Plato's Phaedo Argument for Recollection through Sense-Experience

Sense-Experience and the Argument for Recollection in Plato's "Phaedo"
Author(s): J. T. Bedu-Addo
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1991), pp. 27-60
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Sense-experience and the Argument for
Recollection in Plato's Phaedo
J.T. BEDU-ADDO
Introduction
At Phaedo 65a9ff., in the course of his description of the philosopher's
'practice of death', Socrates maintains that the senses are a hindrance to the
philosopher in his pursuit of truth and wisdom
(qpQovoGL),
and that it is
only by means of pure reason, or reasoning without the aid of the senses
(atUTjj xctO' czrv ELXQLVEI In bLavoiv
XW,UVO
(66al-2), that the
philosopher, in his present life, can attain knowledge of Forms. We are
explicitly told that these Forms - the Just, the Beautiful, the Good, and
even Tallness, Health, Strength and all the rest - cannot be seen with the
eyes, nor can they be apprehended by any other form of bodily perception
(65a4-e5). Accordingly, the true philosopher will 'as far as possible' (xaO'
OCov 8&vvaTaI, 64e5; oTL taiktaXa, 65c7, 66a4) leave the body behind, rid
himself of eyes and ears, and seek truth with reason alone, knowing that the
senses, one and all, are deceptive (65b1-7) and that one can never apprehend
reality and attain truth and wisdom with the eye (65a9-66alO).
A few pages later, however, in the argument for recollection (72e3-77a5)
which forms the second half of the first proof of the immortality of the soul,
Socrates claims, apparently in flat contradiction to what he has just said
about the worthlessness of the senses to the philosopher in his pursuit of
knowledge, that, in fact, it is only through sense-experience, which we all
do have right from the very moment of birth, that we recollect the Forms,
knowledge of which we acquired in a previous discarnate existence and
forgot at the moment of birth.
Taking our knowledge of Equality as an example, Socrates maintains
that we know it, and that we derive our conception of it from no other
source - indeed, to do so is impossible - than from sight or touch, or from
some other one of the senses (74a9-75a7). In such a case, Socrates argues,
we recognize the sensible equals, e.g. equal sticks, equal stones, etc., as
striving to be like Equality, but succeeding only imperfectly, and it is
Phronesis 1991. Vol. XXXVIIJ (Accepted January 1991) 27
impossible for us to do so unless we had previous knowledge of the Form
Equality. Thus, since we begin to see, hear and enjoy the use of all the other
senses as soon as we are born, our knowledge of Equality must have been
acquired before then, and lost at birth. However, later on
(i5crEQOV),
by
using our senses (Tats aiaLoJeoEl
X(COEvoL),
we recover the knowl-
edge which we previously possessed - a process of learning rightly called
recollection (75a 11-76e8).
These two passages deserve careful study, for they are obviously of
crucial importance for any assessment of the roles of reason and sense-
experience in Plato's epistemology and methodology in the Phaedo. Both
passages are concerned with the process of attaining knowledge of Forms.
On the face of it, the argument for recollection which maintains that it is
only through sense-experience that we recollect the Forms seems flatly to
contradict the view clearly expressed in the description of the philosopher's
'practice of death', namely that the senses, being deceptive, are a hindrance
to the philosopher in his pursuit of knowledge of the Forms, and that the
philosopher can only attain this knowledge by the sole use of reason
unaided by the senses. Thus it is not uncommonly supposed that the
philosopher's 'practice of death' has nothing whatever to do with the
argument for recollection in the dialogue, and that unlike the process of
learning involved in the acquisition of knowledge in the Meno, the Republic
and the Symposium, in the Phaedo Plato is explicitly saying that all perceiv-
ers, including newborn infants, do attain knowledge of the Forms involved
in their perceptions. As Michael Morgan' observes:
In the Phaedo the terrain is different. Here any perceiver can have, as a result of his
perception, some knowledge of the Forms involved in that perception. No lengthy,
elaborate technical education is required to bring the soul to an awareness of the
Forms. Simple sense-experience will do. And it must do, in order for Socrates to
argue that the soul must exist prenatally knowing the Forms,
in such a way that at
'
Michael Morgan, "Sense-Perception and Recollection in the Phaedo", Phronesis
XXIX, No. 3 (1984) 238. My emphasis. Cf. also F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae
(Cambridge, 1952) 51-2, where he identifies the argument's weak point as Plato's
implausible ascription of "highly reflective judgements" to infants. According to N.
Gulley
["Plato's
Theory of Recollection", CQ n.s. (1954) 197-8], what is envisaged here
"is an immediate transition from the sensible to the intelligible world". As he says
elsewhere [Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1962) 27], Plato "interprets concept-
ual apprehension as being reminded of an archetypal Form by any one of its sensible
copies. Perception of a single instance is assumed to be sufficient as a reminder, and the
question of reflective comparison and progressive clarification does not enter the argu-
ment". Against such views on recollection in the Phaedo, see esp. H. D. Rankin,
"Immediate Cognition of Forms in the Phaedo?", Dialectica (1958) 81-6; W.K.C.
Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV (Cambridge, 1975) 345-6.
28
the very instant of birth an infant soul could, as a result of an act of sense-experience,
recall and thereby come to know once again the relevant Form. The most primitive
sense-experience, the kind a newborn infant might have, must be sufficient to gener-
ate recollection.
On this view, it is extremely difficult to see any relationship between the
discussion of recollection here and the description of the philosopher's
'practice of death' on the one hand, and Socrates' subsequent description of
himself as abandoning the study of realities in the facts of everyday life
(EQya)
and taking refuge in 'studying the truth of realities in logoi' (99e4ff)2
on the other.
It would seem that many scholars find it extremely hard to believe that
Plato consciously practises the Socratic art of dissimulation, whereby he
manages to conceal a good part of his meaning, whilst appearing to be
trying hard to be explicit. As Vlastos3 says: "This artful chiaroscuro makes
life difficult for anyone who tries to expound his thought systematically".
Fortunately, however, Plato often gives us enough clues and reminders to
enable us understand what he says. As I shall try to show, in the argument
for recollection in the Phaedo, Plato offers us a number of reminders and
clues to his meaning which effectively rule out the possibility, not only of
infant recollection, but also of the vast majority of perceivers attaining
knowledge of Forms.
In a previous paper,4 I have argued (i) that Plato's description of the
hypothetical method in the Phaedo is, in effect, a description of the philoso-
pher's 'practice of death'; (ii) that we are meant to understand that we
derive all our opinions, expressible in logoi, initially from sense-experience;
(iii) that all these opinions, which may be true or false, involve our notions
or conceptions of Forms; and (iv) that it is only by means of the hypothetical
method, which is described as a method of reasoning that proceeds without
2
This method is described as Socrates''second voyage'
-
6rirEqog txkofvg-
'in search of
the cause'. It is not unusually supposed that this 'cause' cannot be the Good. But see my
"On the Alleged Abandonment of the Good in the Phaedo", Apeiron XIII, No. 3 (1979)
104-114, and "The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo", Phronesis XIV
(1979) 112ff., where I argue that the method involves recollection of Forms, including
the Good - the cause of all generation, existence and destruction.
3 G. Vlastos, "Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo", Phil. Rev. LXXVII (1969) 323. As
Plato makes Socrates say at Phaedrus 276c-d: "He (the wise man) will write, when he
does so, to treasure up reminders for himself
(UinoRviijtaTa 01oauvQL46jtevog)
when he
comes to the forgetfulness of old age, and for others who follow the same path".
Presumably, this means that the wise man does not write down his thoughts plainly for
the benefit of all and sundry. As we shall see, in this passage, Plato deliberately uses
words now in one sense and now in another to confuse the unwary.
4 See my "The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo", (n.2) 112ff.
29
the use of the senses, that our minds can form true opinions, and sub-
sequently convert them into knowledge in the course of the 'upward path',
by completely recollecting the Forms involved in a particular dialectical
enquiry. That is to say, the philosopher's 'practice of death' too involves
recollection of Forms.
In this paper, I try to show (1) that the major presupposition of this
argument is a theory of the gradual development of the human mind right
from infancy, at which stage reason is completely put out of action by
sensations
(ackrOTioLg),
to the stage of the true philosopher, at which
alone the mind can dissociate reason from the senses 'as far as possible', and
attain complete recollection of the Forms, and (2) that Plato's main concern
in this argument is to vindicate the thesis of the Meno argument for
recollection, namely, that all learning is recollection. I shall argue (1) that
Plato's conspicuous use of the ability to recognize similarity (To 6 OLOV),
identity (Tai'T6v) and difference (TO ?TEQOV) throughout this argument is a
clear indication that he has all along at the back of his mind this theory of the
development of the mind right from birth which he puts forward explicitly in
the Timaeus (43aff.) and metaphorically in Republic V-VII in terms of
dreaming and being awake in relation to images and their originals, first in
the realm of the faculty of opinion, and second, in the realm of the faculty of
knowledge, and (2) that in this argument Plato has in mind two quite
different types of recollection, namely (i) recollection as a gradual process
of learning
-
i.e. the type of recollection demonstrated in the Meno, and (ii)
the immediate recollection of Forms by true philosophers, who, having
already achieved complete recollection of Forms by means of the first type
of recollection, can, on perceiving a sensible image of a Form, immediately
recall the relevant Form
-
the
type
of recollection we should
expect
the true
philosopher in the Republic to be capable of achieving when he returns into
the cave. In the following discussion, I shall refer to the first type of
recollection as
RI,
and the second as R2, and I shall show that Plato's main
purpose in discussing R2 is to supply himself with a premiss from which he
can argue a thesis about R1.
1. Phaedo 72e2-74a8
Plato introduces the argument for recollection by making Cebes remind
Socrates of his favourite argument (TOV koyov
. ..
.v
0U
ELwOcag
OaLa
X?yELV (72c4-5), namely, that all learning
is
recollection, and so we must
have acquired knowledge at a previous time, but that this would be impos-
sible unless our souls existed before taking on the human form. For the
30
benefit of Simmias who says he does not remember the
argument, Cebes
summarizes it thus: When people are
questioned, if the
questions are
well
framed, they themselves explain everything, and
yet if
they did not
have
knowledge and correct explanation of the matter within
themselves, they
could hardly do that. Next, if you take them to geometrical diagrams or
something else of that sort, it becomes
perfectly clear that this is so
(72e3-73b2).
This passage is a clear statement of
R,;
and, as it is generally admitted, it
is a faithful summary of the Meno argument for
recollection, which makes
no mention of Forms.' Since the Phaedo argument, quite apart from the
fact that it mentions the Forms for the first time in Plato's writings, is
admittedly different from the Meno argument, it seems quite reasonable to
suppose that if Plato himself thought that the two arguments were in any
way incompatible, he would hardly introduce the new argument he is about
to set forth with a summary of the Meno argument, describing it as Socrates'
favourite argument. Thus, just as in the case of any interpretation of the
Phaedo argument for recollection which is incompatible with Plato's de-
scription of the philosopher's 'practice of death', we should be suspicious of
the correctness of any interpretation which renders the two arguments for
recollection incompatible.
Socrates begins the argument by explaining that if one remembers some-
thing, one must have known (Enrrioac0aL) it at some previous time. For
instance, if a person sees or hears or otherwise perceives something that is
different (EiTrQOV), and not only recognizes (yv4) that thing, but thinks of
(?vvoicq)
something different that is not the object of the same (i a' Ti) but
different knowledge (?roij'), we should say, quite rightly, that he has
recollected the thing of which he has thought (oui Ti'v evvoLav EXacev).
Our knowledge of a man
(?Mtot17JtRi a&V0QO;rnou),
for instance, is different
from our knowledge of a lyre, yet when lovers see a lyre or a cloak or
something else that their loved ones are accustomed to use, they recognize
(Eyvwaav) the lyre, and in their thought, they grasp the form (Ev
'i bLa-
voL XEa4ov t6o Etbo) of the boy who owns it. In much the same way,
when people see Simmias, they are often reminded of Cebes; and there are
countless examples of this sort. We may call this a sort of recollection
S See my "Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato's Meno", AJP 104 (1983) 228-
248, where I argue that his suggestion that though one cannot know what a thing is like
(.noEv TL) who does not know what it is (( tOTL), the actual process of recollecting
what a thing is, begins with the "stirring up" of innate true opinions about what it is like,
indicates that at the time of writing the Meno, Plato had already formulated his meta-
physical theory of Forms.
31
(vdjav'q(g
IL;);
and it happens especially with things one has forgotten
through lapse of time and through not having seen them (73cl-e3).
Again, it is possible to see a picture of a horse or of a lyre and be reminded
of a man, or see the picture of Simmias and be reminded of Cebes; and
seeing a picture of Simmias can remind one of Simmias himself. In all these
cases recollection is brought about either by things that are similar (&p'
6Rohov)
or things that are dissimilar (&nd &vojio'wv). In the case of
recollection brought about by something that is similar, one is bound to
consider (lwvvoE^v) whether it falls short or not in respect of its similarity
to the thing of which one is reminded (73e5-74a8).
Plato thus begins the argument by stating what he takes to be the
necessary and sufficient conditions for recollection in everyday life. His
conspicuous use of the mind's ability to recognize similarity, identity and
difference in stating these conditions is a very important clue to the meaning
of the entire argument. It is almost certainly intended to remind readers of
the use to which he puts the mind's ability or the lack of it, to recognize
similarity, identity and difference, especially in respect of images and their
originals. In the Republic and the Timaeus, Plato employs this ability to put
forward a theory of the development of the mind rightfrom infancy. In the
Republic this progress of the mind is described in terms of the metaphor of
dreaming and being awake in relation to images and their originals. In view
of its crucial importance in this argument, I shall proceed to describe briefly
how Plato states this theory in the Republic.6
From Eikasia to Noesis
The clue to the meanings of the four states of mind or levels of thought is to
be found at Republic 476aff., where Plato distinguishes between the levels
of thought of the true philosopher and the lovers of sights, sounds,
etc.
(qPLXOOEaOVEg, qpXf8xoot
xrk).7 He describes the latter as
dreaming about
the Forms because, in their thinking, they are quite unable to
distinguish
between Forms and the sensible particulars
which are said to
participate in
Forms, e.g. between Beauty itself and particular beautiful things.
He
6
I discuss this theory in some detail in my "A Theory of Mental Development: Plato's
Republic V-VII", Pts. 1 and 2, Platon 28 (1976) 288-300, and 29 (1977) 212-24.
' Since Plato does not mention this distinction until long after the Cave passage, when at
533b-c and 534c-d he describes the practitioners of the method of dianoia as dreaming
about the Forms, it is not uncommonly supposed that he mentions the four states of mind
at the end of the Line as an afterthought. Cf. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic,
Oxford (1953) 195. But see note 3.
32
describes the true philosopher who alone is able to distinguish clearly in his
thinking between Forms and particulars as being wide awake - Fauka unazQ
(476d). Plato makes Socrates explain precisely what he means by dreaming
thus: dreaming, whether one is asleep or awake, is to think that what is like
something
is not like it, but is the
thing
itself
-
T6o 6LoL6Ov 'V
x1'
6[oLov
&XX'
acuT6 v"yrjtaL ElvaL i EOLXEV (476c). That is to say, the lovers of sights etc.
are quite unable in their thinking to recognize similarity, identity and
difference in respect of Forms and particulars.
Plato reminds his readers of this distinction between the levels of thought
of the true philosopher and the lovers of sights etc. by making Socrates
explicitly describe the mind in dianoia twice as dreaming about the Forms
(533b-c, 534c-d), by which we are meant to understand, not that in dianoia
the mind apprehends a grade of objects ontologically different from, or
intermediate between, Forms and sensible particulars, but simply that, like
the lovers of sights etc., the dianoietic mathematician is quite incapable of
distinguishing in his reasoning between Forms and the sensible particulars
he actually employs as images of Forms (510b-511a). That is to say, in
dianoia the mind is quite incapable of recognising similarity, identity and
difference in respect of the Square itself, the Diagonal itself etc. and the
sensible squares and diagonals etc. it employs.8
Thus, since the relation between dianoia and noesis in the realm of the
faculty of knowledge is said to be analogous to the relation between eikasia
and pistis in the realm of the faculty of opinion (Rep. 533e-534a), we are
meant to understand that as the mind in dianoia dreams about the Forms
which are the originals in the realm of the faculty of knowledge, so in eikasia
the mind dreams about the physical objects - i.e. 'the trees and animals
around us' etc. (Rep. 510a5-6), which are the originals in the realm of the
faculty of opinion, in the sense that in its thinking it is quite incapable of
distinguishing between these physical objects and their shadows and reflec-
tions in water. That is to say, as the mind in dianoia is unable to recognize
similarity, identity and difference in respect of Forms and sensible partic-
ulars, so in eikasia the mind is unable to recognize similarity, identity and
8
As Plato says of the dianoietic mathematician,
. .
6v.
tLrTo0oU [~v
nEr T6 6V,
'naQ bU d6biuvaTov aOrtfaicz tv (533b) . . . &XX' et an- dib XOU TLVO (wnTE-
TaL
66tn ootx
bLot'tfl-
tp6ntmo0aL (534c).
This should mean that it is
only
when the
mind is able to go beyond the hypotheses of dianoietic mathematics that it can know the
Mathematical Forms. That is to say, only the philosophic dialectician can know the
Mathematical Forms. See note 30 below. On the methods and objects of dianoia and
noesis, see my "Mathematics, Dialectic and the Good in Republic VI-VII", Platon 30
(1978) 112ff., and "ALdvoLa and the Images of Forms in Plato's Republic VI-VII",
Platon 31 (1979) 89ff.
33
difference in respect of the physical objects and their manifold images.
Similarly, as the mind in noesis is wide awake in respect of Forms and
sensible particulars, so in pistis the mind is wide awake in respect of the
physical objects and their shadows and reflections in water.
Thus we can readily appreciate that what Plato has in mind is that in the
realm of the faculty of opinion there are two levels of thought or states of
mind - eikasia and pistis, and that whereas in the former the mind is not
consciously aware of any difference in reality between physical objects and
their images, in the latter the mind is aware of the fact that physical objects
are 'more real'9 than their shadows and reflections. Similarly, in the realm
of the faculty of knowledge there are two states of mind
-
dianoia and
noesis; in the former, though the mind reasons about Forms, it is quite
unaware of the fact that they are entities far 'more real' than sensible
particulars which are their images, whereas in the latter the mind is well
aware of this.
Once the metaphor of dreaming and being awake is interpreted in the
light of the mind's ability to recognize similarity, identity and difference in
respect of images and their originals, first in the realm of the faculty of
opinion, and second in the realm of the faculty of knowledge, it emerges
that Plato, in the Line and Cave, is putting forward a theory of the devel-
opment of the mind right from infancy, and that by eikasia he has in mind
specifically the mental condition that characterizes all infancy and early
childhood -
the stage at which the mind is unable to make any distinction
between reality and unreality, fact and fiction etc., whilst by pistis he has in
mind the mental condition of the normal grown-up who can make these
distinctions in respect of the objects of the faculty of opinion. This state of
mind is, in effect, the mental condition peculiar to man; no other animal
attains pistis. '0
9 Cf. Republic 515d, where the released prisoner is said to have turned "towards more
real things" -
nQ6S
Ia'Uov
6vta.
10 The meaning of the two lower states of mind - eikasia and pistis - are crucial for the
interpretation of the Sun, Line and Cave. However, whereas the meaning of eikasia is
disputed, it is generally agreed that pistis, which means 'conviction' or 'assurance', is the
mental condition of the ordinary man. Aristotle seems to be usingpistis in this very sense
when he observes that no beast attains pistis, but that many of them have phantasia: tdv
[&J] 0Qi
v o0Oevi 1v n6XeL
nItLoTtg
pavtaoa
bU no7roXX (De Anima, III, iii
(428a20). Thus, if our interpretation of eikasia is correct, then, since the distinction
between dianoia and noesis is said to be analogous to that between eikasia and pistis,
Plato is saying, in effect, that in the realm of knowledge the dianoietic mathematician and
all other
qnkoftAzoveg
are children as compared with the 'true philosopher'. And this is
precisely what he makes Socrates hint at, when he humourously compares the practitio-
34
Of the four states of mind, these two, which are really the only states of
mind or levels of thought clearly recognizable in everyday life, are explicitly
described in Timaeus 43aff. in terms of the mythical machinery of the circles
of the mind. We are told that when the gods place the mind (which, like the
universal mind, consists of intertwined circles of the Same and the Other)
into a mortal body, reason is at first (i.e. in infancy) completely put out of
action by sensations, so that the mind, being now thoughtless (dvovs), is
unable to announce the class of the Same and that of Other correctly (Tim.
44a-b). The second stage, i.e. the mental condition of the normal grown-up,
is the stage at which the mind becomes intelligent
(EtQwv),
thus enabling
its possessor to announce the class of the Same and that of the Other
correctly (44b). The attainment of this state of mind is not said to be the
result of any special type of education.'"
The manner in which Plato employs this ability to recognize similarity,
identity and difference in relation to images and their originals in this
argument for recollection would seem to indicate that at the time of writing
the Phaedo, he had already worked out this theory of the development of
the mind right from birth, when it is imprisoned in the human body. 2 Thus,
since all the instances of recollection cited in this section of the argument
are drawn from everyday life, Plato almost certainly has in mind here the
mental conditions of eikasia and pistis in the realm of the faculty of opinion.
This suggests that the ability to recognize similarity, identity and difference
in respect of the objects of sense is an essential prerequisite for the instances
ners of the method of dianoia, who are unable to give logos of the Forms, with "the
children of Glaucon" who, being as XkoyoL as the lines so called, should not be allowed
to hold political power in the state until they become accomplished dialecticians (Rep.
534d). See my 'A Theory of Mental Development: Plato's Republic V-VII," Pt. 1 (n.6)
292ff., where I explain that we are meant to understand that the child's mind likens
(ENdtEL)
images to their originals - it supposes T6 6OAol6v np
d1t
6,koLov &X'aift1
dvaL 4J EOLXEV (476c). Indeed, Plato may be trying to remind us of this description of
the dream state when he refers to the lowest subsection as T6
6>toLWOEv and to the
subsection immediately above this as IO .b
dbRoLWOi
(510a). Cf. also 511a, where the
objects in the second subsection are said to be bno6 tGw x&Xw &JtxaOOEZOLv.
"
Similarly, in the Republic, we are told that the release of the prisoners from their
original condition occurs in the course of nature -
(PVOEL
(515c).
12 For the view that the imagery of the Cave derives from the 'secret doctrine' of the
Phaedo, and that the progress of the prisoners who are said to have been in chainsfrom
childhood bx naLbwv (514a) depicts the progress of the mind imprisoned in the human
body at birth, and also that when Socrates says that the prisoners in their original
unreleased condition are like us -
6Ro(olug iRiv
(515a), we are meant to understand
that their condition depicts the mental condition of all infancy and early childhood, See
Bedu-Addo (n.6, Pt. ii) 212ff.
35
of recollection cited here. For instance, as Socrates explains, for one to
remember A, on seeing B, one must (i) have known A at some previous
time, and (ii) not only recognize B, but also think of A as something
different from B (73c6-8). This is clearly a feat which no infant can perform,
especially when, as in the case of the last example (73e5-74al), the recog-
nition of identity and difference has to do with images and their originals.
Significantly, the next step in the argument which is concerned with the
recollection of our prenatal knowledge of Forms, is modelled on the last
example of recollection of ordinary knowledge cited here, namely, the case
of recollection where, on seeing a picture of Simmias, one remembers
Simmias himself. In a case like this, Socrates explains, one is bound to
consider (?voeELv 74a6) whether the picture falls short or not in respect of
its similarity to Simmias himself. This example, which involves the recog-
nition of identity and difference in respect of an image and its original, is
clearly what Plato considers relevant for the next step in his argument which
is concerned with the similarity sensible equals bear to the Form
Equality.
Thus, it seems clear that, as in the Republic, the similarity Plato has in mind
here is primarily the similarity an image (E'xWv) bears to its original.
Besides, an image may be appropriately described as being inferior to, or
'less real' than its original.
It is important to recognize that in this section of the argument, Plato is
citing examples of recollection in everyday life to illustrate the points he is
about to make in the next step in his argument which is concerned with the
recollection of Forms, and that we are not meant to take the terms denoting
knowledge here (e.g. bIcTaoa, yv4, eoTltiL
. . . 73c2-8) at their
face value. Nevertheless, it is possible for a reader to be misled into thinking
that Plato here considers these instances as constituting knowledge proper-
ly so called. Thus, Morgan observes:
... in the Phaedo Plato . . . does not distinguish the knowledge that results from
ordinary recollection from knowledge of the Forms which is the result of a special
kind of recall, and does not make much of the role of a logos in knowledge of the
Forms, although he does mention that genuine knowledge of Forms does require
the ability to provide such logoi (76b5-6). 3
As we shall see, Socrates' mention of the ability to give logos
of what one
knows is crucial in this argument; for it renders completely untenable the
view that in the Phaedo Plato is saying that all perceivers, including new-
13
Michael Morgan (n. 1) 238, n.3. Cf. also D. Scott, "Platonic Anamnesis Revisited",
CQ 37 ii (1987) 355, where he says Plato "makes no attempt at all to differentiate
between ordinary recollection and the philosophical variety ...
36
born infants, attain knowledge of the Forms involved in their perceptions.
Again, it is important to recognize that the examples of recollection cited
here are not illustrative of the gradual process of learning called recol-
lection (R1); they are rather illustrative of the immediate recollection of
Forms (R2) which is the basis of the argument for recollection in the
Phaedo. It is presumably to distinguish this type of recollection from the
learning process that Plato describes this as a sort of recollection ( v vq-
oL;
TLg
73e1).'4
Finally, Plato's language in this section reveals that he thinks of recol-
lection, even of ordinary knowledge, as being, not indeed the result of
simple sense-experience, but rather of what follows the sense-experience,
namely, thought or reason. Thus, one sees something, recognizes it, and
thinks of
(WvvOIOT 73c7-8) something else; such a person is rightly said to
have recollected the thing of which he has thought (ov'
TI8V
Evvotav 'Ear3v
73c9-74dl). The expression ?V
TIn
bLavo@
'Eapiov
lTo ?1o0
g
oT5
itaLbog
at 73d7-8 is particularly noteworthy. R. S. Bluck'5 translates: ". . . (they)
form a mental image of the boy". However, it seems clear that to Plato, the
formation of this 'mental image' is not at all the work of simple sense-
experience; for, he says, "they grasp the form (or the image) of the boy in
their thought" - ?V Tm
5Lavoq.
Again, we are told that in the case of
recollection brought about by something that is similar to the thing recol-
lected, one is bound to consider (ivvoE?Lv) whether it falls short or not in
respect of its similarity to the thing of which one is reminded (74a5-7). This
'reflective judgement' or 'reflective comparison' is quite obviously the
work, not of simple sense-experience, but rather of reason.
Indeed, this repeated use of the verb 'to think' (Cvvoo6v) here, as well
as in the subsequent argument for the recollection of prenatal knowledge of
Forms, can hardly be unintentional on Plato's part. He seems to be deliber-
ately harping on reason to remind his readers of the important role he has
already assigned to the use of reason in the process of acquiring knowledge
of Forms in his description of the philosopher's 'practice of death'. He
means that sense-experience can prompt reasoning, and that the process of
14
See note 3 above. One of the methods by which Plato tries to conceal his meaning is the
manner in which he employs terms in different senses. In this passage, his description of
the immediate recollection of objects as a sort of recollection -
&v vllo(; xti (73el) is
almost certainly a hint that he has two quite different types of recollection in mind. Cf.
Meno 86e ff. where Plato describes the geometer as having a sort of hypothesis -
WaIEQ
twa &bn6OeGLv - to indicate that he has in mind two quite different types of hypothesis.
See my "Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's Meno", JHS
CIV (1984) 6ff.
Is R. S. Bluck, Plato's Phaedo, (London, 1955) 66. See also note 25 below.
37
recollection itself is identical with the reasoning that is prompted by sense-
experience. This means that there is no recollection where sense-experi-
ence is not followed by reasoning.
2. Phaedo 74a9-75a2
Turning now to recollection of Forms, Socrates asks Simmias whether we
are right in thinking that there is such a thing as Equality - not the equality
of one stick to another, or of one stone to another or anything of that sort,
but something different from these - i.e. Equality itself, and whether we do
know what it is. Simmias enthusiastically replies that there is such a thing
and that we know its nature
(brLoT6[LeOa
ai,t6 6
EgotV 74b2). Socrates
then proceeds to explain that we obtained this knowledge from these very
sticks and stones: having seen them, we conceived (tvEvofGoa>Lv, 74b6)
the notion of Equality from them, though it is something different from
those things. The reason why it is different is that whereas the sticks and
stones etc., while remaining the same (Ta1T'a 6vta 74b8), sometimes
appear equal to one man and unequal to another, Equality itself never
appears unequal to anyone (74a9-c6). Nevertheless "from these equal
things, different though they are from Equality, you conceived and obtained
your knowledge of it ( iv bItocn>8i-v ivcv6pxad; TE xat
EiAqlag
74c8-9)
either because it is similar or dissimilar to them". For it makes no difference
so long as from seeing one thing you think of
(CVoiiCqrg)
another thing
whether similar or dissimilar
-
the process must be recollection (74c7-d2).
Socrates then makes Simmias agree (i) that sensible equals do not appear
to us to be equal in the same way as Equality itself, but that they fall short by
far in respect of their similarity to the Form; (ii) that this being the case,
whenever a man sees something and thinks
(wvvojno)
that "what I am now
seeing wants to be like some other thing that exists (kXo TL T'Wv ovOrwv
74d1O), but that it falls short and cannot be equal in the same way as that
one, since it is inferior"
-
the man who has this thought (t6v toUfco
FwooiuvTa 74e2) must have previous knowledge of that thing to which he
says what he sees is similar, though it is inferior; and (iii) that since we do
have this sort of experience with respect to sensible equals and Equality
itself, we must have had knowledge of Equality before the time when we
first saw the sensible equals and thought (*vevoioaaev) that all these
things are striving to be like Equality, but that they fall short of it
(74d4-75a2).
Now, the manner in which Simmias unhesitatingly and enthusiastically
agrees with Socrates that there exists such a thing as Equality itself, different
38
from sensible equals, is particularly striking. It would seem to indicate
clearly right at the beginning of this section of the argument that "Awe" in
this argument cannot always refer to people in general; in some places it
refers only to 'true philosophers'.16 Plato, in the Republic, makes it clear
that even the lovers of the sights etc. (IAXo0a, ov?g xTX.) and dianoietic
mathematicians who dream about Forms are not consciously aware of the
existence of Forms as different entities from sensible particulars. 17 Here, in
the Phaedo, Plato expects his readers to recognize that only the 'true
philosopher' who, by his assiduous 'practice of death' - i.e. philosophical
dialectic, has already attained knowledge of Forms including Equality, can,
on seeing equal sticks, equal stones etc., think of
(CvvojoatL)
- i.e. recall
the Form Equality and consider how far the sensible equals fall short of
Equality in respect of their similarity to it. Thus, in this section of the
argument, what Plato has in mind is R2 - the sort of recollection the true
philosopher in the Republic is said to be capable of performing when he
returns into the cave and 'gets accustomed to the observation of the obscure
things there' (Rep. 520c1-6).
As we shall see, in this argument, though Plato is aware of the fact that we
obtain all our conceptions of the Forms by making use of our senses, he
does not consider that having the relevant concept of a Form is the same
thing as knowing the Form. The earliest stages in the learning process called
16
Cf. J. L. Ackrill, "Anamnesis in the Phaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c", Exegesis and
Argument, Phronesis, suppl., Vol. 1 (1973) 191ff. As he points out: "It is important to
know whether 'we' and 'you' refer to people in general or to believers in Forms". Cf. also
D. Scott (n. 13) 356ff. where he also limits the reference of "we" to the "philosophically
earnest". Really, at 64cl, Socrates explicitly says that we should ignore other people and
converse among ourselves -
Et7L(ORLV
y6d,
?qM,
EQ6g
iR&g
ai-toVS, XalQELV cin6v-
TEr
fXXe(VOLg.
Thus we are meant to understand that the entire discussion in the
Phaedo is for the benefit of true philosophers. It is not to be supposed, however, that
throughout this argument "we" refers to true philosophers. Plato expects his readers to
detect where it can only refer to true philosophers, and where it refers to human beings in
general.
17
At Republic 474c, Socrates explains that even if someone tries to guide a
pLXoOc6tLWv
to the knowledge of Beauty, he will not be able to follow: aiJT O& x?Xuog
dtFe
vollitv
LYTITE
&v T15
Ayfjtat
bi
xihv
yv&otv aftoO
buvd[evog
7EwOaL. In much the same
way, if a true philosopher, well versed in Mathematics, tries to explain to the dianoiectic
mathematician that the figures he draws are only images of some supremely real entities
called Forms, he will think that the 'true philosopher' is not really mentis compos. As J.
Gosling ["Republic Book V: T'a noUXa XaXd XT.", Phronesis V (1960),
120-211
rightly
points out, the people whom Plato describes as
WLXo6E6VovEg
etc., are not really
ordinary people, but rather people generally regarded as being knowledgeable, but
whom Plato regarded as not really having knowledge, properly so called, and who for this
reason should not be entrusted with political power.
39
recollection
(RI)
are concerned with the formation of concepts, beginning
right from infancy; and the Forms themselves are recollected much later on
in life by means of philosophical dialectic, which is the final stage of R1. It is
only after this stage that one is in a position to perform R2. All the instances
of recollection of ordinary knowledge in the first section of the argument
which, as I have argued, can be performed only by normal grown-ups, are
illustrative of R2 which, in turn, can be performed only by true philsophers.
The easiest way to be misled into obtaining the impression that this type
of recollection (R2) can be achieved by all and sundry is to suppose that the
equality Plato has in mind here is the concept of equality rather than the
Form Equality. This, however, is a misunderstanding, if only because, if we
take equality here as the concept,"8 Plato's talk about the inferiority of
sensible equals in respect of their similarity to equality (i.e. the concept)
becomes quite inappropriate.
This brings us again to the question of what sort of similarity Plato has in
mind here. As in the case of the similarity between Simmias and a picture of
him, if, as I have argued, Plato has in mind in this argument the distinction
between eikasia and pistis on the one hand, and between dianoia and noesis
on the other, then the similarity between Equality itself and sensible equals
has to be that existing between an original and its images
(Edx6vEg);
for, in
the Line we are meant to understand that the sensible particulars of pistis,
which are the originals in the realm of the faculty of opinion, are the images
of Forms employed in dianoia. These objects of pistis are 'less real' than
Forms, since they depend on Forms for their existence. In much the same
way, the shadows and reflections of eikasia are 'less real' than the physical
objects of pistis, since they owe their existence to the physical objects. In
18
That Plato distinguishes clearly between concepts and Forms is clear from the fact that
when at Parmenides 132b Socrates suggests that the Form may be a thought or concept -
vofija, Parmenides rejects the suggestion on the ground that a thought must be of
something, and that thing is the Form as originally postulated. Cf. also Phaedrus 249b if.,
where Plato explains that concepts are not Forms, but that they are only named after
Forms. The philosopher makes use of concepts as tokens or means of remembrance
(bnolLvAttacw)
to recollect the Forms. Since these concepts are of Forms, it is reasonable
to suppose that Plato thinks of concept formation as being part of the process of
recollection. But see D. Scott (n. 13) esp. 348ff., where he argues that recollection is not
operative during the process of concept formation. Assimilation of concept and Form
clearly derives from the presupposition - almost certainly mistaken - that to have the
concept of equality, for instance, is to know (i.e. to have completely recollected) the
Form Equality. As the Phaedrus passage suggests, all human beings form concepts of the
Forms, but only 'true philosophers' make use of them to complete the process of
recotlection. See note 35 below.
40
effect, they are the images of the images of Forms; and thus they owe their
existence ultimately to the existence of Forms.
Interpreted in this light, Plato's talk about the inferiority of sensible
equals to the Form Equality in respect of their similarity to the Form is quite
appropriate; for they can be more or less similar to the Form, but they can
never attain the same degree of reality as the Form. In this sense they are at
once similar to, and different from the Form, and never the same as the
Form. Besides, it is only in the light of the grading of objects in the Line and
Cave that Plato's talk here about considering how far sensible objects fall
short in respect of their similarity to the Forms makes sense; for a sensible
object may be an image of a Form or an image of an image of a Form. That is
to say, it may be either two or three removes in degree of reality from its
Form. As we are meant to understand, when the true philosopher returns
into the cave, he is able to determine whether an action supposed to be just
is really an image of Justice or an image of an image of Justice (Rep. 517d). 19
Again, in this section we are told that when one is reminded of the Form
Equality by equal sticks, equal stones, etc., one also notices that they want
to be like (74d9-10) or strive to be like Equality, but that they fall short of it
(75bl-2). These phrases, like the metaphors of participation and imitation
in the Republic, express a metaphysical relation between Forms and partic-
ulars which only "we", i.e. 'true philosophers', and not any chance perceiv-
er, do notice.20
19 Note that at 517d, Socrates says that the philosopher, when he returns into the cave,
having seen the real objects in the outer world, is compelled &ywv(te,rOaL
ne(i
T6v
toO bLxaLou OXtWv
'
&yaX4dnTV
bv ad axLac, thus making it quite clear that he is
referring to the two grades of images inside the cave, namely, images of physical objects
(i.e. puppets and statuettes and images of the images of physical objects (i.e. the shadows
of the puppets and statuettes)). See my "ALtvoLa and the Images of Forms in Plato's
Republic VI-VII", (n.8) 90ff. for my view that the equality of the two middle subsections
of the line is not something unintended by Plato and that they represent ontologically the
same objects, namely, images of Forms, and that the grading and arrangement of the
symbols in the Cave correspond exactly with the grading and arrangement of the objects
in the Line. Thus in the Line, we have (1) Forms, (2) images of Forms (in the two middle
subsections) and (3) images of the images of Forms, while in the Cave, we have (1)
physical objects, (2) images of physical objects (in the two middle subsections) and (3)
images of the images of physical objects.
? J. Gosling ["Similarity in Phaedo 73b seq.", Phronesis 10 (1965)
157ff.]
rightly says
that the similarity Plato has in mind in this argument is that of an image (dix6v) to its
original, and that he means that no image can be a perfect likeness of its original.
However, he rejects the view that Plato means that sensibles are all imperfect copies of
Forms. Perhaps, what Plato has in mind in using the metaphor of striving is that sensibles
are always in a process of becoming, but never really are in relation to the Forms. Thus
what Plato is saying at 74b6-c6 is not that in the ordinary sense sensible equals may not
41
How closely the Phaedo is related to Republic V-VII is again indicated by
Socrates' argument here for the difference between the Form Equality and
sensible equals: sensible equals, while remaing the same, sometimes appear
(qpa(vExaL)
equal to one man and unequal to another, whereas the Form
Equality never appears unequal to anyone (74bc6). This, in effect, is the
same type of argument Plato offers at Republic (478e7-479d9) for the
difference between Forms (the objects of the faculty of knowledge) and
particulars (the objects of the faculty of opinion) which are said to "roll
about between being ('u6 6v) and non-being (t6
Rh
6v)".
As I have argued, since only 'true philosophers' possess the ability to
recognize similarity, identity and difference in respect of Forms and their
sensible images, we are meant to understand that they are the only people
capable of recalling the Forms on seeing their sensible images. This is why it
is a misunderstanding to suppose that what Plato explicitly says in the
Phaedo is that all perceivers, including newborn infants, attain knowledge
of the Forms involved in their perceptions. Any reader who is unaware of
the fact that Plato employs this ability to recognize similarity, identity and
difference in respect of images and their originals to distinguish between
different levels of thought or states of mind, is bound to find Plato's
argument for recollection in the Phaedo extremely baffling. However, we
are meant to see at least that no ordinary, non-philosophical individual
does, on seeing equal sticks, say to himself, or reason that "the sticks I am
now seeing are striving to be like some other thing that exists, but they fall
short of it in respect of their similarity . . .". The immediate transition here
from the sensible to the intelligible world can only be accomplished by one
who has already attained knowledge of the Form Equality by R1.
Finally, we are told that since we are able to compare the sensible equals
with Equality, we must have had knowledge of Equality before the time
when we first saw the equal things and thought that all these things are
striving to be like Equality, but they fall short of it:
'Avayxaiov &Qa
hit'&;
JtQoEL69VaL
T6 LOOV
nQp6
Ntevou TOi
X&6vov
6X? T6 nQ3TOV W6VT'c5 Ta toa
tvevoijoalcev
bTL
6LQAyETal
rtiV n6vTa
xaOxa Eivat otov r6 laov 9XEL bi
V6ECffQQ;
(74e9-75a3).
This passage, like the previous one, is of crucial importance for the
interpretation of the rest of the argument. If, however, by
the time one
comes to it, one is still under the impression that the recollection thus far
discussed is possible for all and sundry, one is very likely
to think that what
be, or rather appear, perfectly
equal,
but rather that they are
quite
a different type of
things from the Form which never appears different from what it is.
42
Socrates is explicitly saying here is that the first time anyone sees equal sticks
etc., he begins to make reflective comparisons in respect of the sensible
equals and the Form Equality.2" This, however, is almost certainly a
misunderstanding.
Up to this point, Socrates is saying that whenever "we", i.e. true philoso-
phers, see sensible equals, "we" make this reflective companson in respect
of the sensible equals and the Form Equality. Naturally, however, before
"we" attained the ability to do so, there was a long period during which
"we", like everyone else, were seeing equal sticks, equal stones etc.,
without having the slightest inkling that they were indeed striving hard to be
like something else that exists, for "we" were not yet true philosophers.
Socrates, in this passage, is now adverting to the time when "we"first made
this reflective comparison on seeing equal sticks etc. Now, these are two
quite different statements.' In the former case, even newborn infants, since
they enjoy the use of their senses, can make this reflective companrson the
first time they see equal sticks etc.; in the latter, it is only after seeing equal
sticks etc. over a long period - during which period "we" were undergoing
the requisite training right from childhood to become true philosophers
-
that one day, on seeing equal sticks, "we" made this reflective comparison
for the first time. That is to say, by the time "we" made this reflective
comparison for the first time, "we" had already attained knowledge of the
Form Equality, and our reflective comparison was therefore an instance of
R2. Before then "we" were gradually undergoing
R,
which, to judge by
what Plato says about it in the Republic, is an exceptionally long and
laborious process.?3 We can thus see that while the former statement makes
21
See Michael Morgan (n. 1) 238-42 and 249-50.
'
The Greek (quoted above) is admittedly ambiguous and, I think, deliberately so. See
note 3 above. It can be translated either way. However, anyone who recognizes what
Plato is doing with the ability to detect similarity, identity and difference in this argument
is not likely to suppose that what he is saying here is that even a newborn infant is quite
capable of thinking that sensible equals strive to be like the Form Equality, but that they
fall short of it. Plato is aware of the fact that at this stage the mind has not yet formed the
concept of equality to enable it recognize sticks as being equal or unequal, or indeed, as
being different from anything else.
3 On Plato's educational programme for the guardians, see Republic 523a-540a. Note
that at the end of the discussion, Socrates says, significantly, that when true philosophers
obtain political power in a state, their first act of refonn should be to take over all the
children below the age of ten, having sent away all other citizens into the fields, and bring
the children up in their own manners and laws. This should mean (1) that the true
philosophers will guide the children through the stages outlined in the Line and allegori-
cally described in the Cave, and (2) that by eikasia Plato almost certainly has in mind the
mental condition that characterizes all infancy and early childhood. See Bedu-Addo
43
Plato change his mind about the process of acquiring knowledge after
writing the Meno, and again after writing the Phaedo, the latter statement is
in complete harmony with the views expressed in the Meno, the Republic
and the Symposium.
Before proceeding to consider the next step in the argument, we may
note here that, as in the first section of the argument, Plato in this section
makes repeated and obviously deliberate use of the verb 'to think' -
tvEvoilqnoa>v
(74b6);
tvEv6Tcxag
(74c8); ovv o-
g
(74dl); wvvo'
(74d9); Mwooi3vta (74e2) and
EvEvo-qoaaiEv
(75al). This, as I have sug-
gested, is Plato's way of reminding this readers that he has not really
forgotten the role he has already assigned to reason in the process of
attaining knowledge of the Forms, and that he thinks of the process of
recollection as being identical with the reasoning that is prompted by
sense-experience. Seen in this light, this argument has a striking parallel in
Republic 524a-d where Socrates explains how sense-experience can pro-
voke thought.24
3. Phaedo 75aS-c6
When Simmias agrees that we must have known the Form Equality before
that time when, on seeing equal sticks etc. we made that reflective compari-
son for the first time, Socrates reminds him that we also admit that we could
not have had the thought of it from any other source than from sight or
touch or from some other one of the senses, and that it would be quite
impossible to do otherwise:
'AXXa'
Rilv
xal T66b,
6[LoXoyoIU>V
'
. &XXoOEv ai'6T'o
&VEvo-qxEvaL [
bvEatv avaL &vvOOEL MA' fX T IOV 166V ev
6VacvO6L
T' ?X TLVO0
6.XTrs w^v
aiaOq'aEwv
(75a5-7).
(n.6) Pt 2. 221-2.
4 As H. F. Cherniss ["The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato's Later Dialogues", AJP 78
(1957) 244,
n.71)
rightly points out, Theaetetus 185c-186b is parallel in argument to
Republic 524a-d. These three passages would seem to indicate that in all three dialogues
Plato means by aloffaL; mere sensory awareness, and that when he talks as if the
senses themselves sometimes make judgements, as in the Republic passage, he is only
making a concession to popular speech or ordinary language. For the view that in the
Theaetetus passage Plato is arguing that it is not only the xowv6 that are apprehended by
pure reason, but that even the oivoact of sensible characteristics, like hardness and
softness are also apprehended by pure reason, see my "Plato on the Object of Knowled-
ge: Theaetetus 185c ff.", in Allan Gotthelf (ed) Aristotle on Nature and Living Things -
Philosophical and Historical Studies presented to Professor David M. Balme on his
seventieth birthday (Pittburgh and Bristol, 1985) 301-11.
44
Socrates then argues that, since it is also the senses which make us think
that (i'vvoaaLz 6TL) all sensible equals aim at the Form Equality, but fall
short of it, we must have acquired our knowledge of the Form Equality
before we began to see, hear and use the other senses, if we were going to
refer the sensible equals to that standard, seeing that they all strive to be
like it, though they are inferior (75all-75b8). Thus, since we began to see,
hear and enjoy the use of all the other senses as soon as we were born, we
must have acquired our knowledge of Equality before we were born
(75b1O-c6).
This is another crucial passage in the argument. As we have seen, Plato
considers that sense-experience can provoke thought. However, to appre-
ciate what Plato is saying here, we have to bear in mind that there are four
distinct levels of thought, viz. (i) the level of thought of the child, (ii) that of
the ordinary grown-up, (iii) that of the knowledgeable but philosophically
unenlightened man, and (iv) that of the true philosopher. Now, when he
says at 75a5-7 that we could not have thought of Equality without making
use of our senses, he can hardly mean to suggest that true philosophers
cannot think of Equality without making use of their senses, for we have
been told that this is precisely what they do in their regular 'practice of
death'. On the other hand, all human beings, whatever their levels of
thought may be, form the thought (or conceive the notion) of the Form
Equality by making use of their senses. Thus, if we are to make sense of this
statement, we should interpret it to mean that we (i.e. human beings in
general) can only derive our conception of the Form Equality through the
use of our senses.
The second statement (75all-75b8), however, can only apply to true
philosophers, since they alone have the requisite ability to recognize simi-
larity, identity and difference in respect of Forms and their sensible images
which enables them to appreciate the metaphysical relation between Forms
and sensible particulars. Thus in this section of the argument, Plato is using
the verb ivvor'oaL in two slightly different senses to contrast what we (i.e.
all human beings) do, namely, form the thought, or conceive the notion, of
the Form Equality by making use of our senses, with what "we" (i.e. true
philosophers) alone are capable of doing, namely, thinking that sensible
equals strive to be like the Form Equality.' The third statement (75blO-c6)
25
See notes 3, 14 and 15 above. In this section of the argument, Plato is using Mwoiloa
with the accusative in the sense of 'to think of', i.e. 'to form the thought of' or 'to conceive
the notion' of something, as in
9rEeov 0vojop
(73c8). Cf. Toifto . . o. rTiV MwOLaV
Vcafkv (73c9-74dl) and (v rj bLavoa UXaiov TO
Etbog
T0o naL66g (73d7-8). He
uses ?wvo joaL
6n
for 'to think that something is the case'. Thus what he has in mind
45
pretty obviously applies to all human beings - we all do enjoy the use of all
our senses as soon as we are born.
Now, it is not uncommonly supposed that when Socrates says here that
we derive our conception of the Form Equality from no other source than
from sense-experience, he is, in effect, enunciating something quite differ-
ent from anything to be found in the Meno, the Republic and the Symposi-
um. In the first place, it is important to recognize that Socrates is not really
saying here that simple sense-experience is quite sufficient to make us know
the Form Equality. As we have seen, he can only be talking here about how
we all derive our conception of it, i.e. how we come to form our concept of
Equality; and this is the work, not of simple sense-experience, but of the
thought or reason prompted by sense-experience. Secondly, the reason why
it is impossible for us to form our concept of the Form Equality without the
use of our senses is surely to be sought in Plato's view of the present
condition of the human soul. At 62b, we are explicitly told that we human
beings are in a sort of prison - fV TLVL
wQOVQ
t[
LoEV t
oavOQonoL.
In its
previous discarnate existence the soul was directly acquainted with the
Forms. Now, however, imprisoned as it is in the human body, it is only
through sense-experience that it can gradually recollect the Forms.26 As I
have argued elsewhere, Plato's conspicuous use of sensible diagrams in the
Meno argument for recollection indicates that he was aware of the impor-
tance of sense-experience in the process of recovering our prenatal know-
ledge even at that time, though he makes no mention of Forms in that
dialogue.27
However, the greatest obstacle to seeing that in the Republic too Plato
recognizes the indispensability of sense-experience in the process of acquir-
ing knowledge of Forms is that it is not generally recognized that the actual
process of acquiring knowledge of Forms begins only after the mind is wide
here is that whereas we (i.e. all human beings) can form the thought (or conceive the
notion) of Equality to varying degrees of clarity, only "we" (i.e. true philosophers) who
know the Form Equality can think that sensible equals strive to be like Equality. I think
that in the Theaetetus Plato is using b&avoeLUOQL in the same way at 185a ff. There too
he has in mind the view that while we can all 'think of, 'conceive the notion of the xotvd,
only the true philosopher can engage in the independent activity of the mind, by which
alone the xoLv6 can be apprehended. See my "Plato on the Object of Knowledge:
Theaetetus 185c ff." (n.24) 302ff.
1
This view of the present incarnate condition of the human mind is very strongly
reaffirmed at 82d-83a, where Socrates explains that the minds of lovers of learning
(qiXoauf8t4) are compelled to survey reality through the body as through a prison wall,
instead of viewing reality directly by themselves.
27
See note 5 above.
46
awake and can competently detect similarity, identity and difference in the
realm of the faculty of opinion, i.e. after the attainment of pistis,28 with the
use of hypotheses derived from sense-experience. Thus Gulley maintains:
... Although the language of 'images' of Forms is prominent in the dialogue, and
although a theory of recollection is implicit in it, the doctrine of the Republic about
the contribution of sense-perception to knowledge appears in many important
respects to be opposed to what is implied in the Phaedo theory of recollection ..
To appreciate what Plato is doing in the Line, it is absolutely necessary to
read the entire passage in the light of the metaphor of dreaming and being
awake in relation to images and their originals. Thus, when Plato says that
in dianoia, the mind, using as images the objects which were previously
imitated, is compelled (&vayxdtEtaM) to proceed from hypothesis down-
wards to a conclusion, whereas in noesis it proceeds from hypothesis
upwards to a beginning (510b-511a), we are meant to understand (1) that
the process of acquiring knowledge of Forms begins with the use of sensible
particulars in dianoia as images of Forms, but that at that stage, dreaming as
it does about the Forms, the mind is not consciously aware of the fact that
sensible particulars are really images of Forms, nor that the premises of its
demonstrations are only hypotheses and not really pieces of knowledge;'
(2) that the mind is compelled to make use of sense-experience in the
process, precisely because in its present condition it cannot apprehend the
Forms directly;31 (3) that all the hypotheses employed in the realm of the
'
As Plato says at Timaeus 44c, if, after the attainment of the second condition of mind,
"one receives the right educational training, one becomes wholly sound, having escaped
the worst of maladies (i.e. ignorance) . . ."
9 N. Gulley, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (n.i) 53.
3 See note 8 above. Presumably, it is for this reason that Plato describes the 'knowledge'
attainable in dianoia as 66ua. Thus, there are, in effect, three levels or grades of b66a in
the Republic: (i) the b6eaL of the child in eikasia who, being unable to distinguish
between reality and unreality, fact and fiction etc., is inclined to believe every detail in
Alice in Wonderland; (ii) the
66gaL
of the normal grown-up in pistis, which are con-
cerned with facts of everyday life, or contingent truths; and (iii) the b6ctt of dianoia
which are concerned with necessary or a priori truths. Cf. the b6ta of the slave-boy at
Meno 85c.
31 The statement that the mind in dianoia is compelled
(&vayxa4ETaL) to make use of
the objects of pistis as images and proceed from hypothesis, has puzzled commentators
precisely because of the mistaken presupposition that the upper section of the line
represents, quite literally, the intelligible world of the Sun passage (which is, of course,
accessible only to discarnate minds which directly apprehend the Forms) rather than
simply 'the realm of the faculty of knowledge' where the mind, while still sojourning in
this world of sense, can, by making use of the objects of sense and hypotheses derived
therefrom, gradually recollect the Forms with which it was acquainted in its previous
47
faculty of knowledge are, like the hypotheses of the true philosopher in the
Phaedo, opinions expressible in X6yoL involving notions or conceptions of
Forms initially derived from sense-experience;32 and (4) that the process can
only be completed at the stage of noesis when the mind is wide awake and
can go beyond these same hypotheses of dianoia to attain complete recol-
lection of Forms.33 Thus, in describing the method of dianoia the way he
does, Plato is not really blaming dianoietic mathematicians and other
practitioners of that method for doing the wrong thing; he is, in effect, only
speaking from the point of view of the philosophic dialectician who alone
knows what the mind is trying to do at this stage.
We can thus see that when Plato says in this argument that we derive our
conception of the Form Equality from no other source than from sense-
experience, he is not really enunciating something that is at variance with
what he says in other dialogues. He is expressing a view that derives from
his conception of the nature and the present condition of the human mind.34
As we have seen, throughout this argument, Plato makes it clear that he
thinks of recollection as being identical with the thought or reasoning that is
prompted by sense-experience. With this in mind, let us now proceed to
examine the present argument tending to prove that we acquired our
knowledge of the Form Equality before we were born.
Plato's argument may be outlined as follows:
(1) It is from the senses and only the senses that we derive our concep-
tion (or form the thought) of the Form Equality (75a5-10).
(2) It is also through the use of our senses that we come to think that all
sensible equals strive to be like the Form Equality, but that they fall
short of it (75a9-b2).
(3) Thus, we must have acquired our knowledge of the Form
Equality
before we ever began to use our senses (75b3-6).
discarnate existence. Cf. the eulogy of sight at Timaeus 47ff. and the process of attaining
knowledge of Beauty at Symposium 210a-212a. There, it is particularly noteworthy that
the process is said to begin in childhood with the experience of particular beautiful things;
and knowledge of Beauty itself comes much later on in life as the result of a process of
generalization repeated at progressively more abstract levels, while sense-experience
gradually ceases to play a part in it. See also notes 19 and 26 above.
I
For the view that hypotheses both in the Phaedo and the Republic are not things, but
rather opinions expressible in statements or propositions, see my 'The Role of the
Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo" (n.2) 112ff. and "Mathematics, Dialectic and the
Good in Republic VI-VII" (n.8) 114ff.
3 See note 8 above.
3' See notes 26 and 31 above.
48
(4) But we began to enjoy the use of all our senses as soon as we were
born (75blO-12).
(5) Thus, we acquired our knowledge of the Form Equality before we
were born (75c1-3).
Now, as I have argued, Plato is here using the verb 'to think' (EvvofOiuL) in
two slightly different, but closely related senses: (i) to form the thought or
concept of something, and (ii) to think (or have the thought) that something
is the case. Thus, since all human beings form concepts of the Forms,
whatever their levels of thought may be, whereas only true philosophers
can, in their thinking, refer the deliverances of their senses consciously to
the Forms, the point of stating (1) must be that Plato means to contrast what
we (all human beings) do, namely, conceive the notion of the Form Equal-
ity by making use of our senses, with (2), i. e . what "we" (true philosophers)
alone are capable of doing, namely, achieving R2 on seeing equal sticks etc.
In this way, Plato reminds his readers that having the concept of the Form
Equality, which enables all of us to recognize equal sticks etc. when we
come across them, is something quite different from knowing the Form
Equality, which enables "us" to achieve R2 in respect of equal sticks etc.
and the Form Equality.
Before stating (1), Socrates makes Simmias agree that the fact that "we"
are able to achieve R2 on seeing equal sticks etc. indicates that "we" must
have had knowledge of the Form Equality before the time when "we" made
our first reflective comparison in respect of the Form Equality and equal
sticks etc. (74e6-75a4). Thus, since Plato intends to argue that our know-
ledge of the Form Equality must have been acquired prior to our use of our
senses, it would seem that this statement is intended to remind Simmias and
us that it is the concept, and not knowledge of Equality, that we derive from
no other source than from sense-experience.35
Knowledge of Equality, as we learn from his description of the philoso-
pher's 'practice of death', can only be attained by reasoning without the aid
of the senses, and not by any form of bodily perception.36 This means that
3 These two statements would seem to indicate that Plato thought of
R,
as involving
concept formation. Since the concepts are of Forms, our innate knowledge of Forms
must be operative subconsciously in forming these concepts with the aid of sense-
experience. Thus Plato would reject any purely empiricist account of the formation of
concepts. He would rather accept a Kantian account of
R,.
But see D. Scott (n. 13, 350),
where he maintains that in Plato's view "recollection is not operative during the process
of concept formation, and in human cognitive development in general" and that "he rests
content with an empiricist theory to account for our formation of opinions". See also
note 18 above.
3 This would seem to indicate that without relating the argument for recollection in this
49
this argument is enthymematic. There is a suppressed premiss after (2)
which Plato expects readers of the Phaedo to supply, namely (2+), that
knowledge of Equality cannot be attained by any form of bodily perception.
Thus, the entire argument turns on (2), namely, the admitted possibility
of R2; and since Plato infers (3) from (2), he must be assuming that the
ability to perform R2 in respect of equal sticks etc. and the Form Equality,
presupposes knowledge of the Form Equality attained by means of the
philosopher's 'practice of death', i.e. philosophical dialectic. That is to say,
Plato thinks of the learning process called recollection (R1), as culminating
in philosophical dialectic.3" Finally, Plato infers (5), namely that we ac-
quired our knowledge of Equality before we were born, from (4), i.e. we
began to enjoy the use of all our senses as soon as we were born.
It seems clear, then, that this argument, which turns on the possibility of
R2, indicates that Plato is operating with the ability to recognize similarity,
identity and difference in respect of images and their originals, in much the
same manner as he does in the Sun, Line and Cave in the Republic, and that
he has in mind all along the theory of human cognitive development as
stated at Timaeus 43aff. The deduction of (5) from (4) is particularly
noteworthy. As we have seen, for one to recall the Form Equality on seeing
equal sticks etc., one must, among other things, be able to recognize equal
sticks, etc. I submit that Plato expects his readers to see that for all its innate
knowledge of Forms as well as its enjoyment of the use of all its senses, the
newborn infant has not yet formed the concept of equality to enable it to
recognize equal sticks etc. when it is confronted with them. Indeed, it does
not have the ability to recognize similarity, identity and difference in
respect of any objects. At this stage, to use the language of the Republic, the
mind is fast asleep, and does not even dream about the objects of the world
of sense.38 As we are told at Timaeus 43aff ., at this stage reason is completely
put out of action by sensations
(atoOoELg),
and the mind is quite unable
to distinguish between the class of the Same (TCrTov) and that of the Other
(T6
ET6(OV).
Thus, the possibility of infant recollection, whether of Forms
dialogue to the earlier discussion of the philosopher's 'practice of death' and Socrates'
subsequent
description of himself as abandoning the study of realities in the facts of
everyday life
(fQyct)
and taking refuge in 'studying the truth of realities in logoi'
(99e4ff.), it is virtually impossible to make sense of it.
3 See my "The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the Phaedo" (n.2) esp. 122ff.
38 At Timaeus 44bl, the mind is said to be
&voug
at birth. I suspect that this is the
condition of mind described as dyvwo(a /
ZYVOLQ
at Republic 477a9-bl - the opposite of
yvxlLg.
Since the mind in eikasia entertains opinions (see note 30 above), eikasia must
be a higher condition of mind than &yvwaoa, in which the mind can think of nothing
in-as-much as it has not yet formed any concepts.
50
or of particulars, is completely ruled out in this argument. Again, since
neither ordinary men nor knowledgeable people of empiricist cast of mind -
CpLXoOEca4tovEg
etc., have the ability to recognize similarity, identity and
difference in respect of Forms and particulars, they too can have no knowl-
edge of the Forms involved in their perceptions.
It would seem, then, that throughout this section of the argument, Plato
has at the back of his mind his view of sense-experience and reason explicitly
stated at Theaetetus 186b-c, namely, that while all human beings as well as
animals are by nature capable of having sensations right from birth, the
ability to reason about these, with reference to their real nature and worth
(nQog
TE oUi'cav xai xPE'XEtav)
is acquired, by those who do acquire it,
with difficulty and through a long and laborious education.
4. Phaedo 75c7-77a5
Having demonstrated to the satisfaction of his interlocutors that we must
have acquired knowledge of the Form Equality before we were born,
Socrates now explains that if we acquired this knowledge before birth, and
were born with it, then both before birth and as soon as we were born we
had knowledge of all the Forms; for our discussion is concerned with all the
Forms, not just with Equality. Indeed, it is concerned with all those things
which "we stamp with the seal of reality in our dialectical process of
questioning and answering"; and we must have acquired knowledge of all
these things before we were born (75c7-d6).
Thus, Socrates continues, unless after acquiring this knowledge, we have
on each occasion forgotten it, we must be born with the knowledge and
possess it throughout life. For knowing is just this: having acquired know-
ledge of a thing, to possess it, and not to have lost it; while by forgetting we
mean loss of knowledge. However, if having acquired it before birth, we
lost it at birth, and later on (UVOxeQOV) by using our senses we recover the
knowledge we previously possessed, then surely what we call learning (6
XaXOU?I3EV
Rav0aVELV)
will be recollection of our own knowledge (oixEt-
av 3t
aTUl1v), and we should be right in calling this process recollection
(75d7-e8).
Socrates then sums up the preceding argument thus: It seemed possible,
on perceiving something by means of sight or hearing or some other sense,
to think (Mrofiaaw) as a result of this, of something different
-
something
that is either similar or dissimilar but related
-
which had been forgotten; so
that we are faced with two alternatives: either all of us are born with
knowledge of these things (i.e. Forms) and know them throughout life, or
51
those whom we describe as learning recollect them later on
(i6o?ELOV);
and
learning will be recollection (76al-7).
Plato in this section of the argument reveals (i) that he has all along been
making use of our knowledge of Equality to illustrate what he has in mind,
and that what he has said thus far about our knowledge of Equality applies
to our knowledge of all the Forms, and (ii) that "we" in this argument refers
primarily to 'true philosophers', that the argument is addressed to these,
and not to any chance reader, when he makes Socrates say that our present
discussion is concerned with all those Forms which we stamp with the seal of
reality - oti
bELWQaYLt6[LEOa
n6 avt6o 6 e0TL - in our dialectical process
of questioning and answering (75clO-d5). Thus, since dialectic, as I have
argued, is to be identified with the philosopher's 'practice of death' as well
as with the hypothetical method which is said to proceed without the use of
the senses, we are meant to understand that the learning process called
recollection
(RJ)
culminates in the philosopher's 'practice of death'.
Socrates then presents Simmias with two alternatives: either (i) we are
born with knowledge of the Forms, or (ii) we forget this knowledge at birth
and recollect it later on (UcrcrEQov) by using our senses. If (ii) is right, then
Simmias agrees, what we call learning will be recollection of our own
knowledge (75d7-e8). Alternative (i) is clearly unacceptable; for, on that
hypothesis, all human beings, including newborn infants, will possess full or
explicit knowledge (not just innate knowledge) of Forms throughout life,
and so there will be no need for the learning process called recollection
(R1). It is (ii) that is reasonable, if by i5oTEQOV Plato means 'later on in life',
and not 'after birth' as Morgan maintains.39
As I have argued, Plato expects his readers to see that as in the Republic
and the Timaeus, it is only after the mind has attained the ability to
recognize similarity, identity and difference in respect of objects in the
realm of sense, i.e. after the attainment of the level of thought or mental
3 See Michael Morgan (n. 1) 239, note 4, where commenting on Guthrie's rejection of
infant recollection in the Phaedo (n. 1) he says: "Unfortunately, Guthrie does not tell us
how the inference to prenatal existence of the soul is made if such experiences (i.e. R2) are
not possible at birth, i.e. in infancy. Nor can he claim that the recovery is completed later
but begun at birth, since the recovery referred to at 75e3-S is got by TaiS atoOaeFa
XI?pLvoL (3)
... Either the Phaedo and the
Republic
are inconsistent or the
argument
for the soul's prenatal existence is a non sequitur". My emphasis. This view clearly
derives from failure to appreciate (i) that the argument is enthymematic, and that we are
meant to see that the Forms can never be apprehended by any form of bodily perception,
and (ii) that Tats
aIG"OCOL
xQbFtvoL here is precisely what in the Republic we are
said to do in dianoia, where the mind begins to make use of sensible objects as images- d5
etX&L
XW46nI
. . ." to recollect the Forms much later on.
52
condition of the normal grown-up (i.e. pistis), that one can embark on the
education that leads to the full recollectlon of Forms. Indeed, when at
Republic 510b-51 la, Plato says that in dianoia, "the mind, using as images
the things that were previously imitated -
ToLg
TOTE
RI11qOFEotV
4
EaXOtI
XQW[EV?
- iS compelled to proceed from hypothesis ..." he is, in
effect, saying precisely what he says here in the Phaedo, namely we recol-
lect the Forms later on in
life by making
use of our senses
-
tats
aLOiO0j-
OEOL XQW4LEVOL (75e3). It is significant that this phrase occurs only here in
the argument. Elsewhere, Plato makes Socrates talk merely about our
seeing, hearing and having sensations (cf. aiaoOoctE EixoLEv, 75bll).
For, indeed, using our senses for the purpose of acquiring knowledge is
something quite different from merely having sense-experience. That is
why the majority of human beings do not go beyond the stage of pistis - the
mental condition of the ordinary man.
As we have seen, Plato considers that situated as we are, sense-experi-
ence is an indispensable aid in the process of acquiring knowledge of Forms.
However, he considers that at a certain stage in its reasoning the mind
should be able to dissociate reason 'as far as possible' from the senses to
apprehend Forms. His mention of the dialectical process of questioning and
answering here is almost certainly a hint intended to remind us that the
learning process he is describing as recollection (75e3-7), i.e.
R,,
involves
far more than the use of the senses.
In the previous section (75a6-c6) Plato has been preoccupied with R2
-
i.e. the possibility enjoyed by true philosophers of having sense-experience
prompt immediate recollection of their knowledge of Forms. In this section,
Plato begins to prove
RI
on the basis of the admitted possibility of R2. Thus
in his summary of the preceding argument (76al-7), he is saying, in effect,
that since "we" do achieve R2 on seeing sensible images of Forms "we"
have attained knowledge of these Forms. Thus either all human beings
(7u6v-g) are born knowing these Forms, and know them throughout life,
or those whom we describe as learning simply recollect them later on in life,
and learning will be recollection
-
xail Ti
[iatOTo;L
a'vadvolT av EaT
(76a4-7).
Now, it has been strenuously argued that the learning process referred to
here is recollection in sense R2, and hence that since only true philosophers
are capable of achieving R2, 'those whom we describe as learning',
oi5g
waRev u1avO&vELv (76a6),
can
only refer to true philosophers. That is to
say, unlike recollection in the Meno, recollection in the Phaedo is the
exclusive prerogative of true philosophers.' This view is almost certainly a
misunderstanding for the following reasons: (1) Since R2 requires the prior
53
ability to recognize similarity, identity and difference in respect of images
and their originals, it already presupposes the completion of a learning
process. Hence, it is immediate, and not a process of learning at all. (2)
Throughout his development of the argument involving R2 (74a-75c) it is
noticeable that Plato himself never describes it as a learning process at all,
although it satisfies some of the criteria Plato associates with recollection.
On the contrary, he insists that "we" must have attained knowledge of
Equality before the time when, on seeing equal sticks etc. "we" achieved R2
for the first time. (3) Plato only turns explicitly to the question of whether
what we do with regard to knowledge of the Forms, after forgetting it at
birth, is recollect it 'by making use of our senses' - a9oOqoEoL
XQWIiEVOL
(75d7-e8) when the argument involving R2 is over at 75d6. (4) Since, having
introduced the Phaedo argument with a summary of the Meno argument,
Plato makes Socrates say explicitly that if Simmias does not believe that
'what is called learning' - i xako1UEvyEVn
RaiOriot;
- is recollection when
demonstrated in this way
(tacctp),
he is going to demonstrate it in another
way -
TVe
,rn (73b3), we are meant to see that the following argument is
intended to demonstrate the same thesis, namely, that 'what is called
learning is recollection', and hence that by the repeated references to
learning as recollection
-
6 xaXoi'tEv tIavO6vELv (75e5), ov' wpayv icvOa-
VEIv (76a6) and
iq
RaL6OTp3L;
&Vaciv1oL; av Er1 (76a7), Plato is now
meaning to refer to the ordinary time-consuming process we are all familiar
with, including philosophical dialectic, as well as to allude once more to the
thesis of the Meno argument for recollection.
Thus, having argued that since "we" do achieve R2 on seeing sensible
images of Forms, "we" have attained knowledge of those Forms, and that
either all human beings (narvTE;) are born with knowledge of the Forms,
and know them throughout life, or 'those whom we describe as learning
simply recollect them later on in life', Socrates asks Simmias once again
whether he thinks that we are born already knowing the Forms, or that we
later on recollect what we knew before (76a9-b2).
As Simmias is unable to
decide whether we are born already knowing the Forms, or, having forgot-
ten them at birth, we later on recollect them,4' Socrates helps him out of his
4 D. Scott (n.13) esp. 356-358. Cf. p. 358, note 29, where he
suggests
that only
knowledge is recollected: "If Socrates and Simmias are now concluding that all men
recollect, they are contradicting what they have just decided, viz. that not all men know the
Forns . . ." My emphasis. That is to say, the attainment of true opinion is not the result
of recollection at all. As he says at p. 350, "He (Plato) rests content with an empiricist
theory to account for our formation of opinions, but is not concerned with the explication
of such a theory." But see note 35 above.
54
predicament by asking him whether or not one who has
knowledge will
be
able to give an account (bo'vac k6yov 76b6) of the things he knows. When
Simmias replies that it is very necessary for such a person to be able to
give
account of what he knows, Socrates again asks him whether he thinks
everyone can give account of the things we were talking about just now, i.e.
the Forms:
H xaiL bOXOVOL 001 7aVTST EXFLV btbova kOyOV tEQL TOiVTWV dv VUV6
iX yo,.Ev (76b8-9).
To this Simmias replies: "I wish they could, but I am afraid tomorrow by
this time, there will be no one any longer capable of doing so adequately"
(76blO-12).
Here again, Plato reveals his awareness of the fact that he is not at all
being as explicit as some readers may think, and that what he has said thus
far about the importance of sense-experience in the process of acquiring
knowledge of Forms is very likely to give the impression that he is ascribing
knowledge of the Forms to all perceivers, including newborn infants. By
pointing out here that the ability to give account of what one knows is a
necessary condition of knowledge, Plato obviously hopes to dispel any
lingering impression we may still have that he is in fact ascribing knowledge
of the Forms to all and sundry. Here, surely, Plato expects his readers,
whether they are 'true philosophers' or not, to recognize that he is indeed
distinguishing between knowledge and opinion as clearly as he does in the
Meno and the Republic, and that he means us to understand that since only
'true philosophers' can give logos of the Forms, only they have knowledge
of the Forms, whereas
-
with the exception of infants who cannot yet reason
- all other perceivers only have opinions which involve their conceptions of
Forms.42
4' This indicates that it is not futile for Plato to address this argument primarily to 'true
philosophers', since Simmias apparently does not know the epistemological implication
of his own acceptance of the theory of Forms. See also my "The Role of the Hypothetical
Method in the Phaedo", (n.2) esp. 126-7. Cf. also D. Scott (n. 13, 359), where he rightly
points out that "it gives them an explanation as to why these Forms are not accessible to
the senses, why, that is, we could never have derived our knowledge of the Form
Equality purely from seeing equal sticks and stones".
42 Since Plato does not discuss the distinction between knowledge and opinion in this
dialogue, it is sometimes supposed that the distinction is irrelevant for an understanding
of the Phaedo argument for recollection. Thus Morgan (n.1, 249) says: "In the Meno
recollection seems to lead first to belief and only after elaborate labor to knowledge. But
there is no mention of belief in the Phaedo and no support for employing the distinction
between belief and knowledge here". My emphasis. See note 3 above.
55
Having drawn this distinction between knowledge and opinion or belief,
Socrates now makes Simmias admit (i) that not everyone has knowledge, (ii)
that people recollect what they knew before, and (iii) that our souls ac-
quired this knowledge during the time when we were not human beings
(76c1-10). Socrates then concludes that our souls existed earlier on before
taking on the human form, and that they existed apart from bodies, and had
intelligence. Simmias, however, does not seem convinced. He suggests that
perhaps we acquire this knowledge at the same time as we are born, and
that this time still remains as a possibility (76c14-15).43 However, when
Socrates asks him when we lose this knowledge (since they have just agreed
that we are not born with it) and whether we lose it at the same time as we
acquire it, Simmias admits the absurdity of his suggestion - FXaOov ?can-
'u6v oi'b'v 3t'nwv (76d5-6)."
In conclusion, Socrates says, significantly, that it is with these Forms that
our belief in the immortality of the soul must stand or fall: If the Forms do
exist, and "we" refer all the deliverances of our senses to this reality,
discovering that it existed previously and that it is our own, and "we"
compare these things with that reality,45 then our souls must exist no less
than these things before we were born. If, on the other hand, these things
do not exist, then our discussion would have been to no purpose. And it is
equally necessary that these things and our souls must have existed before
we were born - if the former did not exist, then neither did the latter
(76d7-e7). Indeed, Simmias does not seem to have any doubts whatever
that Forrms do exist; and accordingly he accepts Socrates' proof of the
immortality of the soul:
Nothing is so clear to me as this, that all these things - the Beautiful, the Good, and
all the other things you mentioned just now, do have a most complete existence.
And I think the proof is sufficient (77a2-5).
See note 41 above.
" This seems to indicate quite clearly that Simmias finally agrees with Socrates that it is
later on in life that we recollect the Forms. According to Morgan (n. 1, 249), however,
Socrates here "seems to agree that there is a sense in which a newborn can be said to
know, since his rejoinder is not that newborns cannot provide logoi, but rather that
coming to know and forgetting cannot occur simultaneously".
s 76e1-2, from 'discovering' to 'with that reality' (vriQXovoav.
. . oIUwg) is sometimes
said to be an interpolation (so Jackson, Wilamowitz and Archer-Hind). However, the
phrase makes very good sense on our interpretation; for surely, those who do refer the
deliverances of their senses consciously to the Forms can only be the 'true philosophers'
who 'discover' them, i.e. get to know them, and recognize that they were indeed
acquainted with them in their previous discarnate life, and that particulars in this world of
sense are only images of Forms.
56
Conclusion
At the beginning of this paper, I suggested that since Plato introduces the
Phaedo argument with a summary of the Meno argument for recollection,
describing it as Socrates' favourite argument, we should be suspicious of the
correctness of any interpretation of the Phaedo argument which is in-
compatible with the Meno argument. I have tried to show that Plato's main
concern in the Phaedo argument is to vindicate the thesis of the Meno
argument for recollection, namely, that what we call learning is nothing but
recollection (R1). For, who-eas in the Meno, Plato presents a direct argu-
ment for the thesis, in the Phaedo he adds an indirect argument for it - viz.
that the possibility enjoyed by true philosophers of having sense-experience
prompt immediate recollection of their knowledge of Forms (R2) is explic-
able only if
RI
is true (given that nobody is born with access to knowledge of
Forms). Thus, if the Phaedo argument is not incompatible with the thesis
that all learning is recollection, it is not incompatible with the philosopher's
'practice of death' either; for, as I have argued elsewhere,4 by a'riT'a
XoytaRo'g
(Meno 98a) Plato has in mind the ability to give account (boi3vaL
koyov) possessed only by the philosophic dialectician.
I have also tried to show that this argument presupposes the theory of the
gradual development of the mind right from birth as put forward explicitly
in the Timaeus, and metaphorically, in terms of dreaming and being wake in
relation to images and their originals, in the Republic. Indeed, we should be
surprised if, as the middle-period dialogues clearly indicate, Plato believed
in (i) the theory of Forms, (ii) the immortality and prenatal existence of the
mind or soul, and (iii) the theory of learning as recollection, without
realizing that his psychology is incomplete without a theory of human
cognitive development right from birth. That this argument presupposes
such a theory is indicated by Plato's conspicuous use of the mind's ability to
recognize similarity, identity and difference in respect of images and their
originals, as I have tried to show.
In the Phaedo, as in the Republic and the Timaeus, Plato thinks of the
senses (atoi0o0
;Lg)
and reason
(pQo6vqoLg)
as being closely bound to-
gether throughout life in the world of sense. Since at birth, reason is said to
be completely put out of action by the senses,47 whereas at the stage of the
true philosopher, the mind can dissociate reason from the senses 'as far as
possible',48 we should expect that each of the four levels of thought or states
4 See my "Sense-Experience and Recollection in Plato's Meno" (n.5) esp. 244-248; and
"Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's Meno" (n. 14) esp. 9-10.
'4 See Timaeus 43a1-44b2.
57
of mind - eikasia, pistis, dianoia and noesis, marks the extent to which the
miind can or cannot dissociate reason from the senses. Thus the ability (or
the lack of it) to recognize similarity, identity and difference, first, in
respect of physical objects and their images in the realm of sense, and
second, in respect of Forms and their sensible images in the realm of
knowledge, is a function of the extent to which the mind can or cannot
dissociate reason from the senses.
We may thus describe the progress of the mind from birth to the level of
thouglht of the true philosopher in terms of the metaphor of dreaming and
being awake as follows: At birth, the mind completely forgets its prenatal
knowledge of the Forms, since reason is completely put out of action by
sensations. At this stage it is fast asleep, and does not even dream about the
objects in the world of sense. Gradually, however, the mind begins to form
concepts of these forgotten Forms through sense-experience, and as it
begins to recognize objects, it begins to dream about the objects of the
world of sense, being quite unaware of the fact that some objects are more
real than others. This is the lowest level of thought, i.e. eikasia. The mind,
however, gradually wakes up from this initial dream-like condition, until by
the time it attains pistis, the mental condition of the normal grown-up, it is
wide awake in the realm of sense; at this stage reason has begun to assert
itself, and the mind is now consciously aware of the fact that some objects
are more real than others. It has thus attained the ability to detect similarity,
identity and difference in respect of images and their originals in the realm
of sense. However, it takes physical objects for granted as being fully real.
Hence it does not even dream about the Forms. It is only after the attain-
ment of this stage that the mind can embark on the process of acquiring
knowledge, which begins with the use of the senses. When the mind begins
making use of the senses in this way, thus treating sensible particulars as the
images of Forms they really are, reason begins to assert itself still further,
and it begins to dream about the Forms. This is the stage of dianoia. The
mind at this stage cannot apprehend the Forms, since it cannot dissociate
reason from the senses far enough. However, it is now well furnished with
concepts of Forms. If it starts reasoning about these concepts without
reference to particulars, it begins to wake up gradually, until at the stage of
noesis it is wide awake in the realm of knowledge. It can now dissociate
reason 'as far as possible' from the senses and apprehend the Forms,
thus
attaining knowledge properly so called - TMLOT 1, and with it the ability to
48 T 6 .kLoTa (Phd. 045); xaO'6oov bOvaTaL (65c7 and 66a4). Cf. also 6oov >^
Vd6yXi aclIToLS XQTOaL
(83a6-7).
58
recognize similarity, identity and difference in respect of Forms and sen-
sible particulars.
This metaphor of dreaming and being awake in relation to images and
their originals clearly presupposes the theory of recollection. Thus we are
meant to understand that recollection
(RI)
is a life-long process, beginning
right from infancy, but that the process of recollecting the Forms by making
use of our senses -
TaLg
acLoOoEoL
XQW[LEVOt
- begins only after the
mind is wide awake, and can recognize similarity, identity and difference in
the world of sense, i.e. after the attainment of the mental condition of pistis,
the mental condition peculiar to man. This is the process illustrated in the
slave-boy experiment in the Meno.49 However, it is much later on in life that
the Forms are apprehended by those who, by the assiduous practice of
philosophical dialectic - the philosopher's 'practice of death', attain the
ability to reason with concepts alone, making no use of the senses.
I conclude, then (i) that this argument is primarily addressed to people
who have already accepted the theory of Forms; (ii) that since Plato argues
from the possibility of R2 to the possibility of R1, it is plain that his main
concern is to vindicate the Meno argument for the view that all learning is
recollection
-
the argument with which he significantly introduces the
Phaedo argument
-
thus revealing that his theory of recollection is con-
cerned, not indeed with R2 which, being the end product of the learning
process, enables 'true philosophers' to appreciate the metaphysical relation
between the world of sense and the world of Forms, but rather with R1 ;so
(iii) that the argument presupposes not only the philosopher's 'practice of
death' which is identical with the hypothetical method as described in the
Meno, the Phaedo and the Republic,5' but also the progress of the mind
4 It is significant that before proceeding with the experiment, Socrates makes sure that
the slave-boy can speak Greek (Meno 82b); for by the time one attainspistis, one must be
able to speak competently the language of the community in which one happens to live.
Socrates is thus assured that the boy has the necessary concepts to enable him understand
the terms he is about to employ in the experiment. It is also significant that at the end of
the experiment, Socrates says that the boy's true opinion, namely that the square of the
diagonal is twice the size of the given square, has been stirred up in him like a dream -
Wa.ntrQ 6vaQ (85c), thus indicating that this true opinion is not the type characteristic of
pistis, but rather the type attainable in dianoia. See note 30 above.
5 See notes 35 and 40.
5' See my 'Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's Meno", (n. 14)
esp. 9-10. Since in the Phaedo, Socrates deduces consequences from his initial hypo-
thesis, it seems reasonable to suppose that in the Republic too we are not really meant to
understand that it is only in dianoia that the mind deduces consequences from its
hypotheses, and that this procedure, as well as the use of sensible particulars as images of
Forms, is beneath the dignity of the 'true philosopher'. Indeed, we should rather expect
59
from eikasia to noesis as outlined in the Line and allegorically described in
the Cave; (iv) that we are meant to understand that owing to the present
incarnate condition of our minds, sense-experience, which we all do have
right from the moment of birth, is a necessary condition for recollection,
but that it is not also sufficient for that purpose;"2 and finally, (v) that it is
indeed difficult to imagine a more appropriate statement of the moral of the
argument for recollection in the Phaedo, as well as of the Sun, Line and
Cave in the Republic, than the following statement in the Theaetetus:
... all impressions (naxlftLaxa)
which reach the mind through the body are things
that human beings and animals alike are by nature (qr6oEL) able to perceive right
from the moment of birth whereas reasoning and reflection about these with refer-
ence to their real nature and worth
(n(?6g
tE oivotav xai WbcXEtav) are acquired
by those who do acquire them with difficulty and through a long and troublesome
process of education (1 86b1 1 -cS).,
Obafemi A wolowo University
lle - Ife, Nigeria
the true philosopher to be capable of perceiving the consequences of the hypotheses, and
use sensible particulars as images of Forms, even more competently than the practitio-
ners of the method of dianoia; for the two methods must be complementary at the stage
of noesis. See note 8 above, and my "Mathematics, Dialectic and the Good in the
Republic VI-VII" (n.8) 120ff.
S2 Thus, Platonic recollection (R1) has a definite Kantian flavour. See note 35 above.
S See my "Plato on the Object of Knowledge: Theaetetus 185c ff." (n.24) esp. 306-7. Cf.
also W.K.C. Guthrie (n.1, 345-6), where, having rejected Cornford's view that Plato
ascribes "highly reflective judgements" to infants in the Phaedo, he cites Theaetetus
186b-c, and Timaeus 43c. ff. (on the condition of the human mind at birth) in support of
his view that Plato consistently held that recollection is a process - which means that it
takes time, and that "many men never complete it".
I would like to thank the Editor, Dr Malcolm Schofield, for his very helpful comments
on earlier versions of this paper.
60

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Sense-Experience and the Argument for Recollection in Plato's "Phaedo"

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