Consciousness and Cognition[*]

David J. Chalmers
Department of Philosophy
University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
chalmers@arizona.edu
*[[I wrote this paper in January of 1990, but did not publish it because I was never entirely happy
with it. My ideas on consciousness were in a state of flux, ultiately evolvin! into those
represented in y boo" The Conscious Mind #$xford %niversity &ress, 199'(. I now thin" that
soe parts of this paper are unsatisfactory, especially the positive theory outlined at the end,
althou!h a successor to that theory is laid out in the boo". )evertheless, I thin" the paper raises
issues that need to be addressed.**
Introduction
+he proble of consciousness is perhaps the lar!est outstandin! obstacle in our
,uest to scientifically understand reality. +he science of physics is not yet
coplete, but it is well-understood. +he science of biolo!y has explained away
ost of the ysteries surroundin! the nature of life. .here there are !aps in our
understandin! of these fields, the !aps do not see intractable/ we at least have
soe idea of the direction in which solutions i!ht lie. In the science of ind,
thin!s are not ,uite so rosy. Much pro!ress is bein! ade in the study of
cognition, but consciousness itself is as uch of a proble as it ever was.
+he ter 0consciousness0 often serves as a catch-all for all that is ysterious
about entality. .hen usin! the ter, one ust therefore be careful not to
collapse iportant distinctions. +he ost iportant distinction in the study of
consciousness bears upon the approach we ta"e to studyin! it1 we ay ta"e
either the first-person or the third-person approach. .e i!ht say that the third-
person approach treats consciousness as a scientific proble, while the first-
person approach treats it as a etaphysical proble. +hese two different
viewpoints that we can adopt lead to very different treatents of the
phenoenon, each of which can supply crucial insi!hts. 2ut the reconciliation of
the viewpoints sees to be a difficult atter. 3re,uently, proponents of the two
approaches see to be tal"in! past each other. In this paper, I will try to
explicate carefully the relation between the two approaches, and to ar!ue that
they are not so irreconcilable as they i!ht see.
The third-person approach
+he third-person approach has uch to recoend it. $n this view,
consciousness is treated as a proble of science, 4ust li"e heat, life, or nuclear
physics, and aenable to the sae ethods of in,uiry. 5esearchers in the new
discipline of co!nitive science have had uch success in ta"in! this approach to
the study of ental processes in !eneral. It is natural to hope that it i!ht shed
soe li!ht on the probles of consciousness, too.
+he raw aterials of co!nitive science are uch the sae as those of any
science - data !athered fro external observation. +hese data can ta"e a
nuber of different fors. +he ost obvious "ind of observable data are
behavioral, and the study of huan behavior is concentrated in the field of
psycholo!y. 6nother source of data, less accessible than behavior but extreely
useful for the third-person approach, is observation of brain structure and
function. +he field of neuroscience is be!innin! to have si!nificant success in
explainin! how the brain supports co!nition. 6 third, less direct ethod in
co!nitive science is that of co!nitive odelin! - the construction of odels,
usually coputational, that cohere to soe extent with behavioral or
neurophysiolo!ical data. +he field of artificial intelli!ence is concerned with
producin! such odels, and researchers in psycholo!y and neuroscience often
use coputational odels in their wor".
+his tripartite investi!ation of behavior, brain function and co!nitive odels has
led to a si!nificant increase in our understandin! of diverse aspects of co!nition,
such as vision, eory and lan!ua!e coprehension. It is not surprisin! that
these third-person ethods i!ht also be used to investi!ate consciousness.
7uch an approach to consciousness is ur!ed by 8ennett #199:/ 1991(, who !oes
so far as to s"etch co!nitive odels for the phenoenon. 6nother third-person
approach has been ta"en by Jac"endoff #19:9( #althou!h Jac"endoff explicitly
reco!ni;es that a third-person approach will not necessarily tell the whole story(.
2esides these philosophers, soe psycholo!ists #e.!., Johnson-<aird 19:=( and
coputer scientists #e.!., >ofstadter 1999( have tried their hand at reinin! in the
ysteries of consciousness with third-person accounts.
6t the heart of the third-person approach is the philosophical position of
functionalism. 5ou!hly stated, this is the view that the correct way to understand
ental processes is to perfor causal analyses, revealin! the abstract causal
structure behind brain function. 7uch causal structure can be understood in
ob4ective ters, and duplicated in ,uite different aterials #includin!, perhaps, in
coputers(. ?entral to this approach is the view of mind as system. Insofar as
this view addresses consciousness, it ta"es it to be a particular aspect of the
function of a coplex syste/ for exaple, it i!ht be ta"en to be that process
whereby a syste is able to scan its own processin!. +he view of ind as
syste is certainly attractive, and it is a view that I share. +he ,uestion is
whether this approach ta"en alone is enou!h to explain the deepest ysteries of
consciousness.
The first-person approach
8espite the attractiveness of the third-person approach, there is a feelin! that it is
side-steppin! the really hard probles. +he truly difficult ,uestions only see to
arise when we ta"e the first-person approach - when we consider, as )a!el
faously put it, what it is li"e to be who we are, and what it i!ht be li"e to be
soethin! ,uite different1 another huan, a bat, or a coputational syste. It is
with these sub4ective ,uestions that the deepest ,uestions arise. .hy is bein!
e li"e anythin! at all@ 6nd why is it the way that it is@ +hese ,uestions are the
real content of the proble of consciousness. +here ay be other senses of the
ter 0consciousness0, but in the sense in which it is ost coonly used, to
refer to the real ysteries of entality, it is these first-person ,uestions that are
bein! raised.
It is still easy to fall into confusion or to e,uivocate when tal"in! of
0consciousness0, so here I will divide the first-person proble into three parts1
the probles of sensory ,ualia, sub4ective ental content, and the existence of
sub4ective experience.
(1) The problem of sensory qualia
Aualia are the ,ualitative aspects of our ental states, ost obviously of our
sensations. +he paradi! ,ualia are those of color sensations/ other favorites
are the taste of chocolate, the sound of iddle ?, pleasure and pain. 6ll of these
are poorly understood. .hen we loo" at a red patch, this sets off a particular
pattern of neural firin!s in our brain. .hy should this physical process be
accopanied by a rich, sub4ective sensation@ Biven that it is accopanied by a
sensation, why is it this sort of sensation #the red sort( rather than that sort #the
!reen sort(@ +here are two issues here1 why ,ualia exist at all, and why particular
,ualia accopany particular processes. Is the correspondence of ,ualia to
processes arbitrary, or is there soe systeaticity that we do not understand@
Jac"son #19:C( has provided the ost recent reinder of the ,ualia ystery,
with a sharpenin! of the ar!uent of )a!el #199D( before hi. 6 future scientist,
livin! in a tie when neuroscience is copletely understood, i!ht learn
everythin! there is to "now about physical brain-processes. 2ut if she has lived
all her life in a blac"-and-white roo, she will still not "now what it is li"e to see
red/ when she sees red for the first tie, she will learn soethin!. It sees that
the third-person approach, at least as currently understood, cannot tell us about
the nature of ,ualia.
(2) The problem of subjective mental content
.hen I thin" about a lion, soethin! ta"es place in y sub4ective experience
that has soethin! to do with lions. 6!ain, a strai!ht physical account !ives no
reason to believe that such an experience should ta"e place. .hat should a
pattern of neural firin!s have to do with lions@ 2ut soehow, y thou!hts are
about soethin!/ they have sub4ective ental content. It is easy to a"e
attributions of ental content to a syste, 4ustified perhaps by causal relations
with the external world, but for sub4ective ental content we need soethin!
stron!er. .e need brain-states to carry intrinsic content, independent of our
systes of external attribution/ there ust be a natural #in the stron!est sense,
i.e., defined by nature( appin! fro physical state to content.
+he proble of sub4ective ental content is not entirely different in "ind fro that
of sensory ,ualia - the experience of content is itself ,ualitative, in a way. +he
ain difference is that sensory ,ualia usually arise durin! external perception,
whereas this sort of ental content arises durin! thou!ht. #+here is also a third-
person proble of ental content, which has been ra!in! for years, centerin! on
the ,uestion of how we can assi!n propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and
desires concernin! the world, to systes and persons. In soe ways this is an
easier proble, as it ay rely on huan-defined systes of attributions/ these
contents ay have the status of theoretical entities, rather than states that are
presented to us directly. In other ways, the first-person proble is easier, as it
ay not have to deal with the proble of reference. .hen I thin" of a lion, y
phenoenolo!y bears some relation to a lion, but the relationship sees ore
li"e shared pattern than reference.(
(!) The e"istence of subjective e"perience
+he two ites above are concerned with the nature of our sub4ective states - why
they are one way rather than another. 2ut it is 4ust as deep a proble why
sub4ective states should exist in the first place. .hy should it be li"e anything to
be e@ If I did not #no$ that sub4ective states existed, it would see
unreasonable to postulate the. +his is perhaps the deepest ,uestion of all, and
no current theory has coe close to dealin! with it.
)ot any people believe in ;obies - huans with noral behavior but without
any sub4ective ental states. +hese ay be lo!ically possible, but it sees
iplausible that there could be such thin!s in the actual world. 6t least soe
people believe there could be functional ;obies, however1 bein!s which
duplicate the functional or!ani;ation of huans, perhaps coputationally,
without bein! conscious at all #e.!. 7earle 19:0, 2loc" 19:0(. +he ,uestion 0what
sort of entities can be sub4ects of experience@0 is of !reat popular interest. 3or
exaple, is every entity exhibitin! intelli!ent behavior conscious@ ?ould an
appropriately pro!raed coputer be conscious@ I will ar!ue, by cobinin!
first-person and third-person considerations, that the possible existence of
functional ;obies is iplausible.
+here are soe other coonly-raised first-person probles not explicitly listed
above. +he proble of self-consciousness #or self-awareness( I ta"e to be a
subset of the proble of awareness, of which the difficult aspects are covered by
#1( and #C(. +he proble of personal identity is a separate issue and a very deep
one/ but &arfitEs exhaustive analysis #19:'(, which cobines the first-person and
third-person approaches to !reat effect, !ives reason to believe that our first-
person intuitions here ay be ista"en. It is the three probles listed above that
see to be the residual content of the traditional ind-body proble. I will be
usin! the ter 0consciousness0 broadly to cover the phenoena of all of these
probles. If you prefer, replace every occurrence of 0consciousness0 with 0the
sub4ective experience of ,ualia and ental content.0
$ne difficulty with tal"in! about first-person probles is that for every first-person
#conscious( ental state, there is a correspondin! third-person #functionally
definable( ental state. #&erhaps there are not two different ental states, but
siply two different ways of viewin! one state/ this is unclear. In any event, it is
uncontroversial that for every sub4ective ental event there is a correspondin!
physical event/ the physical event ay be viewed via functional abstraction as a
third-person ental event(. 3or every sub4ective sensation there corresponds an
ob4ectively characteri;able perception. +his dichotoy in #ways of loo"in! at(
ental states a"es thin!s a little confusin!, but it will be useful later on.
The relationship et!een the approaches
$f course, the first-person approach and the third-person approach are not
entirely independent of each other. Indeed, I will be ar!uin! that uch insi!ht can
coe throu!h considerin! the not sin!ly, but 4uxtaposed. 2efore doin! this, it is
necessary to enuerate a few facts about the two approaches.
(1) The third-person approach is sufficient, in principle, to yield a
complete explanation of human behavior.
This follows from the explanatory completeness of physical laws - a hypothesis that is
relatively uncontroversial. Physical phenomena have physical explanations, and behavior
is a physical phenomenon. There is no reason to believe that human behavior is any
different in this regard from hurricanes, rivers or stars. ith a complete understanding of
the laws of physics, and a good understanding of the way physical entities combine into
systems, behavior will be understood.
+his is an extreely stron! conclusion, of course, and it !oes a lon! way towards
explainin! the doinance of the third-person approach to the study of entality.
?o!nitive science is doin! its best to brea" down the reovable barrier iplied
by the 0in principle0, and there is no reason to believe that within a few centuries
it should not succeed. If it does not, it will probably be because of probles of
coplexity rather than any deep etaphysical barrier. .e i!ht trivially restate
#1( as
(1a) The first-person approach is not needed to explain anything about
human behavior.
!f course, the first-person approach may well prove to be a useful short-cut in explaining
behavior, and a powerful tool, but the point is that it is not necessary - it is in principle
dispensable, as far as behavior is concerned.
(") The third-person approach (as currently conceived) is not sufficient to
explain all first-person phenomena.
#tatements (1) and (1a) ma$e a powerful argument for the primacy of the third-person
approach. %evertheless, this approach cannot tell the whole story. &onsciousness, the
sub'ective experience of (ualia and mental content, is simply not explained by a third-
person account. %o amount of neuroscience and cognitive modeling explains the
(ualitative nature of a sensation of red, or even why such a sub'ective sensation should
exist.
+his stateent is surely the ost natural view, but it is not undisputed. +hose
who have spo"en the loudest in dispute of #C( include 8ennett #19:C, 19::,
1991( and &. M. ?hurchland #19:'(. I believe their ar!uents to be flawed, but
will not ar!ue the issue here/ it has been elo,uently ar!ued by others. +hose who
disbelieve #C( ay choose to stop readin! here, then, in the belief that
consciousness is not really a special proble. +hey i!ht however read on, to
find an account of first-person probles which is otivated by third-person
issues at every point, or at worst to find a reductio ad absurdum of the first-
person position. +he reainder - those who believe that the ind-body proble
is still a real proble - ay continue undisturbed.
It should be noted that #C( refers to the third-person approach as currently
conceived - that is, the study of the brain as a physical syste with the usual
physical ontolo!y, abetted by co!nitive odels and functional analyses. I would
not li"e to rule out the possibility of an eventual 0ob4ective phenoenolo!y0, to
use )a!elEs ter, but it is difficult to see what it would loo" li"e. 6t the least, new
constructs would be needed, and our ontolo!y would need to be expanded. +o
!et fro the physical and the functional to the sub4ective, we would need
metaphysical bridging principles. It does not see ipossible, however, that
these could be stated fro a third-person viewpoint. +he be!innin!s of such an
approach will be outlined later in this paper. In the eantie, we can restate #C(
as
("a) The third-person approach is not sufficient, in the absence of extra
metaphysical bridging principles, to explain all first-person phenomena.
The need for such a bridge is put nicely by )ac$endoff (1*+,), who says that
computational-functional accounts of mind may have solved the .ind-/ody Problem, but
what we need to do now is solve the 0.ind-.ind Problem0. This would provide a bridge
from the 0computational mind0 to the 0phenomenological mind0 (in the terms 1 have
used, from third-person mental events to first-person mental events). That computational
and functional accounts may have already got us halfway there is a point that will
resurface later.
(2) !ur claims about consciousness are a fact of human behavior.
This is trivially true. (1f you interpret 0claim0 as an irreducibly sub'ective term, then
replace it by 0utterance0 or something more neutral.) hen 1 say 013m conscious, and 13m
totally baffled by it,0 that is a fact of human behavior. hen somebody writes 0The
ineffable sensation of red is inexplicable by physical premises0, that is a fact of human
behavior. This is harmless enough, until combined with (1) to yield
(4) The third-person approach is in principle sufficient to explain our
claims about consciousness
or worse,
(4a) The first-person approach is not needed to explain our claims about
consciousness.
Fverythin! that we say about consciousness is, in principle, aenable to the
usual "ind of physicalGfunctional analysis. +here is no need to appeal to any
ysterious etaphysical constructs to explain the thin!s we say. $n this
account, the last C000 years of debate over the Mind-2ody &roble would have
!one exactly the sae in the absence of sub4ective experience #if such a thin!
were possible(. In particular, our sense of baffleent about the first-person
probles anifests itself in nuerous third-person ways - the thin!s we say, the
thin!s we write, even the thin!s we thin#, if re!arded in ters of neural
processes - and is thus aenable to the ethods of co!nitive science[**. +he
correct co!nitive-science explanation of why we clai to be conscious i!ht be a
little while coin!, but there should be no deep etaphysical probles. +his
leads us to an iportant principle1
*[[McBinn #19:9( re,uests an explanation of why it is so difficult to clearly articulate the the
probles of consciousness. I believe that the reason is closely tied up with #D( and #Da(.
Fverythin! we can say about consciousness is physically caused, and soehow, at the bac" of
our inds, we are aware of this. 7o when the words coe out of our ouths, we are aware of
how easy it i!ht be to explain our clais without invo"in! any !reat ysteries. 3urther, our
words can easily be ta"en as referrin! to third-person ental states1 perception rather than
sensation, and so on. $ur clais see very inade,uate to do 4ustice to the real phenoenon.**
The Mystery Principle5 &onsciousness is mysterious. &laims about
consciousness are not.
This can e(uivalently be stated as
The Surprise Principle5 6lthough consciousness should surprise us, claims
about consciousness should not.
Most people will a!ree that consciousness is a surprisin! phenoenon. If it were
not for the fact that first-person experience was a brute fact presented to us,
there would see to be no reason to predict its existence. 6ll it does is a"e
thin!s ore coplicated. 2y contrast, the thin!s we say about consciousness
are coon-or-!arden co!nitive phenoena. 7oebody who "new enou!h
about brain structure would be able to iediately predict the li"elihood of
utterances such as 0I feel conscious, in a way that it sees no physical ob4ect
could be0, or even 8escartesE 0?o!ito er!o su0. In short, our baffleent about
consciousness can be understood purely as a proble for co!nitive science.
+here are very rich pic"in!s awaitin! anybody who ta"es this path. I believe that
it is not as difficult a path as it i!ht see, and towards the end of this paper I
will !ive a very brief account of why we i!ht expect such baffleent.[**
*[[+here are other reasons why clais about consciousness should not surprise us. It sees
plausible that any syste which #in a purely functional sense( 0perceives0 aspects of the world
and further has sophisticated lin!uistic capacity i!ht profess perplexity about the nature of its
perception/ one i!ht expect pu;;leent at both the 0,ualitative0 and 0indexical0 aspects. 6nd if
such a syste has the capacity to 0thin" about what it is thin"in! about0 #a functional notion, once
a!ain(, it i!ht very well clai full-blown self-consciousness. )o etaphysics needs to be
invo"ed in our analysis of such a situation. #?oputer 61 0I "now IE 4ust a collection of di!ital
circuits, but I canEt explain this stran!e feeling I have of havin! thou!hts of y own.0 ?oputer 21
0Hes, IE inclined towards dualis yself.0( +his point deserves further developent.**
+he situation with which we are now faced sees to border on the absurd. If
everythin! we say, write and even thin# about consciousness is explainable by
co!nitive science, why is there a need to posit any !reat ystery about
consciousness in the first place@ .hy not concede that the appearance of !reat
etaphysical ystery is siply an illusion, and re!ard consciousness itself as a
co!nitive process, on uch the sae level as eory or learnin!@ It becoes a
third-person hi!h-level ter, playin! a siilar role in co!nitive science as 0heat0
does in therodynaics. 6s for this weird 0first-person experience0, then insofar
as it is not a purely co!nitive phenoenon, it siply does not exist. +his is the
approach ta"en by 8ennett and others, and there are powerful ar!uents in its
favor, as evidenced above. 2ut this paper is based on the preise that the ind-
body proble is still a real proble. .e are not yet prepared to concede that #C(
is false, and that the third-person approach as currently conceived is sufficient to
explain all of the first-person ysteries. 6s first-person loyalists, we have to bite
this bullet and stru!!le on, tryin! to produce a coherent account of the atter. I
believe that the pressures on a first-person account produced by #D( and #Da(,
and the third-person constraints that are thus ac,uired, are of !reat value in
shapin! a solution that i!ht be acceptable to partisans of both the first-person
and third-person approaches.
+his is the low point for the first-person partisan. +his is as bad as it !ets. 2ut we
have to confront the proble posed by #D( and #Da( head on. +his has rarely
been done in the literature. 0Aualia frea"s0 #Jac"sonEs ter( have !enerally been
content to ar!ue for the autonoy of first- person phenoena, fro independent
considerations, or ore fre,uently to siply assue it. 2ut if we do not ta"e #D(
and #Da( seriously, then any account that we produce is open to ,uestion. +he
,uestion which faces us, put sli!htly differently, is
(4b) 7ow can first-person experience have any bearing on what we say
about first-person experience8
or more simply
(4c) 7ow can consciousness have any bearing on what we say about
consciousness8
I believe that in the proper understandin! of this ,uestion lies the seed of a
solution to the ind-body proble. 6ll the sae, it is surprisin! how rarely the
,uestion has been considered in the literature. #+he ore !eneral ,uestion of
how the ental can affect the physical of course a perennial favorite. Auestion
#Dc( is uch ore specific, and raises a different set of probles.( It has been
touched on occasionally in various fors, however, with various different
reactions. +he choices in answerin! the ,uestion spread theselves out as
follows.
#6( .e i!ht re4ect preise #1(, and deny that the third-person approach can
even !ive a full account of huan behavior. +his is the approach ta"en by Flit;ur
#19:9(, who ar!ues fro the fact that we tal" about consciousness to the
conclusion that consciousness plays an active role in deterinin! huan
behavior, and deduces that the laws of physics ust therefore play an
incoplete role in deterinin! behavior. +his is certainly an interestin! ar!uent,
but it is a iplausible and should be re!arded as a last resort. +he laws of
physics are too iportant to us to be !iven up so easily. #6 siilar account of the
atter would presuably be !iven by interactionist dualists fro 8escartes to
Fccles.(
#2( .e i!ht answer #Dc( by sayin!, siply, 0It doesnEt.0 +his is the answer that
i!ht be !iven by Jac"son #19:C(, who ar!ues that ,ualia are copletely
epiphenoenal, playin! no causal role #althou!h he does not explicitly consider
utterances about consciousness(. )ow, epiphenoenal ,ualia are already
unparsionious under !eneral considerations, but considered in the context of
,uestion #Dc( their iplausibility increases. 6re we to say that our clais about
consciousness are copletely independent of the fact of our consciousness@
+hat any siilarity anifested between our clais and the actual facts are ere
coincidence@ .hile this conclusion cannot be copletely ruled out, it certainly
sees inele!ant. It fails what I will call, later, the 0?oherence +est0 - its
explanations of #1( consciousness and #C( clais about consciousness fail
copletely to cohere with each other.
I thin" there ay nevertheless be a !rain of truth in epiphenoenalis, but it
needs to be spelt out ore carefully. If we can explicate 4ust ho$ consciousness
is an epiphenoenon of physical processin!, then ,uestion #Dc( ay adit a
ore parsionious answer. I will be defendin! a "ind of 0double aspect0 theory
that bears soe siilarity to epiphenoenalis, while at the sae tie bein!
ore palatable, I hope, to those with a naturalistic view of the world.
#?( .e ay deny preise #C(, and ar!ue that in fact the third-person approach
tells us everythin! there is to "now. 2y denyin! that consciousness is essentially
a first-person phenoenon, we deny that ,uestion #Dc( poses any proble. If
there is anythin! at all called 0consciousness0 that plays a causal role, then it
does so in exactly the sae way that centers of !ravity play a causal role in
physics, or that teperature plays a causal role in therodynaics1 as a
convenient third-person abstraction. +his is presuably the approach that the
li"es of 8ennett and ?hurchland would ta"e.
+he consideration of ,uestions li"e #Dc( has been used as an explicit ar!uent
for the third-person approach in a few places. 3or exaple, 3oss #19:9(, ar!uin!
a!ainst the )a!elGJac"son ar!uents, ar!ues that a 07uper )euroscientist0
could in principle "now everythin! that a bein! would say about its ,ualia-
experience, and everythin! that it might say. 3ro this, he draws the conclusion
that the 7uper )euroscientist would "now everythin! that there is to "now about
,ualia.
?learly ,uestions li"e #Dc( are a !oldine for third-person ar!uents, but these
analyses see too siplistic. +hey 0solve0 the Mind-2ody &roble by denyin!
that there is a proble. +his runs counter to our preise that there is a
substantial proble to be solved. )evertheless, I believe there is a !rain of truth
in these ar!uents. +here is perhaps soe sense in which ,ualia are physical.
+here is perhaps soe sense in which consciousness is understandable fro
the third-person viewpoint. .hat ust be explicated is the nature of this sense.
+he ar!uents above do not solve the Mind-2ody &roble, but they do indicate
that it i!ht be soluble. >owever, there is ore wor" to be done. 6 flat stateent
of physicalis is in no sense a coplete solution. .e need to "now ho$
physicalis could be true. +he nature of the wor" that reains to be done will be
outlined shortly.
2efore we leave this section, we should note that a well-"nown ar!uent of
7hoea"er #199I( bears soe reseblance to the ar!uents in #?(. 7hoea"er
ar!ues a!ainst the possibility of 06bsent Aualia0, or functional ;obies. 7oe
have ar!ued that this possibility refutes functionalis, by deonstratin! that we
i!ht duplicate any !iven functional process without any accopanyin!
sub4ective experience. 7hoea"er responds by ar!uin! that we #no$ about
,ualia/ our "nowled!e is caused by the existence of these ,ualia/ therefore
,ualia play soe causal role. +he conclusion is that 6bsent Aualia are
ipossible, as reovin! ,ualia would chan!e the causal structure. +his is
!enerally construed as an ar!uent for the third-person approach #for
functionalis, in particular(. )evertheless, I a sypathetic with this ar!uent
and with functionalis, and believe that 6bsent Aualia are ipossible. >owever,
what needs to be explained is $hy 6bsent Aualia are ipossible, and ho$ ,ualia
could play a causal role. +his ,uestion is not addressed by functionalis. 6!ain,
ore wor" reains to be done. 2oth functionalis and epiphenoenalis have
plausible aspects, but neither !ives a coplete account of the probles of
consciousness. I will su!!est that a correct theory of consciousness shares
aspects of both functionalis and epiphenoenalis, and that the correct
answer to ,uestion #Dc( lies soewhere between #2( and #?(.
The Coherence Test
+he ?oherence +est is a test that any copleted theory of ind ust pass. It is
otivated directly by ,uestions li"e #Dc(.
The Coherence Test:
6 completed theory of mind must provide
(&1) 6n account of why we are conscious.
(&") 6n account of why we claim to be conscious9 why we think we are
conscious.
:urther (&2), accounts (&1) and (&") must cohere with each other.
It should be noted that #?1( is a copletely first-person atter/ it involves
answerin! the etaphysical ,uestion of how sub4ective experience is possible.
#?C(, on the other hand, is understandable on strictly third-person ters - it is, in
principle, a atter for co!nitive science. #If, a!ain, in your vocabulary 0thin"0 and
0clai0 are irreducibly sub4ective ters, then replace the by appropriate third-
person ters that deal with behavior and brain function.( 6nother way in which to
phrase #?C( i!ht be 06n account of why consciousness sees so stran!e to
us.0 Jiewed appropriately, this is also in principle understandable by a co!nitive
science approach. 6nyway, it is the coherence condition #?=( that is the ost
iportant here. +his ensures that copletely independent accounts under #?1(
and #?C( will be ruled out/ that the accounts ust bear a substantial relationship
to each other. +his provides a vital lin" between the first-person and third-person
approaches.
6nother way of puttin! the ?oherence +est is that we need accounts of
#?1a( +he ind that we experience #a first-person ,uestion(/ and
#?Ca( +he ind that the syste perceives #a third-person ,uestion(.
$ne would hope that these 0inds0, on any copleted account, would bear a
very close relationship to each other. If the relationship is not strict identity, it
should at least be a very close correspondence.
It is not possible to 0prove0 that a correct theory of consciousness ust pass the
?oherence +est, but it certainly sees extreely plausible. .hile it is lo!ically
possible that an account of why we are conscious could be copletely
independent of a co!nitive account of why we believe we are conscious, it sees
inele!ant and unli"ely. If the ?oherence +est in fact fails for a correct copleted
theory of ind, then we are livin! in a world where the thin!s we say about
consciousness and the Mind-2ody &roble bear at best a coincidental relation to
the way these thin!s actually are. 3aced with the possibility of this coplete
unreliability of our verbal reports, it would probably be better to 4oin the third-
person cap and re!ard the ysterious nature of 0sub4ective experience0 as a
ere illusion.
Biven that we accept the ?oherence +est, a correct third-person account of
co!nitive processes puts severe constraints on possible first-person accounts,
and possibly vice versa. $f course, we have not explicitly defined the notion of
coherence. Instead, I thin" it is better to !o ahead and apply it on a case-by-case
basis, and let soe understandin! of the notion eer!e.
"ppl#ing the Coherence Test
3unctionalis is a controversial doctrine when applied to first-person aspects of
entality. 2ut for the third-person study of ental processes, it rei!ns supree.
3ew people these days doubt that the correct way to analy;e huan behavior
and to explain the wor"in!s of the brain is in functional ters. 6ll reotely
satisfactory accounts of learnin! or eory, say, explain these via causal
analyses of systes with any interactin! parts. Indeed, it is difficult to see what
other "ind of account there could be. 7o when it coes to explainin! the thin!s
we say #and even believe( about consciousness, there is little doubt that a
functional analysis will be the way to !o. .e ay enshrine this doctrine as
(;) The fact that we claim to be conscious holds in virtue of certain
functionally specifiable properties of the brain.
$f course, we are not sure exactly what those functional properties are, yet - this
is part of the reason why functionalis alone is not a copleted theory of
consciousness. 2ut we are alost certain that the properties will be functional
ones, considered at the ost parsionious level. 6nd there is no doubt that if we
a"e the correct functional abstraction fro the brain, then duplicatin! this
functional specifications will produce the sae "ind of clais about
consciousness.
.e ay now use this uncontroversial clai, to!ether with the ?oherence +est,
as an ar!uent a!ainst certain theories of ind.
Theory 1% &e are conscious in virtue of lo$-level biochemical processes
7uch a view of ind is held by at least a few writers on the sub4ect #e.!. 7earle
19:0, 2loc" 19:0(. +hese writers have !enerally been ar!uin! a!ainst
functionalis as a theory of ind, or at least as a theory of the first-person
aspects. $f course, alost everybody a!rees that neurophysiolo!ical processes
!ive rise to consciousness in the huan case/ but that view alone is copatible
with functionalis, as these processes i!ht !ive rise to consciousness precisely
in virtue of their functional properties. &roponents of the present view ta"e a
stron!er stand, su!!estin! that biocheical properties are directly responsible
for consciousness. $n this view, only a syste with the relevant biocheical
properties could be conscious/ a silicon isoorph i!ht lac" consciousness
entirely. 2loc", for exaple, clais that ,ualia i!ht be a conse,uence of
physiolo!ical facts which need not appear in a functional account. 7earle thin"s it
very plausible that the 0causal powers0 of the brain #eanin! those powers
sufficient to cause consciousness( lie at the biocheical level.
+his view, however, runs a !reat ris" of failin! the ?oherence +est. If, as
accordin! to #I(, our clais of consciousness are conse,uences of certain
functional properties of the brain, then the stateent that consciousness is
inherently neurophysiolo!ical su!!ests that reason we a"e the clais is lar!ely
independent of the reason we are conscious. +his would see stran!e. 6
possible reply by neurophysiolo!ical partisans i!ht be to clai that the
neurophysiolo!ical locus of consciousness is specifiable functionally, albeit at a
very low level. +he connectionist oveent in co!nitive odelin! has recently
ade popular the idea that a correct functional account ay inhere at a low level
of abstraction. 2ut if we accept that neurophysiolo!ical accounts can also be
functional, then this is no lon!er an ar!uent a!ainst functionalis per se - a
conse,uence that 2loc" and 7earle would be loath to accept. Insofar as our
theory holds that the sources of consciousness are not specifiable functionally,
then it is a theory that fails the ?oherence +est. If consciousness does not arise
fro the functional, then our clais are independent of consciousness.
In reply to a related ar!uent by 7hoea"er #199I(, 2loc" #19:0( su!!ests that
,ualia can be independent of any !iven functional account but still a"e a causal
difference. 2ut such a difference will by definition not bear on any aspect of our
functional account. Biven that our account is specifically constructed to include
our clais of consciousness as a relevant aspect, this reply fails. If ,ualia are
independent of this functional account, then ,ualia cannot a"e a difference to
our clais. >or!an #19:D( a"es a siilar ove in defendin! the clai that
,ualia are neurophysiolo!ical. ?onsiderin! the case of Martians functionally
identical to us but physiolo!ically different, he clais that the issue of whether or
not they have ,ualia i!ht be resolved by observin! whether they anifest the
sae "ind of pu;;leent about ,ualia that we do. 2ut of course they will
anifest siilar pu;;leent, as this is deterined by their functional architecture.
+herefore such observation will tell us nothin! ore than we already "new.
3or siilar reasons, even if we hold that the underpinnin!s of consciousness are
specifiable functionally, it ay be dan!erous to !o to too low a level. It ay well
be that when an account of the processes which lead to our consciousness-
clais is found, it will be specifiable at a level hi!her than the biocheical. If we
insist that consciousness itself inheres at a lower level than this, then the source
of consciousness is independent of the source of our consciousness-clais, and
our theory fails the ?oherence +est. #It ay be possible that certain aspects of
,ualia are deterined at a lower level than the level of our ,ualia-clais. 7uch
aspects could not a"e any causal difference relevant to our clais. 3or
instance, the difference between red-sensations and !reen-sensations is very
difficult to articulate, and so the precise nature of these sensations i!ht be
dependent on certain low-level facts. 2ut the e"istence of such ,ualia ust be
dependent on the hi!her-level functional account, if the correct theory of ind is
?oherent.(
.e ay conclude that theories which place the source of consciousness at too
low a level are iplausible. 6 siilar ar!uent will apply to any theory which
does not satisfy 3unctional 7upervenience1 the principle that replicatin! certain
relevant functional processes, even in a different substrate, is sufficient to
!uarantee first-person ental states. #+his is a wea"er principle than the
3unctional 7tate Identity +heory, which holds that ental states are functional
states.( If consciousness exists in virtue of soe fact which is ,uite independent
of any functional account, then our clais of consciousness do not reflect the fact
of our consciousness. +his ar!uent parallels 7hoea"erEs ar!uent a!ainst
6bsent Aualia in soe ways, althou!h unli"e 7hoea"er I do not wish to ar!ue
for the truth of the 3unctional 7tate Identity +heory. 2ut the ar!uent establishes
that if there could exist bein!s which duplicate our relevant causal structure
#perhaps in a ,uite different substrate(, but which do not possess sub4ective
states - in other words, if there could exist functional ;obies - then the correct
theory of ind is fundaentally Incoherent.[**
*[[It should be noted that the iplausibility of functional ;obies does not necessarily iply the
ipossibility of coputational ;obies. It 4ust i!ht be possible to be a functionalist without
believin! that coputational specifications can ever capture the appropriate causal structure.
#>arnad #19:9(, for instance, believes that the re,uisite function is inherently analo!.( ?hurchEs
+hesis diinishes the plausibility of such a position - it sees li"ely that a non-coputational
causal account always supervenes on a lower-level coputational account - and in practice
functionalis and coputationalis tend to stand and fall to!ether.**
Theory 2% 'piphenomenalism
$n the face of it, this view does not coe close to satisfyin! the ?oherence +est.
It holds that we are conscious in virtue of certain dualistic principles which yield
ental states as a conse,uence of physical states. 7uch principles would see
to be ,uite independent of the relatively strai!htforward functional sources of our
clais that we have 0,ualia0 and 0sub4ectivity0. 6ll parsiony is thrown out the
window. +he facts that we #a( have ,ualia, and #b( clai to have ,ualia, are
related only by coincidence.
I do not thin" that all fors of epiphenoenalis are ruled out, however. It i!ht
be possible to have a principled epiphenoenalis, where the ysterious
0dualistic principles0 above are replaced by soethin! ore concrete, showin!
that ental states arise in virtue of specific, functionally specifiable physical
states. If this were done, then it is possible that the ?oherence +est i!ht after
all be satisfied1 we would be conscious and claim consciousness in virtue of
siilar functional accounts. 2ut all that this possibility shows, for now, is that
epiphenoenalis would need a !reat deal of developent to be a plausible
theory of ind.
Theory !% (dentity Theories) *unctional and +hysical
I have been rather sypathetic to functionalis in the precedin! discussion, but
it is not close to a copleted theory of ind. It perfors well on part #?C( of the
?oherence +est. +he source of our consciousness-clais is undoubtedly
functionally specifiable. +rue, the flat stateent of functionalis !ives no insi!ht
into 4ust $hich functional properties of the brain are responsible for our
consciousness-clais, so there is ore wor" to be done on that point - but we
i!ht set that aside as a ere technical difficulty, a atter for co!nitive
scientists. 6 ore profound difficulty with functionalis is that it does not coe
close to dealin! with #?1(. It has often been noted #recently by 7earle 19:9( that
functionalis is not a theory which is otivated by the existence of first-person
entality/ rather, conscious ental states are viewed as an obstacle for
functionalis to deal with #witness all the 6bsent Aualia and Inverted 7pectru
ob4ections(. It is possible that functionalis is compatible with a correct theory of
consciousness, but ta"en alone it is not that theory.
3unctionalis !ives very little insi!ht into why consciousness exists. It is one
thin! to baldly state 0sub4ective experience arises in virtue of our functional
or!ani;ation0/ it is another to !ive an account of $hy. 3unctionalis, in this way,
is not unli"e its predecessor, the Identity +heory, which stated 0ental states are
brain states0. +he flat stateent alone !ives us no insi!ht into ho$ it could be
true. +here was, of course, soe "ernel of truth to the Identity +heory1 this was
that conscious ental states are indeed supervenient on brain states #that is,
reproducin! a brain state will reproduce the sae correspondin! ental state(. In
a siilar way, 3unctionalis contains a "ernel of truth1 it is very plausible that
conscious ental states supervene on certain functional states. 2y !oin! fro
the loose notion of 0physical state0 to the ore specific notion of functional state,
functionalis has brou!ht us closer to the !oal, but it certainly has not achieved
it.
7o both functionalis and the Identity +heory pass over the "ey ,uestion of 4ust
$hy we are conscious in the first place. 6nd of course, the fact that it fails on
#?1( iplies autoatic failure on #?=( - without !ivin! an account of the existence
of sub4ectivity, it cannot !ive an account of coherence. )evertheless, I believe
that functionalis is a valuable theory, of which any aspects are worth
retainin!. 7oethin! siply needs to be added. +he account that I will !ive
below i!ht be characteri;ed as 0functionalis plus soethin!0.
+o satisfy the ?oherence +est, and thus be a candidate for the title of 0copleted
theory of ind0, a theory ust provide three thin!s, on y estiation1
(1) 6 metaphysical account of how sub'ective experience is possible. This
will almost certainly include some new metaphysical construct, over and
above physical laws.
(") 6 functional account of why we thin$ and claim that we are conscious.
This will presumably be in the idiom of cognitive science.
(2) 6n account of functional-metaphysical coherence, which shows how
(1) and (") cohere with each other.
6s we have seen, theories that consciousness is biocheical pass the buc" on
#C( and fail iserably on #=(. Fpiphenoenalis a"es a start on #1(, but as it
stands has no chance on #=(. 6nd functionalis, as currently conceived, does not
deal at all with #1(, and therefore with #=(. I hope that I have deonstrated 4ust
how far short currently conceived theories fall of yieldin! a solution to the Mind-
2ody &roble. +he ode will now switch fro pessiis to optiis. +he three
re,uireents above sound dauntin!, but I believe that they i!ht be satisfied. In
the next section, I will outline the be!innin!s of a speculative theory which has a
chance of satisfyin! #1(, #C( and #=( above. +his theory alone will not be a
solution to the Mind-2ody &roble, but I hope that it points in the ri!ht direction.
$ind% pattern% information
+he theory I a !oin! to su!!est is an exaple of what is "nown as a 0double
aspect0 theory. +hat is, it holds that first-person ental states and third-person
ental states are two different aspects of the sae thin!. 8ouble aspect theories
have been attractive to others #e.!. )a!el 19:'(, but they have usually foundered
because we cannot say exactly what those aspects i!ht be . +he siple idea
0double aspect theory0 explains very little. 2ut before I !o on to elaborate on this
particular theory, it i!ht be useful to say a couple of words about why double
aspect theories are so attractive. In short, this is because double aspect theories
are at the sae tie alost epiphenoenalis and alost identity theories,
cobinin! the virtues of both with the vices of neither. +he theory I will propose is
alost an identity theory #by this ter I include both 02rain 7tate0 and 03unctional
7tate0 Identity +heories, thou!h the proposed theory is nearer to the latter than
the forer(, in that it holds that first-person and third-person states are the sae
thin! - but different aspects of the sae thin!, a crucial difference. #Hou i!ht
say1 an identity theory that ta"es sub4ective states seriously.( It is alost a
version of epiphenoenalis, as we can ia!ine the sub4ective aspects
0han!in! off0 the non-sub4ective aspects, allowin! the coplete autonoy of the
physical - while at the sae tie allowin! that sub4ective states can be causally
efficacious, as they are but another aspect of the ob4ective states. #Hou i!ht
say1 an epiphenoenalis where ind can atter.( +he account which follows is
brief, speculative, poorly-defined and incoplete. )evertheless, I hope that it
offers a !lipse of what i!ht be the correct direction for the understandin! of
consciousness.
+he two different 0aspects0 that I propose are pattern and inforation. .herever
they occur, pattern and inforation occur to!ether. 6ll inforation is carried by
soe pattern in the physical world/ all patterns carry soe inforation. I
speculate that they should be re!arded as two different aspects of the sae
thin!, which for want of a better ter we ay call 0patternGinforation.0
My proposal is that third-person #ob4ectively analy;able( ental events are
patterns in the brain, while the correspondin! sub4ective #first-person( ental
events are information. $n the above view of patternGinforation, this iplies that
first-person and third-person ental events are indeed two different aspects of
the sae thin!, the underlyin! patternGinforation. #+his has the advanta!e of
not expandin! our ontolo!y too far.(
+he idea that third-person ental events can be re!arded as patterns should not
be too controversial. 6 coitent very uch li"e this is already ade by
functionalis, thou!h it is not always ephasi;ed. .hen we !ive a functional
account of a syste, we are necessarily abstractin! away fro any superficial
details, and hi!hli!htin! particular patterns in the physical substrate. .hen the
functionalist says that a ental state is a functional state, she is coittin!
herself to the notion that a ental state is an abstraction - and every abstraction
is an abstraction of a pattern. #$f course, not every pattern is a functional pattern,
but these are a very iportant subset.(
It is rarely ade clear 4ust what ontolo!ical clais a functionalist would wish to
a"e, thou!h. 6re they coitted to patterns as part of their natural ontolo!y@
+hey i!ht not necessarily have to ta"e this step, as if we are considerin! ental
events only fro the third-person viewpoint, then it is not clear that we have to
adit the into our ontolo!y anyore than we have to adit centers of !ravity -
both i!ht be 0convenient fictions0, in 8ennettEs terinolo!y. 2ut I a prepared
to bite the bullet, and reify patterns. Biven that we believe that the ind and
conscious experience are part of the basic ontolo!y of thin!s, then soe
concession is necessarily -- we have to posit soe etaphysical construction of
the "ind entioned in the previous section. 6dittin! patterns into our ontolo!y is
a surprisin!ly painless way of doin! this - and once it is done, we !et inds for
free.
$f course, we have done a little ore than reify pattern1 we have reified
patternGinforation. I clai that this is a reasonable step, !iven that they always
!o to!ether. &ut it this way1 if there is any chance that a double aspect theory
i!ht be the ri!ht theory - and as we have seen and will see, there is very uch
that is attractive about the - then it is hard to ia!ine two ore natural
candidates for the 0aspects0 than pattern and inforation. +o say that 0ental
events arise fro a double aspect0 is to say very little, unless we want to adit
the ental as a priitive eber of our ontolo!y. Instead, by positin!
patternGinforation, we have a uch ore natural priitive in our ontolo!y, fro
which the double-aspect nature of entality is inherited.
$nce we have ade this posit, then conscious entality falls out. +hird-person
ental events are patterns in the brain1 the correspondin! conscious ental
events are the inforation that these patterns carry. ,ualia are just information
#6 nice way of puttin! this is 0inforation is what pattern is li"e fro the inside0. I
a not ,uite sure what this eans, but it certainly sounds !ood.( 6nyway,
conscious entality arises fro the one bi! pattern that I am. +hat pattern, at any
!iven tie, carries a lot of inforation - that inforation is y conscious
experience. Incidentally, !iven any physical substrate there are any different
ways of abstractin! patterns fro it. In y brain, there will be soe patterns that
do not correspond to ental states at all, and soe which correspond to
unconscious states. +his is not a proble for the theory/ there will be ore on
this later.
&h# !e thin' !e are conscious
+he last few para!raphs ay stri"e the reader as wanton ontolo!ical
extrava!ance. 2ut apart fro any inherent ele!ance the theory i!ht have, it is
also otivated by the fact that it can pass the ?oherence +est. In fact, the above
is at least in part otivated by an functional account of why we thin" we are
conscious, and why consciousness sees stran!e. <o!ically, the functional
account ou!ht to coe first, but it a"es sense to present the etaphysical
theory up front. 2ut what follows can be read independently of what went before.
+his will be a purely functional account, in the tradition of co!nitive science. 7o at
least teporarily, all the etaphysical ba!!a!e ay be thrown away.
Jery briefly, here is what I believe to be the correct account of why we thin" we
are conscious, and why it sees li"e a ystery. +he basic notion is that of
pattern processing. +his is one of the thin!s that the brain does best. It can ta"e
raw physical data, usually fro the environent but even fro the brain itself,
and extract patterns fro these. In particular, it can discriinate on the basis of
patterns. +he ori!inal patterns are in the environent, but they are transfored
on their path throu!h neural circuits, until they are represented as ,uite different
patterns in the cerebral cortex. +his process can also be represented as
information flo$ #not surprisin!ly(, fro the environent into the brain. +he "ey
point is that once the inforation flow has reached the central processin!
portions for the brain, further brain function is not sensitive to the ori!inal raw
data, but only to the pattern #to the inforationK( which is ebodied in the neural
structure.
?onsider color perception, for instance. $ri!inally, a spectral envelope of li!ht-
wavelen!ths ipin!es upon our eyes. Iediately, soe distinctions are
collapsed, and soe pattern is processed. +hree different "inds of cones
abstract out inforation about how uch li!ht is present in various overlappin!
wavelen!th-ran!es. +his inforation travels down the optic nerve #as a physical
pattern, of course(, where it !ets further transfored by neural processin! into an
abstraction about how uch intensity is present on what we call the red-!reen,
yellow-blue, and achroatic scales. .hat happens after this is poorly-
understood, but there is no doubt that by the tie the central processin! re!ion is
reached, the pattern is very uch transfored, and the inforation that reains
is only an abstraction of certain aspects of the ori!inal data.
6nyway, here is why color perception sees stran!e. In ters of further
processin!, we are sensitive not to the ori!inal data, not even directly to the
physical structure of the neural syste, but only to the patterns which the syste
ebodies, to the inforation it contains. It is a atter of access. .hen our
lin!uistic syste #to be houncular about thin!s( wants to a"e verbal reports, it
cannot !et access to the ori!inal data/ it does not even have direct access to
neural structure. It is sensitive only to pattern. +hus, we #no$ that we can a"e
distinctions between certain wavelen!th distributions, but we do not "now how
we do it. .eEve lost access to the ori!inal wavelen!ths - we certainly cannot say
0yes, that patch is saturated with I00-'00 n reflections0. 6nd we do not have
access to our neural structure, so we cannot say 0yes, thatEs a I0 >; spi"in!
fre,uency0. It is a distinction that we are able to a"e, but only on the basis of
pattern. .e can erely say 0Hes, that loo"s different fro that.0 .hen as"ed
0>ow are they different@0, all we can say is 0.ell, that oneEs red, and that oneEs
green0. .e have access to nothin! ore - we can siply a"e raw distinctions
based on pattern - and it sees very stran!e.
7o this is why conscious experience sees stran!e. .e are able to a"e
distinctions, but we have direct access neither to the sources of those
distinctions, or to how we a"e the distinctions. +he distinctions are based
purely on the inforation that is processed. Incidentally, it sees that the ore
abstract the inforation-processin! - that is, the ore that distinctions are
collapsed, and inforation recoded - the stran!er the conscious experience
sees. 7hape- perception, for instance, stri"es us as relatively non-stran!e/ the
visual syste is extreely !ood at preservin! shape inforation throu!h its
neural pathways. ?olor and taste are stran!e indeed, and the processin! of both
sees to involve a considerable aount of recodin!.
+he story for 0internal perception0 is exactly the sae. .hen we reflect on our
thou!hts, inforation a"es its way fro one part of the brain to another, and
perhaps eventually to our speech center. It is to only certain abstract features of
brain structure that the process is sensitive. #$ne i!ht ia!ine that if soehow
reflection could be sensitive to every last detail of brain structure, it would see
very different.( 6!ain, we can perceive only via pattern, via inforation. +he
brute, seein!ly non-concrete distinctions thus entailed are extreely difficult for
us to understand, and to articulate. +hat is why consciousness sees stran!e,
and that is why the debate over the Mind-2ody &roble has ra!ed for thousands
of years.
+he above account is far too brief, and is alost certainly wron! in any
iportant aspects. )evertheless, I believe there is a "ernel of truth in there. Fven
if the above account needs to be thorou!hly revised, I thin" this fact will reain1
the facts that we thin" we are conscious, we clai to be conscious, and
consciousness sees stran!e all hold true in virtue of the fact that the brain is a
sophisticated pattern-processor #is a sophisticated inforation-processor(.
3urther, this account should not surprise us. +hin!s have to be this way. 6ny
bein! which 0perceives0 the world ust do so in virtue of patternGinforation
processin!. $nce the processin! has reached the heart of the co!nitive syste,
further processin! can only be sensitive to the inforation distinctions ebodied
there. .hen the bein! tries to articulate the nature of its perception, it will be
reduced to tal" of 0,ualitative distinctions0. 7iilarly, if a bein! has any reflective
access to its internal processin!, it will only be in ters of hi!h-level patterns. .e
should e"pect such bein!s to be baffled by this 0consciousness0. +he 7urprise
&rinciple is vindicated1 ?onsciousness should surprise us, clais about
consciousness should not.
+he above account, of course, did not rely on any ontological coitent to
pattern and inforation - it erely used the as 0convenient fictions.0 +his was a
copletely functional account. If I were a third-person aficionado, who believed
that the Mind-2ody &roble is only a pseudo-proble, I i!ht stop now, and say
07eeK ?onsciousness is 4ust an illusion.0 2ut I a not, and this account was
intended not to explain away consciousness but to cohere with it.
7o now, we ay run the ?oherence +est. .e claim that we are conscious in
virtue of the brainEs ability as a pattern-processor #as an inforation-processor(.
.e in fact are conscious in virtue of the patterns #inforation( ebodied by the
brain. +hese explanations see to cohere rather well. $f course, there is no
pattern-processin! without patterns. It is precisely the sae patterns which are at
the crux of the pattern processin! #those at the heart of our processin! syste,
fro which all distinctions are ade(, which are also the patterns which are our
ental states. #I occasionally use 0pattern0 as a shorthand for 0patternG
inforation0. )o !reat har is done.( $ne could not as" for better coherence
than this. +he reason we tal" about ental states is that our processin! is
sensitive to precisely those patterns which are our ental states.
6nother, sli!htly over-siplified way to put this, is1 #1( +he brain perceives itself
as pattern. #C( +he ind #that we experience( is pattern. +herefore #=( +he brain
perceives itself as the ind.
(atterns in pattern-processors
$n this account, there are two criteria for bein! a conscious entity1 a
etaphysical #first-person( and a functional #third-person( criterion. +he
etaphysical criterion is that one ust be a pattern. 6ll patterns exist,
presuably. It would see stran!e to reify soe patterns but not others. 2ut not
all patterns are conscious. +o be a conscious pattern, one ust be part of the
ri!ht "ind of pattern processor, bearin! an appropriate relation to it.
6n interestin! and difficult ,uestion concerns the status of patterns which are not
part of pattern processors. 7uch patterns ay still carry inforation/ is there
anythin! it is li"e to be the@ My answer is a tentative 0yes0. 2ut it would not
reseble what it is li"e to be a huan bein!, for such patterns are not conscious,
in the appropriate functional sense. +hey are not parts of pattern-processors, so
they cannot be aware. +his incidentally sees to deonstrate that we should
separate the purely first-person notion of 0be-ability0 fro the partially third-
person notion of 0consciousness0. ?onsciousness itself is dependent on certain
functional criteria, but it sees iplausible that such third-person criteria should
ipose restrictions on etaphysical be-ability. 2ein! the nuber I i!ht be li"e
something/ if only li"e bein! asleep, without the exciteent of dreain!.
$n the other hand, there are pattern processors which are not ebodied in
huan brains. Mi!ht such processors #or the patterns therein( have sub4ective
experience@ 6 connectionist networ", for instance, is a pattern processor par
e"cellence. 6 typical feed-forward networ" i!ht have served as a perfect
siplified exaple in the above account of the "ind of patternGinforation-
processin! that !oes on in the huan brain. )etwor"s are sensitive to certain
patterns in environental data/ they recode these patterns as they pass down
the inforation-processin! chain, until output is sensitive only to a certain "ind of
pattern in the inputs. 8o connectionist networ"s have ,ualia@ My answer is 0yesK0
+his ay see very counter-intuitive at first, but I believe that upon reflection it
becoes plausible. +here is no principled distinction between the "ind of pattern-
processin! perfored by such a networ" and that perfored by a brain, except
one of coplexity. 6nd there is no reason to believe that coplexity should a"e
such a !reat difference to the existence of ,ualia. ?ertainly huan ,ualia will be
ore coplex and interestin!, reflectin! the ore coplex processin!/ but then,
even considerin! our processin! of 0redness0, there is no evidence that uch
ore coplex processin! !oes into this than !oes into a typical lar!e
connectionist networ". &attern-processin! leads to ,ualia in huans, and there
sees no reason to deny that pattern-processin! leads to ,ualia in networ"s
also. #$f course networ"s cannot as yet reflect on the fact that they have ,ualia,
let alone tal# about it, but this is not the point.(
+hen there is that old favorite, the therostat. 8o therostats have ,ualia@ It is
not entirely clear that therostats do the ri!ht "ind of pattern-processin!, but if
they do, their ,ualia are rear"ably siple. 3or therostats process all physical
inputs down to three states1 too hot, too cold, and 4ust ri!ht. It is not clear 4ust
what three-valued ,ualia would be li"e. 2ut if we are ever to understand ,ualia,
this is a !ood test case.
?onnectionist networ"s help illustrate another point1 that patterns ay supervene
on functional descriptions. +he relevant pattern in networ"s are patterns of
activation over a nuber of units, where units and their activations are of course
functionally specifiable. It ay not be the case that all patterns supervene on
functional descriptions #that is, are specifiable relative to functional descriptions,
and duplicatin! the functional syste in another substrate allows duplicatin! the
pattern(, but it sees plausible that all patterns that represent first-person ental
states should. +he plausibility lies in the fact that patterns need to be processed
for us to be aware of the, and processin! is a functional notion. +he current
account is thus copatible with functionalis of a certain variety. Hou i!ht say
that it ta"es functionalis as a startin! point, and adds what is necessary to deal
with the probles of consciousness.[**
*[[)o theory of ind worth its salt would pass up the chance to attac" 7earleEs 0?hinese 5oo0
proble. 3or our theory, the explanation is strai!htforward. .hen we have a hounculus
anipulatin! sybols on paper, there are two ,uite distinct sets of patterns1 patterns carried by
the head of the hounculus, and patterns carried by the coplex syste of sybols on pattern.
+he patterns in the paper ay well support their own ind. Fven if we assue the hounculus
could internali;e the rules #which would re,uire vastly ore eory than any huan has(, then
there would still be two sets of ,uite distinct patterns, both of which are present in the
hounculusEs head. It is a fundaental fact that there can be any different patterns present in a
!iven substrate. +hus, in a sin!le head, there i!ht be two ,uite distinct phenoenolo!ies,
without any overlappin! first-person ental states.**
)oose ends
Movin! away fro the ore co!nitive aspects to the ore etaphysical aspects,
we are yet to explicitly answer our ori!inal ,uestion #Dc(1 how can consciousness
have any bearin! on what we say about consciousness@ $n the present account,
this is easy. ?onscious experience is identified with the 0inforation0 aspect of
certain patternGinforation states. +his inforation can certainly a"e a
difference. It is 4ust another aspect of the pattern, and there is no ,uestion that
the pattern plays a causal role. ?han!in! the inforation chan!es the pattern,
and chan!in! the pattern chan!es any conse,uences. In fact, as we have
seen, our clais about consciousness reflect precisely that patternGinforation in
which our ental states consist. ?onsciousness is thus causally efficacious. 6t
the sae tie, it is ,uite possible to analy;e third-person ental states and thus
behavior without ever needin! to invo"e consciousness, if we so desire. It is
possible to cast everythin! in ters of pattern, without invo"in! inforation.
+his answer corresponds to none of the answers #6(, #2( or #?( !iven ori!inally.
$ur options were in fact not ,uite so liited as they seeed. +his a!ain shows
the advanta!es of a double aspect theory - an identity theory which ta"es
consciousness seriously.
It i!ht be noted that this is not ,uite a double aspect theory in the traditional
sense, where the two aspects are the physical and the ental. +his theory holds
instead that the two aspects are first-person and third-person ental states -
both of the ental, thou!h in different senses. .e are able to use the
resources of theories li"e functionalis to !et us past the first sta!e, fro the
physical to third-person ental states, which ay be functional states,
coputational states, or soe other patterns. 6ll that is left is Jac"endoffEs 0Mind-
Mind0 &roble - the brid!e fro third-person patterns #the 0?oputational Mind0(
to first-person ental states #the 0&henoenolo!ical Mind0(. +his is precisely
what our posited patternGinforation duality achieves.
3inally, it ust be !larin!ly obvious that I have said very little about a very
iportant topic1 the relationship between pattern and inforation. Is this erely a
priitive posited relation, or can it soehow be explicated@ 7oe i!ht clai
that a !iven pattern can be interpreted as carryin! any inforation you li"e. I
believe that this is usin! a different sense of the word 0inforation0 to ine. +he
"ind of inforation I have dealt with here is not 0inforation that0 - it does not
need to refer. +he "ind of inforation I believe in is intrinsic. In this sense, there
is a natural mapping fro pattern to inforation.
Fxactly what the nature of this appin! is is very difficult to say. +his is why the
current theory is not yet a solution to the Mind-2ody &roble. It ay be the case
that the patternGinforation relation is a brute fact, in uch the sae way that the
laws of physics are brute facts. .e have a certain aount of "nowled!e about
their noolo!ical connection, via our sub4ective experience. +his ay or ay not
be enou!h to understand all the facts perfectly. If it is not, then it ay be the case
that we can never "now precisely what it is li"e to be an alien bein! #or a
connectionist networ"(, as we will not understand precisely the nature of the
inforation that their patterns carry. +he outloo" is not necessarily so
pessiistic, thou!h, and perhaps a better analysis of the nature of pattern and
inforation will tell us everythin! there is to "now. #If pressed for an inforal
opinion, I would !uess that at least nine tenths of the patternGinforation
relationship will be understandable analytically, with the last tenth up for !rabs. If
we are not able to understand precisely what it is li"e to be a bat, we will be able
to coe very close.(
+his account has not reoved the Mind-2ody &roble. )evertheless, y
inial hope is that it shows what the be!innin!s of a solution i!ht loo" li"e.
My axial hope is that it has reoved uch of the confusion surroundin! the
proble, and locali;ed the ystery at one "ey, priitive locus1 the relationship
between pattern and inforation.
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