Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
Torres and Torres for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition
this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding
No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without
jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent
court, dated June 13, 1963 (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo
and Antonio Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court "has no
jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of
another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp.
Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of
the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the
instant case".
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12,
1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan
and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8,
1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a
petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will;
that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the
same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned
petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among
other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and
died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12,
1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this
Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963.
It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in
Paraaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in
1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties
in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while
the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in
support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De
Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the
stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence
over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to
preference over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were aware of the
existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of
Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to
prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now petitioners,
came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of
Court, and invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July
27, 1955.
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the
late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the
will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old
Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance
of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a
time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and
place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for
probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition
for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon
the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its
allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the
deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the
will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and
delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12,
eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontestable.1wph1.t
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will
being delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the
Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal
province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that
he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the Bulacan court lacked
jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents'
estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In
re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73
Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that
he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of
June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case
before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be
that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different
incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the
same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the
same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the
prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment.
(Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he
had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the
place of residence of the deceased.
1
Since, however, there are many
Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act
No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall
be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express
provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
(Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first
invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One
is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the
delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently
done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by
the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75)
was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race
between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for
the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only
subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property in which the testator has
not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does
not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or
repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of
accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final
decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy
proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the
settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the
proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners
Rodriguez.


SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND
SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals
dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal
[2]
of the
petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim
M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement
[3]
in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31,
1981 and every May 31
st
thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement,
[4]
this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor
Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note
for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they
also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement
[5]
for the loan dated December
13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic
will.
[6]
Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before the
RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April
9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator
of the estate of the decedent.
[7]
During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed
a Joint Agreement
[8]
dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to
assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities
[9]
was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein
the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters
[10]
for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner
Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the
same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint
[11]
for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund
and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case
No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines.
[12]
Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer
[13]
and
alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party
thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 63.
[14]
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was
subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack
of merit.
[15]

The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with
the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez
was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by
the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement
apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was,
in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement
was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and
that there can be no valid partition until after the will has been probated. The
trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its
assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent
Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents
account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and
void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE
NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-
LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
[16]

The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had
passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence;
the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the
said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their
personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the
probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not
one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the
active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in
the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the
claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money
claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the probate court.
[17]

The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition
made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had
until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph
(e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic
terms when the deceased referred to them as all other properties. Moreover,
the active participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not
amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[18]

In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT
HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00
AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OFP123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.
[19]

The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to
the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for
the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned
the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related
thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without
any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased
did not include nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as
such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and
resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against
the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim
presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who
executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich
themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate
courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her
brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or
the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the
nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May
31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation
solidary as far as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that,
considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and
the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be
held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the
petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal
capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the
petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was
already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about.
However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of
the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said
agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring
that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement
was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the
heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even
stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the
probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in
estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any
continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document presented as
evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of
her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the
partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the
heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether
the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.
[20]
The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
[21]

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a
will.
[22]

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will.
[23]
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim
Santibaez, left a holographic will
[24]
which contained, inter alia, the provision
which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered
later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the
immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my
children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing
provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have
escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This
being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid.
The joint agreement
[25]
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the
tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its
execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired
jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.
[26]
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
[27]
Thus, in
executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the
heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the
identity of the heirs of the decedent.
[28]
In the instant case, there is no showing
that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent.
When it was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court
and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus,
for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible
heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the
joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described
chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
Corp.
[29]
The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an
event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective
share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then
that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its
money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred;
exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract,
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring
against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his
lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein
provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though
the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is
mandatory.
[30]
As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
[31]

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased
by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property
to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt
presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order
to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.
[32]

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent
Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker
of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of
course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not
sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities.
[33]
The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated
August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation
and Union Bank of the Philippines
[34]
However, the documentary
evidence
[35]
clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the
petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no
documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed
to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply
here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).
[36]

This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting.
Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did
not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will
of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine
Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on
the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased
left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of
the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of
the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not
contain a disposition of property after death and was not
intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a
will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no
effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or
otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case
with another case Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was
granted by the court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the
cases, the appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the
probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
instruction as to the management and improvement of the
schools and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla;
and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the order was contrary to law and settled
pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court, to which
the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the
court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed
the petition for the probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla.
The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of
the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme
Court held that 'in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is
reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will
was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla
died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14
years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of
the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be
located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded
before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the
Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's
petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the
ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the
trial court committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE
MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S
WILL.
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot
be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811
of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested
or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been
lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said
will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be
made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104
PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document
itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it
says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B.
Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.