THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

June 13, 1964

Government-Sponsored Industrial Growth
The Jaipur Industrial Estate: A Case Study
S P Kashyap
Much has been claimed for industrial estates as a device for promoting dispersed industrial development. Much
of this claim, at the same time, has been discounted by critics of the Government.
This article presents the results of a survey of the Industrial Estate set up by the Rajasthan Government at
Jaipur.
This estate has many advantages. Situated in the capital of the State, entrepreneurs can directly approach the
Directorates of Industries and Supplies and other Departments of the State Government. Water, power, transport
and other essential facilities are adequate. Finally, Jaipur provides a substantial market and Delhi is not far
away.
The conditions are thus highly favourable for the success of the Jaipur Estate. But in fact the working of the
Estate shows that very little advantage has been taken of these favourable circumstances.
Employment provided by the Estate is disappointingly small and actually declined between 1961 and 1962.
The main reason for this is under-utilisation of capacity. On average the units which are in production operate at
about 25 per cent of their capacity. The percentage of utilisation of capacity is even lower if account is taken of
the units which, though complete, are not in production at all.
The low utilisation of capacity is traceable mainly to scarcity of raw materials. It appears that the Govern-
ment has permitted the establishment of units using scarce raw materials without considering whether their de-
mand for these materials can be met.
But shortage of raw materials is not the whole story. In the Jaipur Industrial Estate the Government has tried
to sponsor "new" entrepreneurs. While this is no doubt a laudable objective, the Government's efforts have been
far from successful.
In spite of technical and financial assistance and allotment of factory space at low rent, the working of a large
number of units is unsatisfactory even after three years of their starting. In some cases, the chosen "entrepre-
neurs" have quit the Estate after making easy money by blackmarketing plant and equipment and essential mate-
rials.
It is evident that after providing incentives and creating facilities at considerable cost, the Government took
little care to assess the ability of entrepreneurs to take advantage of these incentives and facilities.
THI S arti cl e presents the mai n f i nd-
ings of an economic survey of
the I ndust ri al Estate at Jaipur, under-
taken towards the end of 1962 and
compl eted by Mar ch 1963. It may be
confessed at the outset t hat the hi gh
hopes wi t h whi ch the survey was be-
gun coul d not be sustained t i l l the
end; the co-operation received f r om
the respondents i e the entrepreneurs
coul d hardl y be described as satis-
f act ory; nor was the pi cture of per-
formance t hat emerged f r om the
study such as to encourage belief in
the efficacy of the device of i ndus-
t r i al estates. However, there were
many who acti vel y co-operated and
gave the author valuable i nf ormat i on,
and, on the whol e i t has been wor t h-
whi l e to gauge the success of govern-
mental efforts in an area where so
much i s cl ai med on the one hand and
so much of t hat cl ai m i s di scounted
on the other. What i s presented be-
l ow is a pi cture of the Estate as at
the begi nni ng of 1963.
The f oundat i on stone of the Indus-
t r i al Estate was l ai d on August 10,
1957. The Estate was i naugurated on
August 30, 1959 after the compl eti on
of 24 sheds. The Estate was to be
completed in three stages of 24, 24
and 16 sheds. The last stage was com-
pleted by the mi ddl e of 1961. Since
then al l the sheds have been al l otted
ei ther on rental or on hire-purchase
basis. In the former case the rent was
to be subsidized for an i ni t i al peri od
of three years (according to a sl i di ng
scale). The t ot al expenditure i ncurred
by the Government on the Estate t i l l
June 1962 was Rs 19.70 l akhs. Thi s
expenditure i ncl uded items such as
64 sheds and 12 godowns, constructi on
of bank bui l di ng and admi ni strati ve
office and constructi on of water rank
and wel l , etc.
Subsidised Facilities
The Estate provides, besides the
f aci l i t y of accommodati on at a subsi-
di zed rent, various other f orms of
assistance such as adequate water,
power and banki ng faci l i ti es. The
Estate also provides the services of
a raw materi al depot, a common faci -
l i ti es centre (workshop) and a t ool
r oom r un by the Small Scale Services
I nst i t ut e of Government of Indi a*
The mai n products manufactured by
the di fferent uni ts i n the Estate are
bi cycl e parts, condui t pipes, precision
machi ne tool s, flexible tubes, barbed
wi res, bui l ders' hardware, bi f urcat ed
ri vets, shoe tacks, machine screws,
flexible tubes, steel f ur ni t ur e, agri cul -
t ural i mpl ements, pressure stoves,
hinges, ti n-contai ners and wi re nails.
Most of the uni ts are qui te modern
bot h i n regard to the ki nds of pro-
ducts manufactured and the t echni -
ques of product i on used.
At t empt s were made to collect i n-
f ormat i on f r om al l the i ndust ri al un-
dertaki ngs, but i nf ormat i on (part i al or
complete) coul d be actual l y collected
onl y f r om 30 uni ts occupyi ng 39 sheds.
As regards the remai ni ng 25 sheds, it
was f ound t hat no product i on was
being carri ed on i n 18 of them due to
vari ous reasons, and no i nf ormat i on
at al l coul d be obtai ned f r om the rest
of the seven sheds, pri mari l y because
of the absence of the entrepreneurs!
One of the aims of the i ndust ri al
estates programme is to develop lat-
ent enterprise. Therefore, i n the Jai-
pur I ndust ri al Estate much emphasis
was placed on new entrepreneurs. Of
course, many of those who started
manuf act uri ng i n the Estate had been
in other ki nds of business; onl y 10
entrepreneurs had entered the manu-
f act uri ng l i ne wi t hout any business
experience at al l . However, most of
1021
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
June 13, 1964
t he entrepreneurs had been i n busi -
ness f or a rel ati vel y short peri od. I n-
f ormat i on regardi ng the business ex-
perience of the entrepreneurs is given
i n Table 1.
It wi l l be observed t hat one-t hi rd of
the entrepreneurs covered had expe-
rience upto five years onl y and more
than 50 per cent of t hem had expe-
rience of less t han 11 years. They may
be said to consti tute the ' new tal ent'
whi ch fl owed i nt o the I ndust ri al Es-
tate.
In the Estate, generally speaking,
there has been no rehabi l i t at i on of
ol d uni ts. Most of the uni ts have been
newl y promoted. Onl y 4 out of 30
uni ts, were existing earlier outside the
Estate.
1
One uni t was previously r unn-
i ng at Cal cutta; another shi fted f r om
the Okhl a I ndust ri al Estate and t wo
others were existing in Jaipur. The
fact t hat t wo uni ts shi fted t o the I n-
dust ri al Estate f r om outside shows
t hat they f ound some advantages in
doi ng so.
Absentee Capitalism
The entrepreneurs di d not give one
the impression of being the dynami c
personalities whi ch one meets wi t h i n
economic theory. Instead of grabbing
whatever opportuni ti es were given to
t hem, they were i ncl i ned to be highly
cri t i cal of Government policies. Most
of t hem expected to be spoon-fed.
Entrepreneurs moved by new ideas and
promot i ng "new combi nati ons" were
conspicuous by thei r absence. There
were some whose vi si ts to thei r fac-
tories were few and far between. There
was one factory whose head and own-
er was never seen in his factory. Hi s
manager, who was i gnorant about the
true condi t i on of the factory, gave the
i nf ormat i on t hat the owner was doi ng
some al l i ed business in some other
ci t y and graced the uni t onl y rarel y.
It woul d seem t hat the I ndust ri al Es-
tate has encouraged a f or m of ' ab-
sentee capi tal i sm' .
Out of the 30 uni ts surveyed, onl y
26 provi ded i nf ormat i on regarding
t hei r capi tal i nvestment. Tot al invest-
ment (value of fixed assets and the
worki ng capital employed)
2
amounted
to be Rs 54.45 l akhs, of whi ch work-
i ng capital consti tuted Rs 27.46 l akhs
(sl i ghtl y more than 50 per cent of the
t ot al i nvestment). I n the Okhl a I n-
dust ri al Estate wor ki ng capi tal consti -
t ut ed 70 per cent of the total invest-
ment Thus i n the Jaipur I ndust ri al
Estate the proport i on of fixed invest-
ment to the t ot al was comparati vel y
hi gh. Thi s i ndi cated t hat full use of
fixed capi tal was not being made. On
the basis of this i nf ormat i on, the ave-
rage investment per uni t amounted to
Rs 2.6 l akhs, the corresponding figure
f or the Okhl a Estate was Rs 3.79
l akhs.
3
A maj or proport i on of the uni ts i n-
vested in fixed assets between Rs
10,000 and Rs 100,000. Table 2 shows
the di st ri but i on of the reporti ng uni ts
accordi ng to the size of fixed capital
i nvestment. About 77 per cent of the
uni ts had fixed investment wi t hi n a
range of Rs 10,000 to Rs 1,00,000.
Sources of Finance
Inspi te of the fact t hat there are
now various i nst i t ut i onal sources of
finance f or small industries, e g. State
Industri es Department, State Financial
Corporat i on, Nat i onal Small Industri es
Corporat i on, commerci al banks
4
, i t
was f ound t hat in the Jaipur Estate
the bul k of the i nvestment was made
f r om other sources. Thi s wi l l be seen
f r om Table 3, whi ch shows sources
of capi tal (both fi xed and worki ng) of
the 24 reporti ng uni ts in order of thei r
i mportance.
It wi l l be clear f r om the table that
out of t ot al investment, about 68 per
cent was financed by pri vate savings
and borrowi ngs f rom friends and rela-
tives. Borrowi ngs f r om i nst i t ut i onal
sources consti tuted 32 per cent of the
t ot al investment, out of whi ch the
State Bank of Indi a provided 10.1 per
cent f ol l owed by the Rajasthan State
Fi nanci al Corporati on (8.5 per cent).
The share of the State Industri es De-
partment was the lowest, i e, 3.6 per
cent of the t ot al i nvestment. In the
Okhl a Estate borrowi ngs f r om non-
i nst i t ut i onal sources consti tuted about
65 per cent of the t ot al i nvestment
and t hat f r om i nst i t ut i onal sources to
about 35 per cent; the highest con-
t ri but or was the State Bank of I ndi a
(16.6 per cent) and the l owest the
State Industri es Department. Thi s com-
parison bri ngs out the si mi l ari t y i n
the sources of finance.
Table 4 gives the di st ri but i on of the
contri buti ons f r om the various i nst i -
t ut i onal sources among di fferent uni ts.
It wi l l be seen that the State Bank of
I ndi a had given loans to about 42 per
cent of the uni ts though i ts share in
the total capital of al l uni ts was onl y
10.1 per cent. The State Industri es
Department catered to the needs of
37.5 per cent of the uni ts though it
financed onl y 3.6 per cent of the t ot al
i nvestment. Thus, it appears, the State
Industri es Department gave onl y smal l
loans but spread them over a large
number of uni ts. On the other hand,
the Rajasthan State Fi nanci al Corpo-
rat i on had provi ded loans to onl y
12.5 per cent of the uni ts, but it fin-
anced 8.5 per cent of the t ot al invest-
ment. It may be i nferred that its
medi um-terms loans were given to
1023
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
June 13, 1964
comparatively bi g units. The Nat i onal
Small Industries Corporation gave
loans to 16.7 per cent of the units and
financed 5.4 per cent of the t ot al i n-
vestment through the sale of machi-
nery on hire-purchase basis. The com-
mercial banks also played a not un-
i mport ant role in meeting the needs
of the units of the Indust ri al Estate,
as they gave loans to about 21 per
cent of the units and financed 4.3 per
cent of the t ot al productive capital.
Wastage of Capacity
One of the principal motives for
bui l di ng i ndust ri al estates is to pro-
vide employment. The survey, how-
ever, reveals that the total employ-
ment in the 29 units amounted to 446
onl y. Further a declining t rend was
witnessed duri ng 1962 as compared
to 1961. The magnitude of this decline
can be seen in Table 5.
The proport i on of ski l l ed labour to
t ot al employment was quite hi gh. The
ratio of skilled to unskilled labour
came out to be 1:0.91, (This rat i o for
the Okhla Indust ri al Estate was 1:0.93,
showing not much of a variation). This
also i mpl i ed that the units in the Es-
tate were highly mechanised.
The hi ghl y mechanised nature of the
units proved to be a disadvantage in
disguise. Twent y-t wo units out of
twenty-nine had difficulty in getting
the required skills. There was great
shortage of skilled labour such as, die
fitters, turners, foremen and mecha-
nics, etc. Most of the skilled labour
was coming f r om outside Rajasthan.
Out of 215 skilled workers employed
by the 29 units, about 141 came from
outside Rajasthan (about 65 per cent).
Most of the entrepreneurs stated that
imported labour proved to be costly
and their stay was also not reliable.
This hampered production, firstly, by
increasing the cost of production and
secondly by stopping it sometimes.
It was possible to collect the pre-
cise i nformat i on about ut i l i zat i on of
capacity only from 18 out of the 30
units surveyed. The approximate i n-
stalled capacity of these 18 units came
to about Rs 193.7 lakhs (i n value
terms), average being Rs 10.76 lakhs
whereas the value of their production
amounted to Rs 55 lakhs per year,
the average being Rs 3.05 lakhs. Thus
the average ut i l i zat i on of installed ca-
pacity was 28,33 per cent. Table 6
gives figures of ut i l i zat i on of capacity.
I t wi l l be seen t hat about 50 per cent
of the units were ut i l i si ng less than
30 per cent of their installed capacity,
Under-ut i l i zat i on of capacity can be
traced to various factors. Undoubtedly,
one of the most i mport ant of these
was the shortage of the raw materials.
Most of the entrepreneurs found
themselves handicapped by the i nordi -
nate procedural delay in getting raw
material quotas and licences. Raw
materials l i ke copper were bought ge-
nerally from the open market, whi ch
inflated the cost and hence the price.
The shortages were most acute in
i ron and steel The problem was ag-
gravated by the establishment of new
units using these raw materials, even
though the quota received by the
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
June 13, 1964
State as a whole remained unchanged.
Thi s resul ted i n proporti onatel y re-
duced al l otments f or al l uni ts. Not
onl y were the raw materials made
available insufficient for f ul l uti l i sati on
of capacity, but the combi nati on i n
whi ch they were provi ded made mat-
ters even worse.
Under-ut i l i zat i on of capacity was
also the result of filling the Estate
mai nl y wi t h new fi rms. These firms
usually took a long ti me to settle
down, acquire raw materials and to
develop a market.
Anot her reason for the under-ut i l i -
zati on of capacity was that certain
units mis-calculated the potential mar-
ket. The uni ts manufacturi ng barbed
wi re, nuts and bolts and electric
motors are relevant examples, for in
these industries existing capacity ex-
ceeded demand.
Twenty-l i ve units discussed the pro-
blem of market i ng; 13 out of these
faced no specific difficulties in market-
ing. The rest were not so fortunate.
Four uni ts manufacturi ng c y c l e
parts, wi re nails, agri cul tural i mpl e-
ments and copper wires were facing
tough competi ti on f rom large scale
units. Some uni ts suffered due to
the l i mi t ed market i n Rajasthan.
There was also cross movement of
goods, that is, consumers in the local
market purchased goods manufactured
outside Rajashtan, whereas the local
units had to sell their goods in other
States (perhaps at lower competi ti ve
prices). Two uni ts complained that
their market i ng suffered due to trans-
port bottl enecks, as rai l way booki ng
for South I ndi a was seldom available.
Therefore, they had to depend upon
road transport whi ch was costly.
As the Industri al Estate was i nau-
gurated onl y in August 1959, it was
too early for most of the uni ts to have
plans for f ut ure expansion. Neverthe-
less, i nf ormat i on was gathered about
such plans to get an idea of the f ut ure
evol uti on of the Estate. The i nf orma-
ti on is summarised in Table 7.
Expansion Plans
Si xty per cent of the units had no
plans for expansion. They were
merely mai ntai ni ng the status quo or
t ryi ng to survive. Twelve per cent of
the units had concrete plans for ex-
pansion and the same percentage of
units were contempl ati ng expansion.
About 12 per cent of the units were
wi l l i ng to expand onl y on certain con-
di ti ons, such as a change in Govern-
ment' s policies, provision of adequate
financial help, l i beral quotas for raw
materials, etc. It was our impression
that even if these condi ti ons were f ul -
filled the uni ts woul d be able at best
to uti l i ze f ul l y the installed capacity-
One uni t out of 25 reduced produc-
t i on due to raw materi al shortage.
On the whole the entrepreneurial plans
for f ut ure di d not inspire any great
opti mi sm about the future of Industri al
Estate,
It was possible to calculate the capi-
tal to gross output rati o for 18 uni ts.
For thi s purpose the capital has been
taken to include the total productive
capital and out put has been measured
as the ex-factory value of the actual
output at the current rate of uti l i za-
ti on of capacity. The value of land
and bui l di ng was not i ncl uded in pro-
ductive capital nor the rent paid as
an element of cost for i ndi vi dual units.
In calculating labour output rat i o, la-
bour is taken to i ncl ude al l persons
engaged in the factory i ncl udi ng the
worki ng propri etor. For this purpose
no di sti ncti on has been made between
skilled and unskilled labourers.
In aggregate terms the investment
per person employed came to be Rs
14,000 and output (gross value) per
person to Rs 15,900. Therefore, the
output per uni t of investment on the
basis of these calculations amounted
to be 1.14. The investment of Rs
14,000 per person employed was ra-
ther hi gh, much higher than i n that
for the Okhl a I ndust ri al Estate where
it was only Rs 7,100. But the conclu-
sion that the Jaipur Estate is hi ghl y
capital intensive woul d be misleading.
The high rati o of i nvestment to la-
bour employed is mai nl y due to under-
uti ti sati on of capi tal .
The factories established in the Jai-
pur Estate are small and are manufac-
t uri ng a vari ety of products. The
units are hi ghl y mechanised and al l of
them are using power.
In the Estate, the Government has
tri ed to promote " new" entrepreneurs.
Thi s has resulted in some waste as the
new entrepreneurs in most cases are
not able to make good use of the va-
luable facilities offered to them in
terms of technical advice, fi nanci al
assistance, power and water faci l i ti es
and sheds at subsidised rents.
The study shows that the major
porti on of capital requirements nre
met by sources other than the i nst i -
tuti onal ones, i e, personal savings and
borrowings f rom fri ends and relatives.
Insti tuti onal arrangements have helped
to supplement these resources.
The empl oyment provi ded by the
Estate i s di sappoi nti ngl y s m a l l ,
and, what i s w o r s e , the ave-
rage empl oyment per uni t declined
f r om 17 to 15 between 1961 and 1962.
The average investment per worker em-
ployed is f ai rl y high (Rs 14,000) even
when we do not i ncl ude the cost: of
constructi on of sheds and the cost of
other faci l i ti es on a proporti onal basis.
The Estate is thus neither labour i n-
tensive nor capital saving.
The mai n reason for the small em-
pl oyment provi ded by the units seems
to be under-uti l i sati on of capacity.
The aggregate percentage ut i l i zat i on
of capacity wi l l be much lower than
even 28.33 per cent if units whi ch are
not wor ki ng at al l are also taken i nto
account.
The mai n reason for the low ut i l i -
sation of capacity is the scarcity of
raw materials. The existence of scar-
ci ty may be a sign of growth as it
may create "dynami c di sequi l i bri um"
and press the economy to overcome
these shortages. This may or may not
happen in the long r un, but in the
Jaipur Estate the shortage of raw ma-
terials has resulted in waste of scarce
capital whi ch a developing country
like ours can hardl y afford. It appears
that there has not been any proper
planning in small scale i ndustry, par-
t i cul arl y in respect of units based on
scarce raw materials. The "steel i n-
tensiveness" of the Industri al Estate
cannot be justified by the avai l abi l i ty
of raw materials.
Not onl y are the uni ts f unct i oni ng
at less than f ul l capacity but some of
the sheds are not in producti on at al l .
This is strange because nearly three
years have passed since the Estate
started f unct i oni ng. In some cases
they have installed machinery whi ch
was l yi ng idle for want of raw mate-
ri al s. In some cases the manufactur-
ers earned some easy money by black
marketi ng equipment and materials
and later on di d not fi nd it necessary
to conti nue in business and qui t the
Estate. Sometimes the " new" entre-
preneurs realised that they were not
suited for the manufacturi ng business
and l eft the Estate for good.
Better Planning Required
It appears that entrepreneurs who
can play an effective role in economic
development are not comi ng f orward,
at least not in the Jaipur Estate.
It is not possible to sympathise wi t h
those who blame the Government for
not gi vi ng them the promised help or
for meti ng out step-motherly treatment
to them as compared wi t h large scale
uni ts. The fact is that much help is
given to them in the f or m of water
and power supply, technical arid finan-
cial assistance, banki ng faci l i ti es and
uptodate factory space at subsidised
rent. Thi s should have been i ncenti ve
enough for entrepreneuri al talent to
fl ow i nt o the I ndust ri al Estate, It di d
not, unfortunatel y. The Government
shoul d calculate careful l y (before pro-
vi di ng incentives or creati ng faci l i ti es)
the ' absorptive capacity' of the l ocal i ty
and the ' i ncenti ve el asti ci ty' of the
people. Perhaps thi s was not done
whi l e l aunchi ng the ambi ti ous progra-
mme of setting up i ndust ri al estates
for promoti on of small scale i ndustri es.
Our study shows that the Jaipur
Estate is only a moderate success. But
it certai nl y deserved better. The Gov-
ernment should have tri ed to make it
a model estate whi ch other exi sti ng
estates or those whi ch are l i kel y to be
established in the Thi r d Plan coul d
have emulated.
5
It has certain ad-
vantages whi ch other estates in Rajas-
than do not enjoy. They can be
summarised as fol l ows:
(1) The Estate is situated in a cen-
tral place and entrepreneurs can ap-
proach the Directorate of Industri es
and Supplies and other departments
di rectl y.
(2) There is no scarcity of power
and water whi ch other estates in Ra-
jasthan experience, being situated in
comparatively less developed areas.
(3) Jaipur itself provides a fai rl y
wide market for sales. Delhi being
near to Jaipur, market is not much of
a probl em.
(4) Di gni tari es vi si ti ng Jaipur usual-
ly spare ti me to vi si t the I ndust ri al
Estate. It is, therefore, l i kel y to recei-
ve more attenti on than other indus-
t ri al estates in Rajasthan.
But the progress of the Jaipur Esta-
te has not been parti cul arl y marked.
Judging by this the fate of i ndustri al
estates in other parts of Rajasthan is
not di ffi cul t to imagine.
Some suggestions can be made on
the basis of this analysis:
(a) There should be proper planning
of small scale industries based on
scarce materials. Otherwise the exist
i ng as wel l as f ut ure units wi l l be
starved of raw materials and a crisis
mi ght develop in the near future.
(b) The Government must: reconsi-
der its policy of fi l l i ng i ndustri al esta-
tes wi t h new entrepreneurial talent.
Since almost all the faci l i ti es other
than the f aci l i t y of sheds at subsidised
rents, are available to uni ts existing
outside, it wi l l be proper to give place
in the i ndustri al estate only to those
who have proved thei r wort h outside.
This wi l l increase thei r efficiency as
they wi l l now receive help whi ch they
ri ght l y deserve in a more orderl y fa-
shion. Thi s wi l l also save the indus-
tri al estates f rom unstable entrepre-
neurs who start producti on and then
after some time stop it and leave the
estate altogether or take i nordi natel y
before going i nt o producti on.
(c) It wi l l be proper to have an i n-
f ormat i on cell to collect intelligence
about the potenti al market and the
scope for new industries whi ch come
i nto existence. Thi s wi l l guide the
new entrepreneurs as to the types of
i ndustry whi ch can be established.
Notes
1
In other i ndustri al estates, on the
other hand, it has been found that
most of the units are ol d ones,
i e, existing earlier outside the i n-
dustri al estates.
2
Excl udi ng value of investment in
land and bui l di ng whi ch is the
Government' s.
3
Vide survey conducted by the
Small Scale Services Insti tute in
the first week of July 1962.
4
The provision of factory bui l di ngs
at subsidized rents is also a major
source of Governmental financial
assistance.
5
In the Thi r d Plan the Rajasthan
Government has sanctioned 26 i n-
dustri al estates, 800 work sheds in
urban areas and 100 work sheds in
rural areas.
Agro- I ndust ri al Cooperatives
IN order that the benefits of co-
operation may reach the weaker
sections of the communi t y, a scheme
to organise agro-i ndustri al and labour
service cooperatives has been f or mu-
lated by the Mi ni st ry of Communi t y
Development and Cooperati on.
It is proposed to have one such co-
operative in each Village Level Work-
er ci rcl e, that is, for a group of villages
havi ng a popul ati on of 7,000 to 8.000.
The agro-i ndustri al cooperatives wi l l
pri mari l y cater to the needs of
landless labourers. I ni t i al l y, each co-
operative is expected to have some
250 to 300 members. These co-opera-
tives wi l l organise manpower in such
a manner as to undertake rural works
programmes, public works and agri-
cul t ural operations systematically.
1027
THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
June 13, 1964