Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon.

Zeus Abrogar
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly taking, stealing, and using PLDT's
international long distance calls by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing
and completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave
frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call
is destined. PLDT alleged that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and caused
damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
HELD:
Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be interpreted in the context of the
Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of theft , so long as the
same is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be subject to appropriation.
Interest in business should be classified as personal property since it is capable of appropriation, and
not included in the enumeration of real properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service are personal property
which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of
subtraction penalized under the said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and may be considered as
personal property, the said long-distance calls do not belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired
ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone
calls were taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities without PLDT's consent. The
theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property subject of the theft were
services and business of the offended party.


Standard Oil Co. of New York vs Jaramillo
FACTS:
Gervasia dela Rosa executed a document in the form of a Chattel Mortgage purporting to convey to
Standard Oil Co. by way of mortgage both the leasehold interest of the land she leases in Manila and the
building which stands thereon.

The clauses in said document describe the property as personal including the right, title and interest of
the mortgagor in and to the contract of lease and also the building of the said premises therein.

After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner presented it to Joaquin
Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded. The
respondent opined that it was not a chattel mortgage for the interests mortgaged did not appear to be
personal property within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law and registration was refused on this
ground only.
HELD:
The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgages are of purely
ministerial character and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-
judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel
mortgage. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage consists in the fact that it operates as
constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal effects of the contract must be
discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice. Registration adds nothing to the
instrument, considered as a source of title, and affects nobodys rights except as a species of notice.

The parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be
real property and it is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of
taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property.

It is unnecessary to determine whether or not the property described in the document is real or
personal. The issue is to be determined by the Court and not by the register of deeds.

Lopez vs. Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc.
FACTS:
Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied wood for the construction of
the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k thus leaving a balance of
almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, wherein Luzon Surety Company as their
surety and the land and buildings as mortgages. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid materials and was
able to get a judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount.
Also, he was able to obtain a materialmans lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to
42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasnt happy because he
also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the
land are inseparable.
HELD:
The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the construction,
repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which the construction was made is without
merit, because while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed
thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land in the
enumeration (in the CC) of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing- that a
building is by itself an immovable property.

The preference to unregistered lien is only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or
work was made. The materialmans lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was
made or which received the benefit of refection.

Prudential Bank v. Panis
FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real estate
mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot and the
information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building
stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To
secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties. The Secretary of
Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the
bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the real estate mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court held
that the real estate mortgage was null and void
HELD:
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The
inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the
building itself is an immovable property.
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of
the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the
land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a real estate mortgage for the
building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from
the land.
The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy executed before the issuance of the
sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it
is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building was a valid mortgage.
As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibits pertinent
provisions of the Public Land Act, thus it is null and void.

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Co
FACTS:
The "Compania Agricola Filipina" purchased from "Strong Machinery Co." rice-cleaning machines which
the former installed in one of its buildings. As security for the purchase price, the buyer executed a
CHATTEL MORTGAGE on the machines and the building on which they had been installed. Upon buyer's
failure to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed, and the building was purchased by the seller, the
"Strong Machinery Co." This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. Later, the "Agricola"
also sold to "Strong Machinery" the lot on which the building had been constructed. This sale was not
registered in the Registry of Property but the Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.

Previously however, the same building has been purchases at a sheriff's sale by Leung Yee, a creditor of
Agricola, although Leung Yee knew all the time of the prior sale in favor of "Strong Machinery." The sale
in favor of Leung Yee was recorded in the Registry. Leung Yee now sues to recover the property from
"Strong Machinery."

HELD:
The building is real property, therefore, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry cannot be
given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property. The mere fact that the parties
decided to deal with the building as personal property does not change its character as real property.
Thus, neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry, nor the annotation in said registry of
the sale of the mortgaged property had any effect on the building. However, since the land and the
building had first been purchased by "Strong Machinery" (ahead of Leung Yee), and this fact was known
to Leung Yee, it follows that Leung Yee was not a purchaser in good faith, and should therefore not be
entitled to the property. "Strong Machinery" thus has a better right to the property.



Sergs Products v. PCI Leasing
FACTS:
PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of
replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in
favor of PCI.

Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective order. It
asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage.
HELD:
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal
property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential
and principal elements in the industry. In that sense, petitioners are correct in arguing that the said
machines are real, not personal, property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
But the Court disagree with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not
proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure. It has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a
real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily
precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the Lease
Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property.
Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines aspersonal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
The holding that the machines should be deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement is
good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the
subject machinery as personal. In the present case, however, there is no showing that any specific third
party would be adversely affected

Evangelista v. Alto Surety
FACTS:
Santos Evangelista instituted Civil Case No. 8235 of the CFI Manila for a sum of money. On the same
date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land
situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the corresponding notice of
attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. In due course, judgment was rendered in
favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of
execution issued in said case on 8 October 1951.
When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the
ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is
now the true owner of said property. It appears that on 10 May 1952, a definite deed of sale of the
same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held, on 29
September 1950, in compliance with a writ of execution issued in Civil Case 6268 of the same court " in
which judgment for the sum of money, had been rendered in favor of Alto Surety.
Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing
his title over said house, and securing possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due
trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the
house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October
1952, until said delivery. The decision was however reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved
Alto Surety from the complaint on account that although the writ of attachment in favor of Evangelista
had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of Alto Surety, Evangelista
did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been levied as if the house in question
were immovable property.
HELD:
The said house is not personal property but immovable property. As explicitly held, "a true building (not
merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of
the land or by usufructuary or lessee.
It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal
property for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties
are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is
applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no contract
whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar

Tsai v. CA
FACTS:
EVERTEX secured a loan from PBC, guaranteed by a real estate and chattel mortgage over a parcel of
land where the factory stands, and the chattels located therein, as included in a schedule
attached to the mortgage contract. Another loan was obtained secured by a chattel mortgage over
properties with similar descriptions listed in the first schedule. During the date of execution of the
second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased machineries and equipment.

Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed for insolvency proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation and
thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. PBC was the highest bidder
in the public auctions, making it the owner of the properties. It then leased the factory premises
to Tsai. Afterwards, EVERTEX sought the annulment of the sale and conveyance of the properties to PBC
as it was allegedly a violation of the INSOLVENCY LAW.
HELD:
The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real
property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New
Civil Code. While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real
and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and
equipment as chattels.
And, since the disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the
1975 or 1979 chattel mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include
subject machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages. As the auction sale of
the subject properties to PBCom is void, no valid title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof
to Tsai is also a nullity under the elementary principle ofnemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give
what one does not have
Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the
parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. An immovable
may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.

Sibal v. Valdez
FACTS:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by
virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the
defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of
land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount
sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which
he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez
refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to
redemption.
HELD:
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as "ungathered products"
in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates as real
property the following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or
form an integral part of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in recent years an
interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing
crops may be considered as personal property.
Also, from an examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and other states we find
that the settle doctrine is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered
personal property.
Article 334 has been modified by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Chattel Mortgage Law in the sense
that for the purposes of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
ungathered products have the nature of personal property

Davao Sawmill Co. vs Castillo
FACTS:
Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. The land upon which the business was conducted was leased
from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it
used. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on foundations of cement. In the contract of
lease, Davo Sawmill agreed to turn over free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on
the premises with the exception of machineries, which shall remain with the Davao Sawmill. In an action
brought by the Davao Light and Power Co., judgment was rendered against Davao Sawmill. A writ of
execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were levied upon as personalty by the
sheriff. Davao Light and Power Co., proceeded to purchase the machinery and other properties
auctioned by the sheriff.
HELD:
Machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but
not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor
on the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal
property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery was levied upon by the
sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered.

Chua Peng Hian v. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner Chua rented a piece of land owned by Veneracion. It was stipulated in the lease contract
thatupon expiration of the lease agreement all buildings and improvements which the lessee, Chua,
failedto remove would automatically remain on the property and its ownership would transfer to the
lessor,Veneracion.Upon expiration of the lease contract, the lessee, Chua, would not turn over the
building, reasoning thatthe alienation in the contract of lease of his improvements was tantamount to
a disposition of conjugalrealty without the wife's consent.
HELD:
Supreme Court, citing jurisprudence, ruled that in the said building and improvements on the leased
land may be treated as personal properties. Real property would be considered as personal property
only as between the parties to the contract and not to third parties.

Punzalan Jr. vs. Vda De Lacsamana
FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to
pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the
highest bidder.

While Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit for the construction of a
warehouse.

A deed of sale was executed between PNB and lACSAMANA. This contract was amended to
include the warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent
Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name.

Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the bank
did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.
HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is
immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate
and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.

Tumalad vs Vicencio
FACTS:
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house, which
was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan, payable in one year
with a 12% per annum interest.

The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public
auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter
vacate the house as they were the proper owners.
W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties can be subject of
a chattel mortgage.
HELD:
The inclusion of the building separate anddistinct from the land in the enumeration of what may constit
ute real property, that thebuilding is by itself an immovable property.
However, certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable
property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by
their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the
principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may
conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.

In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal
property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have
meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so
that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp., vs Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
FACTS:
In order for to obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation (Makati
Corp.), Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. (Wearever) discounted and assigned several receivables with
Makati Corp. under a Receivable Purchase Agreement. To secure the collection of the receivables
assigned, Wearever executed a Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as a
machine.
Upon Wearevers default, Makati Corp. filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. However, the sheriff failed to effect the seizure of the machine. Later, the sheriff was able to
remove the main drive motor of the machine.
The CA ordered the return of the seized drive motor because it is a real property pursuant to paragraph
5 of Article 415 (NCC), it being attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to remove it
would be to drill out or destroy the concrete floor.
HELD:
If a house of strong materials (Tumulad v. Vicencio) may be considered as personal property for
purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced, there is no reason why a machine, which is movable in its nature
and becomes immobilized only be destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. One who
has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
The characterization of the machine as chattel by Wearever is indicative of intention and impresses
upon the property the character determined by the parties. Parties to a contract may by agreement
treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third
parties would be prejudiced thereby.

Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor and Treasurer
FACTS:
The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro assessed the equipments (welder machine, grinder, battery charger
etc.) of Mindanao Bus Co. at P4,400. Bus Co. appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals
(BTA) on the ground that they are not realty. The BTA and the Court of Tax Appeals sustained the city
assessor.
Assessor and BTAs position: The equipments though movable, are immobilized by destination, in
accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 (NCC).
HELD:
Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be essential and principal
elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or
carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.
There are movables which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal
elements and there are those which are merely incidental. The tools and equipments in this case are not
essential and principal elements of Bus Co.s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidental and used to improve its service. Even without such tools, its business
may be carried on. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if
its equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop.
Paragraph 5 of Article 415 (NCC) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on
a piece of land. The equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation
business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land. Hence the equipment
may not be deemed as real property.

Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng
FACTS:
Mabalacat Sugar Co. (Sugar Co.) obtained from Cu Unjieng e Hijos (Cu) a loan secured by a first
mortgage on two parcels of land with all its existing improvements or that may in the future exist in said
lots. After the mortgage, Sugar Co. increased the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional
machinery which would cost approximately P100,000.
The president of Sugar Co. proposed to B.H. Berkenkotter (Berk) to advance the necessary amount for
the purchase of said machinery, promising to reimburse him as soon as he could obtain an additional
loan from Cu. Berk loaned Sugar Co. P25,750. Furthermore, Berk had a credit of P22,000 against Sugar
Co. for unpaid salaries. With these, Sugar Co. purchased the machinery now in litigation
B.A. Green, president of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied to Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional
loan of P75,000 offering as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B.A.
Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, together with
whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. B.A. Green failed to obtain said loan.
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the additional machinery and equipment, as
improvement incorporated with the central are subject to the mortgage deed executed in favor of the
defendants Cu Unjieng e Hijos.
HELD:
The additional machinery is an essential and principal element of a sugar central. Inasmuch as the sugar
central is permanent in character, the additional machinery must necessarily be permanent. The
installation of machinery in a mortgaged sugar central for the purpose of carrying out its industrial
functions and increasing production constitutes a permanent improvement on the sugar central and
subjects said machinery to the mortgage constituted thereon.
The fact that the purchaser of the new machinery has bound himself to the person supplying him the
purchase money to hold them as security for the payment of the credit, and to refrain from mortgaging
them does not alter the permanent character of the incorporation of said machinery with the sugar
central.
Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. vs Meralco
FACTS:
Meralcos electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant in Laguna and is transmitted to the
Manila by means of electric transmission wires. These wires are fastened to insulators attached on steel
towers. The Quezon City Assessor (Assessor) declared the steel towers for real property tax.
The CTA ordered the cancellation of the tax declarations and to refund Meralco. The CTA held that the
steel towers come within the term poles which are declared exempt from taxes under Meralcos
franchise and that the steel towers are personal properties and are not subject to real property tax.
HELD:
The steel towers do not come within the objects mentioned in Article 415 (NCC) paragraph 15 because
they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are removable and merely
attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled
and moved from place to place.
They cannot be included under paragraph 36 as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the
object to which they are attached. Each of these steel towers consists of steel bars joined together by
means of bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the
same.
Neither do steel towers supports fall under paragraph 57 for they are not machineries, receptacles,
instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the
land.

Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals
FACTS:
Caltex loaned machines and equipment to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement
or receipt. The lease contract stipulated that upon demand, the operators shall return to Caltex the
machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and
equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The City Assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as
taxable realty. However, the City Board of Tax Appeals ruled that they are personalty. The Assessor
appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
The Board held on June 3, 1977 that the said machines are real property within the meaning of Ses. 3(k)
& (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, PD 464, and that the Civil Code definitions of real and
personal property in Articles 415 and 416 are not applicable in this case.
HELD:
The equipment and machinery, are considered as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed
owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation
of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or
affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and
machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Improvements
on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered
personalty

Fernandez v. Presbitero
FACTS:
During the lifetime of Esperidion Presbitero (Presbitero), judgment was rendered against him by the
CA. The CA ordered to execute in favor of Helen Nava (Nava) 2 deeds of reconveyance or upon failure
to do so, to pay to Nava the value of each of the 2 properties. Presbitero was also to pay to Nava the
value of the products he received or 125 cavans yearly from 1951 until possession of the 5-hectare
portion is finally delivered to Nava.
Nava moved for and secured a writ of execution and on the following day wrote the sheriff to proceed
with the auction sale of the sugar quotas registered in Presbiteros name. However, Presbitero died a
few days after the notice of auction sale. Later, proceedings for the settlement of his estate were
commenced. Presbiteros son filed an urgent motion to set aside the writs of execution and to order the
sheriff to desist from holding the auction sale on the grounds that the levy on the sugar quotas was
invalid because the notice thereof was not registered with the Register of Deeds. Nevertheless, the
auction sale proceeded.
Navas position: Sugar quotas can be carried from place to place without injury to the land to which they
are attached and are not one of those included in Article 415 (NCC). They fall under the category of
personal properties under paragraph 4 of Article 416 which states that, In general, all things which can
be transported from place to place without impairment of the real property to which they are fixed are
personal property.
HELD:
They are real property, for they are by law considered real rights over immovable property just like
servitudes and easements. Under the provisions of law (Sugar Limitation Law, R.A. No. 1825, E.O. 873),
the sugar quota allocations are accessories to land, and can not have independent existence away from
a plantation. A plantation means any specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to which is
attached an allotment of centrifugal sugar