2.

The Relationship between Language, Thought and Reality

Long before linguistics existed as a discipline, thinkers were speculating about the nature
of meaning. For thousands of years, the question what is meaning!" has been considered central
to philosophy. #ore recently it has come to be important in linguistics, as well.
2.$ Extension and Intension
The impossibility of equating a word%s meaning with its referents has led to a distinction
between extension and intension or &erin and 'edeutung. The extension of a term corresponds to
the set of entities that it picks out in the real world. The term extension" is often used
synonymously with denotation". &ometimes, denotation is understood not only in its narrower
sense which co(ers the relation between nouns or noun phrases and groups of indi(iduals or
ob)ects, but also the relation between words belonging to other word classes and extra*linguistic
phenomena they relate to. Thus, (erbs denote situations, ad)ecti(es denote properties of
indi(iduals and ob)ects and ad(erbs denote properties of situations.+,ortmann, 2--./ $012
The extension of 3tiger3 is the set of tigers in the real world. Intension corresponds to the
inherent sense of a term, to the concept that is associated with it. For instance, the intension of
woman in(ol(es notions like 3female3 or 3human3.
Two terms can ha(e the same extension and yet differ in intension +meaning2. For
example, the compound terms 3creature with a heart3 and 3creature with a kidney3 ha(e the same
extension because +we assume that2 e(ery creature with a heart possesses a kidney and (ice (ersa.
4e(ertheless the re(erse is impossible/ two terms cannot differ in extension and ha(e the same
intension.
5utnam +$01./ $6.2 claims that this impossibility reflects the tradition of the ancient and
medie(al philosophers who assumed that the concept corresponding to a term was )ust a
con)unction of terms, and hence that the concept corresponding to a term must always pro(ide a
necessary and sufficient condition for falling into the extension of the term.
The term whose analysis caused all the discussions in medie(al philosophy was 789,
thought to be defined through the con)unctions of the terms 37ood3, 35owerful3, 38mniscient3.
The philosopher 5utnam supports Frege%s (iew:stand against psychologism according to
which the psychological state of the speaker determines the intension of a term and hence, its
extension. ;e argues that extension is not determined by psychological state.
<xtension is determined socially +is a problem of sociolinguistics2 and indexically and in
its turn determines intension.
=f concepts +intensions2 were more important than extensions +then we would expect that
when concepts associated with a term no longer applied to the members of its extension2 , then
that term would be replaced by another to refer to the extension. ,nowing the meaning of a word
is to acquire a word, i.e. to associate it with the right concept.
2.2 Sign-sense-reference (referent)
>ontributions to semantics ha(e come from a di(erse group of scholars, ranging from
5lato to ?ristotle in ancient 7reece to 5utnam and Frege in the twentieth century.
?ccording to Frege +$01-/ .12 a sign is any designation representing a +proper2 name
which has as its reference a definite ob)ect +the word ob)ect is taken in the widest sense2, not a
concept or a relation.
The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its reference is of such a kind that to
the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn a definite reference while to a gi(en
reference +an ob)ect2 there does not belong only a single sign. For example, Aristotle +the referent2
can be denoted by these signs/ the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great.
The same sense has different lexicali@ations in different languages or e(en in the same
language +pass aay - die - !ic! the "uc!et2.
To the sense does not always correspond a reference, i.e. in grasping a sense one is not
certainly assured of a reference +e.g. sign words such as unicorn, dragon# elf# fairy, $orld $ar
III, ha(e no referents in the real world e(en though they are far from being meaningless2
Frege maintains that the reference and sense of a sign must be distinguished from the
associated idea +concept2 which is sub)ecti(e/ 3if the reference of a sign is an ob)ect percei(able
by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image arising from memories of sense impressions
which = ha(e had ABC . &uch an idea is often saturated with feelingD the clarity of its separate
parts (aries and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, e(en in the same man with
the same idea3.
8gden and Richards +$02$2 argue that the symbol corresponds to the &aussurian 3signifiant3
+signifier2. They use the term reference for the concept that mediates between the symbol:
word:expression and the referent. The triadic concept of meaning was represented by 8gden and
Richards in the form of a triangle.
#ost linguists agree that a sign +ord or expression2 expresses its sense, stands for and
designates its reference. 'y means of a sign we express its sense and designate its reference.
sense
sign referent/reference
=dentical linguistic expressions may ha(e different referents in different contexts and at
different times +e.g. the 5ope, my neighbour, =, you, here, there, now, tomorrow2. +#eyer, 2--2/
$-E2. These expressions are called expressions with variable reference.
To identify who is being referred to by pronouns like FsheG, F=G, FyouG, etc., we certainly
need to know a lot about the context in which these word were uttered. These words whose
denotational capability needs : requires contextual support are called deictic ords. +The term
deixis comes from 7reek and means roughly pointing").
The sense of a linguistic expression is its content without reference, those features and
properties which define it. For example, the sense of FgirlG is a bundle of semantic features/ :
Hhuman:, :*adult:, :Hfemale:.
The referent of a sign may differ from the sense. For instance, the referent of Fe(ening starG is
the same as that of morning star, but not the sense. Therefore the designation of a single ob)ect can also
consist of se(eral words or signs. 8ther instances of references denoted by se(eral signs are 3the
pupil of 5lato3, 3the teacher of ?lexander the 7reat3 referring to ?ristotle or 3The 5rime #inister
of 7reat 'ritain3 and 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3, both referring +in $0I0 at least2 to
#argaret Thatcher. ?lthough the last two expressions may ha(e the same referent we would not
say that they ha(e the same sense. 4o one would maintain that the phrase 3 The 5rime #inister
of 7reat 'ritain3 could be defined as 3the leader of the >onser(ati(e 5arty3 or (ice (ersa.
'esides expressions with (ariable reference, there are expressions with constant
reference +e.g. the Eiffel Toer and the Pacific %cean2 and non-referring items, that is, they do
not identify entities in the world, such as so# &ery# may"e# if# not# all.
The same sense has different lexicali@ations in different languages +<. ta"le, Fr. ta"le, 7.
Tisch, =t. ta&ola2 or e(en in the same language +pass aay# die# 'ic! the "uc!et2.
The association of two or more forms with the same meanings +synonymy2 and the association
of two or more meanings with one form +homonymy and polysemy2 show that one can hardly find an
ideal language in which words are defined by a one*to*one relation between signified and signifier.
2.6. Types of signs
The relationship between a sign and what it represents +or, in &aussurian terminology between
a signifier and its signified2 can be of three types/ +$2 a relationship of similarity +e.g. between a
portrait and its real life ob)ect or a diagram of an engine and its real life engine2, +22 a relationship of
close association, not infrequently causal association +e.g. the smoke as an indication of fire2 and +62 a
con(entional link, an arbitrary relation.
&tarting from these types of relationship that may hold between a sign and the ob)ect it
represents, >. &. 5eirce makes a distinction between iconic, indexical and symbolic signs. ?n iconic
sign or icon +from 7reek ei!on %replika%2 resembles the referent and pro(ides a perceptual +e.g. (isual,
auditory, etc.2 image of what it stands for. This type of sign is a highly moti(ated one.
?n indexical sign or index +from Latin index %pointing finger%2 stands for what it points to +e.g.
spots indexical of a disease like measles, fe(er indexical of flu, etc.2. ?n index is partially moti(ated to
the extent that there is a connection, usually of causality, between sign and referent.
? sym"ol +from 7reek sym"olon %a token of recognition%2 or sym"olic sign does not ha(e a
natural link between the form and the thing represented, but a con(entional link. 5eirce%s symbol is the
most arbitrary kind of sign/ the word in language, the formula in mathematics and chemistry, a
military emblem, the dollar sign, a flag, red circles in tele(ision, etc.
?s the etymology of the word suggests, the term used in linguistics is understood in the sense
that, by general consent, people ha(e agreed upon the pairing of a particular form with a particular
meaning. =n language, the notion of arbitrariness holds true for most of the simple wordsD howe(er,
new words +compounds, deri(ati(es2 built on already existing linguistic material and therefore are
partially moti(ated. The notion of moti(ation refers to non*arbitrary links between a form and the
meaning of linguistic expressions.
=n terms of their degree of abstraction, the three types of signs can be ordered from the most
%primiti(e% to the most abstract. =ndexical signs, which are said to be the most %primiti(e% +9ir(en and
Jerspoor, $00I/ 62 are restricted to the %here% and %now% and are based on a relation of contiguity
between form and meaning. 'ody language +e.g. smiling2, traffic +e.g. 2 and ad(ertising +e.g. 2 are
areas pro(iding examples of such signs.
=conic signs are more complex in that their understanding requires the recognition of similarity
between form and meaning. Road signs picturing children, animals or (arious (ehicles or scarecrows
in the fields which birds take for real enemies are some instances of iconic signs.
&ymbolic signs, based on a relation of con(ention between sign and meaning, are the exclusi(e
prerogati(e of humans. ?s it has been acknowledged, people ha(e more communicati(e needs than
pointing to things and replicating thingsD we also want to talk about thinks which are more abstract in
nature such as e(ents in the past or future, ob)ects that are distant from us, hopes about peace, etc. This
can only be achie(ed by means of symbols which humans all o(er the world ha(e created for the
purpose of communicating all possible thoughts +9ir(en and Jerspoor, $00I/ E2.
The three types of signs presented so far underlie the structuring of language, i.e. within
language, we may recogni@e principles that are similar to these types of signsD the principle of
indexicality +occurring when we use %pointing% or deictic words2, the principle of iconicity +showing up
in similarities between the order of e(ents and the word order in the sentences we use to describe
them2 and the principle of symbolicity accounting for the purely con(entional relation between the
form and the meaning of signs.
2.E (odels of meaning
The famous triangle of meaning of 8gden and Richards +$06K/ $$2 stands for a model of an
analytical and referential definition of meaningD it has been referred to in hundreds of subsequent
works and has had a powerful influence on semantic thinking.
4e(ertheless, Lllmann +$0K2/ .K2 contends that 3for a linguistic study of meaning the basic
triangle offers too little or too much3. ?s a diachronic semanticist, he obser(es that the meaning of
words may change as new knowledge is generated without a corresponding change in the referent or
real world entity +for example, atoms remain unchanged while our knowledge of their structure has
increased considerably in the present century2.
Lllmann indirectly ad(ises linguists to confine their attention to the left*hand side of the
triangle, i.e. on what he calls name and sense, corresponding to the set %lexeme-concept%
+#agnusson and 5ersson, $0IK/ 2.12 or %form - content% +Marren, $002/ 1K2. The implication is to
neglect the right*hand element, i.e. the thing +Lllmann, $0K2/ .K2, entity +#agnusson and 5ersson,
$0IK/ 2.12 or referent +Marren, $0I1/ 1K2, lea(ing us with a simplified model.
This model corresponds to an intra*linguistic attitude to the study of meaning where there is
no room for extension, i.e. the relation between the symbol and the real world entities to which it
refers. #ore recently, cogniti(e linguists ha(e shown that the (arious beliefs that people may ha(e
about real world entities are crucial to their understanding of word meaning.
Following the cogniti(e line and, at the same time, trying to reconcile componential analysis
+>?2 with the notions of prototypic categories and fu@@y meaning, 5ersson +$00-2 interestingly
combines a core model, often associated with >? +Figure $a2 and a prototypical model +Figure $b2
in what he calls %a complementary% model. Mhat 5ersson notes is that the seemingly unimportant
connotations of the core*meaning model may become significant attributes in his complementary
model.
Figure $ a. Figure $ b.
woman women

The main disad(antage with the model in fig. $a is that it wrongly suggests that the connotati(e
concepts placed in the outer box are somehow less important than the ones in the central box. =n the
can bear
children"

has a has
high* feminine
pitched features"
(oice"
has breasts
and a womb"
h u m a n
f e m a l e
a d u l t "
human female adults
who can bear
children ha(e
feminine features,
breasts and high *
pitched (oices
prototypical model in fig. $b it is precisely these concepts that gi(e salience to the meaning of the
lexeme and pro(ides it with the attributes that are typical of the category it denotes.
5ersson%s complementary model +Figure $ c2 is based on two different types of concept/ +a2
>> N Fcategorial concept+s2G originally corresponding to the core concept and +b2 T? N Ftypical
attributesG standing for the set of attributes that are considered characteristic of the best examples of
the category/
Figure $c woman
=n Fig.$c oman is seen as a Fsense containerG
$
with two boxes in it. The smaller box contains the
>>, i.e. categorial concepts which ser(es to separate women from boys and men, etc. The larger of
the boxes contains the T?, consisting of attributes )udged to be generally held characteristic of
women. These attributes may single out typical women from untypical ones. The dotted box
enclosing the T? suggests that the set of attributes is open * ended and (ariable.
The ad(antage of using a complementary model based on a combination of categorial
concepts and typical attributes can further be pro(ed by an example, which shows the semantic
de(elopment of a word in time.
For instance, spinster originally denoted Fa woman engaged in spinningG. &ince these female
workers were often unmarried, the word came to connote Gunmarried womanG. This connotation
gradually de(eloped into the main sense of spinster# which in the $1
th
century became the legal
designation of an unmarried adult female.
This could stand for the current categorial meaning of the noun spinster and is located in the upper
smaller box +fig.22. The lower larger box contains the (arious beliefs and pre)udices that are usually
associated with spinsters and which in traditional semantics were labelled FconnotationsG/
1
The idea that linguistic expressions, e.g. Mords as well as larger linguistic structures +phrases, clauses,
sentences2 are containers for meanings comes from Reddy +$010/2IE*62E2 and Lakoff and Oohnson +$0I-/$-*$62.
?ccording to Reddy"s (iew of the Fconduit metaphorG, ideas +or meanings2 are regarded as ob)ects, which can be
stored in containers and sent between language users.
?n instance of linguistic e(idence supporting this (iew is the sentence F=t is (ery difficult to put this concept into
words.G
>>
T?

human female
adult"
has breasts and
a womb, can bear
children, has a high *
pitched (oice, has
feminine features"
Fig. 6. spinster

?s can be noticed, most of the T? are pe)orati(e. The fact that nowadays, unmarried career women
firmly dissociate themsel(es from such a pe)orati(e label may explain why the word is becoming
obsolete. Therefore another perspecti(al shift of the prototypical centre is unlikely to occur due to
the FstatusG of the referent itself.
The analysis of a complementary model is also useful for a better understanding of a model
of meaning. Thus, an impro(ed model of meaning would place L<P<#< and >84><5T at the
same hori@ontal le(el. This representation implies that both the speaker"s and the hearer"s points of
(iew are taken into account.
Lecture 3. Types and Dimensions of Meaning
6.$ )eech*s classification
Mhile Lyons +$0I1/ .$2 distinguishes descripti(e meaning from social and expressi(e
meaning, Leech +$0I1/ 262 separates conceptual meaning from (arious types of associati(e
meaning +connotati(e, social, affecti(e, reflected, collocati(e2 and from thematic meaning.
+onceptual meaning, sometimes called denotati(e", cogniti(e" or descripti(e" is
widely assumed to be the central factor in linguistic communication. Me will discuss this type of
meaning, in more detail in section 6.2.
Associati&e meaning is the meaning which becomes attached to a word because of its use
but which is not part of its core sense. The principal types of associati(e meaning are
connotation, collocation, stylistic meaning, and reflected meaning.
+onnotation is the (ariable, sub)ecti(e, often emoti(e part of the meaning of an
expression. >onnotations are relati(ely unstable, i.e. they (ary considerably according to culture,
historical period and the experience of the indi(idual. For example, the connotati(e meaning of
oman embraces the putati(e properties of the referent according to the (iewpoint adopted by an
indi(idual +e.g. a feminist or misogynist2 or a group of people and (aries from age to age or from
society to society.
+ollocation is the habitual co*occurrence of particular lexical items, sometimes purely
formally +e.g. e!e out2, sometimes with some semantic implication +e.g. slim chance2.
unmarried
woman"
prudish, frumpish,
unable to catch a
husband and too
old to marry
>ollocati(e meaning is the type of meaning that consists of the associations a word acquires on
account of the meanings of words which tend to occur in its en(ironment. For example, strong
has a completely different meaning in strong coffee than it does in strong language where it is
usually a euphemism for swearing.
Stylistic meaning is the type of meaning linked to the idea of register. For instance, the
following words ha(e much the same conceptual sense but differ in associations because they
belong to separate styles of <nglish/ domicile +official, technical2, residence +formal2, a"ode
+archaic, poetic2, home +general2, digs +colloquial2, gaff +slang2.
,eflected meaning is that type of meaning which arises in cases of multiple conceptual
meaning, when one sense of a word forms part of our response to another sense. Me sometimes
find that when we use a word with a particular sense, one or more of its senses is reflected in it.
Reflected meaning allows speakers to indulge in innuendo, ambiguity and the generation of puns
as in I ha&e the "ody of an eighteen year old. I !eep it in the fridge.
Thematic meaning is the type of meaning that is communicated by the way in which a
speaker or writer organi@es the message, in terms of ordering, focus and emphasis.
?s we share the (iew that descripti(e meaning and expressi(e meaning are the most
important types of meaning in language, we will discuss these two types in the next sections.
6.$. -escripti&e meaning.
9escripti(e meaning refers to those aspects of meaning which relate directly to
denotations of lexical items and the propositional content of sentences and thus corresponds to an
intellectual le(el of interpretation, as opposed to one where emotional and sub)ecti(e
interpretation is in(ol(ed. This type of meaning has been gi(en (arious labels such as logical#
propositional# referential# o".ecti&e# conceptual# denotati&e# cogniti&e and ideational. <ach of
these labels seems to be accounted for by the defining characteristics identified by >ruse +2--E/
EE2.
a. That aspect of the meaning of a sentence which determines whether or not any proposition it
expresses is true or false )ustifies the labels logical and propositional. For example, in the
utterance Some"ody has turned the "loody lights off which contains both descripti(e and non*
descripti(e meaning, "loody makes no contribution to the truth or falsity of the statement.
;owe(er, in a situation where Some"ody*s turned the lights off is true, Some"ody*s turned the
lights on would be falseD therefore, what off signifies is part the descripti(e meaning of the
utterance.
b. That aspect of the meaning of an expression which constrains what the expression can be used
to refer to, or, from another point of (iew, which guides the hearer in identifying the intended
referent, moti(ates the label referential.
c. 9escripti(e meaning is o".ecti&e, that is, it interposes a kind of distance between the speaker
and what he says.
d. =t is fully conceptuali/ed in the sense that it pro(ides a set of conceptual categories into which
aspects of experience may be sorted.
e. The descripti(e meaning of a sentence can potentially be negated or questioned.
Dimensions of descriptive meaning
The dimensions along which descripti(e meaning can (ary are 0uality# intensity#
specificity# &agueness# "asicness and &iepoint. The dimension of quality can be seen in the
differences between red and green, dog and cat, apple and orange, run and al!, hate and fear,
here and there. 5ure differences of quality are to be obser(ed only between items which are equal
on the scales of intensity and specificity which are discussed below. Intensity characteri@es items
that designate the same area of semantic quality space such as, arm-lu!earm-hot-"oiling.
Jariation in intensity is not confined to the domain of qualities, it is also possible in other areas/
scare-fright-horror-terror# mist-fog# "eat-thrash.
Specificity shows up when one term +the more general one2 designates a more extensi(e area of
quality space than the other +e.g. animal-dog2. Vagueness can be noticed in terms which
designate a region on a gradable scale such as middle-aged in She*s middle-aged (s. She*s in her
fifties.
Basicness relates to words which are close to concrete e(eryday experience, while viewpoint can
be illustrated by deictic expressions such as this# that# here# there# no and then which are usually
claimed to encode the (iewpoint of the speaker at the moment of the utterance.
6.2. 1on-descripti&e meaning
4on*descripti(e meaning is that type of meaning that shows how language reflects the
personal feelings of the speaker, including his attitude to the listener, or his attitude to something
he is talking about. For example, one might say, as a neutral statement, = ha&e finished it or one
may say with triumph and ama@ement, I ha&e 2Actually 23inished it. Mhat is said is in other
respects the same, but the utterances differ in affective meaning. Likewise intonations or words
like actually ha(e, or ha(e at times an affecti(e function. ?lternati(e terms for affecti(e meaning
are attitudinal, emotive or expressive meaning. This type of meaning is often held to fall within
the scope of stylistics or pragmatics.
Lyons +$00./EE2 argues that natural languages (ary considerably in the degree to which
they grammaticali@e expressi(e meaning. <nglish does not ha(e a rich system of grammatical
moods +sub)uncti(e, optati(e, dubitati(e2D instead it encodes expressi(e meaning in much of its
(ocabulary and in the prosodic structure of spoken utterances. For instance, words that are not
necessarily expressi(e, such as still# yet# already may become expressi(e if appropriate intonation
and stress are added/
-oes she still li&e in (anchester4
5as the postman "een yet4
The railay station had already "een closed hen e came to li&e here.
These sentences all seem to be expressi(ely neutral, but feeling can be added prosodically
+>ruse, 2--E/ .I2
Are you still here4
6ou mean you ha&en*t done it yet4
Surely she hasn*t gone already4
;owe(er, what still# yet and already basically express is not an emotion proper but an
expectation or a set of expectations on the part of the speaker.
&imilarly, implicit superlati(es such as huge# tiny# "eautiful# "rilliant, which are
expressi(ely neutral if not stressed, seem to be able to acquire an expressi(e element if stressed/
It as a"solutely huge.
It as a"solutely tiny.
;owe(er, there are cases when not all the members of a synonymic series can be
expressi(ely stressed/
"a"y (s. infant# child# neonate
(other and "a"y are doing ell.
%h# loo!7 It*s a baby7 Isn*t it lo&ely4
4 %h# loo!7 It*s a child8infant8neonate7 Isn*t he lo&ely4
?s can be noticed, "a"y is capable of quite neutral employment and can also be in(ested
with emoti(e expressi(e meaning, usually prosodically. =n contrast, infant and neonate are
incapable of expressi(e use, although their propositional content is (ery close to that of "a"y.
?ccording to the type of meaning they possess, words may be di(ided into +$2 those that
ha(e only expressi(e and no descripti(e meaning * the so*called expletives and +22 words that
ha(e both descripti(e and expressi(e meaning.
<xpleti(es can be exclamations/
$o7 %ops7 %uch7 %# hell7 5ell*s 9ell*s7 9other7 Ace7 I*ll say7
or they may ha(e a grammatical role within a sentence, usually of some kind ad)ecti(al or
ad(erbial modifier/
Get that damn dog off my seat7
It*s free/ing : shut the "loody indo7
6ou can "looming ell put it "ac! here you got it.
Taboo words lend themsel(es readily to expleti(e use /
5oly shit7 9alls7 (y arse7 Piss off7 9ugger me7
&ome expleti(es are historically merely euphemistic alterations of taboo items/ Gosh (God)#
5ec! (5ell) Gee hi/ (;esus)
Lexical items that ha(e both expressi(e and descripti(e:propositional traits are daddy#
mummy# pa +in the sense of FhandG2, mug +in the sense of FfaceG2, "lu""er +in the sense of
FweepG2, damn +in the sense of FextremelyG2, rag +in the sense of Fpaper of poor qualityG2/
It as damn cold.
Stop "lu""ering7
-on*t read that - it*s a rag7
=n the last example, rag expresses contempt for the paper in question. =t is fairly common
to find pairs of words whose meanings differ only in that they express different e(aluati(e
)udgments on their designated referents. +or one expresses a )udgment while the other is neutral2/
horse-nag# car-"anger# a smart alec-a cle&er chap# mean-careful ith money. That some of the
e(aluati(e meaning may well be expressi(e is ob(ious in the following example sentences/
?/ Arthur tried to sell me an old nag.
'/ 1o# he didn*t - it as a perfectly good horse.
?/ I hear Arthur*s &ery mean.
'/ 1o# he isn*t - he*s .ust careful ith his money.
?/ Arthur*s a smart alec.
'/ 1o# he isn*t : "ut he is cle&er.
=t seems that lexical items characteristic of informal style and slang are more likely to
ha(e expressi(e meaning than items belonging to more formal styles. 5ropositional and
expressi(e meanings are the most important types of meaning in language and we can think of
them as what a speaker principally utili@es and directly manipulates in order to con(ey his
intended message.
>ruse +$0IK/ 21E2 rightly belie(es that Fe(ery communicati(e utterance must transmit as
part of its meaning an indication of intended propositional attitude. Mithout this, an utterance
would be communicati(ely dead * it would resemble a proposition entertained" by a logicianG.
6.6. Social meaning
#any semanticists consider expressi(e meaning and social meaning not to be clearly
separated. The interconnection between expressi(e meaning and social meaning can be
understood if we reali@e that the rules of conduct constraining the expression of feelings or
attitudes in certain social situations and the use of expressi(e terms, in particular swear words as
terms of address may ha(e se(ere social consequences.
?n expression or grammatical form has social meaning if and only if its use is go(erned by the
social rules of conduct or, more generally, rules for handling social interaction +Lobner, 2--2/
202. <xpressions with social meaning include forms of address, phrases of greeting or saying
good*bye, phrases of apologi@ing, acknowledging or answering the phone.
=n today"s <uropean languages, with the exception of <nglish where the you form has
come to dominate the entire spectrum of addressing, most languages possess a distinct deferential
form used in addressing people of higher social status or in order to mark distance. Languages
that use respectul forms of address, identical with the second person plural are/ French +&ous2,
Romanian +dumnea&oastra2 >@ech and other &la(ic languages +&y2, Finnish +te2.
=n other languages, the forms of respectful address are based on a third person plural
form, e.g. 7erman Sie and 9anish:4orwegian -e or on fro@en paraphrases of an original
honorific such as &panish <sted, plural <stedes. The so called ma)estic" plural is commonly
used by cardinals, popes, +6our Eminence# 6our 5oliness2, the royalty +6our Grace2, go(ernors
of states, ambassadors +6our Excelency2. These address forms that indicate social standing in
addition to identifying the person addressed, represent a form of social deixis, to use a term
coined by Le(inson +$0I2/ $-02
The informal (ariants tu# du ha(e the same descripti(e meaning as -umnea&oastra, Sie
but differ in social meaning. 'y the choice of the pronoun the speaker indicates his social
relationship to the addressee+s2. The distinction between the two kinds of relationship rele(ant for
choosing either dumnea&oastra or tu in Romanian and Sie or du in 7erman is also rele(ant in
other respects/ it coincides with the use of surnames with titles (s. first names as (ocati(e forms
of address.
#anifestations of formality and informality take many forms, i.e. from the way people
dress to their posture and to the language they use. Thus, in their interactions with others, 4orth
?merican people generally use informal attire and postures and a(oid the use of titles and
honorifics. =diomatic, colloquial speech is hea(ily used on most occasions, except for public
e(ents and fairly formal situations when they use formal speech. Mhen meeting strangers for the
first time ?mericans use first namesD e(en the simple greeting 5i is a badge of informality.
=n most Latin ?merican and <uropean societies there are le(els of formality attached to
status differences. =n ?sian cultures, formality is demanded by greater age as well as by higher
status. ;igh formality is a characteristic of the teacher*student relationship in countries such as
<gypt, Turkey and =ran. The use of personal titles is a way the 7ermans and the #exicans show
their position in the social structure, show respect and mark formality.
Two further expressions with social meaning are please and than!s + than! you,
containing you might be considered as referring to the addressee and to this extent it also has
descripti(e meaning2. Please marks a request as polite +it is a formality marker2 and indicates,
similar to the forms of address, a certain kind of social relationship between speaker and
addressee+s2. 5hrases like I*m sorry and 1ice to meet you which literally represent descriptions
of attitudes, are primarily social and not expressi(e.
6.E E&o!ed meaning/ dialect and register
<(oked meaning is the consequence of the existence of different dialects and registers
within a language. Dialectal variation is (ariation in language use according to speakerD >ruse
+$0IK, 2--$2 classifies it as geographical, temporal and social. For example, the &cots words glen
+(alley2, loch +lake2, ee +small2 and dram +melancholy2 may be familiar to most speakers of
<nglish outside &cotland and recogni@ed as &cottish.
8ther lexical items that ha(e the power of e(oking images and associations of their home
surroundings are ?mericanisms such as fall +autumn2, ele&ator +lift2, apartment +flat2. Temporal
dialectal (ariation is illustrated by the synonymic pair wireless Q radio, swimming bath*
swimming pool, while social dialectal (ariation in(ol(es (ariation according to the social class of
the speaker. The phrase FL and non*L has been coined to refer to upper*class and non*upper
class words/
L non*L
napkin ser(iette
dessert afters, pudding
relation relati(e
potatoes spuds
perspire sweat
sitting room lounge
writing paper note paper
dinner tea
dinner lunch
sofa settee
,ate Fox +2--E/ I22 makes a (ery interesting remark about the relation between linguistic
choices and social status in <ngland/
FThe linguistic codes we ha(e identified indicate that class in <ngland has nothing to do
with money and (ery little to do with occupation. &peech is all important. ? person with
an upper*class accent, using upper*class terminology will be recogni@ed as upper*class
e(en if she is earning po(erty line wages, doing grubby menial work and li(ing in a run*
down council flat. 8r e(en unemployed destitute and homeless. <qually, a person with
working class pronunciation, who calls his sofa a settee, and his midday meal dinner, will
be identified as working class e(en if she is a multi*millionaire li(ing in a grand country
house. There are other class indicators such as one"s taste in clothes, furniture, decoration
cars, pets, books, hobbies, food and drink but speech is most immediate and most
ob(ious. B Mords are our preferred medium, so it is perhaps significant that they should
be our primary means of signaling and recogni@ing social status. F
The second type of (ariation which contributes to what >ruse +$0IK2 calls e(oked meaning" is
register variation, that is, (ariation +within the speech of a single community2 according to
situation. Mhereas dialects are language (arieties associated with different characteristics of
users, +e.g. regional affiliation, age and class2, registers are (arieties of language +used by a
single speaker2 which are considered appropriate to different occasions and situations of use.
Components of register and synonymy
Register is usually di(ided into three main components/ field, mode and style. ield refers
to the topic or field of discourse/ there are lexical +and grammatical2 characteristics of, for
instance, legal discourse, scientific discourse, ad(ertising language sales talk, political speeches,
football commentaries, cooking recipes and so on. The difference between expert +technical2
terms and their correspondents +synonyms2 in ordinary language is that the former may ha(e
stricter definitions +e.g. extirpate2 while the latter are more loosely defined +e.g. ta!e out2. Terms
that differ only in respect of the fields of discourse in which they typically appear are cogniti(e
synonyms. For instance, matrimony may be considered a field-specific synonym most frequently
encountered in legal and religious contexts of one of the senses of marriage +state of being
married2D edloc! o(erlaps with matrimony# but is more likely to be heard in church than in a
court of law.
The second dimension of register, that is, mode, is concerned with the manner of
transmission of a linguistic message Q whether it is written, spoken, telegraphed or emailed. For
example# further to is specific of written language, wheras like is used in the spoken language
+e.g. I as!ed him# li!e# here he as going.2
The third dimension of register, that is, style, is a matter of the formality:informality of an
utterance. &tyle spawns the most spectacular proliferation of cogniti(e synonyms, especially in
taboo areas such as death, sex, excretory functions, money, religion, power relations, etc. For
instance, pass aay belongs to a higher +more formal2 register than die and !ic! the "uc!et and
croa! belong to a lower register. The synonymic series of die contains items that may be
differentiated in respect of field as well as style/ !ic! the "uc!et# "uy it# snuff it# cop it# pop off#
peg out# expire# perish# die# pass aay# decease# etc.
!. "ense #elations $%&' (olysemy and )omonymy
E.$ Semasiology and onomasiology - to "asic approaches to the study of ords and their senses
The terminological pair onomasiology: semasiology is a traditional one in <uropean
lexicology and lexicography. This pair is generally regarded as identifying two different
perspecti(es for studying the relationship between words and their semantic (alues.
&emasiology +from the 7reek sema# 3sign32 takes its starting point in the word as a form
and describes what semantic (alues:senses:signifies it may ha(e. 8nomasiology +from 7reek
onoma 3name32 accounts for the opposite direction in the study of meaning, that is it starts from a
semantic (alue:gi(en concept +signified: signifie2 to the (arious words:expressions:signifiers
+signifiants2 that are used to name that particular concept.
?ctually, onomasiological research is rather concerned with sets of related concepts
+expressed by sense relations such as synonymy and antonymy2 than with a single semantic
category +e.g. polysemy and homonymy2D as such, it traditionally coincides with lexical field
research.
7eeraerts, 7rondelaersand and 'akema +$00E/ 62 include semasiological and
onomasiological (ariation among the four main kinds of lexical (ariation they identify/
semasiological, onomasiological, formal and contextual. The first two types are placed under the
general heading conceptual (ariation.
&emasiological (ariation in(ol(es the situation that one particular lexical item may refer
to distinct types of referents. 8nomasiological (ariation in(ol(es the situation that a referent or
type of referent may be named by means of (arious conceptually distinct lexical categories.
Mhile the poststructuralist phase in the history of lexical semantics had a predominantly
semasiological focus +concentrating as it did on the changes of meaning of indi(idual words2, the
structuralist stage stressed the necessity of complementing the semasiological perspecti(e with an
onomasiological one.
'aldinger +$0I-/ 6-12 discusses onomasiology and semasiology in terms of speaker%s and
hearer%s points of (iew/ 38nomasiology approaches problems form the (iewpoint of the speaker,
who has to choose between different names of expression. &emasiology approaches problems
from the (iewpoint of the listener, who has to determine the meaning of the words he hears, from
all the possible meanings3
The complementarity of the onomasiological and semasiological perspecti(es is
summari@ed in the last chapter, presenting the interdependence of the two structures/ 3<ach
linguistic e(olution is produced on the one hand within the framework of a semasiological
structure and on the other within the framework of an onomasiological structure.3 +'aldinger,
$0I-/ 6-I2
E.2 3rom ord to concept= polysemy and homonymy
The classical distinction between polysemy and homonymy has concerned semanticists
like Lllman +$0K22, Meinreich +$0K6, $0KK2, Lyons +$0112, Lehrer +$01Eb2.
Lllman +$0K22 has proposed two criteria for distinguishing homonymy and polysemy/
etymology and spelling. Following Lehrer +$01Eb2 we contend that these criteria rely on
diachronic structure and are not workable for languages that are unwritten or for which the
history is unknown.
;owe(er, Lllmann +$0K22 rightly notes that it is impossible to imagine a language
without polysemy while a language without homonymy is not only concei(ableD it would in fact
be a more efficient medium.
The criteria that are most in(oked in the literature to distinguish between polysemy and
homonymy are etymology and relatedness of meaning. =n terms of the former criterion, lexical
items with the same origin are considered as polysemic, whereas if they ha(e e(ol(ed from
distinct lexemes in some earlier stage of the language than they are regarded as homonymous.
This condition is not always rele(ant and therefore decisi(e, because the history of the
language does not always reflect its present state/ there are instances of words that come from the
same source and cannot be considered polysemantic, but homonymic. For instance, in present*
day <nglish, the lexemes pupil
$
3student3 and pupil
2
, 3iris of the eye3 are not semantically related
but they both come from Latin pupillus# pupilla 3ward, orphan*boy3 which is a diminuti(e of
pupus 3child3.
The opposite case is also fairly common, namely when two lexemes deri(ed from
different roots in an earlier state of the language are seen as related. For example, ear
$
3organ of
hearing3 comes form Latin auris %ear%, while ear
2
3spike of corn3 is deri(ed form Latin acus,
aceris %husk% .
&ynchronically, most people heat these two lexemes as one polysemous word and explain
their relation by means of metaphor, i.e. the ear corn was felt to be a metaphor of the type 3the
eye of a needle3, 3the foot of the mountain3, etc.
Therefore, the etymological criterion can be misleading when deciding between
homonymy and polysemy. The latter criterion, i.e. relatedness (s. unrelatedness of meaning is
questioned by Lyons +$0112 who argues that relatedness of meaning appears to be a matter of
degree, together with the fact that sometimes nati(e speaker%s intuitions are from being the true
interpretations as has been seen with the ear example.
&imilarity:relatedness of meaning has been represented in a formali@ed manner by ,at@
+$0122, ,at@ and Fodor +$0K62 who propose the decomposition of the sense of a word into its
minimal distincti(e features, i.e. into semantic components which contrast with other
components.
Lnfortunately, componential definitions of the type Aphysical ob)ectC, AconcreteC,
AanimateC for the description of lexemes such as "an! or mouth are not sufficient for the
polysemy*homonymy problem.
The relatedness between the different senses of a word is not expressible in terms of H*
features because there are cases in which these features are present in different degrees, not in
absolute terms. For instance, the terms "achelor, lie and mother ha(e become classic examples in
the literature.
Fillmore +$0I2a2 analyses "achelor that is usually defined as an unmarried adult man by
bringing into discussion less typical examples of bachelors such as male participants in long*term
unmarried coupling, boys abandoned in the )ungle and grown to maturity away from contact with
human society, some priests or homosexuals.
>oleman and ,ay +$0I$/ 2$2 discuss the concept lie in terms of +a2 falsehood, +b2
deliberateness and +c2 intent to decei(e. ?s these three elements may possess different degrees of
importance, there may be prototypical lies, when a statement is characteri@ed by properties +b2
and +c2 and partial lies that include instances of social lie +e.g. %-rop in any time%2, white lie,
exaggerations, )oke, etc. ? social lie is a case where deceit is helpful and a white lie is a case
where deceit is not harmful.
Lakoff +$0I1/ 1K2 analyses the concept mother and concludes that it cannot be defined 3in
terms of common necessary and sufficient condition approach3 that can be associated with >? in
structuralist semantics. ;is argument is the existence of marginal or less typical cases of mother/
biological mothers, donor mothers +who donate an egg2, surrogate mothers +who bear the child
but may not ha(e donated the egg2, adopti(e mothers, unwed mothers who gi(e their children up
for adoption, and stepmothers.
The problem of relatedness of meaning should therefore be regarded as a gradient and
sometimes sub)ecti(e notion. ?lthough some linguists such as Lyons +$011/ ..62 question to
some extent the theoretical significance of the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, the
two phenomena differ from each other in two ma)or points/
+$2 homonymy is an accident and thus highly language*specific phenomenon
+22 polsemy is moti(ated and similar senses can be found in different e(en
typologically:historically unrelated languages.

*. "ense #elations $%%&' "ynonymy and +ntonymy
..$. 3rom concept to ord= synonymy and antonymy
"ynonymy
?s stated earlier, onomasiology deals with cases in which the same concept or similar
concepts are expressed by different words or expressions. ?ccording to one definition +usually
attributed to Leibni@2, two expressions are synonymous if the substitution of one for the other
ne(er changes the truth (alue of a sentence in which the substitution is made. 'y that definition,
true or absolute synonyms are rare, if they exist at all.
?bsolute synonyms are defined +Lyons, $0IK/ .$2 as 3expressions that are fully, totally
and completely synonyms3 in the sense that
+a2 all their meanings are identical +full synonymy2
+b2 they are interchangeable in all contexts +total synonymy2
+c2 they are identical in all rele(ant dimensions of meaning +complete synonymy2
?ctually the (ery terms %absolute synonymy%, %%full synonymy3, Gtotal synonymy3 and
3complete synonymy3 +not to mention exact synonymy2 are themsel(es used as synonyms
whether absolute or partial in standard works in semantics or lexicology, usually without
definition.
Mithout fa(oring the hair*splitting terminological distinctions, Lyons +$0IK/ .$2 insists
upon the importance of +a2 not confusing near synonymy with partial synonymy and +b2 not
making the assumptions that failure to satisfy one of the conditions of absolute synonymy
necessarily in(ol(es the failure to satisfy either or both of the other conditions.
To exemplify the first condition required by absolute synonymy or full synonymy +i.e.
same range of meanings2 we will consider the pair "ig-large, where the former term has at least
one meaning that it does not share with the latter one. =f we compare the sentence 3= will tell my
big sister3 with 3= will tell my large sister 3we notice that the polysemy of "ig does not perfectly
o(erlap with the meaning of large.
The second condition for absolute synonymy, i.e. interchangeability of terms in all
contexts +total synonymy2 refers to the collocational range of an expression +the set of contexts in
which it can occur2. For example, the members in the pairs "usy*occupied, decoration*
ornamentation, li"erty *freedom do not always ha(e the same collocational range. There are
many contexts in which they are not interchangeable without (iolating the collocational
restrictions of the one or of the other. For instance, freedom cannot be substituted for li"erty in
%6ou are at li"erty to say hat you ant%.
>oncerning the third condition for absolute synonymy, i.e. identity:similarity of all
dimensions of meaning +complete synonymy2, Lyons +$0IK/ ..2 distinguishes descripti(e
synonymy and expressi(e synonymy. Two expressions are descripti(ely synonymous, i.e. they
ha(e the same descripti(e propositional:cogniti(e:referential meaning in and only if statements
containing the other and (ice (ersa. For example, "ig can be substituted for large in %I li&e in a
"ig house%.
;owe(er, in particular instances, synonymous expressions may differ in terms of the
degree or nature of their expressi(e meaning. <xpressi(e +affecti(e:attitudinal:emoti(e2 meaning
is the kind of meaning by (irtue of which a speaker expresses, rather than describes his beliefs,
attitudes and feelings
2
.
For example, words like huge, enormous, gigantic, colossal are more expressi(e of their
users% feelings towards what they are describing than (ery big or (ery large with which they are
perhaps descripti(ely synonymous +Lyons, $0IK/ .E2.
?s languages seem to (ary considerably in the degree to which they grammaticali@e expressi(e
meaning to choose the right word :expression out of a wide range of synonymic terms differing in
their degree of expressi(ity is a (ery demanding task for translators. =t is the expressi(e rather
than the descripti(e component of meaning that
dominant when we decide to use terms that imply appro(al or disappro(al/ statesman (s.
politician# thrifty (s. mean8stingy (s. economical# stin!8stench (s. fragrance (s. smell#
crafty8cunning (s. s!illful (s. cle&er. =n order to attract the reader and listener%s attention headline
and ad(ertisement writers ha(e to be (ery skillful at using expressi(e synonymy. ,nowing the
expressi(e meaning of a lexeme is )ust as much a part of one%s competence in a language as
knowing its descripti(e meaning.
?lthough synonymy is fairly irrele(ant for the structure of the lexicon of a language, i.e. a
language can function without synonymy, language learners cannot use the language properly.
Mithout synonymy, language learners cannot use the language properly without knowledge of all
its synonymic resources.
+ntonymy
?lthough there is no logical necessity for languages to ha(e lexical opposites at all
+<nglish would be )ust as efficient as semiotic system if ther were such pairs as good /ungood,
wide / unwide, far/ unfar2 antonymy reflects the human tendency to think in opposites, to
categories experience in terms of binary contrast+ Lyons, $011 / 21K2.
?ntonyms ha(e recei(ed a good deal of attention from linguists such as &apir +$0EE2,
9uchacek +$0K.2, 'ierwisch +$0K12, Lyons +$0K1, $0112, >ruse +$01K, $0IK2, 'olinger +$0112,
Lehrer +$0I22.
Lyons +$0112 replaces the term antonymy in the wider sense by 3oppositeness3 +of meaning2
and distinguishes three different types of oppositeness/ a2 complementarity b2 anotnymy +in the
narrower, restricted sense2 c2 con(erseness.
Complementarity
>omplementarity can be exemplified by pairs of words like male and female, single*
married. =t is characteristic of complementaries that the denial of the one term
implies the assertion of the other and (ice (ersa. For instance, ;ohn is not married implies that
;ohn is single and also ;ohn is married implies that ;ohn is not single.
?lthough complementaries are not gradable oppositesD there are instances that
2
Hence, expressive meaning falls within the scope of semantics, stylistics and pragmatics
do not co(er all possible cases in real life. Thus there may be other possibilities besides
complementaries, e.g. male and female namely hermaphrodite.
>ruse +$0IK/2-22 claims that complementaries are not normally gradable, that is, they are
odd in the comparati(e or superlati(e degree or when modified by intensifiers such as extremely,
moderately or slightly.+e.g. extremely true, moderately female, etc2. 4e(ertheless, he states, there
are instances where one member of the pair lends itself more readily to grading than the other.
Thus, ali&e is more gradable than dead +(ery dead, moderately dead, deader than before (s. (ery
ali(e, moderately ali(e, more ali(e than before2. For example, if someone says to us =s P still
ali(e then!". ?nd we reply Jery much so." or ?nd howR" we are not thereby challenging the
ungradability of dead/ ali(e in the language system. Mhat we are grading, Lyons+$011/ 21I2
assumes are (arious secondary implications or connotations of ali&e.
The same holds true of the pair open-shut where shut is less gradable than open +slightly
shut, moderately shut, more shut than before (s. wide open, slightly open, moderately open, more
open than before2.
'esides >ruse +$0IK/ 002 maintains that the relations between dead and ali&e is not at all
affected by medico* legal uncertainty as what constitutes the point of death. &uch referential
indeterminacy afflicts all words, without exceptions. The point about complementaries is that
once a decision has been reached regarding one term, in all rele(ant circumstances a decision has
effecti(ely been made regarding the other term, too."
>ruse +$0IK/ 2--2 belie(es that complementarity is to some extent a matter of degree and
supports his statement by examples such as ghosts and &ampires that existed in a state, which was
neither death nor life. &imilarly he says, the existence of hermaphrodites and totally
indeterminate sex weakens the relationships between male and female. ?n e(en weaker
relationship would hold between terms such left- handed and right- handed.
>omplementaries are, generally speaking, either (erbs or ad)ecti(es. ?ccording to >ruse
+$0IK /2--2 an interesting feature of (erbal complementaries which distinguishes them from
ad)ecti(al complementaries is that the domain within which the complementarity operates is often
expressible by a single lexical item e.g. the (erb command sets the scene for the complementarity
of o"ey and diso"ey.
Further examples are "orn- li&e- die# start- !eep on- stop# learn- remem"er- forget#
arri&e- stay- lea&e# earn- sa&e- suspend# re0uest- grant- refuse# in&ite- accept- turn don# greet-
ac!noledge- snu"# tempt- yield- resist# try- succeed- fail# compete- in- loose# aim- hit- miss.
? final example of lexical triplets in(ol(ing (erbal complementaries are attac!- defend-
su"mit# change- refute- admit# shoot(in foot"all)- sa&e- let in# punch- parry- ta!e.
?s can be noticed, the members of the complementary pair represent an acti(e and a
passi(e response to the original action or perhaps more re(ealing counteraction or lack of
counteraction.
The same holds true of the pair open- shut where shut is less gradable than open +slightly
shut# moderately shut# more shut than "efore &s. ide open# slightly open# moderately open# more
open than "efore2.
8(er examples of more or less fully gradable complementary ad)ecti(es are the pairs
true- false# pure- impure# clear- dirty# safe- dangerous = moderately clean# &ery clean# fairly
clean# cleaner# slightly dirty# 0uite dirty# fairly dirty# dirtier# moderately safe# &ery safe# fairly
safe# safer# slightly dangerous# 0uite dangerous# fairly dangerous# more dangerous.
+ntonymy proper
?ntonymy in the narrow, restricted sense of Lyons + 2 is the second subclass of
oppositeness of meaning. The logical relationship is based on the fact that the assertion of one
member does imply the negation other, but not (ice (ersa. =n other words, for pairs of antonyms
like good- "ad# "ig- small# high- lo, only one of the relations of implication +entailment2 stated
for complementarity holds.
Thus, ;ohn is good# implies ;ohn is not "ad. 'ut ;ohn is not good does not necessarily
imply ;ohn is "ad. Therefore, the negation: denial of one term does not necessarily imply the
assertion of the other.
=n the case of antonymy proper, a third possibility exists. ?ntonymous ad)ecti(es +in the
narrow sense2 beha(e like comparati(es, i.e. they are fully gradable unlike complementaries that
are not.
Converseness
>on(erseness is the third subclass of oppositeness of meaning distinguished by Lyons.
The logical criterion used for the sense relation of con(erseness is the possibility of permuting
noun phrases functioning as arguments +semantic roles2 in sentences which remain otherwise
equi(alentD the sentences imply each other and thus ha(e the same meaning. Thus, Oohn bought
the car from 'ill implies 'ill sold the car to Oohn and (ice (ersa. &chematically, the sentences
may be represented in the following way /
45$ bought 456 from 452.
452 sold 456 from 45$.
?s can be noticed, the substitution of lexical con(erses causes a permutation of 45s
functioning as arguments. The three types of oppositeness of meaning proposed by Lyons +$0KI2
are based on the relation of lexical implication or entailment. =n more recent works +Lyons, $011D
>ruse, $0IK2 semanticists refined the classical treatment of oppositeness of meaning by
introducing a fourth type, called directional opposition. This fourth subclass is based on the
notion of contrary motion +i.e. in opposite direction 2 / up- don# come- go# arri&e- depart.
,. )ierarchical "ense #elations' )yponymy and Meronymy
K.$ 5yponymy
;yponymy, like incompatibility and antonymy has been one of the topics of li(ely
interest for lexical semantics since the structuralist period. ?lthough Lyons +$0KI2 declared that
all sense relations were context dependent, they ha(e almost uni(ersally been treated +including
by Lyons himself2 as stable properties of indi(idual lexical items.
Traditionally, sense relations are defined in terms of entailment, i.e. of the logical relation
between two sentences such that the truth of the second sentence follows from the truth of the
first. 8n this approach, a sentence like It*s a dog unilaterally entails It*s an animal so dog is a
hyponym of animal. &imilarly, I alays a&oid the red s!irts unilaterally entails I alays a&oid
the scarlet s!irts and ;ohn punched 9ill unilaterally entails ;ohn hit 9ill. ?s can be noticed, the
normal direction in the entailment is from hyponym to superordinate.
;yponymy is one of the most fundamental paradigmatic relations, corresponding to the
inclusion of one class in another. For example, terms such as daisy# daffodil and rose all contain
the meaning of floer. That is to say, they are all hyponyms of floer.
The set of terms which are hyponyms of the same superordinate term are co-hyponyms,
for example, red# "lac! and yello, in the colour system, or ox# "ull# calf that are co(ered by the
superordinate term cattle.
?nother way of describing the relationship is to say that the indi(idual colours are sisters of the
parent term colour or sisters of the parent term cattle.
? hyponym is a word that is more specific +less general2, which has more elements of
meaning and is more marked than its superordinate. For example, it can be marked for age
+puppy# !itten# calf# piglet# duc!ling and cygnet are marked, while dog# cat# co# pig# duc!# san
are unmarked2 or for sex +"itch# dra!e# "ull# hog# so# co"# pen are marked, while dog# duc!#
co# pig# san are unmarked2. ;ence, we can define hyponyms in terms of the hypernym plus a
single feature, as in stallionN"male horse", !ittenN"young cat".
The more general term with reference to which the subordinate term can be defined, as is
the usual practice in dictionary definitions +a cat is a type of animalB"2 is called the
superordinate or hypernym. &ometimes a word may be superordinate to itself in another sense.
This is the case with animal, as shown in the figure below. The first occurrence, opposed to
&egeta"le, is the sense contained in the phrase the animal kingdom". The second occurrence is
synonymous with mammal, and the third with "east.
&uperordinate terms in turn may become hyponyms in relation to a more general
superordinate term/ e.g. cattle is a hyponym of animal. 5airs of lexical items related by
hyponymy are far more frequently found among nouns than among ad)ecti(es or (erbs.
;yponymy is a (ertical relationship which is fundamental to the way in which we classify things.
#ost dictionaries rely on it for the pro(ision of definitions +a chair is a type of furniture", a flute
is a type of musical instrument" and so on2. ;yponymy offers a good organi@ing principle for
(ocabulary learning and teaching. #ost language coursebooks use this feature of organi@ation
Li(ing things
?nimal Jegetable
'ird Fish =nsect
;uman
?nimal
?nimal
implicitly or explicitly in grouping names of flowers together or garnments or articles of
furniture.
+utohyponymy
?utohyponymy is a (ariety of polysemy +>ruse, 2--E/ $-I2 and occurs when a word has a
default general sense and a contextually restricted sense which is more specific in that it denotes
a sub(ariety of a general sense. For example, dog has two senses, a general sense, member of the
canine race" as in -og and cat oners must register their pets and a more specific meaning as in
That*s not a dog# it*s a "itch.
Mhat is interesting to note is that in the lexicali@ation of a distinction of sex, for some
species it is the lexeme denoting males, and for other species the lexeme that denoting females
that is semantically marked +for more details about markedness see the next chapter2.?n instance
of generali@ation of a feminine term is the use of co as in those cos o&er there or a field full of
cos to refer to bo(ines of both sexes, especially when there is a mixed group.
K.2 (eronymy
#eronymy is a term used to describe a part*whole relationship between lexical items. For
instance, co(er and page are meronyms of book. Me can identify this relationship by using
sentence frames like P is part of S, or S has P, as in a page is a part of a book or a book has
pages.
The lexical relation of meronymy, sometimes referred to as partonymy, is usually
informally described as part*whole relation. >roft and >ruse +2--E/ $.$2 claim that meronymy is
a relation between meanings, whereas the part*whole relation links two indi(idual entities and
generates chains of elements/ ? is a part of ', ' is a part of >, > is a part of 9 and so on. For
instance,
? fingertip is a part of a finger.
? finger is a part of hand.
? hand is a part of arm.
?n arm is a part of a body.
?n important point is that the networks identified as meronymy are lexical/ it is
conceptually possible to segment an item in countless ways, but only some di(isions are coined
in the (ocabulary of a language. <(ery language has a range of ways of referring to parts of
things. #any of these ways in(ol(e speciali@ed lexical items.
#eronymy is similar to hyponymy because it reflects a hierarchical and asymmetrical
relationship between words, represented by the less than" sign. For example, stan/a is a
meronym of poem, but poem is not a meronym of stan/a. 8r, sonnet is a hyponym of poem but
poem is not a hypomym of sonnet. ;owe(er, unlike hyponymic relations, meronymic hierarchies
are less clear cut and regular. #eronyms may (ary in how necessary the part is to the whole.
&ome are for normal examples, for example, nose is a meronym of face, others are usual but not
obligatory, like collar, as a meronym of shirt, still other are optional, like cellar for house.
#eronymy also differs from hyponymy in transiti(ity. ;yponymy is always transiti(e,
but meronymy may or may not be. ? transiti(e example is nail, a meronym of finger and finger
of hand. Me can see that nail is a meronym of hand as we can say A hand has nails. ? non*
transiti(e example is/ pane is a meronym of indo +A indo has a pane2 and indo of room
+A room has a indo2D but pane is not a meronym of room, for we cannot say A room has a
pane. 8r hole is a meronym of "utton and "utton of shirt, but we wouldn"t say that hole is a
meronym of shirt +A shirt has holes2.
+utomeronymy
>ruse +2--E/ $-E2 argues that automeronymy, like autohyponymy, is a (ariety of
polysemy. Mhile in the case of autohyponymy the more specific reading denotes a subtype, in the
case of automeronymy the more specific reading denotes a subpart. For instance, door can refer
to either the whole set*up with )ambs, lintel, threshold, hinges and the leaf panel as in 7o through
that door or )ust to the leaf, as in Take the door off its hinges. Further, a sentence such as Me took
the door off its hinges and walked through it illustrates @eugma.
)yponymic and meronymic enrichment
The effects of context on the meaning of a word can be seen in what >ruse +2--E/ $$02
calls contextual modulation" that can manifest itself in two forms or (arieties/ enrichment, i.e.,
the addition of semantic content to the meaning of a word and impo(erishment, i.e. the remo(al
of semantic content from the meaning of a word.
)yponymic enrichment arises when the context adds features of meaning to a word
which are not made explicit by the lexical item itself/
%ur maths teacher is on maternity lea&e +gender is determined2
(y "rother alays "umps his head hen he goes through the door +height is determined2
(y coffee "urnt my tongue. +temperature is determined2
%ur house as "urgled hile e ere aay. They only too! the &ideo# though +legality is
determined2
&ometimes the context points to a specific kind of the class normally denoted by the
lexical item employed, rather than adding a feature, like in I ish that animal ould stop
"ar!in!8miaoing or ;ohn is going ell in the >?@@:metres freestyle.
Meronymic enrichment arises when there is specification to part of what the lexical item
used normally refers to. This part may be definite and identifiable +e.g. a tyre as in A car has a
puncture2 or less definite +e.g. a car*s damaged area as in The car as damaged hen ;ohn
dro&e it into a tree2. This kind of narrowing down to a part, that is, meronymic enrichment, is
widespread in language use and speakers are not usually aware of this. For instance, a red "oo!
has red co(ers, not red letters, whereas a red arning sign most likely has red letters. Further
examples include noun phrases made up of a colour ad)ecti(e and a head nounD (ery often the
colour does not apply globally to the ob)ect denoted by the head noun but only to a part/ a red
apple +a significant portion of outer skin is red2, a yello peach +inner flesh is yellow2, a pin!
grapefruit +inner flesh is pink2, red yes +white of eyes is red2, "lue eyes +iris is blue2. =n all these
examples the colour ad)ecti(e indicates that the referent of the head noun is distincti(e by (irtue
of its possession of an area with certain perceptual properties.
-. "emantic .rgani/ation
1.$. The Lexicon
Lexicon assumptions
The lexicon is a collection of all the words and lexical items, i.e. associations between sound and
meaning that a language has +;offman, $006/ 2K2. Lehrer +$01E/$0-2 maintains that the lexicon
is an unordered set of lexical entries and as such it can be arranged in a number of ways Q
alphabetically, as a dictionary, by semantic fields, as a thesaurus. ?ccording to Lyons +$0I62 the
information that is found in a lexical item is of three kinds/ morphological0 syntactic and
semantic.
=n generative grammar0 the lexicon has a special status and it refers to the component
containing all the information about the structural properties of the lexical items in a language.
Thus, a lexical entry includes phonological0 semantic and syntactic information. Recent
syntactic theories ascribe a more significant role to the lexicon, some claming that much of the
syntax is pro)ected from the lexicon +'resnan, $0I2D >homsky, $0I$2. =n other words, the
semantic organi@ation of the lexicon can predict and explain at least some regularities.
?ccording to 9ir(en +$0I.2 the lexicon has an internally structured character and is only
theoretically finite. =t contains a number of rules for creating new lexical items or for extending
the meaning of gi(en lexical items. 4ew lexical items are formed by the rules of compounding,
deri(ation, borrowing, the creation of neologisms, acronyms. The meaning of gi(en lexical items
can be extended by processes such as the metaphor and the metonymy.
&tarting with $00-"s there has been a surge of interest in the lexicon. The demand for a
fuller and more adequate understanding of lexical meaning required by de(elopments in
computational linguistics, artificial intelligence and cogniti(e science has stimulated a refocused
interest in linguistics, psychology and philosophy.
The basic problem that distinguishes the different (iews of the lexicon relates to the
nature of the information in the lexicon. #urphy +2 argues that knowledge about words +i.e.
lexical knowledge2 does not always o(erlap with knowledge about the things words denote
+conceptual knowledge2. The lexicon contains information that is necessary for linguistic
competence, i.e. our capacity to produce grammatical and interpretable sentences.
The fact that we can fail to make the association between things that we recogni@e and
words that we know for those things indicates that our means of storing and:or accessing the
name of that thing is the same of our means of storing and:or accessing other knowledge about
the thing. The piece of e(idence for this is tip*of*the tongue syndrome, i.e. the case when we ha(e
complete access to the concept, because we can picture it, reason about it and describe it, but we
are not able to access its name. 8ther e(idence for the separation of lexical and conceptual
information is related to the lack of the one*to*one relationship between words and concepts
pro(ed by the existence of polysemy and synonymy in language. Mords can be used to indicate
more than a single concept, and the name that we attach to a thing may (ary by context. =n the
first case, the word !nife can refer to things like scalpels, daggers, butter kno(es and letter
openersD in the second, a single kind of furniture may be reffered to by a (ariety of terms like
table, bedstand, and chest of drawers.
?lthough they are two distinct types of knowledge, lexical knowledge and conceptual knowledge
interact in the processes of language production and comprehension.
Contents and structure of the lexicon
The lexicon contains both linguistic expressions that are greater than words and ones that
are smaller that words. 5hrasal expressions like thro up or paint that ton red and morphemes
such as : ness and pre : are also to be includes in the definition of lexical item or lexeme
+#urphy, $00.../ $E2. ? lexical item in the lexicon is an abstract representation that is instantiated
as a lexical unit in language use, which has a particular form and a particular sense. For example,
highest in the phrase the highest note in the song and high in I thre the "all high are both lexical
units instantiating the lexical item high. The term lexical entry denotes the collection of
information +phonological, morphological and semantic2 about a lexeme that is includes in the
lexicon.
#ost linguists agree that the lexicon is the repository of what is exceptional and
idiosyncratic in language +the part that has to be learned2, while grammar expresses the
regularities of a language. 5sychologically, the lexicon is a more tangible entity that grammar
because speakers are aware that they know and use words, but they are hardly aware that they
know and use rules of the grammar. +>ornilescu, $00./ 0.2.
..2. Semantic fields
ield theories
? semantic field is an area of meaning containing words with related senses. &emantic
field theory deri(es (ery largely from the work of 7erman and &wiss scholars in the $02-s and
$06-s. ?ccording to this theory, meanings of words cluster together to form fields of meaning,
which is turn cluster into e(en larger fields until the entire language is encompassed. &o, for
example, we can identify a semantic field of madness containing words like insane# demented#
"atty# schi/ophrenic# paranoid# some of which are synonyms of mad, and others which are types
of madness. This field belongs in turn within a larger one of mental states, which includes a wider
selection of words. &imilarly we can identify a field of running including words such as
sprinting# running and .ogging, which itself clusters into the field of human motion.
'efore &aussure"s >ourse of linguistique generale +$0..2 the study of semantics was
predominantly diachronic and the concern was with the changes in the meaning of indi(idual
words. The concept of semantic field was introduced by ;umboldt +$06K2, Trier +$06$2, 5or@ig
+$0.-2 and Meisgerber +$0.-2 and more recently de(eloped by Lyons +$0K6, $0112 Lehrer
+$01E2, ,ittay +$0I12 and 7randy +$0I12.
?mong the 7erman linguists Trier was the most important and influential. The procedure
followed by Trier in diachronic semantics was to compare the structure of a lexical field at time
t$ with the structure of a lexical field at tme 2. ;e pointed out that the slightest change in the
meaning of a term in a semantic field brings about changes in the neighbouring terms as well.
Therefore, a word acquires its meaning by its opposition to its neighbouring words in the pattern.
Trier distinguished between lexical and conceptual fields, whereby the lexical field
di(ides the conceptual field into parts, like a mosaic. Lehrer +$01E2 belie(es that the study of
linguistic field should pro(e to be a rich source about human conceptuali@ation and that the
correct or at least the best semantic analysis is one that describes a speaker"s conceptual structure.
?lthough Trier opened a new phase in the histor of semantics +Lllmann, $0K2/12 he has been
criticised for a number of assumptions that are highly contro(ersial.
6
8ne of them is that he
assumes that lexical fields are closed, well*defined sets. The disagreement is founded especially
if one considers peripheral items in a field. For example, in the semantic field of cooking (erbs,
we ha(e "a!e# "oil# fry# but scald# carameli/e +e.g. carameli/e fruits2, render +e.g, render fat2 and
clarify +e.g. clarified "utter2 are peripheral.
?ccording to Lehrer +$01E/ I2 a semantic field as a group of words closely related in
meaning, often subsumed by a general term. For instance, the words in the field of colour in
<nglish fall under the general term >8L8LR and include red# "lue# green# hite# scarlet and
do@ens other. =n their study of colour terms +$01-2 'rent 'erlin and 5aul ,ay
E
found that
speakers disagree among themsel(es as to where to draw the line between colours, e.g. red and
orange. #oreo(er, the )udgments of a single speaker differ at (arious times. The solution the two
?merican scholars ha(e proposed is that of focal points for colours, e.g. the most typical red or
the best example of yellow. The prototype Q based model has to be more useful for the analysis of
semantic fields because it allows for fu@@y borders among lexical items. The study by 'erlin and
,ay also shows that there are some parts of the colour spectrum are not happily co(ered by any
term or at least by any basic term. Lehrer +$01E2 rightly states that a (ery interesting question to
in(estigate is what speakers do when they want to express some concept not co(ered by any
lexical item in the language.
Lexical gaps
The absence of a lexeme at a particular place in the structure of a lexical field is generally
referred to as a lexical gap. For instance, in <nglish there is a word corpse" meaning roughly
body of a dead human being" and a word carcass" meaning body of a dead animal", but no
word which is applied to dead plants. =n general, conceptual fields are hea(ily lexicali@ed. Mhen
part of a field is unlexicali@ed, it constitutes a lexical gap. For instance, it can be argued that there
is a gap for a term superordinate to aunt and uncle and another for niece and nephe.
Fundamental to field theory is the assumption that words can belong to more than one
field. =n addition to meaning insane", for example, mad can also mean angry", and as such
belongs within the field of anger. 8r, orange
$
a colour" belongs to the field of >8L8LR&, while
orange
2
a fruit" belongs to the field of F889&.
? natural consequence of field theory is the idea that words, or more particularly the
senses of words, define themsel(es against each other. &o, for example, in the field of medical
personnel, part of our understanding of doctor is not nurse8surgeon8matron or orderly".
Therefore, the meanings of words must be understood, n part, in relation to other words
that articulate a gi(en content domain. The goal of the analysis of semantic fields is to collect all
the words that belong to a field and show the relationship of each of them to one another and to
the general term.
3
Trier has been challenged for assuming that (1 lexical fields can be organi!ed into neat rigid patterns
based on oppositions and differences (2 there are no gaps or overlaps in a lexical field" #inally he has
been critici!ed for his concentration upon paradigmatic relations of sense to the exclusion of sintagmatic
relations"
$
%olour categories have been investigated by &rent &erlin and 'aul (ey (1)*) two +merican cognitive
anthropologists who contributed to the development of prototype theory"
Conceptual field0 lexical field0 semantic field
&ome of the concepts in a conceptual field become lexicali@ed to form a semantic field
+7randy, $0I1D ,ittay, $0I1D Lehrer, $01ED Lyons, $011D #iller and Oohnson Laird, $01K2. For
example, in the field for coo1", simmer" lexicali@es field for animal", mare" means horse*
female*adult" and puppy" means dog*infant".
'asic to field theory is the (iew that words occupy a certain amount of semantic space
within the language, which is distributed among the specific lexical items a(ailable. &o, for
example, the field of residences is di(ided up into castle# maisonette# home# "ungalo and flat,
to name )ust a few. These terms constitute the lexical set, or lexical field which realise the
semantic field. The meaning of any one of them is affected by the other terms to which it is
related. ?s a consequence, fields are constantly expanding and contracting. =f the term
maisonette" was remo(ed from the set, then one of the others, possibly house, or flat, would
expand to occupy the space.
Field theory is (ery useful in the contrasti(e analysis of different languages. Languages
differ quite widely e(en in apparently basic lexical di(isions, and fields such as temperature0
1inship0 colour0 parts of the body0 and animal and vegetable worlds0 di(ide the semantic
space differently with respect to them. For instance, some languages like <nglish use ele(en
colour terms which name the following colour categories/ 'L?>,, M;=T<, R<9, S<LL8M,
'LL<, 'R8M4, 5LR5L<, 5=4,, 8R?47<, and 7R<S. 8ther languages use only two basic
colour terms +black and white2, three basic colour terms +black, white and red2 etc. ?ctually,
when there are fewer than ele(en basic colour terms
.
in a language, one basic term names a union
of basic colour categoriesD for example, 'LL< H 7R<<4.
?ccording to the cogniti(e linguistic (iew the words of a language reflect conceptual distinctions
made by a particular culture. 9ir(en and Radden +$001/E2 illustrate how the ?nglo culture and
the 7erman culture car(e up the conceptual continuum atmospheric conditions for which the
7erman culture pro(ides two categories/
?nglo culture Fog mist ;a@e
7erman culture 4ebel 9unst
Figure $
?s a result, speakers place their experience of (isibility and air moisture under one of the
categories pro(ided by their culture.
The cogniti(e approach claims that meanings do not exist independently of human perception and
cognition but are created by the way in which humans experience and think of the phenomena
that surround them. The cogniti(e (iew could account for the flexibility of word meaning and
explain why definitions of words are often too difficult to make precise. =t concentrates on how
language is shaped by human experience and cogniti(e processes. >ogniti(e linguists argue that
,
#or a colour term to be basic it must meet the following re-uirements (.a/off, 1)012 2,2
* it must consist of one morpheme, li/e blue, rather than one, as in dar/3blue"
* te colour denoted by the term must not be contained in another colour" 4carlet, is, for example,
contained within red"
* it must not be restricted to a small number of ob5ects6 for example blond"
* 7it must be common and generally /nown, li/e yellow as opposed to saffron"
categories are conceptual in nature and that many, if not all of our conceptual categories are laid
down in language as linguistic categories.
+n illustration' the semantic field of coo1ing terms
Lehrer +$01E2 illustrates the theory of semantic fields with words from two lexical fields/ cooking
and sounds. 8ne of her arguments for this choice is that the sets seem to contain many of the
subtleties, asymmetries and indeterminacies which are characteristic of other lexical fields.
The basic words in the field of >88,=47 are coo!# "a!e# "oil# roast# fry and "roil +or
grill for 'ritish <nglish2 and for some speakers, steam. Grill and toast denote the same action or
process from the point of (iew of the agent, but different patients are in(ol(ed. Grilling is a
method of cooking, whereas toasting is notD things that get toasted are normally already cooked,
whereas items for grilling are raw. The set also includes simmer# ste# poach# "raise# saute.
3rench fry# deep fry# "ar"e0ue and charcoal. The most general are coo! and "a!eA words such as
deep-fry saute# par"oil# plan!# shirr# scallop# flam"er# rissoler or compounds like steam-"a!e#
pot-roast# o&en-poach# pan-"roil# pan-fry and o&en-fry are considered peripheral.
The first three basic cooking terms, i.e. coo!# "a!e and "oil ha(e both general and specific
senses. =t is interesting to note that only basic words show this characteristic. >ooking words can
be placed in a chart like in the figure below/
cook
$
bake
$
cook
2
steam boil
$
fry broil roast bake
2
simmer boil
2
saute deep*fry grill grill barbeque
French*fry charcoal
poach stew braise
?s can be noticed, words are synonyms if they appear in the same squareD incompatible
terms are separated by a (ertical bar, and hyponyms appear directly under the superordinate one.
Thus, steam# "oil fry# "roil# roast and "a!e
B
are hyponyms of coo!
B
. French fry and deep fry are
synonyms, etc.D cook
$
and bake
$
differ from the rest in that they refer to human acti(ities Q in one
case the preparation of food for meals and in the other the preparation of a number of items
commonly called bakery products Q bread, pastry, cookies, etc. 8nly cook
$
and bake
$
freely occur
intransiti(ely with human sub)ects. = cook and ;e bakes are more acceptable than TOohn
simmered yesterday or ;elen is frying. >ook
2
and all the words under it are process words which
can be analysed grammatically as causati(es. 'oil
$
and its subordinates differ from others in the
semantic field in that water or some water*based liquid must be used +wine, stock, milk2 while
the absence of water is necessary for fry, broil, roast, and bake. &immer differ from boil
2
by
specifying that the liquid is )ust below the boiling point, without the rolling bubbles that
characterise boil
2
. The hyponyms of simmer bring in highly specific aspects of meaning. 5oach
specifiesthat the food is slowly cooked in water carefully so that the shape is preser(ed. &tew is
applied when the food is to be cooked slowly for a long time usually until it is soft. 'raise is e(en
more complex Q the food is first browned +quickly fried on the outside2 and then allowed to cook
slowly in a tightly co(ered pot with a small amount of water.
=n general, the more specific the meaning of the word, the fewer collocational possibilities
there are/ boiled meat, boiled eggs, boiled (egetables are linguistically acceptable, but poached
(egetables and stewed eggs are less so +Lehrer, $01E/ 662. Steam and "oil are closer in meaning
than to any other basic term. &team constrast with boil in that the food, which must be a solid, is
not submergedD it is cooked by the rising (apour. 3ry and its hyponyms contrast with other in the
field by requiring the presence of fat or oil in the cooking process although the fat can be in the
food itself. Like bacon. -eep-fry and its synonym 3rench-fry require a large amount of oil or fat
Q enough to co(er the item being cooked. Saute, on the other hand, refers to quickly cooking
something in a frying pan with a small amount of fat. 3ry is used when food is cooked in a frying
pan whether or not fat is added +in the latter case there is some fat in the food cooked, e.g. steack,
or a non*stick frying pan is used2. 9roil and its hypnyms refer to cooking something directly
under a heating unit or o(er or under an open fire. Grill has a range of meaning that o(erlaps with
fry slightly, sincer grilled cheese sandwiches are fried, not broiled. Grill also applies to cooking
food on an open grill, but sometimes it is used synonymously with broil. 9ar"e0ue, is one of its
senses synonymous to charcoal, and both refer to cooking food o(er hot coals. 9a!e
B
is applied to
cooking food in an o(en, such that the heat is indirect, rather than direct as in broiling. ,oast and
broil are close in meaning.
The semantic field of cooking (erbs can finally be set up to look like a series of H:*
features as in the table below, where - means that the feature does not apply distinctly one way or
the other. For example, frying as a kind of cooking that in(ol(es the use of fat in contact with a
flame and is not ussualy gentle.
water fat o(en flame gentle
>ook - - - - -
'oil H * * H *
&immer H * * H H
Fry * H * H -
Roast * * H * -
Toast * * * H -
'ake * * H * -
Metaphorical extension
#ost of the terms in the field of >88,=47 may ha(e metaphorical extensions in other semantic
fields. They may be used for states of emotions +"oil# "urn# simmer# steam# ste2 or temperature/
e.g. t*s roasting 8 steaming in this room.