Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
0.0
7
0.0
9
0.0
5
1
Diff.
growth
total
loans
0.0
5
0.0
6
0.0
2
0.21 1
Dum
large
bank
0.0
5
0.0
7
0.0
2
0.02 0.01 1
Dum
small
bank
0.0
9
0.0
8
0.0
9
0.02 0.01
0.2
7
1
Interes
t
incom
e
share
0.2
6
0.2
2
0.2
0
0.06 0.02
0.2
1
0.0
4
1
Fundin
g costs
0.0
3
0.1
4
0.0
9
0.12 0.15
0.2
0
0.1
2
0.18 1
Eq.
o.
TA
CI
rati
o
Loa
n
loss
pro
v o.
TA
Yr
growt
h
deposi
ts
Growt
h
tot.loa
ns
Du
m
larg
e
ban
k
Du
m
sma
ll
ban
k
int.in
c. sh
Fun
d
cos
ts
Dum
bank
age
midd
le
Dum
ban
k
age
you
ng
Du
m
stat
e
ban
k
Du
m
list.
ban
k
Du
m
for.
ban
k
Eff.
tax
rat
e
Real
gdp
grow
th
Term
structu
re
H
HI
Dum
bank
age
middle
0.3
1
0.0
7
0.1
3
0.05 0.02
0.1
3
0.0
8
0.41
0.0
4
1
Dum
bank
age
young
0.3
1
0.2
5
0.0
9
0.08 0.07
0.0
4
0.0
9
0.31
0.0
6
0.16
1
Dum
state
bank
0.0
1
0.1
1
0.0
3
0.08 0.06
0.2
9
0.1
2
0.05
0.0
9
0.13
0.11
1
Dum
listed
bank
0.0
2
0.0
5
0.0
2
0.04 0.05
0.3
1
0.1
2
0.05
0.0
6
0.08
0.05
0.2
8
1
Dum
foreign
bank
0.3
5
0.1
6
0.1
8
0.11 0.06
0.2
4
0.0
8
0.32
0.0
6
0.28 0.28
0.1
4
0.0
9
1
Effecti
ve tax
rate
0.2
2
0.0
1
0.0
7
0.01 0.02
0.3
2
0.1
3
0.23
0.1
7
0.01
0.10
0.3
2
0.1
6
0.1
1
1
Real
gdp
growth
0.0
2
0.1
6
0.0
5
0.06 0.24
0.0
5
0.0
2
0.02
0.0
8
0.02
0.01
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
7
1
Term
structu
re of
int.
0.1
1
0.1
4
0.0
4
0.09 0.11
0.0
3
0.0
1
0.05
0.2
4
0.02
0.04
0.0
1
0.0
1
0.0
6
0.0
1
0.44 1
HHI
0.0
3
0.0
3
0.0
1
0.01 0.02
0.0
2
0.0
3
0.01
0.0
5
0.04
0.08
0.2
1
0.0
2
0.0
5
0.0
9
0.04 0.03 1
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4.2. Methodology
To empirically investigate the effects of internal and external factors on bank profitability, we follow
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Garca-Herrero et al. (2009) and use a linear model given by (1):
equation(1)
<img height="51" border="0"
style="vertical-align:bottom" width="366" alt="View the MathML source" title="View the MathML
source" src="http://origin-ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S1042443110000831-
si1.gif">PERFit=c+PERFi,t1+j=1JjXitj+l=1LjXitj+it
Turn MathJax on
PERFi,t is profitability of bank i at time t , with i = 1,,N , t = 1,,T , c is a constant term, Xit's are
the bank-specific and market-specific explanatory variables as outlined above, and i.t is the
disturbance, with v i the unobserved bank-specific effect and u it the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-
way error component regression model, where v i (IIN(0, <img height="19" border="0"
style="vertical-align:bottom" width="34" alt="View the MathML source" title="View the MathML
source" src="http://origin-ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S1042443110000831-si2.gif">0,v2))
and independent of u it (IIN( <img height="19" border="0" style="vertical-align:bottom"
width="34" alt="View the MathML source" title="View the MathML source" src="http://origin-ars.els-
cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S1042443110000831-si3.gif">0,u2)). Bank profits show a tendency to
persist over time, reflecting impediments to market competition, informational opacity and/or
sensitivity to regional/macroeconomic shocks to the extent that these are serially correlated ( Berger et
al., 2000). As a consequence, we specify a dynamic model by including a lagged dependent variable
among the regressors, i.e. PERFi,t1 is the one-period lagged profitability and the speed of
adjustment to equilibrium. A value of between 0 and 1 implies persistence of profits, but they will
eventually return to their normal level. A value close to 0 indicates an industry that is fairly competitive,
while a value close to 1 implies a less competitive structure. 1
Given the dynamic nature of our model, least squares estimation methods produce biased and
inconsistent estimates (see Baltagi, 2001). Therefore, we use techniques for dynamic panel estimation
that are able to deal with the biases and inconsistencies of our estimates. Another challenge with
estimation of bank profitability refers to the endogeneity problem. As Garca-Herrero et al. (2009)
outline, more profitable banks, for example, may also be able to increase their equity more easily by
retaining profits. Similarly, they could also pay more for advertising campaigns and increase their size,
which in turn might affect profitability. However, the causality could also go in the opposite direction,
because more profitable banks can hire more personnel, and thus reduce their operational efficiency.
Another important problem is unobservable heterogeneity across banks, which definitively also exists in
the Swiss banking industry, differences in corporate governance, which we cannot measure well.
Following Garca-Herrero et al. (2009), we address these problems by employing the generalized
method of moments (GMM) following Arellano and Bover (1995), also known as system GMM
estimator. This methodology accounts for endogeneity. The system GMM estimator uses lagged values
of the dependent variable in levels and in differences as instruments, as well as lagged values of other
regressors which could potentially suffer from endogeneity.
We instrument for all regressors except for those which are clearly exogenous. The variables treated as
endogenous are shown in italics in the result tables below. The system GMM estimator also controls for
unobserved heterogeneity and for the persistence of the dependent variable. All in all, this estimator
yields consistent estimations of the parameters.
In a first step, we estimate our model over the entire time period from 1999 to 2009. In order to
investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis on the determinants of banking profitability, we
additionally split up the sample into two time periods, namely the pre-crisis period ranging from 1999 to
2006, and the crisis and post-crisis period including the years 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Finally, the simultaneous inclusion of certain variables may raise concerns of multicollinearity. As noted
later on, we computed several tests in order to make sure that our results are not affected by
multicollinearity issues.
5. Empirical results
Table 5 summarizes the empirical results for our main profitability measure ROAA. The first two columns
report the results when including all eleven years in our sample. In order to investigate the impact of the
recent financial crisis on the banks profitability determinants, we further split up the sample: Columns
three and four refer to the period before the crisis (up to 2006). Columns five and six report the
estimates for the years of the financial crisis, namely 20072009. In order to identify the stability of the
coefficients and their significance, we first include only the bank-specific determinants into our model
(columns one, three and five). In a second step, we report the estimates of the full model with the bank-
and market-specific factors (columns two, four and six).
Table 5.
Regression results for returns on average assets (ROAA) as dependent variable.
Dependent
variable:
ROAA
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-
specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Dependent
variable:
ROAA
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-
specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
L.ROAA
0.087***
(0.023)
0.090***
(0.023)
0.044
(0.029)
0.051*
(0.030)
0.156***(0.04
9)
0.131***
(0.050)
Equity over
total assets
0.011
(0.007)
0.014**
(0.007)
0.005
(0.011)
0.005
(0.011)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.028***
(0.010)
Cost-
income
ratio
0.028***
(0.001)
0.027***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.002)
0.025***
(0.002)
0.027***
(0.001)
0.028***
(0.002)
Loan loss
provisions
over total
loans
0.005 (0.010)
0.000
(0.010)
0.016
(0.013)
0.021
(0.013)
0.143**
(0.060)
0.138**
(0.061)
Yearly
growth of
deposits
0.005***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.002)
Diff.
between
bank and
market
growth of
total loans
0.008***
(0.001)
0.008***
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.001)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.002)
Dummy:
large bank:
total
assets>512
m. USD
0.155
(0.132)
0.118
(0.133)
0.436**
(0.185)
0.419**
(0.187)
0.929***
(0.268)
0.871***
(0.272)
Dummy:
small bank:
total
assets<212
m. USD
0.758***
(0.136)
0.817***
(0.139)
1.377***
(0.189)
1.420***
(0.191)
0.227 (0.253)
0.067
(0.262)
Dependent
variable:
ROAA
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-
specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Interest
income
share
0.005***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.019***
(0.004)
0.011***
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.002)
Funding
costs
0.053***
(0.015)
0.031*
(0.017)
0.154***
(0.022)
0.151***
(0.024)
0.058 (0.121) 0.070 (0.112)
Dummy:
bank was
founded
between
1950 and
1989
0.687***
(0.148)
0.614***
(0.152)
0.997***
(0.217)
1.006***
(0.223)
0.991***
(0.284)
0.834***
(0.297)
Dummy:
bank was
founded
after 1989
0.301*
(0.165)
0.300*
(0.166)
0.056
(0.225)
0.003
(0.227)
1.237***
(0.307)
1.105***
(0.318)
Dummy:
bank is (co-
)owned by
state or
city
1.336***
(0.293)
1.105***
(0.308)
1.001
(0.925)
0.443
(0.551)
1.803***
(0.399)
1.750***
(0.433)
Dummy:
bank is
listed at
stock
exchange
1.930***
(0.337)
1.852***
(0.346)
1.653***
(0.464)
1.341***
(0.476)
1.468***
(0.569)
1.388**
(0.586)
Dummy:
bank is a
foreign
bank
0.318**
(0.135)
0.285**
(0.137)
0.326*
(0.191)
0.198
(0.197)
0.133 (0.270)
0.053
(0.275)
Effective 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
Dependent
variable:
ROAA
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-
specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
tax rate (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Real gdp
growth
0.037***
(0.013)
0.006
(0.016)
0.032
(0.044)
Term
structure
of interest
rates
0.193***
(0.067)
0.038
(0.089)
0.282**
(0.135)
Herfindahl
Index
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000 (0.000)
Constant
4.185***
(0.210)
3.643***
(0.293)
3.452***
(0.311)
2.346***
(0.418)
3.459***
(0.454)
3.923***
(0.594)
Number of
observatio
ns
1639 1639 981 981 658 658
Number of
banks
372 372 318 318 263 263
Wald-test
2(22) = 1898.
26
2(25) = 1886.
68
2(22) = 966.
46
2(25) = 963.
19
2(22) = 1232.5
5
2(25) = 1238.
11
Hansen
test (p-
value)
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
AB test
AR(1) (p-
value)
(0.002) (0.13) (0.002) (0.002) (0.03) (0.039)
AB test
AR(2) (p-
value)
(0.144) (0.13) (0.58) (0.503) (0.961) (0.884)
The table reports results from GMM estimations of the effects of bank- and market-specific
characteristics on bank profitability. The dependent variable is the return on average assets ROAA. For
the notation of the variables see Table 1. The full sample includes 1639 observations from 372 banks.
The period covers the years 1999 to 2009. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM
procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995). Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that
are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *
respectively. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the ArellanoBond test that average autocovariance in
residuals of order 1 respectively of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets.
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Our estimation results point out to stable coefficients. Also, the Wald-test indicates fine goodness of fit
and the Hansen test shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. The equations indicate that a
negative first-order autocorrelation is present. However, this does not imply that the estimates are
inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if second-order autocorrelation was present (Arellano and
Bond, 1991). But this case is rejected by the test for AR(2) errors.
Our lagged dependent variable, which measures the degree of persistence of our profitability measure
ROAA, is statistically significant across all models, indicating a high degree of persistence of bank
profitability and justifying the use of a dynamic model.
Overall, we observe some significant differences between the estimation results of the different time
periods, both with respect to the significance and the size of the coefficients. The capital ratio, which is
defined as equity over total assets, does not have a significant impact on bank profitability before the
crisis. However, it has a negative and significant effect on bank profitability as measured by ROAA during
the financial crisis 20072009. One of the main reasons for this relation is that safer banks in Switzerland
were attracting additional saving deposits (mainly from UBS) during the crisis. However, they were not
able to convert the substantially increasing amount of deposits into significantly higher income earnings
as the demand for lending decreased in this period. Even though total earnings for these banks often
slightly increased during this time of turmoil, profitability decreased as banks did not find attractive
investment opportunities or were lowering net interest margins in order to lend their additional
deposits.)
The coefficient of the cost-to-income ratio, our operational efficiency measure, is negative and highly
significant for all different time period. The more efficient a bank is the higher is its profitability. This
result meets our expectation and stands in line with the results of Athanasoglou et al. (2008).
The loan loss provisions relative to total loans ratio, which is a measure of credit quality, do not have a
statistically significant effect on bank profitability before the crisis. This is not surprising, given that
banks in Switzerland had very low loan loss provisions before the financial crisis. However, the loan loss
provisions have significantly increased during the crisis, and this is reflected in its negative impact on
profitability during the crisis years, with the coefficients being significant at the 5% level.
The yearly growth of deposits has a significant and negative impact on bank profitability, and this effect
is mainly driven by the crisis years. Banks in Switzerland were not able to convert the increasing amount
of deposit liabilities into significantly higher income earnings above all in recent time of turmoil.
However, and most interestingly, banks with relatively higher lending growth rates (in comparison to the
market) were more profitable than slowly growing banks in all considered time periods. The effect of a
faster growing loan volume seems to over-compensate the risk that a too fast growth in loans may lead
to a decrease in credit quality.
As to bank size, which we track by dummy variables, we find some empirical evidence that larger and
smaller commercial banks were more profitable than medium-sized banks (reference category) before
the crisis. This gives some indication that larger banks were able to benefit from higher product and loan
diversification possibilities, and/or economies of scales (see Smirlock, 1985 and Bikker and Hu, 2002).
However, large banks in Switzerland were less profitable than small and medium-sized bank during the
past 3 years of the financial crisis.2 The main reasons for this negative relationship between size and
profitability are that larger banks in Switzerland had relatively higher loan loss provisions during the
crisis and that larger banks were found to have significantly lower net interest margins in times of
turmoil than smaller banks (see below). This might also be a consequence of some reputational
problems that mainly larger banks in Switzerland faced during the recent crisis.
On average, 75% of total income for the commercial banks in our sample consists of traditional banking
income (interest income) and to a lesser extent of fee and commission income as well as trading
operations. Our findings show that banks with a higher share of interest income relative to the total
income are significantly less profitable, and this holds before as well as during the crisis, with the effect
being significant at the 1% level. The reason for this coherence is that profit margins of fee, commission
and also trading operations are usually higher than profit margins in interest operations, and that many
banks could benefit from a positive development of the stock market and a higher stock exchange
turnover.
Funding costs have a significantly negative impact on the return on assets before the crisis, i.e. banks
that raise cheaper funds are more profitable. However, this does not hold anymore during the crisis,
where funding costs dropped anyway to a historically low level. Furthermore, bank age has a significant
impact on banking profitability in the whole sample period. In contrast to our hypothesis as formulated
above, older banks are not more profitable than recently founded banks or banks founded between
1950 and 1989. Newer banks seem to be even more profitable than older banks. This means that newer
banks are able to pursue successfully new profit opportunities and that a longer tradition of service and,
in this context, a better reputation does not positively affect the profitability of a bank. Also, younger
banks may be more efficient in terms of their IT infrastructure, which is reflected in the profitability
measure as well.
Our results regarding the impact of ownership on profitability before the crisis support the findings of
Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) that the ownership status
(private or state-owned banks) is irrelevant for explaining profitability. Our results from Switzerland
stand thus in contrast to the findings of Micco et al. (2007) and Iannotta et al. (2007), who point out that
government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability than privately owned banks. However, things look
different for the crisis years, which is quite interesting. Our results provide empirical evidence for the
Swiss market that state-owned banks are more profitable than privately owned banks during the
financial crisis. In this time of turmoil, state-owned banks were considered as safer and better banks in
comparison to privately owned institutions. International ownership of a bank seems to have a
significant impact on bank profitability when considering the whole model. In fact, foreign-owned banks
in Switzerland seem to be less profitable than their Swiss competitors. This result confirms the findings
of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), who find evidence that foreign-owned banks are less profitable
in developed countries than domestic banks. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that banks
listed on the stock exchange are slightly less profitable than banks that are not. This holds for all
specifications.
Considering the external factors related to the macroeconomic environment and the financial structure
in Switzerland, our study finds that taxation negatively affects bank profitability in Switzerland, with the
coefficients being significant at the 1% level in all specifications. Our results confirm the findings of
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) that higher tax rates lead to a lower post-tax profit. This result is of
specific importance in Switzerland, where tax rates vary widely across the Swiss cantons, all of which
have their own tax regime. However, the impact of taxation on banking profitability is rather small.
Overall, it seems that banks are able to shift a large fraction of their tax burden onto their depositors,
borrowers, and purchasers of fee-generating services.
The business cycle significantly affects bank profits when considering all years. Bank profits seem to be
pro-cyclical as the demand for lending increases during cyclical upswings and thus lead to more and
more profitable business (Athanasoglou et al., 2008 and Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009). The term
structure of interest rates, measured by the difference between the 5-year and 2-year treasury bills in
CHF issued by the Swiss government, positively affects the profitability of Swiss banks overall and in
particular during the financial crisis. Commercial banks in Switzerland use short-term deposits to finance
long-term loans. A steeper yield curve, as during the financial crisis years, thus affects the profitability
positively.
Furthermore, the impact of the market structure, approximated by the Herfindahl index seems to have a
significant and positive effect on bank profitability before the crisis, but not thereafter. Accordingly, we
do find some support for the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis. These findings are in line with
the results of Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), even though the effect seems to be
rather small.
Table 6 reports the regression results for our second profitability measure return on average equity
ROAE. Again, we estimate the model for the entire time period considered, and then separately for the
two subsamples pre-crisis and crisis years.
Table 6.
Regression results for returns on average equity (ROAE) as dependent variable.
Dependent
variable:
ROAE
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
L.ROAE
0.181***
(0.024)
0.180***
(0.024)
0.123***
(0.033)
0.128***
(0.033)
0.086*
(0.045)
0.092**
(0.045)
Equity over
total assets
0.023
(0.056)
0.036
(0.057)
0.055
(0.097)
0.054
(0.098)
0.050
(0.058)
0.065
(0.059)
Cost-income
ratio
0.144***
(0.009)
0.140***
(0.009)
0.208***
(0.016)
0.203***
(0.016)
0.084***
(0.008)
0.088***
(0.008)
Loan loss
provisions
over total
loans
0.078
(0.081)
0.090
(0.082)
0.176
(0.116)
0.197*
(0.119)
0.535*
(0.325)
0.474
(0.333)
Yearly growth
of deposits
0.024**
(0.011)
0.017 (0.012) 0.006 (0.019) 0.004 (0.019)
0.004
(0.011)
0.001
(0.012)
Diff. between
bank and
market
growth of
total loans
0.025***
(0.007)
0.031***
(0.008)
0.044***
(0.012)
0.046***
(0.014)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.008 (0.009)
Dummy: large
bank: total
assets > 512
m. USD
2.412**
(1.093)
2.647**
(1.101)
8.654***
(1.717)
8.587***
(1.736)
4.462***
(1.323)
4.580***
(1.355)
Dummy:
small bank:
total
assets < 212
m. USD
3.289***
(1.131)
3.521***
(1.153)
9.298***
(1.765)
9.345***
(1.778)
0.962
(1.344)
0.726
(1.413)
Interest
income share
0.014***
(0.010)
0.012***
(0.011)
0.219***
(0.033)
0.223***
(0.034)
0.052***
(0.009)
0.060***
(0.010)
Funding costs
0.400***
(0.123)
0.293**
(0.133)
1.247***
(0.194)
1.186***
(0.210)
0.245
(0.181)
0.198
(0.183)
Dummy: bank
was founded
between
0.475 (1.199) 0.290 (1.231)
3.407*
(1.900)
3.326*
(1.943)
0.441
(1.593)
0.844
(1.681)
Dependent
variable:
ROAE
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
1950 and
1989
Dummy: bank
was founded
after 1989
2.388*
(1.376)
2.412*
(1.381)
3.002
(2.022)
3.035
(2.043)
1.896
(1.773)
2.171
(1.839)
Dummy: bank
is (co-)owned
by state or
city
2.365
(2.211)
3.204
(2.307)
1.885
(4.442)
3.362
(4.585)
1.188
(2.158)
1.149
(2.304)
Dummy: bank
is listed at
stock
exchange
2.724 (2.600) 3.186 (2.672) 1.633 (4.102) 2.563 (4.196)
6.919**
(3.091)
7.523**
(3.156)
Dummy: bank
is a foreign
bank
0.240
(1.141)
0.231
(1.157)
0.221 (1.757) 0.457 (1.798)
3.303**
(1.572)
3.846**
(1.633)
Effective tax
rate
0.022**
(0.010)
0.021**
(0.010)
0.011
(0.016)
0.012
(0.016)
0.070***
(0.009)
0.067***
(0.009)
Real gdp
growth
0.264** 0.104 (0.142)
0.370
(0.250)
Term
structure of
interest rates
0.715 (0.542) 0.417 (0.782) 0.368 (0.716)
Herfindahl
Index
0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
0.000
(0.000)
Constant
25.116***
(1.734)
22.024***
(2.366)
20.559***
(2.749)
17.455***
(3.521)
30.667***
(2.607)
32.572***
(3.330)
Number of
1639 1639 981 981 658 658
Dependent
variable:
ROAE
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
observations
Number of
banks
372 372 318 318 263 263
Wald-test
2(22) = 911.4
6
2(25) = 914.3
7
2(22) = 660.1
2
2(25) = 653.2
1
2(22) = 812.1
5
2(25) = 801.7
6
Hansen test
(p-value)
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
AB test AR(1)
(p-value)
(0.015) (0.01) (0.085) (0.08) (0.04) (0.042)
AB test AR(2)
(p-value)
(0.405) (0.35) (0.41) (0.342) (0.739) (0.527)
The table reports results from GMM estimations of the effects of bank- and market-specific
characteristics on bank profitability. The dependent variable is the return on average equity ROAE. For
the notation of the variables see Table 1. The full sample includes 1639 observations from 372 banks.
The period covers the years 19992009. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM
procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995). Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that
are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *
respectively. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the ArellanoBond test that average autocovariance in
residuals of order 1 respectively of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets.
Full-size table
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Overall, the results of these regressions confirm to a large extent the above-discussed key results. There
are, however, also some differences. In contrast to the results for our main profitability measure ROAA,
differences exist related to our ownership variables. The ownership status (private or state-owned
banks) has no impact on bank profitability when measured by the ROAE. This does not only hold for the
period before the crisis, but also thereafter. Banks listed at the stock exchange are more profitable
during the crisis than unlisted banks. This result might be driven by the fact that the return on equity
reflects shareholder maximization attempts, which is a common practice of some of the listed banks. In
particular, some listed banks in Switzerland may have effectively lowered their equity capital in order to
increase the ROAE. Also, there is empirical evidence that foreign-owned banks are not less profitable
over the whole period when the ROAE is our dependent variable. Furthermore, there is no significant
impact of the market structure, approximated by the Herfindahl index, on bank profitability before the
crisis.
Table 7 reports the regression results for another profitability measure, the net interest margin. Again,
we estimate the model for the entire time period considered, and then separately for the two
subsamples pre-crisis and crisis years. Analyzing the determinants of the net interest margin helps us to
better understand some results of the ROAA specifications. For instance, it is interesting to see that
larger banks have a significantly lower net interest margins during the financial crisis than medium- or
small-sized banks. This might also explain why large banks were less profitable in the referring years.
Furthermore, banks with a high relative loan growth exhibit higher net interest margins. This is also a
possible explanation for the positive relationship between the relative loan growth and bank
profitability when measured by both the ROAA and the ROAE. Furthermore, banks with a higher share of
interest income of total income have lower net interest margins. This might be another reason why
banks with a higher interest income share are less profitable than banks that have a better income
diversification.
Table 7.
Regression results net interest margin (NIM) as dependent variable.
Dependent
variable: NIM
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
L.NIM
0.668***
(0.018)
0.704***
(0.018)
0.621***
(0.023)
0.653***
(0.024)
0.668***
(0.041)
0.652***
(0.041)
Equity over
total assets
0.018***
(0.003)
0.019***
(0.003)
0.027***
(0.004)
0.029***
(0.004)
0.003 (0.005)
0.004
(0.005)
Cost-income
ratio
0.004***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.002**
(0.001)
Loan loss
provisions
0.017*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.014***
0.009 (0.028)
0.001
Dependent
variable: NIM
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
over total
loans
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.028)
Yearly
growth of
deposits
0.001
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.001 (0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
Diff. between
bank and
market
growth of
total loans
0.001*
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.006***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.004***
(0.001)
Dummy:
large bank:
total
assets > 512
m. USD
0.162***
(0.052)
0.090*
(0.053)
0.084
(0.067)
0.034
(0.068)
0.242**
(0.122)
0.235*
(0.123)
Dummy:
small bank:
total
assets < 212
m. USD
0.117*
(0.060)
0.108*
(0.061)
0.144*
(0.079)
0.176**
(0.080)
0.378***
(0.122)
0.354***
(0.122)
Interest
income share
0.001**
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.001)
0.007***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
0.002*
(0.001)
Funding
costs
0.042***
(0.006)
0.045***
(0.006)
0.031***
(0.008)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.031*
(0.017)
0.030*
(0.017)
Dummy:
bank was
founded
between
1950 and
1989
0.197***
(0.060)
0.251***
(0.062)
0.018 (0.081) 0.109 (0.083)
0.223
(0.144)
0.143
(0.152)
Dependent
variable: NIM
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Dummy:
bank was
founded
after 1989
0.021 (0.066) 0.020 (0.066) 0.084 (0.086) 0.025 (0.087)
0.288**
(0.142)
0.288**
(0.142)
Dummy:
bank is (co-
)owned by
state or city
0.729***
(0.109)
0.659***
(0.115)
0.606***
(0.156)
0.389**
(0.170)
0.013 (0.207)
0.017
(0.214)
Dummy:
bank is listed
at stock
exchange
0.883***
(0.123)
0.700***
(0.125)
0.969***
(0.151)
0.667***
(0.157)
0.252 (0.295)
0.196
(0.297)
Dummy:
bank is a
foreign bank
0.060
(0.052)
0.101*
(0.053)
0.103
(0.066)
0.098
(0.069)
0.203 (0.132)
0.129
(0.132)
Effective tax
rate
0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Real gdp
growth
0.047***
(0.005)
0.040***
(0.006)
0.032
(0.021)
Term
structure of
interest rates
0.080***
(0.028)
0.118***
(0.034)
0.056
(0.065)
Herfindahl
Index
0.000 (0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Constant
0.565***
(0.079)
0.007 (0.120)
0.699***
(0.110)
0.074
(0.159)
0.923***
(0.221)
0.608**
(0.276)
Number of
observations
1639 1639 981 981 658 658
Dependent
variable: NIM
All years
Before the financial crisis:
19992006
During the financial crisis
20072009
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Bank-specific
factors
Bank- and
market-
specific
factors
Number of
banks
372 372 318 318 263 263
Wald-test
2(22) = 3251.
90
2(25) = 3420.
79
2(22) = 2183.
61
2(25) = 2274.
52
2(22) = 1392.
62
2(25) = 14
41
Hansen test
(p-value)
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
AB test AR(1)
(p-value)
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
AB test AR(2)
(p-value)
(0.987) (0.49) (0.94) (0.801) (0.657) (0.389)
The table reports results from GMM estimations of the effects of bank- and market-specific
characteristics on bank profitability. The dependent variable is the net interest margin NIM. For the
notation of the variables see Table 1. The full sample includes 1639 observations from 372 banks. The
period covers the years 1999 to 2009. Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure
following Arellano and Bover (1995). Robust standard errors are in brackets. Coefficients that are
significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are marked with ***, **, and *
respectively. The Hansen test is the test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model
estimation. AB test AR(1) and AR(2) refer to the ArellanoBond test that average autocovariance in
residuals of order 1 respectively of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation); p-values in brackets.
Full-size table
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Download as CSV
6. Conclusions
This paper has examined how bank-specific characteristics, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors
affect the profitability of 372 commercial banks in Switzerland over the period from 1999 to 2009. To
account for the impacts of the recent financial crisis, we separately considered the years before and
during the crisis, namely the period up to 2006, and the crisis years 2007, 2008 and 2009. To date, no
econometric study has examined the determinants of profitability for the Swiss banking market, which is
surprising given that Switzerland is one of the most important banking centers in the world. Similarly,
there exist very few papers that investigate the impact of the recent financial crisis on bank
performance.
We use a dynamic model specification that allows for profit persistence. Our results clearly show that
there exist large differences in profitability among the banks in our sample and that a significant amount
of this variation can be explained by the factors included in our analyses. In particular, bank profitability
is mainly explained by operational efficiency, the growth of total loans, funding costs and the business
model. Efficient banks are more profitable than banks that are less efficient. An above-average loan
volume growth affects bank profitability positively; higher funding costs result in a lower profitability.
The interest income share also has a significant impact on profitability. Banks that are heavily dependent
on interest income are less profitable than banks whose income is more diversified. We also find some
evidence that ownership is an important determinant of profitability. Furthermore, the separate
consideration of the time periods before and during the crises provides new insights with respect to the
underlying mechanisms that determine bank profitability. The results outlined in this paper provide
some evidence that the financial crisis did indeed have a significant impact on the Swiss banking industry
and on bank profitability in particular.
Overall, our results provide some interesting new insights into the mechanisms that determine the
profitability of commercial banks in Switzerland. Our findings are relevant for several reasons. First, our
estimation results confirm findings from former studies on bank profitability. Second, we consider a
larger set of bank- and market-specific determinants of bank profitability, which extends our knowledge
of bank profitability with respect to several important dimensions. These extensions let us generate
some new and interesting findings. Third, we consider the years from 1999 to 2009. Not only do we
provide evidence for a recent period, but these years were also characterized by some important
changes in the banking industry. In addition, by dividing the sample into pre-crisis and post-crisis
segments, we gain additional insights into the impacts of the financial crisis on financial institutions.
Finally, by using the system GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995), we apply an up-to-
date econometric technique that addresses the issue of endogeneity of regressors, which, in this type of
study, can lead to inconsistent estimates. Also, our dynamic model specification allows for the fact that
bank profits show a tendency to persist over time and tend to be serially correlated, reflecting
impediments to market competition, informational opacity, and sensitivity to regional and/or
macroeconomic shocks.
Even though our sample includes a large fraction of all commercial banks active in Switzerland and
considers the main bank profitability determinants as well as factors related to the institutional and
macroeconomic environment, it has certain limitations. Including additional aspects in our analyses,
such as the impact of mergers, would help us to understand even better the determinants of bank
profitability. In addition, it could be fruitful to integrate specific information on management and board
members, e.g. education, skill level, experience, independence, all of which are increasingly important
factors in understanding bank profitability. Some of these issues will be addressed in future work.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank participants of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the European Financial Management
Association in Milano, the 12th conference of the Swiss Society for Financial Market Research (SGF) in
Geneva in 2009 and the Brown Bag seminar at the Institute of Financial Services Zug, Urs Birchler and
Kevin Walsh for helpful suggestions, and the Lucerne University of Applied Sciences and Arts for their
financial support.
Appendix A. The Swiss banking market
The Swiss banking system is based on the concept of universal banking, i.e. all banks may offer all
banking services. As of 2009, there are 278 authorized banks and securities dealers in Switzerland,
ranging from the two big banks down to small banks serving the needs of a single community or a
few special clients. Swiss banks vary of the degree to which they use the option to engage in all financial
activities. Some banks really do offer universal services, while other institutions specialize either in
traditional banking or in asset management. In the official statistics maintained by the Swiss National
Bank, Swiss banks are classified into seven major groups: the (two) big banks, the cantonal banks, the
regional and savings banks, the Raiffeisen banks, the foreign-owned banks, the private bankers, and
other banks. To better understand our sample and subsequent empirical work, we provide a brief
description of each type below.
The two big banks, UBS AG and the Credit Suisse Group, are the largest and second largest Swiss
banks. Both banks have extensive branch networks throughout the country and most international
centers. We do not include the two big banks in our sample because they pursue all lines of financial
activities (private banking, institutional asset management, investment banking and commercial
banking), because a large share of their lending activities is abroad and because commercial banking is
not a predominant part of their revenues on group level.
Cantonal banks are state-owned, either entirely or partially, and the majority of a cantonal bank's capital
is owned by the sponsoring canton, which also guarantees the bank's liabilities. According to cantonal
law, the objective of a cantonal bank is to promote the canton's economy, although cantonal banks
must comply with commercial principles in their business activities. Collectively, the cantonal banks
account for around 30% of banking business in Switzerland and have a combined balance sheet total
that is greater than 300 billion Swiss francs. Formerly, there were at least one or two cantonal banks per
canton. Today, there are only 24 cantonal banks (in Switzerland's 26 cantons and half-cantons). Cantonal
banks vary both in size and in their business activities. They are engaged in all banking businesses, with
an emphasis on lending/deposit business, and they operate primarily in the market of their home
canton. Because these banks are active mainly in the traditional commercial banking business, we
include all 24 cantonal banks in our sample.
Regional and savings banks are typically small banks focusing on traditional banking, and their business
is often limited to very small geographical areas. We have included almost all Swiss regional and savings
banks in our sample.
Raiffeisen Switzerland, the third largest bank group in Switzerland, is comprised of 390 member banks,
most of which are located in rural areas, and each of which is run as a cooperative. Collectively, the 390
Raiffeisen banks control a network of 1154 branch offices, the largest such network in Switzerland, and
count 1.4 million Swiss citizens as members, hence co-owners, of the cooperative. As a group of banks
with the largest branch network in Switzerland, 390 Raiffeisen banks with totally 1154 branches
together form Raiffeisen Switzerland. Raiffeisen Switzerland coordinates the group's activities, creates
the conditions for the business activities of the local Raiffeisen banks and advises and supports them in
many issues. The bank group is organized as a cooperative and has positioned and established itself as
the third largest bank group in Switzerland. As one of Switzerland's leading retail banks, Raiffeisen is
mainly focusing on mortgage lending. Raiffeisen meanwhile counts 1.4 million Swiss citizens as members
of the cooperative and hence co-owners of their Raiffeisen bank. However, the Raiffeisen banks are still
legally independent small banks located and active mainly in rural areas. Due to their legally
independent status, our sample includes each of the Raiffeisen member banks individually.
Foreign banks are institutions operating under Swiss banking law, but whose capital is primarily foreign
controlled. Foreign control means that foreigners with qualified interests hold over half of the
company's votes. The national origin of these foreign-owned banks is predominantly European (over
50%) and Japanese (around 20%). These banks differ widely in size and activities. Some qualify as
universal banks while others focus on asset management. Our sample includes only those foreign-
owned banks that are active in the traditional banking activities. Our sample excludes foreign-owned
banks that are active only in asset management for private clients.
Private bankers are among the oldest banks in Switzerland. They are unincorporated firms, primarily
active in asset management for private clients. Private bankers are subject to unlimited subsidiary
liability with their personal assets. Because these private banks, which do not publicly offer to accept
savings deposits, are not active in the traditional banking field, and because they do not have to publish
data, we do not include them in our analysis.
The group, other banks, includes banks with various business objectives, such as institutes
specializing in the stock exchange, securities, and asset management. For our sample, only banks active
in traditional lending (mainly category 5.11 commercial banks, as defined by the Swiss National Bank)
are considered in our analyses.
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1
See also Athanasoglou et al. (2008) for further details.
2
As a robustness test, we alternatively measure bank size by total assets instead of the dummy variables
for the different size categories. The effect of total assets on the ROAA is negative and statistically
significant at the 10% level, which confirms our results from the dummy approach. Note that the
advantage of including the dummy variables for size is that we have obtained more information about
the impact of size on the return on bank profitability.