Leibnizs Theodicy and the Epistemological Problem of Evil

Christia Mercer, Columbia University

University of Notre Dame, September 2010
(Please dont cite without permission)
Our conference is entitled Leibniz's Theodicy: Context and Content. Its description
insists:
unlike typical conferences focused on a publication anniversary, this conference will also
explore how the views expressed fit into the larger intellectual landscape of the period, standing
as it does at crucial crossroads: the waning of the post-Reformation, the maturing of the Scientific
Revolution, the dawning of the Enlightenment, and the maturing of the rationalist philosophical
framework introduced in the early seventeenth century. As a result, papers will focus both on
Leibniz and the text of the Theodicy as well their relation to these broader themes.
In this paper, I am very interested in contextualizing the Theodicy. Not only
because weve been encouraged to do so, but also because some of the subtlety and
importance of the text is best seen in doing so. One part of the context I want to delineate
is philosophical, the other historical.
The philosophical problem that concerns me is both a striking feature of the
Theodicy and one that (as far as I know) has not been noted, namely, what I call Leibnizs
epistemological optimism (EO). In my book, I highlight Leibnizs commitment as a
young man to a philosophy of peace. I argue that he intended to use philosophy as a
means to political, religious, personal peace.
1

Noting Leibnizs irenism is important, but it is also important to take seriously
what might be considered the irenical features of his methodology. In the book, I discuss
two such features. The first, what I call his conciliatory eclecticism, is the method that the
thoughtful philosopher is supposed to use in discovering the right or true solution to a
problem. In brief, this method is to survey prominent positions offered by major
historical and contemporary philosophers and then combine or conciliate the true
elements drawn from those.
2
Leibnizs commitment to conciliatory eclecticism reached a
fevered pitch around the time of the Theodicy, motivated by his fascination with the
Chinese philosophy that he was learning from the Jesuits in China.
3
In his early period,
Leibniz was committed to conciliating warring philosophical and Judeo-Christian
positions; in his later years, he was eager to extend the materials for his conciliation to
any and every smart position he found. He became convinced that Chinese philosophy
had much to offer and so it should be studied closely as well. As he wrote to Joachim
1
Leibniz Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development (Cambridge University Press: 2001), passim. Maria
Rosa Antognazzas rich and insightful book, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography, is both consistent with my
study of the youthful Leibniz and goes well beyond it by showing in wonderful detail how his commitment
to peace, i.e., his irenism, constitutes the goal around which the diverse projects of his fascinating life can
be best understood.
2
For more about how this is supposed to work, see chapter 1: The Metaphysics of Method assumes that
the true metaphysics will be constructed from the underlying truths in the great philosophical systems, will
be consistent with Christian doctrine and the claims of the revelation, and will explain the phenomena
(including the new experiments) (p. 53).
3
See Cook and Rosemont, eds. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China; and Cook, Understanding
the Other Leibniz.
Bouvet in 1700:
What you tell me of the traces of the true revealed religion among the ancient Chinese, which
are to be found in their ... classical books, seems to be considerable. I have always been inclined
to believe that the ancient Chinese, like the ancient Arabs (witness the book of Job), and perhaps
the ancient Celts (that is to say the Germans and Gauls) were far from idolatry, and were rather
worshippers of the sovereign principle.
4
Leibniz assumed that the truth is there to be discovered by any and all thoughtful people
regardless of their perspective.
The first feature of the methodology is the means to discover the truth, while the
second is the means of encouraging others to find it themselves. In the book, I called this
the rhetoric of attraction, which was supposed to help explain why Leibniz would so
often shift his philosophical terminology and so seldom put his philosophical cards on the
table. While I think he continues to use this rhetoric of attraction in his later period, it
becomes less prominent towards the end of his life when he more actively wants to enlist
people to his own view. But a major goal of his rhetorical tendency remains: to engage
his interlocutors in a manner that will attract their attention so that they will see the right
way to view the problem and its solution. Were all familiar with texts like the following.
Consider this often cited note from 1676:
A metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstrations, but nothing should
be demonstrated in it apart from that which does not clash too much with received opinions. For
in that way this metaphysics can be accepted; and once it has been approved then, if people
examine it more deeply later, they themselves will draw the necessary consequences. Besides
this, one can, as a separate undertaking, show these people later the way of reasoning about these
things. In this metaphysics, it will be useful for there to be added here and there the authoritative
utterances of great men, who have reasoned in a similar way; especially when these utterances
contain something that seems to have some possible relevance to the illustration of a view.
5

Or consider this from1678:
I am concerned, as are all who wish to hold a middle ground, not to seem too much inclined
toward either of the two opposed adversaries. Whenever I discuss matters with the Cartesians,
certainly, I extol Aristotle where he deserves it and undertake a defense of the ancient philosophy,
because I see that many Cartesians read their one master only, ... and thus unwisely impose limits
on their own ability.... I think that the two philosophies should be combined and that where the
old leaves off, the new should begin.
6
Or, as he writes in a letter to Duke Johann Friedrich of 1679:
There are many sides to everything, and the way it [a philosophical proposal] is first seen
determines much. The most harmless proposals have often been rejected on false suspicions, and
the most scabby ones accepted through the ability of their supporters. People often do not take
pains to examine matters thoroughly, and however acceptable views may be, they are sometimes
4
Quoted in Walker, The Ancient Theology, 199. The story of the Jesuit missionaries in China is a
fascinating one that I cannot summarize here. Suffice it to say that, although many of Leibnizs
contemporaries were outraged by their claims about the Chinese, Leibniz took their accounts of Chinese
thought as significant evidence for the truth of a version of prisca theologia. According to Leibniz, Chinese
thought contained some truths because Christian wisdom had at one time found its way to China. For some
of the details about the Jesuits and about Leibnizs reactions, see Walker, The Ancient Theology, chapter 4.
Also, see Cook and Rosemont, eds., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Writings on China; and Cook,
Understanding the Other Leibniz.
5
VI iii 573f-74f: Pk 94. For other such texts, see my Leibniz Metaphysics, xx; and Antognazzas Leibniz,
yy.
6
II.i.402: L 190
2
rejected at once on a false prepossession.
7

Finally, in the New Essays, written in 1703-05, Leibniz offers a summary of his
philosophy and the methodology that produced it. He writes:
This system appears to unite Plato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes, the Scholastics with
the moderns, theology and morality with reason. Apparently it takes the best from all systems and
then advances further than anyone has yet done.... I now see what Plato had in mind when he
talked about matter as an imperfect and transitory being; what Aristotle meant by his entelechy;
how far the sceptics were right in decrying the senses.... How to make sense of those who put life
and perception into everything .... I see everything to be regular and rich beyond what anyone has
previously conceived.... Well, sir, you will be surprised at all I have to tell you, especially when
you grasp how much it elevates our knowledge of the greatness and perfection of God.
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One of my points today is to draw attention to the rhetorical aspect of the Theodicy. More
on that later.
My strategy now is this: Ill show that the Theodicy raises some puzzling
questions about Leibnizs epistemological goals; then Ill contextualize those questions
by introducing you to what I call the Ultimate Epistemological Problem (UEP) and some
of its prominent historical solutions. Then Ill turn to works related to the Theodicy to
explicate Leibnizs solution to the UEP and finally to the Theodicy itself.
I. The Theodicy and Epistemological Optimism
At the very beginning of the preface of the Theodicy, Leibniz sets up a contrast
between the men in general, who embrace outward forms for the expression of their
religion like ceremonies, and those who seek sound piety, that is to say, light and
virtue. He explains that because of human weakness, we are impressed by what is
outward and do not work appropriately to discover the inner essence of things (p. 49).
These introductory comments suggest what might be called epistemological pessimism,
namely, the view that human nature is such that few will acquire knowledge or
understanding of the divine light and the virtue that is supposed to be related to it.
But notice how the preface continues. According to Leibniz, the aim of religion is
to withdraw us from any approach to vice, to inure us to the good and to make us
familiar with virtue. That was the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of the wise
men who founded religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, divine founder of the
purest and most enlightened religion.
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(p. 49). Leibniz adds: it happens only too often
that devotion is stifled by custom, and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions of
men (dvotion est touffe par des faons, p. 50). Leibniz suggests three points here:
first, that one of the main goals of religion is to effect virtue; second, that Christianity is
one among other enlightened religions, albeit the purest and most enlightened and the
7
II i 123: L 262.
8
VI ii 71-73.
9
Page numbers are given to the Open Court edition, but Ive given the French when I think its worthwhile
doing so as here: "pour nous loigner des approches du vice, nous accoutumer au bien, et pour nous
rendre la vertu familiere. C'toit le but de Mose, & d'autres bons Legislateurs, des sages Fondateurs des
Ordres Religieux, & sur-tout de Jesus-Christ, divin Fondateur de la Religion la plus pure & la plus
claire."
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one founded by a divine personage; and finally that the divine light (lumiere divine)
is there to be glimpsed for anyone (of whatever religion) who can avoid the obscurity of
the opinions of men. These points themselves suggest something both radical and
epistemologically optimistic, namely, that the divine light is available to everyone,
regardless of religion, and that virtue is the point or one of the main points -- of
religion. The epistemological optimism here consists in the assumption that humans are
capable of glimpsing the divine light regardless of their religious perspective.
Leibniz then offers a history of religion. Although the Hebrews were more
enlightened than the rest of the human race so that they could understand that God is a
single source of all good, he credits the wise men of other nations with coming close
to the correct doctrine of divine substance. Leibniz suggests that Mohammed also
grasped theological truths which his followers spread abroad. In this brief history,
Leibniz emphasizes the doctrine of immortality. Notice that he also suggests here that
Jesus Christ is merely a part albeit a very important part -- of this history. He writes:
but it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until Jesus Christ lifted the veil.
Moses had already expressed the beautiful Ideas of the greatness and the goodness of
God , but Jesus Christ developed fully the consequences of these conceptons,
proclaiming that divine goodness and justice shine forth to perfection in Gods designs
for the souls of men (50-51).
10

There appears to be a tension in the first few paragraphs of the Theodicys preface.
On the one hand, Leibniz seems pessimistic about the capacity of humans to grasp the
divine light and thereby acquire the virtue that is supposed to follow from it. They fail to
acquire this ultimate knowledge due to human weakness. On the other hand, he seems
optimistic, suggesting that humans are naturally poised to discover this light and virtue.
All they have to do whether Jew, Muslim, Christian, or other is avoid the obscuring
opinions of men and discern the beautiful conceptions related to the greatness and
goodness of God.
Not only does the preface go on to suggest that Leibniz is epistemologically
optimistic, but of course the rest of the work implies both that Leibniz himself has a firm
grasp of the way the world is and that he intends to convince others of his account (in
short, that this is the best of all possible worlds). But if he really is so optimistic, why
doesnt he make this optimism more explicit in the Theodicy, which is, after all, a
discussion of the problems of evil and the perfection of the world? Its particularly
striking that the entire discussion of the Theodicy optimistically assumes that we human
beings can grasp the harmonious way the world is and yet it doesnt argue for his EO at
all. In short, a survey of the Theodicy, leaves us with some puzzling questions about
Leibnizs underlying epistemology. Is it easy to acquire this ultimate knowledge or not?
Is it easy to be moved by the beauty of these conceptions or not? What does it mean to
say that conceptions are beautiful? In what does this beauty consists? In the end, what
are we to think about the ease of acquiring this most important, ultimate knowledge?
In order to understand Leibnizs epistemological optimism and its role in the
Theodicy, we have to set things up. The set up has three parts. In Part II A, I offer an
account of the metaphysical reasons for being epistemologically optimist; in Part II B,
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...mais elle n'toit point autoris d'une maniere populaire, jusqu' ce que Jesus Christ leva le
voile...Mose avoit dja donn les belles idees de la grandeur & de la bont de Dieu...mais Jesus Christ en
tablissoit toutes les consequences, et il faisoit voir que la bont & la justice divine clatent parfaitement
dans ce que Dieu prpare aux ames.
4
theres a presentation of the ultimate epistemological problem (UEP) while Part III
contains a romp through the UEP in the political, philosophical, and religious context of
early modern Germany. Finally, in Part IV, I return to the Theodicy and related texts to
resolve the puzzle about Leibnizs epistemological optimism.
II. The Ultimate Epistemological Problem
A. The Metaphysical Set Up [Ive made this point elsewhere, so this is just a reminder]:
For many thinkers in the history of philosophy, in different ways and to different degrees,
we human beings are divine. However undivine you may feel, you and the other products of the
divine nature are nonetheless so. The underlying assumption here is that there is an ultimately
good source of the world that is somehow IN every creature. But how? There has been a good
deal of disagreement about the precise relation between God and creatures in the history of
philosophy. But for many philosophers -- both inside and outside the Judeo-Christian tradition
the assumption is that the Supreme Being is in us and in the world.
Consider some classic expressions of this assumption.
--- In the New Testament, Paul writes that there is:
One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all (Ephesians, 4:6).
For in him we live and move and have our being (Acts 17:28). God is that of whom all things
are, through whom all things are, in whom all things are (Rom.11: 36).
--- Anselm of Canterbury, 11th century, Monologion: The supreme essence is in and through all
things. All things are through and in - and out of - the supreme essence (sect. 14);
--- Augustines Confessions, Book I, sect. 1: Without you, whatever exists would not exist. But
does what exists contain you? I also have being ... which I would not have unless you were in me.
Or rather, I would have no being if I were not in you.
So, God is in us and in the world. The divine nature is there to be glimpsed, loved, and
(for some philosophers) experienced. [slide of St Teresas Ecstasy?].
B. The Problem
But this intimate relation between God and the world in general and between God
and humans in particular generates what I consider to be a striking philosophical problem
(it is not one, as far as I can tell, that has been properly noted).
The problem goes like this. The divine nature is diffused, expressed, or emanated
(or whatever relation suits you) throughout the world and moreover the same nature is in
us, who are the divine products, expressions, or modes of God. Given the closeness of
this relationship, it would seem to follow that those creatures capable of knowledge of the
world say, creatures like us human beings would have intimate knowledge of the
divinity. After all, given that the divinity is everywhere in nature and (many of
philosophers maintain) constitutes our nature, it would seem to follow that we would
have lots of knowledge of it. To make the point another way, the close metaphysical
relation between God and creatures would seem to imply a close epistemological relation.
But of course this is not the case. Not only do we not have intimate knowledge of
God, we dont have any direct knowledge of God at all. In fact, it seems very, very
difficult to acquire such knowledge.
My inclination is to see this problem as a version of the problem of evil. The
problem faces anyone who assumes that the divine nature is in the world and in all its
parts. The severity of the problem seems to increase the more fully the divine nature is in
the world and in us. That is, the more the divine nature is supposed to be IN things, the
5
easier it should be to know it. How can God be so fully there and yet not be more
apparent? Given that the divine nature is so difficult to know, it would seem to follow that
something has gone wrong. But with God things are not supposed to go wrong. So, the
apparent paradox is: God is everywhere, but nowhere to be found.
Nor is this just an academic problem. According to many of the philosophers who
maintain the close metaphysical relation between God and us, the goodness of our souls
depends on glimpsing God. That is, its not just that it would be nice to see God, say, like
it would be nice to see Barack Obama succeed or social justice prevail. Rather, for many
thinkers who insist that God and the world are so intimately related, they also insist that
we must glimpse God in order to be virtuous or righteous or good. For them, one cannot
live a proper life without glimpsing the divine nature. Moreover, for some people, this
unrequited desire to know the divine creates a kind of suffering. I know or strongly
believe that the divine nature is there to be glimpsed, but cannot see it myself.
Is there a solution to the problem, a way to avoid the paradox? Lets be clear
about what a solution might look like. For those philosophers who maintain that God is
thoroughly in the world and who want to solve (or circumvent) the ultimate
epistemological problem, they will have to explain precisely what it is about humans that
prevent them from immediately finding God. I propose that they will need to answer
three questions:
1. What prevents people from (more or less easily) glimpsing the divine nature?
2. What will allow them to get better at it?
3. Is it ever easy to do so and if so, how?
III. Prominent Historical Solutions to the Ultimate Epistemological Problem
The Theodicy offers a solution to the Ultimate Epistemological Problem. Within
the context of this philosophical problem, we can better appreciate the power of the work.
But to grasp the subtlety and originality of Leibnizs solution, we need also to place the
work in its broader historical scope. Lets do that now.
A. Epistemological Pessimism and Original Sin
The Christian doctrine of original sin offers a brilliant solution to the problem and
neatly answers our questions. Its easy to forget how radical this position is. Let me
remind you.
Because of original sin in brief, because of our tainted natures we turn away
from God and seek the truth by mistaken means. Because of original sin, the only way to
glimpse God within the world is through grace, i.e., with direct divine help. Either we are
utterly lost to sinfulness and foolishness, or God aids us in recognizing the divinity and
(however pathetically) following the right course. Paul explains in Romans that, on the
one hand, those who have sought the truth are without excuse in that what can be
known about God has shown it [the truth] to them. Ever since the creation of the world
his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the
things that have been made. On the other hand, admits Paul, they became futile in their
thinking and their senseless minds were darkened so that claiming to be wise, they
became fools (Romans 1:18-23). Although Pauline letters are hardly systematic, the
suggestion is that grace is necessary for ultimate knowledge. Paul is vividly clear about
what happens if we are not properly helped. Such people are Full of envy, deceit,
craftiness, they are gossipers, slanderers, insolent, haughty, boastful, foolish, heartless,
ruthless (I: 29).
6
Augustine offers a systematic philosophy that offers direct answers to our
questions. He does not shy away from the fact that God is evident in the world. He
writes: God is wholly everywhere and the mind lives and moves and has its being in
him. The mind acquires knowledge by turning towards the Lord, as to the light which
in some fashion had reached it even while it had been turned away form him
(Confessions XIV.15.21). So, for Augustine, God is there to be discovered; it ought to be
easy to find God.
But it is not. Because of the sinful nature we inherit from Adam and Eve, we
rarely glimpse the divinity in the world. So, in answer to our first question, it is our
(proper) punishment for original sin that prevents us from glimpsing the divine nature. As
he makes the point in the Confessions: But from the disappointment I suffered I
perceived that the darknesses of my soul would not allow me to contemplate these
sublimities (VII.xx.26).
Is there anyway out of this epistemological trap? Or as Augustine himself poises
the question: What will wretched man do? (VII.xx27). In answer to our second
question, he explains that we will be delivered from this state only through the grace of
Jesus Christ (ibid.). Thus, human nature by itself is not capable of finding God, and will
do so only with direct divine help.
In answer to our third question, is it ever easy? The short answer for Augustine is
a resounding NO. But, with the help of God, some of us can nonetheless struggle to
remain in contact with the divinity and live something like a proper life (as book 10 of
the Confessions makes clear, it is a constant struggle to live properly).
However morose the doctrine of original sin might make us, it offers a tidy
solution to the UEP: although God is metaphysically very close to human beings, they
cannot grasp the divinity due to their fallen nature; grace is necessary for any proper
epistemological relation to God.
B. Mitigated Epistemological Optimism in Lutheran Germany
1. Luthers Trouble
Famously, at the Leipzig Disputation in 1519, Luther denied the authority of the
Church. For our purposes, what is particularly important is that, in doing so, he denied a
long established criterion of truth, namely, traditional church authority. At the center of
Luthers rebellion are the denial of authority and the acceptance of his own conscience as
a criterion of truth. As you know, Luther wrote volumes of commentaries on Biblical
texts, full of epistemological darkness and doom. Among the most relevant of these is his
long commentary on Galatians, which both Luther and many of his followers considered
one of his most important. The epistemology of the Galatians commentary is terrifying.
Luther complains bitterly about the ease with which the truth may be hidden from sight,
even for those believers who have just been shown the way to it. Even those who are
well-established in the truth may become lost. Indeed, we make little headway in the
pursuit of the truth because the devil seduces people into misbelief. There are four
points here especially relevant to the Theodicy, each more terrifying than the next. First,
the truth about God often escapes the arduous truth-seeker. Second, one can glimpse the
divinity and almost immediately lose sight of it. Third, one can glimpse the divinity and
yet be seduced by the devil in to mistaken belief. Finally, to be mistaken is to be doomed.
For Luther, either you find the truth or you are utterly lost, no better than a Jew, a
Mohammedan, and any other old or new heretic [citations].
The epistemological pessimism here is striking. Human nature is weak and easily
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deceived. Acquiring anything like a stable knowledge of the divinity requires grace. The
divine nature will not be grasped without grace.
[Interesting and relevant historical facts:]
When Luther cast aside the stabilizing influence of authority, he opened the door to
epistemological chaos. If Luthers conscience is good enough to overthrow authority, then why
isnt mine? He may think that hes justified in his truth, but what if the devil is seducing him? And
of course chaos ensued. I remind you of the many immediate problems: the Peasants Revolt, the
development of radical splinter groups like Anabaptists, the Zwickau Prophets of Wittenberg
(in the period 1521-22) who claimed that they regularly had conversations with the Holy Spirit
(beer apparently helped!). Such groups merely pushed Luthers epistemological strategy to its
logical conclusion.
Fast forward to the seventeenth century. Between the beginning of the Thirty Years War
in 1618 and the Peace of Westphalia in1648, close to one-third of the population of the German
states (roughly 6 million people) died. Many of these deaths were not direct casualties of war, but
due to its disruption and illness. The soldiers carried disease and ravaged food supplies. One
historian has written that, by the end of the war, Germany was in economic ruin, her fields
devastated and blood-soaked.
During the period and beyond, the truth was a very unstable matter. My favorite example
is that famous moment in Prague (May 1618) when angry Calvinists threw two Catholic
representatives from a high window in the castle. The men survived their fall. According to the
Catholic story, angels appeared and carried the men to safety. According to the Protestant
account, a large pile of manure spared the men.
Dick Popkin and others have emphasized the importance of skepticism in the period as a
response to this epistemological chaos. The moral that I want to draw is slightly different: the
Protestant revolt and the political and religious horrors that ensued encouraged many truth-
seekers (i.e., non-skeptics) to be pessimistic about achieving their epistemological goals with any
ease. It would have been foolhardy in the seventeenth century to assume that a stable system of
knowledge could be generated with ease. The task of glimpsing God and using that knowledge as
a means to generate either a political structure or an ethics must have seemed extremely arduous.
2. Philip Melanchthon to the Rescue: Mitigated Optimism
But Luthers right-man was willing to try. Melanchthon was justifiably given the
title Praeceptor Germaniae. His theological, philosophical, and literary achievements
were extraordinary. Here are some of the highlights relevant to us:
a. He composed the first systematic treatise of Reformed theology, the Loci
Communes and the Ausburg Confession, the first Protestant manifesto (which Leibniz
sites frequently in the Theodicy).
b. Given the epistemological chaos of the 1520s (see above), it became
Melanchthons task to create a stable environment for a Lutheran life. In response to the
chaos that followed his mentors rebellions, he came to see poor education as the main
source of the problem, and turned to philosophy for a solution. He created a university
curriculum that was supposed to educate the proper Protestant citizen and that survived
through much of the seventeenth century. (For us, it is especially noteworthy that he
advised on educational reforms for the university in Leipzig.)
c. Luther emphasized the distrust of reason in understanding God and Gods will.
Melanchthon used Aristotle to help build a clear distinction between philosophy as the domain of
reason and theology as the domain of faith. He begins On the Distinction between the Gospel and
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Philosophy of 1527 with a misreading of Paul:
When Paul says: See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy (Colossians 2:8), he
does not reject philosophy but its abuse. Paul is speaking of the kind of abuse that is most
harmful in the Church, namely, when Scripture is received as though it taught nothing other than
a knowledge of human reason. For it is easy for cunning men to transform the Gospel by skilful
explanation, into philosophy, that is, the teaching of human reason But [when properly
restricted] philosophy is a good creation of God, and a thing that is necessary in this
corporal and civic life, such as food, drink or public laws.
d. Within its proper domain, Melanchthon argued that reason has two very important
tasks. In the first place, the proper use of reason can produce certain. Here, the underlying idea
seems to be that God made human reason and philosophical truths so that they perfectly suit one
another. Human reason, a divine gift, will simply acquiesce to philosophically derived
consequences and the proper order of ideas. [Should we tell our logic students this?] The other
use of reason is the a posteriori study of Gods footprints in the natural world. Here the idea is
that God made the world and reason so that reason could discover the providence of God within.
Melanchthon explains that knowledge of natural causes and effects is possible because the
world is arranged by God and so philosophy should study that divine order.
e. Despite its importance in philosophy and the study of nature, reason cannot
apprehend the truths contained in the Gospel. Certainty about many such truths is only
available to the faithful. It is important, however, that philosophy and its divine reason
prepare the mind for theology. [citations]
f. It is the nature of this preparation that is the final point to emphasize. Given the
chaos of the 1520s, it is particularly striking how optimistic Melanchton becomes about
the powers of mind and its reason. Through the proper use of reason, the mind will see
and assent to the truths.
In summary, Melanchthon appears to believe that the mind is the kind of thing
that can be ordered or harmonized, the right education (i.e., a rigorous one based in the
classics) will produce such an order, and a stable society is constituted of such ordered
minds. In Melanchthons system, there is virtually no place for civil disobedience. To
exaggerate somewhat, there are ordered states created out of ordered minds within which
the faithful with their individual consciences can flourish. He brilliantly creates a role
for authority that will offer a stable environment within which to live and be consistent
with the basic theological teachings of Luther.
In the end, we have an interesting solution to our UEP and answer to our
questions:
1. What prevents people from (more or less easily) glimpsing the divine nature?
Part of the reason that people cannot glimpse the divine nature is that they have not
developed an ordered and harmonized mind and they have not developed an ordered and
harmonized mind at least partly because they have not lived in an ordered state.
2. What will allow them to get better at it?
The right education.
3. Is it ever easy to do so and if so, how?
Part of Melanchthons point in focusing on the importance of civil order is to avoid the
horrors of disorder. But there is some reason to believe that he was prepared to say that,
while it is never be easy to glimpse God and while grace is always required to do, a stable
state and a stable mind will create a circumstance in which glimpsing God (and
apparently receiving grace) is easier.
3. The Peace of Westphalia and Conciliatory Optimism
9
At the end of the Thirty Years War, as the German states, universities, town life
stabilized, statesmen and philosophers because obsessed with peace. The Peace of
Westphalia of 1648 proclaims in Article 1: There shall be a Christian and Universal
Peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity among the previously conflicting
political groups. Moreover, the article demands that this peace and amity be observed
and cultivated with such a sincerity and zeal that each party shall endeavor to procure the
benefit, honor, and advantage of the other; that thus on all sides there may see this peace
and friendship flourish.
The language of the article commands that peace be made out of a diversity of
interests. So did many German seventeenth-century philosophers. That is, throughout the
German states, philosophers claimed that a harmonized and true philosophy could be
constructed out of diverse elements. These elements may not easily cohere, but when
cultivated with sincerity and zeal, they could be made into a harmonious whole. For
philosophers in the German states, the goal of peace became rather like an 11th
Commandment: Thou shall honor and seek peace!
Johann Adam Scherzer (1628-83) and Jakob Thomasius (1622-84) were
prominent professors at Leipzig who influenced Leibniz. Each was aware of the present
chaos of philosophy and yet optimistic about the possibility of peace. For each, the proper
use of the history of philosophy and the proper education was the root of success.
Briefly, consider, the title page of a text by Adam Scherzer. His Vade mecum went through at least
five editions from 1564-1704. For now, notice that Plato (here without beard!) stands on one side
of sphere with Aristotle on the other. The triangle, a symbol of the trinity sheds light on the stag, a
symbol of the faithful Christian. Plato and Aristotle point toward the light illuminating the stag.
There is not time for many examples here, but consider the title page of a book by Jakob
Thomasius (1622-84), who is often called the father of the Enlightenment figure, Christian
Thomasius, a well- known figure in Leipzig , and mentor to the young Leibniz. I argue elsewhere
that Leibniz was much influenced by Thomasius methodological and philosophical proposals.
For Thomasius, the proper philosophical system will be constructed out of a harmony of truths
that corresponds to the harmony of Gods attributes. Each discipline gives insight into some set of
truths, but each set is connected to all the others. The system is a web of interrelated truths.
[see slides in Nijmegen lecture; slide of peace]
Finally, lets consider Johann Christoph Sturm, a contemporary of Leibniz (1646-1716).
For us, Sturm is particularly important as a system builder whose system is a powerful response
to the need for intellectual peace. Sturms Eclectic Philosophy of 1686 wonderfully represents
what happens to the conciliatory methodology when it is charged with the task of assimilating the
new natural philosophy. Not only does Sturm not exemplify the Cartesian spirit, he considers
Descartes thought only one of several sources of truth. According to Sturm, his period has
reached a dangerous state of "envy and malice" because his contemporaries have been both
arrogant in their own views and ignorant in their opinions of others. The Cartesians are
especially guilty. If his fellow Cartesians will but "open their eyes, it will become clear that no
single philosopher is sufficient when it comes to understanding "the whole wonderful immensity
of Nature."
What these German philosophers all have in common:
a. The problem with the pursuit of knowledge in general and of God and nature in
particular in mid-seventeenth-century Germany is that there is too much discord and not
enough harmony among philosophers. (Scherzer: as many philosophies as
philosophers).
b. The causes of this philosophical chaos is (at least): the lack of care in using the
history of philosophy (so that obscurity results); the lack of clarity in defining and using
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philosophical terms (so that confusion and then discord results).
c. The solution to this problem is the proper method in philosophy which
involves: (i) proper study of history of philosophy so that the real views of historical
authors are understood (including Jewish and other non-Christian sources); (ii) careful
discrimination among these so that only the true and accurate views are selected; and (iii)
great care in presentation of these views so that these true elements of philosophy can be
understood and used.
d. The underlying metaphysical assumption is that God emanates the divine
attributes so that the world contains and reflects the divine harmony. God is in that sense
there to be glimpsed.
e. The underlying epistemological assumption is that through the careful use of
the proper methodology, we can glimpse the attributes of God and the harmony of the
world.
f. In conclusion, they all share a mitigated epistemological optimism in that they
believe human beings can glimpse the truth, including truths about God, and even create
a philosophical system that corresponds to the divinely ordained truths, but it requires
education and hard work.
4. Epistemological Optimism and the Beauty of Insight
[Ive written about this elsewhere, but to remind you]
Plotinus is surely one of the most epistemologically optimistic philosophers in the history
of philosophy. His attitude and language is often strikingly like Leibniz, who read him as a boy. A
few words about him will help.
In Plotinus essay on Beauty (which for centuries, was the only treatise of the Enneads
available), we find the surprising notion that the beauty in a physical object a statue, a sunset, a
childs embrace can act as a first step in the epistemological journey to knowledge of the
divinity. Very simply, the claims are: the beauty of the supreme being (the One) is diffused
throughout the world so that everything is a manifestation of the beautiful itself. Thus, when a
human being recognizes the beauty even in a physical object, she is glimpsing the beautiful itself
and recognizing (at some level of consciousness) her own connection to it. Plotinus writes: The
beauty, then, of bodily forms comes about in this way from communion with the intelligible
realm. According to Plotinus, then, it is easy to glimpse the beautiful and be drawn towards it.
Concerning our first qstn and why so few people see the divinity in nature, the short answer is
that their souls have just not been directed in the right way and therefore have not had the
opportunity to glimpse the divinity. The answer to our second question is that we will become
better at glimpsing the divine in nature, as soon as we contemplate the beauty in the world. Once
we glimpse physical beauty, it will become easier to recognize moral beauty (e.g., the beauty of
souls). Every virtue is a beauty of The Soul. And, having glimpsed the beauty of virtuous souls,
it is easier to accustom ones eye to the beautiful itself. But how? In order to answer our third
question, we need to explain why, when you glimpse the beauty in something, this glimpsing
makes it easier to move to the higher epistemological state, one more closely related to the divine
nature. Plotinus writes: The soul is delighted when it sees any signs of its kinship or anything
that is akin to itself, takes its own to itself, and is stirred to new awareness of whence and what it
really is [sect. 2]. He continues: All souls tend to the Good. Anyone who has seen it knows
what I mean, in what sense it is beautiful. As good, it is desired and towards it desire advances
[sect.7].
For our purposes, what is important is that the simple recognition of a beautiful thing
changes you. It makes the soul that lingers on a beautiful object better and hence more capable of
going to the next stage. Your soul becomes better and better, until it is finally ready for more
profound knowledge (IV.9.5). Using elements from Platos cave analogy, Plotinus writes: For the
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eye must be adapted to what is to be seen, have some likeness to it, if it would give itself to
contemplation. No eye that has not become like unto the sun will ever look upon the sun; nor will
any that is not beautiful look upon the beautiful. Let each one therefore become godlike and
beautiful who would contemplate the divine and beautiful (I 6 [9]).
Plotinus goes on to say that, every part of knowledge contains also all the other parts
potentially and therefore the knower in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a kind of
sequence. In short, Plotinus solution to the ultimate epistemological problem is to say: the
divinity is everywhere in the world to be found, and we will indeed find it there and do so with
greater and greater ease as we learn to recognize the beauty in things.
IV. Leibnizs Extreme Epistemological Optimism
The elaborate historical context set in Section III allows us to grasp the subtlety
and originality of Leibnizs solution to the UEP. As with so many other philosophical
problems, Leibniz responded to the UEP with finesse. For him it was obvious that God is
everywhere, that everything is in God, and even that we are intimately related to God
epistemologically. I propose that his extreme epistemological optimism was due to his
fundamental belief both that there is an intimate relation between God and creatures and
therefore that there must be an intimate epistemological relation as well. Unlike Paul and
Augustine, he did not think that original sin infected the human reason and
understanding; unlike Luther, he did not think that, having glimpsed the divinity, it was
easy to be misled. Although he agreed with Melanchthon that a stable mind was easier to
produce in a stable society, he did not think grace was required for insight into most
truths about the divinity (i.e., the non-revelatory ones). And, while he agreed with his
German Lutheran predecessors that the proper methodology would help people arrive at
the truth, he went much further than they dared do. His extreme EO is rooted in the view
(as it was for Plotinus) that the beauty of the truths themselves would draw and motivate
humanity.
Lets consider his solution to the UEP. I remind you that the severity of the
problem seems to increase the more fully the divine nature is in the world and in us. The
more the divine nature is supposed to be in things, the easier it should be to know it. The
apparent paradox is: God is everywhere, but nowhere to be found. Leibnizs response to
this paradox is to claim that God is everywhere and therefore everywhere to be found. He
believes that to have any sort of knowledge is to glimpse God and moreover to have any
sort of knowledge is to love it and want more. So, whatever sort of knowledge it is, one
has taken a step toward knowledge of the divine.
Consider first Leibnizs view that the intimacy of the metaphysical relation
between God and humanity entails an epistemological intimacy. For Leibniz, even
confused perceptions contain potentially knowledge of the whole. The following, well
known passages take on a slightly new sense when placed in the context of the UEP.
For our soul expresses God, the universe, and all essences, as well as all existences ( 26,
Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686).
The monad therefore already envelops its past and future states in itself, so that an omniscient
being could read them from it; and monads agree between themselves, being mirrors of the same
universe to infinity, although the universe itself is of an infinite diffusion (Letter to Peirre
Dangicourt, 1716 (Shorter Texts, p. 54)).
Each soul is a world in miniature, representing things from the outside according to its point of
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view, and confusedly or distinctly according to the organs which accompany it, whereas God
includes everything distinctly and eminently (Letter to Electress Sophie 6 February 1706
(Shorter Texts, p. 82)).
Every individual substance contains in its perfect notion the entire universe and everything that
exists in it, past, present, and future.indeed, all individual created substances are different
expressions of the same universe and different expressions of the same universal cause, namely
God (Primary Truths, 1689: AG 33)).
Because both God and the entirety of the divine creation is available to each mind, each
aspect of creation is available to the mind as something to know. In short, the whole
world, its order, and infinity are available to each mind.
An obvious question arises: how does a mind come to glimpse the divinity within
this infinity of states and expressions? In an essay written in German, probably in the
final years of the seventeenth century, Leibniz confronts the Ultimate Epistemological
Problem head on. In the Mystical Theology, he offers one of the boldest of his
epistemological claims, namely, that each created thing or self-being is of God
[Selbswesen von Gott],. In each and every creature is everything, but with a certain
degree of clarity [Kraft der Klarheit]. For Leibniz, in order to glimpse God, all we have
to do is have a momentary insight in any area of knowledge. He explains: Within our
self-state [Selbststand] there lies an infinity, a footprint or reflection of the omniscience
and omnipresence of God.... Every single self-state, such as I or you, is a unified,
indivisible, indestructible thing.... In each and every being there is everything though
with a certain degree of clearness (On the True Theologica Mystica, L 608). When we
consider the footprint of God in our minds and manage to grasp a property of an
attribute of God, we have thereby grasped some part of Gods essence. All such
knowledge is knowledge of God. Whats most important for our purposes here is that to
grasp the essence of something just is to begin our journey to God. That is, for Leibniz, to
grasp the essence of something is to take a first step toward more thorough knowledge of
God. Leibniz summarizes the point: God is the easiest being to know.
A distinction will help. [Ive written about this elsewhere.] In the Philosophers
Confession of 1672-73, he makes a distinction that diminishes the severity of our trap:
Even an accurate cognition [exacta cognitio] can increase, not by novelty of matter, but
by novelty of reflection. If you have nine units accessible to you, then you have
comprehended accurately the essence of the number nine. However, even if you were to
have the material for all its properties, nevertheless you would not have its form or
reflection [formam seu reflexionem]. For even if you do not observe that three times
three... and a thousand other combinations are nine, you have nonetheless thought of the
essence of the number nine.... I will give an example of a finite thing representing
[praebentis] properties that are infinite without any comparison with external things. Here
is a circle: if you know that all the lines from the center to the circumference are equal, in
my opinion, you consider its essence sufficiently clearly. Still you have not
comprehended in virtue of that innumerable theorems.
We have here a distinction between the cognition of the essence of something and its complete
cognition. The former consists of an understanding of an essential property; the latter involves the
cognition of all its properties.
Leibnizs point may be put as follows: to have complete knowledge of an essence
E is to know all its properties. Since, according to Leibniz, every essence of the relevant
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sort has an infinity of properties, only God can have this sort of knowledge. But finite
human beings are capable of having some knowledge of E: when we grasp some property
of E, we thereby have knowledge of E, though only partial.

By piecing together these and
other clues, we attain the following:

for any essence E, whether infinite or finite, there is a
range of possible cognitions of it, from partial to complete, where a partial cognition of E
is to grasp one of its properties and a complete cognition of E is to grasp every such
property. Moreover, for any essence E, whether infinite or finite, it may be represented
or expressed more or less clearly, although each property of E is a partial expression of
it.
The bad news is that no finite human being will be able to have a complete
cognition of any infinite essence and therefore of any divine attribute. Leibniz writes in
Principles of Nature and Grace of 1714: But since each distinct perception of the soul
includes an infinity of confused perceptions which embrace the whole universe, the soul
itself knows the things it perceives only so far as it has distinct and heightened [reveles]
perceptions; and it has perfection to the extent that it has distinct perceptions. Each soul
knows the infiniteknows allbut confusedly. It is like walking on the seashore and
hearing the great noise of the sea: I hear the particular noises of each wave, of which the
whole noise is composed, but without distinguishing them (L 211). But the good news is
that the attributes and eternal ideas of God are all around us to be glimpsed and to cause
felicity. He continues, in Principles of Nature and Grace: It is true that supreme felicity
(with whatever beatific vision or knowledge of god it may be accompanied) can never be
complete, because, since God is infinite, he can never be entirely known (Principles of
Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (AG, 213)). Or, as he makes the point in 1711:
So, inasmuch as we receive our finite perfections from his, which are infinite, we are
immediately affected by them. And it is thus that our mind is affected immediately by the
eternal ideas that are in God, since our mind has thoughts that are in correspondence with
them and participate in them. It is in this sense that we can say that our mind sees all
things in God (Philarte and Ariste, L 1021).
For Leibniz, then, our minds are created to find God easily within them. All we
have to do is to pay attention: It would indeed be wrong to think that we can easily read
these eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetors edict can be read on his notice-
board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that they can be discovered within us by
dint of attention: (New Essays, Preface 51). Now consider this striking passage: Not
only has God endowed the soul with the faculties it needs to know him, but it has also
imprinted upon it characters which delineate him (New Essays, Chapter iii, p. 435).
Notice also that Leibnizs God has constructed the world to have enormous
epistemological and moral benefits. He writes in 1702:
Perception, too, cannot be explained by any mechanism, whatever it may be. We can
conclude then that there is also something immaterial everywhere in created beings, and
particularly in us, where this force is accompanied by a fairly distinct perception, and
even by that light of which I have spoken above, which makes us resemble God in
miniature not only through our knowledge of order but also through the order which we
can ourselves impart to the things within our grasp, in imitation of that which God
imparts to the universe. It is in this, also, that our virtue and perfection consist
(On What Is Independent of Sense and of Matter, Letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte, L
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897-898).
The ascent to God is the recognition of this order in the world and in us. There are
echoes of Melanchthon here: our minds can be ordered and will be through the study and
contemplation of divine order. In the process, God helps us: Meanwhile, it can be said
that because of the divine concourse which continuously confers upon each creature
whatever perfection there is in it, the external object of the soul is God alone and that in
this sense God is to the mind what light is to the eye. This is that divine truth which
shines forth in us (Letter to Hansch, 1707, L 964).
Nor is that all. Like Plotinus, Leibniz thinks that the recognition of some piece of
knowledge will lead us to seek more and that, once we begin the process, a certain
happiness is already in our power. He insists in 1699: the principle of order proves that
the more we analyze things, the more they satisfy our intellect (Letter to De Volder, L
837). Or consider this fascinating comment in the New Essays: There are confused ideas
where we cannot expect complete knowledge, such as the ideas of some sensible
qualities. But with distinct ideas there is reason to hope for everything (376). According
to Leibniz, there is an underlying pleasure and beauty in this pursuit. In 1714, he writes:
One could know the beauty of the universe in each soul, if one could unfold all its folds,
which only open perceptibly with time. (Principles of Nature and Grace, L 211). An
astonishing feature of Leibnizs account of knowledge is that the path to knowledge itself
is both pleasurable and never ending. Even heaven is a place where there is perpetual
pleasure and beauty. He explains: even when the blessed have been admitted to God,
i.e., to the universal harmony and the supreme reason, nevertheless [they] have delight
without end because they multiply their delight to infinity. Since there is no pleasure
without perpetual novelty [citation].
Lets review. Whether I have a partial understanding of justice or triangularity, I
have only remotely glimpsed the infinite complexity and glory of the divine nature. But I
have nonetheless glimpsed it. If I come to understand a property of justice, then I have a
partial cognition of the essence of justice. Since justice is a divine attribute, it follows
that I also have a partial cognition of God. Although there is a huge epistemological
divide between a partial and complete understanding of justice, and an even greater one
between a partial understanding of justice and a complete understanding of God, it is
nonetheless true that to understand any attribute partially is to have a partial
understanding of God and hence be on the path to a more complete knowledge.
Moreover, for Leibniz, one is motivated along this path by the beauty and pleasure of the
knowing.
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A question arises at this point: if its so easy to grasp the supreme being and if the
more humans know, the better they become, then why do so few know God more fully?
Lets return to the Mystical Theology where he acknowledges the epistemological
difficulties that follow. He writes:
Every perfection flows immediately from God. Only the inner light that God
himself kindles in us has the power to give us a right knowledge of God. The
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In the end, Leibnizs EO is quite like that of Plotinus: the metaphysical intimacy of the relation between
the supreme being and its creatures entails an epistemological intimacy; the parts of the world are
connected so that knowledge of any one part can lead to knowledge of all the others; human beings are
ripe with knowledge of the whole; when they acquire knowledge of any part, they recognize the beauty
in it and are drawn to know more; and the more knowledge they acquire, the better they become.
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divine perfections are concealed in all things, although very few know how to
discover them there. Hence there are many who are learned without being
illumined, because they believe not God or the light but only their earthly teachers
or their external senses and so remain in the contemplation of imperfections.
Echoing some of the epistemological pessimism we find in Paul and Augustine, Leibniz
suggests that it is difficult to have right knowledge of God. On the one hand, the divine
attributes or perfections are in everywhere in the world, waiting to be discovered. On
the other, they are very difficult to glimpse. Echoing Platos cave analogy, Leibniz asserts
that it is easy to be trapped in this shadow world. Now, consider this early text:
since every mind is like a mirror, there will be one mirror in our mind, another in other
minds. Thus, if there are many mirrors there will be a greater light, the mirrors
blending the light not only in the [individual] eye but also among each other. The
gathered splendor produces glory. This is part of the reason for the deformity in mind:
otherwise there would be nothing in the shadow to be magnified through the reflection of
the mirrors (VI i 464).
This passage contains a striking response to our question and is a more optimistic version
of Melancthons point about the development of ordered minds. The deformity of mind
precludes the possibility of our minds grasping God easily, but it also prepares us to be
ready to do. That is, according to Leibniz, this deformity is a good thing, since it
contributes to the harmony and goodness of the world. As he writes in an essay probably
of 1675: It is a great boon to the human race that infinite things resist our finite
understandings. Because of our limited understandings, we cannot so easily crawl
straight into the middle of the brambles where we would become lost. Rather, our finite
understanding forces us to develop morally at the right pace. He suggests here that it is a
good thing that the human race progresses towards improvement only gradually.
Moreover, once we begin the process, a certain happiness is already in our power, and
this is a happiness that deserves development. Leibniz seems to think not only that the
recognition of some piece of knowledge will lead us to want more, he also suggests that
our slow but steady epistemological progress goes hand-in-hand with moral development.
Lets return to our questions and review Leibnizs solution to the UEP. What
prevents people from glimpsing the divine nature? The deformity of mind. In a sense,
Leibniz agrees with Augustine that minds are deformed, but he disagrees with him about
the cause of this deformity: they are not deformed out of punishment, rather, they are
deformed because their deformity contributes to the goodness of the world. They are
limited as they are so that they can progress to virtue at the right pace.
What will allow them to get better at glimpsing the divine nature? Leibniz flatly
rejects Luthers pessimism about the ease in which humans are lead astray. For Leibniz,
despite this deformity, minds are poised to grasp the divinity, which they do as soon as
they grasp an essence. To grasp an essence is to have a partial cognition of God and to
have such knowledge is to begin the epistemological journey to God.
Is it every easy to do so and, if so how? For Leibniz, it is enormously easy to
glimpse God and to be set on a path to virtue. Moreover, each step in the journey
contributes to the splendor or glory of the world and thereby makes the world a better
place.
In his usual fashion, Leibniz has solved a problem -- the UEP -- with finesse.
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V. Theodicy and the Epistemological Optimism
Lets finally return to the Theodicy itself and the questions raised by the preface.
Those questions were: Is it easy to acquire this ultimate knowledge or not? Is it easy to be
moved by the beauty of these conceptions or not? What does it mean to say that
conceptions are beautiful? In what does this beauty consists? In the end, what are we to
think about the ease of acquiring this most important knowledge?
In the context set by the UEP and its main historical solutions, we can glimpse (if
not God, then) Leibnizs brilliant solution to the problem. And in the context of Leibnizs
solution, we learn a good deal both about the epistemology of the Theodicy and his place
in the dawning of the Enlightenment. The Theodicy is supposed to offer beautiful
conceptions about the goodness of the world and allow people to move from the
deformity of mind, to the recognition of Gods goodness, and ultimately to virtue. The
text assumes epistemological optimism in that its author works hard not just to argue
against Bayle and situate his own ideas in a wide historical context, but to offer his
readers a glimpse of the extraordinary harmony and beauty of the world. In this sense, the
Theodicys goal is to lead its readers to a greater ordering their minds and a greater sense
of the beauty of the divine nature. By asking his readers to glimpse the perfection of the
world and hence that of its creator, Leibniz works hard to move them toward
enlightenment, love, and virtue. He writes in the preface just after the passages discussed
in Section I:
It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished that the Divinity
should be the object of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by
anticipation, and gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. For there is
nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. Love is that mental state
which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object of our love, and there is
nothing more perfect than God, nor any greater delight than in him. To love him it
suffices to contemplate perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the ideas of
these within ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our souls, but he possesses
them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, whereof to us only drops have been granted;
there is in us some power, some knowledge, some goodness, but in God they are all in
their entirety. Order, proportions, harmony delight us; painting and music are samples of
these: God is all order; he always keeps truth of proportions, he makes universal
harmony; all beauty is an effusion of his rays (51).
12
This is a wonderfully rich passage. The perfections of God are in our souls and are easy
12
Lon voit que Jesus-Christ, achevant ce qui Mose avoit commence, a voulu que la Divinit ft lobjet,
non seulement de notre crainte & de notre veneration, mais encore de notre amour & de notre tendresse.
Ctoit rendre les homes bienheureux par avance, & leur donner ici-bas un avant-got de la felicit future.
Car il ny a rien de si agreeable que daimer ce qui est digne damour. Lamour est cette affection qui nous
fait trouver du plaisir dans les perfections de ce quon aime, & il ny a rien de plus parfait que Dieu, ni rien
de plus charmant. Pour laimer, il suffit den envisager les perfections; ce qui est ais, parce que nous
trouvons en nous leurs ides. Les perfections de Dieu sont celles de nos ames, mais il les possede sans
bornes: il est un Ocean, dont nous navons reu que des goutes: il y a en nous quelque puissance, quelque
connoissance, quelque bont; mais elles sont toutes entieres en Dieu. Lordre, les proportions, lharmonie
nous enchantent, la Peinture & la Musique en sont des chantillons; Dieu est tout ordre, il garde toujours
la justesse des proportions, il fait lharmonie universelle: toute la beaut est un panchement de ses rayons.
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to contemplate. Leibniz is explicit here about the aesthetic aspect of the movement
toward greater understanding of God. In a passage quoted in Section I, Leibniz mentions
the beautiful conceptions of the greatness and goodness of God. Here he goes much
farther to claim that the aesthetic pleasure of painting and music delight us and are
themselves samples of the order that God both creates and is. But even more striking still
is the claim that all beauty is an effusion of his rays. Leibniz seems very optimistic
indeed about knowledge: God is order, the world God created has order, the order and
perfections of God are in our soul, and order delights us so that we move closer to the
beauty and hence toward the rays.
Briefly, lets return to the rhetorical strategy of the Theodicy. The pessimistic
manner in which Leibniz begins his preface is wonderfully suitable: human weakness
leads us to be impressed by what is outward and to not work appropriately to discover
the inner essence of things (p. 49). Leibniz thereby prepares his reader for the difficulty
of the task ahead. Because they have been taken with the wrong opinions (including those
of Bayle), it is appropriate for him to lead them in slow but steady steps to glimpse the
harmony of Gods world and eventually to love it. Echoing the methodological
prescriptions of his German predecessors, he offers a history lesson of the relevant
problems, carefully discriminates among prominent historical and contemporary figures
so that the true and accurate views are selected, and presents his own views with care
so that the elements of his solutions can glimpse.
Finally, this view of the Theodicy and its author makes them seem more forward
looking than one usually thinks of Leibniz. He rejects the Augustinian idea that grace is
required for knowledge of God and goes well beyond the Reformation notion that
Christianity is required for virtue. For Leibniz, everyone whether pagan, Jew, Muslim,
or other can recognize the beauty and harmony in the world, love it, develop more
knowledge of it, and ultimately acquire virtue. The only thing that limits humanity in this
pursuit of knowledge is the opinions of men, but with the proper contemplation of the
harmony in the world they can attain virtue. The grandiose plan is to improve the
condition of humankind. Its a pity it didnt work.
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