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Patric Coleman: the urgency of Bloom's critical appeal calls for the reader's heart-felt response. He says the proliferation of his works, each providing a different version of his "theory of poetry," gives the reader pause. Coleman: "are we really meant to answer the call? or is our eventual response already tried and found wanting?"
Patric Coleman: the urgency of Bloom's critical appeal calls for the reader's heart-felt response. He says the proliferation of his works, each providing a different version of his "theory of poetry," gives the reader pause. Coleman: "are we really meant to answer the call? or is our eventual response already tried and found wanting?"
Patric Coleman: the urgency of Bloom's critical appeal calls for the reader's heart-felt response. He says the proliferation of his works, each providing a different version of his "theory of poetry," gives the reader pause. Coleman: "are we really meant to answer the call? or is our eventual response already tried and found wanting?"
Reviewed work(s): A Map of Misreading by Harold Bloom Source: Diacritics, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 44-52 Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/464881 Accessed: 09/02/2010 09:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jhup. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The Johns Hopkins University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Diacritics. http://www.jstor.org BEYOND HYPERBOLE PATRICK COLEMAN Harold Bloom. A MAPOF MISREADING. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. The urgency of Harold Bloom's critical appeal calls for the reader's immediate and heart-felt response, yet the very proliferation of his works, each providing a different version of his "theory of poetry," gives the reader pause. Are we really meant to answer the call, or is our even- tual response already tried and found wanting when measured against the power of Bloom's own response to himself? When Bloom writes, at the beginning of A Map of Misreading, that "this book offers instruction in the practical criticism of poetry," the mystified reader of the earlier Anxiety of Influence (1973) breathes a sigh of relief, expecting clarifica- tion of his perplexity. Yet he will find that this offer is only another of those "gifts that famish the taker" so frequent in Bloom's portrayal of poetic influence. Bloom's Map traces no more than a Holzweg in the forest of poetic symbols, and the instruction seems all for Bloom alone. No other aspect of Bloom's work shows more his identification with his favorite poets, and to a certain extent Bloom claims immunity from criticism outside the visionary company. Still, for Bloom as for Stevens, the theory of poetry is the "theory of life as it is," and the position staked out by Bloom at the heart of poetic creation is intended as a perspective on life. Not just life in general, but life as it is for us in our culture today. In this respect, his stance reminds me less of Nietzsche than, say, of F. R. Leavis, in that a certain charged vocabulary-"life," "elite," "instruc- tion," "strength," and so on-is made to operate on two very different levels where vast generalizations coexist with very specific judgments that neither really illustrate nor limit those generalizations. There is, on the one hand, a description of the experience of poetry, that is, of the intensity and concentration on certain particular verbal contexts, and, on the other, of a communicative situation called "the present." It is the uneasy relationship between these two particular fields, whose articula- 44 tion consists of a series of "intricate evasions" more irritating than those imposed by Stevens's harassing master, which defines the peculiar structure of Bloom's work. As with Leavis, a hyperbolic rhetoric of valuations and judgments marks the absence of mediation between these two discourses, the critic wishing to preserve the specific- ity of each by avoiding the impression that one might only be the metaphorical transposition of the other, and all the while claiming to pass back and forth at will from one to the other. So it is that the so-called "practical criticism" in A Map of Misreading, while interesting in itself, is no more helpful than that in Revaluation, while Bloom's comments on the American cultural scene are sometimes cogent but more often strangely detached. The comparison with Leavis, although not as flattering to Bloom as his own iden- tification with Nietzsche and Freud, is by no means a disparagement of Bloom. Indeed, Leavis's lack of "helpfulness" has had a salutary effect in many ways, and the reaction to Bloom's shake-up of the American literary world is producing some of the same results, although some of the same faults affect both. The difference lies in Bloom's attempt at a greater systematic program of instruction, one more explicit and self-contained than his forbear's, and therefore Bloom's evasions occur at a higher, more interesting level, finally, than those of Leavis. I have said that Bloom's practical criticism does not provide the mediation between the two levels of his discourse. To be fair, I must add that Bloom does not believe such a mediation is possible. Instead, he proposes what he calls a "tropological" articulation: his eva- sions are "the intricate evasions of as." The originality of A Map of Misreading lies in the organization of the rhetorical tropes which allow us to pass from one discursive level to another, from one time to another, from one poet to another, and even from poetry to life, in ways that at the same time make us mistake one for the other. It is the nature of the organization which needs investigation, if only to ascertain why it does not constitute even a flawed mediation. The concern with this troping movement was already present in The Anxiety of Influence, but only in so far as the possibility, indeed the necessity of error produces anxiety in the subject struggling for personal and poetic autonomy. Both poetic and psychological categories were employed to show the pervasiveness of this anxiety, and Bloom was so successful in the attempt that the reader was hard put to locate where Bloom himself stood. On the one hand, Bloom's claim to be writing, not criticism, but a "strong poem," implied that, like the successful poets, he had mas- tered the imaginative processes required to countenance and compass the prospect of this systematic pattern of error and anxiety. At the same time, he claimed not to have purchased power by forfeiting knowledge: as a critic, he would provide a discursive report on the ways of error as a guide to the perplexed. Thus A Map of Misreading, where the intricacies of analogy and trope are elucidated. Still no media- tion, but a six-fold sequence of figures defining, according to Bloom, both the path of enlightenment and the structure of error. The development from influence to misreading can be briefly traced. In The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom dwelt on the various ways in which the young poet, or ephebe, could defend against the powers of his predecessor poets, the Oedipal struggle between precursor and latecomer being emblematic of the temporal pro- cess of poetic creation. Bloom defined six "revisionary ratios" or versions of poetic defense, and his description of these ratios showed their vital as well as literary implications. At this stage, Bloom's vocabulary was, except for the exotic names of the ratios, derived from Freudian (Sigmund and Anna) psychology, with the em- phasis placed on the ruses involved in psychic defenses. Paul de Man then suggested, in a review of the book [Comparative Literature, XXVI, 3 (Summer 1974), 269-75], the interesting correspondence between the mechanism of these defenses, with their possibilities of self-delusion, and that of rhetorical figures. In A Map of Misreading, dedicated to de Man, Bloom takes up the idea in formulating his six-fold sequence of tropes. The psychological categories remain, with this difference, that "misreading" is used to describe their operation as well as that of linguistic tropes. Under this guise, Bloom's incessant journey from poetry to life and back becomes a diacritics/September 1977 45 more serene ramble through the thickets of rhetoric, as if this new vocabulary pro- vided a safe haven from the contagion of poetic anxiety, and the new clarity of the Map a safeguard against the errant excesses of poetic power, even his own. What lies behind this serenity is something we must discover. But de Man's influence is not accepted uncritically. The heady combination of psychological and rhetorical categories engenders a third kind of discourse: the pedagogical vocabulary of instruction alluded to earlier. This certainly takes us away from de Man, and closer to Bloom's old master Northrop Frye (the path from Leavis to Frye being itself one of greater serenity before the anxiety of value-judgments). A Map of Misreading may, even in its title, be seen as a reply to Anatomy of Criticism, with the "evasions" of the former corresponding to the "displacements" of the latter. The appearance, indeed, in Bloom's work of an insistent set of references to Jewish tradition as part of a polemic against Frye's "Low Church" mythology strongly suggests the burden of this other influence. To this is linked another important transformation. In the earlier book the six ratios were seen as merely six different versions of the process of influence and recovery. No one ratio was either primary or conclusive, and no order articulated their operation. In the Map, despite various disclaimers, Bloom sets up a rigorous sequence of tropes endowed with an integrity and a hierarchy of its own. This of course seems at odds with the general pattern of indiscriminate evasions in Bloom's work as a whole, and any discussion of the pres- ent book must therefore center around the structure of the Map. To some sympathet- ic readers, this may be to direct attention to the weakest point in Bloom's theory, and even Bloom suggests that we should not take the order of the tropes as a literal one applying in every case. On the contrary, I think the principal interest of A Map of Misreading lies in this order, and Bloom's unwillingness to speak directly to the question of the status of his scheme only obscures the real power of his work. For if the influences on Bloom are not always what they seem, Bloom's own influence is also to be sought in unexpected places. Here is the Map, showing the correspondence between the earlier ratios and the rhetorical tropes (the related defenses have been omitted, since they call for a complicated explanation best postponed to another occasion): 1. Clinamen irony limitation 2. Tessera synecdoche substitution 3. Kenosis metonymy limitation 4. Daemonization hyperbole substitution 5. Askesis metaphor limitation 6. Apophrades metalepsis substitution The six tropes are grouped into three pairs according to a recurring, though not identical, oppostion between a "limiting" and a "substituting" or "representational" movement. That is, the initial figure of each pair is a reductive one, undoing the achievement of the previous poet (in the context of a poetic genealogy), or of the earlier stage of the same poet's work (in a poetic life), or of the progress of an individual poem-these three levels being isomorphic. The second member of the pair restores or reinvents its meaning in the place left vacant by the limitation. Bloom deploys a complex set of terms derived from Kabbalistic tradition to describe this double movement, but in essence this aspect of the Map is the most conventional, resembling many other attempts to demonstrate a "dialectic" of poetic creation. In a recent essay, Bloom breaks up the Map into three distinct "poetic crossings" [see "Poetic Crossing: Rhetoric and Psychology," Georgia Review XXX, 3 (Fall 1976, 495- 524], suggesting that this aspect is also the more important to him, but in A Map of Misreading what counts is the sequence as a whole. The sequence purports to show a single development, one that establishes the poet as poet, and the reader as a true "misreader." It is, therefore, essential to trace the line of progression from one stage to the next in order to see the shape of this development. 46 Irony, as the first trope, marks the clinamen, or primary swerve away from the presence of the predecessor text. The irony lies in that an absence of meaning, a deserted ground, is the only locus of a new and autonomous poetic statement. Tessera is a token or fragment of an "antithetical completion," and synecdoche, as the substitution of a putative whole for a part, is a first attempt to repair the ironic deficiency. Metonymy then undoes the illusory whole by a series of displacements and regressions showing what lies beyond the ken of what at this stage is only a borrowed integrity. The term kenosis is derived from Saint Paul, and designates a process of humiliation undergone by the penitent. Daemonization is "the repression or hyperbole that becomes a belated or counter-Sublime" (p. 99), an "over- restitution" of what was taken away in regression and doubt. It is hyperbolic in that such a restitution goes far beyond the support that can be mustered for it in the ordinary or fallen world previously inhabited by the poetic subject. It is a moment of pure imagination, which, in linguistic terms, "has no referential aspect" [p. 100], although it counts on the expectation of a new and higher world. This last trope is not very well defined in Bloom's text, although many pages are devoted to it. It marks, nevertheless, the crucial articulation in the Map. The rejec- tion of any referential claim would seem to signal a failure, or at least a gap in the easy analogy between poetry and life, if life continues, in contradistinction to "world," to be identified with "the present." For Bloom, however, the hyperbolic sublime is a distinctive achievement, a liberation of the poetic imagination from the mere repetition of earlier stages. The poet does not borrow this totality, he is swept away with it, at least momentarily. Hyperbole is a positive term in Bloom's vocabulary. On the other hand, metaphor is stripped of its usual happy connotations and is made a figure of limita- tion. Its intervention marks the askesis or trial of the subject compelled to situate himself in relation to the power of a poetic discourse overwhelming him. For in casting aside the referential ground of language, hyperbole has in effect expelled the subject from his discourse: the latter trails behind in the missing "present." Bloom's view is just the opposite of the one I am here expressing-for him, hyperbole is a solipsistic triumph-but this only masks what is really going on. Bloom is explicit in denying to hyperbole any of its perjoratively "subjective" connotations, and his talk of solipsism, although meant to convey the objectivity of a pure re-presentation, is really a paradoxical expression for a poetic subject devoid of a subjection to subject- hood. Metaphor reintroduces these constraints, including the polarity between sub- ject and object, inside and outside, and defines the subject's relation to a discourse which no longer proceeds from him, but which comes to him from elsewhere. Solipsism, therefore, can only mean that this "elsewhere" is also in the subject, or, to put it another way, also in the domain of poetry, and that the constraint and distinctions introduced by metaphor do not open up a new domain, but limit the identification of poetry and life proclaimed hyperbolically. It can only do so, not from the perspective of the "referent," but from a point both within figural language and outside it. This point is not defined by Bloom, who only sees it as a troublesome obstacle to poetic integrity, one the subject must pass through in order to attain its reward in the metaleptic return to an "earliness," a moment when the subject, once expelled and displaced, and not only by the precursor but by his own attempts at creation, overcomes the "belatedness" of his present and seals the originality of his own text. It would appear, in retrospect, that the point of obscurity was the "pres- ent" as defined by Bloom, but this is belied by the description of the "earliness" of the Map's desire. Bloom calls it apophrades, or "return of the dead," but this return is not away from us; it is a return to us of these shades in all their vivid presence. Even so, the moment of metalepsis is not the expected subsumption of the subject under the generality of poetic language. It is, in Bloom's terms, a "transumption," and this means a reinforcement of the particularity of the new and living poetic; poetic language as such never appears on the stage. Although it first appeared that the subject could only be incorporated into figural language if the trammels of the present's polarities were to be overcome (the incorporation thus being more of a diacritics/September 1977 47 disembodiment), we now find that the subject is the "incarnation," as Bloom puts it, following the eighteenth-century poet Collins, "of the Poetical Character" [p. 11, and passim]. It is this "incarnation," problematic as it may be, that is the final representation of the Map. The Poetical Character thus exemplifies the victory of and over influence in the poetic and personal struggle, the term "character" meaning both a psychic construct, the shape of agency, and the shape of a mark or figure generally. What are we to make of this scheme? Already in my brief exposition I have been forced to interpret Bloom's statements to make preliminary sense of his six-fold sequence, and especially of the fundamental revaluation of hyperbole and metaphor at the heart of the Map. This articulation is the central problem in determining the Map's coherence, all questions of "applicability" aside. But nowhere does Bloom make explicit the reasons behind his elliptic assertions. One suspects that there is a connection between the different values assigned to these tropes and the absence of real explanation (or dialogue) in Bloom's dogmatic, even "solipsistic" discourse. That is to say, this revaluation points to the place of the subject of Bloom's text, although that subject-call him "Bloom"-declines to appear. Can we draw him out? We must, if we are to understand the real dynamic of the Map, if we are able to read it, as well as other texts, through its grid. Perhaps the most fruitful way to do so is by adducing other texts between whose lines Bloom may appear. Too direct an approach might confine us to the metaphoric position or polarity, and limit our perspective. So, in the spirit of Bloom's spirit of "farfetchedness," a phenomenon linked to our metaleptic goal, I will align two texts with Bloom's Map in the hope of pinpointing Bloom by triangulation. Let us take, first of all, a poem by Mallarme. It is a prose poem, and one far removed from the tradition of the "greater Romantic lyric" from which Bloom de- rives most of his examples. "The Ecclesiastic" was probably written in 1886, and occupies the penultimate position in a series of twelve such poems composed be- tween 1864 and 1887.1 It describes what Bloom likes to call a "scene of instruction," 1 Whether or not the poem is the penultimate one is actually a debatable point. In Divaga- tions, the important collection in which Mallarme gathered together these prose poems, there appears a thirteenth text, "Conflit," which the Pl!iade editor has placed elsewhere. I would like to thank my friend Shoshana Felman, whose comments have greatly helped in my reading of Mallarme. In the translation of "The Ecclesiastic" printed as an appendix to this review, I have attempted to provide a scrupulously faithful, and thus rather literal rendering of the poem [from Mallarmd's Oeuvres completes (Paris: Pliade, 1961), pp. 286-88]. 48 one calling out for practical criticism. Setting aside for the moment the temporal complexities arising from the narrative situation, we may say that the poem begins with the ironic reference to a wintry discontent exacerbated by the presence of various texts whose promise of renewal applies only to beasts, not to suffering, conscious men. The move toward a naive "naturalism" constitutes a synecdochic gesture in which the poet claims to derive insight and inspiration from a few blades of grass. This mood is also that of the narrator proposing to draw an example of the "height of inspiration" from the banal mysteriousness of a suburban glade. But this attempted mediation of nature and public, significance and banality, is only a de- graded version of the priestly role played by the ecclesiastic in daily life, the life he comes to the country, like the poet, to escape. The appearance of the priest shows up the initial construct for what it is: no more than a metonymic aggregate of "interstices of shrubs useless from the point of view of privacy," whose interpreta- tion is irrelevant to public welfare. The very term, "ecclesiastic," now alludes to no true assembly of the people, but only to the anonymity of the urban crowd. The fervor of the priest's regression reminds us of such early Mallarmean poems as "Renouveau," and so, while the priest seems to be the object of mockery, the poet as narrator is directing his words against his earlier self. Yet the very singleminded- ness of the priest's degraded quest, his kenosis, works against the poet's scorn, and leads him away from himself, and the security of self-deprecation. The poet is led to reconsider his attitude and conduct, and to make a break with the aspect of his vision which only repeats and restates his predicament. Hyperbole intervenes in the poet's leap away from the spectacle toward a purely imaginary reconstruction of the ecclesiastic's mission. In the words of the Faun, "ce pretre, je le veux perpetuer." From the image of the nimble foot, we proceed to the "mind" capable of describing what follows in such detail that we forget that the poet is no longer portraying a real situation. This radical move is the only one allowing the poet the same "total" satisfaction enjoyed by the priest. The vision reaches its high- est, or most hyperbolic, non-referential point in the momentary abolition of sexual difference. But of course the flower-stalk is only a parody of the explicitly "hyper- bolic" ones in the nearly-contemporaneous "Prose pour des Esseintes," and, as in the latter poem, the sexual polarity reminds us of the vanity of any claim to self- sufficiency. Rather, the hyperbolic moment of pure imagination in which the poet is identified with the priest as pure image and in the absence of any "personal" rela- tionship (an identification as impossible as that of the sexes) gives way to a discursive relationship involving a third party: first the "icy silence" that alone heard the "furi- ous flappings" of the ecclesiastic's chaste frenzy; then the public, whose cold com- pany only reinforces the solitude of the scene. The moment of this return to a discursive situation represents both a retreat and a progression. A retreat in that the poet is deprived of his vision; a progression in that he is restored to a communicative context first named at the beginning of the poem. It is at this point, indeed, that the subject becomes the narrator of the poem, the exhibitor as well as the nurturer of the vision. Of course, as narrator, the poet must face the reader's implicit reminder that the spectacle is only an evanescent one, and that the priest himself has returned to the humble needs of his ministry. At a further stage of reflection, Mallarme takes up the banality the poet shared with the ecclesiastic: the poet remains identified, albeit not so happily, with the poem's eponymous figure. Yet the poet has undergone an askesis on the way to his narrative position. In suspending the vision, and in renouncing any future for his vision other than that afforded by the fate of the narrative itself, the poet has, paradoxically, shaken off the "unchangeable texts" confining and delimiting the ecclesiastical role. Thus the poet claims the "right" to ignore the outcome of the story. The "seal of modernity" signals a metaleptic transumption into earliness in that it does not refer to an actual future, but to a narrative present which for every reader is that of a past in the future of his reading. In this poem, the narrative time in which the reader is included, the time corresponding to the banality of the spectacle (that is, its true significance), is given two names. It is called "baroque" and "modernity." An diacritics/September 1977 49 analysis of "modernity" in MallarmLwould be a formidable task, but a sense of what he means can already be seen in the prime "baroque" analogue to the ecclesiastic: Hamlet, another hero-exhibitor dressed in black. Of him Mallarme writes: "Sol- emnly, an actor bequeathes to a future which probably will not care but which will not at least be able to alter it, elucidated, somewhat motley but very much a whole, as if authenticated by the seal of a supreme and neutral era, an immortal re- semblance" [Oeuvres completes, p. 302]. These remarks do not pretend to constitute an interpretation of Mallarme's poem: no mere "mapping" of tropes could hope to accomplish that. But the applica- tion of Bloom's sequence to the text shows up the obscured problematic at the heart of the Map. It lies in the quality of the difference between the first four tropes and the last two. In his concern with the emergence of the poet through influence, anxie- ty, and defense, Bloom fails to see how the poet as subject finds his place in poetic discourse. The intervention of the subject in the progress of the poem cannot but mark a change in the status of the Map as a "tropological" scheme. Should we not, in fact, recall the key position of the so-called "tropological" moment in that earlier map of misreading, the four-fold scheme of allegorical interpretation? What moti- vates Bloom's apparent indifference to this question once we get inside the Map and away from the enveloping pathos of his illustrative rhetoric? One reason, surely, is Bloom's identification with the hyperbolic style. In his review, Paul de Man has remarked on how hyperbole is Bloom's characteristic trope. For Bloom, hyperbole is the triumph of a sublime solipsism in which poet and language are one. In the face of such an ideal, no wonder anxiety is so pervasive. Any other relation to discourse (if we grant that hyperbole can ever constitute a dis- course) can only represent a fall. Yet according to the Map, we must go beyond hyperbole, and the triumph of the poet is unexpectedly deferred to a later moment. This is a new phase in Bloom's critical development, for until now the chastening moments of askesis came outside the poem, outside Bloom's specifically critical comments, in the vague appeals to "humanization" by which he would link his criticism to the world of the reader. In former days, Bloom's criticism was satisfied with the flight of the imagination. His new rhetoric of poetic instruction seeks to overcome the gap in his dual discourse. He must go beyond hyperbole, within criticism, but cannot see where this would take him. We thus return to the dilemma facing Bloom's reader, having discovered how it confronts Bloom himself, within the Map. Does the move beyond hyperbole take us further into poetic language and its ruses, or away from it toward a subject defined by a new discursive context in which communication takes precedence over figural structure? Does "poetry" encompass both these alternatives? From Mallarme's poem, we can see that the moment of metaphor is both a step forward, beyond hyperbole, and a regression of a very specific nature. Metaphor re-establishes a communicative context in which subject, speaker, and reader are implicated, but which may or may not be described as a "poetic" situation, a stage in 50 the development of the poem as an entity in its own right. Such a discursive relation may indeed run counter to the "completion" of the poem, for the new, "antitheti- cal" completion of the other does not complete the same thing. Bloom himself approaches the problem when he admits that "the common reader cares little to be taught to notice tropes or defenses. Images must suffice . . ." [p. 178], but he does seem to realize that these images are no longer those of the pure Imagination, although the tone suggests an implicit awareness of this. These images now serve an exchange which is not determined by the anxiety of influence, but by something Bloom calls "the incarnation of the Poetical Character," which is an image of agency which refers us, not to a pathology, but to an anthropology of communication. For such an "incarnation" must be seen as the counterpart, if not the completion, of the earlier expulsion of the subject from the discursive system, and the "characteriza- tion" of the subject as poet implies a symbolic context which that discourse exceeds but does not abandon in its liberation from a constraining "reference." It would, perhaps, be useful to re-examine the late-eighteenth-century texts from which Bloom, following Walter Jackson Bate, originally derived the vocabulary of poetic "influence," to see what connection can be found between debates over poetic autonomy and the hesitant development in the same period of such an anthropology (in both the philosophical and ethnological senses). Be that as it may, what Bloom can accept on the level of the reader he terms a "catastrophe" for the poet [p. 11], and this is why the intersubjective context implicit in metaphor is made a limiting polarity in the Map. The only successful poets, strangely enough, are those who lack character (pace Sartre), for only they are open to the transumptive force that turns the latecomer-and every poet is a latecomer- into an originator. Except that there is no origin to go back to, only a further projec- tion onto a hyperbolic future. For Bloom, despite what we infer from his Map, hyperbole is the beyond; to go beyond hyperbole is only a momentary illusion, a reference signifying nothing. Bloom provides no character references for his vision- ary company. And there is no incarnation, only another fall. But this is acceptable only if we assume that Bloom is himself not, or no longer, a "common reader," one for whom poets do "represent" something other than their mere appearance. Bloom of course is such a reader, as all his talismanic invocations to the poets attest: he cites them unceasingly as references for himself. But he is a reader who, at a crucial point, refuses to read, on the grounds that he has already read enough, and found reading insufficient. Bloom's problematic relation to his reader's potential response, the point from which I began, is ultimately a reflection of an internal polarity in A Map of Misreading itself. That is, it would be a polarity if Bloom were able to go beyond hyperbole to the metaphoric moment, the tropologi- cal level, of his own sequence of tropes, the moment at which his position inside or outside his critical discourse would become an issue. The issue, however, never arises, primarily because, in reading, Bloom would himself be read, and nothing disturbs him more, finally, than this prospect. This is his evasion: as subject, Bloom disappears into the "as" of his analogies, for which he claims no responsibility. Does Bloom then lack character, and does this make him a reprobate or a poet? Poets are forgiven for not reading (this is not the same as misreading), but not literary critics, and still less teachers of literature. Bloom sometimes claims that poets cannot be read in any case, but this is a different matter. To protect the poets from the abuse of their readers is one thing; to defend oneself from reading is another. It is curious that the term "anxiety" can apply in both cases. As Freud has pointed out, anxiety comes not only between the subject and the feared event, but between the subject and the fear of that feared event.2 The difference is crucial for the working out of the subject's relation to his future, for the kind of anticipation or earliness that projects him into a temporal world from which he feels excluded. The problem is too com- plex for summary treatment; I can only suggest the importance of a distinction blurred in Bloom's work. 2 An unpublished paper by Richard Klein on The Anxiety of Influence develops this point. diacritics/September 1977 51 Apart from these appeals to other disciplines and discourses, can we read Bloom with the materials at hand, that is, poetic texts? Mallarme's poem took us some distance in this direction. But there is another text whose relation to Bloom's work is much more intimate, once we juxtapose its progress to the dynamic of Bloom's Map. The religious vocabulary of fall and incarnation have already suggested it: it is the Bible. Only the Bible comes up to the level of Bloom's rhetoric, and if Bloom cannot go beyond hyperbole, we can at least bring hyperbole back to Bloom. First, it is surprising that in all the talk of influence and defense in poetry no mention is made in Bloom's text of what in our poetic tradition is the most audacious trope of all: to take the Bible as literature. To have succeeded in doing so, while still taking it seriously-as seriously as literature is taken-has been the privilege of very few poets and even fewer literary critics. On just these grounds, it would be instruc- tive to see Bloom discuss it. Second, Bloom's many references to Jewish tradition, Biblical and post-Biblical, raises the question of which Bible he would read. In the light of his own theory of antithetical completion there can only be one answer: the antithetically completed two-Testament Bible. Not only because the nature of this completion is a poetic question of the first order, all other implications aside; but because a mapping of Bloom's sequence of figures onto the surface of the Bible is most revealing. The parallel between irony and Fall (following some interpretations, we might even say, Creation); synecdoche and Convenant; metonymy and the "backsliding" of the historical books; hyperbole and the Prophets-all this is most suggestive. Bloom indeed does allude to these parallels, but never as part of a reading of the Bible as a text. Perhaps this is because, to fill out the sequence of "revisions" in his Map, he must go outside the Jewish canon. Several references to Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, however, point to an implicit awareness of the crucial articulation and difference of the two Testaments, even from the point of view of influence, for Bloom's discourse of instruction. And so, the metaphoric askesis of Jesus, the metaleptic Resurrection (whether we place this trope here or in Revelations depends on a debate, even among Christian critics, on the status of the last book as "completion" of the canon) show us, within the text of the Bible, what is at stake in Bloom's revaluation of hyperbole and metaphor. The problem of going beyond hyperbole thus takes on a new significance, and the dilemma of whether we are inside or outside the text, or inside or outside the text as poetry or "life," becomes one that reads the reader in more ways than one. This is not to say that ultimate "communicative context" of which I have spoken must be defined as a religious one. It cannot be assumed that the Bible has any other than a poetic unity and coherence, although the putative analogy between the theory of poetry and the theory of life can be seen here in a new light, one potentially productive of Bloom- ian anxiety. On the other hand, Bloom's provocative discussion of how revisions of texts change our reading but do not affect the earliness of the precursor, his au- tonomous influence in future readings, may deliver us from the more degraded forms of the anxiety and from the dogmatism of its (belated) resolution. The possibility of a measure of serenity in this domain brings us back to the obscured influence of Northrop Frye at the heart of Bloom's work, and particularly of A Map of Misreading. It may well be that Frye's forthcoming work on the symbolism of the Bible will help illuminate the "secular scripture" of Bloom's own quest- romance, and lead Bloom to an antithetical reading of himself. It should certainly provide him with the occasion for an equally instructive and much-needed revision of Frye. 52