Interpretation

WaysofThinkingabouttheSciencesandtheArts
EDITED BY PeterMachamerandGereonWolters
UniversityofPittsburghPress
Contents
Published bytheUniversityofPittsburgh Preface VB
Press, Pittsburgh,Pa., 15260
All rightsreserved 1 SomeCogitationsonInterpretations 1
ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica PeterMachamer
Printedonacid-freepaper
10987654321
2 TheLogicofInterpretation 16
RuthLorand
ISBN 13: 978-0-8229-4392-1
ISBN 10: 0-8229-4392-1
3 InterpretationasCulturalOrientation: 31
Remarkson
AnnemarieGethmann-Siefert
4 HermeneuticsandEpistemology: 44
ASecondAppraisal Heidegger,
Kant,andTruth
PaoloParrini
5 DavidsonandGadameronPlato's 66
DialecticalEthics
KristinGjesdal
6 TheInterpretationofPhilosophical 91
Texts
NicholasRescher
7 TheExplanationofConsciousnessand 100
theInterpretationofPhilosophicalTexts
CatherineWilson
8 OnInterpretingLeibniz'sMill 111
AndreasBlank
VI Contents
9 HowtoInterpretHumanActions
(IncludingMoralActions)
ChristophLumer
130
10 InterpretivePracticesinMedicine
KennethF. Schaffner
158
11 InterpretingMedicine:Formsof
KnowledgeandWaysofDoingin
ClinicalPractice
CorneliusBorck
179
12 ConceptFormationviaHebbian
Learning:TheSpecialCaseof
PrototypicalCausalSequences
PaulM.Churchland
203
13 InterpretingNovelObjects:The
DifficultCaseofHybridWines
GeorgeGale
220
14 ClassifyingDryGermanRieslingWines:
AnExperimenttowardStatisticalWine
Interpretation
UlrichSautter
234
Index 261
Preface
Interpretation is an activity thatcuts across theartsandsciences. Its
ubiquityservedasthemotivationformakingthiscolloquiumallabout
interpretation.Wesoughttocovermanyaspectsanddomainsinwhich
interpretivepracticeswerefound.Sotheessayscollectedheredealwith
thegeneral natureofinterpretation,withcontrastornot between in-
terpretationandhermeneutics, with the interpretationofphilosophi-
cal texts, ofhuman action, in medicine, ofthe brain, and finally of
wine. Oneset ofessays has an unusual structure. Nicholas Rescher
wroteapaperoninterpretingphilosophicaltexts,andwe askedCath-
erine Wilson andAndreas Blank to choose a text, and then see how
wellRescher'sclaimstestedoutagainsttheirinterpretationofthattext.
ThechosentextwasthemillpassagefromLeibniz'sMonadology.
Theessaysinthisvolumearerevisedversionsofpresentationsgiven
at the eighth meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the
Philosophy ofScience held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from Thurs-
day, October2,toSunday,October5,2008.ThePittsburgh-Konstanz
ColloquiuminthePhilosophyofScienceis a jointundertakingofthe
CenterforPhilosophyofScienceoftheUniversityofPittsburgh(USA)
andtheZentrumPhilosophieundWissenschaftstheorieoftheUniver-
sityofKonstanz(Germany).
Theprogramco-chairs areeditorsofthisvolume. Thecolloquium
was sponsored by Fritz Thyssen Foundation in Cologne (Germany)
and the Harvey and Leslie Wagner Endowment (University ofPitts-
burgh).Theeventwasheldin honorofGereonWolters'scontribution
tothePittsburgh-Konstanzcollaborationovertheyears.
Theeditors thank Barbara Diven Machamerfor reading the page
proofsandTaraGainfortandBennyGoldbergforindexingthevolume.
67
5
DavidsonandGadameron
Plato'sDialecticalEthics
KristinGjesdal
TempleUniversity
Overthepasttwentyyears,therehasbeenanincreasinginterestinthe
relation between Donald Davidson's theory ofradical interpretation
and Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Whereas
some ofthis interest has been geared towardthe intellectual horizon
andheritageofDavidson'swork,
1
philosopherssuchasRichardRorty
andJohnMcDowellhave takenGadamer'shermeneuticstosuggesta
possible avenue beyond what they perceive to be the limitations of
Davidson'stheory.2ThisessayapproachestheDavidson-Gadamerre-
lationfrom adifferentpointofview. Myconcernis nottoaskabout
theproperlocation orpossible limitationsofDavidson's philosophy,
buttoaddressDavidson'sownclaimsabouttheaffinity betweenradi-
calinterpretationandphilosophicalhermeneutics.
Itakeasmy pointofdeparturean articlethatDavidsonwrotefor
theGadamervolumeofthe Library of Living Philosophers in 2002.3
In this text, Davidsonexamines Gadamer's Habilitationsschrift from
1931, Plato's Dialectical Ethics. Like Davidson, Gadamerstartedhis
philosophicalcareerwithastudyofPlato'sPhilebus, andDavidsonis
astonishedtofindthatthetwohaveendedup,via"alargelyaccidental
butcommodius vicus ofrecirculation,"inthesame"intellectualneigh-
borhood."4DavidsonarguesthatGadamer'sreadingofthe Philebus,
containing,in spe, thephilosophicalcoreofTruth and Method, repre-
sents an inquiry into "thefoundation ofthe possibility ofobjective
thought" and, bythe sametoken, illustrates"his [Gadamer'sJ idea of
66
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
howthe interpretation ofany textis toproceed."5 In my view, these
claimsarelargelypremature.Itrace Gadamer'sstudyofthe Philebus
back to its Heideggerian roots and argue that Davidson misunder-
stands the phenomenological rationale ofGadamer's turntoancient
philosophy and that he misconstrues the concerns of philosophical
hermeneutics. In this way, his encounterwith Gadamer's philosophy
fails tosetthe premises fora fruitful exchange between post-Heideg-
gerian hermeneutics andAnglophone theories oflanguage andinter-
pretation.
GadamerontheDialogicalFoundationsofObjectivity
In orderto understand Davidson's claimthat Gadamer's 1931 study
representsaninquiryintothefoundationofthepossibilityofobjective
thought,abriefaccountofGadamer'snotionof dialogicalrationalityis
needed.Plato's Dialectical Ethics consistsoftwocomprehensiveessays,
thefirstofferingageneralintroductiontoPlato'sdialecticsandthesec-
ond a close reading ofthe Philebus. In his reading ofthe Philebus,
Gadamerarguesthatwithregardtobothtopicandmethodology,this
presumably late dialogue represents a return to Plato's earlierwork.
Like some oftheearlySocraticdialogues, the Philebus addresses the
humanaspectofthegood, and the methodis elenctic. In Gadamer's
view, thisreturntothehumangoodandtheelencticmethodbringout
a dialogical core that unifies the work ofPlato: the conviction that
thehumangoodis realizedin andshapedthroughongoingdialogical
activity.
GadamerframeshisstudyofPlato'sdialecticalethicsbycontrasting
Socraticdialogue withSophistic speech. TheSophistis driven by the
desiretodistinguishhimselffromothers,andhasnocommitmenttora-
tionality.Assuch,theSophistrepresentsadegenerateformofspeech.
6
Socrates,bycontrast,incarnatesreason,pureandsimple.Havingexpe-
rienced how reason was literally put on trial in the case against his
teacher,Platoreflectivelyturnsfromthecolloquialpracticeofdialecti-
calreasoningtoasecond-orderquest,stillcommittedtothedialogical
form,foritsconditionsofpossibility.Hefindssuchconditionsofpos-
sibilityinthedialecticaldialogue,inwhichtheparticipants,inspiteof
theirdivergingpointsofview, joinforces inanopen-endedconversa-
tion aboutagiven problemorsubjectmatter.
7
So conceived,genuine
dialogue,theongoingprocessofcomingtoanunderstandingabouta
-------------- - ---- --
68 KristinGjesdaI
given subjectmatter, is defined by its being (a) bilateral, (b) oriented
towardasubjectmatter,and(c) nonconclusive.
(a) Any reader of Plato will know that Socrates does not always
engage in a straightforward,mutualexchangeofopinions. While he
sometimesvoiceshisownbeliefs,hemoreofteninquiresintotheunre-
flected presuppositions ofhis interlocutors. Socrates frequently pur-
suesthepathofrefutation;he tests his discussant'sassertionswithout
thereby claiming to possess a final truth or objectivity. However,
whereastheSophistrefuteshisinterlocutorsinordertoestablishsocial
superiority, the Socratic philosopher investigates his interlocutor's
standpointbyrequesting"furtherinformation"(PDE 561 GW 5:42).
Theaimofthe Socraticmethodis constructive;itis "notaprocessof
reducingtheotherpersontosilencesoas,tacitly,tomarkoneselfoutas
the knower, in contrasttohim, but a process ofarrivingata shared
inquiry"(PDE 591 GW 5:44).Bylayingbarefalsepresuppositions,the
dialoguesteadilyprogressestoward understanding.Indeed,Gadamer
takesthisproceduretobeapreconditionfordialogicalknowledgeand
claims that the dialogue is grounded in "a shared ignorance and a
sharedneedtoknow"(PDE 59/GW 5:44).
The commitment to dialogical knowledge requires that the inter-
locutorsrecognize therationalityoftheother'spointofview. Whena
speakerleavesbehindanoriginalclaimasaresultofreflectivedelibera-
tion, he or she is only getting closer to knowledge as true, justified
belief or, as Gadamer would say, as a progressive disclosure ofthe
subject matter. Gadamer argues that this intersubjective process of
acknowledgmentisanintrinsicaspectofrationality.Totheextentthat
itinvolvesattentivenesstoreasons,eventhinkingis basedontheinter-
subjectivityofdialogue.
(b) Dialogue proper consists in testing out diverging, sometimes
contradictorybeliefsaboutagivensubjectmatter(suchas, in thePhi-
lebus, thehumangood).Yettheinterlocutorssharethedesiretoobtain
knowledge aboutthe subject matter underdiscussion. This common
orientationisasine qua non forallconversation.Socraticrefutationis
madepossiblebythedesiretoclarifythesubjectmatter(PDE 59/GW
5:44). As Gadamer puts it, "the first concern of all dialogical and
dialecticalinquiryisacare for the unity and sameness ofthethingthat
is under discussion" (PDE 64/GW 5:48). To the extent that self-
expressionis anelementofdialogue, itissecondarytotheorientation
towardthesubjectmatter.Dialogueproperhasanessentiallytriangu-
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
larstructure.It consistsoftwoormorepartiesandtheirsharedorien-
tationtowardaSachverhalt.
1
69
(c)Atrulydialogicalattitudeinvolvesthewillingnesstoreviseone's
beliefsif, onfurtherconsideration,thesubjectmattershowsitselfina
different light. The dialogue "progressively discloses the object, con-
tinually addressing it as something different" (PDE 19 / GW 5:16).
progressivedisclosurehasnopositiveendorconclusion.InGada-
mer's words, dialogue proper"doesnottake possession," but points
"awayfrom all supposed possession and toward the possibility ofa
possessionwhichis alwaysinstoreforit, becauseitalwaysslipsaway
fromit"(PDE 6-71 GW 5:9).
Againstthe background ofthis quick recapitulation ofGadamer's
understandingofrationality in Plato's Dialectical Ethics, wenowre-
turntoDavidson.Byandlarge,DavidsonapplaudsGadamer'sreading
ofPlato. Yet he is concernedthatGadamerunderestimatesthe differ-
ence between the Philebus and theearlydialogues (430). Heworries
thatGadameroverlookshow, in theearly dialogues, Socrates, "how-
everignorant[he] wasofthefinal truth, ...wasrightinwhathe did
claim....Always theinterlocutor,neverSocrates,turned outtohave
inconsistentopinions"(430). As Davidson putsit, "eventhoughSoc-
ratessometimesseemsgenuinelytothinkhemaylearnsomethingfrom
thediscussion,weareshownnorealcases wherethishappens" (430).
However,insteadof pursuingthisinitialpoint- asheshouldhavedone
(I return tothis pointin the section below) Davidson simplystates
thatthePhilebus, morethananyotherworkofPlato'S,lendsitselftoa
philosophicaldiscussion ofthedialogical pathtoshared understand-
ing.In fact, DavidsonnotonlyendorsesthebasicthrustofGadamer's
readingofthePhilebus butalsowishestobolsteritbyofferingfurther
argumentative support. Hepoints outthat this is one ofthe few di-
aloguesinwhichSocratesdoesindeedchangehismindastheconversa-
tion unfolds (430). Although Gadamer himselfoverlooks this point,
Davidsonclaimsthatitdoessupporthiscase.Thatis, ifGadamerhad
onlybeen moresensitivetothedevelopmentfrom theearlydialogues
(whereSocratesdoes notchangehis mind) tothe Philebus (where he
does), his argumentwould have been even moreconvincing. Amore
developmental approach to Plato would, in Davidson's assessment,
"cohabitmorehappilywithGadamer'sownconceptionof dialogueand
conversation" (430).8 In this sense, Davidson's reading ofGadamer
takestheform ofan immanentcritique.Heis fundamentally sympa-
70
r
KristinGjesdal
thetic toGadamer'sinterpretationofthePhilebus, and,in thisspirit,
pointsouthowGadamer,throughaslightlydifferentapproach,could
have reinforced his reading by drawing on more adequate textual
evidence.
JudgingfromDavidson'scomments,thedisagreementbetweenthe
twophilosophersconsists inminor,interpretativenuances andcould
plausibly be dissolved in the course offurther intellectual exchange.
This, however, is a misunderstanding. Although it is presented as a
minorphilological issue, Davidson'sremarkcoversoverasetofpro-
foundphilosophical differences.
Objectivity,Truth,andSelf-Transformation
Davidson'searlyinterestintheSocraticelenchus,firstexpressedinhis
1949dissertationonthePhilebus, isrecapitulatedintheessay"Plato's
Philosopher" (1985).9In this article, thee1encticmethodis connected
to a capacity for removing inconsistencies that ultimately refers to a
conceptoftruth as coherence. Davidson focuses onthe usefulness of
theelencticmethodfor theanalysis ofmoralconceptssuchas thatof
the good life. Whereas a Plato scholar like Gregory Vlastos, whose
workDavidsongenerallyapplauds, locates thismethodtotheearlier
dialogues, Davidson argues that "ata certain pointlatein his career
Platoreturns to (ifhe ever departed from) both theSocratic concern
with the good life, the rightwayto live: andthathe depends onthe
assumptionthatthereisenoughtruthineveryonetogiveus hopethat
we canlearn [by proceeding throughthee1enchus] in whatthegood
life consists."10 In this essay, Davidson also recalls thatwhen he ini-
tiallywasworkingonPlato'sPhilebus, hesoondiscovered"thatbyfar
themostprofoundcommentaryonthePhilebus wasProfessorGada-
mer'spublisheddissertation."l1
If we take Gadamer at his word, a philosophical position is best
understood in light ofthe questions to which it responds.!2 Plato's
dialogical form, he claims, responds tothecrisis ofreason following
thetrialagainstSocrates.What,then, ofGadamer'sownworkinthe
early 1930s? Upon turning to Plato's notion of dialogue, Gadamer
doesnotsimplywishtoexplorealesserknownaspectofancientGreek
philosophy. This much should immediately be granted Davidson.
However, the fact thathe does notengage in a merely historical ex-
ercise does not imply that he, as Davidson indicates, is seeking to
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics 71
explore the foundation ofthe possibility ofobjective thought. What
drives him, rather, is the perception ofa fundamental crisis in the
humanitiesin the1920s-acrisisthatis triggeredbythewayinwhich
thehumanities,wishingtomodeltheirnotionofvalidityovertheepi-
stemic norms ofthe natural sciences, leave out the problem ofself-
understanding. This crisis cannot be overcome by calling for a re-
articulationofthefoundationsforthepossibilityofobjectivethought,
butdemandsa fundamental rearticulatingoftheoutermostpremises
andself-understandingofthehumansciences.
Thesenseoftherebeingacrisisinthehumanitieswaswidelyshared
atthetime.13 Withinphenomenological circles, this wasmostclearly
voiced by EdmundHusser! and Martin Heidegger. In his laterwork,
Gadamerrepeatedlyemphasizes the impactHeideggerhadonhimin
thisperiod.Eventhoughheexpressessomereservationswithregardto
Heidegger'srhetoric,!4 GadamerremainsclearthatHeidegger'swork
putsupthestandardagainstwhichhis ownhermeneuticsoughttobe
measured (TM xxv1 WM 5). Heidegger's philosophy, he suggests, is
groundbreaking in that his "temporal analytics of Dasein has ...
shownconvincinglythatunderstandingis notjustoneofthevarious
possible behaviors of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein
itself"(TM xxx1WM 2:440).
AtthetimewhenGadamerwasstillastudentofHeidegger,Heideg-
gercriticizedthehumansciencesingeneralandphilosophyinparticu-
larforhavingneglectedthe beingofDasein.
15
As aconsequence,phi-
losophyhadbeenreducedtoa "greatindustryof'problems'"(HF 41
5).Thehistoryofphilosophyhadbeenturnedintoanobjectthatcould
bestudiedfromadisinteresteddistance;thepastwasapproachedwith
nogenuineinterest,onlyan"industriouscuriosity"(HF 41 5).Worse
'"1
,
.,
i
still, itwas notonlythe past, butlife itselfthathad been objectivized
(HF 28-291 36).16 Husserl's phenomenology, the young Heidegger
;-'1
announces, provided an alternative tothis attitude. Yet Husser! had J
notgonefarenough(HF 1-311-3). InHeidegger'sview,Husser!had
!
failed to address "the radical question of whether epistemological
questions might not in fact be meaningless in phenomenology" (HF
!
57 1 73). Heidegger, however, addresses this question. Moreover, he
proposes a shift from traditional epistemic problems to the idea of
philosophyas philosophizing.17As opposed totraditional epistemol-
ogy, Heidegger'snotionofphilosophizingis distinguished by itsinsis-
tence on (a) self-understanding, (b) self-transformation, and (c) the
J
1
72 73 KristinGjesdal
notionofphilosophyasbeinganendinitself.Eachofthesepointsisin
needoffurtherclarification.
Intheearly1920s,Heideggerclaimedthatintraditionalphiloso-
phy theproblem ofDasein's self-understandinghad been "taken too
lightly."18 Because it overlooked the question ofself-understanding,
academic philosophy ceased to address genuine philosophical ques-
tionsanddistracteditselfinsteadwithfashionablequasi-problems(HF
4/5-6).Philosophizing, bycontrast,shouldbe "occupiedextensively
with ...the radical interpretation ofourownconcrete situation."19
Thisinvestigation yieldsnoobjectiveknowledge, butaspirestoa bet-
terunderstandingofone'sownexistence(there-being [Da-sein)). Hei-
deggerclaims thatthis is the real problemofphilosophy, the area in
whichithas its ownrigor, as opposedtotheexactnessofthenatural
sciences.
10
Knowledge ofourownDasein leads toself-transformation.As
such, itinvolves afirst person singularperspective. Even ifBeing and
Time had not been written in the authorial voice ofthe first person
singular (like traditionalmeditationsfrom AugustinetoDescartes),11
the treatmentofauthenticitypresupposes thisperspective. As under-
stood by the young Heidegger, philosophizing was not primarily an
epistemic matter but "an existentiell phenomenon (the preeminent
one)."22As an existentiell phenomenon,philosophizingis anongoing
task.Dasein neverunderstandsitselffully. ThephilosophizingDasein
turnsouttobewhatHeidegger,withanodtoHusserl,describesas a
"genuineandconstant'beginner.'"23
Theprocessofphilosophizingisanaiminitself,anautoteleolog-
icalpractice.AsHeideggerseesit,philosophyis neitheraprofessional
occupation,northemasteryofanacademictechnique,butanactivity
inwhichthephilosopheris whatheorsheis in theactivityitself.
24
In
philosophizing, the reflective activity and the understanding that is
beingsoughtare twosidesofthe samecoin.This,Heideggerargues,
distinguishes philosophy from the other sciences. Whereas one can
speak ofboth philosophy and philosophizing, the disciplines of, for
example,philologyorbiologycannotberenderedinanactiveform(as
"philologizing"or"biologizing").zs
It hasfrequently beenclaimedthatGadamer'searlystudyofPlato
representsaturnawayfromHeidegger.Inthiswork,Gadamersetsout
to rehabilitate a philosopher Heidegger had rejected as causing the
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
beginningofthedeclineofWesternthought.
26
Furthermore,hedoesso
in order to rehabilitate a dialogical rationality that was not part of
Heidegger's agendainthe 1920s. Both ofthese claims are correct. In
Plato's Dialectical Ethics, Gadamerbringsoutthephenomenological
relevanceofPlato'sworkbyemphasizingtheroleofSocraticdialogue.
Moreover, the very interest in dialogue represents a significant step
beyondHeidegger,whosecrassjudgmentonpublicspeechanddiscus-
sion finds expression in the distinction between Rede and Gerede in
Being and TimeY Nonetheless,Gadamer'sstudyofSocraticdialogue
remainsHeideggerianinspiritandresponds,alongthelinesstakedout
bytheyoungHeidegger,totheproblemsof(a) self-understanding,(b)
self-transformation, and (c) theautoteleologyofphilosophy.In order
toseehowthischallengestheideaofanaffinitybetweenDavidsonand
Gadamer,eachofthesepointsmustbestudiedinfurtherdetail.
WithregardtoGadamer'sreadingofthePhilebus, welearnearly
onthat"theknowledgeofthegood"is notakindofknowledge that
somehaveandothersdonothaveattheirdisposal;itisnotaknowledge
"by which only the 'wise' are distinguished" (PDE 53 / GW5:39).
According to Gadamer, "the claimto this knowledge constitutes the
mannerofbeingofhumanexistenceitself" (53/39). Assuch,knowl-
edgeofthegoodis notakindofknowledgethatthesubjectpossesses
butfromwhichitis detached. Rather,to havethiskindofknowledge
meanstounderstandoneselfintermsofit(53/39).Theknowledgeof
thegood- ofthatinlightofwhichDasein understandsitself- canbe
vagueandimplicitandthusreflectwhatGadamercallsanaverageself-
understanding. Expressing himself in overtly Heideggerian terms,
Gadamerexplains that"Dasein'saverageself-understandingcontents
itselfwiththemereappearance ofknowledgeandcannotgive anac-
countingofitself"(54/40).Socratesdoesnotsomuchwishtoconvey
knowledgeaboutthegoodas todemandthathisinterlocutorsgivean
accountofthehighestgoodinlightofwhichtheyleadtheirlives.And,
asGadamerpointsout,"Everyonemustbeabletoanswerthisquestion,
because it asks him about himself" (54 1 40; emphasis added). Self-
understandingcharacterizeshumanity, andSocraticdialogueseeksto
make explicit the implicitself-understandingofthe interlocutor, and
ultimately also ofthe readerofPlatonic dialogue. This dimension of
self-understandingis whatGadamerhas inmindwhenheclaimsthat
Plato'sdialogicalethics,whilemotivatedbytheexperienceofreason's
------------------------------
74
"
KristinGjesdal
slippingintoempty,Sophisticspeechintheperiodleadinguptothe
againstSocrates, is basedon"anunlimitedwillingness to justify and
supplyreasonsforeverythingthatissaid"(52/39).
(b) Gadamerarguesthattheproblemofself-understandingcharac-
terizesSocraticconversationingeneral."Evenwhentheinitialtopicof
theconversationis notknowledgeaboutone'sownbeing butaclaim
toknowledgeinaspecificarea,"itis thecasethat"theSocratictesting
ofthis claim leads back to oneself" (PDE 541 GW5:40). This is a
knowledgeofwhatHeideggerwouldcallthe"forthesakeofwhich"of
one'sownexistence (Worum-willen der eigenen Existenz, 54I 5:40).
Thegoodis theultimate"forthesakeofwhich"thatprovidesindivid-
ual Dasein with existential direction. Insofar as Dasein knows the
good,"itdoeseverythingthatitdoesforthesakeofthis"(60/44). The
"for-the-sake-of-which"ofDasein's everydaypracticegiveswaytothe
"knowledgeofthe 'forthesakeofwhich'ofitsownbeing"(60/44).
Thisknowledge,Gadamercontinues,"bringsDaseinoutoftheconfu-
sionintowhichitisdrawnbythedisparatenessandunfathomableness
ofwhatimpingesonitfromtheworldintoastancetowardsthat,and
thusintotheconstancyofitsownpotentialityfor being"(60/44-45).
Hence, knowledge ofthegood, the subjectofPlato's Philebus, leads
to self-transformation and, ultimately, a better and more truthful
existence.
TheSophistlacks this orientation.Thisis why Gadamerspeaksof
Sophistic talk as inauthentic (uneigentlich) (PDE 441 GW5:33; see
alsoTM 3631 WM369).Histalkeffectsnodeepenedself-understand-
ing. TheSophistdoesnotexposehimselftothesubjectmatterthatis
beingdiscussed,andnodimensionofself-transformationisinvolvedin
hisrhetoricaltourdeforce.
(c) In Gadamer's own environment, Plato research had branched
outintoanumberofmajorcamps.Therewere,forexample,theneo-
KantianswhoinsistedthatPlato'sdialoguesshouldbe readascondu-
cive to a philosophy ofscience.
28
And there was the visionary poet
StefanGeorgeandhisaestheticizinginterpretationofPlatoasaphilos-
opher-poet.
29
Against bothofthese lines ofinterpretation, Gadamer
proposesthatPlato'sdialogicalformsitsattheveryheartofhis under-
standingoftruthandrationality.Platoperformativelydemonstratesa
notionofphilosophyasphilosophizing,apracticethatis notameans
to an external end, but an end in itself. His philosophy, Gadamer
explains, "is a dialectic notonly because in conceiving and compre-
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
7S .
hendingitkeepsitselfonthewaytotheconceptbutalsobecause,asa
philosophythatconceivesandcomprehendsinthatway,itknowsman
as a creaturethatis thus 'onthe way' and'inbetween'"(PDE 3-41
GW5:6). Human good is the striving for knowledge, and Socratic
dialectic does notrelateto this as anobjectto be studiedatacritical
distance,but"itcarriesout,itself,whatitseeshumanexistenceas"(41
6-7). Philosophy investigates the human good by exercising it;
good is not comprehended as an abstract idea, but implemented in
philosophicalpractice- itis the very realizationofthispracticeitself
(4/7).
In lightofthe Heideggerian background ofGadamer'sstudy, it is
evident,first, thatGadamer'sreadingofPlatodoesnotsimplyseekto
provide a philosophical foundation for the possibility of objective
thoughtoremphasizeatriangularstructurethatinvolvesthemutually
acknowledging interlocutors and thesubjectmatteratstake. Rather,
Gadamerwishestostresstheintrinsicrelationbetweenknowledgeand
life.Second,giventhatGadamerisnotprimarilyinterestedinthefoun-
dationsof objectivethought,butintheself-transformationinvolvedin
philosophicaldialogue,thedifferencebetweentheearlydialoguesand
Philebus is notascentralas Davidsontakesittobe. Davidson,aswe
have seen, develops his theses aboutPlato'sreturn to theelenchus in
critical interaction with Vlastos's developmental claim that Plato
would ultimately leave this method behind.
30
As far as Gadamer's
readinggoes,however,thisconcernisslightlyoffcenter.InGadamer's
reading, it does not matter whether Socrates ends up changing his
pointofview(asheallegedlydoesinthePhilebus, butnotintheearly
dialogues).Whatmatters,rather,is hiscapacitytomaketheinterlocu-
tors realize that the issues theyengage with work back on how they
lead their lives. Therefore, the fact thatit is mainly his interlocutors
andnotSocrateshimselfwhochangeshismeaningisnotaproblemfor
Gadamer, buthas been presupposed throughout. Socrates' authority
does notdepend onthe fact that he knows the subjectmatter better
his interlocutors but on his understanding ofphilosophy as an
ongoing, transformative process ofedification. In this way, Socrates
playsthesamerolefortheyoungGadamerasthecanonicaltextsof
past will laterplay in Truth and Method. Like the eminent texts of
tradition,Socratesapproacheshisinterlocutorswithanethicalimper-
ativedemanding,liketheTorsoofApolloinRilke'spoem,that"Thou
mustalterthylife."3l ThisSocratic-hermeneuticimperativeinvolvesa
76
77
,.
KristinGjesdal
conceptionoftruthfulnessthatentailsa lotmorethanDavidson'sno-
tionofthefoundationsofthepossibilityofobjectivethought.
InadditiontohisclaimaboutGadamer'sfocusonthefoundationof
thepossibilityofobjectivethought,Davidsonpointstoasecondaspect
ofGadamer's work that, again, supposedly confirms the affinity be-
tweenthetwophilosophers.Thislatteraspectconcernsthehermeneu-
tic rationale ofGadamer'sinterpretation ofthe Philebus, thatis, the
wayinwhich Gadameris performatively"illustrating...his idea of
howtheinterpretationofanytextistoproceed."32
InterpretingthePast
ThelateDavidsonseemsgenerallysympathetictotheconcernsofEu-
ropeanphilosophy. In "DialecticandDialogue,"he describes how"a
remarkablerapprochement...is nowtakingplacebetweenwhatfora
time seemed two distinct, even hostile, philosophical methods, atti-
tudes and traditions" and emphasizes how Continental and Anglo-
American philosophy share "a common heritage." In line with this
attitude, Davidson, in spite ofhis indebtedness to Vlastos and the
horizonofAnglo-AmericanPlatoscholarship,seesGadamerasa"su-
perb classicist" andclaims thatwhile he touches upon textual prob-
lems when appropriate, "his [Gadamer'sl interest in the Philebus is
f
entirelycenteredonitsphilosophicalcontent."InDavidson'sview,this
makesGadamer'stext"astunningessayontheoriginsofobjectivityin
communal discussion," but, equallyimportantly, also "ademonstra- I
tionofwhattheinterpretationofatextcanbe."Theunderlyingmes-
sageseemstobethatunlikethehistoricizingapproachesoftraditional
!
r
Europeanthought, Gadameravoids allcontextualizationandfocuses
j
directlyon thesubjectmatterofthe text,thusapproachingPlatoin a
!
waythatiscompatiblewiththeorientationofanalyticphilosophy.33
YetagainDavidson'sendorsementispremature.Surely,Davidsonis
correctinpointingoutthecloserelationshipbetweenGadamer'sinter-
estindialogicalethics,ontheonehand,andthehermeneuticrationale
ofhisreadingofPlato,ontheother. Buthavingoverlookedthedeeper
motivation of Gadamer's philosophy- having presented his 1931
study as an investigation into the foundations of objectivity, rather
thanadefenseforanonobjectivizinghumanisticdiscourse- Davidson
fails tonotehowGadamer'sinterpretationexemplifiestheveryideaof
self-transformationthathe ascribes to Socratic dialogue. Inorderto
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
see this, it is necessary, yet again, to consider the young Gadamer's
indebtednesstoHeidegger.
NearlyallofHeidegger'slecturecoursesfromtheearly1920sexam-
ine classical works of European philosophy. His philosophizing is
played outin theinterpretationoftexts by Augustine, Aristotle, Lu-
ther, and Kierkegaard. In fact, more than anything, the very idea of
philosophizing is directed against the philological approaches to the
pastthat,inHeidegger'sunderstanding,werepredominantwithinthe
humansciences atthe time. These approaches, he argues, drownthe
philosophicalcontentinanobsessionwithhistoricaldetails.However,
when dealing with the classical works oftradition, "Objectivityand
calmness" are not desired qualities but "instances ofweakness and
indolence."34 Ratherthan treating these works as objects to be scru-
tinized bythedisinterestedhistorian,weneedtoengagewiththepast
inaninterested way. 35
FortheyoungHeidegger, a proper- interested- engagementwith
the pastdemandsarefashioningofphilosophy. Previously, he claims,
thetextsofthepasthave beenhandeddowntousthroughagradually
developing body ofhistoricizing commentaries. Whatwe now need,
Heideggerargues,isawayof makingtheworksof traditionmattertous
anew. Still indebted to the program of Husserlian phenomenology,
Heideggerenvisionshisphilosophyasadestruction ofthetradition.36
Hischoiceof termsispotentiallymisleading.Theaimofthedestruction
is notnegative.
37
Atstake,rather,is a philosophicalrescue operation
throughwhichtheworksof thepastaremadetospeaktotheinterpreter
anewandbroughtyetagaintomattertothepresent-aninterpretative
maneuverthatbreaksthroughpetrifiedpatternsofunderstandingand
meaning-ascription,thusrecoveringthetextsaswellasthetraditionin
whichthesetextswereoriginallyproducedorkeptalive.
BecauseDasein isitselfhistoricallysituated,theinvestigationofthe
pastis butaself-investigationand,conversely, a phenomenologically
adequateself-investigationmust,bydefinition,entailahistoricalcom-
ponent.Hence,historicalcritiqueis not"amereexerciseinproviding
convenient historical illustrations, butrather a fundamental task of
philosophy itself" (HF 59;HdI 75). While thephilosopherwishes to
"appropriatethepastgenuinelyfor the first time,"38 heorshecannot
relyontheexistingconsensusofthescholarlycommunity. Rather, he
orshe mustmakethepasthis orherown, thatis, enter a process of
appropriation or An-eignung. By doing this, the interpreter under-
78
79
KristinGjesdal
stands himself or herself better and, by the same token, the past is
broughttomatteras anarenaofself-understanding.Historyandphi-
losophyarenolongermerelyacademicdisciplines, but"modesofin-
terpretation, somethingwhich Dasein itselfis, in which it lives" (HF
39/48).
WhenGadamerpublishedhisHabilitationsschrift onPlato'sdialec-
ticalethics,hehadstillnotarrivedathishermeneuticaccountoftradi-
tionandhistoricity.OnlyinTruth and Method, publishednearlythirty
yearsafterhisstudyofthePhilebus, aretheseconceptssystematically
explored.YeteveninthePhilebus study,Gadamerreflectsonthephi-
losopher's relation to the tradition. His thoughts on this issue echo
Heidegger'sconcernsthroughoutthe 1920s. Gadamerhimselfmakes
nosecretofthis butretrospectivelygrantsthatwhenturningtoPlato,
hisambitionwasnothinglessthantodoforPlatowhatHeideggerhad
donefor Aristotle. Should it not,Gadamerasks inthe preface tothe
secondeditionofPlato's Dialectical Ethics, bepossibleforhimtoo"to
seeGreekphilosophy,AristotleandPlato,withneweyes- justasHei-
degger was able in his lectures on Aristotle to present a completely
uncustomary Aristotle, one in whom one rediscovered one's own,
present-dayquestionsinstartlinglyconcreteform?"(PDE xxxii1GW
5:161).FromHeidegger'steachingin Marburg,Gadamerhadlearned
toavoid"boththelearnedairsofthescientificfraternityand,asmuch
as possible, the traditional technical terminology, thereby bringingit
aboutthatthethings(thefactsofthematter)almostforcedthemselves
uponone"(xxxii1161). Placinghimselfwithinthephenomenological
tradition,he"triedtolayasideallscholarlyknowledgeforonceandto
take as [his] point ofdeparture the phenomena as they show them-
selvestous"(xxxii1161). JustastheinterlocutorsofSocraticdialogue
were committed to the subject matter under discussion, the young
Gadamerclaimsthat"WewouldbepoorreadersofPlatoifwedidnot
to lead us to the things, the facts ofthe matter,
thanreadingthemas merematerialfromwhichto
reconstructPlato'sdoctrineofprinciples" (xxxiii1162). Hence,look-
ingbackathisearlywork,Gadamerconcedesthathisintention"was
really only toapply the artofphenomenological description, which
[he] hadjustlearned,toaPlatonicdialogue"(xxviiii1159).
In this spirit, the young Gadamer declines to engage with thesec-
ondaryliteratureonPlato.Hefelt,inhisownwords,like"afirstreader
ofPlato"and"triedtolayasideallscholarlyknowledge"(xxxii1161).
,
f
l
f
I
i
I
t
l
t
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
ThesameappliestoananalysisoftheconsistencyofPlato'sargument
- thiswouldbe butanotherwayofobjectivizingthetext.Thatis,even
ifaclose,argumentativeanalysiscouldbringPlatotospeaktocontem-
poraryreaders, itcouldnotmakehim address us inthewaySocrates
hadaddressed his interlocutors,namely, withthedemandthatwere-
flectivelyinvestigateourownunexaminedprejudicesandtakerespon-
sibilityforourprereflectiveunderstandingofourownbeing.As Gada-
merwouldcastthispointinTruth and Method, itis notprimarilythat
theinterpreterexaminesthetext,butratherthattheinterpretermakes
thetexthisorherownbybeingexposedtoits
Gadameris notso interested in
theoryofthefoundationsforthepossibilityofobjecnvernought}as
is inretrievingtheSocraticwayofdoingphilosophy.Thisiswhatgets
lost when laterphilosophy turns from dialogical toconceptual anal-
ysis,which,inGadamer'sunderstanding,is whatcharacterizesphilos-
ophyafterPlato(PDE 81 GW 5:10). Gadamerlocates suchaturnin
Aristotle. Although he discovers a significant overlapping between
Plato's dialogical form and the insights espoused in Aristotle's ethics
(PDE 3-51 GW 6-8),heclaimsthatwithAristotle"conceptualinves-
tigationitselfisnecessarilyunderstoodontheleveloftheconceptifitis
supposedtobe understoodphilosophically"(7/9). Bythisturn,how-
ever,"theinnertensionandenergy"ofPlato'sphilosophizingdissolves
andthegainincomprehensibilityis paidforwithaloss"instimulating
multiplicityofmeaning" (719). This is so because the "partoflived
realitythatcanenterintotheconceptisalwaysaflattenedversion"(71
9).Giventhatwe,aslaterreaders,aremoreaccustomedtoconceptual
analysis than dialogical philosophizing, we have a tendency to read
Plato'swork"viaAristotle"(8 110).39 Hence,thechallengeforphilo-
sophicalhermeneuticsis tocounterthenarrowcultivationofconcep-
tualanalysisandkeepalivethestimulatingmultiplicityofmeaningsat
stake in Socratic dialogue. Only thus can hermeneutics integrate an
elementofself-transformationandtranscendthesearchforobjectivit]
ininterpretation.ThisdimensionofGadamer'sworkgetslostinDav-
idson'srecapitulationofPlato's Dialectical
PhilosophicalHermeneuticsandRadicalInterpretation
Atthispoint,onecouldarguethatDavidson's2002essayprovidesan
interpretationofGadamer'searlyworkthatiscorrect,butnotexhaus-
80
81
-.,...-
,
KristinGjesdal
tive. Thatis, onecould argue thatgiven his late focus ontheshared
rootsofEuropeanandAnglo-Americanthinking,Davidsonis rightin
centeringonGadamer'seffortatdialogicallyrearticulatingthefounda-
tions ofthe possibility ofobjective thought, butthat he fails to pay
attentiontotheself-transformativeaspectsofhermeneuticexperience.
Given that Davidson's aim is to show how he and Gadamer, both
outwithastudyofthePhilebus, endupinthesameintellect
neighborhood,hemayappearjustifiedinfocusingonlyon
thestorythatbestcomplieswiththisparticularpurpose.
Davidsonappearstobeawareofthisrisk. In thelastsectionofthe
essayonGadamer'sPlato,hereflectsonthedifferencesbetweenphilo-
sophicalhermeneuticsandradicalinterpretation:
WhereI differ (and this maymerely showI have notfully understoodGada-
mer) is thatIwouldnotsayaconversationpresupposesacommonlanguage,
noreven thatitrequires one. Understanding,to my mind, is always amatter
not only ofinterpretation but oftranslation, since we can never assume we
meanthesamethingbyourwordsthatourpartnersindiscussionmean.What
is created in dialogue is not a common language but understanding; each
partnercomesto understandtheother.Anditalsoseemswrongtome to say
agreement concerning an object demands that a common language first be
worked out. Iwould say: it is only in the presence of shared objects that
understandingcancomeabout.Comingtoanagreementaboutanobjectand
comingto understandeach other'sspeechare notindependentmoments but
arepartofthesame processoftriangulatingtheworld.
40
Gadamer'sclaim,however,is notthatunderstandingrequiresacom-
monlanguagein thenarrowmeaningoftheterm.He,too,wouldsee
nderstanding as a matter oftranslation. Yet Gadamerstresses that
understanding and translation are enabled by a primordial lin-
guisticality through which the world, as a field ofintelligibility and
meaning, is disclosed. Onlyagainst theprereflective meaningtotality
oftheworld(asdistinctfrom amereenvironment)canthingspresent
themselves tobeings ofourkind. Things presentthemselves tous as,
say, ahammer,a table,a poem,ora workofart,ratherthanas bare
objects thatthe individual language user, through a secondaryreflec-
tion,labels,accordingtothesemanticresourcesofhisorherparticular
language, as an object of a certain kind. The process of linguistic
world-disclosureisanenablingconditionofinterpretation.Hence,the
problemtowhichDavidsonresponds- paradigmaticallyexpressedby
theexampleoftheinterpreterwhoencountersaspeakerwhouttersthe
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
words "Sta korg" whenever a red object is in plain sight and then
reckonsthat"Stakorg"meansred-isforeign toGadamer.41
Eventhough Davidsonmay be correct in pointingoutthatthe in-
quiryintothefoundationofthepossibilityofobjectivethoughtis one
dimensionofGadamer's hermeneutics, his reading misses outonthe
more fundamental orientation ofGadamer's philosophy. Gadamer's
aim is notto brin!! out a non-Cartesian notion of
,;thedisclosureof
insights oftraditionandtheself-understandingthat,given theshared
linguisticalityofhumancultures,isreachedthroughengagementwith
the meanings ofthe eminent works ofthepast. That is, ifGadamer
criticizesmodernphilosophyfornottakingintoaccountthedialogical
aspectsofthinkingandrationality,hewishesnotonlytorehabilitatea
dialogicalnotionofobjectivity, butalso,morefundamentally,tobring
totheforeatypeofhermeneuticexperiencethatallowstheencounter
withtheother be it thediscussant (as in hisearlyworkon thePhi-
lebus) ortheeminenttextsoftradition(as in Truth and Method) - to
triggera self-transformation ofthe kindthatSocratespromptsin his
interlocutors.Thetaskofreplacingamonologicalnotionofobjectivity
withadialogicalonemaybeanecessarysteptowardthearticulationof
philosophicalhermeneutics;asufficientstep,however, itis not. What
isneededis anotionofinterpretationthattakesthedialogical-herme-
neutic experience to be intrinsically linked to the possibility ofself-
transformation.
Theideaofself-transformationis threatened by theorientationto-
wardobjectivity,yetitfares no betterinotherareasofmodernlife. In
Gadamer'swork,eveninthe1930s,thecritiqueof modernrationalityis
onlyoneexampleoftheimpoverishmentofreasoninmodern
InTruth and Method, heapproaches
suggests,42inlightof acritiqueof moaernSCIence,
acntiqueofthesubjectivizationofartand beautyin thetraditionof
Kant and the romantics. By Gadamer's lights, modern aesthetics re-
ducesarttoaSourceofsubjectivepleasurethatoccasions notruthor
existentialself-understanding(TM 42-551 WM 48-61).Artoccursas
anautonomousaestheticphenomenon,butbythesametokenitlosesits
placewithinthelarger,ethical-politicalcontextofitssociety.Gadamer
seesinthistheemergenceofaphilistine,aesthetichumanism.Aesthetic
humanism believes that its emphasis on the aesthetic dimension of
82
KristinGjesdal
tradition provides a genuine alternative tothe scientistic worldview.
Hereinlies its na'ivete. Forby definingartandaestheticexperiencein
termsofasubjective, noncognitive pleasure,aesthetichumanismcon-
firms, rather thanchallenges, a reduction oftruth and objectivity to
scientifictruthandobjectivityonly.Theveryideathatartaddressesus
intermsofourself-understanding,thatitquestionsourwayoflifeand
demandsanethicaltransformation,is notconsideredbyaesthetichu-
manism. Gadamer,bycontrast,wishestoemphasizethisaspectofart,
and this is why Truth and Method begins with a discussion of
subjectivization of art in post-Kantian aesthetics and ends with the
rehabilitationoftheworld-disclosivetruthofart.
Precisely because Gadamer's philosophy responds to a broader
problemconcerningtruth,self-understanding,andthemeaningoftra-
dition,thecritiqueofmodernscience (andthecorrespondingfounda-
tionofobjectivity)is justoneoutofanumberofwaystocircleinand
diagnosetheproblemsofmodernphilosophy:alossofgenuinehistor-
icityandafailure toownuptoourownhistoricalexistencebyletting
ourselves be addressed,in a bindingway, by the truthoftheeminent
worksofthepast. Gadamer'sphilosophyis acomprehensiveeffort,in
the tradition ofHeidegger and the phenomenological movement, to
respond to the modern loss of a relationship with the continually
evolving tradition in whichDasein is situated. This is nota problem
thatcan besolvedbythetransitionfromamonologicaltoadialogical
paradigmofrationality,norbyrearticulatingthefoundationsofobjec-
tivity.WhatGadamerrequires,rather,is thatweturntotradition
experienceit as a totalitythatgrants meaninganddirection tofinite,
historicalcreaturesof ourkind.InGadamer'searlywork,thisisnotyet
broughttotheforeatthelevelofphilosophicalcontent.It is,however,
very much present at the level of his methodological-historical ap-
proach:thatis,inthewishtodoforPlatowhatHeideggerhaddonefor
Aristotle,subjecthisworktoadestructive-phenomenologicalreading,
hencemakingitmattertothepresentinawaythatthemorephilologi-
cal,historicizingstudiesofPlatohadfailedtodo.
However,byreturningtoGadamer'searlywork,Davidsondoesnot
justwanttosaysomethingabouttheaffinity betweenhimselfandthe
youngGadamer.Healsosuggeststhatthisaffinityextendsbeyondthe
earlyyears,sO thatthetwophilosophers,bothstartingoutasstudents
of Platonic dialogue, arrive in the same intellectual neighborhood.
Hence, we must consider the possibility thatthe self-transformative
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics 83
aspect of Gadamer's hermeneutics is simply an early, Heideggerian
infatuationofhis,somethingthatthemorematurephilosopherwould
leavebehindinhis magnumopusTruth and Method.
During the almost thirty years between Plato's Dialectical Ethics
andTruth and Method, GadamerwroteashortmonographonJohann
Gottfried Herder, Yolk und Geschichte im Denken Herders (1941),
butalsocontinuedtoworkonPlato.
43
In thisperiod,hepublishedthe
essays"PlatoandthePoets"and"Plato'sEducationalState,"aswellas
a number ofreview articles oncontemporaryGerman Platoscholar-
ship. Not surprisingly, then, there is a thematic continuity between
Plato's Dialectical Ethics, the essays from the 1930sand 1940s, and
the hermeneuticissues addressedin Truth and Method. In Truth and
Method, GadamerstillreferstoPlatonicdialogueandemphasizesSoc-
rates'capacitytopromptreflection andself-transformationin his in-
terlocutors. Atthis point, however, he significantlysuggests thatit is
theabilitytoask questionsthatcharacterizestheSocraticwayofphi-
losophizing.TheSocratic docta ignorantia, we nowlearn, points the
wayto the "superiorityofquestioning" and the affinity between the
structureofopennessthatcharacterizesthequestionandthenatureof
hermeneuticexperienceassuch(TM 3621 WM368).Furthermore,the
paradigmatic,hermeneuticsituationisnolongerlimitedtoadialogical
interaction between two ormore discussants, butinvolves theentire
relationtothetraditioninwhichtheinterpreterfindshimselforherself
situated.Traditionis ascribeda normativitynoindividual interpreter
couldeverpossess. As Gadamerputsit, "Themostimportantthingis
thequestionthatthetextputstous, ourbeingperplexedby thetradi-
tionaryword,sothatunderstandingitmustalreadyincludethetaskof
thehistoricalself-mediationbetweenthepresentandtradition"(3741
379).Thismomentofperplexityis onlymadepossiblebythefactthat
"therelationofquestionandansweris,infact,reversed.Thevoicethat
speakstous from thepast- whethertext,work,trace- itselfposesa
questionandplaces ourmeaningin openness" (374/379). Tradition
alwaysprovides the morefundamental andcomprehensive meaning-
totalityofwhichtheinterpreterisapartandinlightofwhichheorshe
understands herself. Only when acknowledged as authoritative can
traditioncallonandquestiontheself-understandingoftheinterpreter.
Thisis nodialoguebetweenequals(evenlessso,onecouldadd,thanis
generallythecasein Socraticdialogue). Theadequateresponsetothe
calloftraditiondoesnotonlyconsistin accountability,reason-giving,
84
85
KristinGjesdal
andrationalconsideration.Whethersherecognizesitornot,theinter-
preterparticipatesinandbelongstothemeaning-totalitythattradition
ultimatelyis. Gadamer illuminates this belonging by reference tothe
structureofgame-playing.Takingonthecallofthetradition,theinter-
preterletsgooftheaspirationtoautonomyandlets himselforherself
be absorbed in an experience of "ecstatic self-forgetfulness" (128 1
133).Onlythiskindofexperience- andnotthegiveandtakeofcom-
munal reason-giving and reflective deliberation- triggers the self-
transformativeexperiencethatGadamerseeks. Gadameremphasizes
that"Toreachanunderstandinginadialogueisnotmerelyamatterof
puttingoneselfforwardandsuccessfullyassertingone'spointofview,
butbeingtransformedintoacommunionin whichwe donotremain
whatwewere"(379/384). AccordingtoGadamer,truthis ultimately
aboutgainingamorefulfillinglife.Thisisthepointatwhichtheyoung
Gadamer's Habilitationsschrift anticipates the most central ideas of
Truth and Method and also the reason why the mature Gadamer,
looking back to Heidegger's early lectures and seminars, maintains
that Truth and Method is but an attempt to justify philosophically
whatHeideggerwas doingin his earlyteachinginFreiburgandMar-
burg. Gadamer's interestinhermeneuticself-transformation is there-
fore no early, Heideggerian whim of his, but a concern that runs
throughandunifieshiswork.
BypresentingonlyapiecemealversionofGadamer'swork,theearly
Plato text as well as the later hermeneutic contributions, Davidson
missesoutonitsrealphilosophicalthrust.Hisisadeflationaryreading
thatevades,ratherthanconfronts,thegenuinepointsofdisagreement
betweenthephenomenologicaltraditionandhisown.Davidsonover-
looks the larger conceptual and philosophical contextofGadamer's
work,he overlooks the very question towhich philosophical herme-
neutics representsananswer,andheignoresthelargelyHeideggerian
rootsofGadamer'splatoscholarship.Hence,he misses the difference
between his own philosophy and that ofGadamer- and potentially
alsotheopportunityto discussinmoredetailtheachievementsaswell
as thepotentialproblemsofphilosophicalhermeneuticswhenjudged
fromtheperspectiveofradicalinterpretation.
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
NOTES
1.Thishaslargelybeen understoodas aquestion ofwhetherDavidson'swrit-
ing is best understood as a last step in the tradition evolving from the Vienna
Circle, logical positivism, and Quine oras part ofthe tradition ofpost-Kantian
Europeanthinking.Davidsoncommentsontheinfluencesfromphilosopherssuch
as Socrates, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Kant in his "IntellectualAutobiography," in
The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. LewisE. Hahn(Chicago: OpenCourt,
1999),63-64.
StudiesofDavidson'srelationshipwithEuropeanphilosophyincludeFrankB.
Farrell,Subjectivity, Realism, and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the World in
Recent Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Bjl'nn T.
Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction (Lon-
don: Blackwell, 1989);andJeffMalpas,"Gadamer,Davidson,andtheGroundof
Understanding," in Gadamer's Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gada-
mer, ed.JeffMalpas,UlrichArnswald,andJensKertscher(Cambridge,Mass.:The
MITPress,2002),195-216.
2. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell,
1980),chap. 8. See also John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1996), 115-19,and"Gadamerand Davidsonon Un-
derstandingandRelativism," in MalpasetaI.,Gadamer's Century, 173-94.Rob-
ert B. Brandom pleads for a return to Gadamer in Tales of the Mighty Dead
(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,2002),chap.3.
3. Donald Davidson, "Gadamerand Plato's Philebus," in The Philosophy of
Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed.LewisE.Hahn(OpenCourt:Chicago,1997),421-32.
4.Ibid.,421;hereaftercitedin thetextby pagenumber.
5.HansGadamer,Truth and Method, trans.JoelWeinsheimerandDonaldG.
Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), hereaftercited as TM; Wahrheit und
Methode, Gesammelte Werke, 2 vols. (Tiibingen: J. c. B. Mohr, 1990), vol. 1,
hereafter cited as WM; unless otherwise noted, WM refers to vol. 1. Davidson,
"GadamerandPlato'sPhilebus," 421.DavidsonalsopraisesGadamerin his"In-
tellectualAutobiography,"in Hahn,The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, 27.
6. On the Sophist's mind is the desire to stand forth as an individual to be
admired or, possibly,to take downoratorsofall scales, thusconfirminghis own
standing.TheSophisthasnogenuineinterestingettingclosertothetruthabouta
givensubjectmatter.Whetherheaimsatgainingtheagreementofothersorrefut-
ingthem,hisspeechdoesnottry"primarilytomakethefacts ofthemattervisible
in theirbeingandtoconfirmthisthroughtheotherpersonbutrathertodevelopin
speech, independentlyofthe access thatit creates to the facts ofthe matter, the
possibility precisely ofexcluding the other person in the function ...offellow
speakerandfellow knower."InSophisticspeech,theotherisassignednoessential
roleincontributingtothesubjectmatteroftheconversation.As Gadamerputsit,
"Partoftheessenceofsuchtalk...is toavoiddialogue."See Hans-GeorgGada-
mer,Plato's Dialectical Ethics, trans.RobertB.Wallace(NewHaven:YaleUniver-
sityPress,1991),46;Platos dialektische Ethik, Gesammelte Werke, vol.5
gen:J.C.B. Mohr,1999),34-35.FurtherreferencestotheEnglishtranslationwill
86 87 KristinGjesdal
beabbreviatedPDE (Plato's Dialectical Ethics). ReferencestoGesammelte Werke
willbegivenasGW, followed byvolume.ThequoteaboveisfromPDE 48/GW
5:36.
7. According to Gadamer, this shared commitment to the disclosure ofthe
Sachverhalt is characteristic ofspeech as such. In its primordial form, speech is
definedasU asharedhavingtodowithsomething"(PDE 29/GW5:23).
8. IreturntothequestionoftheinterpretativerationaleofGadamer'sreading
ofPlatobelow. Beforeproceedingthatfar, however,anotherquestionneedstobe
addressed: whetherDavidsonis rightin claimingthatwhatGadameris after, in
thisearly work, is toprovideanaccount ofthe foundation ofthe possibilityof
objectivethought.
9. Donald Davidson, Plato's Philebus (New York: Garland, 1990), "Plato's
Philosopher," Truth, Language, and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005),
225-40.
10.Davidson,"Plato'sPhilosopher,"226-28,230.
11. Donald Davidson, "Dialecticand Dialogue" (1994), in Truth, Language,
and History, 252.
12. "[A] personwhowantstounderstandmustquestionwhatlies behindwhat
issaid.Hemustunderstanditasananswertoaquestion"(TM 370/ WM 375).
13.ForacriticalstudyofGermanacademia in the period between 1919and
see Fritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German
Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press,
1990).
14.GadamerworriesthatHeidegger'swayofdoingphilosophy"madeiteasy
toraise thecharge ofmythologicalthinkingagainsthim."See Gadamer,"Histor-
icism and Romanticism," in Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and
History, ed. DieterMisgeldandGraemeNicholson,trans.LawrenceSchmidtand
MonicaReuss(Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1992),128.Fromthis
background,Gadamerclaimsthattheearlywork on Plato,writtenwhen he was
still a student of Heidegger's, was driven by the wish to "emancipate" himself
"from the style of Heidegger" (Gadamaer, "Writing and the Living Voice," in
MisgeldandNicholson,Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry and History,
66).Yet,inemancipatinghimselffromhisteacher,Gadamerdoesnotwishtoleave
behind the insights ofHeidegger's philosophy; in particular, he did notwish to
leave behind the hermeneutic challenge thatHeidegger had laid outin his
seminarsonAristotle.Gadamerclaimsthathewas"latertojustifyintheoryandto
represent" the perspective of these influential seminars. See "Selbstdarstellung
Hans-Georg Gadamer" (WM 2:485), and Gadamer, Philosophical Apprentice-
ships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass.: The MITPress, 1985), 49;
Gadamer, Philosophische Lehr;ahre. Eine Ruckschau (Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torioKlostermann,1977),216.
15. As he puts it in the lecture course from the summersemesterof1923, a
"fundamentalinadequacyofontologyinthetraditionandtoday"isthat"itblocks
access to that being which is decisive within philosophical problems: namely,
Dasein, from out ofwhich and for the sake ofwhich philosophy 'is.'''Martin
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, trans. Tohn van Buren
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 1999), 2; Ontologie (Hermeneutik der
Faktizitat), Gesamtausgabe, II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen, vol. 63 (Frankfurt am
Main:VittorioKlostermann,1988),3.HereaftercitedinthetextasHF.
16. See also Heidegger'scritiqueofDiltheyand HarnackinThe Phenomenol-
ogy of Religious Life, trans.MatthiasFritschandJenniferAnnaGosetti-Ferencei
(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004),120-21;Heidegger,Phanomeno-
logie des religiosen Lebens, Gesamtausgabe, voL 60(Klostermann: Frankfurtam
Main,1995),166-67;hereaftercitedinthetextasPRL.
17. Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initia-
tion into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington:
Indiana University 2001), 32-35;Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu
Aristoteles, Gesamtausgabe, voL 61 (FrankfurtamMain:VittorioKlostermann,
1985),42-46.
18. The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 6; Phanomenologie des religiosen
Lebens, 8.
19. Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle, 32;Phanomenologische In-
terpretationen zu Aristoteles, 42.
20. The Phenomenology of Religious Life, 7; Phanomenologie des religiosen
Lebens,10.
21. For a helpful discussion ofthis point,seeAmHie OksenbergRorty, "The
Structure ofDescartes' Meditations," in Essays on Descartes' Meditations, ed.
Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press,1986),9-11.
22. Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle, 42;Phanomenologische In-
terpretationen zu Aristoteles, 56.
23.Ibid.,12/13.Husser!speaksabouttheneedforanewbeginninginphilosophy
inErste Philosophie. IntheCartesian Meditations, henoteshowtheradicalbeginning
philosophershould"carryoutmeditationswiththeutmostcriticalprecautionanda
readinessforany- eventhemostfar-reaching- transformationoftheold-Cartesian
meditations." In initiating such a beginning, phenomenology redeems the secret
longingof earlierphilosophy.SeeEdmundHusser!,Cartesian Meditations: An Intro-
duction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1988),48,andThe Paris Lectures, trans.PeterKoestenbaum(Dordrecht:Martinus
Nijhoff, 1964). The German texts are published as Husserliana I, Cartesianische
Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage, ed. S. Strasser (The Hague: Martinus
1950), 48. Helpful discussions ofthese pointscan also be found in David Smith,
Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations (London:Routledge,2003),2-3;andLudwig
Landgrebe,"Hussed'sDeparturefrom Cartesianism,"The Phenomenology of Hus-
serl (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1981),66-121.
24.Heideggercomparesthistotheplayingofmusic(musiziere - "poetizing"in
theEnglishtranslation, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, 36;Phan-
omenologische lnterpretationen zu Aristoteles, 47),yetemphasizes that"itis in-
cumbentonustoavoidfrom theveryoutsettheopinionthatthisanalogyimpliesa
betweenphilosophyandart"(37
25. Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle, 36;Phanomenologische In-
terpretationen zu Aristoteles, 47.
88 89 KristinGjesdal
26. As Brice Wachterhauser, Beyond Being: Gadamer's Post-Platonic Herme-
neutical Ontology (Evanston, Ill.: NorthwesternUniversityPress, 1999),14-15,
35-36, notes, Gadamer, throughout his life, remained critical ofthis aspect of
Heidegger'sphilosophy.
27. Martin Heidegger, Beiltg and Time, trans.JohnMacquarrie andEdward
Robinson (San Francisco: Harper, 1962);Sein und Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2
(Ttibingen:MaxNiemeyer,1977),167-70(Germanstandardpagination).
28.As GadamerrecountsNatorp'sreadingofPlato(and his 1921 revision of
Platos Ideenlehre from 1903),
Natorp's conception of the Platonic "idea" was one ofthe most paradoxical theses ever
presented in historical research. He understood the idea from the point ofview ofnatural
law,inthesenseinwhichitisfundamentalto GalileanandNewtonianscience....Righthere
is therootoftheneo-KantianimageofPlato.Theideaiscertainlywhattrulyis,whatasreal
beingisfundamentaltophenomena.Butthisfoundation,thehypotheticalidea,isaslittlean
existing being alongside existing beings as is the mathematical scheme ofthe equation in
modernscience. (Hans-GeorgGadamer,Philosophical Apprenticeships, 25;Philosophische
Lehrjahre, 66)
See also Paul Natorp, Platos Ideenlehre (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft,1961).
29.Tosomeextent,GadamerwashimselfassociatedwiththeGeorgecirclein
Marburg(FriedrichWolters,HansAnton,andMaxKommerell).Yethecriticizes
theGeorgecircle'sreadingsofPlatoin"TheOriginsofPhilosophical Hermeneu-
tics," Philosophical Apprenticeships, 185; "Selbstdarstellung," Wahrheit und
Methode, 2:501. For an extensive analysis of the George circle, see Robert E.
Norton,Secret Germany: Stefan George and His Circle (Ithaca:CornellUniversity
Press, 2002). For a more general account of the reception of Plato within the
German tradition,see CatherineH.Zuckert,Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Hei-
degger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida (Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1996).
30.SeeDavidson,"Plato'sPhilosopher,"232f.and238f.
31.Hans-GeorgGadamer,"AestheticsandHermeneutics"(1964),Philosophi-
cal Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. DavidE. Unge(BerkeleyandLos Angeles: Uni-
versityofCaliforniaPress,1977),104;"AsthetikundHermeneutik,"Gesammelte
Werke, Bd. 8, Asthetik und Poetik I (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1993), 8. For
Rilke's poem,see Rainer MariaRilke, New Poems, ed. and trans. EdwardSnow
(New York: North Point Press, 2001), 183; Die Gedichte (Frankfurt am Main:
lnselVerlag,1992),503.
32.Davidson,"GadamerandPlato'sPhilebus," 421.
33.Davidson,"DialecticandDialogue,"251;"GadamerandPlato'sPhilebus,"
422.
34. Pheltomellologicallnterpretations of Aristotle, 4;Phanomenologische In-
terpretationen zu Aristoteles, 2.
35. Lateron,Heideggerretrievesandreinterprets the (Kantian) idea ofdisin-
terestedness. In his lectures on Nietzsche's critique of subjective aesthetics, he
discusses howSchopenhauermistookKantian disinterestedness for a"sheerapa-
thetic drift." Againstthis, Heidegger insists that in Kant's work, "interest" does
notsignify thatsomethingis meaningful andsignificantfor us, so that,concomi-
DavidsonandGadameronPlato'sDialecticalEthics
tandy,anattitudeofdisinterestednesswouldimplyaneglectofthissignificanceor
meaning. Rather, the term "interest" invokes an effort to gain something "for
oneself as a possession, to have disposition and control over it." According to
Heidegger,totakeaninterestintheobjectimpliestoapproachtheobjectasamere
means,ratherthananendinitself. Againstthis background,thenotionofdisin-
terestedness does not signify a sheer neglect. Rather, withKant's conception of
disinterestedness,"theessentialrelationtotheobjectitselfcomesintoplay ....for
the first time the objectcomes to the fore as pure object and ...such coming
forward into appearance is the beautiful." Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans.
DavidF. Krell(SanFrancisco:Harper,1991),108-10;Nietzsche. Wille zur Macht
als Kunst. Gesamtausgabe, vol. 43 (Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1996),126-28.
36.Heideggerintroducedtheideaofadestruction,orphenomenologicalKritik
oftradition,in1919.HisnotionofdestructionwasbroadlyspeakingHusserlian:a
processinwhich theoreticalconstructionswereled back to theless abstractcon-
textofthe life-world. However,Heideggersoonexpanded the notionofdestruc-
tionsoastomakeitincludearadicalreadingofthepast.SeeTheodoreKisiel,The
Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time" (BerkeleyandLosAngeles:Universityof
CaliforniaPress,1993),493-94.
37."Toburythepastinnullityis notthepurposeofthisdestruction;itsaimis
positive," asHeideggerputsitinBeing and Time /Sein und Zeit, 23.
38. Phenomenological Imerpretations of Aristotle, 49;Phanomenologische In-
terpretationen zu Aristoteles, 65.
39.GadamertookWernerJaegertorepresentsuchaview.Gadamerwasoneof
the first toattack not only Jaeger's (Spengler-influenced) appropriation ofAris-
totle, but also his interpretationofthe relation between Plato and Aristotle as a
transition from mythology toempirical science. See Gadamer's review, "Werner
Jaeger,Aristoteles" (1928),GW5:286-93.SeealsoWernerJaeger,Aristotle: Fun-
damentals of the History of His Development (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,
1962); Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin:
Weidmann,1923).
40.Davidson,"GadamerandPlato'sPhilebus," 432.
41. Davidson,"TheSocraticConceptofTruth,"inTruth, Language, and His-
tory (Oxford:ClarendonPress,2005),245_
42.GadamerhimselfhadinitiallysuggestedthetitlePhilosophical Hermeneu-
tics, whichhispublisherfoundtooobscure.
43. Gadamer, Yolk und Geschichte im Denken Herders (FrankfurtamMain:
Klostermann, 1941). The essay was originally given in French as a lecture for
French officers in a camp for prisoners of war in Paris and then rewritten and
translated intoGerman. Gadamer briefly refers to this talkin "Sclbstdarstellung
Hans-Georg Gadamer," W M 2:490, and in Philosophical Apprenticeships. In
spite ofthe political rhetoric that saturates the German version of the essay-
includingapraiseofhowtheGermannotionofYolk offersapromisingalternative
tothedemocraticparolesoftheWest(Volk und Geschichte, 23)- Gadamerlater
defends it as a "a purely scholarly study" (it is unclear whether Gadamer here
referstotheGermanortheFrenchversionofthetext) (Philosophical Apprentice-
ships, 99;Philosophische Lehrjahre, 118).InGerman,thepassagefromYolk und
90 KristinGjesdal
Geschichte reads: "Dies unpolitische Erahnen und Vorbereiten des Kommenden
wariiberhauptdasdeutscheSchicksalseinerEpoche,undvielleichtistdasSchick-
sal solcher politischen Verspatung die Voraussetzung dafiir, daB der deutsche
BegriffdesVolkesim Unterschied zudendemokratischenParolendesWestensin
einerverandertenGegenwartdieKraftzuneuerpolitischerundsozialerOrdnung
erweist."l;ortheFrenchtext,see"Herderetsestheoriessur\'histoire,"inRegards
sur l'histoire (FernandSoclot:Paris,1941),9-36.
6
TheInterpretationofPhilosophicalTexts
NicholasRescher
UniversityofPittsburgh
1.TheProblem
Itshould bemadeclearfromtheoutsetthatwhenonespeaksofinter-
pretingaphilosophicaltextinthesettingofthepresentdiscussionitis
specificallyanexegetical interpretationthatisatissue- anelucidation
ofwhatitmaintains,aclarificationofitsclaimsandcontentions.
A good interpretation of this sort consists in providing a set of
explanationsthatwouldfacilitateaparaphraseofthetextthatgivesa
fuller restatementoftheinformationandideasthatitconveys.Inthis
way,aninterpretationseekstorealizewhatisclearlyoneofthecentral
missionsoftheenterprise,thatofprovidingaclearandaccurateview
ofthe meaning and purportofthe textin relation to the position or
thought-systemofitsauthor.
Inphilosophy,afterall,thepurepurposeoftextinterpretationis to
facilitate comprehension. And, preeminently, this means removing
obstaclesto understanding: avoidablecomplications, inconsistencies,
seemingparadoxes,andthelike. Interpretationsexisttoeaseourcog-
nitive access to texts: the rational economy of cognitive effort is the
governing principle ofexegetical text interpretation.
To besure,interpretationscanproceedatthemacro- aswellasthe
micro-level. Butatevery level, theexegetical interpretationofphilo-
sophical texts seeks to make smooth the path to understanding-to
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