SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,



-versus-



SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and ROLANDO PLAZA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 169004

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
*

PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
*
and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION


PERALTA, J .:


For this Court's resolution is a petition
[1]
dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Resolution
[2]
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,
with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of
Toledo in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he
received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said
cash advances ofP33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government
in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.


Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss
[3]
dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter
issued an Order
[4]
dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition
[5]
to the Motion to
Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution
[6]
onJuly 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.


Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying
a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the
felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan,
[7]
claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration
in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in
relation to public office.

In his Comment
[8]
dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original
jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases
where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1)
(a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could
exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante
[9]
is a case with
uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were
both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza
failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).


In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27
and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.
[10]
as
a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
[11]


P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
[12]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed
on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier
mentioned case,

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.
[13]
The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as
R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.
[14]



Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by
public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what
applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004,
the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:


Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.


Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:


The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4
(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction
over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as
consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
[15]



Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding
[16]
case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section
4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and
which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante,
[17]
that the I nding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly
discussed:

x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b)
where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.


A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This
Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an
offense committed in relation to his office.
[18]
Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et
al..,
[19]
where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of
the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,
[20]
where the public official was charged with grave threats,
this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during
a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds
violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or
angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus,
based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was
committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend
the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then
there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public
officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation
to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the
principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that
principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out
in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the
accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a
constituent element of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice
Concepcion, said that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the]
abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and
they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x
[21]



Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification
as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
[22]
unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
[23]
The intention of the lawmakers - who
are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. (Italics supplied.)
[24]



With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,
[25]
the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is herebyNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,



-versus-




SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and VICTORIA AMANTE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167304

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,
*

CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,
**

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 25, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


D E C I S I O N


PERALTA, J .:


Before this Court is a petition
[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution
[2]
of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) datedFebruary 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to
this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher
in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December
19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22,
1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated
cash advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996,
submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that
respondent Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30,
1999, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, onApril 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum
finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information
[3]
with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89
of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo
City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of
Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine
Currency, which she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the
period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage
and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.


The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION
TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION
[4]
dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision
of the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that
respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the
investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of
Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local
official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.

The OSP filed its Opposition
[5]
dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too
plain and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution
[6]
dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion
of which reads:


WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.

The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN
RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES
MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.


In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of
this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan.
[7]
According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No.
8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

Respondent Amante, in her Comment
[8]
dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several
exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction
only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official
below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
and if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official
must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must
apply. The same respondent proceeded to cite a decision
[9]
of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived,
enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.

In its Reply
[10]
dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to
(g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses
in relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case ofEsteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al.
[11]
wherein this
Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is intimately connected with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.

The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly
discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
[12]
thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
[13]


P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
[14]

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D.
No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x


Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary
Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect
on May 16, 1995, which was again amended onFebruary 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown
in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense.
[15]
The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Ti tle VII
of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:


The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in
relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall
govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.


The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Secti on 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and
other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed
by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:

x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan. Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they
are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction
would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D.
No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to
grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her
office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated,
the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated
public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the
aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary
grade '27' is a requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a
public office with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.


Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is
the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan
[16]
where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No.
1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to
petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for
under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No.
3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts
contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of theSangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public
official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where
the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in
relation to the public officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.


A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or
employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
[17]
Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,
[18]
where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those
public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.


Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,
[19]
where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution
wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public
hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the
mayor or chief executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private
complainants attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever
private complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information,
the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.


Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippinesreveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of
the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the
one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said
reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is
enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term
offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108
Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in
relation to the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent
element of the crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although
public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x
[20]



Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it
refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
[21]
unless
it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
[22]

are, ordina statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
[23]


WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated February 28, 2005 isNULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran
**
accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan
ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions
1
of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,
denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP,
to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.
2
On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of
the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).
3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.
4
President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
5
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine
Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.
7
The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public
officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance
of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that
the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and
despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to
do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
8
It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
9
It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling
under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.
10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.
12
It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be
threshed out during a full-blown trial.
13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the
general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office,
petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.
14

Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.
15
It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R. A.
8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees
in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
x x x x
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration
in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university,
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of
the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University;
to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its
discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in
the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to
those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such
board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original
exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President
Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on
the merits of this case.
16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
17
The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
February 4, 2004.
18


Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION."
19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.
20
Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders,
such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.
21
The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals
in a single action.
22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
23
the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer,
go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an
order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment
of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases,
the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the
general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense,
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss
the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.
25
She repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari
26
and in her memorandum of authorities.
27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this
claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.
28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan
was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the
highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the
people.
29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily
carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
31
Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal
relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly
or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some
business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene.
Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close
personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all
giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined
in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.
33
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay
hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.
34
The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view.
35
In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.
36
Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,
37
the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an
attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office
of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the
President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item
Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.
38
Pertinent parts of the
Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the
latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a
joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered
the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is
not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. InKhan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.
39
The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,
40
the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right
to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because
and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as
a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary
(42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,
41
the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer."
42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. InGeduspan v. People,
43
We held that while the first part of Section
4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-
stock corporation.
45
By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.
46
At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.
47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
technical training.
49
Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for
profit.
50

The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the I nformation.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.
51
More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.
52
Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.
53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner
insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses
and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.
54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation
from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition forcertiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of
the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,
55
where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos
in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.
56

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness.
57
The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.
58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Corona
*
, Nachura, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158187. February 11, 2005]
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner
Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporary
restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions
[1]
dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the respondent
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended,
was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc.,
respectively. The information read:
That on or about the 27
th
day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a
public officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo
City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR.
EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong
Bi, Inc., Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health
Insurance Corp., prior to January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100
(P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale
executed on November 27, 1999, involving the sale of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that
the possession, operation and management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc.
effective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West Negros
College, Inc., thus accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her official functions, had given
unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C.
FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros College, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified
under salary grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment
[2]
show that she was appointed as
Department Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government
owned and controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. She cites
paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758);
specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of
Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioners appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is,
Department Manager A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of
Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present
assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by respondent court of
the decision of this Court in Ramon Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan.
[3]

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the Regional Director of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992 his position of
Regional Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and
that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Underscoring supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the abovequoted
provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged
together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction
of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.
[4]
ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the
law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation
to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled
corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she
was charged was committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-20687 April 30, 1966
MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. A. Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J .:
Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three
(3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June
30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with
consent".
The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint,
1
duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging petitioner Maximino Valdepeas
with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by
Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the court of first
instance of Cagayan
2
in which the corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape
3
was filed.
4
In due course, said court of
first instance rendered judgment
5
finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly.
6

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals
7
modified the decision of the court of first instance, convicted him of abduction
with consent and meted out to him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.1wph1.t
A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the
effect that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court
8
granted the motion, set aside its
aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for the reception of additional evidence on said issue. After a
retrial, the court of first instance rendered another decision,
9
reiterating said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its
judgment
10
of conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of
Appeals
11
which
12
affirmed that of the court of first instance
13
with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed
14
a motion for
reconsideration based, for the first time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and
over the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion,
15
petitioner
interposed the present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo
Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and
had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find no merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
16
In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then
justice of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back
before said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had
transpired until the Court of Appeals, rendered its last decision,
17
had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3)
courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his
person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps
taken by him before said courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction
thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this lease the crime of abduction with
consent is and may be conferred only by law;
18
that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may
not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may
be convicted of abduction with consent.
19
It is true that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
. . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with
the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is
merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition
has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather
than go through with the scandal of a public trial."
20

In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint adverted to above and
going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten (10) years.
Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is
included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that
the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also,
their willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.
The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged,
according to him, in the complaint filed herein,
21
namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18
years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age
...", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code,
22
as an essential
ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of
abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation,
23
because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the
outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members."
24

The complaint in the case at bar
25
alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously" took her "by force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother"
from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force,
intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence,
single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin,
26
apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation,
27
for, as Chief
Justice Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of
chastity.
28

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepeas. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Barrera, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL
ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch
I, dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines, Complainant versus
Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying
the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-
private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The
hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who
had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and
at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and
there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is
hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused
from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED.
1

The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and
subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted
Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further
prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could
no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of the
said case.
2

The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April
1974.
3
This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by
the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul,
4
promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state the rule in
regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been filed in court. In
said case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial of the case on the merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of
Lucena City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the
accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Undersecretary of
Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Upon such instructions, the
Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a
certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by
the accused with this Court, raising the issue previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case
exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court.
Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the
Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation."
(Emphasis supplied).
5

In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of
filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested
that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite such
manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on
whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of
the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the
prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own
reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-6410 November 24, 1954
JUAN Y. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EUSEBIO F. RAMOS, ETC., respondent.
Onofre M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Eusebio F. Ramos in his own behalf.
JUGO, J .:
The petitioner, Juan Y Beltran, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro with the crime of malversation
of public funds, alleged in the information to have been committed in the municipality of San Jose, province of Occidental Mindoro,
on or about July 6, and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in all the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang all of Occidental
Mindoro, on or about July 6, and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang, all of
Occidental Mindoro. The continuation of the trial was transferred to the municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro. The
defendant Beltran, herein petitioner, objected to the continuation of the trial in Calapan on the ground that it is outside of the territorial
boundaries of the province of Occidental Mindoro where the crime was committed. The trial court overruled the objection and ordered
the trial to proceed in Calapan. The petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the trial court from
continuing the trial in Calapan.
The respondent contends that the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro constitute the Eight Judicial District under the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act NO. 296). There being no separate court for the province of Occidental
Mindoro, it is claimed that the judge of the district may hold his sessions in either of the two provinces. This contention is untenable in
the present case for the reason that the Rules of Court expressly provide that a criminal case should be instituted and tried in the
municipality or province where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place. This is fundamental principle,
the purpose being not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime
was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. Although
the judge of a district may hold the trial in any particular case subject to the specific provisions, or section 14 (a), Rule 106, in order
not to violate the Rules of Court and disregard the fundamental rights of the accused. Sometimes a judicial district includes provinces
far distant from each other. Under the theory of the respondent, the accused may be subjected to the great inconvenience of going to a
far distant province with all his witnesses to attend the trial there. This is prohibited by the Rules of Court as being unfair to the
defendant.
There is no contradiction between the Judiciary Act and Rule 106, section 14 (a). They should, therefore, be enforced together
harmoniously.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge is enjoined from continuing the trial of the above-mentioned case in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, without pronouncement to costs. So ordered.


YUSUKE FUKUZUME,
*
G.R. No. 143647
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, Chairman,
**

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
***
J J .
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 11, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
[1]
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay
private complainant the sum of P424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
[2]

The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires.
[3]
Sometime
in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,
[4]
who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house
of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.
[5]
Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that
Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.
[6]
Fukuzume
confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).
[7]
Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume.
[8]
The initial agreed purchase price was P200,000.00.
[9]
Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which
eventually totaled P290,000.00, broken down as follows: P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00, given on July 22,
1991; P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and, P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.
[10]
Fukuzume admitted that he received
the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount ofP290,000.00.
[11]
To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being
sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are
allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December
27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez.
[12]
At the time that
Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the
people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the other
for P34,000.00.
[13]
However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the
checks should have been drawn is already closed.
[14]
Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks
bounced.
[15]
Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to
enable him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.
[16]
On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date,
signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to
dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan.
[17]
Thereafter, Fukuzume
agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.
[18]
When Yu
arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.
[19]
Hence, Yu proceeded to show
the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter
issued by Furukawa dated January 17, 1992.
[20]
NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17, 1991
and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with
NAPOCOR as of December 1991.
[21]
Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to
Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him.
[22]
Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.
[23]
When
Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of
profits.
[24]
Subsequently, Yu filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
[25]


In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as
follows:

That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false
representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co.
Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor
and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce
and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and
delivered the total amount ofP424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with
his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain,
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and
despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of
Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount of P424,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[26]


Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.
[27]
Trial ensued.

In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for
twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount
of P424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
[28]

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.

On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying
the penalty imposed, thus:

although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years,
it failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.
[29]

Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term
of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[30]


Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS
JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR
SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT
IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-
CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THEREOF, IF ANY.
[31]


We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The CA ruled:

The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false
representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in
Paraaque, appellant and private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50,000.00 for said
transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the
crime that the offended party was induced to part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within
the jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case.

The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 1994
[32]
and the affidavit of Fukuzume which
was subscribed on July 20, 1994.
[33]


With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged
therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree
with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to
Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus:

Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke
Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.

Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.

Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.

ATTY. N. SERING

Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.
COURT

Please wait until the answer is completed.

Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?

A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.

FISCAL E. HIRANG

Q When was that, Mr. Witness?

A That was in 1991, sir.

COURT

When?

FISCAL E. HIRANG

Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.

A July 12, 1991, sir.

Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?

A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.

Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of
money?

A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.

Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on
that particular date?

A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in
payment of the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.

Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?

A Our first agreement was for P200,000.

Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?

A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation
but according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.

Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount of P50,000?

ATTY. N. SERING

Objection, Your Honor.

FISCAL E. HIRANG

The complainant testified he gave P50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on
that particular date.

A On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on that date.

Q Not P200,000?

A No, sir.
[34]


Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.
[35]


More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume
or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.
[36]
Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,
[37]
we held in
the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People
[38]
that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial
show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)

Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.
[40]


In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was
charged with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:

1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.

2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.

3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means.

4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
[41]


The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by
Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement
or to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on
July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof
to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of
Yu established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to
the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is
a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed
to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered
damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,
was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap
wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an
unspecified date, he received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit
for the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is
settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record
of the case in the RTC.
[42]
In People vs. Crispin,
[43]
this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the
preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not
form part of the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not
compelled to take judicial notice of the same.
[44]
Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes affidavit,
the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati
or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa

should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of
competent jurisdiction.

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
[45]
Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since
such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.
[46]
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy,
[47]
wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be
barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the
general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.

Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary
to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No.
95-083 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO,
Petitioners,



- versus -




PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 167764

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
*

VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 9, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION


PERALTA, J .:


Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
[1]
of the
Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution
[2]
dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion
for reconsideration.
In an Information
[3]
dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G.
Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:

That on or about the 5
th
day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr.
Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication
on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim
hereunder, to wit:

MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN

PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their
patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.

However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office,
SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not
doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports reaching
Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year
when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation,
taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.

Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's
Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said,
after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one
to recommend.

Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June
24, she was readmitted to the hospital.


The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and
the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter
punched on her right side.

This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.

Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of
Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be
a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state.

The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the
company physician.

My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your
side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that
their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita
passed away, July 2, 1994.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations
prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower
price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-
called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices
which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.

The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many
times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly
born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time
stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!

My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her
body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in
peace, Inday Lita.

wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility
expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and
malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name,
character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[4]



Upon being arraigned
[5]
on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in
the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.

On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision
[6]
finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby
rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision
Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.
[7]



Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
[8]
dated February 20, 1998.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.

On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:


I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN
THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY
SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.
[9]



Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as
columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the
poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and
expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such
criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief
that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article;
that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of
the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the
columnists exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views
and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every
indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon
by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears
on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which,
if properly considered, may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence
submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.

The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over
the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.

The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in
their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,
[10]
the Court ruled:

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage
of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which
justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
[11]

The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People
[12]
that:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have
been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try
the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with
an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis
supplied.)
[13]


Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in
cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or
where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,
[14]
the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.

2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
[15]

Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged
libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or
in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:

That on or about the 5
th
day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication
with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr.
Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and
exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of
said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN....

The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed thatIloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.

In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,
[16]
which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of
the Information of which reads:

That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat]
conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation
of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of
injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
maliciously cause to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their
respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....
[17]


the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance
with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:

x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is utilized in the precise
context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in
Manila. The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were
published in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation,
and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila
does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading
national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does
not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.

Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the
publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other
locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this
petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply
because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363
sought to avoid.
[18]


In Agustin v. Pamintuan,
[19]
which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was published in
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines, the Court did not
consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous
article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of
the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to
allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner
in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.

Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,
[20]
where the Information for libel alleged that the offended party was the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the Court did not find such allegation
sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:

The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required.
However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a
transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a
residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place,
combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is
possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually
residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes
were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident
therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the
statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
[21]


Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
[22]
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360,
the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of
libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,

- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 170122








G.R. No. 171381

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
*
and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 12, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to
nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,
[1]
as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a
suit for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution
[2]
of the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture
case involving the same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
1379,
[3]
filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No.
0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be
raffled also to the Fourth Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also
referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others
with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the
SB. The plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. Per the Sheriffs
Return
[4]
dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB
issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction
over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias
in default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they
have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment
SB issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution
[5]
of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion
as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in
default.
Another resolution
[6]
denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and set a date
for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the prohibited
pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I
with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.
[7]

On May 20, 2005, the SB 4
th
Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter
alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4
th
Division of jurisdiction over the
forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.
By Order
[8]
of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been declared in
default which has yet to be lifted.

It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special civil action for
mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:

I. Whether or not the [SB] 4
th
Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely Noted
without action, hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to
dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:

A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4
th
Division could not have acquired
jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less make them become the true
parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared
in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB]
4
th
Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised
anytime, even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all
proceedings before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the first
challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB
4
th
Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate
and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated
April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.

D. In any event, the [SB] 4
th
Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic
forfeiture of the subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction
for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder
law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.

F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal conviction
for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.

G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of
forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of
forfeiture as a penal sanction.
[9]
(Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the petition for Forfeiture II
was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13, 2005, the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNPDetention Center who in turn
handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the
other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im
receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named (sic).
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof
which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of
summons. The motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion to dismiss
and/or to quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.
[10]


From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant petition for certiorari, docketed
as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4
th
Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:

A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed
forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.

B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA
No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of forfeiture be
exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting
decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction.
[11]
(Emphasis added.)

Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were consolidated.

The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of jurisdiction and may thusly be
couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for
that matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have
been ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already been filed and
pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.

Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb
the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196

Petitioner maintains that the SB 4
th
Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases
are now covered or included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main
plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4
th
Division of
its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary,
so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions. Prescinding from these
premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4
th
Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the
two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the
outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We
said so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
[12]
involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I
case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4
th
Division of the
SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture
cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4
th
Division in its May
20, 2005 Resolution,
[13]
the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired
properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x
x.
[14]
Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
[15]
Thus if the
respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such
judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State.
[16]
x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving
ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3
[17]
the filing of
forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,
[18]
interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent
civil actions separate from the criminal actions.

Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is
Criminal

It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different
from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture
cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.
[19]

Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of
conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense,
[20]
suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings
under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for
a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case
28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder case and the subject
forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court
on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the plunder case
is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the
forfeiture case. They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the
plunder case while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or
vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict. After
all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in
the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and
the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of the
subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth
not recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder
and the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.
[21]


RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that
RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080
is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members
of his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other
hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the
State to recover the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted to
harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be
harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.

Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children

On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her
children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted
service of summons, thus:

SEC. 7.

Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service
of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a
person.
[22]

In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores
Garcia, who is detained at the PNP DetentionCenter, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed
that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at
the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable time being so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.
[24]
Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different
dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on
a competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her
children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid
substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was
made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of
suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants,
however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative
relief.
[25]
In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the
improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in
the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.

Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction
Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first
sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without
qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) mot ion to
dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for
partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the
purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her
motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22,
2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her
stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the
SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals
[26]
applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the
current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a
motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection
to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective
substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor
are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of
summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in
the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the
forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner
and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos.
0193 and 0196 before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for
lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G. R. No. 156747 February 23, 2005
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision
1
dated 22 March 2002
and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Alfie
Lorenzo, et al."
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher,
managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper "Abante" were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN
CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of "Abante" a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO
TRINIDAD to public hatred, dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and maliciously write, publish, exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid
newspaper, in its issue of July 13, 1996 an article which reads as follows:
"Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at
binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.1a\^/phi1.net
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto
Natividad siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan
dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng T-
shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang
rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang
kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa
kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang
na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao,
pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si
Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo
na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga
ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo
para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie," ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno
Liberty Boys!"
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and causing
in view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY
TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.
2

In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.
3

On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings
dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on
27 August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo,
refused to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf.
4
As for
petitioner Macasaet, his arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared
arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in
Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense
5
(Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and
to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.
6
Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied the
petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27
August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment
and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover,
banking on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,
7
the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had
already manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ,
it was premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed
that regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their "not guilty" pleas is in order as they
planned to move for the quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997,
8
Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that "with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court considers
the accused to have abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to act on the same."
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997,
9
the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City, had
jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant below)
was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio,
Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the case.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit
purportedly executed by private respondent as it is "axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a consideration of
the information as filed with the court, and no other." Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the
information filed before the court state that private respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted
for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information.
10

On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply
11
attaching thereto certifications issued by
Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City,
respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification
12
issued by Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain person
by the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to no
avail.
On the other hand, the certification
13
issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident ofKaren Street, Sto.
Nio, Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.
. . .
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for "IDENTIFICATION."
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangaycertifications. Also marked
for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the editorial box
appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF
Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days within which to
submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,
14
private respondent contended that the certification issued by thebarangay captain
of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon
City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes;
and that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of
judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents and that
a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him (private respondent). Finally, private
respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.
15
The court a quo noted that
although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its
consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abanteclearly indicated that the purported libelous article was printed and
first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed,
jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private respondent appeared to be the one
in Marikina City although right below it was a handwritten notation stating "131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC"; b) the
two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-
Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
16
insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was
published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at
the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term "address" to mean the place where he
originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual
residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit executed by
a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where private respondent
supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of any inquiry conducted by
the barangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondents motion for reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and observe
that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect.
17

Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.
18
In the Decision now assailed before
us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City,
in Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.
19

The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the "residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or abode" and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a persons place of abode
and not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.
20
In this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint wherein the residence
of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case,
the same could be done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.
21

As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Nio, the Court of
Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or temporary
residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City can be a voter
of Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he resides in the latter.
It is just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who is not a registered voter
of a place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one need
not even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the barangay in Marikina.
22

The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to controvert the
same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution promulgated on
6 January 2003.
23

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL
ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A
CRIMINAL CASE.
24

Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was not a
resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them, the information dated 10 July 1997
filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina City.
Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint
25
and the memorandum for preliminary investigation
26
where references
were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental
affidavit executed by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought.1awphi1.nt
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario. They insist
that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecutions failure to present the affiant to testify as regards the veracity of
her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as evidence, it was
only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the trial court
as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases. Thus, the Court
of Appeals made a mistake in holding that -
While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private complainant
nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged improper laying of
venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be
argued that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in accused-appellees cited case
in the motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals(GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the private complainant
has an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the interest of justice and fair
play, therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the
case.
27

In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,
28
private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had
jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he leased in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed defamatory article
appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy
of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the affiant before the
trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public and the private
prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing the case of Joseph
Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,
29
private respondent avers that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of
witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the appellate level,
private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public prosecutor as what
happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 2003
30
wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on the
following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the time of the
publication of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with
questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondents residency in Quezon City during the time material to this case was
sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation and in the
affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit private respondent
executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court since its
(OSGs) office is only "authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once
the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as "the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which belongs to
them exclusively"
31
and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.
32
The term derives its origin from two Latin words
"jus" meaning law and the other, "dicere" meaning to declare.
33
The term has also been variably explained to be "the power of a
court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of
a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to
render."
34

In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional.l^vvphi1.net Thus, the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
35
In the case ofUy v. Court of Appeals and
People of the Philippines,
36
this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
37

The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said
case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,
38
we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
39

In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could
only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the
time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient
to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating "Quezon City" at the beginning of the information,
the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was
invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed
libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from
the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective.l^vvphi1.net Sadly for private respondent, the information filed
before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for invoking
the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.1a\^/phi1.net
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the
case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual
and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and
first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
40

Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of this
libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a
court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
41
In resolving a motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.
42
The
exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash
43
such as when the
ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused.
44
In these instances, it
is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case
obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was attached to
private respondents supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document "supports private
(respondents) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article was published."
45
The
pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting
the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal
pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the
admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its
admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.
46

Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should deal
with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the
supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he
filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us into
giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even
bother to explain the reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to
file it much earlier in the proceedings.l^vvphi1.net He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the "sole
representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases."
47

Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the
appellate courts.
48

The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence?
Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that "(i)n appeals by notice of appeal,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties."
49
When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.
50
As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz
Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected
their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not
do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to
do so for all the parties.
51

Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before the
trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an
appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents when
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR.,Petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order
1
of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended
Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution
2
of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez
3
(Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular,"
former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),
4
a criminal
complaint,
5
before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio,
Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who
are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of
the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after
PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by
which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under
the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot
6
under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group
7
at no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005,
he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused]
containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
Malayan."
8
He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it
was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos benefited much from
the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER.
Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us
start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince
friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after
knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x
9
(emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,
10
the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13)
separate Informations
11
charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-876,
which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they
hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and
defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x
x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will
try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the
complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to the accused as
trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones responsible for the posting and publication of
the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
12

Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice who, by
Resolution of June 20, 2007,
13
reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for
libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was non-existent, hence, the accused could not be
charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
14

Petitioners, as co-accused,
15
thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash
16
the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in the
Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,
17
petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,
18
the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information, citing
Agustin v. Pamintuan.
19
It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati
at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,
20
insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction
on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban
21
which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the libelous
publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of
which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely needed a
formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal
cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.
22

By Order of March 8, 2007,
23
the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly ordered the
public prosecutor to "amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007,
24
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they
hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring,
confederating together with John Does, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously
with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the
complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City, an injurious and
defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information
25
which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent
because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be sufficient in
form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration
26
having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they
filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE
DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.
27

With the filing of Gimenezs Comment
28
to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts
to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of the
Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,
29
as a rule, requires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
30
A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter should
be filed in the Court of Appeals.
31
The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but purely
legal questions.
32

In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to
abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under
Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous
matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
33
This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article
360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,
34
the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo
35
which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases,
viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the
case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual
and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and
first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second.
Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words,
it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an
examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals
36
explained the nature of
these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep.
Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations is the province
wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct the preliminary investigation of complaints
for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the
criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the
criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and
Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil.
933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so
as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in
libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity
or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses
influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial
publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as
there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his first
access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that
would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.1avvphi1
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the Courts
pronouncements in Chavez
37
are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a private person must file the
complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the complainants place of residence. We would also have
to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing
reason to resort to such a radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous,
especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended
Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended Information
in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 171542 : April 6, 2011]
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE
GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, DONATO ENABE and ALFIE
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,
[1]
petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA), datedSeptember 26, 2005
[2]
in People of the Philippines , et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC
Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution datedFebruary 6, 2006
[3]
denying respondents
motion for reconsideration.
[4]
The assailed rulings denied the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
upheld the ruling
[5]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMandaueCity, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU-10123.
[6]

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder
against several accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under the National Bureau of Investigation.
[7]

During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was
there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
[8]
The oral objection was reduced
to writing onJuly 21, 2003 when Magno filed an opposition
[9]
before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the provisions of
Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.
[10]

The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment,
[11]
while the accused submitted their joint opposition.
[12]
The respondents
likewise submitted their comments to the opposition of the other co-accused.
[13]

OnSeptember 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute this
case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. 6770.
[14]

In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which the RTC later denied in itsOctober 1,
2003 Order.
[15]

Proceedings before the CA
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, fileda petition for certiorari before
the CA.
[16]
They contended that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel
for the private offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may intervene, by counsel, in
the prosecution of offenses.
[17]

Magno, in his comment
[18]
filed onDecember 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before the RTC was the appearance and
authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman.
[19]
He stressed that while the Office of the
Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to
private practitioners/private prosecutors.
[20]
He further stressed that while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the
Ombudsman is the proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene personally, as the
Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case.
[21]

OnFebruary 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case,
but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.
[22]

The respondents moved for the reconsideration
[23]
of the CA decision. OnSeptember 26, 2005, the CA amended its decision,
[24]
ruling
that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to intervene in the prosecution of the offense
charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.
[25]

Failing to obtain a reconsideration
[26]
of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this Court through the present
petition for review on certiorari
[27]
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to hear and decide that question
is with the Sandiganbayan.
[28]
To support this contention, Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I.
Mapayo, etc., et al.
[29]
where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
[30]

Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the
respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770.
[31]
Section 31 limits the Ombudsmans prerogative to designate
prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to deputize
private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
[32]

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its memorandum onFebruary 8, 2008.
Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
[33]
Section 31
merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases.
[34]
The Ombudsman opines that the two
provisions of law are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict,
[35]
as a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended
complainants in the prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman to deputize.
[36]
The Ombudsman,
however, did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on
behalf of the Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
x x x x
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided,
however, That where the civil action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action,
otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.
[37]
In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for certioraribefore the CA, claiming that the
RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA
refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition. Recognizing the amendments
made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,
[38]
we sustained the CAs position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include petitions for mandamus, prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
[39]

In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the
interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have
filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are
public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation.
[40]

The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule theSeptember 26, 2005 Amended
Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for reconsideration.
J urisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
[41]
and any judgment, order or resolution
issued without it is void
[42]
and cannot be given any effect.
[43]
This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal or even after final judgment.
[44]

We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al.,
[45]
as follows:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer
jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to
themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before the CA
[46]
the ground of lack of
jurisdiction before the CAs Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside
for its alleged failure to raise new or substantial grounds for reconsideration.
[47]
Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction is a new and
substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure the jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs
decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been raised only on appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still
not be cured. In Machado,
[48]
citingPeople of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,
[49]
we held:
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the Amended Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated onSeptember 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution ofFebruary 6, 2006, NULL AND
VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this
Decision within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CARPIO MORALES, J ., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, J J .

G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the
COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.

PARAS, J .:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial
issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and
Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M.
Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and
(b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and
underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under
the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions
and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit
was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the
respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied
by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial
was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional
trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly
misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private
respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an
acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to
quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final
judgment or order rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to
enter a Plea, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek
Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require
the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for
estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court
before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not
the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint
is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not
by the findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and
earth under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio
Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following manner, to wit. the said having
been authorized to act as insurance agent of said corporation, among whose duties were
to remit collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn over the
same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez,
as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and received the amount of
P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but herein
accused, once in possession of said amount, far from complying with her aforesaid
obligation, failed and refused to do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the
whole amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential
elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the
City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the
essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended
party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit
the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on
this point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 103276 April 11, 1996
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J .:p
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution
1
denied with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
Court's April 12, 1994 Decision
2
affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
3
of violation of Section 3(e) of the "Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act"
4
for his alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official training
programs of the Department of Agriculture Entry of judgment was ordered, to be made in due course.
5
Six (6) years and
one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioner's guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness
Josephine Angeles'
6
testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places
7
, and 2) petitioner's
failure to present a single receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former lawyers'
insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness that he has nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on, petitioner
takes a novel recourse by filing the instant "Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration In The
Light Of The Present Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction".
8
This
was filed on petitioner's behalf by a new counsel, as shown by the "Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave To Submit
Attached Omnibus Motion" filed on June 27, 1994
9
after petitioner's former lawyers withdrew their appearance.
10

In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly
mistake of his former
lawyers
11
in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him of
presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that would have completely belied the
accusation against him. Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of expenses and receipts
12
in support
of the liquidation voucher (Exhibit "E") showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training programs
actually conducted the original records of which are all along kept in the Records Section of the Bureau of Plants
Industry as per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P. Gianzon
13
and which are readily available. Petitioner now
appeals to the Court's sense of justice and equity that these documents be summoned and appreciated by the Court itself
or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the final chance to prove his innocence.
When required by the Court to comment on the "Omnibus Motion"
14
, the Solicitor General, representing respondents,
was granted no less than eight (8) extensions to do so
15
, the last one with warning that no further extension will be given.
None was filed. Instead, the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension which was denied considering the
warning contained in the eighth (8th) extension.
16
The tenth (10th) motion for extension was merely noted by the
Court.
1
7Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated August 15, 1995 required the Solicitor General's Office to 1) SHOW
CAUSE why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated failure to file comment and 2) file its comment, both
within ten (10) days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General's Office filed its Comment and Explanation.
The Court accepted such Explanation, noted the Comment filed and required petitioner to file a Reply thereto within ten
(10) days from notice in a Resolution dated October 10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due time.
The Solicitor General's Office advances the following arguments in its Comment:
1. Petitioner's "Omnibus Motion" is violative of the Court's adopted policy on second motions for reconsideration as
expressed in a Resolution dated April 7, 1988 stating that:
Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and decrees the denial to be final, no
motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
2. Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers, assuming that the latter indeed committed one.
3. Even granting the petitioner is not bound by his former lawyer's mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner now
attempts to present would nonetheless not cast at all a reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, to warrant a reversal of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner's Reply, on the other hand, contains the following counter-arguments.
1. The "Omnibus Motion" is not violative of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such motion does
not seek leave to file a second motion for reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For Reconsideration filed
on May 6, 1994 and in its stead to admit the "Omnibus Motion" containing the petitioner's documentary evidence and
arguments. Thus, petitioner's Motion to vacate the first motion for reconsideration is but necessary to his defense that he
should be excused from the mistake of his former lawyers.
2. Adherence to the general rule that the client is bound by his counsel's mistake is to deprive petitioner of his liberty
through a technicality.
3. The pieces of evidence petitioner is now presenting for appreciation either by this Court or the Sandiganbayan will,
contrary to the OSG's claim, disprove his guilt of the charge levelled against him.
After carefully considering anew petitioner's plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign
supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes
of justice require it, cannot be questioned.
18
In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on
grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness,
19
negligence or incompetency of counsel,
20
improvident
plea of guilty,
21
disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in trial court,
22
and where a judgment
was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense.
23
Similarly, in a considerable
host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms
of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Take for instance the relatively recent case of "PNB, et. al. v. CA, et.
al."
24
where the Court once again extended this liberality of allowing an appeal filed beyond the reglementary 15-day
period. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting therein,
25
nonetheless made this crucial observation:
The majority opinion, with due respect would suspend the rule actually the law for what it says are
"petitioners" detailed demonstration of the merits of the appeal' without, however, delving on such so-
called "merits". The simple merits of one's case, lost through neglect, to my mind should not automatically
call for the suspension of applicable rules, laws, or jurisprudence. At the very least, before this may be
done, transcendental matters, surely, life, liberty, or the security of the State, should be at risk, but
obviously, not simple matters which can be reduced to pesos and centavos. (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, when "transcendental matters" like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is
likely to be welcomed more generously.
Petitioner's present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at
stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural
strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner
from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous
lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties
from the negligence or mistakes of counsel.
26
To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than
rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which he failed to present in the
Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that we
are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioner's documentary evidences prima
facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles' testimony, indicating that official training
programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for
those programs. In this connection, the Court in "US v. Dungca",
2
7 had occasion to state that:
. . ., the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this would be done only under very
exceptional circumstances, and in cases where a review of the whole record taken together with the
evidence improvidently omitted would clearly justify the conclusion that the omission had resulted in the
conviction of one innocent of the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied).
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote susbstantial
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.
28
This power to suspend or even
disregard the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And this is not without additional basis. For in "Ronquillo
v. Marasigan",
29
the Court held that:
The fact that the decision . . . has become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof
because even with the finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the
instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with justice and the facts. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact
ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation".
30
And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we
do not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioner's record
as public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, "while guilt shall not escape, innocence
should not suffer".
31

In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of
justice to render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime of which he is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words in "People v. CA, et. al.",
32
(where
substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accused's appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal
and his subsequent escape from confinement) that "if only to truly make the courts really genuine instruments in the
administration of justice", the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible miscarriage of justice
resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's "Omnibus Motion" is GRANTED and the Court's April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16, 1994
Resolution are hereby RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for reception
and appreciation of petitioner's evidence. No costs.