to a potential ambiguity rom
grouping so many threats under one heading, conceptual clarity emerges i three key
attributes are considered, its scope o coerage, its system based approach to understanding
causal relationships, and its ocus on the ital core o the indiidual ,on deinitions o human
security, see lampson, 2002,. 1hese three critical aspects o broadly deined human security
are exempliied by the UNDP ,1995,, Salbina Alkire ,2002, and Jorge Ne ,1999,
respectiely.
1he 1994 UNDP luman Deelopment Report is generally seen as the irst
signiicant attempt at articulating the broad approach to human security. 1his report
describes human security as haing two principal aspects: the reedom rom chronic threats
such as hunger, disease and repression, coupled with the protection rom sudden calamities.
1he report concedes that its conception o human security is broad, but explains that simply
relects the large number o signiicant harms that go unmitigated. As a conceptual structure,
UNDP ,1995, identiies seen distinct components o human security that proide the
oundation or the methodology used in this study ,see 1able 1,.
5

1abte 1 - |^DP bvvav .ecvrit, covovevt.

Security components Identifiable threats
1. Lconomic security Poerty
2. lood security lunger and amine
3. lealth security Injury and disease
4. Lnironmental security Lnironmental degradation and resource depletion
5. Personal security Various orms o iolence
6. Community security Integrity o cultures
. Political security Political repression

\hat is important about UNDP`s categorization is that it sets the boundaries o the concept
ery broadly, clearly separating itsel rom past security re-conceptualizations. Also, it orces
other deinitions o human security ,outlined below, to justiy their narrowing rom this ery
broad starting point.
A second conceptualisation is oered by Jorge Ne ,1999,, who points out the
importance o a components-based approach to deining human security. le describes ie
interconnected subsystems o human security: ecosystem, economy, society, polity and
culture. lor Ne, these ie are all in complex interplay, their linkages deining the nature o
systemic balance. More crudely, this points out that i causality is going to be addressed, then
the boundaries o the concept must be set ery broadly in order to capture all o the possible
signiicant ariables interening in the system. Acknowledgment o the interconnectedness
o human security components, howeer deined, is absolutely critical both to understanding
causality and properly addressing policy.
A third approach to a broad concept o human security is a ocus on the ital core`
enabling indiidual lie, thereby allowing to separate human security` rom human
deelopment`, a term which is more linked with well-being than emergencies. Alkire ,2002,
best illustrates this approach, arguing that: 1he objectie o human security is to saeguard
the ital core o all human lies in ways that enhance human reedoms and human
ulillment`. Key to this approach is the setting o standards under which human security
comes under threat. Acknowledging that institutions cannot be expected to protect people
rom all threats, she stresses the prioritization o ital ,and preentable, ones.
Building on these perspecties, the human security concept must be inclusie and
broad reaching, and it must also allow or separating its components into dierent types o
security or threats addressing causal eects, and it must set a threshold demarcating the ital
core in order to separate itsel rom human deelopment.
6
1. |titit, of vvav ecvrit,

lor the concept o human security must explicitly outline its utility to legitimize itsel in the
world o oreign policy and deelopment. By broadening the ocus o security beyond that
o the state, human security allows oreign policy to engage with a wider range o issues
threatening to the security o indiiduals. By narrowing the ocus o deelopment on lie-
threatening actors, human security allows deelopment agencies to concentrate their eorts.
1he ollowing example, using data rom the \lO 2000 mortality dataset or Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam, illustrate the nature o threats to the security o indiiduals and the
importance o preentable inectious diseases, rather than iolence or war.

1abte 2 - Cav.e. of aeatb iv Cavboaia, ao., 1ietvav .vbregiov iv 2000

Cause of Death 1otal Number of Deaths
1uberculosis 336,000
lIV,AIDS 32,000
Malaria 13,000
Violence 58,000
\ar 2,000

I Cambodia is taken on its own, the relatie importance o threats shows similar imbalance.
Although the impact o iolence and war has been proound since the late 1960s, as a whole
it is now mostly related to political iolence around elections and only represents a raction
o what makes many Cambodians insecure. 1he irst and oremost threat to Cambodians is
ood insecurity: the \orld lood Program has recently shown that in 835 communes, oer
50 o the population lies below the poerty line beyond which people are assumed not to
be able to eed themseles adequately ,\lP: 2002,. Communicable diseases such as malaria,
lIV,AIDS, tuberculosis, dengue eer and anaemia are also threatening hundreds o
thousands o people. linally, looding, drought and deorestation are leading to large-scale
crop ailure, population displacement and social instability.
1his is not to say that Cambodian security has not improed signiicantly oer the
past decade - to the credit o the many working tirelessly or peace, justice, and deelopment,
it has. It is only to point out that using a traditional notion o security, or een a iolence-
ocused human security deinition, almost all o what is truly harming Cambodians is simply
o the radar screen. Consequently, Cambodia will not be treated as insecure`, which could
possibly limit international assistance attention and eorts.

1.1 Mea.vrivg vvav ecvrit,

In order to analytically reine what can be an ambiguous concept and to demonstrate the
clear policy utility o the concept o human security, six methodologies hae been proposed
to measure human security.
1he six methodologies are based on quite dierent conceptions o human security
,see Owen, 2002,. lor instance, whereas GLClS stresses enironmental ariables and
King,Murray stress deelopmental issues, neither addresses the measurement o iolence.
1he luman Security Report index, on the other hand, includes neither enironmental nor
deelopment actors in its measure o human security. 1he ollowing diagram displays the
7
indicators used by each methodology and demonstrates how much o the broad UNDP
deinition each one incorporates.

igvre 1 - Mea.vrevevt ectrvv



I this chart is paralleled with the easibility o each methodology, it is clear that attempts to
broaden an index by including more indicators, issues o weighting, timeliness and accuracy
become problematic
3
. 1his results in a diicult paradox: 1he more conceptually accurate -
broad- a methodology attempt to be ,i.e. closer to representing all possible threats,, the less
practically and analytically easible it becomes.
As a methodology expands its conceptualization o human security, closer to the
broad UNDP deinition, it become increasingly diicult to both aggregate and dierentiate
between each method`s autonomous ariables. In addition, particularly on a global scale, the
data simply are unlikely to be aailable to ill out a laundry list` o threats or eery country.
1his leads to either signiicant gaps when comparing one country to another, or the use o
old, problematic and unreliable data.
Another signiicant concern with all o these measuring methodologies is their
reliance on national leel data. As will be seen with Cambodia, the national picture simply
does not accurately represent the threats Cambodians ace. 1bi. va/e. cav.at retatiov.bi.
betreev tbreat. atvo.t ivo..ibte to ai.cerv ava otic, gviaavce to bvvavitariav ava aeretovevt oeratiov.
cto.e to v.ete...
1he principle obstacles to measuring human security are summarized in the table 3,
along with the proposed solutions that will be detailed in the ollowing section.

1abte Probtev. iv Mea.vrivg vvav ecvrit, ava Proo.ea otvtiov.
Problems Proposed solutions
Data Aailability Only measure regionally releant threats

3
lor extensie discussion on the problems o data collection see, Collier, 2001, Brauer, 2001, Mial, 2001, Mack,
2002.
8
Look sub-nationally or data
Data Integrity Accept subjectiity, mitigated by local knowledge
and disciplinary experts
Data Aggregation Use space as a common denominator
Geographic Inormation Systems ,GIS,


2. Overview of Cambodian Case Study and Conceptual Approach

I human security is accepted as conceptually useul, proponents are let with two serious
concerns:

1. low does one organise and compare the ast amount o data representing all o the
aorementioned threats, keeping in mind that it is in dierent ormats, and is
generally only intelligible to disciplinary experts

2. low can this inormation be eectiely presented to the public and to the policy-
making community

A recent study, based at the Cambodian Deelopment Research Institute, proided the
opportunity to test a methodology that addresses these two concerns. Based on the structure
o a Geographic Inormation System, the methodology is designed to collect, organize, map
and analyze data that depicts human security threats. 1his section introduces the case study,
Cambodia, and proides an oeriew o the methodology used and results obtained.

2.1 Cboice of Ca.e tva,: Cavboaia

1hree criteria were used in selecting an appropriate case study or this methodology: leel o
insecurity, data aailability and easibility. lirst and oremost, the methodology needed to be
tested in a region where the signal leel` o high human threats was potentially high.
Cambodia ranks ery low on almost all socio-economic indexes - 130
th
in GDP Per Capita,
130
th
on the lDI, 140
th
on the lPI - which is likely to be relected in high leels i
insecurity, yet we do not know where and why.
Second, there must be suicient data to implement the methodology. It is possible
that in the most insecure countries, such as in sub Saharan Arica, there may not yet be
enough accurate data aailable. 1he process becomes more diicult and resource intensie
the less data there are and this actor was particularly important or a single researcher with
minimal unding. Due to a signiicant UN and international aid presence since 1992, as well
as data collection eorts by domestic organisation, there has been much research and data
collection done in Cambodia.
linally, linked to the second criteria, the implementation must be easible. Data must
be accessible, the region must be suiciently sae to work in and the assistance o an host
institution in preerable ,in this case the Cambodian Deelopment Research Institute oered
to house and acilitate the project,.



9
2.2 rief ac/grovva of Cavboaia

Cambodia is situated in the southeastern part o the Indochinese peninsula, between
1hailand and Vietnam, and comprises an area o 181,035 km
2
. At the centre o the country
lies a lood plain, drained by the Mekong Rier and surrounded by low altitude mountains
and undulating plateaux coered by eergreen or deciduous orests. A short coastline oers
access to the Gul o 1hailand. Its population, estimated at 13 million and growing at an
annual rate o 2.8, is young ,nearly hal under the age o 15, and predominantly rural
,about 80,. 1he distribution o population is extremely unequal with about 85 liing in
the central plains, leaing ast expanses o sparsely populated orests at the periphery.
Natural resources are critical to the population`s surial, as economic diersiication has
only recently started, partly due to nearly three decades o ciil war, starting rom 1968
through our years o illegal US bombing ,see Map 1,, and marked by the Khmer Rouge
genocide in the 190s as well as isolation rom large \estern assistance until the early 1990s.
1he numbers o people reported killed during the Khmer Rouge regime aries rom
800,000, i solely those murdered in camps are counted, to oer two million i indirect deaths
rom staration, oerwork and orced migration are rightly included. In 199, the
Vietnamese took oer Cambodia, ending the genocide and installing a Vietnamese styled
peoples` republic. A coalition was established between Khmer Rouge deectors and the old
political elite that had suried by leeing the country. In another bitter irony, the
Cambodians were saed by their historic enemies. 1he Khmer rouge then retreated to the
north o the country ,see hotspot analysis` below or the insecurity leels o this region,, and
launched a guerrilla campaign that lasted almost 20 years.
In 1990, the Paris Peace Conerence or Cambodia established a broad plan that lead
to a ceaseire, a peace accord, and an interim authority lead by Sihanouk, all oerseen by the
largest peacekeeping operation to date, 1he United Nations 1ransitional Authority in
Cambodia ,UN1AC,. In 1993 UN1AC oersaw the irst democratic election. Although
lUNCIPLC ,the royalist Party, won a majority, lun Sen and the CCP ,the ormer
Vietnamese backed Communist Party, had control o the military, resulting in a coalition
goernment, with an awkward arrangement o a irst and second prime minister. 1his
tenuous situation was exacerbated by the withdrawal o UN1AC and its inability to wipe out
the Khmer Rouge, who continued guerrilla attacks until the death o Pol Pot in 1998. In
199, lun Sen lead a successul coup ,although many in Cambodia do not recognize it as
such, oer his rial prime minister and won the election in 1998 to become sole leader.
Since then the country has experienced relatie peace, with the absence o ull blown
ciil conlict and a steady decline in iolence and crime. \estern assistance, largely conined
during the 1980s to reugee camps in 1hailand, has poured into the country - initially under
the aegis o the United Nations 1ransitional Authority in Cambodia ,1992-93,. International
post conlict` reconstruction and deelopment eorts amounted on aerage to an estimated
US>500 million per year, or about US>40 per head. Although high, this leel o assistance is
not exceptional at an international leel but neertheless represents a massie inlow o
resource into the country ,equialent to about 65 o domestic exports, and particularly in
terms o public expenditures. loreign aid is generally donor-drien and disproportionably
allocated to the capital city and a ew proinces ,e.g. Kompong Speu,. Although Cambodia is
now traditionally` secure, its human insecurity is haing a deastating impact on the people.



10


2. . ^er Defivitiov of vvav ecvrit,

lor this methodology, I use a hybrid deinition o human security. \ith the goal o
remaining both broad and concise, the deinition recognizes that there is no dierence
between a death rom a lood or rom a gun, all are considered threats to human security.
But, as it must also be able to separate and categorize all o these possible threats, human
security gets sub-diided into six threat categories. 1he deinition, thereore, takes two parts.
1he irst is deried rom 1he luman Security Commission ,luman Security Commission,
2002,: vvav .ecvrit, i. tbe rotectiov of tbe ritat core of att bvvav tire. frov criticat ava erra.ire
tbreat..
1he adantage o this deinition is that it remains true to the broad nature o human
security, while clearly separating it rom more general concepts o human wellbeing and
deelopment. Making the reerent object all human lies` both ocuses on the indiidual
while also indicating a uniersalism in its mandate. As the highest human insecurity is likely
to occur in the deeloping world, this is particularly important.
1he threshold or what is deemed a human security threat is set by the terms ital
core` and critical and perasie threats`. 1his is important in order to ingrain a necessary
degree o seerity within the concept. 1he ital core, as 1he luman Security Commission
points out, is what constitutes a minimum leel o surial ,lSC: 4,. Reerence to critical
and perasie threats` establishes both seerity and immediacy. As there are an unlimited
number o possible threats, only the most serious, those that take or seriously threaten lies,
are included.
1he second part o the deinition addresses the issue o conceptual clarity. It
establishes clear categories under which all human security threats are ordered. 1hese
11
categories are not threats themseles, but rather are conceptual groupings, proiding a
degree o disciplinary alignment to what is an oerarching concept: vairiavat. reqvire rotectiov
frov evrirovvevtat, ecovovic, fooa, beattb, er.ovat ava otiticat tbreat..
By grouping all possible threats into six categories, I argue that human security
becomes both more manageable and analytically useul. 1hese categories are based on the
original UNDP deinition discussed in the preious section
4
. 1his is important as the
UNDP`s deinition is the most widely sited deinition o human security and is considered
the origin o the concept. 1he inal deinition is thereore,

vvav .ecvrit, i. tbe rotectiov of tbe ritat core of att bvvav tire. frov criticat ava erra.ire
evrirovvevtat, ecovovic, fooa, beattb, er.ovat ava otiticat tbreat..

I argue that perhaps most importantly, this deinition is dynamic. It rerains rom simply
listing threats, recognizing that no possible list can be conclusie, and that it is the protection
o the indiidual that should be the ocus.

2.1 rov Defivitiov to Mea.vrevevt

Although the aboe deinition articulates a concept and categorisation o human security, by
itsel it does little to reeal exactly what the threats are, who they are eecting and where
they are located. \ithout this qualiying inormation, human security means nothing. \ith
this in mind, I hae deeloped a methodology, based on the structure o a Geographic
Inormation System ,GIS, that acilitates the collection, organization and spatial analysis o
human security inormation.
1his methodology, incorporating ast amounts on interdisciplinary data, takes a sub
national approach and is capable o clearly identiying the human security threats o a
country, isolating hotspots` o aggregated insecurity and determining important spatial
relationships amongst rarely compared security threats.
1his methodology also directly takes on the paradox o measurement: that the
broader the conceptualization, the more diicult and less accurate the measurement. It does
so by addressing one o the key diiculties o complex system analysis, the aggregation o
diering data types. By building the methodology around the spatial reerence o data, a
common denominator is created - space - allowing or direct aggregation and analysis
without creating a subjectie nominal scale.
Also critical is the methodologies ocus on identiying local hotspots rather that
creating a national index. Although many global indexes point policy makers to
underdeeloped or insecure countries, none, isolate speciic regions and problems within
these countries. 1his arguably contributes to poor, nationally ubiquitous deelopment policy
and a lack o meaningul correlation analysis between harms.
It should be noted that there is a precedent or using GIS technology to assess
ulnerability. 1o notable examples, one in academics and one in the ield o international
deelopment demonstrate the early uses o what is sure to be a growing ield. Cutter and

4
It should be noted that community security` included in UNDP`s conception o human security was omitted
rom my deinition. 1his was done because I eel it conlicts with the irst part o the deinition, limiting human
security to critical and perasie threats to the ital core. I don`t eel that integrity o culture, while undeniably
important, its under this conception.
12
Solecki ,Cutter and Solecki, 1989, hae identiied what they call a hazard-o-place, with
Cutter and al. ,2000: 16, arguing that:

1he interplay o social, political and economic actors- interacting separately, in
combination with one another, and with the physical enironment- creates a
mosaic o risks and hazards that aect people and the places they inhabit.

Curiously, while recognized, this mosaic has only once, and quite recently, been
quantitatiely assessed. Cutter et al. ,Cutter et al, 2000, proide a practical methodology,
using GIS, called the hazard-o-place model o ulnerability, or combining arying
biophysical and societal ulnerabilities and hae conducted a case study or a county in
South Carolina. 1heir methodology, howeer, being somewhat narrow in both its theoretical
base and spatial ocus ,only conducted or one county, in one state o the US,, can only be
seen as a ery early trial.
As a practical example o the used o GIS in measuring ulnerability, the \orld
lood Program`s Vulnerability Assessment Mapping ,VAM,, is the best example
5
. 1his
project, which is operational in 43, uses a similar oerlay technique as this project, but limit
their threat ariable to those pertaining to ood insecurity. 1hey use this technique to ind
areas o high ood stress in order to prioritise relie. In a sense, the methodology proposed
here, is an expansion o the VAM project, to include other aspects o human security
spectrum outlined by the UNDP in 1994. 1hey do, howeer, proide a powerul example o
the power o spatial analysis and o the policy utility o this project.


3. Methodology and Case Study

1here are three stages o the measuring methodology: threat assessment, data collection and
organization and, data mapping and analysis.

.1 tage Ove: 1breat ...e..vevt

As indicated, there is yet any consensus as to a common set o ariables coered by the
human security paradigm, consequently, a manageable list o threats alicting Cambodia
must irst be determined. 1his was done by listing all possible threats that surpassed the
threshold inherent in the human security deinition, in each o the six categories o security
,economic, health, enironmental, personal, political and ood,: iz. those that represent a
critical and perasie threat to the ital core. 1hese are the threats or which data will be
collected, mapped and analysed. 1his is essential in order to isolate the most serious
concerns rom the thousands o possible threats alling under the broad deinition.
1he releant human security threats were determined through 65 interiews in Phno
Penh with researchers, deelopment workers and Goernment oicials. Out o this detailed
qualitatie analysis, the ollowing threats were determined.



5
For more information on the VAM project, see http://vam.wfp.org/new/index.asp
13
igvre 2 Cavboaiav 1breat. iv ecvrit, Categor,
1hese threats, organized in disciplinary isolation, constitute the critical and perasie threats
to the ital core o Cambodians.

.2 tage 2: Data Cottectiov ava Orgaviatiov

Data Collection
Once the threats are determined, data detailing them must be collected. 1his data can be o
any type proiding it has a spatial correlation. 1his means that all data entries in the set must
be linked to either a distinct geographic area ,such as a illage, commune or proince, or to a
spatial coordinate ,grid point or axis point,. 1his is needed in order to organize and map the
data with the Geographic Inormation System.
Now that the critical set o threats had been determined and the broad conception o
human security had become manageable, data detailing these threats were collected. As the
data was inputted into a Geographic Inormation System or analysis, the only criteria or
this data was that they should hae a spatial reerence. In the case o Cambodia, this could
mean that the data was disaggregated politically, to the illage, commune, regional district,
proince, or by a coordinate system, a point on a map. It should be noted that at this point,
the data was still in its raw orm. 1hat is, the unit o analysis is disciplinary, and thereore
may be diicult or non-experts to understand. lor example, lood modeling data are o little
use to a rural poerty specialist, and ice ersa.
Data was collected rom local and international NGO`s, International
Organizations, Research Institutes and goernment Ministries. lor a detailed table o all data
collected, see Appendix 1.

Data Organization
1he next step was to organize the data detailing each threat by its spatial unit, eg proince,
district commune or illage, so that it could be mapped and analyzed in the GIS. A table was
thereore created or each threat showing solely its spatial unit, the reerence code o that
spatial unit and the data set. lor example, the base table or a data set ,inant mortality per
100,000, using proinces as its spatial reerence will look like this:









Environ. Economic Political Personal Food Health

Floods
Droughts
Landmines
UXOs
Violence
Robbery/Theft
Small Arms
Starvation
Malnutrition
HIV/AIDS
Malaria
TB
Dengue Fever
Poverty
Corruption
Human Rights
Abuses
14
1abte 1 avte of Data 1abte

KHETCODE1 PROVINCE Infant mortality per 1000 births
1 Banteay Meanchey 78.2
2 Battambang 98.0
3 Kampong Cham 107.9
4 Kampong Chhnang 129.3
5 Kampong Speu 68.3
6 Kampong Thom 64.5
7 Kampot 100.4
8 Kandal 89.2
9 Koh Kong 70.7
10 Kratie 71.3
11 Mondul Kiri 169.8
12 Phnom Penh 37.6
13 Preah Vihear 71.3
14 Prey Veng 111.0
15 Pursat 139.4
16 Ratanak Kiri 169.8
17 Siemreap 77.9
18 Sihanoukville 100.4
19 Stueng Treng 71.3
20 Svay Rieng 102.0
21 Takeo 96.0
22 Otdar Meanchey 77.9
23 Kep 100.4
24 Pailin 98.0
99 Tonle Sap

Source: Demographic lealth Surey, 2000.

1ables were then created or the ollowing human security threats.
Lconomic and Iood Security
6

Poerty- Percent o population below the poerty line ,commune,

Health Security
Dengue leer - new cases per 100,000 ,Proince,
Malaria - o population at risk ,Proince,
lIV,AIDS- o inected sex workers ,Proince,

1B- Cases per 100000 ,District,
Inant Mortality per 100,000- ,Proince,
8


Personal Security
Landmines - Percent o contaminated illages ,district,
Small Arms-Percent o physical injuries due to a gun ,Proince,
Domestic Violence-Percent o Married \omen Lxperiencing Domestic Violence ,Proince,
Violence- conlicts oer land, thet and robbery, and iolence in home ,Commune, aggregated up
rom illage,

Political Security
9

luman rights iolations per 100,000 ,Proince,

6
Ater much discussion, ood and economic security were combined as one with a poerty indicator. 1his
method is adocated by the \orld lood Program who beliees that when a country is in a low enough leel o
poerty, income means nothing. 1he only measurable expenditure is how much they consume. 1his is
measured in Calorie Intake.

Data are aailable or other high risk groups but not or the entire population. I was told that number o sex
workers was a particularly good indicator or lIV,AIDS incidence, especially in Cambodia.
8
Although not listed as a speciic human security threat, I was told by many that it was the best single indicator
o health in Cambodia.
9
It is possible to get data on election irregularities. loweer, do to time restraints, this was not collected.
15

Lnvironmental Security
10

llood - Aected People per 100,000 ,District,
11

Drought - Aected people per 100,000 ,District,

. tage 1bree: Data 1i.vatiatiov ava .vat,.i.

Data Visualization
Once the spatially reerenced data is collected it is then organized in a Geographic
Inormation System. As it is all linked to a like unit, space, all the data is connected by a
common attribute. \ithin the GIS, each threat becomes a layer that can be mapped alone or
with any other threat. 1his enables any data set, whether it is a surey, quantitatie study or a
satellite image, to be mapped and analysed. 1his process has three stages: spatial joining,
threat ranking and data merge.

Spatial Joining
In order or the data tables to be mapped, they must be joined with the data tables o the
shapeile
12
representing the map boundaries. 1hese tables are joined by a like ield. In this
case, the like ield is the GIS code gien to the spatial unit
13
. 1his allows or any o the
inormation in the threat table to be mapped.
lor example, by joining the Domestic Violence table with the Proincial Boundary
table by their GIS codes, a map showing Domestic Violence Leels can be mapped ,see
ligure 3,
14
.



10
Data on deorestation and particularly land concessions is incredibly controersial at the present time.
Although signiicant data exists, including maps o uture logging areas, it was impossible to acquire.
11
1his data is collected by the ICRC. It encompasses all o their humanitarian assistance and details exactly
who receied what and where. I hae also acquired radarsat images o the 2000 and the 2001 loods which are
used or the poerty oerlay analysis. 1hey were not used or this because they don`t indicated necessary socio-
economic impact.
12
Shapeiles are the complete package o iles, one o which is a data table, needed to display inormation in
ARCiew GIS, the program used or this analysis.
13
Matching these codes caused signiicant problems with the Cambodia data. As Cambodian researchers hae
just begun to use GIS data, their coding system has not been standardized. Also, at the commune and illage
leels, there is considerable inconsistency in the names o political boundaries. 1his discrepancy in codes was
oercome by manually matching all codes in an excel spreadsheet then importing them back into the original
data sets.
14
lor the base leel maps, all data was organized according to its natural breaks. 1his means that the data is
categorized into, in this case 5 diisions, based on the way it clusters in the set.
16
igvre Diagrav of atiat ]oivivg Proce..






























1hreat Ranking
Although each o the threats could now be mapped independently, as they all use dierent
units o analysis, i.e., per 100,000, percent o contaminated land and so on. Consequently
they could not be combined or aggregated into one table and subsequently one oerall map
showing hotspot` locations. In order to do this a common comparable scale must be
created. lor this analysis, the common scale was a simple ordinal ranking o high, medium
and low threat or any gien spatial unit. 1hese three leels o threat, represented by a 2, 1 or
0 respectiely, were determined by classiying the data set in the GIS by its Natural Breaks
15
.
1his grouped the categories based on clusters o data ,see ligure 4,.

15
Natural Breaks in one o many options or classiying data sets in ArcView GIS. It was chosen because it
most accurately captures the bulk o the data without complex statistical reasoning. Other options or
classiying include Quintiles, Lqual Interals and Standard Deiation.
Province Boundary Shapefile
GIS CODE KHETCODE1 PROVINCE
01 1 Banteay Meanchey
02 2 Battambang
03 3 Kampong Cham
04 4 Kampong Chhnang
05 5 Kampong Speu
06 6 Kampong Thom
07 7 Kampot
08 8 Kandal
09 9 Koh Kong
10 10 Kratie
11 11 Mondul Kiri
12 12 Phnom Penh
13 13 Preah Vihear
14 14 Prey Veng
15 15 Pursat
16 16 Ratanak Kiri
17 17 Siemreap
18 18 Sihanoukville
19 19 Stueng Treng
20 20 Svay Rieng
21 21 Takeo
22 22 Otdar Meanchey
23 23 Kep
24 24 Pailin
99 99 Tonle Sap
GIS CODE PROVINCE PROVINCE1 AREA PERIMETER
1 Banteay Meanchey BANTEAY MEANCHEY 6054204711.986 535684.886
2 Battambang BATTAMBANG 11803125597.893 684479.700
3 Kampong Cham KAMPONG CHAM 9480870666.371 773974.754
4 Kampong Chhnang KAMPONG CHHNANG 5339744644.269 429003.867
5 Kampong Speu KAMPONG SPEU 6969719229.931 495765.316
6 Kampong Thom KAMPONG THOM 12441423000.738 768543.967
7 Kampot KAMPOT 4685926820.106 409329.726
8 Kandal KANDAL 3563801147.198 537788.410
9 Koh Kong KOH KONG 12118103311.488 830782.309
10 Kratie KRATIE 12250793193.793 696772.638
11 Mondul Kiri MONDUL KIRI 13394415606.708 686452.398
12 Phnom Penh PHNOM PENH 373849395.930 114924.941
13 Preah Vihear PREAH VIHEAR 13655706145.268 713819.803
14 Prey Veng PREY VENG 4759934939.716 396836.192
15 Pursat PURSAT 11737086786.879 804018.970
16 Ratanak Kiri RATANAK KIRI 11721188636.131 699451.659
17 Siemreap SIEMREAP 10863661754.492 638385.091
18 Sihanoukville SIHANOUKVILLE 1492181252.337 453571.187
19 Stueng Treng STUENG TRENG 12076709457.058 702785.480
20 Svay Rieng SVAY RIENG 2869349587.119 348403.900
21 Takeo TAKEO 3482029143.703 341902.097
22 Otdar Meanchey OTDAR MEANCHEY 6681936370.084 556668.909
23 Kep KEP 187266753.435 110001.667
24 Pailin PAILIN 1102792730.126 171511.696
99 Tonle Sap TONLE SAP 2503555797.652 571343.884
GISCODE PROVINCE PROVINCE1 AREA PERIMETER GIS CODE PROVINCE % of Women Abused
1 Banteay Meanchey BANTEAY MEANCHEY 6054204711.986 535684.886 01 Banteay Meanchey 12.3
2 Battambang BATTAMBANG 11803125597.893 684479.700 02 Battambang 8.9
3 Kampong Cham KAMPONG CHAM 9480870666.371 773974.754 03 Kampong Cham 16.8
4 Kampong Chhnang KAMPONG CHHNANG 5339744644.269 429003.867 04 Kampong Chhnang 19.8
5 Kampong Speu KAMPONG SPEU 6969719229.931 495765.316 05 Kampong Speu 2.7
6 Kampong Thom KAMPONG THOM 12441423000.738 768543.967 06 Kampong Thom 13.4
7 Kampot KAMPOT 4685926820.106 409329.726 07 Kampot 11.1
8 Kandal KANDAL 3563801147.198 537788.410 08 Kandal 17.9
9 Koh Kong KOH KONG 12118103311.488 830782.309 09 Koh Kong 20.0
10 Kratie KRATIE 12250793193.793 696772.638 10 Kratie 13.9
11 Mondul Kiri MONDUL KIRI 13394415606.708 686452.398 11 Mondul Kiri 9.5
12 Phnom Penh PHNOM PENH 373849395.930 114924.941 12 Phnom Penh 17.2
13 Preah Vihear PREAH VIHEAR 13655706145.268 713819.803 13 Preah Vihear 13.9
14 Prey Veng PREY VENG 4759934939.716 396836.192 14 Prey Veng 7.6
15 Pursat PURSAT 11737086786.879 804018.970 15 Pursat 38.9
16 Ratanak Kiri RATANAK KIRI 11721188636.131 699451.659 16 Ratanak Kiri 9.5
17 Siemreap SIEMREAP 10863661754.492 638385.091 17 Siemreap 27.8
18 Sihanoukville SIHANOUKVILLE 1492181252.337 453571.187 18 Sihanoukville 11.1
19 Stueng Treng STUENG TRENG 12076709457.058 702785.480 19 Stueng Treng 13.9
20 Svay Rieng SVAY RIENG 2869349587.119 348403.900 20 Svay Rieng 16.0
21 Takeo TAKEO 3482029143.703 341902.097 21 Takeo 13.2
22 Otdar Meanchey OTDAR MEANCHEY 6681936370.084 556668.909 22 Otdar Meanchey 27.8
23 Kep KEP 187266753.435 110001.667 23 Kep 11.1
24 Pailin PAILIN 1102792730.126 171511.696 24 Pailin 8.9
99 Tonle Sap TONLE SAP 2503555797.652 571343.884 99 Tonle Sap
Joined with Domestic Violence data table
Results in Combined Table (linked by GIS Code)
Which can then be thematically mapped
Province Boundary Shapefile
GIS CODE KHETCODE1 PROVINCE
01 1 Banteay Meanchey
02 2 Battambang
03 3 Kampong Cham
04 4 Kampong Chhnang
05 5 Kampong Speu
06 6 Kampong Thom
07 7 Kampot
08 8 Kandal
09 9 Koh Kong
10 10 Kratie
11 11 Mondul Kiri
12 12 Phnom Penh
13 13 Preah Vihear
14 14 Prey Veng
15 15 Pursat
16 16 Ratanak Kiri
17 17 Siemreap
18 18 Sihanoukville
19 19 Stueng Treng
20 20 Svay Rieng
21 21 Takeo
22 22 Otdar Meanchey
23 23 Kep
24 24 Pailin
99 99 Tonle Sap
GIS CODE PROVINCE PROVINCE1 AREA PERIMETER
1 Banteay Meanchey BANTEAY MEANCHEY 6054204711.986 535684.886
2 Battambang BATTAMBANG 11803125597.893 684479.700
3 Kampong Cham KAMPONG CHAM 9480870666.371 773974.754
4 Kampong Chhnang KAMPONG CHHNANG 5339744644.269 429003.867
5 Kampong Speu KAMPONG SPEU 6969719229.931 495765.316
6 Kampong Thom KAMPONG THOM 12441423000.738 768543.967
7 Kampot KAMPOT 4685926820.106 409329.726
8 Kandal KANDAL 3563801147.198 537788.410
9 Koh Kong KOH KONG 12118103311.488 830782.309
10 Kratie KRATIE 12250793193.793 696772.638
11 Mondul Kiri MONDUL KIRI 13394415606.708 686452.398
12 Phnom Penh PHNOM PENH 373849395.930 114924.941
13 Preah Vihear PREAH VIHEAR 13655706145.268 713819.803
14 Prey Veng PREY VENG 4759934939.716 396836.192
15 Pursat PURSAT 11737086786.879 804018.970
16 Ratanak Kiri RATANAK KIRI 11721188636.131 699451.659
17 Siemreap SIEMREAP 10863661754.492 638385.091
18 Sihanoukville SIHANOUKVILLE 1492181252.337 453571.187
19 Stueng Treng STUENG TRENG 12076709457.058 702785.480
20 Svay Rieng SVAY RIENG 2869349587.119 348403.900
21 Takeo TAKEO 3482029143.703 341902.097
22 Otdar Meanchey OTDAR MEANCHEY 6681936370.084 556668.909
23 Kep KEP 187266753.435 110001.667
24 Pailin PAILIN 1102792730.126 171511.696
99 Tonle Sap TONLE SAP 2503555797.652 571343.884
GISCODE PROVINCE PROVINCE1 AREA PERIMETER GIS CODE PROVINCE % of Women Abused
1 Banteay Meanchey BANTEAY MEANCHEY 6054204711.986 535684.886 01 Banteay Meanchey 12.3
2 Battambang BATTAMBANG 11803125597.893 684479.700 02 Battambang 8.9
3 Kampong Cham KAMPONG CHAM 9480870666.371 773974.754 03 Kampong Cham 16.8
4 Kampong Chhnang KAMPONG CHHNANG 5339744644.269 429003.867 04 Kampong Chhnang 19.8
5 Kampong Speu KAMPONG SPEU 6969719229.931 495765.316 05 Kampong Speu 2.7
6 Kampong Thom KAMPONG THOM 12441423000.738 768543.967 06 Kampong Thom 13.4
7 Kampot KAMPOT 4685926820.106 409329.726 07 Kampot 11.1
8 Kandal KANDAL 3563801147.198 537788.410 08 Kandal 17.9
9 Koh Kong KOH KONG 12118103311.488 830782.309 09 Koh Kong 20.0
10 Kratie KRATIE 12250793193.793 696772.638 10 Kratie 13.9
11 Mondul Kiri MONDUL KIRI 13394415606.708 686452.398 11 Mondul Kiri 9.5
12 Phnom Penh PHNOM PENH 373849395.930 114924.941 12 Phnom Penh 17.2
13 Preah Vihear PREAH VIHEAR 13655706145.268 713819.803 13 Preah Vihear 13.9
14 Prey Veng PREY VENG 4759934939.716 396836.192 14 Prey Veng 7.6
15 Pursat PURSAT 11737086786.879 804018.970 15 Pursat 38.9
16 Ratanak Kiri RATANAK KIRI 11721188636.131 699451.659 16 Ratanak Kiri 9.5
17 Siemreap SIEMREAP 10863661754.492 638385.091 17 Siemreap 27.8
18 Sihanoukville SIHANOUKVILLE 1492181252.337 453571.187 18 Sihanoukville 11.1
19 Stueng Treng STUENG TRENG 12076709457.058 702785.480 19 Stueng Treng 13.9
20 Svay Rieng SVAY RIENG 2869349587.119 348403.900 20 Svay Rieng 16.0
21 Takeo TAKEO 3482029143.703 341902.097 21 Takeo 13.2
22 Otdar Meanchey OTDAR MEANCHEY 6681936370.084 556668.909 22 Otdar Meanchey 27.8
23 Kep KEP 187266753.435 110001.667 23 Kep 11.1
24 Pailin PAILIN 1102792730.126 171511.696 24 Pailin 8.9
99 Tonle Sap TONLE SAP 2503555797.652 571343.884 99 Tonle Sap
Joined with Domestic Violence data table
Results in Combined Table (linked by GIS Code)
Which can then be thematically mapped
17
igvre 1 Diagrav of tbe Creatiov of tbe igb 1breat Ma for tbe orert, ivaicator
































Data Merge
1he inal step beore urther analysis o hotspot location can be conducted was to merge all
data, or all leels o analysis, ,proince, regional district and commune,, into one inal table
reerenced to the lowest spatial unit, in this case the commune leel. 1his was done by irst
grouping all data, original data type and ranking by like spatial units. 1his resulted in three
tables: proince inal, district inal and commune inal. 1hese tables were then combined
using the Union unction. 1his unction essentially oerlays the maps ,and thereore the data
tables as well, putting all that was inside the more reined leel ,commune, into the coarser
ones ,districts and proinces,. 1he inal product was a table and map with all data listed by
proince, district and commune name and codes ,see ligure 5,.
GIS CODE COMMUNE N4 POV_RANK
70302 Takaen 0.72 2
190305 Thma Kaev 0.18 0
130301 Choam Ksant 0.59 1
190301 Preaek Meas 0.14 0
130302 Tuek Kraham 0.42 1
130304 Rumdaoh Srae 0.47 1
130303 Pring Thum 0.31 0
130207 Kampong Sralau Muoy 0.42 1
220302 Chong Kal 0.68 2
130203 Sangkae Muoy 0.73 2
130205 Mlu Prey Muoy 0.66 2
10706 Kumru 0.60 1
130208 Kampong Sralau Pir 0.31 0
130202 Chhaeb Pir 0.63 2
160104 Ta Lav 0.15 0
10704 Thma Puok 0.77 2
130402 Kuleaen Cheung 0.63 2
171206 Slaeng Spean 0.84 2
160909 Phnum Kok 0.07 0
10705 Kouk Kakthen 0.72 2
130403 Thmei 0.44 1
10703 Phum Thmei 0.83 2
10804 Svay Chek 0.72 2
10807 Treas 0.43 1
190508 Preah Rumkel 0.34 0
130703 Chhean Mukh 0.39 1
130704 Pou 0.03 0
130705 Prame 0.26 0
160101 Malik 0.16 0
.1629
GIS CODE COMMUNE N4
70302 Takaen 0.72
190305 Thma Kaev 0.18
130301 Choam Ksant 0.59
190301 Preaek Meas 0.14
130302 Tuek Kraham 0.42
130304 Rumdaoh Srae 0.47
130303 Pring Thum 0.31
130207 Kampong Sralau Muoy 0.42
220302 Chong Kal 0.68
130203 Sangkae Muoy 0.73
130205 Mlu Prey Muoy 0.66
10706 Kumru 0.60
130208 Kampong Sralau Pir 0.31
130202 Chhaeb Pir 0.63
160104 Ta Lav 0.15
10704 Thma Puok 0.77
130402 Kuleaen Cheung 0.63
171206 Slaeng Spean 0.84
160909 Phnum Kok 0.07
10705 Kouk Kakthen 0.72
130403 Thmei 0.44
10703 Phum Thmei 0.83
10804 Svay Chek 0.72
10807 Treas 0.43
190508 Preah Rumkel 0.34
130703 Chhean Mukh 0.39
130704 Pou 0.03
130705 Prame 0.26
160101 Malik 0.16
1629
COMMUNE COM_CODE MAX_N4 POV_RANK
Mkak 10604 0.79 2
Banteay Chhmar 10701 0.84 2
Kouk Romiet 10702 0.75 2
Phum Thmei 10703 0.83 2
Thma Puok 10704 0.77 2
Kouk Kakthen 10705 0.72 2
Svay Chek 10804 0.72 2
Ta Baen 10805 0.64 2
Tuol Pongro 10901 0.64 2
Ou Sampor 10902 0.96 2
Ou Sralau 10903 0.71 2
Ta Kong 10906 0.72 2
Rung Chrey 20210 0.70 2
Ou Mal 20307 0.65 2
Prey Khpos 20404 0.70 2
Ampil Pram Daeum 20405 0.76 2
Kaoh Chiveang 20507 0.70 2
Kakaoh 20607 0.63 2
Preaek Chik 20611 0.80 2
Prey Tralach 20612 0.63 2
Andaeuk Haeb 20702 0.66 2
Roka 20804 0.63 2
Kampong Pring 20806 0.63 2
Reang Kesei 20807 0.68 2
Ta Sda 21003 0.78 2
Santepheap 21004 0.66 2
Serei Mean Chey 21005 0.68 2
Phnum Proek 21101 0.91 2
Pech Chenda 21102 0.94 2
1629
Percent of Pop. Below Poverty Line
Poverty Threat (High, Low, None)
High Poverty Threat
All_data_final.shp
Poverty 2000 (commune).shp
0 - 0.23
0.23 - 0.42
0.42 - 0.58
0.58 - 0.76
0.76 - 0.99
All_data_final.shp
0
1
2
Pov_high.shp
GIS CODE COMMUNE N4 POV_RANK
70302 Takaen 0.72 2
190305 Thma Kaev 0.18 0
130301 Choam Ksant 0.59 1
190301 Preaek Meas 0.14 0
130302 Tuek Kraham 0.42 1
130304 Rumdaoh Srae 0.47 1
130303 Pring Thum 0.31 0
130207 Kampong Sralau Muoy 0.42 1
220302 Chong Kal 0.68 2
130203 Sangkae Muoy 0.73 2
130205 Mlu Prey Muoy 0.66 2
10706 Kumru 0.60 1
130208 Kampong Sralau Pir 0.31 0
130202 Chhaeb Pir 0.63 2
160104 Ta Lav 0.15 0
10704 Thma Puok 0.77 2
130402 Kuleaen Cheung 0.63 2
171206 Slaeng Spean 0.84 2
160909 Phnum Kok 0.07 0
10705 Kouk Kakthen 0.72 2
130403 Thmei 0.44 1
10703 Phum Thmei 0.83 2
10804 Svay Chek 0.72 2
10807 Treas 0.43 1
190508 Preah Rumkel 0.34 0
130703 Chhean Mukh 0.39 1
130704 Pou 0.03 0
130705 Prame 0.26 0
160101 Malik 0.16 0
.1629
GIS CODE COMMUNE N4
70302 Takaen 0.72
190305 Thma Kaev 0.18
130301 Choam Ksant 0.59
190301 Preaek Meas 0.14
130302 Tuek Kraham 0.42
130304 Rumdaoh Srae 0.47
130303 Pring Thum 0.31
130207 Kampong Sralau Muoy 0.42
220302 Chong Kal 0.68
130203 Sangkae Muoy 0.73
130205 Mlu Prey Muoy 0.66
10706 Kumru 0.60
130208 Kampong Sralau Pir 0.31
130202 Chhaeb Pir 0.63
160104 Ta Lav 0.15
10704 Thma Puok 0.77
130402 Kuleaen Cheung 0.63
171206 Slaeng Spean 0.84
160909 Phnum Kok 0.07
10705 Kouk Kakthen 0.72
130403 Thmei 0.44
10703 Phum Thmei 0.83
10804 Svay Chek 0.72
10807 Treas 0.43
190508 Preah Rumkel 0.34
130703 Chhean Mukh 0.39
130704 Pou 0.03
130705 Prame 0.26
160101 Malik 0.16
1629
COMMUNE COM_CODE MAX_N4 POV_RANK
Mkak 10604 0.79 2
Banteay Chhmar 10701 0.84 2
Kouk Romiet 10702 0.75 2
Phum Thmei 10703 0.83 2
Thma Puok 10704 0.77 2
Kouk Kakthen 10705 0.72 2
Svay Chek 10804 0.72 2
Ta Baen 10805 0.64 2
Tuol Pongro 10901 0.64 2
Ou Sampor 10902 0.96 2
Ou Sralau 10903 0.71 2
Ta Kong 10906 0.72 2
Rung Chrey 20210 0.70 2
Ou Mal 20307 0.65 2
Prey Khpos 20404 0.70 2
Ampil Pram Daeum 20405 0.76 2
Kaoh Chiveang 20507 0.70 2
Kakaoh 20607 0.63 2
Preaek Chik 20611 0.80 2
Prey Tralach 20612 0.63 2
Andaeuk Haeb 20702 0.66 2
Roka 20804 0.63 2
Kampong Pring 20806 0.63 2
Reang Kesei 20807 0.68 2
Ta Sda 21003 0.78 2
Santepheap 21004 0.66 2
Serei Mean Chey 21005 0.68 2
Phnum Proek 21101 0.91 2
Pech Chenda 21102 0.94 2
1629
Percent of Pop. Below Poverty Line
Poverty Threat (High, Low, None)
High Poverty Threat
All_data_final.shp
Poverty 2000 (commune).shp
0 - 0.23
0.23 - 0.42
0.42 - 0.58
0.58 - 0.76
0.76 - 0.99
All_data_final.shp
0
1
2
Pov_high.shp
18
igvre : - avte. of Data Merge 1abte.

Data Analysis
1he inal stage, data analysis, is done by conducting a series o oerlays between threat
layers. 1he oerlay analysis were able to decipher hotspots o human insecurity, spatial
correlations between threats, in particular, the long term consequences o war.

lotspots
ot.ot. are regions that experience the aggregate impact o multiple security threats.
Although we may know where each independent threat is the most serious, we hae no idea
where they are oerlapping and causing cumulatie harm. lor example, satellite images can
tell us where looding has been the worst, studies demonstrate the location o landmines and
socio-economic analysis reeals regions o extreme poerty. But what i one illage,
commune or region were subject to all three o these threats Clearly they would be the most
ulnerable and should be the ocus o immediate attention.

GIS Code PROVINCE Z001_PER_1 DENG_RANK Z_POP_AT_R MAL_RANK Z_OF_PHYSI GUN_RANK Z_OF_MARRI DOMV_RANK
1 Banteay Meanchey 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1
22 Otdar Meanchey 333 2 34 1 13.9 2 27.8 2
17 Siemreap 397 2 15 1 0.0 0 27.8 2
13 Preah Vihear 315 2 81 2 12.5 2 13.9 1
19 Stueng Treng 3 1 86 2 12.5 2 13.9 1
2 Battambang 25 1 5 1 5.3 1 8.9 0
24 Pailin 431 2 95 2 5.3 1 8.9 0
15 Pursat 162 2 7 1 8.8 1 38.9 2
9 Koh Kong 41 1 68 2 4.0 1 20.0 2
5 Kampong Speu 26 1 10 1 15.1 2 2.7
7 Kampot 14 1 8 1 9.4 1 11.1 0
23 Kep 127 2 53 2 9.4 1 11.1 0
21 Takeo 39 1 0 0 0.0 0 13.2 1
20 Svay Rieng 1 1 0 0 7.5 1 16.0 1
8 Kandal 56 1 0 0 7.1 1 17.9 1
14 Prey Veng 8 1 0 0 0.0 0 7.6 0
16 Ratanak Kiri 323 2 94 2 0.0 0 9.5 0
11 Mondul Kiri 0 0 78 2 0.0 0 9.5 0
10 Kratie 10 1 26 1 12.5 2 13.9 1
3 Kampong Cham 54 1 24 1 9.9 1 16.8 1
12 Phnom Penh 73 1 0 0 15.0 2 17.2 1
18 Sihanoukville 19 1 40 1 9.4 1 11.1 0
6 Kampong Thom 54 1 16 1 9.3 1 13.4 1
4 Kampong Chhnang 47 1 16 1 23.3 2 19.8 1
GIS Code COMMUNE N4 POV_RANK PLG_TOTAL PLG_RANK CONT_PERCE CONT_RANK
70302 Takaen 0.72 2 111 2 3.10 1
190305 Thma Kaev 0.18 0 7 0 0.00 0
130301 Choam Ksant 0.59 1 22 1 0.00 0
190301 Preaek Meas 0.14 0 5 0 0.57 1
130302 Tuek Kraham 0.42 1 83 2 1.10 1
130304 Rumdaoh Srae 0.47 1 35 1 0.00 0
130303 Pring Thum 0.31 0 7 0 0.47 1
130207 Kampong Sralau Muoy 0.42 1 35 1 0.51 1
220302 Chong Kal 0.68 2 65 1 0.46 1
130203 Sangkae Muoy 0.73 2 14 1 0.00 0
130205 Mlu Prey Muoy 0.66 2 18 1 0.03 1
10706 Kumru 0.60 1 43 1 0.00 0
130208 Kampong Sralau Pir 0.31 0 0 0 0.71 1
130202 Chhaeb Pir 0.63 2 29 1 0.18 1
160104 Ta Lav 0.15 0 4 0 0.00 0
10704 Thma Puok 0.77 2 27 1 0.00 0
130402 Kuleaen Cheung 0.63 2 31 1 0.19 1
171206 Slaeng Spean 0.84 2 122 2 0.17 1
160909 Phnum Kok 0.07 0 6 0 0.00 0
10705 Kouk Kakthen 0.72 2 53 1 2.28 1
130403 Thmei 0.44 1 0 0 0.00 0
10703 Phum Thmei 0.83 2 22 1 0.29 1
10804 Svay Chek 0.72 2 0 0 32.64 2
10807 Treas 0.43 1 46 1 41.31 2
190508 Preah Rumkel 0.34 0 42 1 0.11 1
GIS Code DISTRICT TB_100000 TB_RANK AFFEC_1000 FLOOD_RANK DROUGHT_PE DROUG_RANK
109 Malai 0 0 0 0 0.00 0
108 Svay Chek 188 1 0 0 0.00 0
107 Thma Puok 191 1 0 0 0.00 0
106 Serei Saophoan 100 2 0 0 0.00 0
105 Ou Chrov 36 2 0 0 0.00 0
104 Preah Netr Preah 98 2 0 0 0.00 0
103 Phnum Srok 164 1 0 0 0.00 0
102 Mongkol Borei 81 2 847 1 0.00 0
2205 Trapeang Prasat 1547 1 0 0 0.00 0
2204 Samraong 133 2 0 0 16.06 2
2203 Chong Kal 314 1 0 0 0.00 0
2202 Banteay Ampil 0 0 0 0 0.00 0
2201 Anlong Veaeng 156 1 0 0 0.00 0
1714 Varin 0 0 0 0 0.00 0
1713 Svay Leu 0 0 0 0 0.00 0
1712 Srei Snam 0 0 0 0 14.07 2
1711 Soutr Nikom 205 1 346 1 3.86 1
1710 Siem Reap 181 1 0 0 0.00 0
1709 Prasat Bakong 0 0 0 0 0.63 1
1707 Puok 213 1 232 1 0.00 0
1706 Kralanh 377 1 0 0 12.12 2
1704 Chi Kraeng 112 2 159 1 0.00 0
1703 Banteay Srei 149 1 0 0 0.14 1
1702 Angkor Thum 0 0 0 0 2.95 1
1701 Angkor Chum 188 1 0 0 2.36 1
1307 Tbaeng Mean Chey 479 1 0 0 0.00 0
Province Level
Data
District Level
Data
Commune Level
Data
Final Complete
Table
Union
PROVINCE DISTRICT COMMUNE PROV_CODE DIST_CODE COM_CODE CASES_1000 DENG_RANK Z_POP_RISK MAL_RANK Z_OF_INJUR GUN_RANK Z_MARRIED DOMV_RANK INFANT_MOR INF_RANK HR_VIOLATI HRV_RANK DCSW AIDS_RANK TB_100000 TB_RANK FL_AFF_100
Tonle Sap Tonle Sap Tonle Sap 99 99 99 0
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Banteay Neang 1 102 10201 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Bat Trang 1 102 10202 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Chamnaom 1 102 10203 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Kouk Ballangk 1 102 10204 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Koy Maeng 1 102 10205 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Ou Prasat 1 102 10206 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Phnum Touch 1 102 10207 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Rohat Tuek 1 102 10208 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Ruessei Kraok 1 102 10209 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Sambuor 1 102 10210 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Soea 1 102 10211 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Srah Reang 1 102 10212 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Mongkol Borei Ta Lam 1 102 10213 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 81 2 847
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Nam Tau 1 103 10301 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Paoy Char 1 103 10302 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Ponley 1 103 10303 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Spean Sraeng 1 103 10304 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Srah Chik 1 103 10305 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Phnum Srok Phnum Dei 1 103 10306 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 164 1 0
Banteay Meanchey Preah Netr Preah Chhnuor Mean Chey 1 104 10401 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 98 2 0
Banteay Meanchey Preah Netr Preah Chob Veari 1 104 10402 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 98 2 0
Banteay Meanchey Preah Netr Preah Phnum Lieb 1 104 10403 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 98 2 0
Banteay Meanchey Preah Netr Preah Prasat 1 104 10404 268 2 13 1 12.9 2 12.3 1 78.2 1 44 2 37 2 98 2 0
19
lotspots also help us to understand whether multiple minor threats hae the same impact as
one emergency threat. 1his should be important to the deelopment community as it
addresses the trend o deelopment as humanitarian emergency response. Should we be
doing more than simply responding to the next emergency Perhaps by showing that people
are insecure, not solely in disaster areas, but also in communities aced with many non
emergency` threats, we will bring attention to these orgotten regions.
lotspots are created by oerlaying all 13 o the high threat maps. 1his inal hotspot
map thereore shows how many high human security threats a region is exposed to.



Spatial Correlations o 1hreats and the Consequences o \ar

Much is written on the long term impacts o war. A measurable physical legacy o conlict,
particularly or Cambodia, are unexploded ordinances. Cambodia is one o the most seerely
landmine and UXO aected countries in the world due to decades o ciil war and years o
aerial bombardment. 1he Landmine Impact Surey, issued in May 2002, reports that 6,422
illages are arected by landmines UXO, that 2.5 percent o the country`s surace area may
be contaminated and that 5.1 million people were at risk. 1he direct concequences o this
are easy to measure. In 2002, 834 new landmine and UXO casualties were reported 145
20
people were killed and 689 injured. 1he indirect impacts o landmines are assumed, but ar
more diicult to capture ,LMR, 2003,.
Although landmines are a deastating human security threat to some Cambodians,
the problem is highly spatially determined - or instance, someone liing in urban Phnom
Penh has little ear o stepping on an unexploded ordinance. lor this reason, spatial analysis
could be ery useul in demonstrating corresponding threats that are present in rural regions
o high landmine contamination.
\e beliee that in a largely agrarian society such as Cambodia, poerty orces people
onto known contaminated land leading to high strike ictim rates. Also, as there are ar
ewer landmine ields in urban areas and since good goernance generally comes with
tandem landmine education and demining initiaites we expect both to dampen strike ictim
rates. \e thereore hypothesize that:

l1: Poerty will drie up, and urbanity and good goernence will dampen landmine
and UXO strike ictims.

Indeed, poerty does signiicantly drie up the propensity or landmine ictims. Not only
that, but the magnitude o contaminated land is also highly correlated with poerty. 1his
created what we beliee is a cycle o between the presence o landmines, the poerty they
cause and the number o ictims that result
16
.








16
lor details o the methods, data and larger statistical project see: Owen, 1aylor & Aldo Benini, 2004.
luman Security in Cambodia: A Statistical Analysis o Large-Sample Sub-National Vulnerability Data`. Report
written or the Centre or the Study o Ciil \ar at the International Peace Research Institute Oslo.

21



4. Iuture of Research

1he possible uture applications or this methodology are ast, or Cambodia, or the
international deelopment and humanitarian relie community and or academia.
Most importantly, the data and the completed GIS tool will be returned to Cambodia
to be used by NGO`s, IOs and Goernment Ministries. Much o this data has neer been
mapped and almost none o it has been spatially analyzed. 1he results will be useul to
many
1
.
Ideally, the next stage in the Cambodian human security assessment would consist o
a qualitatie ground-truthing` o the data. lotspot regions could be assessed to determine
whether they truly do suer rom a releant dierence in ulnerability. Lxperts in the ield
would also ealuate regions that hae shown signiicant relationships in the correlation
analysis.
On a much broader scale, the methodology has two paralleling potential applications,
both requiring multi-country case studies: locating populations at risk, and analysing causality
and relationships in human insecurity.

Locating populations at risk
lirst, as a logistical tool or deelopment planning and humanitarian assistance, a human
security GIS would be inaluable. Knowing what threats are present in a country and exactly
where they are prealent would help in both the conception and execution o programs and
aid. 1he methodology also acilitates the type o data and inormation sharing that rarely
occurs in this policy community. lor agencies in a region to hae access to each others data
and knowledge o all deelopment initiaties would proide a leel o streamlining that is
desperately needed. lumanitarian assistance should not be a competitie isolationist
enterprise, it must cease to be operated as such and work toward collaboration as opposed to
antagonism.
CIDA, or example, could commission a human security assessment o a country or
which they were planning signiicant bi-lateral assistance. 1his assessment, along with the
GIS database would help them both target the most ulnerable peoples, choose the most
eectie programming and aoid many o the ineitable pitalls o deelopment planning,
such as project redundancy and lack o inter-agency collaboration. At a time o immediate
post-conlict assistance this inormation would be ideal. As aid loods into a country there is
oten little thought as to exactly what is needed and where. More than oten the people who
need help most, the most insecure, neer receie the assistance they desperately require
18
.


1 lor example, although the \lO collects data on malaria, 1B, dengue eer and lIV,AIDS, they hae
neer been mapped together, an exercise that will be aluable to the organization.
18
As a testament to this, one only need look at post conlict Aghanistan. NGOs clamoring or media coerage
ailed to address the majority o the people truly suering. lorror stories o thousands o security blankets
arriing at a illage desperately needing ood and water, are not uncommon.
22
Analysing human security
1he second uture application o this methodology is academic. 1he study o the causes and
consequences o war is a burgeoning inter-disciplinary endeaour. Spatial analysis should be
part o this dialogue.
1he causes o war, particularly intra-state conlict, hae undergone dramatic re-
ealuation. 1he triggers o complex regional instability and iolence oten inole an
intersection o policy, identity, resource location, poerty, disasters and ulnerability. 1hese
relationships, howeer, hae generally only been studied at the national leel and in
disciplinary isolation - or instance economists studying poerty and conlict, geographers
studying resources and conlict, political scientist studying goernance and conlict and so
on. An intra-state spatial analysis o all o these potential conlict-causing ariables could
reeal correlation and perhaps causation that has thus ar gone undetected. 1his type o
analysis could also be conducted as a historical exercise. i.e. under what conditions did
regional conlict break out
19

1he long-term socio-economic consequences o war also warrant urther
inestigation and again, spatial analysis o human security indicators proides a unique
acilitating mechanism. In an era o high altitude bombing and heay landmine use, the past
20 years has resulted in deastation, long ater the conlicts hae ended. 1he long term
eects o landmines and unexploded ordinances ,UXOs, can be crippling to a country
already raaged by the immediate impacts o war. Showing exactly what and how serious
these socio-economic impacts are, howeer, would be inaluable to the promotion o a
human security agenda.
A multi-country GIS analysis could be deeloped rom this project`s brie
examination o the spatial correlation o landmines and human insecurities. Does heay
landmine contamination always result in higher incidences o poerty, dengue eer and
iolence, 20 years ater their deployment ,as is shown in this study, Do the UXOs rom
cluster and carpet-bombing leae a long lasting legacy o insecurity, as they do in Cambodia
1hese types o questions warrant analysis.

S. Conclusion

1he methodology applied or the analysis, begins to address both o the concerns acing
proponents o human security - analysis and presentation o large amounts o
interdisciplinary data.
lirst, adding a common ariable, space, to each o the data sets, allows or the direct
comparison and aggregation o ery dierent inormation. In other words, a common
language acilitates interdisciplinarity. Also, haing all releant data in one location and linked
by a common attribute is inaluable to data users and policy analysts.
Second, interactie data isualization is the ideal mechanism to present complex,
broad ranging inormation to the policy making community. A map is ininitely more
approachable than a complex database, especially when doing multiariate analysis. 1his
accessibility will proe critical in attracting the much-needed attention that Cambodian
security issues warrant.
Cambodia is not a sae place. In order to see this, howeer, one needs to look
beyond traditional notions o security. luman Security, by expanding the discourse to
include health, enironmental and economic threats, proides such a ramework. 1here is


23
reason to beliee that a tool that recognizes and displays human insecurities, in a manner
attractie to both academics and policy makers, would go great lengths to both identiy
Cambodia`s human insecurities as well as to solidiy the concept in international discourse.



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Acronyms

CDRI Cambodian Deelopment Research Institute
COMlRLL Committee or lree and lair Llections in Cambodia
CPP Cambodian Peoples Party
lUNCIPLC United lront or an Independent, Neutral and Co- operatie
Cambodia
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GLClS Global Lnironmental Change and luman Security
GIS Geographic Inormation System
lDI luman Deelopment Index
lPI luman Poerty Index
ICRC International Commission o the Red Cross
IlI Indiidual luman Insecurity
IlS Index o luman Security
IO International Organization
LIGI Liu Institute or Global Issues
NGO Non-Goernmental Organization
PLG Partnership or Local Goernance
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Deelopment Program
UN1AC United Nations 1ransitional Authority or Cambodia
UXO Unexploded Ordinances
\lP \orld lood Program
\lO \orld lealth Organization