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IPS 246--China and the World

Description and Objectives: Chinas reemergence as a global player is transforming both
China and the international system. Other nations view Chinas rise with a mixture of
admiration, anxiety, and opportunism. Some welcome Chinas rise as a potential
counterweight to US preeminence; others fear the potential consequences of Sino-
American rivalry and erosion of the US-led international system that has fostered
unprecedented peace and prosperity. There is a natural temptation to hedge but doing
so entails significant risks. This course provides an overview of Chinas engagement
with countries in all regions and on a wide range of issues since it launched the policy of
opening and reform in 1978. The goal is to provide a broad overview and systematic
comparisons across regions and issues, and to examine how Chinas global engagement
has changed over time.

The course will combine lectures and seminar formats with the goal of covering a great
deal of material in a short time without imposing impossibly heavy reading requirements.
The course can be taken for either 4 or 5 units. Grading will be based on the midterm and
final exams (both of which are take-home). Those taking the course for 5 units will also
write one 10-page research paper on a mutually agreed topic.

The Instructor: Thomas Fingar began his career as a China specialist and published
dozens of monographs and articles on China before leaving Stanford to head the China
Division of the State Department in 1986. He continued to follow Chinas global
engagement as Director of the State Departments Office of Analysis for East Asia and
the Pacific (1989-94). Between 1994 and 2008 he held several positions, including
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Analysis, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, in all of
which he had analytic responsibility for all countries and all issues.

Required Books:
Bates Gill, Rising Star: Chinas New Security Diplomacy (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2007)
Aaron L Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011)
Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin, 2011)
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold
War, Second Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010)

Other Reading Assignment:
Most of the other assignments listed in the syllabus have been posted to the
Materials section of the Coursework site (indicated by an asterisk [*] after
citation). Additional readings may be assigned during the quarter.

1/10 Course Overview and Introduction: Thinking about China and the World. After
dealing with essential housekeeping chores with respect to course organization,
reading assignments, class participation, etc., this class will set the stage by
explaining the instructors policy implications approach (e.g., what various
players seek to accomplish and what implications specific forms of engagement
have for US, Chinese, and third country policy decisions); and summarizing
conventional wisdom about the implications of Chinas rise.

Henry Kissinger, The Singularity of China, On China, pp. 5-32
Aaron Friedberg, The Propensity of Things, and Hide our Capabilities
and Bide Our Time, A Contest for Supremacy, pp. 120-155
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 1-37
Wang Jisi, Chinas Search for a Grand Strategy, Foreign Affairs, Vol.
90, No. 2 (Mar/Apr 2011), pp. 68-79*
Additional Readings:
Alastair Iain Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power? International
Security Vol 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56*
Aaron L. Friedberg, The Future of US-China Relations, International
Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-45*
Thomas J. Christensen, Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?
International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006), pp. 81-126*

1/12 No ClassUse time to get ahead on readings.

1/17 Chinese Foreign Policy Before 1979. This session will provide a brief overview
of Chinese foreign policy during the first three decades of the Peoples Republic
in order to establish a baseline against which to evaluate changes in approach and
policy since 1979. Many who project how China will behave in the future refer
back to goals and patterns of behavior dating from this earlier period and this
session will attempt to illustrate reasons underlying their projections and

Kissinger, A Decade of Crisis. pp. 181-201
Thomas W. Robinson, Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the
1990s, Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign
Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994),
pp. 555-602*
John W. Garver, The Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), pp. 133-178*

1/19 Logic and Dynamics of Deng Xiaopings Strategy of Reform and Opening.
Propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, Chinese domestic and foreign policy
had failed miserably during the first 30 years of the Peoples Republic. The gap
between China and the countries to which it wished to be compared was
widening, the country remained extremely poor, and Beijing had little
international influence. The solution was a dramatic break with the past with two
interconnected pillars: closer relations with the United States and the capitalist
world, and gradual reform of domestic and foreign policy to promote rapid
modernization. Once launched, reform acquired a dynamic unanticipated by
Deng and other Chinese leaders.

Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why Chinas Rise Doesnt
Threaten the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 1-19,
and 48-69*
Barry Naughton, The Foreign Policy Implications of Chinas Economic
Development Strategy, Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh,
Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 47-69*
John W. Garver, The Opening to the Outside World, John W. Garver,
The Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China, pp. 193-209*

Additional Readings:
Avery Goldstein, The Diplomatic Face of Chinas Grand Strategy: A
Rising Powers Emerging Choice, China Quarterly No. 168 (Dec 2001),
pp. 835-864*

1/24 China and the United States I: Mutual Interests and Different Goals. The US and
China began to normalize relations because of mutual concerns about the Soviet
Union but by late 1978 Deng saw better relations with the US and access to the
US-led international community as essential for Chinas modernization, security,
and perpetuation of Communist Party rule. The US saw engagement as a way to
increase Chinas stake in the global order and to transform Chinas political
system. China anticipated greater independence; the US envisioned growing
Chinese dependence on the West in general and the US in particular. Neither
anticipated the degree of interdependence that ensued.

Kissinger, The Road to Reconciliation, pp. 202-235
Friedberg, From Containment to Alignment, and Congagement, pp.
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 131-151

Additional Readings:
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China
Since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1992), pp. 67-106*
David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US-China
Relations 1989-2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2001), pp.

1/26 The Strategic Triangle: China, the United States, and Russia. Chinas
relationships with its former allies were shaped by desire to counter and check US
influence and continued espousal of socialist goals and Leninist methods while
adopting temporary expedients to facilitate modernization. Using the Soviet
Union to hedge its new relationship with the US-dominated capitalist world
became impossible after the collapse of the USSR and regimes in Eastern Europe.
The collapse and transformation of these regimes provided lessons that China
used to adjust its own approach to reform.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 269-285
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008), pp. 38-132*
Chenghong Li, Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino-Russian
Rapprochement and the Driving Forces, Journal of Contemporary China
(August 2007), 16(52), pp. 477-497*

Additional Readings:
Feng Yujun, Prospects for Sino-Russian Relations and Chinas National
Interests in the Next Decade, Contemporary International Relations,
Jul/Aug 2008, pp. 25-50*
Elizabeth Wishnick, Why a Strategic Partnership? The View from
China, James Bellacqua, Editor, The Future of China-Russia Relations
(Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), pp. 56-80*
Chien-peng Chung, The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: Chinas
Changing Influence in Central Asia, China Quarterly, No. 180 (Dec
2004), pp. 989-1009*

1/31 Chinas Relations with Northeast Asia I: Japan. Chinas relationships
with its Northeast Asian neighbors are shaped and complicated by security
concerns (Japan and the ROK are allied with the US and China has a long-
standing special relationship with the DPRK), economic opportunities and
rivalries, and a great deal of historical baggage. This is the region China should
know best and where it has unique opportunities and obligations. It is also the
one in which Chinas rise has the most immediate impact.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 173-192
Akio Takahara, A Japanese Perspective on Chinas Rise and the East
Asian Order, Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, Editors, Chinas Ascent, pp.
Peter Hays Gries, Chinas New Thinking on Japan, China Quarterly,
No. 184 (Dec 2005), pp. 831-850*
Tomonori Sasaki, China Eyes the Japanese Military: Chinas Threat
Perceptions of Japan Since the 1980s, The China Quarterly No. 203 (Sep
2010), pp. 560-580*
Kent E. Calder, China and Japans Simmering Rivalry, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 85, No. 3 (Mar/Apr 2006), pp. 129-139*

2/2 Chinas Relations with Northeast Asia II: ROK and DPRK. China arguably has
closer relations and more influence with the DPRK than any other country but it
has failed to persuade Pyongyang to adopt Chinas reform and opening policies
or to surrender its nuclear weapons. China-ROK relations are deep and broad but
complicated by the US-ROK alliance and Beijings support for the DPRK.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 192-208
Christopher Twomey, Explaining Chinese Foreign Policy toward North
Korea: Navigating Between the Scylla and Charybdis of Proliferation and
Instability, Journal of Contemporary China (2008), 17(56), August, pp.
Scott Snyder, DPRK Provocations Test Chinas Regional Role,
Comparative Connections Jan 2011 at*
Bonnie S. Glaser and Wang Liang, North Korea: The Beginning of a
China-US Partnership? The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3
(2008), pp. 165-180*
Heungkyu Kim, From a Buffer Zone to a strategic Burden: Evolving
Sino-North Korea Relations During the Hu Jintao Era, The Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar 2010), pp. 57-74*

2/7 Europe: Advantages and Perils of Economic Opportunism. China and
European nations have few security concerns about one another and China
welcomed efforts by Europe to lessen dependence on the United States. This
created opportunities for profit and technology transfers but restricted
development of political or security relationships to buffer European unhappiness
with Chinas human rights and environmental policies and job losses attributed to
Chinese exports.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 285-296
Bates Gill and Melissa Murphy, China-Europe Relations: Implications
and Policy Responses for the United States (Washington, DC: CSIS,
2008) at
chinaeuroperelations-web.pdf, pp. 1-29*
Jian Junbo, A Clash of Civilization? Norms and Sino-E Relations,
International Review, 2008, No. 4, pp. 53-84*
Jonathan Holslag, The Strategic Dissonance Between Europe and China,
The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2010), pp.
John Fox and Francois Godement, A Power Audit of EU-China Relations
(London: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009), pp. 1-18, 32-
51* at

2/9 China and South Asia I: Pakistan. Long shaped by the enemy of my enemy is
my friend thinking, Chinas relationships with Pakistan (nuclear technologies,
missiles, and conventional arms) and India (friend of Chinas adversaries), have
become much more complicated as a consequence of perceived opportunities,
Chinas growing engagement and stake in the international system, and concerns
about terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 241-254
Jian Yang and Rashid Ahmed Siddiqi, About an All-Weather
Relationship: Security Foundations of Sino-Pakistan Relations Since
9/11, Journal of Contemporary China September 2011, pp. 563-579*
Mathieu Duchatel, The Terrorist Risk and Chinas Policy Toward
Pakistan, Journal of Contemporary China, September 2011, pp. 543-
Mathias Hartpence, The Economic Dimensions of Sino-Pakistani
Relations, Journal of Contemporary China, September 2011, pp. 581-

Additional Readings:
William Burr, Editor, China, Pakistan, and the Bomb, The National
Security Archives at*
Lutfullah Mangi, Pakistan and China: An Excellent Model for Relations
Between Neighboring Countries, Contemporary International Relations,
2010, No. 6, pp. 106-122*

2/14 China and South Asia II: India. Relations between India and China have been
marked by competition between the worlds largest democracy and the worlds
largest (in population) socialist state, military conflict, alignment with different
Cold War rivals, competition for leadership of the non-aligned world, and
competition for foreign direct investment in the era of the BRICs. This session
will look at this complex and important relationship.

Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 1-64*
Sujit Dutta, Managing and Engaging Rising China: Indias Evolving
Posture, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2011, pp. 127-144*
Jing-dong Yuan, The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations
in the 21
Century, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2007, pp.
Gillian Goh Hui Lynn, China and India: Towards Greater Cooperation
and Exchange, China: An International Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sep
2006), pp. 23-284
M. Taylor Fravel, China Views Indias Rise: Deepening Cooperation,
Managing Differences, in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica
Keough, Editors, Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers (Seattle: National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), pp. 65-98*

Midterm Exam Distributed; Due Back By Start of Class on February 21.

2/16 China and Southeast Asia: Relations with Former Tributary States. China used
diplomacy, trade and investment, and displays of military force to change
fundamentally its relationships with SEA nations but some of its efforts may be
becoming counterproductive.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 209-232
Robert Sutter, The United States and China in Southeast Asia, Southeast
Asian Affairs 2010, pp. 44-59*
Evelyn Goh, Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), pp. 113-157*
Rizal Sukma, Indonesia-China Relations: The Politics of Re-
engagement, Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2009), pp. 591-608*
Bronson Percival, The Dragon Looks South: China and Southeast Asia in
the New Century (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2007), pp. 5-19, and 75-110*
Michael A. Glosny, Heading Toward a Win-Win Future? Recent
Developments in Chinas Policy Toward Southeast Asia, Asian Security
2:1 (2006), pp. 24-57*

2/21 China and the Middle East: Arms, Energy, and Geopolitics. China
once saw the Middle East largely as an arena in which its primary interest was to
limit the influence of Washington and Moscow but that changed dramatically
during the reform era as it turned to Israel for military technology, became a
major supplier of conventional arms during the Iran-Iraq war, sold missiles to
Saudi Arabia and Iran, nuclear technology to Iran, and became increasingly
dependent on energy from the Gulf. Its own self-interests now sometimes clash
with its international responsibilities as a member of the P5.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 297-310
Jon B. Alterman and John W. Graver, The Vital Triangle (Washington,
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008), pp. 1-92*
Jon B. Alterman, The Vital Triangle, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, July 12, 2010*
Richard L. Russell, Chinas WMD Foot in the Middle Easts Door,
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Sep 2005), pp.
Steve A. Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle
East, Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 199-218*
Erica S. Downs, The Chinese Energy Security Debate, China Quarterly,
No 177 (Mar 2004), pp. 21-41*
John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial
World (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 281-301*

2/23 China, Transnational Issues, and International Control Regimes
China once maintained that it would not be bound by international agreements
and control regimes that it had not helped to draft but it abandoned this posture
and gradually accepted and enforced treaty commitments. Along the way,
however, it assisted missile and nuclear programs in a number of countries.

Bates Gill, Rising Star: Chinas New Security Diplomacy (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2007)
Stefan Stahle, Chinas Shifting Attitude Toward United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, China Quarterly No. 195 (Sep 2008), pp. 631-
Yeshi Choedon, Chinas Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations:
Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy, China Report 2005, 41:39, pp.,

2/28 China and Africa: Rhetoric, Resources, and Reality. Chinas worldwide quest
for energy, minerals, and investment opportunities has made it a big and
controversial player in Africa. Its attempts to apply a model of mutual benefit and
non-interference have had mixed success. Chinese have rediscovered the
meaning of in for a penny, in for a pound, and that corrupt regimes are no less
corrupt when they deal with Chinese interests.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 310-323
Robert I. Rotberg, Chinas Quest for Resources, Opportunities, and
Influence in Africa, Robert I. Rotberg, Editor, China Into Africa: Trade,
Aid, and Influence (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2008), pp. 1-20*
Li Anshan, Chinas New Policy Toward Africa, Robert I. Rotberg,
Editor, China Into Africa, pp. 21-49*
Chris Alden and Christopher R. Hughes, Harmony and Discord in
Chinas Africa Strategy: Some Implications for Foreign Policy, China
Quarterly No. 199 (Sep 2009), pp. 563-584*
Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, African Perspectives on China-Africa
Links, The China Quarterly, No. 199 (Sep 2009), pp. 728-759*
Li Anshan, China and Africa: Policy and Challenges, China Security,
Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 69-93*
Linda Jakobson, Chinas Diplomacy Toward Africa: Drivers and
Constraints, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 9 (2009),
pp. 403-433*
Wenran Jiang, Fuelling the Dragon: Chinas Rise and Its Energy and
Resources Extraction in Africa, The China Quarterly, No. 199 (Sep
2009), pp. 585-609*

3/1 China and Latin America. China has been increasingly active in Latin America
but has demonstrated caution about encroaching on US interests. Some Latin nations are
more interested in poking Uncle Sam in the eye than is China. This section looks at why.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 323-334
Riorden Roett and Guadalupe Paz, Assessing the Implications of Chinas
Growing Presence in the Western Hemisphere, in Roett and Paz, Editors,
Chinas Expansion into the Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2008), pp. 1-23*
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, A View from Latin America, in Roett and Paz,
pp. 59-89*
Francisco E. Gonzalez, Latin America in the Economic Equation
Winners and Losers: What Can Losers Do? in Roett and Paz, pp. 148-
Maite J. Iturre and Carmen Amado Mendes, Regional Implications of
Chinas Quest for Energy in Latin America, East Asia, (2010) No. 27, pp.

3/6 China and the United States II: Interdependence and Mutual Suspicion. Chinas
skill in taking advantage of the US-maintained global order has facilitated its
extraordinary achievements over the past three decades and US-China relations
are more stable than ever. But growing interdependence has not quelled
suspicions about ultimate intentions and both sides feel compelled to hedge in
ways that fuel the suspicions that make hedging an appropriate strategy. This
class will examine why both are suspicious and what might be done to alleviate
such concerns.

Aaron Friedberg, The Balance of Influence, The Balance of Power,
and Alternative Strategies, pp. 182-263
Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 131-152
Henry Kissinger, A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation:
The Jiang Zemin Era, and The New Millennium, pp. 447-513
Banning Garrett, US-China Relations in the Era of Globalization and
Terror: A Framework for Analysis, Journal of Contemporary China
(August 2006) 15(48), pp. 389-415*

Additional Readings:
David M. Lampton, Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic
Suspicion in US-China Relations (National Bureau of Asian Research,
June 2010), pp. 5-25*
Thomas Fingar, Worrying About Washington: Chinas Views on the US
Nuclear Posture Review, The Nonproliferation Review 18:1 (March
2011), 51-68*
Evan S. Medeiros, Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific
Stability, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp.
Thomas J. Christensen, Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent
Lessons for the Obama Administration, The Washington Quarterly 32:3,
pp. 89-104*
Jia Qingguo, Learning to Live with the Hegemon: evolution of Chinas
policy toward the US since the end of the Cold War, Journal of
Contemporary China, Aug 2005*

3/8 China on the World Stage. Chinas increasing engagement on the world stage is
changing the international system but engagement has changed China more than it
has changed the international system. However, China is not just another country
and the scale and character of its global activities, especially in conjunction with
the rise of India, Brazil, and others, makes it unlikely that the institutional order
that has facilitated their rise and has served the world so well for more than 60
years can endure much longer. China must be part of any effort to remake the
global system.

Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations, pp. 99-109
Margaret M. Pearson, The Case of Chinas Accession to GATT/WTO,
in David M. Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security
Policy in the Era of Reform, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2001), pp. 337-370*
Zhu Feng, Chinas Rise will be Peaceful: How Unipolarity Matters, in
Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, Chinas Ascent, pp. 34-54*
Joseph S. Nye, American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis,
The Washington Quarterly (2010) 33:4, pp. 143-153*
Robert J. Art, The United States and the Rise of China, Ross and Zhu,
Chinas Ascent, pp. 260-290*

Final Exam Distributed, Due Mar 15
Research Papers from those taking the course for 5 units are due on Mar 13.

3/13 Assessing and Anticipating Chinas Impact on the Global System.
This session will employ a mixture of lecture and discussion to construct a net
assessment of Chinas international behavior and how its policies and actions both
shape and are shaped by the international system. It will also address policy
implications for China and the United States.

Aaron Friedberg, To Win Without Fighting, pp. 156-181
G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China: Power, Institutions, and the
Western Order, Ross and Zhu, Chinas Ascent, pp. 89-114*
Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, After Unipolarity: Chinas Visions
of International Order in an Era of US Decline, International Security,
Vol. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011), pp. 41-72*
Scott L. Kastner, Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of
Chinas International Economic Ties, paper prepared for Stanford China
Seminar, January 27, 2011 at Courseworks.*
Ely Ratner, The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping Chinas Rise,
The Washington Quarterly 34:1 Winter 2011, pp. 29-44*
Thomas J. Christensen, The Advantages of an Assertive China:
Responding to Beijings Abrasive Diplomacy, Foreign Affairs Mar/Apr
2011, pp. 54-67*

IPS 246 Syllabus 1-9-12