dingpolit ik.wordpress.

com
http://dingpolitik.wordpress.com/2014/01/09/the-critique-of-critique-critical-theory-as-a-new-access-to-the-real/
by duanerousselle2013 January 9, 2014
The Critique of Critique: Critical Theory as a New Access to
the Real
Note: I, Duane Rousselle, have selected the title for this transcription of a talk that Alain Badiou gave to
students of the Global Center for Advanced Studies on the morning of January the 8
th
, 2014. I have taken
some minor liberties in my transcription so as to facilitate better comprehension. Alternatively, the reader may
choose to watch the lecture rather than read it. This can be done by clicking on the following link: Alain Badiou,
Live at GCAS.
The Critique of Critique: Critical Theory as a New Access to the Real
By Alain Badiou
The word critique has a very long history. In the old language, we have the word krinein and the meaning
of krinein was to sort, or to separate, something which is good f rom something which is bad. So there is
always a relationship between the idea of critique and the idea of judgement; judgement concerning very
dif f erent things; judgements concerning the true and the f alse, concerning the good and the bad,
concerning what is appropriate and what is not, and so on. So, the philosophical history of the word
critique is also the history of that sort of mental activity which consists of the separation between two
values. Maybe the clearest example of critical enquiry is with Plato whom made the f undamental distinction
between opinion and knowledge, and, between what is without philosophical interest and what is inside of
the f ield of philosophical interest.
This is a very important point: critique is not reducible to a purely negative activity. Very of ten the word
critique has a close relationship to something like negativity, and f inally to a sort of skepticism.
(Skepticism, in the sense of a purely negative conclusion or a negative activity.) But this is not exactly the
meaning of the word critique. We must say that critique always has a negative part which is the negative
determination of some activity, some mental disposition, or some orientation of thinking. But there is also
always something which is good, which is the result of the separation between two f orms of thinking, of
knowledge, and so on.
As you know, another meaning of critique has a close relationship to the work of Immanuel Kant (in The
Critique of Pure Reason, and so on). And so, it is very important f or us to clearly understand the meaning of
critique in the work of Kant. I think we can say something like this: with Kant, critique is not exactly the
pure separation between what is true and what is f alse, it is more about the idea of a limit. Kants role was
to determine the limit of pure reason, the limit of knowledge. So, the separation is not exactly between
something true and something f alse but much more between what is possible and what is impossible. It is
dif f erent f rom the original sense of the word critique. We have now passed f rom the idea of separation,
the distinction between what is true and what is f alse, between opinion and clear knowledge, and so on,
toward something of a dif f erent nature which is the knowledge of what is possible f or human knowledge.
And I think that this sort of transf ormation of the word critique is also the transf ormation of the f unction
of negativity within knowledge itself .
For Kant, f inally, the negative f unction of critique was to determine that something is impossible f or
human knowledge, that something can not be really known by humanity. And this is the idea of the limit. It is
something like a radical critique of what Kant names dogmatism. Dogmatism is in some sense classical
metaphysics. There was something in Kant which f ormed the real beginning of what I can name the modern
tradition. The modern tradition is dif f erent f rom the old f ashion of philosophy, under the name of
metaphysics (when we are in the Heideggerian style), dogmatism (when we are in the classical style), and
nonsense (when we in Wittgensteins style). But in any case, with Kant, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, we
have the idea of something completely inappropriate, something obscure, and f inally, with no value
concerning knowledge within a large part of the philosophical tradition. And with the negative designation,
under the name of dogmatism, nonsense, or metaphysics. A large project of human thinking is f inished.
Critics say something like that. The idea of critique is to transf orm the historical idea of something like the
end of a philosophical style.
This transf ormation is very important because if critique in a primitive sense is the exercise of practical and
theoretical separation between true and f alse, opinions and truth, and so on, then practically all
philosophers must admit that activity is in some sense a metaphysical one. Because inside metaphysics,
inside skepticism, inside critical theory, and so on, we have always some separation between that which is
true and that which is f alse, or truth and accident, and so on. There is no thinking without the work of
separation. But if critique takes the modern meaning of something which is historically accomplished or
historically f inished and if the meaning is that philosophy must accept the limit of its proper activity, then
this is something dif f erent. It is something dif f erent because it is not a general characteristic of
philosophical activity, but it is a philosophical proposition. And a philosophical proposition can be discussed
and can be ref used, and so on. At this point I can say something like that.
We have two meanings of critique. First, in some sense a weak meaning: which is only the activity of
separation between what is possible within philosophy and what is outside the world of philosophy. And, in
this case, the point is only what is the extension, the dimension, of negativity. We can begin f rom the
Platonic position, which is that we can, af ter a good critique, we can have an idea of Truth, toward the
skeptical position, which is that we have no idea of Truth. But in any case, the separation is the point and
the separation is active and af f irmative, f inally, in the case of Plato, and the separation is completely
negative in the sense of skepticism. It is the classical meaning of critique, if you want. But now, in the
modern time we have a strong meaning of critique which is the idea that a large part of philosophy, the
destiny of philosophy, must be determined as something which is f inished, something which is historically
f inished.
We can say some words about the latter position [about the strong modern meaning of critique]. I am in
some sense against the modern meaning of critique if this modern meaning is a judgement concerning the
complete history of philosophy. I dont agree with the idea that af ter some centuries of dogmatic power [in
philosophy] we are now in the f ield of critical possibility and that we know the limits of reason. And, why?
It is because I think that in f act we can not know something that limits reason. So its my critique of critique.
We can not know the limit of reason because human reason is in some sense the inf inite dimension of our
existence. And inf inite must be understood in the strong sense. Inf inite means that we can not know
precisely the limit of what we can know, of what we can understand, and so on. And so I think the true
modern idea of critique, on the contrary, is to assume that we can not understand, we can not have a clear
idea, of what is an end or a limit of reason.
My position is contrary to the modern sense of critique as the determination of something impossible.
Why? On this point, I am Lacanian. I think that the impossible is precisely the name of the Real. So when we
say, okay, I know the limits of reason, I know what is impossible f or reason to know, and so on, I am
saying, f inally, I am not able to understand the Real at all. Af ter all, this is the position of Kant: that being-
as-such and the Thing-as-such, can not be known, precisely. Maybe it concerns the f ield of practical
reason, but in the f ield of knowledge we can not know it. And so there is a close relationship between Kant
and Lacan on the topic of the Real; the Real, precisely as being-as-being [being qua being], being-as-such,
can not be known, and so it is a point of impossibility. The Real is also something impossible. Thats a
conclusion. Its not that it is completely impossible to have access to the impossible. We can perf ectly have
the conclusion that something of the Real can be known under the condition of a displacement concerning
the limitations of possibility and impossibility. Part of what is impossible can be known if the separation
between what is impossible and what is possible changes. And, it is my conception, basically, that
something which satisf ies the limit between impossibility and possibility opens a new access to the Real as
such.
Finally in that sort of context, what is the possible def inition of something like critical theory? The
def inition would be something like this: critical theory is the opening up of the new possibility to think the
Real through the possible modif ication of the separation between what is possible and what is impossible.
In some sense, the goal of critical theory is always to know, to have an understanding (to have a new
f orm of understanding), of what is impossible to know. So it is something which accepts the Kantian idea
concerning the relationship between the Real and the impossible. That is the Lacanian part. To be on the
side of Kant and also on the side of Lacan is precisely on the point of this close relationship to the Real.
Although we can accept all of that, the conclusion concerning critical activity is that the f ield of critical
activity is always to work at the limit of the possible and the impossible with the idea that this limit is not a
stable limit, it is a limit which in some sense can be modif ied, can be transf ormed.
The work of critical thinking is precisely the work on this limit. So, as a retroactive conclusion, my vision is
f irst to accept the classical meaning of critique: critique is always a question of separation and so of a
limit between, classically, the good and the evil, and so on. I also accept the modern meaning of critique:
that is the meaning given by Kant, which is that the question of the limit is the question of the limit between
the possible and the impossible. But my conclusion is not a negative position, my conclusion is an
affirmative one. That is, that we can open up a new access to the transf ormation of the limit itself . So, it is
not only the activity of the def ining of the limit but the activity of the change of the limit itself .
About these ads