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Hermeneutical Understanding in Collingwood and Gadamer

Patricia Ussyk


Master of Arts in Political Philosophy

University of York

Department of Politics

2011

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Word count: 5156


Hermeneutical Understanding in Gadamer and Collingwood


Abstract: Hermeneutics concerns the art of interpretation and understanding. One of the most im-
portant authors of the 20
th
century concerned with the hermeneutical problem was Hans-Georg Gad-
omet wbo, sttooqly lofloeoceJ by nelJeqqets teocbloqs, wtote exteoslvely on the subject. A key ele-
meot to CoJomets stoJy wos collloqwooJs potttoyol of tbe loqlc of poestloo ooJ ooswet. colllog-
wood himself was much focused on the essential role of questioning, this becomes evident not only
oo bls temotks oo tbe blstotloos tole but throughout many of his works; furthermore, his dialectical
approach to the mission of understanding unmistakably puts Collingwood in the field of hermeneu-
tlcs. 1bls essoy wlll otqoe tbot oltbooqb CoJomet ctltlclses collloqwooJs tbeoty of teeooctmeot, the
qop betweeo tbe two ootbots tbooqbts ls smollet tboo ooe mlqbt tblok, os oftet o few clotlflcotloos
of collloqwooJs lJeos, lt becomes cleot tbot CoJomets Jlsopptovols otlqlooteJ ftom mlslotetpteta-
tions and that, in fact, both authors had very similar, hermeneutical approaches to the task of under-
standing.






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Collingwood and Gadamer appear to have many interests in common. They both seem to be
concerned with the task of understanding and they both also observed its direct connection with
self-knowledge. Moreover, both thinkers were committed to explaining the understanding of mean-
ing in a way that does not result in psychologism or solipsism. The key point of interception between
Cadamer and Colllngwood's LhoughL ls, wlLhouL a doubL, Lhe loglc of question and answer. Gada-
mer's emphasls on Lhe lmporLance of quesLlon and answer ls, as he admlLs, deeply rooLed ln Lhe
LhoughL of .C. Colllngwood, Lhe Cerman auLhor hlmself pralsed Colllngwood's percepLlon of Lhe
essential role of question and answer to the mission of understanding. And although Collingwood
never used the term hermeneutics, one cannot ignore that his depiction of the logic of question and
answer (LQA) as an on-going process of inquiry carries hermeneutical characteristics. Furthermore,
one can clalm LhaL Lhe colllngwoodlan LCA shouldn'L be seen merely as a loglcal sysLem buL as a
dialectic process of knowledge and self-consclousness. As descrlbed by Mlnk, Colllngwood's LCA is
not a theory of logic at all, in any ordinary sense of that term, nor is it even a theory of semantics; it
is a hermeneutics" (Mlnk 1969: 131). Powever, Cadamer has noL only pralses for Colllngwood. Pls
crlLlclsm of Lhe Lngllsh Lhlnker's Lheory of reenacLmenL seems Lo puL Lhe Lwo auLhors aparL. Cada-
mer claimed that Collingwood did not have a clear perception of the important balance between
past and present in what he called the fusion of horizons and for that reason, as the German author
clalmed, Colllngwood fell lnLo hlsLorlclsm. 8uL afLer Colllngwood's ldea of reenactment is truly un-
dersLood, lL becomes clear LhaL Cadamer's crlLlclsms are ln facL rooLed ln a few mlsundersLandlngs
and that the two authors have more similarities than originally thought; furthermore, it shows that
hermeneutical understanding is more presenL ln Colllngwood's LhoughL Lhan lL may have appeared
at first glance.



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Collingwood and the Logic of Question and Answer

Colllngwood's Loglc of CuesLlon and Answer plays an essenLlal role ln hls ldeas. ln hls Auto-
biography, Collingwood makes it clear that knowledge is not constituted by propositions and judge-
ments alone; in order to truly reach the meaning of something, the proposition must be understood
with the question that it claimed to answer. What he means to say is that one cannot understand
the meaning of what was said or written if he interprets them solely as it appears in writing or spo-
ken words; rather, it must be clear that such statements were always (consciously or not) originally
meant as answers to questions (COLLINGWOOD 1939: 30-2). Colllngwood's new ouLlook on loglc
was lndeed an lnnovaLlve one: lL afflrmed LhaL LruLh ls noL a seL of proposlLlons buL complexes con-
sisting of questions and answers", whlch ulLlmaLely means LhaL proposlLlons cannoL be Lrue or false
in themselves, rather, Lhey can only be a rlghL or wrong answer Lo a speclflc quesLlon. 1he 'rlghL
answer", ln Colllngwood's accounL, ls Lhe one LhaL allows one Lo conLlnue wlLh Lhe lnqulslLlve pro-
cess (COLLINGWOOD 1939: 37). Through this interpretation, there cannot be contradictions among
statements unless they are answering the same question. Nonetheless, as Louis Mink intelligently
observed, Colllngwood's LCA should noL be consldered as an acLual subsLlLuLe for LradlLlonal formal
loglc: The question-and-answer complex is a model, not of a logical system of interrogative and
indicative sentences, but of stages in the process of inquiry or of active thought in general" (Mlnk
1969: 131). The collingwoodian model characterised by Mink matches a dialectic process and it cer-
tainly puLs Colllngwood's ldeas ln a hermeneuLlcal realm.
1he lmporLance of quesLlonlng ln undersLandlng ls presenL LhroughouL Colllngwood's works.
As a flrsL example of hls hermeneuLlcal approach, leL us Lurn Lo a few of Colllngwood's remarks ln
Speculum Mentis. In this work, he distinguishes knowing from asserting; the process of knowing is
based on the interrogation of what is already known in the present; additionally, Collingwood claims,
lL ls a forward and open movemenL a perpetual revision of the answer". Meanwhile, understanding
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is always a retrospective activity. Such a distinction is not often made; but, as it is affirmed by Col-
llngwood, lL cannoL be forgoLLen LhaL it is only when the knower looks back over his shoulder at the
road he has travelled, that he identifies knowledge with assertion"( CCLLlnCWCCu 1924: 77).
Knowledge that is printed in books, Collingwood says, can be identified with assertion as it is finished
and dead but can only be truly understood if it is perceived as a discovery from the past, as answers
to questions ( COLLINGWOOD 1924: 80). One can clearly see from these statements that Colling-
wood gave great importance to the dialectic process involved in the practice of thinking that, as he
perceived in the case of intellectual history, involved not only looking at documents and propositions
as mere series of statements but as the means of recovering their corresponding question and
henceforLh, dlscoverlng Lhelr meanlng. As he emphaslses: Information may be the body of
knowledge, but questioning is its soul" (CCLLlnCWCCu 1924 : 79).
AnoLher example of Colllngwood's hermeneuLlcal approach Lo Lhe LCA can be found ln An
Essay on Philosophical Method". Whlle explalnlng Lhe overlap of phllosophlcal concepLs ln classes
and the scale of forms, he clarifies that concepts do not stand independently of each other but over-
lap in a series that is developed progressively, in which each level relates to its predecessor (JOHN-
SON 1998: 27). As Collingwood puts it:
philosophy does not, like exact or empirical science, bring us to know things of
which we were simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a different way things which
we already knew in some way; and indeed it follows from our own hypothesis; for if
the species of a philosophical genus overlap, the distinction between the known and
the unknown, which in a non-philosophical subject-matter involves a difference be-
tween two mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a philosophical subject-matter im-
plies that we may both know and not know the same thing; a paradox which disap-
pears in the light of the notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where coming to
koow meoos comloq to koow lo o Jlffeteot ooJ bettet woy. (COLLINGWOOD cited
by HOGAN 1987: 268)
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The process that Collingwood described in this essay is always based on questioning as an
open-ended activity. The philosophical method depicted by Collingwood portrays philosophical
thinking as a process constituted by stages that keep changing and expanding the ones that precede
them. Questioning is already a central focal point in his attempt to characterize philosophical meth-
od and it has certainly influenced his later approach to history; he already states in this earlier work
LhaL we undersLand pasL phllosophles from Lhe presenL, as Lhey are telescoped into the pre-
sent"(CCLLlnCWCCu 2003: 193) and remaln open Lo Lhe dlalecLlcal process of quesLlonlng and an-
swering (HOGAN 1987: 268).
A Lhlrd example of Lhe colllngwoodlan emphasls on Lhe LCA arlses ln hls An Essay on Meta-
pbyslcs. In this essay, Collingwood presents the field of metaphysics as the one that elucidates the
constellations of absolute presuppositions (HOGAN 1987: 268). Absolute presuppositions are not
propositions, they are never answers but always raise many questions; they can be held by individu-
als, groups or entire societies and are not commonly reflected on more importantly, they do not
come from experlence, raLher Lhey are the yard-stick by which experience is
judged"(CCLLlnCWCCu 1998: 193-4). Metaphysics, Collingwood claimed, consists in the study of
the absolute presuppositions of a time; moreover, as he affirms later in his Autobiography, meta-
physics can investigate how constellations of presuppositions have turned into others throughout
the historical process (MINK 1969: 141-3). For this analysis, Collingwood once more emphasises the
essenLlal role of Lhe quesLlon, as he afflrms LhaL Every statement that anybody ever makes is made
in answer to a question", furLher, he clarlfles LhaL even afLer Lhe quesLlon ls answered, lL does not
stop it from still being a question the only difference is that it now has an answer (COLLINGWOOD
1998 : 24-5). Thus, in this essay, he again reaffirms that the answering of a question is never final.
As it can be clearly observed, the dialectical process of question and answer is present in
both of these essays; it is in fact this underlying subject that, as it is observed by John Hogan, makes
these two essays (quite different in many aspects) compatible. Hence, both of his works in philo-
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sophical method and in metaphysics can be better understood after one realises his LQA as a key
background element (HOGAN 1987: 268-9).
8uL lL ls on hls accounLs of hlsLory LhaL Colllngwood's emphasls on Lhe LCA appears wlLh
most substantive significance; after all, it is through the critical interpretation of evidence and data
that the historian can understand the past. History, according to Collingwood, corresponds to the
knowledge of past events this knowledge is acquired through the examination of evidence as the
authority that indicates what has happened. However, a historian can never make statements about
Lhe pasL solely based on Lhe evldence's auLhorlLy, as he ls always lnvolved ln a crlLlcal lnLerpreLaLlon
of it it is in this critical analysis that the LQA plays an essential role. By asserting that historical evi-
dence musL always pass Lhrough Lhe hlsLorlan's crlLlcal enqulrles, Colllngwood ls emphaslslng LhaL
the mere informative character of the evidence does not have any meaning unless it is interpreted
(DEBBINS 1967: xiii-xv). Therefore, the historian always has to have a question in mind when looking
Lhrough Lhe evldence, as Colllngwood clearly sLaLes: The beginning of historical research is there-
fore not the collection or contemplation of crude facts as yet uninterpreted, but the asking of a ques-
tion which sets one off looking for facts which may help one to answer it" (CCLLlnCWCCu 1946:
137). In this light, it becomes clear that Collingwood does not take past facts to simply exist as a
complete and universal body; history does not form a universal whole but always tries to answer a
particular question. History may be universal, Collingwood affirmed, but only in the sense that it
covers Lhe presenL knowledge we have of Lhe quesLlon, noneLheless, as no history can be universal,
so no history can be final"(CCLLlnCWCCu 1946: 138). Lvery generaLlon of hlsLorlans wlll ask dlffer-
ent questions and will therefore get a different historical perspective as the process of enquiry never
ends, questions will always be raised and new answers will always be given by each generation. Such
a dlalecLlcal deplcLlon can only prove furLher Colllngwood's proxlmlLy Lo Lhe fleld of hermeneuLlcs
(HOGAN 1987: 269).

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Cadamer's Approach Lo Lhe Loglc of CuesLlon and Answer

Hans-Georg Gadamer is a distinct figure in 20
th
century hermeneutics. His main work, Truth
and Method, re[ecLs classlcal and romanLlc hermeneuLlcs' Lheorles of lnLerpreLaLlon and re-examines
the role of objectivism in human understanding. Gadamer, clearly lnfluenced by MarLln Peldegger's
philosophy, describes the hermeneutic circle as the interaction of the human being and its world.
Cadamer follows Peldegger ln hls concepLlon of belng-in-the-world" and afflrms Lhe presupposlLlon
of a slLuaLedness" of Lhe subject in the world in order to understand anything at all. The radicaliza-
tion of the hermeneutic circle signifies, to Heidegger and Gadamer, the impossibility of utilizing a set
of rules as the condition for understanding. Both German authors focus on a hermeneutical ap-
proach different from its past depictions -the shift is made from epistemological to ontological her-
meneutics which signifies a concern that no longer concentrates on method of interpretation per se,
but on the being of the subject that interprets and understands. Such a being should not be con-
celved as a dlsengaged sub[ecL buL as an agenL who ls always already ln Lhe world" and cannoL es-
cape having preconditioned understandings of his surroundings (GUIGNON 2002: 265-7). From these
new perspectives, Heidegger and Gadamer ultimately claim that methodological approaches to both
natural and historical occurrences are not outside history which ultimately means that the objectivi-
ty of our knowledge is always curtailed by its connections with our prejudices and historicity. More
lmporLanLly, from Cadamer's perspecLlve, lL ls naive and erroneous Lo belleve LhaL any meLhod could
transcend these dependencies (WARNKE 1987: 1-4).
Gadamer tries to reclaim our ideas of prejudice by clarifying that its negative connotation
was wrongfully implemented during the Enlightenment which concentrated on finding a correct
undersLandlng of LradlLlon, one LhaL would resL only on reason and noL on auLhorlLy or pre[udlces'
over-hastiness (GADAMER 2004: 274). But this project, Gadamer claimed, is an impossible one that
ls rooLed ln a pre[udlce agalnsL pre[udlce". AfLer all, reason does noL have an absLracL and absoluLe
exlsLence, lL exists for us only in concrete, historical terms- i.e., it is not its own master but remains
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constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it operates"(CAuAML 2004: 277). 1he
pre[udlce agalnsL pre[udlce, afflrmed Cadamer, ls anchored on uescarLes' ldea of meLhod LhaL prom-
ised to protect reason from all error by upholding doubt towards all authority; hence, to trust au-
LhorlLy represenLed Lhe abandonmenL of uslng one's own reason (CAuAML 2004: 279). ln re[ecLlon
Lo Lhe LnllghLenmenL's LoLal repudlaLlon of LradlLlon and pre[udlce, Cadamer agaln follows
Peldegger's LhoughLs. When describing the way in which understanding is achieved, Heidegger clari-
fies that one is always projecting when trying to understand an object (or text); the subject always
has prior expectations regarding the meaning of the object, and the task of understanding consists
ultimately in the process of working out our preunderstandings and finding out what the text or
ob[ecL ls Lrylng Lo say. As lL ls descrlbed by Culgnon, Peldegger held LhaL any interpretation must
start out from some preunderstandingj] ooJ lt will interpret particular passages in the light of the
prior grasp of the whole. It will then use the interpretation of specific passages to revise and recon-
figure its initial understanding of the whole. This circular structure has the consequence that, in tex-
tool lotetptetotloo, tbete coo be oo occess to tow focts ot btote Joto to qtoooJ o teoJloq of o
text"(CulCnCn 2002: 269-70). Cadamer Lhus calls for a 'rehablllLaLlon of auLhorlLy and LradlLlon'
and elucidates that prejudice simply means pre-judgement; judgement that is made before the as-
sessment of all evidence, it can be either confirmed or refuted after further experience and it does
not necessarily have to be illegitimate and deceptive (WARNKE 1987: 76-7). Tradition involves both
an element of freedom and of history, it is not simply the acceptance of what once existed and is
being passed down; but instead, tradition is constantly being confirmed, cultivated and preserved
through the active use of reason - as preservation is as much a freely chosen action as are revolu-
tion and renewal"(CAuAML 2004: 282-3).
It is also important to highlight that tradition does not merely consist in an eternal precondi-
tion; it is a product of ourselves as it is through our understanding of it that we take part in its con-
tinuous development (GADAMER 2004: 293).The dialectic character of understanding will bring out
not only the meaning of the object but also of the subject. Again, in a heideggerian sense, Gadamer
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depicts understanding as self-understanding it is because we always take ourselves along while
interpreting what surrounds us that we cannot escape being included in the hermeneutic circle. This
inevitability has to be realised, human finitude cannot be taken for granted, one has to be aware of
his own hlsLorlcally effecLed consclousness and accepL LhaL he is master neither of time nor the fu-
ture", whlch ulLlmaLely means for Cadamer LhaL Real experience is that whereby man becomes
aware of his finiteness"(CAuAML 2004: 331).
As the problem of hermeneutics concerns interpretation; Gadamer affirms that, to under-
stand a given text is to interpret it. In Truth and Method the German philosopher emphasises the
lmporLance of language and conversaLlon Lo Lhls Lask. Cadamer's vlews on dlalogue and undersLand-
ing are directly linked with the Socratic art of conversation. The Socratic dialectic involves creating
the conditions for the questions; as it was through the confusion of his interlocutors that Socrates
ultimately arrived at the important activity of learning Lo ask quesLlons, learning to see what is
questionable"(CAuAML 2004: 339). 1he arL of conversaLlon ln Lhe ocraLlc sense presupposes LhaL
Lhere's a deslre of knowledge LhaL comes from Lhe parLlclpanLs LhaL always enLer dlalogues already
having questions. Furthermore, these same dialogic assumptions are also relevant to the under-
sLandlng of a LexL, Cadamer sLaLes LhaL: To understand a text is to come to understand oneself in a
kind of dialogue"(CAuAML 1976: 37). 1hls dlalogue always carrles Lhe presupposition of the
knowledge that was wisely claimed by Socrates: the knowledge that we do not know. Moreover,
one cannot enter a conversation with the mere anticipation of winning arguments because the dia-
lectic art aims not to point out the weaknesses of what it is said but to draw out the strength within
lL, hence, Lhe arL of conversaLlon is not the art of arguing (which can make a strong case out of a
weak one) but the art of thinking (which can strengthen objections by referring to the subject mat-
ter)" (CAuAML 2004: 361). As lL was undersLood by Cadamer, Lhls dlalogue always lmplles Lhe
anLlclpaLlon of compleLeness" as a vlLal assumpLlon LhaL musL be Laken when one reads a LexL or
participates in a conversation. Gadamer insisted that we must accept that interpretation should
always begin with the presupposition that what is to be understood has something that to say,
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something that is understandable, meaningful. Surely, the anticipation of completeness serves as an
enabler element in interpretation but it does not necessarily affirms that the text or object in fact
has a complete meaning. The idea is that prejudices and a presupposition of truth can aid with the
orientation of finding the meaning of the text, otherwise, there will be no basis for deliberating
wheLher Lhe quesLlonablllLy of Lhe LexL comes from lLs own fallures or Lhe lnLerpreLer's own lnablllLy
to comprehend it (WARNKE 1987: 83-6).
CuesLlonlng ls an essenLlal elemenL of Lhe hermeneuLlcal slLuaLlon. We can'L have any expe-
rience, Gadamer affirms, without raising questions. If understanding is a dialogic activity, it is implied
that questioning is what gives meaning to our perspective of the object or, as Gadamer explains:
the sense of the question is the only direction from which the answer can be given if it is to make
sense" (CAuAML 2004: 336).CuesLlons arlse from our negaLlve response Lo experlence when we
are shocked by things that do not accord with our expectations"(CAuAML 2004: 360). 1he quesLlon
opens up a horizon, a range of possible answers that will be worked out through the tension be-
Lween Lhe famlllarlLy and sLrangeness of Lhe sub[ecL's vlew of Lhe ob[ecL, as Alon egev porLrayed lL:
the process of questioning is carried out in the twilight region between knowledge and igno-
rance"(LCLv 2007: 323). Pence, hermeneuLlcal undersLandlng ls based on Lhe dlaloglc lnLeracLlon
of Lhe sub[ecL's pre[udlces condlLloned by hlsLorlclLy and Lhe ob[ecL's own hlsLorlcal condlLlons and
context when reading a text, for example, the reader finds himself in a dialogue that mediates and
integrates familiar and alien notions between the text and the reader. What comes out in the end,
according to Gadamer, is an integration of past and present, that, as in a dialogue, is a sort of
'agreemenL' LhaL always surpasses the original positions of the participants in a not necessarily bet-
Ler buL dlfferenL way (CAuAML 2004: 297). ln summary, as Ceorgla Warnke clarlfles, Cadamer's
'fuslon of horlzons' is the integration of our historically determined concerns with the object of un-
derstanding in such a way that this integration determines the content of the object for us" (WAnkL
1987: 103).
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The dialectic character of the hermeneutical understanding of a text instantly draws to Col-
llngwood's loglc of quesLlon and answer. After all, the sense of the text is grasped only by accessing
the horizon of the question to which the text is an answer to. Gadamer in fact admits his colling-
woodlan lnfluences ln clalmlng LhaL the logic of the human sciences is a logic of the poestloo. j]
Almost tbe ooly petsoo l floJ o llok wltb bete ls .C. collloqwooJ.j] ne cleotly sow wbot wos mlss-
ing in nave hermeneutics founded on the prevailing philosophical critique"(CAuAML 2004: 363).
The focus of attention of both authors was in the relation between object and subject, text and in-
terpreter; both of them saw the need of grasping the question that orients the text; but, when it
comes Lo lLs appllcaLlon, Cadamer ls noL saLlsfled wlLh Colllngwood's vlews. Pls maln problem con-
cerns Colllngwood's Lheory of reenacLmenL as an aLLempL Lo reconsLrucL hlsLorlcal agenLs' lnLen-
tions. This approach, according to Gadamer, unfortunately made Collingwood fall into historicism
(HOGAN 1987: 272-3).

Cadamer's CrlLlclsm and Mlsreadlngs of Colllngwood's 1heory of eenacLmenL

In a section of his magnum opus, Truth and Method, Cadamer deplcLs Colllngwood's loglc of
question and answer and its application to the historical method. According to the German author,
Collingwood explains that historical happenings are only understood once the question to which the
historical actions of the agents were an answer to is reconstructed. The explanation is illustrated by
Colllngwood's example of Lhe 8aLLle of 1rafalgar as a clarlflcaLlon of nelson's plan (CAuAML 2004:
364). In this case, the historical events and the thought of the historical agent come together result-
ing in the combination of the actions of the historical agent and the thought conception of the tacti-
cian demonsLraLlng LhaL All history is the history of thought. The historian re-enacts in his mind the
tbooqbts of tbe blstotlcol oqeot.(COLLINGWOOD cited by VARDOULAKIS 2004: 9). But this account
brings some problems to hermeneutical interpretation according to Gadamer. His main issue con-
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cerned Colllngwood's obllvlon Lo dlscern Lhe lnLenLlon of Lhe hlsLorlcal agenL and Lhe 'real' meanlng
of Lhe acLlons of Lhe hlsLorlcal evenL. ln Cadamer's vlew, undersLandlng a LexL does noL lmply LhaL lLs
meanlng should colnclde wlLh Lhe auLhor's lnLenLlon, as lLs real understanding always goes beyond
the scope of the intention that originated it (FESTIN 2005: 37). Gadamer cannot accept Colling-
wood's reenacLmenL because lL seems Lo hlm LhaL Lhe meanlng ls Lhen reduced Lo Lhe agenL's lnLen-
Llons, he afflrms: the interpreter of history always run the risk of hypostasizing the connectedness of
events when he regards their significance as that intended by the actual actors and plan-
ners"(CAuAML 2004: 364) such an account, Gadamer claimed, trapped Collingwood in undesira-
ble historicism.
1he second crlLlclsm porLrayed by Cadamer concerns Colllngwood's The Idea of History and
its depiction of the platonic argument in Theaetetus(GADAMER 2004: 514-6). The passage in ques-
Llon ls: wbeo l teoJ llotos otqomeot lo tbe 1beoetetos against the view that knowledge is merely
sensation, I do not know what philosophical doctrines he was attacking; I could not expound these
doctrines and say in detail who maintained them and by what arguments" (CCLLlnCWCCu 1946:
301).In this example of interpreting a philosophical text, Gadamer accuses Collingwood of affirming
LhaL Lhe deLecLlon of laLo's lnLenLlons ln Lhe dlscusslon would be posslble only afLer suspendlng Lhe
reader's pre-judgements and then identifying the context of the platonic discussion. The error in this
case, Cadamer explalned, would conslsL ln Colllngwood's fallure Lo recognlse Lhe hlsLorlcal lnLerpre-
LaLlon llnked Lo Lhe conLexL of laLo's LhoughL the principles of the LQA would not be then properly
applied. Hence, Gadamer insisLs LhaL Lhe Lheory of reenacLmenL doesn'L successfully grasp Lhe fuslon
of horizons of past and present (VARDOULAKIS 2004: 9-10).
8uL ls Colllngwood's Lheory of re-enactment really restricted to only reconstructing the orig-
inal intentions of the agent? Does it really ignore the historicity of the interpreter or the importance
of historical interpretation? If looked at attentively, it does not. It must be reminded that there are
key elemenLs for Colllngwood's Lheory of reenacLmenL. llrsL of all, lL musL be elucidated the clear
dlsLlncLlon beLween whaL Colllngwood called 'human hlsLory' from 'naLural evenLs', Lhe hlsLorlan ls
14

not concerned with natural processes but with actions performed by men. When encountering his-
torical evidence, the historian occupies himself with the ideas that gave life to the object and made
them significant (JOHNSON 1998: 82). Human history is thus constituted of human actions (COL-
LINGWOOD 1939: 127-8), and these always possess, according to Collingwood, outside and inside
aspects. The outside characteristics establish the context of the act, they concern the spatial and
temporal circumstances of the event; whereas the inside feature corresponds to the internal charac-
ter of the event as conscious thought. As human action always represents the union of the outside
and lnslde feaLures of an evenL, Lhe hlsLorlan can never lgnore nelLher one or Lhe oLher: His work
may begin by discovering the outside of an event, but it can never end there; he must always re-
member that the event was an action, and that his main task is to think himself into this action, to
discern the thought of its agent" (CCLLlnCWCCu 1946: 213). Colllngwood ls clearly sLaLlng ln Lhls
passage that both outside and inside features are essential to understanding the historical event; the
reconstruction starts with a picture of the spatial and temporal aspect of the past which will be un-
derstood along with the thought behind it (the inside aspect) as it is rethought by the historian him-
self (DEBBINS 1967: xv).
To rethink the hlsLorlcal agenL's LhoughL may appear a Lad mysLerlous, and lL ls cerLalnly a
source for mosL of crlLlclsm of Colllngwood's phllosophy. ln order Lo undersLand Lhls, anoLher col-
lingwoodian distinction must be clarified: the one between thought in its immediacy and its media-
tion. Immediate thought relates to the subjective context of the agent: his feelings, emotions and
sensations (SAARI 1984: 37) Lhls aspecL of Lhe agenL's mlnd can never be re-enacted as these fea-
Lures are only coincidental with the thought, and they have nothing to do with the thought as
thought, with the thought in its universality"(uL88ln 1967: xxv). ln conLrasL, LhoughL ln lLs medla-
tion consists in the objective content of it; this feature does not entail the private mental activities
LhaL belong excluslvely Lo Lhe agenL/Lhlnker, raLher, medlaLe LhoughLs are 'publlc' and accesslble ln a
manner that everyone can think them for themselves therefore, this aspect of the thought can
sustain itself through time, through the change of context and can consequently be rethought by
15

others (SAARI 1984: 38). The rethinking of past thoughts involve only the mediate content of the
LhoughL, Lhe parL LhaL can survlve Lhe change of conLexL, as Colllngwood emphaslses We shall never
know how the flowers smelt in the garden of Epicurus, or how Nietzsche felt the wind in his hair as he
walked on the mountains; we cannot relive the triumph of Archimedes or the bitterness of Marius;
but the evidence of what these men thought is in our hands; and in re-creating these thoughts in our
own minds by interpretation of that evidence we can know, so far as there is any knowledge, that the
thoughts we create were theirs"(CCLLlnCWCCu : 296).
It is pivotal to remember, nonetheless, that the reenactment performed by the historian
does noL conslsL excluslvely ln Lhe acLlon of reLhlnklng Lhe hlsLorlcal agenL's LhoughL or lnLenLlon
(this is the inside aspect of the action) but also in recovering and examining the outside contextual
characteristics of the event (FESTIN 2003: 41). 1hls seems Lo solve Cadamer's problems wlLh Col-
llngwood's alleged dependence on auLhorlal lnLenLlons. Colllngwood's reenacLmenL ls based on
carefully and critically reading the evidence, it is not pure intuition but the interpretation of the pre-
sent (i.e. the evidence) as a product of the past, in order to illuminate the historical act (HOGAN:
279). Concerning the Theaetetus example, it can be pointed out that Gadamer mistakes Colling-
wood's negaLlve commenLs on eplsLemology for hls acLual Lheory of knowledge. When put into the
rlghL background of Lhe Lngllsh auLhor's LhoughL, lL becomes clear LhaL Colllngwood ls aLLacklng Lhe
position that knowledge only comes from immediate thought ( FESTIN 2005: 38). What he was trying
to explain is that historical thought is neither knowledge merely as sensation nor knowledge purely
as subjective thought ( VARDOULAKIS 2004: 14). But as Raymund Festin perceived, the example cho-
sen by Cadamer ls noL Lhe besL one Lo properly undersLand Colllngwood's hlsLorlcal reenactment;
the reader can easily confuse immediate thought in the subjective context with immediate thought
ln Lhe ob[ecLlve conLexL. urely Lhere's no way of knowlng exactly the background context of a past
discussion, but it is the historian task to use the evidence at hand and his critical examination to
arrive at a better understanding of the context of the problem (FESTIN 2005: 40); about the histori-
an, Colllngwood sLaLes: he must see what the philosophical problem was, of which his author is here
16

stating his solution. He must think that problem out for himself, see what possible solutions of it
might be offered, and see why this particular philosopher chose that solution instead of anoth-
er"(Colllngwood 1936: 283).

Conclusion

Once it is understood that some of Cadamer's crlLlclsms of Lhe colllngwoodlan Lheory of
reenactment are rooted in a few misunderstandings, it seems that there are no hermeneutical con-
LradlcLlons buL many common facLors beLween Lhe phllosophers' LhoughLs. 8oLh Colllngwood and
Gadamer agree that understanding meaning involves grasping the question that lies behind the text
or historical evidence; moreover, this does not imply a psychological approach to the intentions of
the original author or agent. Another similarity can be observed ln Colllngwood's porLrayal of abso-
luLe presupposlLlons" as a basls always presenL ln human mlnds and socleLles, a characLerlzaLlon
LhaL does noL seem Loo dlfferenL from Lhe heldeggerlan deplcLlon of preundersLandlngs" (nAuCLL
1993: 21-2), or from Gadamer's reclalm of Lhe slgnlflcanL role of pre[udlce Lo undersLandlng (CAuA-
MER 2004: 273). Additionally, both authors had the wise perception of the past as always connected
wlLh Lhe presenL hence, hlsLory becomes a llvlng pasL" LhaL ls kepL allve ln a dlalectical relation be-
tween present and past, our current surroundings and tradition (COLLINGWOOD 1946: 226 -1939:
97-8; GADAMER 2004: 293). This dialectical process is not detached from but intertwined with our-
selves; which characterises self-knowledge as an essential factor to both Gadamer, who carried the
heideggerian notion that all understanding involves a self-encounter, and Collingwood, who similarly
LhoughL LhaL: moo, wbo Jesltes to koow evetytbloq, Jesltes to koow blmself. j] wltboot some
knowledge of himself, his knowledge of other things is imperfect: for to know something without
knowing that one knows it is only a half-knowing, and to know that one knows is to know oneself.
Self-knowledge is desirable and important to man, not only for its own sake, but as a condition with-
17

oot wblcb oo otbet koowleJqe coo be ctltlcolly jostlfleJ ooJ secotely boseJ.(COLLINGWOOD 1946:
205). In conclusion, it becomes clear that Collingwood, not so distant from Gadamer, had a herme-
neutical approach to the mission of understanding. As Collingwood emphasised the importance of
the never-endlng process of quesLlonlng and answerlng, and Cadamer's 'fuslon of horlzons' por-
trayed understanding as a task that is permanently open both philosophers perceived history as
continuously dependent on human interpretation; without an end or final answer, the dialectical
process of quesLlonlng goes on, changlng, evolvlng and remaining essentially open"(PCCAn 1987:
269, 281).













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18

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