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Reflective Analysis on Afghanistan

Omar Alansari-Kreger

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, factionalism quickly
descended on the Afghan national landscape which resulted in almost two decades of
civil war. The most predominate out of these factions arrived in the form of the Taliban
depicting left over remains from the loosely run alliance of Mujahedeen fighters. Now
that a common enemy no longer existed in the aftermath of the Cold War, Afghan
factions, formed largely through the designs of tribal lineage, began fighting among
themselves for control over the nation. The Taliban monopolized most of the foreign
weapon systems dumped into Afghanistan deriving from Western support during the
years of the Soviet invasion; as a result of that tactical advantage the Taliban was quick
to form the so called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan even though the entire nation
remained in a civil war with the Northern Alliance.
The reason for this history lesson is to simply demonstrate that the Taliban is
much more than a band of nameless terrorists bent on blind belligerence, but are simply
trying to reestablish the old order that had existed before 9/11. Since the launch of
Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban has styled itself as an alternative to the
current socio-political order that rules Afghanistan with the help of its American minders.
In all reality, there arent too many alternatives besides the Taliban within the Afghan
national arena. The Taliban up-plays the underdog card to make it appear as if they
are waging a holy war against the infidels which further attracts extreme dogmatists
functioning under religious affiliations. It becomes all too easy to convert young, eager,
and desperate minds into the realm of fanaticism when there is such a great deal of
social disparity in the foreground.
In the eyes of many, the Taliban is merely a deposed government that is trying to
forge a desperate comeback; the illegal drug and arms trade finances the operational
backbone of the Taliban which is why numerous military campaigns have targeted
narcotic producing poppy fields. That medium of engagement has transformed into a
method that leverages the playing field within the Afghan arena. So, the Taliban is much
more than a petty band of terrorists even though the mobility of their tactics is terroristic
in nature. Outside major urban areas in Afghanistan, the Taliban still functions as a
feared authority that thrives off the malignant intimidation (often conducted under the
alias of communal extortion) of its adversaries; both foreign and domestic.
It is for that reason why diplomatic interactions with the Taliban can be
legitimized; besides, the United States has expressed an interest in pulling out of
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Afghanistan within a not too distant future. It is not like the United States will be able to
eradicate the Taliban before that timeframe comes to pass; even if that happens a
potent flame of propaganda will depict an underclass that fought a romanticized struggle
against a global power paving the way for the resurgence of a new Taliban styled
organization. You can eliminate the incumbent, but that isnt the same as eradicating
the conceptual paradigm.
Side note about prisoner exchanges between Taliban and American forces:
On a side note, we shouldnt forget that the release of John McCain from the
infamous Hanoi Hilton during the Vietnam War can be viewed in a similar light
considering that the essence of that arrangement involved the release of North
Vietnamese regulars and irregulars. There is a staunch reason why McCain is strongly
opposed to torture which attributes to the experiences he endured while imprisoned at
the hands of his North Vietnamese captors. An outside observer has to wonder, if he
wasnt released would we have survived the war?