Soviet pursuit of the atomic bomb 1942-1949

Cody deVilliers
500 185 089
In a time of great conflict where the world is held in a fragile balance with an uncertain
future; any new discovery can have untold effects. The discovery of nuclear fission was a no small
discovery by any means. This monumental discovery was magnified by the present state of the world
during World War II. Initial excitement of this new discovery led to a global scientific community
working together to reshape the world was quickly silenced when the realization that this technology
could result in catastrophic destruction. xcitement was coupled by fears that rival nations were
producing the same fearful weapon and this began the nuclear arms race. !owever" there was an
omnipresent lingering doubt about the feasibility of such a weapons successful development.
#vercoming many obstacles the $oviet %nion would follow the %nited $tates and become the second
country to successfully test the atomic bomb. The successful discovery and testing of which would
bring about numerous technological applications along with incredible destructive power.
$oviet interest in nuclear energy began after nuclear fission was discovered in &erlin in
'ecember ()*+. ,$oviet -hysicists were as quick as their counterparts in other countries to see that one
of its potential applications was the creation of a bomb with unprecedented destructive force.. /0effler
and -ainter )12 3fter the discovery of nuclear fission a new direction of $oviet research was adopted"
primarily in 0eningrad. Igor 4urchatov was the head of the -hysicotechnical Institute in 0eningrad and
would later be the scientific director of the atom pro5ect. /0effler and -ainter )62 7uclear physics
during the ()*89s was the epitome of international scientific cooperation. :esults were shared between
several countries and spectacular progress was made. 'ue to the tremendous results leading up to ();8
4urchatov wrote to both the -residium of the 3cademy of $ciences and the government urging the
expansion of nuclear research. !e explicitly detailed the possibility of the results of this research
leading to the creation of a bomb" ,the destructive power of which would be incomparably greater than
that of any existing explosive.. !owever" 4urchatov received no response and subsequently the
<erman invasion forced nuclear research in the $oviet %nion to come to a halt. /0effler and -ainter
)+2
The $oviet pursuit of the atomic bomb gained momentum in ();=. The $oviets had
received information about &ritish" 3merican" and <erman work on the atomic bomb through
numerous sources. The most recognized source of foreign intelligence for the $oviets was 4laus >uchs.
!owever" the important realization that the 3mericans must be working on a bomb was brought before
$talin by <.7. >lyorov; one of 4urchatov9s former students. In ();8 >lyorov had aided the discovery
of spontaneous fission and a note about this discovery had been published in the 3merican 5ournal
-hysical :eview. In ();= >lyorov visited a ?oronezh %niversity library to look at physics 5ournals to
see what had developed as a result of the discovery. !e was startled to find that there had been no
response and that the ma5or names in the field of study had ceased publishing on the sub5ect. ,!e
concluded" rightly" that research was now secret and that the 3mericans must be working on an atomic
bomb.. /0effler and -ainter )+2 Throughout ();= $oviet leadership consulted with scientists about the
development of an atomic bomb and" despite estimates that the pro5ect would cost as much as the entire
war effort" production began in early ();*. /0effler and -ainter ))2
$talin9s decision to begin construction of the bomb was met with critics who felt that it was
a waste of time and resources. It was estimated that it would take between (8@=8 years to complete.
,$talin could hardly have thought that a $oviet bomb could be built in time to affect the outcome of the
war.. /0effler and -ainter ))2 :egardless of the impact the bomb would have on the outcome of the
war it would definitely prove to be an invaluable source of diplomatic and military strength in the post
war period. -erhaps most important benefit of the production of the atomic weapon by the $oviets was
to counter the 3merican bomb and therefore prevent a monopoly on such devastating power after the
<ermans were defeated. This line of reasoning led 3merican scientists to share critical research data
with the $oviets and this data greatly accelerated their production process.
Initially $talin allocated a relatively small amount of resources towards the atomic pro5ect.
4urchatov operated out of a small facility with limited assistance and materials. This was due to many
factors" for example; the cost during the war with an uncertain future for the $oviets made it difficult to
5ustify the heavy allocation of resources to a pro5ect that was still somewhat surrounded by doubt
outside of the scientific community. 3 ma5or problem that presented itself was the sheer lack of
materials to conduct research and production. Aore specifically the lack of uranium. The $oviet %nion
at the time had no known domestic sources of uranium. ,0ack of uranium was a serious problem for
the $oviet atomic pro5ect" but it was only one fragment of a bigger pictureB without more active
government involvement and all@sided support" the 3@bomb would never make it beyond the drawing
board.. /Craig and :adchenko D=2 It was this realization that forced 4urchatov to write to $talin
informing him that an atomic bomb was a realistic possibility" however" government support was
crucial in obtaining the necessary materials for development. !e also stressed the fact that foreign
countries were closer to developing an atomic weapon and effort needed to be made in an attempt to
catch up. It seemed at this point that $oviet leadership began to realize the atomic bomb as a legitimate
possibility and finally granted 4urchatov the resources his team needed to proceed effectively. $talin
turned the pro5ect of uranium acquisition over to the -eoples Commissariat for Internal 3ffairs. ,3fter
two years of futile struggles with bureaucrats" 4urchatov stood in the shadow of an organization with
vast resources" an organization with a name that sent chills down the spines of bureaucrats.. /Craig and
:adchenko D*2
The significance of espionage during the production of the atomic bomb is still an issue of
scholarly debate. $oviet scientists have made claims that the intelligence that was taken from 3merican
and &ritish research was only used to verify their own work. !owever" $oviet scientists were far
behind in their construction and the data from their rivals definitely helped save valuable time and
effort. 3fter reviewing intelligence documents 4urchatov welcomed the ,fairly important data. and
remarked that $oviet science ,fell behind considerably from science in ngland and 3merica.. /Craig
and :adchenko D*2 The $oviets did not depend entirely upon foreign research" they did however reap
several benefits from it. -rimarily in the stages involving uranium mining and separation. ,7atural
uranium consists of )).*E uranium@=*+ and 8.6E uranium@=*D" but only the latter is fissile. The
chemically identical uranium@=*D has to be physically separated from the more plentiful isotope..
/FAanhattan -ro5ectF2 There were several postulated methods for isotope separation. This is an
important instance in which $oviet science relied upon 3merican and &ritish research. They were able
to save much time and frustration by adopting a different method /gaseous diffusion2 of isotope
separation.
The 3merican atomic pro5ect had established a sizable lead in the arms race. The atomic
energy pro5ect was given the highest priority in the %nited $tates due to concerns that the <ermans
were already building an atomic weapon and that it9s use would be a deciding factor in the war. ,The
threat of a <erman atomic bomb precipitated a hasty marriage of convenience between &ritish research
and 3merican resources. When scientists in &ritain proposed a theory that explained how an atomic
bomb might quickly be built" policy makers had to assume that <erman scientists were building one..
/0effler and -ainter +82 This assumption was true" however" 3merican and &ritish fears had
exaggerated the rate at which <erman construction of such a device was actually progressing. These
fears however precipitated into the efforts that would lead to the 3merican9s being the first to
successfully test an atomic weapon. This also provided an opportunity for the $oviets to accelerate their
research if they could manage to obtain &ritish or 3merican research data.
The source of this foreign intelligence is an interesting and conflicted issue that is still
shrouded in secrecy. 3fter the discovery of nuclear fission there was a global scientific community that
published the findings and worked together to advance this research. !owever" after the realization that
this new discovery could lead to a devastating weapon the global scientific community disappeared.
This was a result of government actions to keep the information secret from their enemies and as a
result gain massive political and military advantages. >or various reasons" the desire for the world to
have this information was still inherent within many scientific minds. This was the case with 3merican
scientist Theodore /Ted2 !all.
Ted !all was the youngest scientist working on the Aanhattan -ro5ect at the age of (). !e
witnessed the first test of the 3merican atomic bomb on the (1
th
of Guly " ();D. In an interview many
years later Ted statedB ,I decided to give atomic secrets to the :ussians because it seemed to me that it
was important that their should be no monopoly that could turn one nation into a menace...the right
thing to do was to break the 3merican monopoly. /Cold War international !istory pro5ect =B(82 Ted
!all was never charged due to a lack of evidence" however" other known defectors were sentenced to
death during this time period.
'efectors were considered traitors to their home countries and never fully trusted by the nations
that they defected to. They believed in their cause" they knew the risks involved" and they defected
regardless of the dangers. $ome defected for personal gains but others simply understood that the
power of the weapon that was being developed coupled with the dangers of this power being
monopolized in the wrong hands far outweighed the dangers inherent in defecting or divulging detailed
secrets to the other side.
The $oviets had several agents within the 3merican and &ritish operations who were unaware
of each other. The most historically recognized is 4laus >uchs due to his high level of involvement
with critical scientific data. 'r >uchs was the head of theoretical physics at the 3tomic nergy
:esearch stablishment" !arwell. ,In fact" there had always been doubts about >uchs9 security
clearance" but Ainistry of $upply civil servants had decided to ignore them precisely because 9the
advantages gained by !arwell through the undoubted ability of 'r >uchs outweigh the slight security
risk.9. /<oodman D)2 This showcases a casual attitude that was present towards the secrecy of critical
information due to the importance of successfully completing the atomic pro5ect. In a way this attitude
facilitated the bombs completion" however" it also allowed the soviets to complete their bomb much
sooner.
3mong other agents 4laus >uchs and Ted !all passed along detailed information to the $oviets
about the principle of ,implosion. to trigger the device. This principle was so new to the :ussians that
they did not have an equivalent :ussian word for the term. This is another important example of how
$oviet atomic research was streamlined and greatly advanced by using information obtained through
the difficult and dangerous efforts of others. The :ussians were able to use this information to bypass
dangerous stages of research that had claimed the lives of 3merican scientists. >oreign intelligence data
is said to have advanced $oviet atomic capabilities by at least two years.
This casual attitude was also due to an underestimation of the utility the $oviets would be
able to obtain from any information that was leaked. In $eptember ();DB ,Goint Intelligence Committee
Chairman William !ayter asked" 9If it were to be assumed that the :ussians were obtaining a continual
flow of information from well placed sources in 3merica" would HitI in time materially alter the
estimates of :ussian HatomicI productionJ9 The answer" from Aichael -errin" surprising now given the
benefit of hindsight " was 9that it was unlikely that any information that was disclosed to the :ussians
would materially alter the estimates.9 /pg. D) K $pying on the 7uclear &ear2 This underestimation is
definitely surprising in hindsight" however" it was also a surprising decision in the context of what was
known at the time it was made. Intelligence was an incredibly powerful weapon during this period of
the cold war and this casual attitude to such sensitive matters had the direct effect of drastically
shortening the window of time that the 3merican9s held a monopoly on atomic weaponry" however" this
is arguably a good thing in the grand scope of history. In the end espionage played an important role in
the speed at which the $oviets produced their bomb and this shortening of the time frame on the
3merican monopoly had incalculable effects upon the world.
3fter the end of World War II the world had witnessed the incredible and terrifying power
of the 3tomic bomb as it was unleashed upon !iroshima and 7agasaki. $talin understandably
increased the priority of developing an equivalent bomb. This added pressure that came as a result of
bearing witness to !iroshima forced the pro5ect to gain considerable resources. ,The $oviet leaders
regarded the use of the bomb in Gapan as part of an effort to put pressure on them" as a demonstration
that the %nited $tates was willing to use nuclear weapons. $oviet security now seemed to be at risk
from a new threat.. /0effler and -ainter (8(2 3fter <erman had been defeated their research was
capitalized upon. The ma5or uranium production facilities that :ussia established after WWII ended
were based upon resources taken from <erman atomic bomb research and production. &oth the $oviet
%nion and the %nited $tates benefited from <erman research in the field of rocket science. The first
$oviet long range rocket" the :@(" which was tested in #ctober ();6" was a modification of the <erman
?@=. /0effler and -ainter (8=2
The small scale atomic pro5ect during the war had provided a framework for the large scale
operations that were established after the <erman defeat. These unabated production facilities resulted
in the $oviets first successful test of the atomic bomb in 3ugust of ();). This arms race reached a
climax at which the world possessed approximately ;D"888 nuclear warheads.
The pursuit of atomic weapons after the discovery of nuclear fission was an extremely
critical period of time not only for the ma5or powers involved but also for the rest of the world. The
implications of an atomic weapon were terrifying and tremendously profound. It presented a conflicted
humanity with the ability to completely eradicate itself if it was not careful to avoid such a catastrophe.
>ears of such a power falling into the wrong hands acted as a significant motivation to place the atomic
pro5ect on high priority. The $oviets had to overcome the <erman invasion and significant uranium
shortages in their pursuit of the atom bomb. They largely benefited from the global nature of the
scientific community and later through their own espionage. The intelligence gathered from <erman"
&ritish" and 3merican research helped to greatly reduce the time it took for a successful test to be
possible. The most important result of the $oviet nuclear pro5ect was the elimination of the 3merican
monopoly on the technology. If the %nited $tates had been able to maintain absolute dominance for a
long period of time the world could be in a very different state. It is arguable whether the world would
be better or not as a result of such a monopoly but that is a position that the $oviet %nion wanted to
avoid at all costs. The scientific community believed that" politics aside" the atomic bomb was too
powerful a weapon for one nation to possess alone unchecked.
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(. 0effler" Aelvyn" and 'avid -ainter. Origins of the Cold War. 7ew LorkB :outledge" ());. )1.
-rint.
=. <oodman" Aichael. Spying on the Nuclear Bear. $tanfordB $tanford %niversity -ress" =886.
-rint.
*. Craig " Campbell" and $ergey :adchenko. The Atomic Bomb. The Composing :oom of
Aichigan" Inc." ()1;. -rint.
;. FAanhattan -ro5ect.F Wikipedia. Web. =6 Gul =8(=.
MhttpBNNen.wikipedia.orgNwikiNAanhattanO-ro5ect
D. Cold War international !istory pro5ect" >irst. Cold War 212! full length documentary " Spies
1#!!"1##!. 7.d. ?ideo. Loutube" Washington" 'C. Web. =1 Gul =8(=.
MhttpBNNwww.youtube.comNwatchJvP)o61dQhi8tLRfeaturePrelmfu S.