Page 1 of 23

SUCCESSION
LIST OF CASES
1. Bonilla vs. Barcena 71 SCRA 490
2. Estate of Hermady vs. Luzon Surety 100 Phil 388
3. Alvarez vs. IAC G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
4. Lee vs. RTC 423 SCRA 497 (2004)
5. De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja 46 SCRA 577
6. Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons 4 SCRA 526
7. Uson vs. Del Rosario 92 Phil 531
8. Blas vs. Santos 1 SCRA 899
9. Sicad vs. Court of Appeals 294 SCRA 183
10. Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon 33 SCRA 554
11. Bellis vs. Bellis 20 SCRA 358
12. Torres vs. Lopez 48 Phil 772
13. National Housing Authority vs. Almelda 525 SCRA 383 (2007)
14. Vitug vs. CA 183 SCRA 755
15. Natividad Nazareno vs. CA 343 SCRA 637 (2000)
16. Pacio vs. Billon 1 SCRA 284
17. Heirs of Sps. Sandejas vs. Lina 351 SCRA 183 (2001)
18. Reganon vs. Imperial 22 SCRA 80 (1968)
19. Salvador vs. Maria 20 SCRA 603 (1967)
20. Ramirez vs. Baltazar 24 SCRA 918 (1968)
21. Puno vs. Puno Enterprises 599 SCRA 585 (2009)
22. Reyes vs. RT of Makati Br. 142 561 SCRA 593 (2008)
23. Santos vs. Lumbao 513 SCRA 408 (2007)



Page 2 of 23

SUCCESSION LIST OF CASES PART I

Bonilla vs. Barcena 71 SCRA 490

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI,
widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra,respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

MARTIN, J :
This is a petition for review
1
of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata
Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the
aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla,
instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss,
the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to
amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is
dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing,
counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her
husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead
person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975,
he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
2

On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On
September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and
Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.
From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the
complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was
denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its
orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot
sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show
that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means
that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had
acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party
who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
"whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ...
and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was
complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata
Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however,
instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to
sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute
owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law.
3
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
Page 3 of 23

definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent.
4
The right of the heirs to the property of the
deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.
5
When
Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the
properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not
to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within
such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for.
6
In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
7
Following the
foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is,
therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the
latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to
bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her
counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as
guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court
refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another
grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for
the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad
litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear
provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution
of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the
Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside
and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for
the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Which this Court treats as special civil action as per its Resolution dated February 11, 1976.
2 Section 16. Duty of Attorney upon which death, incapacity or incompetency of party. - Whenever a
party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence
of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
Section 17. Death of party.After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for
deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardianad litem for the minor
heirs.
3 Buan vs. Heirs of Buan, 53 Phil. 654.
4 Ibarle vs. Po, 92 Phil. 721.
5 Morales, et al. vs. Ybanez, 98 Phil. 677.
6 Iron Gate Bank vs. Brady, 184 U.S. 665, 22 SCT 529, 46 L. ed. 739.
7 Wenber vs. St. Paul City Co., 97 Feb. 140 R. 39 C.C.A. 79.

Page 4 of 23

Estate of Hermady vs. Luzon Surety 100 Phil 388

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J. B. L., J .:
Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes
Caluag, dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause
of action.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter
bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of
them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors.
The twenty counterbonds, or indemnity agreements, all contained the following stipulations:
Premiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the
sum of ________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________
months or fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified
and hold and save it harmless from and against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and
expenses of whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or incur in consequence of
having become surety upon this bond or any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of
the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its successors and assigns, all sums and
amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the
undersigned or any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the litigation or other
matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorneys fees, but in no case less than P25. It is hereby
further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof
under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement
for the purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which
may be granted under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by the company shall bear interest at the
rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the
same interests as the capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as
the COMPANY shall have become liable therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or
not.
x x x x x x x x x
Waiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which may arise between them by
reason of this document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of
competent jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of the
acceptance and approval of this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived.
x x x x x x x x x
Our Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal upon his default, or
to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and
severally, a primary one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such
default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in
consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed
to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the lower court, by order of September
23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds: (1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary
stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady),
since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that whatever losses may occur after
Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning of the court below ran as follows:
Page 5 of 23

The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, in
the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court
believes that there is merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a
new requirement has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out by the
Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was
not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to
his estate because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the personality, character, honesty and
integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a
paragraph entitled Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced by the security company.
The security company has not demanded from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of
first mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned
in the list of properties mortgaged which appears at the back of the indemnity agreement. (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889
(Article 1257), the rule is that
Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of
the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding
one) expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation
of law.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his
death.
In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the
deceased (Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party,
touching the estate of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
x x x x x x x x x
The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in
accordance with that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any
contracts touching the real estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythey take such property subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom
they derive their rights.
(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that
money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs
(Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been
entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as
observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a
representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae,
in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of
the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the
conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the
creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but
the reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the
principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady
himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
Page 6 of 23

The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional and contrary
to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least,
clearly inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that
they are non-transferable.
(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y obligaciones; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryle excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la
transmision, como elemento natural a toda relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es
menester el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido entre partes trasciende a sus herederos.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los vinculos juridicos
creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion
sobre los sucesores de esa persona; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycuando no se quiera esto, se impone una estipulacion
limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las
mismas personas que lo otorgon. (Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and his
heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his failure
to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not
require bondsman Hemady to execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the companys faith and confidence in the
financial stability of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are not transmissible by
operation of law. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603),
contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of
the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is
extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor
must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation
which he guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the
perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the
supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality
mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty or should become
insolvent, the creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is
excepted where the creditor has required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor.
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the
disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to
demand a replacement of the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary it is his
right, not his duty; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may waive it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence
Article 2057 of the present Civil Code is incompatible with the trial courts stand that the requirement of integrity in the
guarantor or surety makes the latters undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty
automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible
due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual
liability thereunder necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims
provable against his estate under section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co.
vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).
The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a
principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his
principal until he himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this,
there instantly arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has
contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no
right of action against anybody no claim that could be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryGibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryMaxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521
Reeves vs. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryErnst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)
For Defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files claims against the
estate of the principal debtor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us,
Page 7 of 23

where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations
between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the
estate of the principal debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against
the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the
estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter
does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against the principal debtors under
Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon
Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to
discuss the estates liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon
Suretys claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin, with
instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the Administratrix- Appellee. SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J ., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, J J .,
concur.























Page 8 of 23

Alvarez vs. IAC G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO
YANES, respondents.
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner. Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo
Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it
ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision
insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's
fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration
of its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were originally known as
Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was
registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on
October 9, 1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado
and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are
children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib.
1
It is not clear why the latter is not included as a
party in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the
other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the
children of Felipe also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to
settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the "Japanese time up to peace
time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of
the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in
possession of Lot 773.
2

It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. RF 2694 (29797)
covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters.
3
TCT No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of
the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the name of Fortunato D.
Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ).
4
Said transfer certificate of title also contains a
certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the sum of
P7,000.00.
5
Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name.
6

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella,
his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting
authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.
7
By virtue of a court order granting said motion,
8
on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda.
de Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez.
9
Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166
covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez.
10

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelita, Iluminado and
Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of
Lots 773 and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint
be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be
delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees.
11

During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot for
P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
12
Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason,
13
who thereafter,
declared the two lots in his name for assessment purposes.
14

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and assisted by their
counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic)
Page 9 of 23

any claim, monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled
case."
15

On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant, and thereafter to
deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16

It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of service dated October 20,
1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in
the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs
as Siason was "not a party per writ of execution."
17

The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private respondents (the Yaneses) filed
on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title
and for a declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez.
18
Thereafter, the court
required Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, "in
good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that
the decision in the cadastral proceeding
19
could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was not a party-litigant therein
but also because it had long become final and executory.
20
Finding said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral
court, in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title
mentioned therein.
21

In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5022. Siason
opposed it.
22
In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had
instituted another action for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced
against Siason as he was not a party in the case.
23

The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with damages.
24
Named defendants
therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez, Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null
and void; the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs return of
service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could
not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the
Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November
13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of
P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00.
25

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having been passed
upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from
questioning said order.
26
On their part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been
"barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel."
27

In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an
agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration.
Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity demanded that they
recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court
approval.
28
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby
dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate children of the
deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre, Negros
Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00
Page 10 of 23

representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal rate of interest from
date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the costs of
this suit.
SO ORDERED.
29

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31, 1983
30
affirmed the lower
court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of
P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros
Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages,
moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively."
31
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and
attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
32

Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly invoked and
raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are any, as
alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil
Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription of action and
estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father of the
petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No.
8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived, renounced and
quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4"
Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A
and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or
transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process .
33

The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme Court, to review the decision
in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long
become final and executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in
Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal
the decision against them.
34

Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so
long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
35
As
consistently ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a
limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted
an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if
endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of
justice.
36

There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally adjudicated in Civil Case
No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally
deprived of ownership and possession of the lots in question.
37
In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from
the failure to execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the
same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the
controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is
a purchaser in good faith.
Page 11 of 23

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on November 11,
1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the
plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in
dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount.
38

As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice
for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
39
"It is one
thing to protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if deceit would be
rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of
decisions coming from this Court, such an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against."
40

The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022 in favor of private
respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel
have not been properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not.
They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another case in order to
defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by Rosendo Alvarez to
Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general transmissibility of the
rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc.
41

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our
Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made
from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in
fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as
observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman
concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to
patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is
of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the
estate.
42

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance. With this
clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to
cover the amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur. Bidin J., took no part.
Page 12 of 23

Lee vs. RTC 423 SCRA 497 (2004)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. April 22, 2005]
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary, respectively, of
Philippine International Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN ASSISTANCE
GROUP, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE
PEDRO M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G.
RIVERA and PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J .:
For resolution is private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes omnibus motion to cite petitioners in indirect
contempt of Court and for the disbarment and/or imposition of disciplinary sanctions on petitioners counsel
[1]
for their refusal
to comply with the final and executory decision of this Court dated February 23, 2004.
This case began with a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez filed 25
years ago on September 24, 1980. Forming part of the inventory of the estate were 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine
International Life Insurance Company (Philinterlife). During the pendency of these proceedings, Juliana, Jose and Rafael (all
surnamed Ortaez), the surviving legitimate spouse and legitimate children of the decedent respectively, executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, partitioning it (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
Thereafter, Juliana and Jose sold the 2,029 shares to the Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG).
[2]

However, private respondent, one of the illegitimate children of the decedent, was in the meantime appointed as
special administratrix of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock. When Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus motion seeking the
approval of the sale of the shares of stock to FLAG and the release of private respondent as special administratrix, the trial
court in its August 11, 1997 order, denied said motion. On August 29, 1997, the intestate court declared the extrajudicial
settlement made by Juliana, Jose and Rafael partially void ab initio insofar as the transfer of the Philinterlife shares was
concerned. These orders were later upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) and this Court.
In its order dated July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution filed by private respondent:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio
Ortaez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock and transfer
book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P.
Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to
the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock certificates of Philinterlife for
2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violation of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares; and
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes, has the power to exercise all the
rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to vote and to receive dividends;
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, to acknowledge
and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain
from resorting to any action which may tend (to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise
thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with this Order within three (3) days from
receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the writ of execution
with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.
[3]

Unfortunately, however, the writ of execution was not enforced due to the resistance of herein petitioners. To block
the execution, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736, questioning the
Page 13 of 23

order of execution, among others. The petition was dismissed outright on July 26, 2000. Petitioners then elevated the case
to us. On February 23, 2004, a decision was promulgated by the Third Division of this Court:
[4]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736 dated July
26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the
execution of its (trial courts) August 11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

On April 27, 2004, petitioners filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and referral of this case to the en banc
allegedly in view of the conflicting rulings of two divisions of the Court. In a resolution dated May 26, 2004, the Court denied
the motion for lack of merit:
The Court deliberated on the petitioners omnibus motion for reconsideration of the decision of February 23, 2004 which
denied the petition for review on certiorari. It appears to the Court that the motion merely reiterates the same arguments
earlier raised and does not present any substantial reason not previously invoked nor any matter not already considered and
passed upon by the Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. This denial is FINAL.
[6]

Thus on July 9, 2004, the February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory, and was recorded in the book of
entries of judgments. On October 1, 2004, an alias writ of execution was issued by the intestate court (the court of origin).
In said writ, the deputy sheriffs were ordered to enforce the August 11 and 29, 1997 and July 6, 2000 orders of the intestate
court.
Instead of complying with the writ, petitioners filed on October 15, 2004, a motion to suspend execution/period of
compliance by reason of supervening events, raising the following arguments: (1) the intestate court had already revoked
the appointment of private respondent as special administratrix; (2) there was a need to lay down the legal procedure in the
implementation of the writ and (3) there must be a declaration that the price per share of the 2,029 shares was only P1,000
which was its book value at the time the shares were sold in 1989 and 1991.
[7]

Private respondent went back to this Court and filed this omnibus motion asserting that petitioners made a travesty of
the final and executory decisions of the Lower Courts and this Honorable Court when they refused to comply with the
Alias Writ of Execution issued by the Lower Court.
[8]

Before we discuss the substance of private respondents motion, we note that attached to it were mere photocopies of
the supporting documents and not certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein as required by the Rules of
Court.
[9]
However, given that the motion was verified and petitioners, who were given a chance to oppose or comment on it,
made no objection thereto, we brush aside the defect in form and proceed to discuss the merits of the motion.
Furthermore, as held in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA,
[10]
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court outlines the
procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1) the filing of a written charge and (2) an
opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel. All that the law requires is that there is a charge in writing duly filed in court
and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. What is important is that the alleged
contemner be granted an opportunity to meet the charges against him and to be heard in his defense.
[11]
Petitioners were
given this opportunity; they in fact filed their Opposition.
[12]

Petitioners assert that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping because the latter had previously filed a similar
motion in the intestate court. The argument has no merit. The charge for indirect contempt must be filed before the court
against which the indirect contempt was committed. Section 4, Rule 71 states:
SEC. 5. Where charge to be filed. Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such court.
xxx
Hence, the charge for indirect contempt for disobedience to our February 23, 2004 decision was correctly brought to
us. As we explained in the case of Igot v. Court of Appeals:
In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner
as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial
administration, jurisdiction has been felt to properly rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy.
Only the court which rendered the order commanding the doing of a certain act is vested with the right to determine whether
or not the order has been complied with, or whether a sufficient reason has been given for noncompliance, and, therefore,
whether a contempt has been committed. It is a well-established rule that the power to determine the existence of contempt
of court rests exclusively with the court contemned. No court is authorized to punish a contempt against another.
The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule ... is that, contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable
only by the court against whose authority the contempts are charged; the power to punish for contempt exists for the
purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to its judgments, orders
and processes and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire whether there
has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to deprive
the proceeding of half its efficiency.
[13]

Page 14 of 23

We now proceed to the merits of the motion to cite for indirect contempt and for imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
The private respondent alleges that the following acts of the petitioners constituted indirect contempt under Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court: (1) petitioners failure to comply with the alias writ of execution served upon them on October
12, 2004 and (2) their act of filing a patently baseless motion (to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of
supervening events) which was obviously intended to defeat the implementation of the final and executory decision of this
Court.
On the other hand, petitioners allege that the immediate execution of the subject decision would be inequitable and
should be suspended pending an order of clarification of certain matters. According to them, the certificates of the shares of
stock were turned over to the intestate court and not to private respondent because her appointment as special
administratrix had already been revoked by the court.
Petitioners obstinate refusal to abide by this Courts February 23, 2004 decision demonstrates a contumacious
attitude which this Court cannot countenance. This contumacy becomes all the more glaring because of the strongly worded
admonition in our decision that (p)etitioners and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further
delay the execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
[14]
The previously quoted July
6, 2000 order of the intestate court, which was affirmed by this Court, also contained the following directives:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, to acknowledge
and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid rights on the said shares and to refrain
from resorting to any action which may tend (to) directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free
exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other person or persons
claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with this Order within three (3) days
from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the writ of execution
with dispatch to forestall any/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.
[15]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioners defiant non-compliance with these directives, as proved by the sheriffs report dated October 13,
2004, constituted indirect contempt. The pertinent portion of this report stated:
That on October 12, 2004, when Sheriff Borja went to the Philenterlife (sic) Office to check whether there was already
compliance with the Alias Writ of Execution, one of their staff told Sheriff Borja that Mr. Jose Lee wanted to talk with Sheriff
Borja over the Telephone. In their telephone conversation, Mr. Jose Lee told Sheriff Borja that he had already consulted his
lawyer regarding the matter.
WHEREFORE, we respectfully submit this report to the Honorable Court with the information that up to this writing,
Philenterlife (sic) has not submitted their compliance to the Sheriff or to the Court.
[16]

Petitioners act of filing their motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events also
showed their continuing, stubborn resistance to this Courts judgment. Indeed, one of the exceptions to the principle of
immutability of final judgments is the existence of supervening events. Supervening events refer to facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances which develop after the judgment has
acquired finality.
[17]

The private respondent alleges that the revocation of her appointment as special administratrix was made by the
intestate court in its May 12, 2003 and September 4, 2003 orders.
[18]
This is not disputed by the petitioners. In short, this fact
already existed before the decision of this Court was promulgated on February 23, 2004 and before it became final and
executory on July 9, 2004. Therefore, the revocation of the appointment of private respondent as special administratrix was
evidently not a supervening event.
Furthermore, this issue had already been raised in petitioners motion for reconsideration
[19]
of this Courts February
23, 2004 decision and passed upon by the Court in its resolution dated May 26, 2004 denying the motion for lack of merit.
Likewise, the increase in the value of the shares from P1,000 to P4,000 was also raised in the same motion for
reconsideration.
[20]
The Court stated that the motion merely reiterate(d) the same arguments earlier raised and (did) not
present any substantial reason not previously invoked nor any matter not already considered and passed upon by the
Court.
[21]

Petitioners insist that there must be an order laying down the legal procedure for the implementation of the writ, which
implementation did not include taking over the management of Philinterlife and obtaining possession of office premises. We
disagree. The execution should not be suspended for that reason.
Our February 23, 2004 ruling categorically stated that the estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez was the lawful owner of
2,029 Philinterlife shares. As lawful owner of the Philinterlife shares, the estate can exercise all the rights of ownership,
including the right to vote the shares. If, by voting the shares, the estate is able to elect its own representatives who
Page 15 of 23

succeed in attaining management control of Philinterlife, then let it be as such would be a legitimate consequence of our
February 23, 2004 decision.
We call particular attention to the fact that in our February 23, 2004 decision, we noted that petitioners, with the rest of
the FLAG-controlled directors and stockholders, increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process
the 2,029 shares of the estate
[22]
representing 50.725% of Philinterlife. We observed that this was obviously calculated to
make it difficult for the estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife. Thus, we ruled that, considering the nullity of
the sale of the 2,029 shares to FLAG, the increase in Philinterlifes authorized capital stock was void ab
initio.
[23]
Consequently, any approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission of this increase would likewise be void ab
initio.
Moreover, the directives to petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, as president and corporate secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife, were sufficiently clear and needed absolutely no clarification in order to exact their compliance
thereto. Since the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares to FLAG had been confirmed, they were ordered to:
(1) reinstate the shares in the name of the estate in the stock and transfer book;
(2) issue stock certificates in the name of the estate;
(3) acknowledge and allow the special administratrix to exercise all the rights appurtenant to the shares;
(4) refrain from resorting to any action which may tend to directly or indirectly impede, obstruct or bar the free
exercise of these rights and
(5) comply with the order within three days from receipt.
The first two directives were undoubtedly covered by the duties and functions of the corporate secretary and president
of a corporation. The next two ordered them not to resist the writ and the last directive provided a period for their
compliance. Given the foregoing, there was never any need to clarify the procedure for the implementation of the writ.
Pertinent portions of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court xxx
(c ) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx
In the recent case of Heirs of Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas v. Court of Appeals, we explained the concept of
contempt of court:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority
and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation
(12 Am. Jur. 389, cited in 14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of
the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice (17
C.J.S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil.
944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
[24]

Petitioners disobedience to this Courts judgment is an affront to the Court and the dignity with which it is clothed.
Their attempt to raise issues already laid to rest by a final and executory judgment of no less than the highest tribunal of the
land constitutes a disrespectful and insolent defiance of the authority of this Court and impedes the speedy administration of
justice.
[25]
As mentioned in the beginning of this Resolution, this controversy has been pending for 25 long years already.
Apparently, petitioners want to prolong it to eternity.
In Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, we said:
Page 16 of 23

Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it
will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of
the verdict. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result and must frown upon any attempt to
prolong the controversies.
The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.
[26]

This case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, the immutability of the February 23, 2004
decision is all the more emphasized in this case since it is this Court, the highest Court of the land and final arbiter of all
legal controversies, that promulgated it. Thus, petitioners are bound by the finality of our decision and cannot, under the
guise of a phony motion to suspend execution/period of compliance by reason of supervening events, reopen a case already
decided with finality. Nor should they be permitted to litigate anew questions or issues already laid to rest.
The fact is that virtually the same issues have been elevated to this Court no less than three times: in G.R. Nos.
128525, 135177 and 146006. Private respondent obtained a writ of execution in 2000 but her attempt to enforce the writ
was unsuccessful. After our February 23, 2004 decision became final and executory, she obtained an alias writ of execution
on October 1, 2004 but the petitioners again managed to frustrate her efforts to execute the decision and torpedo its
enforcement.
As we ruled in Beautifont, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that [the] controversy is finally laid to
rest. Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties
and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case. A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality. In this case, the dictates of
justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality.
[27]

This Court is becoming impatient with the devious tricks and maneuvers of petitioners.
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court penalizes indirect contempt as follows:
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. xxx
Petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, for their defiance and resistance to the October 1, 2004 alias writ of
execution enforcing this Courts February 23, 2004 decision resulting in the frustration of its execution are hereby
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt.
Finally, with regard to the administrative charge against petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this Court resolves to refer it to the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao, president and corporate secretary, respectively, of
petitioner Philippine International Life Insurance Company, are hereby found GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT for which
the maximum FINE of P30,000 is hereby imposed on each of them, payable in full within five days from receipt of this
resolution. They are furthermore given a final non-extendible period of five days from receipt of this resolution within which
to comply within our decision and orders as aforementioned. Petitioners are hereby warned not to file any more pleadings in
connection herewith. Failure to comply with our decision, orders and P30,000 fine within the five-day period will subject
them to imprisonment till full compliance.
In view hereof, petitioners counsel, Atty. Teodorico Fernandez, is likewise strongly warned to refrain from any further
attempts to make a mockery of our judicial processes.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Carpio-Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., no part.



Page 17 of 23

De Borja vs. Vda. de Borja 46 SCRA 577

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as
administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of
Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix
appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja,plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.
L-28040 Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee. Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja. Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568 Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee. Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611 Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee. Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J .:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of
the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,
1
from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja,
Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid
compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of
the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the
probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I.
The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their
son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole
administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto
himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to
Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits
and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts.
The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to
all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,
2
by and between "[T]he heir and son of
Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are
as follows:

Page 18 of 23

A G R E E M E N T
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
A N D
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
W I T N E S S E T H
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various court
litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration,
settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to
enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal,
presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more
specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de
Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con
Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con
los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total
amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent
P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano
and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of
Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament
or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the
proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja
or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from
the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and
paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
(approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to
Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever
mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or
actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and
demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each
other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva
Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed
against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely,
absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability,
arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the
assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of
Page 19 of 23

Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce
absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof,
shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de
Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding
receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned
under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the
sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this
instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court
approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-
28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is,
nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage
between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and
effect.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely
on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the
presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy
when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco
that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's
estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been
submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it
is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was
entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940,
which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He
also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the
view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a
useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the
terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically
stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco
shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or
devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos
or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was
here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will.
The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other
claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)
3
there is no legal
bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
4
Of course, the effect
of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp.
79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives
the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.
Page 20 of 23

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was
his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid
disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist
even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in
their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the
same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that
the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its
performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In
support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in
similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at
P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained the following
clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein
owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de
Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt
of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof,
this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract
(Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this day
of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it
carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides
in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent
the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the
consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit
Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalize
agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not
being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the
stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with
Jose de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the
estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal
so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now
under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose
de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the
Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only
her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she
owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her
undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly
recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a
compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening
paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de
Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status.
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There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21
September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise
agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been
arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed
amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly
notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back
out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex
"A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended
resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as
required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as
wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view
of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking
judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final
remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de
Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that the
order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more
satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A")
and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from
the finality of the order, now under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while
the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while
the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But
the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her
attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June
1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation
in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by
Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by
his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa
Tangco. The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic,
in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the
cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of
P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of
possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de
Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in
Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465).
Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the
Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja
(V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at
P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator
of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private
property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of
his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the
Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
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Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's
fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of
the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession.
Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the
conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in
the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special
Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended
Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit
"3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco".
And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala
Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which
are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No.
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both
Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija
Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on
the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas)
adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a
foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo
de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000,
Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's
assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would
represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a
bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages
13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied
upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of
inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the
original Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property,
but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the
source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since
he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the
statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement
itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when
Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion
of Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that
the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The
inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of
72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Page 23 of 23

Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the
absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the
conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest
of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative
weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal
character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof.
Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal
partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the
corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro
announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby
affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.