BRILL Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379

Aristotle on the Starting-Point

of Motion in the Soul
Myrna Gabbe
Phibsophy Department, University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 454619, USA
mgabbel @udayton. edu
Abstract
In Eudemian Ethics 8.2, Aristotle posits god as the starting-point of non-tational desite
(patticulatly fot the natutally fottunate), thought, and delibetation. The questions that
dominate the lltetature ate: To what does 'god' refer? Is it some divine-like entity in the
soul that ptoduces thoughts and desites ot is it Aristotle's ptime movet? And how does
god opetate as the statting-point of these activities? By ptoviding a catefiil teconsttuction
of the context in which god is evoked, I argue against the popular deflationaty teading
of'god', showing why Atistode's ptime movet must be the end of these natutal activities,
and how it serves as a final cause fot the tational and desitative patts of the soul. I contend
that EE 8.2 ptovides evidence against the traditional notion that god operates as a final
cause by dtawing natural potentialities to theit completion, and suggests instead that it
serves as a final cause by enteting into the explanation of natutes and natural activities as
theit ultimate end.
Keywords
Atistotle; god; arche; final causation; good fortune; luck; thinking; desite; noetic self-motion
In De Anima 3.5, Aristotle famously posits a productive intellect with
divine attributes. This immortal and eternal intellect is said to 'make all
things' (430a 12, 15) and be necessary for thinking (430a25).' It is unclear
what this intellect is - if it is, in fact, an intellect - and how it causes ratio-
nal activity, but the ambiguity of the chapter has inspired immense
" I should note that the Gteek, Kal tvei) xoxov oiov VOE, is ambiguous. The xoijxou
may tefet to eithet the ptoductive ot passive intellect and the subject of voe is not stated.
I take it to tead: 'without the ptoductive intellect, the passive intellect thinks nothing'.
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/13685284-12.341236
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 359
passion and imagination. It is therefore surprising that so little attention
has been given to Eudemian Ethics 8.2, wherein god is posited as the
starting-point {arche) for theoretical and practical thinking, as well as
for certain non-rational desires. The EE chapter is significant. It provides
us with an argument, different from those given in DA 3.5, for why a
divine arche is needed to complete the picture of human intellection; and,
because the arche's scope includes non-rational activities, it challenges
interpretations of ZM 3.5 that place the productive intellect squarely in the
human rational soul.
I shall not here defend the view that the god of EE is DA's productive
intellect, though there is no obvious reason to think otherwise. The focus
of this essay lies principally on 8. 2, since little has been done to analyze
rigorously the difficult arguments that led Aristotle to posit a divine arche
for human psychic activity. Interpretations of 'god' in this chapter fall
along the same lines as those of the productive intellect: some maintain
that it refers to Aristotle's prime mover, others that is a divine-like entity
in the soul. What is at stake, then, is the role that god plays in the cosmos,
and the level at which Aristotle pursues his analysis of psychic activity.
I argue that a careful reconstruction of the context in which god is
evoked demonstrates the implausibility of the popular deflationary reading
of'god' that sees Aristotle as positing a productive entity operating beneath
the level of conscious activity. What we are offered instead is an argument
for why god must be the end to natural activities like desiring and think-
ing, and how god serves as a final cause for the rational and desirative parts
of the soul. On this reading, EE 8.2 supports a robust interpretation of
god's influence in the natural world. Hence, I shall end the essay by situat-
ing the claims within Aristotle's larger teleological theory and highlight
their contribution.
Eudemian Ethics 8.2 inquires into the causes of good fortune
Aristotle's objective is to explain how it is that some people prosper
{fb jipxxeiv) though they are unable to reason well. That they are called
'fortunate' implies that they owe their success to luck. Nonetheless,
good fortune is commonly attributed to a quality possessed from birth
(1247a9-13): a quality conferred on some by nature, just as nature makes
some people blue-eyed, others black. The problem is that nature and luck
360. M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
cannot both be causes of a single phenomenon, since nature 'is the cause
of what occurs in the same way always or for the most part, whereas luck
is the opposite' (1247a31-3). Aristotle resolves the tension by disambigu-
ating our use of 'good fortune'. He shows us that one type is owed to
nature, the other to luck.
Aristotle explains that those who prosper by nature do so because they
act on impulses {hno xi opn.fi, 1247b29) issuing from correct desires:
'they desire what they ought and when they ought and as they ought'
(1247b24; 1248a6). Hence, the desires of the fortunate are as if engen-
dered by reason or practical wisdom. Aristotle contends that these indi-
viduals are called 'fortunate' because one is lucky when reasoning and
calculation are not causes for his success (1248a9-12). But properly speak-
ing, these individuals are neither lucky nor fortunate (1247a38-9). They
are well-endowed (e-cpufi, 1247a38); their 'good fortune accords with the
natural endowment of inclination and desire (TI exu^ia Kax' fbifo'iav
p^ec Kal jit&un.ia)' (1247b3 9-1248al). All of us, Aristotle explains,
desire naturally what is pleasant, and therefore our desires march towards
the good by nature (1247b20 -l). But, evidently, we can be mistaken about
what is genuinely pleasant and desirable, since what we perceive to be
pleasant and desirable can lead us away from the real good. The fortunate,
then, are well-endowed just because they desire correctly, without effort or
coherent thought, that which is good. For this reason, the naturally fortu-
nate are capable of repeated and continuous success.
The lucky do not prosper as the naturally fortunate do. Their success is
sporadic, at best. This type of good fortune does not result from impulse
and choice (1247b30); rather, it is achieved despite the impulses of the
individual. It may be that the individual wanted something other than
what he obtained; or it may be that he received a greater good than the one
he desired (1247b32-3). Whatever the case, the fortunate man's desires do
not explain his success.^ This type of fortune results accidently from one's
^' Fot reasons that are not cleat to me. Woods, in his ttanslation and commentaty, takes
the example of a man teceiving a different ot gteatet good than he desited to be a special
case of natutal good fottune. See M. Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics Books I, II and
VIII (Oxford, 1992), 38 and 169. The example is ptesented in the second patt of an
V KEvot. . . V ToUTOi clause (1247b30-33) and is designed to showcase the contrast
between the two types of good fottune distinguished in the ptevious sentence. The formet
cases (V KEVOI) exemplify natutal good fottune; the lattet (v Touxot) exemplify sheet
luck. In these lattet cases, because the fortunate man's desite is not fot the outcome
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 361
desires and intentions because it results from external factors beyond the
individual's control. There is, then, no explanatory connection between
the desire and the good outcome. That is why this type of luck occurs
infrequently.'
Aristotle reiterates his conclusion in the-final summarizing passage of
the chapter, but adds here that god is the cause of the naturally fortunate.
He writes (1248b3-7):''
It is cleat, then, that there ate two sorts of good fortune, the one divine (9Ea) - on
account of which it also seems that the fortunate man is successful because of god (i
Kal OKE EiJx'ux'l t 9EV Kaxop9oCv). This man is the one who is successful in
accordance with impulse (Kax xfiv opfifiv); the other is so contrary to impulse (napa
XTIV 6pnr|v); but both are non-rational (aXoyot). It is this one form of good fortune,
rather, that is continuous; the latter form is not continuous.
While there is no explicit mention of luck and nature in this passage, argu-
ably the two kinds of fortune divide on these lines. Good fortune resulting
'contrary to impulse' can be owed neither to the individual's desires nor.
his reason; hence, it remains for it to result sporadically from luck. Divine
fortune, by contrast, is 'in accordance with impulse', whose source is non-
rational. We can safely presume, then, that the impulse in question issues
from a naturally endowed desirative faculty, explaining, in turn, why this
divine fortune is continuous. The upshot is that nature and god are both
obtained, his luck is contrary to, or despite, his desire and impulse. It is not, then, a matter
of endowment.
' ' Aristotle's examples complicate his case since it is not always clear whether he would
characterize them as resulting from luck or nature. Particularly perplexing is his example of
dice-throwing since he appears to identify nature as the cause of successful throws, even
though doing so does not fit with his account of fortune by nature (1247a23). The natu-
rally fortunate are so because of right desires. Yet all dice-throwers desire the same thing,
whether they are lucky or not. This is to say, desire has no impact on the results of the
throw. Hence, I suspect that Aristotle was not describing the fortunate dice thrower at
1247a23, but making reference to the way people describe him. Fot if his success is really
owed to nature, then he should be so lucky always or for the most part. Aristotle denies this
possibility later at 1247b 15-18 for the dice thrower.
"" With some modifications, translations ofthe Eudemian Ethics are from Woods, Aristotle's
Eudemian Ethics (n. 1 above).
362 M. Gabbe/Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
causes of the same phenomenon: the rightly directed desires and impulses
of the fortunate few.^
We might think that god causes natural good fortune by giving certain
individuals a nature that causes them to desire what they ought, when they
ought, as they ought. But Aristotle argued earlier in the chapter that good
fortune cannot be caused by a god acting as steersman since that would
require it favoring an individual who lacks virtue and wisdom over 'the
best and the wisest' (1247a29). Nevertheless, ruling out a steersman god as
the source of this fortune does not preclude a transcendent god from oper-
ating as a remote cause of right desires. In order to understand god's role
in fortune by nature, we must turn to the argument presented just before
the summarizing remarks quoted above.
II
Aristotle posits god as the source of rightly directed desires in an argument
advanced in response to the following challenge. He writes (1248a 16-17):
[A] The question might be raised 'Is luck the cause of this very thing - of desiring
what one should and when one should?' Or will luck in that way be the cause of
everything?
Aristotle explains why luck would be the cause of everything in the follow-
ing lines (1248al8-22):
[B] For it will be the cause both of thinking and of deliberating; for a man who delib-
erates has not deliberated already before deliberating and deliberated about that -
there is some starting-point (arche). Nor did he think, after thinking already before
^' Cf. Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (Oxford, 1992), 73-5. Kenny takes Aristotle to
distinguish between four ways of being fortunate in EE 8.2: (i) God-given good nature that
engenders sound deliberation and virtuous action (1248al7); (ii) God-given good nature
that engenders flawed deliberation but successful outcome (1247b37); (iii) God-given
inspiration that precipitates successful outcome without deliberation; and (iv) bad desires
that lead to good outcomes due to lucky circumstances. Kenny insists that (iii) and (iv) are
the two ways of being fonunate under discussion in this last passe of the chapter at
1248b3j^The former is divine; these fortunate individuals have inspiration or 'an inner
oracle', like Socrates' daimn, that leads them to do the right thing. The latter is a matter of
sheer luck.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 363
thinking, and so on to infinity. Thetefote, nous is not the arche of thinking, not is
counsel the ZrfA of delibetation. So what else is thete save luck?
Since clearly Aristotle does not believe that thinking and deliberating are
owed to luck, he posits something else as their cause, god (1248a23-9):
[C] (i) Ot is thete some archheyon which thete is no othet {r\ eaxi xi pxii fi OK
oxiv .Kk\\ ^(), and this - because it is of such a sott - can have such an efFect? But
what is being sought is this: What is the arche of motion in the soul (xi r\ xf\ KtvpcEcoc
pXTi v XT\ xiruxi)? () It is now evident: just as god <is the arche of motion> in the
univetse, so is god <the arche of motion> in the soul (SfjXov 5ii Sanep v x X,cp
9eo, Kv KEVTi);'' (iii) for, in a sense, the divine element in us moves evetything
(KtvE yap Ttw Jtvxa x6 v TIHV GEOV); (iv) but the arche of teason is not teason but
something supetiot (Xoyov 5' pxil oi) Aoyo, Xh. TI KpExxov). (v) What then could
be supetiot to even knowledge and nous save god (xi ow v KpExxov Kal itioxT|nt\
e'Ti <ical vo> iJi\v 9EO)?
We might begin by asking what Aristotle means in [C] by 'the arche of
motion in the soul (TI XT KivT|oe(o p^Ti v xfi v^XT)'- ^^ he looking for
(a) the starting-point located in the soul or (b) the starting-point of motion,
namely the motion in the soul? If Aristotle intends (a), then a strictly tran-
scendental reading of'god' is ruled out; (b) is opened to the transcendental
and deflationary interpretation. The grammatical structure of the sentence
does not clearly indicate Aristotle's intention. Because ev XT V|/DXT '^ "o*^ "
the attributive position along with xfic Ktvrioeco, it could modify p^ii in
which case (a) would be correct. Nonetheless, it would have been awkward
for Aristotle to place it there. To make clear where v xfi V|/\)XT belongs, he
'*' Woods does not supply the vetb and predicate in (ii) ftom the ptevious line, but uses
instead the vetb from the next line: 'as it is a god that moves in the' whole univetse, so it
is in the soul'. I think that Woods' ttanslation obscutes the sttuctute of the atgument
by linking with the same vetb 'god' in (ii) and 'the divine element' in (iii). Note also that
in (ii) the OCT teads: Kav EKEVCO. I accept Spengel's emendation, teading Ksivri fot
EKev) since it most natutally tefets back to the soul. Cf F. Buddensiek, Die Theorie des
Glcks in Aristoteles'Eudemischer Ethik {Gttingen, 1999), 167 n. 38. Though Buddensiek
gets mote ot less the same sense out of the passage, he teads Jtv KEvep fot KV KEVQ). But
this tendeting does not avoid all ttoubles. His ttanslation is as follows: 'OfFensichdich ist
ein theos - wie im Ganzen - so auch fit jenes (d.h. die in Ftage stehenden Dinge in det
Seele) Ptinzip det Bewegung'. The awkwatdness lies with EKevcp since he takes it to tefet
to things in the soul.
364 M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
could have repeated either XT or f).^ That he did not suggests that he
thought it would become clear in the next line, where he specifies god as
the arche. Though Aristotle often refers to the parts of the soul as divine,
he does not call them gods.* An entity can be divine without thereby being
a god, so long as it has its source in one; for nothing is divine except in
relation to god. That, I suggest, is why line (iii) serves as an explanation of
and justification for (ii). On the assumption that the intellect is a divine
element in us that in a sense (TIC) moves everything, god is established as
the cause of the intellect and, thereby, its movements.'
There are a few scholars - notably, Frede, Caston, and Kenny - who
would agree that Aristotle here makes his transcendental god, the prime
mover, the arche of motion in the soul.' Frede and Caston do not demon-
strate the viability of reading 'god' in this way. Their discussion of 8. 2
is cursory, playing a merely supporting role to their analysis of DA 3.5.
Kenny, by contrast, provides a comprehensive account of the chapter.
Briefly, Kenny's view is that correct desires are the product of divine inspi-
ration, not natural endowment. Thus, god, in his view, operates as an
eflScient cause. He likens god's work to actual graces: 'the thoughts and
inarticulate desires that precede all deliberation and choice and are the
expression of the divine in us' ." I do not find this approach compelling:
(a) it denies the parallels between good fortune by nature and divine for-
tune; and (b) it makes god a steersman for those who do not employ
reason.'^ Yet my discussion of Kenny is confined to the notes because the
concern here is to show problematic the deflationary reading of' god' .
' ' I am grateful For the insight and advice oF Susan Prince, Fred Jenkins and Fred Miller
on this passage. Miller, it must be noted, disagrees with Prince, Jenkins, and myselF, insist-
ing that V xfi ifuxu niodifies pxi in line (i).
*' CF NE 1153b25-32; 1177al6, b26-8.
'*' I take (iii) to be an observation on the role the intellect plays in human liFe and activity;
For it makes possible cities, political structures, agriculture, crafts, and, more generally,
culture. The claim is qualified with nmc because the intellect is not the source oFall human
actions and processes.
"" M. Frede, 'La thorie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' in R. Dherbey and G. Viano
(eds.). Corps et me: Sur le De Anima d'Aristote (Paris, 1996), yjl-'iV) at 387-8; V. Caston,
'Aristotle's Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal', Phronesis 44 (1999), 199-227 at 222-3;
and Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 56-81 and 145-66.
' " Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above) 79.
'^' Regarding (a), see Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life 73-5, with note 5 above. As For
(b), Kenny does not worry that making god an efficient cause oF correct desires conflicts
M. Gabbe/Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 365
It would seem that more often than not interpreters take Aristotle as
seeking a starting-point located in the soul and assume it to be the referent
of' god' in (ii) and (iii), as well as that of' the divine element in us' in (iii).
This, at any rate, is the line pursued by White, Woods, van der Eijk,
Shields, and Wedin. " White equates 'god' with 'a kind of insight or intu-
ition' possessed by the naturally fortunate regarding what they ought to
do.'" Woods and van der Eijk, by contrast, take 'god' to be the divine ele-
ment in us that moves everything as the source of all psychic phenomena.'^
Woods is more or less silent on what he takes this divine element to be, but
van der Eijk describes it as a 'psycho-physiological mechanism', which, in
addition to producing rational activity, 'turns the pn.a into the right
direction'.'^ Evidently, this interpretation makes a single entity in the soul
responsible for both rational and non-rational activity. This leaves us to
wonder whether non-rational impulses have their source in the rational
soul or, contrariwise, the activities of the rational soul stem ultimately
from a mechanism that belongs most properly to the appetitive soul. Yet
. both Shields and Wedin ignore the role this entity plays as cause of the
fortunate man's desires. Shields suggests that 'the divine element in us'
refers to the object of thought, which, in his view, is the formal cause of
with Atistotle's insistence that god would not favot the unteasoning ovet the best and the
brightest. He claims that because god's contribution 'is ptiot to any virtue ot wisdom
acquired by the individual', it cannot favot the one over the othet. Kenny, Aristotle on the
Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 80. This explanation is thotoughly unsatisfactoty. If god is the
efficient of cause of desites fot the lucky, then it favots those who do not use theit capacity
fot teason. It does not mattet that the desires manifest befte the individual might have
exercised teason.
'^' Even Ftede, who insists that 'god' in [C] tefets to the ptime movet, thinks that Atistotle
hete places god in the soul. God, he insists, is in the soul as a ptinciple of out thoughts,
albeit in a metaphotical way. Ftede atgues that to teally think something is to understand
it in telation to god, the fitst ptinciple of all things and most intelligible of objects. Thus,
god becomes a ptinciple of out thinking at the very moment we come to understand
god as the cause of all. M. Ftede, 'La thotie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' (n. 10
above), 387-90.
'" S. White, 'Natutal Vittue and Perfect Vittue in Atistotle', Proceedings of The Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Phibsophy S (1994), 133-68 at 151.
'^' M. Woods, Aristotle Eudemian Ethics (n. 2 above), 171; P. J. van det Eijk, 'Divine
Movement and Human Natute in Eudemian Ethics 8, 2', Hermes 117 (1989), 24-42 at 31.
"' P. J. van det Eijk, 'Divine Movement and Human Natute' (n. 15 above), 32.
366 M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
noetic activity.'^ Wedin, by contrast, takes it to be the cause ofthe objects
of thought and so links the god of EE to DA's productive nous. He argues
that because the objects of thought need to be produced before they
can bring about an actual thought, the productive nous must serve this
function." The productive nous, he explains, 'retrieves...from receptive
mind a given object of thought and so renders it actual' ."
There is prima facie evidence for the deflationary reading of' god' in the
passage following [C]. After concluding that god is the starting-point of
motion in the soul, Aristotle writes (1248a29-b3):^
[D] And for that reason, as I was saying earlier, they are called fortunate who succeed
in what they initiate though they lack reason. And it is of no use for them to deliber-
ate; for they have such an arche (EXOUOI yap pxriv xoiaxrjv) as is superior to nous
and deliberation (others have reason but do not have this nor do they have divine
inspiration) (o xv Ayov xovxo ' OK 'xovai ov' v9o\jaiaa|iv), but cannot
do this; for though irrational they succeed... For the arche seems to be stronger when
reason is disengaged, just as blind people remember better, when released from con-
cern with visible things, because the remembering element is stronger.
O n the two occasions in [D] wherein Aristotle mentions an arche respon-
sible for the success of the fortunate, that starting-point is in the individ-
ual. The first instance is found in lines 1248a32-3: the fortunate by nature,
Aristotle writes, 'have such an arche as is superior to nous and deliberation
(others have reason but do not have this nor do they have divine inspira-
tion)'. Clearly, for Aristotle, people bear relations to god, the necessary
being upon which all depends. We do not have or possess such a god.^'
Hence, the arche here cannot refer to a transcendent being. The passage
ends with the assertion that 'the arche seems to be stronger when reason is
disengaged' (1248a40-bl), so illustrating the effect that these two facul-
ties, or aspects ofthe soul, have on one another. Thus, again, arche refers
to something in the soul. Therefore, because the arche in [D] is described
in similar terms as that described in [C] in [C], the arche is superior to
"' C. Shields, 'Mind and Motion in Aristode' in M. L. Gill and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Self-
Motionfrom Newton to Aristotle (Princeton, 1994), 117-33 at 132.
'"' M. Wedin, 'Aristotle on the Mind's Self-Motion' in M. L. Gill and J. G. Lennox (eds.),
Self-Motion from Newton to Aristotle (Princeton, 1994), 81-116 at 102-16.
''" M.^edin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle {New Hiven, 1988), 173.
^"^ I have left out lines 1248a34-40 because the text is too corrupt to make good sense of.
^" Pace Frede, 'La thorie aristotlicienne de l'intellect agent' (n. 10 above), 383-90.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 367
knowledge and nous; in [D], it is superior to nous and deliberation - it is
natural to assume that the arche of [C] is likewise in the soul.
Yet if we reject the deflationary reading, we can expect Aristotle to rec-
ognize two distinct archai: the well-endowed desirative faculty of the natu-
rally fortunate and god. Notice that the first line of [D] indicates that
Aristotle is returning to an earlier discussion, one presumably entertained
before the interlude on the starting-point of motion in the soul: 'And
for that reason, as I was saying earlier, they are called fortunate who
succeed in what they initiate though they lack reason' (1248a29-31).
Before the interlude, Aristotle's concern was to establish right desires as
the source for natural good fortune and distinguish this type of fortune
from sheer luck. Assuming, then, that Aristotle is following up on an
earlier thread, it is reasonable to hold that he shifts focus between [C] and
[D] - that he moves from the ultimate arche of motion in the soul to the
proximate arche of the fortunate individual's success: namely, her rightly
directed desirative faculty.
Moreover, a tension between [C] and [D] arises on the supposition
(required by the deflationary reading) that arche has the same referent in
both passages. On the deflationary reading, [C] indicates that all possess
an archi in the soul responsible for psychic phenomena like thinking and
deliberating. [D], by contrast, suggests that some people namely, those
with good powers of reasoning lack this arche. Clearly, those with reason
cannot fail to have the very arche that stands at its source.^^ Hence, rather
than supporting the deflationary reading of' god' , [D] serves to highlight a
difficulty of this view: how something possessed by all serves a very distinct
function in the naturally fortunate few.
Il l
Careful consideration of how god averts the regress in [B] will allow us to
assess better the two interpretations (the transcendental and deflationary
readings of 'god') and help us to understand the role that god plays as the
^^' Note that this tension arises on Frede's account as well insofar as he too insists that god,
Aristotle's prime mover, is in the soul. Frede's view is that god is in the soul as the ultimate
intelligible (i.e. that in relation to which all else must be understood) at the moment one is
capable of contemplation.
368 M. Gabbe /Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
starting-point of motion in the soul. Again, the regress is prompted by the
question (1248a 16-17):
[A] 'Is luck the cause of this vety thing - of desiring what one should and when one
should?' Ot will luck in that way be the cause of everything?
This question comes at the heels of the conclusion that some types of for-
tune are caused by nature, others by luck (1248a 12-16). Thus, [A] is not
merely asking whether rightly directed desires are owed to luck - that has
been ruled out - but whether their cause, natural endowment, is owed to
luck. The regress, in turn, explains why natural endowment is an incom-
plete explanation for rightly directed desires - that is, it explains why luck
remains a concern (1248a 18-22):
[B] Fot it will be the cause both of thinking and of delibetating; for a man who delib-
etates has not delibetated alteady before delibetating and deliberated about that -
thete is some statting-point. Not did he think, aftet thinking alteady befte thinking,
and so on to infinity. Thetefote, nous is not the statting-point of thinking, not is
counsel the starting-point of delibetation. So what else is thete save luck?
The deflationary reading takes the regress to ensue on the assumption that
mental acts are caused by antecedent mental acts of the same type. There
are two versions of the argument. On one, the regress demands an expla-
nation for the first thought or desire: a thought, it is reasoned, cannot
always be caused by a prior thought, a desire always by a prior desire; in a
human being, there has to be a first psychic event.^^ On the other, the
regress demands an explanation for the production of each discrete
" ' Both Shields and Wedin atticulate some vetsion of this atgument. Shields, 'Mind and
Motion' (n. 17 above), 126, wtites: 'If every mental event, e.g., evety instance of thinking,
is caused by anothet event ofthat same type, then the causal ancestry of my thinking/> at
t^ includes my having had some othet thought q at i_,, and so on into infinity'. Wedin's
articulation of the atgument sttaddles both vetsions. Cleatly, Wedin takes the tegtess to
highlight the need fpr an explanation of discrete thoughts: 'The explanation of an ability
can hardly consist in citing a same-level exetcise of the ability. The pXT of thought can be
the cause of acts of thinking, in a theotetically satisfying way, only if the causation opetates
at a difFetent level ftom the combined ot ptopositional thoughts it explains' ('Atistotle on
the Mind's Self-Motion', n. 18 above, 100). Yet, part of the teason why it is 'theotetically
unsatisfying' tO' explain a thought by a preceding thought is because it cannot always
happen that a thought is pteceded by a thought {ib. 98).
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 369
thought. We do not. White explains, 'think whether to think before we
think. ..something must initiate these processes'.^"* But both interpreta-
tions take the regress to demonstrate the necessity of a mechanism or sub-
faculty operating beneath the level of actual psychic activity, on the ground
that the occurrence of a thought cannot be explained either by prior men-
tal events or luck.^'
Wedin and Shields bring this regress to bear on the issue of noetic self-
motion, reasoning that thoughts could not be subject to the will were they
produced by luck or antecedent thoughts. In their view, the autonomy of
the intellect requires thoughts to be produced by a self-moving faculty. By
inference from animal self-motion animals can move themselves because
one part is active and the other passive ^^ they infer that the intellect must
have one part responsible for producing thoughts, another for receiving
thoughts. Hence, insofar as the regress reveals the arche of thinking and
deliberating, on their view, it illuminates the agent of intellection and
source of noetic autonomy. Thus, Wedin and Shields use the regress to
provide an account of the causal story of each occurrent thought."
"' White, 'Natural Virtue' (n. 14 above), 149. See also Woods, Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics
(n. 2 above), 170.
"' CF Kenny, Aristotle on the Perfect Life (n. 5 above), 7.1-3, who limits the regress to the
sphere oF action. According to Kenny, the argument runs as Follows. IF luck is the cause oF
correct desires that precipitate correct action without reason, then it will also be the cause
oF deliberation preceding correct action because deliberation has its source in non-rational
desire. ThereFore, since luck cannot be the cause oF all deliberations, god is its source.
Regarding Kenny's argument, we must ask whether all deliberations preceded by a non-
rational desire For some particular good thing or whether only the deliberations and actions
oFthe Fortunate so preceded. Arguably, those who are not naturally Fortunate deliberate in
order to determine what the appropriate thing to desire and do is. Perhaps Kenny has
in mind that all deliberations have their staning-point in some pre-rational desire For the
good. Indeed, Aristode says as much at 1247b 18-21. But it still does not Follow that iF
the non-rational desires oF the Fortunate are owed to luck, then so too is the non-rational
desire For the good that precipitates ordinary acts oF deliberation about what precise end
and course oF action is genuinely good. (Both can be understand as means to some more
general good.) They are different types oF non-rational desire: the one For a particular good,
the other For the good in general. Thus, a non-rational desire For a particular good can be
owed to luck without entailing that all non-rational desires are owed to luck. It is better,
I think, to take the regress as extending Aristotle's concerning about luck beyond the sphere
oF desire and action.
^''^ Physics 8.4, 2553Ln-20.
"' For a compelling argument against Wedin' s conception oF noetic-autonomy, see
370 M. Gabbe /Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
To b clear, 'noetic autonomy' and 'noetic self-motion' are not expres-
sions that Aristotle uses. The license to use them comes principally from
two remarks found in the De Anima. At 4l7a27-8, Aristotle tells us that a
person with knowledge is one who 'is able to contemplate, if he wished
(o-uA.T|Gelc Swat Bepev)'. Later at A\l\)TiA, he asserts that 'thinking
is up to us whenever we wish' (vofioat ^v in' ax^, 7txav ouA,Tixai)
because 'the universal is somehow in the soul'. Both remarks describe a
person possessed of knowledge. One has knowledge when he can contem-
plate or apply what he knows, if he so desires. Conversely, if he desires to
employ some bit of knowledge but cannot, he likely does not have the
knowledge he thought himself to possess. In neither remark is it suggested
that the will is necessary for thinking being up to us. For all that Aristotle
says, one could have thoughts against one's wish that were nonetheless up
to the individual. This would happen if she wished to avoid some issue,
but could not keep herself from thinking or deliberating about it. There is
nothing here to indicate that Aristotle envisions the mind as a self-mover
capable of initiating each thought by its own resources.
I will say more about Wedin and Shield's conception of noetic autom-
ony in the next section, after we look at the interpretive problems encoun-
tered by the deflationary reading. We can begin with passage [B], though
the difficulties start in [A]. According to the deflationary reading, the
regress is designed to show that thoughts and desires have their source
beneath the level of conscious psychic activity. On this interpretive
line, the regress sets up an argument by elimination, first by introducing a
problem - it shows that there must be a source for our thoughts and delib-
erations - ; next by offering a solution that is to be rejected in favor of a
better alternative. Hence, the argument will not be convincing unless the
alternatives are exhaustive. Read in this way, passage [B] provides two
alternatives that are to be rejected in favor of a divine element in the soul:
mental acts are caused either by prior mental acts of the same type or by
luck. But same-type causation and luck are not the only plausible alterna-
tives to what Wedin dubs 'levels-causation' - the theory that something
beneath the level of conscious psychic activity brings the thought or desire
to actuality. It is well known that Aristotle postulates perception as the
K. Corcilius, 'How ate Episodes of Thought Iniriated accotding to Aristotle?' in G. van Riel
and P. Desttee (eds.). Ancient Perspectives on Aristotle's De Anima (Leuven, 2009), 1-15.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 371
Starting-point of intellection and thought as a cause of desire.^* Moreover,
in our EE chapter we get a picture whereby non-rational desires initiate
deliberative processes, which, though faulty, serve to countenance the
original good desire that inspired it (1247b28-37). Aristotle's view, then,
is that mental acts are sometimes caused by mental acts of another type.
This reading ofthe regress is tied to a particular interpretation of [A]
one that prompts the reader to consider what in the individual (as opposed
to what cosmically) lies at the source of natural endowment. But why Aris-
totle would entertain luck as an internal source for natural endowment is,
on this view, a mystery. Prior to [A], Aristotle established natural endow-
ment as a cause for rightly directed desires because the fortunate individ-
ual, whose luck is owed to correct desires, consistently achieves success.
Sheer luck was ruled out as the cause for his success on the ground that it
cannot explain things that happen with regularity. Therefore, by passage
[A] it had been determined that luck cannot cause natural endowment.
Hence, no compelling reason can be given for the deflationary interpreta-
tion ofthe question.
The difficulty that the deflationary approach has in making sense of pas-
sages [A] and [B] is symptomatic of more fundamental problems pertain-
ing to its treatment of 'god' as a mechanism or sub-faculty in the soul
superior to reason and knowledge, and 'beyond which there is no other'
(1248a23). For the implication is that this entity can operate indepen-
dently of other faculties and dispositions. This idea is expressed unambigu-
ously by Wedin, who uses EE 8.2 to support his vision ofthe intellect as a
self-moving faculty. Nonetheless, the autonomy of 'god' is a feature of all
versions of the deflationary approach, since they share in common the
notion that there must be an entity in the soul responsible for psychic
phenomena that would otherwise be unexplained: naturally correct desires
and first thoughts. That is why, on their view, the entity is described as
divine: it produces desires and thoughts as if inspired. Yet there is no rea-
son to suppose that natural endowment would be left unexplained without
a divine entity at work in the soul.
In the DA, Aristotle tells us that the content of our desire is the product
of thought and imagination insofar as these faculties apprehend what is
good and how things appear, respectively {DA 3.10, 433bl2). Yet these
See APo2.\^, Meta. l.l,andMM. 12.7, 1072a29-30.
372 M. Gabbe /Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
faculties alone do not account for what we take to be desirable; for how
things appear to the imagination is determined by the capacities and dis-
positions of the soul in virtue of which character is ascribed {EE 2.2,
1220b7-20). As Aristotle explains in the EE, all of us are susceptible to
affections - emotional responses to objects or state of affairs that give rise
to pain and pleasure (1220bl2-l4). Yet how we experience an affection -
whether we are insensitive to it or quick to feel it pertains to the particu-
lar capacities and dispositions of our soul (1220b7-10). Thus, our character
traits play a big role in determining what we desire, how we desire (i.e.,
with ferocity or reservation), and when we desire some object or end
(under appropriate or inappropriate circumstances). The deflationary read-
ing, however, ignores this earlier account of desire by assuming that were
there no arche in the soul to explain correct desires, they would be the
product of luck. Said differently, it assumes that natural endowment can-
not be explained without appeal to some divine-like entity in the soul. But
there is no reason to think that consistently correct desires cannot be
explained under the theory just described. All of us are born with natural
inclinations that, as we develop, incline us toward particular kinds of plea-
sures and pains.^' We ought to presume, then, that the fortunate were
born with natural inclinations that gave rise to capacities or dispositions
(in other words, character traits) that produce right desires.
The problem, then, with the deflationary account is not simply that it
posits an unnecessary mechanism in the soul. The problem is that its way
of understanding the production of desire runs counter to Aristotle's holis-
tic account given earlier in the EE. No single faculty, or entity therein, is
made responsible for whether we take something to be pleasant and desir-
able. How we respond to an object, person, or state of afFairs is a matter of
numerous faculties, capacities, and dispositions working in tandem. More-
over, to posit an entity that can be solely responsible for desires or thoughts
leaves its powers unexplained. If it can operate independently of these
other faculties, or states of the soul, then what accounts for its ability to
produce correct desires? Not character or knowledge. It is a deus ex machina
that complicates the puzzle without solving it.
See EE 1222a36-bl as well as EN 1109al0-16, bl-4.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 373
IV
If the assumption leading interpreters astray is that the luck in [A] pertains
to the production of correct desires, then it would seem that their
problems can be avoided if luck is understood to regard the possession of
natural endowment. On this approach, the question is: Is it a matter of
luck that some are born naturally endowed? In other words, is it a matter
of luck that some are so fortunate as to have natures leading them towards
the good? The challenge will be to explain the force of the regress, since it
is natural to read [B] as a comment on how thoughts and desires are engen-
dered. But if the proposed reading of [A] is correct, then the regress must
show that the directedness of our thoughts and deliberations towards the
good would be a matter of luck, were there no god.
Suppose that the regress emphasizes, not the production of thoughts,
but the character and content of our thoughts: how we think what we
think. Understood in this way, the regress reminds us that we do not think
about having thought T'prior to thinking 7"any more than we deliberate
about what and how we are going to deliberate before we deliberate. On
this interpretation, what is revealed is something exceedingly peculiar about
human intellection: individual instances of thought are not intentionally
caused. We do not know what thought we are going to think next, until
we actually think it. So from our perspective, they simply occur to us.
The insight articulated through this interpretation of the regress is,
I believe, astute. Moreover, it sheds light on the concern that motivates
Shield and Wedin's theory of noetic self-motion. Shield and Wedin worry
that if thinking were not subject to the \yill, we would be removed from
our thoughts, watching them, in Shields' words, like a 'passive spectator'.'"
The dispositional knowledge in our possession would vie with each other
for consciousness and our minds, to quote Shields again, would be 'like
dammed bodies of water that flow into motion as soon as the barriers are
removed'.^' The regress, however, reveals how little the will can explain
actual episodes of thinking and reminds us of how frustrating theoretical,
and practical deliberation can be. Shields may be right that if 'one knows
'"' Shields, 'Mind and Motion' (n. 17 above), 122. Wedin ('Atistode and the Mind's Self-
Motion', n. 18 above, 87), makes a similat tematk, noting that if the intellect wete capable
of self-motion, thinking would be 'a putely passive affait'.
3" Shields, 'Mind and Motion' (n. 17 above), 121.
374 M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
the paradox generated by the Russell set, one can call it forth to conscious-
ness at wiir.'^ We might even will ourselves to think about Aristotle's eth-
ics and, in that sense, think when we want (4l7a24). But we do not will
the precise thoughts that comprise an extended episode of theoretical or
practical thinking. Indeed, intellectual and practical progress would be
impossible were willing our thoughts a requirement for us to think auton-
omously. What we do is rather like what Shields denies to be the case. We
sit down with a goal in mind - say, to solve a puzzle; we make the condi-
tions right for thinking, in part, by obstructing cognitive paths that would
lead us away from our goal; and then we hope that we will discover the
cause of the problem to which we set our minds. Yet what we wish to dis-
cover does not go very far to explain the actual thoughts we think. It does
not explain why we hit upon a correct thought or line of reasoning, or why
we follow one that leads us astray. And it certainly does not explain sudden,
unexpected monients of clarity and genius. Hence, the concerns of Shields
and Wedin are unfounded. Though what we think, when we think, is not
determined by the will, we are hardly passive spectators to our thoughts.^^
Yet even if our will does not dictate our thoughts, they tend to display
logical order and directedness. Aristotle makes this observation in the
De Anima: "Thinking,' he writes, 'consists of thoughts... [that] have a
serial unity, like that of number, not a unity like that of magnitude'
(407a7-9). Successive thoughts are unified, and thereby coherent only
insofar as they manifest order and directness towards some conclusion,
some truth. If our thoughts did not manifest unity, then a principal human
good, understanding, would be out of our reach. What the regress shows,
then, is that this unity requires an explanation, since we do not actively
choose, direct, or order the discrete thoughts we think. God, it would
seem, enters into the explanation of their unity. The question becomes
how god explains the unity of thinking.
^^' Shields, 'Mind and Motion' (n. 17 above), 117.
"' Indeed, it is hard to understand how Sheilds and Wedin thought interjecting the will
into this picture solves the 'passive spectator' problem. IFthe active and passive parts oFthe
intellect were sub-Faculties operating beneath the level oF conscious thought, then actual
thoughts would still take us by surprise and, by Wedin and Shield's assessment, make us
passive spectators to our thoughts. To avoid the problem, the active part oFthe mind would
have to be aware oFthe will and capable oF making decisions. But in this case, the intellect
would have a mind. That it cannot, tells us that there is something wrong with a theory oF
noetic selF-motion modeled after that oF an animal. The animal moves because its active
part, its soul, has awareness oFits own desires and surroundings.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 375
We can rule out the idea that god plants thoughts into our head as an
efficient cause. Supposing god to be a proximate cause of our thoughts
ignores the role that the rational faculty must play in determining the
content of our reflections and in 'producing unified thoughts. Though
Aristotle does not make clear how precisely he envisions the faculty to
operate, we ought to suppose that what we think is a feature of what we
know and our skills in reasoning - our ability to miake sound inferences,
good judgments, and to systematize our beliefs. Clearly, a child's reflec-
tions are different from an adult's. One can neither reflect on a subject
about which one knows nothing, nor acquire and contemplate knowledge
without skills in reasoning. Moreover, if god were the proximate cause of
our thoughts, it would also be the proximate cause of the fortunate indi-
viduals' desires. Yet this story is irnplausible since god would not only
replace natural endowment as the proximate cause of correct desires, but
favor the unreasoning over the best and the wisest (1247a29).
It is better to suppose that god is the cause of thoughts and desires inso-
far as it explains the nature of the desirative and rational faculties: namely,
why it is that these faculties have by their very nature the capacities neces-
sary to benefit their possessor and lead the individual to some real good.
Indeed, this way of understanding god's role provides us with a means to
understand the concern that motivates the question in [A]: Could it be
that luck is the cause of natural endowment? On this interpretation, the
question in [A] and regress in [B] are prompted on the assumption that
god does not enter into the explanation of thoughts and desires. For, short
of evolutionary theory, it would be a matter of luck that our faculties ben-
efit us were god not a part of their causal story. That it is not by luck that
we are by our nature capable of achieving success, virtue, knowledge, and
eudaimonia is owed to that fact that god is the ultimate arche of the natu-
ral world. The fortunate individual may not have virtue, but what encour-
ages and enables people to seek virtue is part of the same capacity
responsible for naturally correct desires the natural inclination all of us
have to pursue what we take to be good. This desire belongs naturally to all
humans because god is a final cause of our natures.
The proposed reading of EE 8.2 supports the contentious view that
god's teleological influence extends to all creatures and natural entities
exhibiting goal directed behavior. Adherents to this robust view of god's
376 M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
involvement usually see god as driving natural potentialities to their real-
ization as an object of love. Take, for instance, Kahn's seminal paper, 'The
Prime Mover and Teleology'. The argument there is that god 'serves as a
kind of metaphysical magnet drawing all natural potencies on to their
realization in act and to the acquisition of their specific form'.'"* Kahn's
approach to Aristotle's teleology was not new. Joachim, for example, had
earlier written that all things in the universe are 'inspired by love of God,
as striving, so far as in them lies, to attain God; i.e. to imitate in their
activities that perfect and eternal life'.'^ More recently, Sedley asserts: 'Just
as every heavenly sphere is motivated by love for its mover, and through
that mover ultimately by love ofthe prime mover, so too sublunary things
are motivated by love for the prime mover, even if the motivation is
increasingly remote as one travels down the natural hierarchy'."' In these '
three representative accounts, natural and celestial entities need some kind
of motivation or inspiration in order to complete their realization. It must
be emphasized, however, that no concern is shown in these accounts to
explain why things have the natures they do. Indeed, Kahn goes so far
as to say that god plays no role in the determination of natures beyond,
perhaps, the outermost sphere.'^
Yet there is no hint in our EE passages that god's role is to complete
natures we possess from birth in some yet unrealized form. Not only is the
language of imitation and love absent from the discussion, but a cosmic
magnet cannot answer the question in [A]. If god's role is to draw out
potentialities, luck will remain the only explanation as to why the naturally
fortunate, as well as the rest us of us, have faculties that enable the indi-
vidual to obtain what is good.
Still, the significance of our EE's passages would be limited, were it an
irnmature work. There is, however, indication that his discussion here con-
forms to his conception of god articulated elsewhere in the corpus. This is
not the place to provide a repudiation of the 'cosmic magnet' view of
god and a defense of the view implied in the EE. But I would like to
^'" Charles Kahn, 'The Place of the Prime Mover in Aristode's Teleology' in A. Gotthelf
{ta.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things [VmshuT^, 1985), 183-205 at 184.
"' Harold Joachim, On Coming-to-be and Passing-Away {Oxford, 1922), 256.
^''' David Sedley, 'Metaphysics Lambda 10' in M. Frede and D. Charles (eds.), Aristotle's
Metaphysics Lambda. Symposium Aristotelicum (Oxford, 2000), 327-50 at 333.
"' Kahn, 'The Place ofthe Prime Mover' (n. 34 above), 186.
M. Gabbe/Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 377
end by reviewing two familiar passages - De Anima II 4, 4l5a22-b7, and
Metaphysics 12.10, 1075al 1-25 - that, on inspection, nicely align with the
vision of god we get in the EE.
In discussing the nutritive soul, Aristotle famously asserts that plants
and animals reproduce 'in order that they may share in the eternal and
divine as far as they can' (4l5a29). That is why, Aristotle continues, 'all
things strive for this and it is for the sake of this that they do what they do
according to nature' (4l5bl-2). On the face of it, it may seem that what is
crucial here is the striving for reproduction and, thereby, the divine. Thus,
it may seem that god's role as the object of desire is to drive the nutritive
soul to reproduce and fulfill its realization. But this way of reading the pas-
sage ignores its context. And the context is key here because it reveals what
god is brought into explain.
The passage in question appears very early on in Aristotle's discussion of
the nutritive soul, where his concern is simply to articulate its powers.
What is clear is that this part of the soul is possessed by all plants and ani-
mals and, therefore, must possess the powers necessary for life. These, we
are told, are the use of food and reproduction (4l5b26). Aristotle does not
explain why he thinks the nutritive soul processes food for sustenance and
growth because, presumably, he thinks it is evident that these functions are
necessary for the life of plants and animals. That his argument focuses on
reproduction he argues first that reproduction is basic to living things
('its functions are reproduction and the use of food, because for living
things the most natural of all functions... is the production of another like
itself: 415a25-8) before explaining why it is so shows that it is not obvi-
ous why it should be among the nutritive soul's function. Moreover,
reproduction seems to be the highest end of most plants and animals, not
just one end among many, insofar as 'it is for the sake of this that they do
what they do according to nature' (415b 1-2). Again, it is not clear why
reproduction should be the highest end of most living things as opposed
to, say, comfort, longevity, or pleasure. After all, animals take great risks to
secure mates; they suffer significant pains in the birthing process; and, in
many cases, they do not partake in and enjoy the responsibility that attends
the care for one's young.
What Aristotle must do in order to explain why reproduction belongs
to the nutritive soul is show that it is a real good for the individual. This he
does by appeal to god. Reproduction, he explains, is in the highest interest
of natural organisms (other than humans) because it is the only way for
378 M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379
them to share in the divine, to participate in divine activity. God, then,
does not explain how natural potentialities come to completion, but why
living things have the natures that they do.
Metaphysics 12.10 sets into context the evocation of god in DA 2.4
and EE 8.2 by situating living things - in particular, their activities and
natures within a hierarchical universe whose order and goodness is owed
to god. That there is order in the universe is evidenced by the interconnec-
tion of all things. 'All things,' Aristotle writes, 'are ordered together some-
how, even fishes, birds and plants,' things that may not appear to be
connected, 'but not in the same way. For it is not such that one thing has
no relation to another. There is some connection' (1075al5-6). Presum-
ably, Aristotle recognizes horizontal or symbiotic relations between enti-
ties within the celestial and sublunary realms, as well as hierarchical
relations both within and between the realms.'*
This interconnection establishes the common good: the good that
belongs to the universe taken as a whole. The order is the cause of its good-
ness, but is not in itself good. Its order is good because it is the source for
the cosmos' eternality and unity: attributes that also belong to god. Fur-
thermore, the order expresses rationality because it depends on the perfec-
tion of those at the top of the hierarchy, the celestial beings. The universe,
Aristotle writes, is 'like a household, where it is least possible for the free
men to do what they chance, all or most of what they do is ordered, while
slaves and beasts do little that contributes to the common <good> and
mostly what they chance' (1075al9-22). But though certain beings con-
tribute more to the common good than others, all things make a contribu-
tion as far as their natures allow - even to the extent that all in the sublunary
realm must eventually dissolve into their elements (1075a23-4).
What this chapter brings into focus is how the fulfillment of one's
nature is beneficial to the possessor. The story is more profound than at
first it may appear. It is not simply that reproduction or contemplation is
beneficial to us because it allows us, in some abstract or metaphorical way,
to participate in divine activity and become immortal. Our natures are
beneficial to us because they allow us to perpetuate and preserve some-
thing that is truly good: the universe and its beautiful order. Thus, even if
one cannot live forever, or if one's life is insignificant next to a human or
^^ Fot the atgument that Atistotle's teleology is centered on man, see David Sedley, 'Is
Atistotle's Teleology Anthtopocenttic?', Phronesis 36 (1991), 179-96.
M. Gabbe / Phronesis 57 (2012) 358-379 379
celestial being's, there is some purpose to, and goodness in, one's life and
death. But this would not be, were it not for god. Our natures allow us to
contribute to the common good only insofar they are all directed to this
single end (1075al8-9): 'For such a principle,' i.e. the common good, 'is
the nature of each of them' (1075a22-3).
Once again, there is no mention of desire or inspiration in this chapter;
rather, the household analogy implies that the common good is estab-
lished and sustained by activities that are 'ordered' by god. God appears,
then, to be a final cause the ultimate end that explains the character of
inherent final causes without being a catalyst for fulfillment. Inherent
final causes have their end ultimately in god, insofar as the fulfillment of a
creature's nature allows it to participate in the divine.
That god is responsible for the character of natures is exemplified in the
case of natural good fortune. In the final chapter of the , Aristotle urges
us to judge what is appropriate to have and do by asking what best leads to
the contemplation of god (1249b20). Evidently, the virtuous and noble
are those who consciously make god the end of their activities and pur-
suits. But they are not the only ones oriented in this manner. The fortu-
nate may not consciously use god as their reference, but they are lucky, I
submit, just because they have natures directed toward god nonetheless.^'
^" Earlier drafts oFthis paper were delivered at the 2011 meeting oFthe Ohio Philosophical
Association at the University oF Dayton and the 11th annual meeting oF the Ancient Phi-
losophy Society at Sundance, Utah. I owe special thanks to my two commentators, Priscilla
Sakezles and Tom Tuozzo For their helpful criticisms. I am deeply grateful For the com-
ments and advice oF Larry Jost, Fred Miller, and the anonymous reviewers, which helped
advance this paper a great deal.
Copyright of Phronesis is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or
emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission.
However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.