INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

For this kind of manslauht!r th! "!f!ndant do!s not ha#! th! m!ns r!a to kill or to
$aus! %&%h' &ut h! do!s an a$t that is dan!rous or rossl( n!li!nt and it
r!sults in d!ath of th! #i$tim%
In#oluntar( Manslauht!r d!fin!d
Involuntary manslaughter is the term given to an unlawful killing where the necessary
mens rea for murder is not present - the defendant will not have had any intention to kill
or do g.b.h. In fact, the defendant will probably not have contemplated the death of the
victim at all. There are two broad categories of involuntary manslaughter:
Manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act (also known as constructive
manslaughter,
Manslaughter by gross negligence, and
!s with voluntary manslaughter, if a defendant is convicted of involuntary manslaughter
the sentence is at the discretion of the trial "udge and can range between life
imprisonment and an unconditional discharge.
Manslauht!r &( an Unla)ful A$t * a $at!ror( of in#oluntar( manslauht!r+
This type of manslaughter is committed when the defendant has caused the death of a
person by an unlawful and dangerous act. The #ourt of !ppeal in R v Mitchell $%&'() *
+,- &(' (below said that to establish this type of manslaughter it had to be shown:
%. that the accused had committed an unlawful act.
*. that the act was dangerous in the sense that a sober and reasonable person would
inevitably recognise that it carried some risk of harm.
(. that the act was a substantial cause of death. and
/. that the accused intended to commit the act as distinct from intending its conse0uence.
A$tus R!a
1. Must show there was an Unlawful ACT -
R # Franklin *,--.+ ,/ 0o1 00 ,2.
The defendant while walking along a pier, took up a 1good si2ed bo31 from a stall and
threw it into the sea where it struck a swimmer and killed him. The defendant was guilty
of manslaughter as death arose from an unlawful act, ie taking another4s property and
throwing it into the sea.

R # Lam& 3,4256 7 89 4-,
The defendant pointed a loaded gun at his friend in "est. 5e did not intend to in"ure or
alarm the victim and the victim was not alarmed. There were two bullets in the chambers
but neither was in the chamber opposite the barrel. 6ecause they did not understand how
a revolver works, both thought there was no danger in pulling the trigger. 6ut when the
defendant did so, the barrel rotated placing a bullet opposite the firing pin and the victim
was killed. The defendant was not guilty of a criminal assault or battery because he did
not foresee that his victim would be alarmed or in"ured.

R # Aro&i!k! 3,4--6 0rim LR .,:
The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter on the basis that his presence at a
railway station had caused the victim, whom he knew to be terrified of him, to attempt an
escape by crossing the railway tracks, with the result that he was electrocuted. The #ourt
of !ppeal 0uashed the conviction on the ground that there had been no criminal act by
the defendant, as the evidence did not show that the defendant had physically threatened
or chased the deceased.

R # 0ato 3,4526 , ;LR ,,<
The defendant and the victim agreed to in"ect each other with heroin. The victim had
consented to a number of such in"ections during the course of an evening. The following
morning he was found to have died from the effects of the drug-taking. The defendant
was convicted of maliciously administering a no3ious substance contrary to s*( of the
7ffences !gainst the 8erson !ct %'9%, and of manslaughter, either on the basis that his
unlawful act had caused death, or on the basis that he had recklessly caused the victim4s
death.
The #ourt of !ppeal held that the defendant had been properly convicted. ,ord +idgery
#: stated that heroin was a no3ious substance on the basis that it was likely to in"ure in
common use, and that the defendant had administered it knowing of its no3ious 0ualities.
The victim4s consent to suffer harm of this nature could never relieve the defendant of his
liability, or destroy the unlawfulness of the defendant4s act.
7% THE A0T MUST 9E "ANGEROUS= The act must be dangerous in the sense that
the average person would recognise that it could cause some form of physical harm to
another person

R # 0hur$h 3,4226 , 89 /4
The defendant had gone to his van with a woman for se3ual purposes. ;he mocked his
impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out. The defendant panicked, and
wrongfully thinking he had killed her, threw her unconscious body into a river, where she
drowned. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. 5e had acted unlawfully
towards the victim in a way that sober and reasonable people would appreciate involved
risk of in"ury to the victim.
<dmund-=avies : provided a definition of dangerousness when he stated: 1... the
unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise
must sub"ect the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit
not serious harm...1

R # "a)son *,4-/+ -, 0r A>> R ,/<
The defendant and two other men carried out an attempted robbery at a petrol station. The
cashier at the petrol station was a 9> year old man who, unknown to the defendants,
suffered from a heart disease. =awson had pointed a replica handgun at the victim and his
partner had banged a pick-a3e handle on the counter. Money was demanded, but the
victim pressed the alarm button and the defendants fled empty handed. ;hortly afterwards
the victim collapsed and died from a heart attack.
The defendants were convicted and successfully appealed to the #ourt of !ppeal,
following a misdirection by the trial "udge. +atkins ,: held that
(a if the "ury acted upon the basis that emotional disturbance was enough to constitute
harm then, they would have done so upon a misdirection. ! proper direction would have
been that the re0uisite harm is caused if the unlawful act so shocks the victim as to cause
him physical in"ury. (b -egarding the test for determining whether or not the unlawful
act was dangerous, he stated: 1This test can only be undertaken upon the basis of the
knowledge gained by a sober and reasonable man as though he were present at the scene
of the crime and watched the unlawful act being performed ... he has the same knowledge
as the man attempting to rob and no more.1
Thus, the reasonable man must be taken to know only the facts and circumstances which
the defendant knew. It was never suggested that any of the defendants knew that their
victim had a bad heart. therefore the reasonable man would not know this.

R # ;atson 3,4-46 , ;LR 2-:
The defendant had burgled a house occupied by an '? year old man who suffered from a
heart condition. The defendant disturbed the victim, and verbally abused him, but made
off without stealing anything. The police were called shortly afterwards, and a local
council workman arrived to repair the windows broken by the defendant in gaining entry.
!n hour and a half after the burglary the victim had a heart attack and died. The
defendant was convicted of manslaughter but appealed successfully on the issue of
causation (as to which see below.
!s to the nature of the unlawful act however, the #ourt of !ppeal recognised that,
following Dawson and applying the test established by +atkins ,:, the unlawful act had
to be dangerous in the sense that all sober and reasonable persons would foresee that it
created a risk of some physical harm occurring to the victim, but added that in applying
this test, the reasonable person was to be imbued with all the knowledge that the
defendant had gained throughout his burglarious trespass (ie his realisation of the victim4s
frailty and not "ust the defendant4s limited or non-e3istent knowledge at the moment he
first entered the property.
Note: 7n this basis therefore, the burglary did constitute a dangerous unlawful act, but
only because the court assumed that the defendant, during the course of the unlawful act,
must have become aware of the frailty of the victim.
.% SU9STANTIAL 0AUSE OF "EATH= The unlawful and dangerous act must be a
substantial cause of death.
Must th! a$t &! dir!$t!d at th! #i$tim?
It had been suggested that because the unlawful act must e3pose the victim to the risk of
some bodily harm, it must be aimed at that victim
R # "al&( 3,4-76 , ;LR :7/
The defendant was a drug addict who lawfully obtained drugs on prescription. 5e gave
some of the tablets to the victim, also known to be a drug addict. The victim had
consumed a large 0uantity of the drug in one session, and subse0uently in"ected himself
with other substances. The following morning he was found to have died of a drug
overdose.
The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, based on his unlawful supply
of the controlled drug, and he appealed on the basis that his supply of the drug was not a
dangerous act which had operated as the direct cause of death. 5e contended that the
death was due to the victim4s act in consuming such a large dose of the drug in such a
short space of time. The #ourt of !ppeal allowed the appeal, +aller ,: holding that the
defendant4s act had not in any event been the direct cause of death, but had merely made
it possible for the victim to kill himself. 5is ,ordship stated that where manslaughter was
based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it had to be an act directed at the victim which
was likely to cause immediate in"ury, albeit slight.

R # Mit$h!ll 3,4-.6 7 ;LR 4.-
The defendant, having become involved in an argument whilst 0ueuing in a post office,
pushed an elderly man, causing him to fall accidentally on the deceased, an elderly
woman, who subse0uently died in hospital from her in"uries. The defendant was
convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. 5e unsuccessfully appealed on the ground that
his unlawful act had not been directed at the victim.
;taughton : held that although there was no direct contact between the defendant and the
victim, she was in"ured as a direct and immediate result of his act. Thereafter her death
occurred. The only 0uestion was one of causation and the "ury had concluded that the
victim4s death was caused by the defendant4s act. The actions of the elderly man in falling
on the victim were entirely foreseeable and did not break the chain of causation between
the defendant4s assault and the victim4s death. Dalby was distinguishable on its facts as a
case where the victim was not in"ured as a direct and immediate result of the defendant4s
act. In addition, the court saw no reason of policy for holding that an act calculated to
harm ! cannot be manslaughter if it in fact kills 6: see Latimer (%''9.

R # Goodf!llo) *,4-2+ -. 0r A>> R 7.
The defendant had deliberately fire bombed his own council house in the hope that he
would be rehoused by the council. 5is wife and children, who had been in the house,
were killed in the ensuing bla2e. 5e appealed against his conviction for manslaughter on
the ground that his unlawful act (criminal damage had not been directed at the victims as
re0uired by Dalby. The #ourt of !ppeal held that Dalby should not be construed as
re0uiring proof of an intention on the part of the defendant to harm the victims. It was to
be viewed as an authority on causation, in that the prosecution had to establish that there
had been no fresh intervening cause between the defendant4s act and the death.

R # ;atson 3,4-46 , ;LR 2-:
(@or facts see above. The defendant appealed successfully on the ground that his counsel
had been denied a sufficient opportunity to address the "ury on the issue of whether the
e3citement caused by the arrival of the police and the council workman could have taken
over as the operating and substantial cause of death. (Note: 6ut did this predictable event
break the chain of causationA

:% MENS REA of Manslauht!r &( an Unla)ful A$t%
"@@ # N!)&ur( and Aon!s 3,4526 A0 /<<
The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from a railway
bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The ob"ect struck and killed the
guard who had been sitting in the driver4s compartment. The defendants were convicted
of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen
that their actions might cause harm to any other person. ,ord ;almon e3plained that a
defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act
which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary
that the defendant had known that the act in 0uestion was unlawful or dangerous.
B-7;; C<B,IB<C#<
!ctus -ea
The essential elements are:
(% e3istence of the duty.
(* breach of the duty causing death. and
(( gross negligence which "ury considers "ustifies criminal conviction,
(/ the gross negligence was a substantial cause of the death (see the indictment in R v
Litchfield (%&&'

Mens -ea
-ecklessness- ob"ective test

Gross n!li!n$! manslauht!r



Gross n!li!n$! manslauht!r is a form of in#oluntar( manslauht!r where the
defendant is ostensibly acting lawfully. Involuntary manslaughter may arise where the
defendant has caused death but neither intended to cause death nor intended to cause
serious bodily harm and thus lacks the mens rea of murder. +hereas constructive
manslaughter e3ists where the defendant commits an unlawful act which results in
death, ross n!li!n$! manslauht!r is not dependant on demonstrating an unlawful
act has been committed. Gross n!li!n$! manslauht!r can be said to apply where the
defendant commits a lawful act in such a way as to render the actions criminal. Gross
n!li!n$! manslauht!r also differs from constructive manslaughter in that it can be
committed by omission.

Bross negligence manslaughter was originally set out in:


R v Bateman ,4 0r A>> R -
! doctor was convicted of manslaughter arising out of his treatment of a woman in
childbirth. ,ord 5ewitt #: gave the following guidance in relation to gross negligence
manslaughter:
1If ! has caused the death of 6 by alleged negligence, then, in order to establish civil
liability, the plaintiff must prove (in addition to pecuniary loss caused by the death that
! owed a duty to 6 to take care, that that duty was not discharged, and that the default
caused the death of 6. To convict ! of manslaughter, the prosecution must prove the
three things above mentioned and must satisfy the "ury, in addition, that !4s negligence
amounted to a crime. In the civil action, if it is proved that ! fell short of the standard of
reasonable care re0uired by law, it matters not how far he fell short of that standard. The
e3tent of his liability depends not on the degree of negligence but on the amount of
damage done. In a criminal court, on the contrary, the amount and degree of negligence
are the determining 0uestion. There must be mens rea.1
In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that in the opinion of the "ury
the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between
sub"ects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a
crime against the ;tate and conduct deserving punishment.1


This was followed in:


Andrews v DPP 3,4.56 A0 /52 5ouse of ,ords
The appellant drove a van above the speed limit and overtook another car. !s he did so
he struck a pedestrian and killed him.
5eld:
5is conviction for manslaughter was upheld.
,ord !tkins on the degree of negligence re0uired for gross negligence manslaughter:
1;imple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes of
the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is
re0uired to be proved before the felony is established




This was considered unsatisfactory as the test was circular in that the "ury were being told
in effect to convict of a crime if they thought a crime had been committed. ;ubse0uently
gross negligence manslaughter was largely replaced with reckless manslaughter:


R v Lawrence $%&'*) !# D%>

R v Seymour $%&'() * !# /&(
Kong Cheuk Kwan v The ueen (%&'D '* #r !pp - %'




5owever, the 5ouse of ,ords in !domako held that the law as stated in R v
Seymour $%&'() * !.#. /&( should no longer apply since the underlying statutory
provisions on which it rested have now been repealed by the -oad Traffic !ct %&&%.



R v Adomako 3,44:6 . ;LR 7-- 5ouse of ,ords
The appellant was an anaesthetist in charge of a patient during an eye operation. =uring
the operation an o3ygen pipe became disconnected and the patient died. The appellant
failed to notice or respond to obvious signs of disconnection. The "ury convicted him of
gross negligence manslaughter.
The #ourt of !ppeal dismissed his appeal but certified the following 0uestion to the
5ouse of ,ords:
1In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence not involving driving but involving a
breach of duty is it a sufficient direction to the "ury to adopt the gross negligence test set
out by the #ourt of !ppeal in the present case following R" v" #ateman (%&*D %& #r.
!pp. -. ' and !ndrews v" Director of $ublic $rosecutions $%&(?) !.#. D?9, without
reference to the test of recklessness as defined in -. v. ,awrence (;tephen $%&'*) !.#.
D%> or as adapted to the circumstances of the
caseA1
5eld:
5is conviction for gross negligence manslaughter was upheld. The ,ords ruled that the
law as stated in - v ;eymour $%&'() * !.#. /&( should no longer apply since the
underlying statutory provisions on which it rested have now been repealed by the -oad
Traffic !ct %&&%.
The certified 0uestion was answered thus:
1In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence involving a breach of duty, it is a
sufficient direction to the "ury to adopt the gross negligence test set out by the #ourt of
!ppeal in the present case following -. v. 6ateman %& #r. !pp. -. ' and !ndrews v.
=irector of 8ublic 8rosecutions $%&(?) !.#. D?9 and that it is not necessary to refer to the
definition of recklessness in -. v. ,awrence $%&'*) !.#.
D%>, although it is perfectly open to the trial "udge to use the word 1reckless1 in its
ordinary meaning as part of his e3position of the law if he deems it appropriate in the
circumstances of the particular case.1
,ord Mackay ,# set the test for gross negligence manslaughter:
17n this basis in my opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to
ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the
victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the ne3t 0uestion is whether
that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the "ury must go on to consider
whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a
crime. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the
defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred.
The "ury will have to consider whether the e3tent to which the defendant4s conduct
departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must have
done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be "udged criminal.
Th! !ss!n$! of th! matt!r )hi$h is su>r!m!l( a Bur( Cu!stion is )h!th!r ha#in
r!ard to th! risk of d!ath in#ol#!d' th! $ondu$t of th! d!f!ndant )as so &ad in all
th! $ir$umstan$!s as to amount in th!ir Budm!nt to a $riminal a$t or omission%%%
It is true that to a certain e3tent this involves an element of circularity, but in this branch
of the law I do not believe that is fatal to its being correct as a test of how far conduct
must depart from accepted standards to be characterised as criminal. This is necessarily a
0uestion of degree and an attempt to specify that degree more closely is I think likely to
achieve only a spurious precision. 1
@ollowing !domako it was necessary for the prosecution to establish that the defendant:

%. 7wed a duty of care to the victim
*. +as in breach of duty
(. The breach of duty caused death
/. The defendant4s conduct was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in the
"ury4s opinion to a crime.

Don 0hu!k D)an # R *,4-/+ -7 0r A>> R ,- The 8rivy #ouncil applied the new
form of reckless manslaughter to a case involving a collision between two hydrofoils in
5ong Eong harbour. It was held that the direction suggested in - v ,awrence, upheld in
- v ;eymour, applied in the present case. The 8rivy #ouncil stated that this was a
comprehensive test for the purposes of all involuntary manslaughter which did not fall
under the heading of constructive manslaughter.
R # Lidar 0A ,,E,,E44 The defendant had an argument with the victim, who was half
leaning into the defendants car, and drove off. The victim was crushed by the rear wheel.
The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. The #ourt of !ppeal held that in order to
be liable, the defendant must have (a foreseen a risk of serious in"ury or death occurring,
and (b assessed that risk as at least highly probable to occur.