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Date: Feb.15, 2007 LTC-PB-P0-004


Rev: 1
PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE
SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONS
AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN
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PROCEDURE FOR

PRESSURE SAFETY VALVE CALCULATIONS

&

FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN



















1
General
Revision
NUT/MPR NPK/KNK/RHD SS Feb., 15, 2007
0 First Issue SJ R SS MH March, 12, 1996
Revision.
No.
Description Prepared By Reviewed By Approved
By
Approved
Date

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Date: Feb.15, 2007 LTC-PB-P0-004
Rev: 1
PROCEDURE FOR PRESSURE
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AND FLARE SYSTEM DESIGN
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CONTENTS
1 SCOPE..................................................................................................................................... 5
2 CODES AND PRACTICES................................................................................................... 5
3 DEFINITION OF TERMS..................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Pressure Relief Device ............................................................................................................ 6
3.2 System pressures ..................................................................................................................... 6
3.3 Device Pressures...................................................................................................................... 7
3.4 Relieving conditions................................................................................................................ 7
4 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES............................................................................................. 7
4.1 Types of Pressure Relief Valves............................................................................................. 8
4.2 Back Pressure.......................................................................................................................... 9
5 SET PRESSURE, ACCUMULATION LIMITS AND RELIEVING PRESSURE........ 11
6 OVERPRESSURE................................................................................................................ 14
6.1 Over Pressure Criteria ......................................................................................................... 14
6.2 Principal Causes.................................................................................................................... 15
7 PSV RELIEF LOAD CALCULATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY...................................... 15
7.1 External Fire.......................................................................................................................... 15
7.2 Blocked / Closed Outlets (Exit block).................................................................................. 21
7.3 Cooling or Column Reflux or Pump around failure.......................................................... 21
7.4 Tube Rupture / Plate & Frame Heat Exchanger Failure.................................................. 22
7.5 Control Valve failure ............................................................................................................ 25
7.6 Hydraulic / Thermal Expansion.......................................................................................... 28
7.7 Power Failure (Steam or Electric)....................................................................................... 29
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7.8 Instrument Air Failure......................................................................................................... 30
7.9 Air Cooled Exchanger failure.............................................................................................. 30
7.10 Cooling Water failure........................................................................................................... 31
7.11 Abnormal Heat Input ........................................................................................................... 31
7.12 Check Valve Mal-operation ................................................................................................. 31
7.13 Loss of Heat in Series fractionation system........................................................................ 32
7.14 Liquid Overfill....................................................................................................................... 32
8 SIZING FOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE.................................................................... 35
8.1 Sizing for Vapor or gas relief............................................................................................... 35
8.2 Sizing for Steam Relief ......................................................................................................... 37
8.3 Sizing for Liquid Relief ........................................................................................................ 37
9 DESIGN OF PIPING UPSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE............................................. 39
10 DETERMINATION OF FLARE DESIGN CAPACITY.................................................. 40
11 SIZING OF FLARE HEADER........................................................................................... 42
12 DESIGN OF PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE...................................... 44
13 FLARE STACK SIZING..................................................................................................... 45
13.1 Flare Stack Diameter............................................................................................................ 45
13.2 Flare Stack Height ................................................................................................................ 45
14 DESIGN OF FLARE KNOCKOUT DRUM...................................................................... 47
14.1 Horizontal Knockout Drum................................................................................................. 47
14.2 Vertical Knockout Drum...................................................................................................... 48
15 DESIGN OF SEALS IN FLARE SYSTEM........................................................................ 49
15.1 Sealing of the Flare Stack..................................................................................................... 49
15.2 Sealing of Piping Headers .................................................................................................... 49
16 PURGING OF FLARE HEADER AND FLARE TIP....................................................... 52
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16.1 Procedure for Calculating Flare Header Purge................................................................. 52
16.2 Procedure for Calculating Flare Tip Purge........................................................................ 52
17 P&I DIAGRAM FOR FLARE SYSTEM........................................................................... 52
18 ANNEXURES........................................................................................................................ 53
18.1 Annexure-1 [Tables, Figures (as per API-520/521)] .......................................................... 53
18.2 Annexure-2 (Environment factor data) .............................................................................. 68
18.3 Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization of pure single component
paraffin hydrocarbon liquids) ................................................................................. 70
18.4 Annexure-4 (Sizing for Two-phase Liquid/Vapor Relief)................................................. 71
18.5 Annexure-5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief load) ..................................................... 83
18.6 Annexure-6 (Typical Flare Load Summary sheet) .......................................................... 109
18.7 Annexure-7 (Flare Header / PSV outlet line sizing) ........................................................ 110
18.8 Annexure-8 (Flare stack, Figure-A, B) ............................................................................. 112
18.9 Annexure-9 (Flare knock out drum, Figure-C) ............................................................... 114
18.10 Annexure-10 (Seal drum, Figure-D) ................................................................................. 114
18.11 Annexure-11 (Typical flare system P&I Diagram).......................................................... 115
18.12 Format for Relief load calculation sheets ......................................................................... 116
19 OTHER REFERENCES.................................................................................................... 116
19.1 Handbook by Crosby.......................................................................................................... 116
19.2 Questions and Answers for API-520 / 521........................................................................ 116
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1.0 SCOPE

This document covers the standard design procedure to perform PSV sizing calculations. The
safety of personnel and the protection of equipment due to overpressure are the basis for the
design, sizing, and selection of pressure relieving systems. All systems and pressure relief
devices shall meet the applicable codes, industry standards and practices as well as related
owner/PMC job instructions.
The objective is to apply a systematic examination to all modes of operations and engineering
intentions to the mechanical integrity of the equipment and piping systems based on all
credible incidents. Provisions shall be made to contain or safely relieve any excessive pressures
in the system. These provisions shall include utilization of the applicable standards as listed in
further sections.
The equipment and piping systems shall be designed, fabricated, tested, and assembled in
accordance with project specifications and shall be subject to the vendors quality assurance
and control procedures, including third party inspection.
The practices outlined in this document shall be followed, for all Process unit areas including
related Utilities, Offsite, licensor and non-licensor packages. Also this manual presents the
standard design procedure of a flare system.
2.0 CODES AND PRACTICES

API RP 520 Part I and II : Recommended Practice for the Sizing, Selection and
Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in Refineries.
API RP 521: Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring systems.
API STD 526: Flanged Steel Pressure-Relief valves.
API STD 527: Commercial Seat Tightness of Safety Relief Valves with Metal to Metal
Seats
API STD 2000: Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks (Non
refrigerated and refrigerated)
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec I, Power Boiler
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Sec VI, Recommended Rules for Care and
Operation of Heating Boilers
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel, Sec VIII, Pressure Vessels, including Appendix
ANSI/ASME B31.3, Chemical Plant and Petroleum Refinery Piping
ANSI/ASME Power Piping B31.

Wherever the code differs and/or conflicts, the more appropriate practice shall apply in
agreement with Client/PMC/Owner.







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3.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS

3.1 Pressure Relief Device

Actuated by inlet static pressure to prevent a rise of internal fluid pressure in excess of
specified design value. The device may be a pressure relief valve, a non-reclosing pressure
relief device or a vacuum relief valve.



Pressure Relief Valve:
A pressure relief device
designed to open and relieve
excess pressure and to reclose
after normal conditions have
been restored.
a). Relief valve: Valve opens
normally in proportion to the
pressure increase over the
opening pressure. Used
primarily with incompressible
fluids.
b). Safety valve: Characterized
by rapid opening or pop action.
Normally used with
compressible fluids.
c). Safety Relief valve: May be
used as either a safety or relief
valve depending on the
application.
Non-reclosing pressure
relief device:
A pressure relief device
which remains open after
operation.
a). Rupture disk device:
Actuated by static
differential pressure
between the inlet &
outlet of the device and
designed to function by
bursting of a rupture
disk.
a). Pin-actuated device:
Actuated by static
pressure and designed to
function by buckling or
breaking a pin, which
holds a piston or plug in
place.
Vacuum relief
Device:

3.2 System pressures
(Refer Annexure-1, Figure-1)
Maximum operating pressure is the maximum pressure expected during normal system
operation.
Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) is the maximum permissible gauge
pressure at the designated coincident temperature. This pressure is determined by the
vessel design rules for each element of vessel using actual nominal thickness, exclusive
of any other allowances such as corrosion etc. The MAWP is normally greater than the
design pressure but must be equal to design pressure when design rules are used only to
calculate the minimum thickness for each element and calculations are not made to
determine the value of MAWP. The MAWP is the basis for the pressure setting of the
pressure relief devices.
Design pressure of the vessel along with design temperature is used to determine the
minimum permissible thickness of each vessel element. This pressure may be used in
place of MAWP where MAWP has not been established. Design pressure is equal to or
less than MAWP.
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Accumulation is the pressure increase over the MAWP of the vessel allowed during
discharge through pressure relief device, expressed in pressure units or % of MAWP or
design pressure.
Overpressure is the pressure increase over the set pressure of the relieving device
allowed to achieve rated flow, expressed in pressure units or % of set pressure. It is same
as accumulation when the relieving device is set to open at MAWP of the vessel.

3.3 Device Pressures
Set pressure is the inlet gauge pressure at which the device is set to open under service
conditions. In general, the set pressure of single installed PSV is equal to the MAWP of
the protective equipment. If the MAWP is not defined, the design pressure would be
applicable for the set pressure.
Backpressure is the pressure that exists at the outlet of pressure relief device as a result of
the pressure in the discharge system. It is the sum of the superimposed and built-up
backpressures.
Built-up Backpressure is the increase in pressure at the outlet of pressure relief device
that develops as a result of flow after the pressure relief device or devices open.
Superimposed backpressure is the static pressure that exists at the outlet of pressure relief
device at the time the device is required to operate. It is the result of pressure in the
discharge system coming from other source and may be constant or variable.

3.4 Relieving conditions
The term relieving conditions is used to indicate the inlet pressure and temperature on a
pressure relief device during an overpressure condition.
4.0 PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES

Pressure relief devices are required for all equipment subject to overpressure that results
from outside pressure sources, external heat input or exothermic reactions. This section
summarizes the design approach to the sizing and selection of pressure relief devices to
protect equipment against overpressure from operating and fire contingencies.
All pressure relief devices shall be stamped with the ASME Code Symbol for Section I or
for Section VIII application as required.
All pressure relief valves shall be bench tested to verify the set pressure prior to final
installations, except those requiring in situ testing for ASME Section I applications.
Acceptable types of pressure relief devices include spring-loaded pressure relief valves,
pilot-operated pressure relief valves, rupture disks and rupture pins.

Pressure relief valves shall be designed and constructed in accordance with API STD 526
and API STD 527 and sized in accordance with API RP 520 PT I and API RP 521.
For pressure relief valves in water and steam services, appropriate sections of the ASME
Code shall apply. The ASME Code shall be the minimum acceptable where local codes do
not cover relief valves or are less stringent.
Weight-loaded pressure relief valves shall not be used without OWNER / PMC approval.
Venting and breathing equipment for low-pressure, aboveground storage tanks at less than
1.03 bar gauge (15 psig) shall be sized as specified by API STD 2000, Sections 1-3 or API
STD 620, Section 6.

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4.1 Types of Pressure Relief Valves
4.1.1 Conventional pressure relief valve

It is a spring loaded pressure relief valve whose operational characteristics are directly affected
by changes in the backpressure. (Refer Annexure-1, Figure-2)

The operation of a conventional spring loaded pressure relief valve is based on a force balance
(Refer Annexure-1, Figure-19). The spring load is preset to equal the force exerted on the
closed disc by the inlet fluid when the system pressure is at the set pressure of the valve. When
the inlet pressure is below the set pressure, the disc remains seated on the nozzle in the closed
position. When the inlet pressure exceeds set pressure, the pressure force on the disc
overcomes the spring force and the valve opens. When inlet pressure is reduced to a level
below the set pressure, the valve re-closes. The pressure at which the valve re-seats is the
closing pressure. The difference between the set pressure and the closing pressure is blow
down.

4.1.2 Balanced pressure relief valve

It is a spring-loaded pressure relief valve that incorporates a bellows or other means for
minimizing the effect of backpressure on the operational characteristics of the valve. (Refer
Annexure-1, Figure-3)

When a superimposed backpressure is applied to the outlet of a spring-loaded pressure relief
valve, a pressure force is applied to the valve disc which is additive to the spring force. This
added force increases the pressure at which an unbalanced pressure relief valve will open. If
the superimposed backpressure is variable then the pressure at which the valve will open will
vary (Refer Annexure-1, Figure-22). In a balanced-bellows pressure relief valve, a bellows is
attached to the disc holder with a pressure area A
B
, approximately equal to the seating area of
the disc, A
N
, (Refer Annexure-1, Figure-23). This isolates an area on the disc, approximately
equal to the disc seat area, from the backpressure. With the addition of a bellows, therefore, the
set pressure of the pressure relief valve will remain constant in spite of variations in back
pressure. It is important to remember that the bonnet of a balanced pressure relief valve must
be vented to the atmosphere at all times for the bellows to perform properly.

When the superimposed backpressure is constant, the spring load can be reduced to
compensate for the effect of backpressure on set pressure and a balanced valve is not required.
Balanced pressure relief valves should be considered where the built up backpressure is too
high for conventional pressure relief valve. Balanced pressure relief valves may also be used as
a means to isolate the guide, spring, bonnet and other top works parts within the valve from the
relieving fluid.

4.1.3 Pilot operated pressure relief valve

It is a pressure relief valve in which the major relieving device or main valve is combined with
and controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary pressure relief valve (pilot). (Refer Annexure-1,
Figure-6)

A pilot operated relief valve consists of the main valve, which normally encloses a floating
unbalanced piston assembly, and an external pilot. The piston is designed to have a larger area
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on the top than on the bottom. Up to the set pressure, the top and bottom areas are exposed to
the same inlet operating pressure. Because of the larger area on the top of the piston, the net
force holds the piston tightly against the main valve nozzle. As the operating pressure
increases, the net seating force increases and tends to make the valve tighter. This feature
allows most pilot operated valves to be used where the maximum expected operating pressure
is higher than the percentage shown in Annexure-1, Figure-1. At the set pressure, the pilot
vents the pressure from the top of the piston; the resulting net force is now upward causing the
piston to lift, and process flow is established through the main valve. After the overpressure
incident, the pilot will close the vent from the top of the piston; thereby re-establishing
pressure, and the net force will cause the piston to reseat.

The lift of the main valve piston or diaphragm, unlike a conventional or balanced spring-
loaded valve, is not affected by built-up backpressure. This allows for even higher pressures in
the relief discharge manifolds. The pilot vent can be either directly exhausted to atmosphere or
to the main valve outlet depending upon the pilots design and users requirement. Only a
balanced type of pilot, where set pressure is unaffected by backpressure, should be installed
with its exhaust connected to a location with varying pressure (such as to main valve outlet).
Slight variations in back pressure may be acceptable for unbalanced pilots.

4.2 Back Pressure
Pressure existing at the outlet of a pressure relief valve is defined as backpressure. Regardless
of whether the valve is vented directly to atmosphere or the discharge is piped to a collection
system, the backpressure may affect the operation of the pressure relief valve. Effects due to
backpressure may include variations in opening pressure, reduction in flow capacity, instability
or a combination of all three.
Backpressure, which is present at the outlet of pressure relief valve when it is required to
operate, is defined as superimposed backpressure. This backpressure can be constant if the
valve outlet is connected to a process vessel or system, which is held at a constant pressure. In
most cases, however the superimposed backpressure will be variable as a result of changing
conditions existing in the discharge system.

Backpressure, which develops in the discharge system after the pressure relief valve opens, is
defined as built-up backpressure. Built-up backpressure occurs due to pressure drop in the
discharge system as a result of flow from the pressure relief valve.

The magnitude of the backpressure, which exists at the outlet of a pressure relief valve, after it
has opened, is the total of the superimposed and built-up backpressure.

4.2.1 Effects of superimposed back pressure on pressure relief valve opening

Superimposed backpressure at the outlet of a conventional spring loaded pressure relief valve
acts to hold the valve disc closed with a force additive to the spring force. The actual spring
setting can be reduced by an amount equal to the superimposed backpressure to compensate for
this.

Balanced pressure relief valves utilize a bellow or piston to minimize or eliminate the effect of
superimposed backpressure on set pressure. Many pilot operated pressure relief valves have
pilots which are vented to atmosphere or are balanced to maintain set pressure in the presence
of variable superimposed back pressure. Balanced spring loaded or pilot operated pressure
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relief valves should be considered if the superimposed backpressure is variable. However, if
amount of variable superimposed backpressure is small, a conventional valve could be used
provided:

The set pressure has been compensated for any superimposed back pressure normally
present and
The maximum pressure during relief does not exceed the code-allowed limits for
accumulation in the equipment being protected.

4.2.2 Effects of back pressure on pressure relief valve operation and flow capacity

Conventional Pressure Relief Valves:

Conventional pressure relief valves show unsatisfactory performance when excessive
backpressure develops during a relief incident, due to the flow through the valve and outlet
piping. The backpressure tends to reduce the lifting force, which is holding the valve open.

Excessive built-up backpressure can cause the valve to operate in an unstable manner. This
instability may occur as flutter or chatter. Chatter refers to the abnormally rapid reciprocating
motion of the pressure relief valve disc where the disc contacts the pressure relief valve seat
during cycling. This type of operation may cause damage to the valve and interconnecting
piping. Flutter is similar to chatter except that the disc does not come in to contact with the seat
during cycling.

In a conventional pressure relief valve application, built-up back pressure should not exceed
10% of the set pressure at 10% allowable overpressure. When the back pressure is expected to
exceed these specified limits, a balanced or pilot operated pressure relief valve should be
specified.
Balanced Pressure Relief Valves:

A balanced pressure relief valve should be used where the built-up backpressure is too high for
conventional pressure relief valves or where the superimposed back pressure varies widely
compared to the set pressure. Balanced valves can typically be applied where the total back
pressure (superimposed + built-up) does not exceed approx. 50% of the set pressure. The
specific manufacturer should be consulted concerning the backpressure limitation of a
particular valve design.

With a balanced valve, high backpressure will tend to produce a closing force on the
unbalanced portion of the disc. This force may result in a reduction in lift and an associated
reduction in flow capacity. Capacity correction factors, called back pressure correction factors,
are provided by manufacturer to account for reduction in this flow. Typical backpressure
correction factors may be found for compressible fluid service in figure-30 and for
incompressible fluid (liquid) service in figure-31.

Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves:

For pilot-operated pressure relief valves, the valve lift is not affected by back pressure. For
compressible fluids at critical flow conditions, a back pressure correction factor of 1.0 should
be used.
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4.2.3 Effects of back pressure and header design on pressure relief valve sizing and
selection

The pressure relief valve discharge line and flare header must be designed so that the
built-up backpressure does not exceed the allowable limits.

In addition, the flare header system must be designed in order to ensure that the
superimposed backpressure caused by venting or relief from another source will not
prevent relief valve from opening at a pressure adequate to protect equipment as per
applicable code.

For a balanced pressure relief valve, superimposed backpressure will not affect the set
pressure of the relief valve. However total backpressure may affect the capacity of the
relief valve. Sizing a balanced relief valve is a two step process:
- The relief valve is sized using a preliminary backpressure correction factor, Kb.
- Once a preliminary valve size and capacity is determined, the discharge line and
header size can be determined based on pressure drop calculations.
- The final size, capacity, backpressure and backpressure correction factor can then
be calculated.

For a pilot operated pressure relief valve, neither the set pressure nor the capacity is
typically affected by backpressure for compressible fluids at critical flow conditions.
Tail pipe and flare header sizing are typically based on other considerations.






5.0 SET PRESSURE, ACCUMULATION LIMITS AND RELIEVING PRESSURE

Contingency Single Valve Installations Multiple Valve Installations
Maximum
Set pressure
%
Maximum
Accumulated
pressure %
Maximum Set
pressure %
Maximum
Accumulated
pressure %
Nonfire Cases
First Valve 100 110 100 116
Additional
valve(s)
- - 105 116
Fire Cases
First Valve 100 121 100 121
Additional
valve(s)
- - 105 121
Supplemental
valve
- - 110 121

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All values are % of MAWP. The maximum accumulated pressure equals to the relieving
pressure of PSV.

Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Single-Valve Installation (Operating
Contingencies)

Characteristic Value
Valve Set Pressure Less than MAWP
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 110.0
Valve set pressure, psig 90.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 20.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 124.7

Valve Set Pressure Equal to MAWP
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 110.0
Valve set pressure, psig 100.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 10.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 124.7

Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Multiple-Valve Installation
(Operating Contingencies)

Characteristic Value
First Valve (Set Pressure Equal to MAWP)
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 116.0
Valve set pressure, psig 100.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 16.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 130.7

Additional Valve (Set Pressure Equal to 105% of MAWP)
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 116.0
Valve set pressure, psig 105.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 11.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 130.7

Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Single-Valve Installation (Fire
Contingencies)

Characteristic Value
Valve Set Pressure Less than MAWP
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 121.0
Valve set pressure, psig 90.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 31.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 135.7
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Valve Set Pressure Equal to MAWP
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 121.0
Valve set pressure, psig 100.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 21.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 135.7

Example: Determination of Relieving Pressure for a Multiple-Valve Installation (Fire
Contingencies)

Characteristic Value
First Valve (Set Pressure Equal to MAWP)
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 121.0
Valve set pressure, psig 100.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 21.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 135.7

Additional Valve (Set Pressure Equal to 105% MAWP)
Protected vessel MAWP, psig 100.0
Maximum accumulated pressure, psig 121.0
Valve set pressure, psig 105.0
Allowable overpressure, psi 16.0
Relieving pressure, P
1
, psia 135.7

For steam Boilers:

As per ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section-I,
Set pressure and Accumulation limits
Single Valve Installations Multiple Valve Installations
Maximum
Set
pressure %
Maximum
Accumulated
pressure %
(As per ASME PG-
72 & PG-67.5)
Maximum
Set pressure
%
Maximum
Accumulated
pressure %
(As per ASME PG-
72 & PG-67.5)
First Valve 100 103 ** 100 103 **
Additional
valve
- - 103 103 **

** Maximum up to 106% of MAWP (as per ASME PG-67.2). However, normally safety
valves shall be designed to attain full lift at a pressure no greater than 3% above their set
pressure (As per ASME PG-72).
All values are % of MAWP. The maximum accumulated pressure equals to the relieving
pressure of PSV.


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Number of PSVs
Each boiler shall have at least one safety valve / safety relief valve and if it has more than
500 ft
2
(47 m
2
) of bare tube water heating surface, or if an electric boiler has a power input
more than 1100 kW, it shall have two or more safety valve / safety relief valves. For a
boiler with combined bare tube and extended water-heating surface exceeding 500 ft
2
(47
m
2
), two or more safety valve / safety relief valves are required only if the design steam
generating capacity of the boiler exceeds 4000 lb/hr (1800 kg/hr).

6.0 OVERPRESSURE

6.1 Over Pressure Criteria
All equipment and piping systems must be protected when the internal or external pressure can
exceed the design condition of the system due to an emergency, upset condition, operational
error, instrument malfunction or fire. Pressure relieving devices are installed to ensure that a
system or any of its components are not subjected to pressures that exceed the code-allowable
pressure accumulation. Any circumstance that reasonably constitutes an overpressure type
hazard under the prevailing conditions shall be analyzed and evaluated.

Assumptions
- It is assumed that trained operators will staff the plant.
- In evaluating a given emergency condition, certain assumptions must be made
concerning equipment not affected by the emergency in order that relief rate may be
determined.
- The simultaneous occurrence of two or more conditions which could result in
overpressure will not be considered if the causes are unrelated, i.e., if no process,
mechanical, or electrical commonality exists among the causes.
- The opening and closing action of control valves and the automatic start-up of
equipment will not be considered as a substitute for pressure relieving devices for
equipment protection because power supply to these items in an emergency is not
considered reliable. As a general rule, final overpressure protection is to be provided
by means of a mechanical pressure-relieving device.
- Equipment not affected by a utility failure being evaluated will be considered to remain
in operation while control functions and other systems will be assumed to operate as
designed.
- Flow rates through the equipment and other conditions during the emergency will be
assumed to be at the normal rates except where the particular primary emergency case
under consideration would alter the flow.
- In case of fire, the flow is assumed to have stopped and been contained within a defined
system.
- The possibility of an operator inadvertently opening or closing any one valve or taking
any incorrect action in the wrong sequence or at the wrong time will be considered.
(However, block valves, electric switches, and other equipment items that are locked or
car sealed in the correct position will not be considered involved in any cases of
operator error).
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6.2 Principal Causes
The following lists some common principal causes of overpressure, which shall be analyzed to
determine the individual relieving flow rates for pressure relieving devices. Also, clarification
of the failure and overpressure protection device is provided where applicable.
The list is not intended to be all-inclusive but is intended to serve as a guide.


1. External Fire
2. Exit Block Or Blocked Outlet
3. Cooling Or Column Reflux Failure Or Pump around failure
4. Tube Rupture
5. Control Valve Failure
6. Hydraulic / Thermal Expansion
7. Power Failure
8. Instrument Air Failure
9. Loss of fan in air cooled exchangers
10. Cooling water failure
11. Abnormal heat input to reboiler.
12. Check Valve mal-operation
13. Loss of Heat in series fractionation system
14. Liquid Overfill

7.0 PSV RELIEF LOAD CALCULATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY

7.1 External Fire
Assume that all fluid flow to the equipment has stopped, and that the liquid level inside the
equipment is at the top of its normal working range.
In calculating fire loads from individual vessels, assume that vapor is generated by fire
exposure and heat transfer to contained liquids at operating conditions. The calculation
procedure is as mentioned below.
For determining pressure relief device capacity for several interconnected vessels, each vessel
should be calculated separately, rather than determining the heat input on the basis of the
summation of the total wetted surfaces of all vessels. Vapors generated by normal process heat
input are not considered. No credit is taken for any escape path for fire load vapors other than
through the pressure relief device (which may be a common relief valve for more than one
connected vessel), nor is credit allowed for reduction in the fire load by the continued
functioning of condensers or coolers.
Equipment, which normally operates dry, must be evaluated for the expansion of vapor or
supercritical fluid due to fire. A procedure is as mentioned under section for unwetted area
calculations.
The insulation system for an equipment item shall be considered individually. Credit may be
taken for equipment insulation in reducing the required relief load if project specifications
concerning fireproofing insulation are met.
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See calculation procedure for details.
For vessels filled with both a liquid and a solid (such as molecular sieves or catalysts), the
behavior of the vessel contents normally precludes the cooling effect of liquid boiling. Hence
fireproofing and depressurizing should be considered as alternatives to protection by pressure
relief devices, unless provision of pressure relief is required by local regulations.
Piping and piping components are generally not considered to require protection against
overpressure due to fire exposure, consistent with requirements of ASME B31.3.
To determine the total vapor capacity to be relieved when several vessels are exposed to a
single fire, a processing area may be divided into a number of smaller single fire risk areas by
increased spacing. A single fire risk area is defined as a group of equipment items that is
surrounded on all sides by clear access ways that are at least 6 metre wide. The space under
pipe racks is considered an access way if it is at least 6 metre wide. For the estimation of the
vapor relief load, it is assumed that all (and only) the equipment contained within a single fire
risk area is exposed to the same fire. The largest of the vapor relief loads calculated from each
of the individual fire risk areas into which the plant is subdivided is used as the basis for the
analysis of the vapor collection system (if any) based on fire exposure.
Overpressure protection from fire exposure for heat exchangers: In general, heat exchangers do
not need a separate pressure relief device for protection against fire exposure since they are
usually protected by pressure relief devices in interconnected equipment or have an open
escape path to atmosphere through cooling water return lines. This is true even if the heat
exchanger has a manual block valve between it and the pressure relief device since it is not
expected that operators will close this valve during a fire incident. However, in situations
where a fail-close control valve or an automatically actuated emergency isolation valve could
isolate the heat exchanger from the pressure relief device providing protection against fire
exposure, a separate pressure relief device to protect the exchanger may be required.
Fire exposure protection for heat exchangers that are provided with blocks and bypasses to
permit cleaning while the rest of the unit is operating, present a special situation. Again,
interconnected equipment usually provides the required overpressure protection but these
exchangers are expected to be occasionally isolated from the system. In this case, one of two
options is available to provide protection: installing a pressure relief device or relying on
operating procedures. If the operating procedure option is used, this operating procedure must
direct the operators to drain all liquid from the exchanger immediately upon isolating it from
the system, and maintaining the exchanger dry" and unpressurized during the period of time it
is isolated from the pressure relief device that would normally provide protection. To increase
the probability that this operating procedure is followed, a caution sign to that effect shall be
permanently placed at the block valves of all exchangers equipped with a bypass.
Fire exposure overpressure protection for air-cooled exchangers is discussed in below
mentioned calculation procedure.









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CALCULATION PROCEDURE FOR EXTERNAL FIRE SCENARIO:

Refer ANNEXURE-5, Section-18.5.1 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

1. For Wetted Surface:

The following formula should be applied. The process flows from / to the system would
be stopped and the protective equipment is assumed to be contained within defined
system.

L
Q
W =
...(Eq.01)

Where adequate drainage and firefighting equipment exist;
82 . 0
21000 A F Q = ; For British unit..(Eq.02)
82 . 0
27140 A F Q = ; For Metric unit..(Eq.03)
Where adequate drainage and firefighting equipment do not exist;
82 . 0
34500 A F Q = ; For British unit..(Eq.04)
82 . 0
61000 A F Q = ; For Metric unit(Eq.05)

Where;
British unit Metric unit
W : Relieving Capacity lb/h kg/h
Q : Total heat absorption (input) to the
wetted surface
Btu/h kcal/h
F : Environmental Factor (#1) - -
A : Total wetted surface (#2) ft
2
m
2

L : Latent heat (#3) Btu/lb kcal/kg

In calculating the total wetted surface of the equipment, the expanded volume of the liquid in
the vessel should be used. The expanded volume includes the thermal expansion of the liquid
as it is heated from its initial temperature to its boiling point at the accumulated vessel
pressure.
These equations apply to process vessels and pressurized storage. For storage vessels with
design pressure of 15 psig (100 kPa) or lower see API 2000 for recommended heat absorption
due to fire
(#1) Environmental Factor
Refer to Annexure-2
(#2) Wetted Surface Exposed to Fire
The wetted surface area used to calculate heat absorption for a practical fire situation is
normally taken to be the total wetted surface within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade. Grade"
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usually refers to ground level, but any other level at which a major fire could be sustained,
such as a solid platform, should also be considered. In the case of vessels containing a variable
level of liquid, the high level is considered. Specific interpretations of A to be used for various
vessels are as follows:
1. Horizontal Drums
The wetted vessel surface within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, based on high liquid level, is
used.
2. Vertical Drums - The wetted vessel surface within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, based on
high liquid level, is used.
3. Fractionators and Other Towers - An equivalent tower dumped" level is calculated by
adding the liquid holdup on the trays to the liquid at high liquid level hold up at the tower
bottom. The surface that is wetted by this equivalent level and which is within 25 ft (7.62
m) above grade is used. Level in the reboiler is to be included, if reboiler is an integral
part of the column
4. Storage Spheres - The total surface exposed within 25 ft (7.62 m) above grade, or up to
the elevation of the centerline whichever is greater, is used.
5. Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers and Piping - The surface area of a tower reboiler and its
interconnecting piping should be included in the wetted surface of exposed vessels in a fire
risk area. The surface area of piping, other than that for reboiler, is not normally included
in the wetted surface area.
6. Storage tanks - Maximum inventory level up to the height of 25 ft (7.62 m) (portions of
the wetted area in contact with foundation or ground are normally excluded). For tanks of
15-psig operating pressure or less; see API STD 2000.
7. Air Cooled Exchangers:
Refer to API RP 521 sect. 3.15.7
Or
Only that portion of the bare surface on air-cooled exchangers located within the fire zone area
being evaluated needs to be considered in the calculation of fire loads. Air fins located directly
above pipe racks are also normally excluded since they are shielded from radiation by the
piping. The bare area is used instead of the finned area because most types of fins would be
destroyed within the first few minutes of fire exposure.
The following types of air-cooled exchangers need not be considered in the calculation of relief
loads due to fire:
Gas cooling services. There will be no vapor generation due to fire and the tubes are likely to
fail due to overheating.
Air-cooled partial or total condensers that meet the following criteria:
a. The tubes are sloped so that they are self-draining.
b. There is no control valve or pump connected directly to the condenser liquid outlet.
For these services, condensation will stop in the event of a fire, and any residual condensate
will drain freely to the downstream receiver. However, in this case, the normal condensing
load for the air-cooled condenser must be added to the calculated fire load from other sources,
unless it can be established that the source of condensing vapors would stop in the event of a
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fire.
For air-cooled condensers that do not meet the above criteria, and for liquid coolers, the wetted
area used to calculate the relief load should be the bare area of the tubes located within the fire
zone area and within 25 feet (7.5m) above grade (or any other surface at which a major fire
could be sustained, such as a solid platform). For tubes located higher than 25 feet (7.5m)
above grade (or other surface at which a major fire could be sustained), the wetted area shall be
taken as zero for forced draft units (the tubes would be shielded from radiant heat exposure by
the fan hood) and as the projected area (length times width) of the tube bundle for induced
draft units.
8. Piping:
It may be appropriate to add a percentage of the vessel area to account for vapor generation in
piping associated with the vessel under consideration.
(#3) Latent Heat calculations
If relieving pressure is beyond critical pressure, use 50 Btu/lb as latent heat.
Single Component Systems:
Refer to Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization for pure single component
paraffin hydrocarbon liquids)
Or
For single component systems, the term equals the latent heat of vaporization at relieving
conditions. It may be determined from a flash calculation as the difference in the specific
enthalpies o f the vapor and liquid phases in equilibrium with each other, or it may be obtained
from API RP 521, Appendix A, Figure A-1 or other literature sources. For such systems, the
latent heat, the vaporization temperature, and the physical properties of the liquid and vapor
phases in equilibrium remain constant as the vaporization proceeds. The peak relief load will
always occur at the start of the fire, when the wetted surface, A, and consequently, the heat
input, Q, are both at a maximum.
Multi-component Systems:
Refer to Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization for pure single component
paraffin hydrocarbon liquids)
Or
For multi-component systems, the vaporization of the liquid initially in the vessel at the start of
the fire proceeds as a batch distillation in which the temperature, vapor flow rate and
physical properties of the vapor and liquid in equilibrium with each other change continuously
as the vaporization proceeds. The peak relief load may or may not coincide with the start of
the fire. In general, such systems require a time-dependent analysis to determine the required
relief area and the corresponding relief rate. The following approach is suggested: Assume
that all vapor and liquid inflows into and outflows from the vessel (other than the fire relief
load) have stopped.
Using the composition of the residual liquid inventory in the vessel, perform a bubble point
flash at the accumulated pressure. In doing this flash, the flow rate of the feed stream to the
flash can be set at any arbitrary value. For convenience, it is suggested that the mass flow rate
be set numerically equal to the mass inventory of liquid initially in the vessel or 1000 units of
mass flow rate (lb/h or kg/s).
Flash the liquid from the preceding flash at constant pressure and the weight percent vaporized
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equal to 1% to 5%. Divide the heat duty calculated for this flash by the mass flow rate of
vapor generated. The result is the heat absorbed per unit mass of vapor generated, . NOTE
THAT, IN GENERAL, THIS VALUE WILL NOT EQUAL THE LATENT HEAT OF
VAPORIZATION, NOR WILL IT EQUAL THE DIFFERENCE IN VAPOR AND LIQUID
SPECIFIC ENTHALPIES. In fact, the value thus calculated will generally exceed the latent
heat of vaporization, especially in the case of wide boiling mixtures. The reason is that a
significant portion of the heat absorbed goes into raising the temperature of the system (most
of which is residual liquid at this point) to the equilibrium temperature of the flash (i.e. sensible
heat).
Using the value of calculated from Step 3; calculate the relief vapor rate, W

2. For Un-wetted Surface:
Un-wetted wall vessels are those in which the internal walls are exposed to a gas, vapor or
super-critical fluid. The following formula should be applied:

( )

=
1506 . 1
1
25 . 1
1
1
'
1406 . 0
T
T T A
P M W
W
.(Eq.06)


Where;
W : Relieving Capacity lb/hr
M : Molecular Weight of Gas lb/lbmole
P
1
: Relieving pressure (=set pr.+allow. Over press.+atm. Press.) psia (lb/in
2
A)
A : Exposed surface area ft
2

T
W
: Vessel wall temperature
The recommended maximum vessel wall temp. for the usual carbon
steel plate material is 1100 F (593.33 C). Where vessels are
fabricated from alloy materials, the value for T
W
should be changed
to more appropriate recommended maximum.
R
T
1
: Gas temperature, absolute, in R, at the upstream relieving pressure,
determined from the relationship,
n
n
T
P
P
T

=
1
1
Where,
P
n
: Normal operating gas pressure, psia (lb/in
2
A)
T
n
: Normal operating gas temp. in R
R

Relieving temperature for wetted & un-wetted surface are often above the design temperature
of the equipment being protected. If, however, the elevated temperature is likely to cause
vessel rupture, additional protective measures should be considered such as:
Cooling the surface of a vessel with water
Depressuring systems
Earth-covered storage

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7.2 Blocked / Closed Outlets (Exit block)

Refer ANNEXURE-5, Section-18.5.2 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

The capacity of the relief device must be at least as great as the capacity of the sources of
pressure. If all outlets are not blocked, the capacity of the unblocked outlets may properly be
considered.
The quantity of material to be relieved should be determined at conditions that
correspond to the set pressure plus overpressure instead of at normal operating
conditions.
The effect of friction drop in the connecting line between the source of overpressure and the
system being protected should also be considered in determining the capacity requirement.

Base for relief capacity (blocked outlet):
Liquid relief Vapor relief
Maximum liquid pump-in rate Total incoming steam and vapor that
generated therein at relieving conditions

7.3 Cooling or Column Reflux or Pump around failure

Refer ANNEXURE-5, Section-18.5.3 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).
Reflux Flow Failure - In some cases, failure of reflux (e.g., pump shutdown or valve closure)
will cause flooding of the condenser, which is equivalent to the pressure relief valve capacity
required for total loss of coolant. Compositional changes caused by loss of reflux may produce
different vapor properties, which affect the relieving capacity. Usually, a pressure relief valve
sized for total tower overhead will be adequate for this condition, but each case must be
examined in relation to the particular components and system involved.

Pump around Flow Failure - The relief requirement is in the vapor condensed by the pump
around circuit evaluated at the relieving pressure and temperature. Pinch out" of steam heaters
may be considered, if appropriate. When pump around duty is high, or the feed to the
fractionators is highly superheated, loss of a pump around may cause a significant reduction in
tower cooling and result in dry-out of the tower. Therefore, the potential for dry-out should be
evaluated. The relief load due to fractionators dry-out is usually the sum of the entire vapor
feeds entering the fractionator plus any stripping steam or reboiler vapor (where applicable).
Because of the difficulty in calculating detailed heat and material balances at relieving
pressure, the simplified bases described in following table have generally been accepted for
determining relieving rates.

1 Total condensing The relief requirement is the total incoming vapor rate to the
condenser, recalculated at temperature that corresponds to the new
vapor composition at relieving pressure and the heat input
prevailing at the time of relief.
The surge capacity of the overhead accumulator at the normal liquid
level is generally limited to less than 10 minutes. If cooling failure
exceeds this time, reflux is lost, and the overhead composition,
temperature and vapor rate may change significantly.
2 Partial The relief requirement is the difference between the incoming and
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condensing outgoing vapor rate at relieving conditions. The incoming vapor rate
shall be calculated on the same basis as total condensing.
If the composition or rate of the reflux is changed, the incoming
vapor rate to the condenser should be determined for the new
conditions.
3 Fan Failure (AFC
failure)
Because of natural convection effects, credit for a partial
condensing capacity of 20% to 30% of normal duty is often used
unless the effects at relieving conditions are determined to be
significantly different.
4 Louver closure Louver closure on air-cooled condensers is considered to be total
failure of the coolant with the resultant capacity established in point
1 & 2.
5 Top-tower reflux
failure
Total incoming steam and vapor plus that generated therein at
relieving conditions less vapor condensed by side stream reflux.
6 Pump around
circuit
The relief requirement is the vaporization rate caused by an amount
of heat equal to that removed in the pump around circuit. The latent
heat of vaporization would correspond to the latent heat under
relieving conditions.

7 Side stream
reflux failure
Difference between vapor entering and leaving section at relieving
conditions.

7.4 Tube Rupture / Plate & Frame Heat Exchanger Failure

Refer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.4 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

Regarding the heat exchangers, there are some failure modes where the lower pressure side
could be exposed to fluid from the high-pressure side.

When design pressure of the low-pressure side is equal to or greater than ten-thirteenth the
design pressure of the high-pressure side, no need to calculate the relieving rate due to tube
rupture.
Tube failure shall be considered a potential source of overpressure for the low-pressure side of
heat exchangers except for the following heat exchanger types:
(a) Tubular reactors and waste heat boilers with tubes 1.5 in. (38 mm) and larger in diameter,
in which the tubes have wall thickness equivalent to process piping, and in which the
tubes are welded to the tube sheet.,
(b) Double-pipe exchangers except those with multiple tubes.
(c) Shell and tube exchangers that meet ALL of the following criteria:
(1) Tube vibration is not likely based on a rigorous tube vibration analysis.
(2) Tube wall thickness is at least one standard gauge thicker than the minimum required
for the specified material or a detailed equipment strategy has been developed, documented
and reviewed by experienced equipment specialists (both mechanical and metallurgical).
The equipment strategy must specifically recognize the application of the 6mm corrosion
hole concept (see below) and, consider all potential Equipment Degradation Modes. In
addition, inspection data with similar designs, process conditions and metallurgy should
confirm that no degradation has been found.
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(3) The tubes are not subject to erosion.
(4) The tubes will operate at temperatures warmer than -150F (-101C).
(5) The tubes are not subject to fatigue or creep.
(6) The process fluid will not cause aggressive corrosion or degradation of tubes and tube
sheets (for example pitting from salt deposits, corrosion from acidic condensates or stress
corrosion cracking).
(7) An appropriate tube inspection program will be developed for the exchanger bundle in
consultation with Materials Engineering specialists.
All these heat exchanger types shall be evaluated for potential overpressure in the event of
leakage through a 0.25in. (6mm) Hole due to corrosion.

If a pressure relief device is required to protect the low-pressure side, the relief rate is defined
by the maximum flow through the two open ends resulting from a guillotine cut of a single
tube at the tube sheet. In calculating this maximum flow rate, it is assumed that the normal
process flow into the low-pressure side has stopped and the pressure difference across the tube
opening is the difference between the maximum operating pressure of the high-pressure side
and the design (set) and/or relieving pressure of the low-pressure side.

Flow rate capacity from both side of a ruptured tube is defined as follows. It is based on a
single orifice equation with a discharge co-efficient of 0.7. For liquids that do not flash when
they pass through the opening or vapors, this formula shall be applied.

1. Liquid flow and conventional (conservative) equation for vapor flow:

( )
1 2 1
2 7 . 0 = P P A W
...(Eq.07)

2. Critical vapor flow:

+
=
1
1
1 1
1
2
7 . 0
k
k
k
k P A W
.(Eq.08)

In case k =1.4 (conservative), then

1 1
685 . 0 7 . 0 = P A W
..(Eq.09)

3. Non critical vapor flow
1 1
685 . 0 7 . 0 = P A W

1 2 1
) ( 2 7 . 0 P P A Y W =
.(Eq.10)

P
2
< 0.5 x P
1

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r
r
k
k
r Y
k
k
k
1
1
1
1
2
...(Eq.11)



In case k =1.4 (conservative), then

=
r
r
r Y
1
1
5 . 3
286 . 0
43 . 1
.(Eq.12)




Where,
W : Mass flow rate kg/s
A : 1. For STHE: Cross sectional area of one side of ruptured tube x 2
2. For PLHE: (**)
m
2

P
1
: Absolute upstream pressure based on maximum operating pressure pa a
P
2
: Absolute downstream pressure (PSV set pressure) pa a
r : P
2
/ P
1
-
k : Ratio of specific heat, Cp/Cv -

: Density at upstream pressure kg/m


3


(**) Plate and Frame Heat Exchanger failure case:

The following two types of failure modes are recommended based on experience(s) in past
projects

1) Failure mode of a 6 mm "pinhole" from one side to the other, which is referenced in
API RP 521.

2) Gasket Failure Mode (Rectangular opening)
The potential leak should be quantified as the flow through orifice in the same way we would
do it for a shell and tube exchanger (assuming flow from the high pressure side set pressure to
the low pressure side relief pressure). The size of the orifice should be calculated as the
hydraulic equivalent of a rectangular opening 0.0625 (1/16) inch wide, with a length equal to
the diameter of the relevant inlet or outlet (semi-cylindrical) flow header on the exchanger. The
Crane fluid flow handbook has equations for calculating the "hydraulic radius" for a circular
opening equivalent to a flow path of arbitrary cross-section. This method has the advantage of
being based on vendor input, and is consistent with the most industry practice.

For two phase flashing fluids, the flow models developed by DIERS and others shall be used in
determining the relieving rate through the failure.
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7.5 Control Valve failure

Refer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

Automatic control devices are generally actuated directly from the process or indirectly from a
process variable (cascaded), e.g., pressure, flow, liquid level, or temperature. When the
transmission signal or operating medium fails, the control device will assume either a fully
open or fully closed position according to its basic design (the fail-safe position), although
some devices can be designed to remain stationary in the last controlled position.
When examining a process system for overpressure potential, it shall be assumed that any one
automatic control valve could be either open or closed, regardless of its specified fail-safe
action under loss of its transmission signal or operating medium.
When the control valve size (flow coefficient, Cv) is known it shall be assumed that this size
valve is installed, and the maximum flow rate through the fully open control valve shall be
calculated based on the installed Cv. If the required relief area for any pressure relief device is
dependent on, or may be affected by, the maximum flow rate through a control valve, a
permanent sign shall be attached to the control valve stating that the installed Cv shall not be
increased without confirming the capacity of any pressure relief device that may be impacted
by the proposed change.

As a minimum, the following individual control valve failures shall be considered in the
analysis of control systems for determination of pressure relief requirements:
(a) Failure in the closed position of a control valve in an outlet stream from a vessel or
system.
(b) Failure in the wide-open position of a control valve admitting fluid (liquid or vapor/gas)
from a high-pressure source into a lower pressure system.
(c) Failure in the wide open position of a control valve which normally passes liquid from a
high-pressure source into a lower pressure system, followed by loss of liquid level in the
upstream vessel and flow of high-pressure vapor. No credit is allowed for the response of
the level controller, which under normal conditions would close the control valve upon
loss of liquid level, since this scenario could be caused by the level controller failure. If
detailed analysis indicates that flow through the wide-open control valve is mixed phase,
then this should be considered when determining the maximum flow through the control
valve. High pressure may also be generated in the piping system as a result of liquid slugs
being pushed by the vapor; hence the potential for excessive pressure from this event
should also be evaluated.
(d) Failure in the closed position of a control valve in a stream removing heat from a system.
(e) Failure in the open position of a control valve in a stream providing energy (heat) to a
system.
When a control valve is equipped with a bypass, the installed flow coefficient (Cv) of the
bypass valve shall not exceed that of the control valve. The following additional scenarios
shall be analyzed:
(f) The control valve fails wide open with its bypass valve partly open. To calculate the
relieving rate for this case, the flow rate through the partly open bypass valve is calculated
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using a Cv for the partially open bypass valve equal to 50% of the installed Cv of the
control valve in its wide-open position, regardless of the actual size of the bypass valve.
(g) The bypass valve is wide open with the control valve closed or blocked-in. The relieving
rate for this case is the flow rate through the wide-open bypass valve using the installed
Cv of the bypass valve in its fully open position.

For the control valve or its by pass valve that gives high differential pressure as described
below, the capacity of downstream PSV must be at least as great as the capacity passing
through the valve(s).


Where,
P
1
: Upstream pressure of control valve, kg/cm
2
A

P
2
: Downstream pressure of control valve, kg/cm
2
A



Flow rate through a Failure opened control valve is calculated as follows:

1. Liquid flow and conventional (conservative) equation for vapor or steam flow:

( )
2 1
3 . 27 P P C W
L VE
=
..(Eq.13)


2. Critical vapor flow:

1
1
9 . 56
T
M
P C W
VE
=
...(Eq.14)


3. Non critical vapor flow:
( )
2
2
2
1
1
311 P P
T
C W
N
VE
=

.(Eq.15)

( )
2
2
2
1
1
7 . 65 P P
T
M
C W
VE
=
..(Eq. 16)




P
1
P
2
x

1.5
P
2
< 0.5 x P
1

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4. Critical Steam Flow:

( )
SH
VE
T
P C
W
+

=
00126 . 0 1
76 . 11
1
.(Eq.17)


5. Non critical steam flow:

( )
SH
VE
T
P P C
W
+

=
00126 . 0 1
51 . 13
2
2
2
1
...(Eq.18)


Where,
W : Mass flow rate kg/hr
C
VE
: Control valve flow co-efficient, Or
Refer ANNEXURE-5, Ssection 18.5.5 for C
VE
value table Or
Refer (***)
-
P
1
: Pressure at control valve inlet based on the normal operating
pressure
kg/cm
2
A
P
2
: Pressure at control valve outlet that is equal to PSV relieving
pressure
kg/cm
2
A
M : Molecular weight kg / kgmole
T
1
: Temperature at control valve inlet K

: Upstream vapor density at normal conditions (=M/22.4141) kg/Nm


3

L
: Liquid density kg/m
3

T
SH
: Steam degree of superheat (=Superheated temp. Saturated
temp.)
K

(***)
Alternate method for calculation of Cv (During initial stage before the control valve is
selected):
1. At first, please calculate process required CV value for corresponding control valve.
2. Use 200 % of calculated required CV value for PSV calculation for no bypass
configuration across control valve.
3. Use 300% of calculated required CV value for PSV calculation with bypass valve
(same size as that of main control valve) configuration [take as 200% is max CV X
150% (50% is by bypass valve open)].

Note:
100% CV is process required CV value
200% CV is Max CV value
300% CV is Max CV +bypass valve open



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7.6 Hydraulic / Thermal Expansion

Refer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.6 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).
Thermal expansion is the increase in liquid volume caused by an increase in temperature. Most
common causes are the following:
1. Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are filled with cold liquid and are subsequently
heated by heat tracing, coils, ambient heat gain or fire.
2. An exchanger is blocked-in on the cold side with flow in the hot side.
3. Piping or vessels are blocked-in while they are filled with liquid at near ambient
temperatures and are heated by direct solar radiation.
X 1 (NPS X NPS 1) relief valve is commonly used. Two general applications for which
thermal relieving devices larger than X 1 (NPS X NPS 1) relief valve might be required
are long pipelines of large diameter in uninsulated aboveground installations and large vessels
or exchangers operating liquid-full.

For liquid full systems, expansion rates for the sizing of relief devices that protect against
thermal expansion of the trapped liquids can be approximated using the following formula:

C G
H B
V

=
500
.(Eq.19)

C G
H B
V

=
997
.(Eq.20)
Where,
British unit Metric unit
V : Relieving rate Gpm m
3
/hr
B : Cubical expansion co-efficient (#1) for the liquid at
the expected temperature
1/ F 1/ C
H : Total heat transfer rate. For heat exchangers, this can
be taken as maximum exchanger duty during
operation.
Btu/hr kcal/hr
G : Specific gravity referred to water =1.0 at 60 F.
Compressibility of liquid is usually ignored.
- -
C : Specific heat of trapped fluid Btu/lb F kcal/kg C

Typical values of cubical expansion coefficient for
hydrocarbon liquids and water at 60 F
Gravity of liquid (API) Value (per F)
3 34.9 0.0004
35 50.9 0.0005
51 63.9 0.0006
64 78.9 0.0007
79 88.9 0.0008
89 93.9 0.00085
94 100 and lighter 0.0009
#1
Water 0.0001
; For British unit
; For Metric unit
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If the blocked-in liquid has a vapor pressure higher than the relief design pressure, then the
pressure relief device should be capable of handling the vapor generation rate.

7.7 Power Failure (Steam or Electric)
(1) Normal Individual and Process Unit Basis for Pressure Relief Sizing Considerations
The following contingencies shall be considered as the basis for evaluating overpressure
that can result from electric power failures:
(a) Individual failure of power supplies to any one item of consuming equipment, such as a
motor driver for a pump, fan or compressor.
(b) Total failure of power to all consuming equipment in a process unit supplied by a unit
substation.
(c) General failure of power to all equipment supplied from any one bus bar in a substation
servicing one or more process units. Note that some substation designs include a
hierarchy of bus bars. With such an arrangement, a design contingency such as a ground
fault in a higher-level bus bar will result in loss of all power to the lower level bus bars.

In the case of the bus bar contingency, the basic assumption for this contingency is a ground
fault in the bus bar. Thus, the impact it will have on the equipment will be affected by the
design of the substation and the protective equipment provided. Some substations are designed
with normally closed circuit breakers isolating adjacent bus bars, when these are fed from the
same electrical feeder. When a ground fault occurs in a bus bar, these circuit breakers open,
thus isolating the fault and preventing the ground fault from extending to other bus bars and
perhaps causing the complete substation to fail. The basic philosophy is to assume that
normally closed circuit breakers will function. For example, if the substation is designed such
that a single feeder provides power to two bus bars separated by a normally closed circuit
breaker, the design contingency for this design would be the loss of power to the equipment
connected to the bus bar having the ground fault. If in the example above, the substation were
designed without any circuit breaker, then the design contingency would be the loss of both
bus bars.
Other substation designs use normally open circuit breakers that are meant to close upon loss
of a power source to permit continued operation by obtaining power from a different source.
Since this type of protection implies action by a device/instrument in order to prevent
overpressure in the equipment, no credit may be taken for the potential continuation of power
delivery. Hence, the contingency of loss of power to a bus and the normally open circuit
breaker failing to close and reestablish power needs is evaluated as a design contingency.
During design it may not be known from which bus bar a piece of equipment will be receiving
its power at the time of failure. Therefore, the combination of equipment losing power from
any single bus bar fault that results in the highest release rate shall be used as the design basis
for this contingency. Alternatively, the design specification may specify the arrangement of
equipment within the available bus bars.
For units in which spared equipment is supplied from different bus bars in the same substation,
loss of any one bus bar will, on average, result in loss of power to one-half of the equipment.
Hence, for the design of a closed flare header system, a release equal to one-half of the release
for the worst combination of equipment loss can be assumed as a design contingency.
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(2) Consideration of Plant-wide Power Failure
The following general power failures on a plant-wide scale must be considered.
(a) Failure of purchased power supply to the plant.
(b) Failure of internally generated power supply to the plant.
(c) Total power failure in any one major substation
Total electrical power failure may result in loss of seawater, cooling water, steam and
instrument air if these utilities rely on electrically driven equipment for their availability.
In case of partial failure, equipment that is not affected by the failure of concern will be
considered to remain in operation and the controls will be assumed to operate as designed.
Reference to the electrical one-line diagrams and steam system P&IDs shall be made to
determine the extent of failure. For example, consider a cooling water circulating system
consisting of two parallel pumps in continuous operation, with drivers having different and
unrelated sources of power. If one of the two energy sources should fail, credit may be taken
for continued operation of the unaffected pump, provided that the operating pump would not
trip out due to overloading. Similarly, credit may be taken for partial continued operation of
parallel, normally operating instrument air compressors and electric power generators that have
two unrelated sources of energy to the drivers.
Backup systems which depend upon the action of automatic startup devices (e.g., a turbine-
driven standby spare for a motor-driven cooling water pump, with PLC control) shall not be
considered an acceptable means of preventing a utility failure for normal pressure relief design
purposes, even though their installation may be fully justified by improved reliability of plant
operations.
In cases of fan failure of the air-cooled exchangers, refer to section7.9

7.8 Instrument Air Failure
In case of total instrument air failure, the inventory in the instrument air receiver/header shall
be adequate to allow a safe shutdown without causing overpressure and subsequent release to
the flare header.
The failure position of control valves upon loss of instrument air shall be specified such that
potential hazards, including overpressure, are minimized. It shall be assumed that, upon partial
or total loss of instrument air, all control valves affected by the failure will assume their
specified failure position. Control valves that are specified to initially fail stationary shall be
either assumed to drift to their specified ultimate failure position or assumed to remain at their
last controlling position, whichever condition is more restrictive from an overpressure
protection standpoint.

7.9 Air Cooled Exchanger failure
Loss of air-cooled exchanger capacity may result from fan failure, inadvertent louver closure,
pitch control failure, or variable speed motor driver failure.

Refer Section-18.5.7, ANNEXURE- 5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).




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7.10 Cooling Water failure

(1) Normal Individual and Process Unit Basis for Pressure Relief Sizing Considerations
The following design contingencies shall be considered as the basis for evaluating overpressure
that can result from cooling water failures:
(a) Individual failure of water supply to any one cooler or condenser.
(b) Total failure of any one lateral supplying a process unit that can be isolated from the
offsite main.
(2) Consideration of Plant-wide Failure
The following general cooling water failures shall be considered:
(a) Failure of any section of the offsite cooling water main.
(b) Loss of all the cooling water pumps that would result from any design contingency in the
utility systems supplying or controlling the pump drivers.
Relief load calculation can be done based on the following conditions:

Total Condenser : Total normal incoming vapor
Partial Condenser : Normal condensing rate

Refer Section-18.5.8, ANNEXURE- 5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

7.11 Abnormal Heat Input

Refer Section-18.5.9, ANNEXURE- 5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).

The required capacity is the maximum rate of vapor generation at relieving conditions
(including any non-condensable produced from over-heating) less the rate of normal
condensation or vapor outflow.
In every case potential behavior of the system and each of its components shall be considered.
Some examples are:
Design value should be used for an item such as valve.
Built-in overcapacity shall be used for burners, heater etc.
Where limit stops are installed on valves, the wide-open capacity, rather than the
capacity at the stop setting, should normally be used. However, if mechanical stop is
installed and is adequately documented, use of the limited capacity may be appropriate.
In Shell & Tube heat exchange equipment, heat input should be calculated on the basis
of clean rather than fouled conditions.


7.12 Check Valve Mal-operation

Refer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.10 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).
A check valve is not effective for preventing overpressure by reverse flow from a high-
pressure source. Experience indicates a substantial leakage through check valves.
The following guidelines apply to the evaluation of reverse flow through check valves as a
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potential source of overpressure.
(1) A pressure relief device is not required to protect piping against potential overpressure
caused by reverse flow if the pressure of the high-pressure source does not exceed the
short-term allowable overpressure for piping. The short term allowable overpressure for
piping is 133% of the maximum continuous pressure for the specified flange rating at the
flange operating temperature.
(2) A pressure relief device is not required to protect a pressure vessel against potential
overpressure caused by reverse flow if the pressure of the high-pressure source does not
exceed MAWP of the vessel. With the explicit approval of the OWNER / PMC, on a case-
by-case basis, a pressure relief device may not required if reverse flow from the high-
pressure source does not exceed the maximum allowable accumulated pressure of the
vessels.
(3) For piping or pressure vessels not covered under 1 and 2 above, a pressure relief device
may be required to protect against potential overpressure caused by reverse flow through
a failed check valve. The following scenarios shall be considered:

Scenario
No.
Number of Check
Valves in Series
Potential Overpressure Scenario
1 1 Partial failure of check valve.
Assume failed check valve behaves as a restriction
orifice with a diameter equal to 1/3 the nominal diameter
of the check valve. Use this basis for reverse flow of
liquid, vapor and liquid followed by vapor.
2 2 or more Partial failure of one check valve.
Failed check valve behaves as a restriction orifice with a
diameter equal to 1/3 the nominal diameter of the check
valve. Each of the remaining check valves in series is
assumed to behave as a restriction orifice with a diameter
equal to 1/10 the nominal diameter of the check valve.


7.13 Loss of Heat in Series fractionation system

In series fractionation, i.e., where the bottoms from the first column feeds into the second
column and the bottoms from the second feeds into the third, it is possible for the loss of heat
input to a column to overpressure the following column. Loss of heat results in some of the
light ends remaining with the bottoms and being transferred to the next column as feed. Under
this circumstance, the overhead load of the second column would consist of its normal vapor
load, plus the light ends from the first column. If the second column does not have the
condensing capacity for the additional vapor load, excessive pressure could occur.

7.14 Liquid Overfill

Refer ANNEXURE- 5, Section-18.5.11 (Examples for Calculation of Relief).
Pressure relief devices are often located in the vapor space of partially liquid filled vessels such
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as towers, distillate drums, refrigeration flash drums, etc., which could overfill during a plant
upset. In all cases, if overfill can result in a pressure above the design pressure of the vessel,
the pressure relief device must be sized to prevent overpressure due to liquid overfill.
In analyzing liquid overfill, two general scenarios must be considered:
(a) Liquid outflows stop while liquid inflows continue at design flow rates.
(b) Liquid inflows increase above design flow rate (for example, due to a control valve failing
open) while liquid outflows continue at the nominal turndown rates (typically, 50% of
design). For this case, the possible overfill may be limited by the upstream vessels
inventory.
In determining the required relief capacity of the pressure relief device, credit may be taken for
flow through normally open process channels that are not likely to become partially or totally
blocked as a consequence of the overfill. For example, if a steam drum is balanced directly on
a steam collection header without any intervening control valves, a failure of the level control
valve in the full open position will eventually cause the drum to overfill, but credit may be
taken up to the capacity of the steam piping to handle the combined flow of incoming water
plus the design steam generation rate. If the steam piping cannot handle the resulting flow rate
without exceeding the drum MAWP, then the pressure relief device should be sized for the
difference between the incoming flow and the flow rate that can be handled by the steam
piping when the drum is at its accumulated pressure. On the other hand, if there is a control
valve between the steam drum and the steam collection header, the capacity credit that may be
taken will depend on the response of the control valve to the upset and its capacity under these
conditions. Unless the minimum relief capacity available through the control valve can be
predicted with confidence, no credit should be taken for it.
CAUTION: The flow from the pressure relief device because of the overfill contingency may
be two phase flow, especially if the inlet flow normally contains vapor. In the event of two-
phase flow, the pressure relief device must be designed to relieve the vapor plus liquid, minus
the flow available through remaining normally open outlets, unless a dedicated pressure relief
device is installed in the liquid stream to specifically handle the liquid.
Liquid overfill need not be considered as a design contingency for pressure relief device sizing
purposes if BOTH of the following are satisfied:
(1) The vessel has a safety critical, independent high level alarm (LHA), and
(2) The vessel vapor space above the independent LHA is equivalent to a 30 minute (or
longer) holdup based on the design liquid inlet rate and a stoppage of the liquid outflow.
It is recognized that situations may arise where protection against overpressure caused by
liquid overfill by the use of a pressure relief device may not be practical, and/or may be
insufficient to ensure the integrity of the equipment. For example, an existing disposal system
may lack the capacity to absorb the relief load, or the vessel support structure may not be
capable of supporting the weight of a liquid filled vessel without risk of structural failure. In
such cases, the use of a High Integrity Protective System (HIPS) on all incoming feeds,
including start up oil, to protect against liquid overfill may be considered as an alternative (or
in addition) to a pressure relief device. The dynamics of the HIPS must be evaluated to ensure
that the set pressure of the pressure relief device will not be exceeded and that surge pressures
associated with the rapid closure of the isolation valves are considered in the design of
upstream and downstream piping systems.
The use of a HIPS to eliminate the liquid overfill contingency does not eliminate the need for a
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pressure relief device to protect the vessel against other potential overpressure contingencies
such as fire, utility failure or operating failure. In addition, the possibility of leakage across the
HIPS isolation valves must be considered in determining the required relief capacity of the
pressure relief device protecting the vessel. To account for possible isolation valve leakage,
the pressure relief device should have sufficient capacity to handle at least 10% of the relief
load that would arise from liquid overfill without exceeding the allowable accumulation. For
exceptional cases where the structural supports for a vessel are not designed for the weight of
the vessel full of liquid and leakage cannot be tolerated, the use of double isolation valves with
an intervening bleeder discharging to the flare (all actuated by the HIPS) should be considered.
The provision of a safety critical LHA as described in the preceding paragraphs is not
necessary if either of the following conditions is met:
The pressure relief valve protecting the vessel from other contingencies has sufficient capacity
to handle the liquid overfill contingency without exceeding the Code allowable accumulation
AND the pressure relief valve discharges to a closed system, OR
There is no credible scenario that could lead to liquid overfill. For example, the maximum
pressure that can be developed by the feed system is lower than the set pressure of the pressure
relief valve protecting the vessel (plus static head, if applicable).
When liquid overfill is a credible overpressure scenario, the design pressure of all the
equipment affected by the overfill condition shall be set sufficiently high to account for any
liquid static head attributable to the overfill condition. As an example, consider a reboiled
distillation column that is protected against overpressure due to liquid overfill by a pressure
relief device located at the top of the column. In this case, the design pressure of the reboiler
should be at least equal to the set pressure of the pressure relief device plus any liquid static
head developed between the pressure relief device inlet and the top of the reboiler as a result of
the overfill scenario.
Another example involves an overhead receiver associated with a distillation column.
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which the receiver is overfilled due to loss of the product
and/or reflux pumps. If the pressure relief device protecting the receiver is located on the
tower overhead, the level in the overhead system will continue to rise up to the condenser inlet.
At this point the level will not increase further since there will no further condensation.
Instead the lack of a disposal route for the overhead vapor will cause the tower pressure relief
valves to open. Therefore, as a minimum the tower pressure relief valves must be designed for
the full overhead flow rate. In addition, the design pressure of the overhead receiver must take
into account the maximum fill level that will be reached during the contingency. For this
example, the drum design pressure should be at least as high as the set pressure of the pressure
relief valve(s) protecting the tower plus the liquid static head between the top of the drum and
the top of the flooded condenser.
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8.0 SIZING FOR PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE

8.1 Sizing for Vapor or gas relief
Critical flow pressure (P
CF
): Critical flow rate is that corresponding to the limiting velocity,
the velocity of sound in the flowing fluid at that location.
The critical flow pressure (P
CF
) in absolute unit is calculated by following formula,

+
=
1
1
2
k
k
R CF
k
P P
.(Eq.21)
Where,
P
CF
: Critical flow nozzle pressure, in psia
P
R
: Upstream relieving pressure, in psia
k : Specific heat ratio, Cp/Cv

8.1.1 Sizing for critical flow:


The orifice area is calculated by the formula,

M
Z T
K K P K C
W
A
c b R d


=
...(Eq.22)
Where,
A : Required effective discharge area in
2

W : Required relieving rate lb/hr
C : Coefficient due to k (=Cp/Cv) of the gas or vapor at
relieving conditions. This can be obtained from
Annexure-1, Figure-32 or Annexure-1, Table-8. Where
k cannot be determined, it is suggested that a value of C
equal to 315 be used.
hr lb
R lb
lb
f
mole
m


K
d
: Effective coefficient of discharge =0.975, when PSV is
installed with or without Rupture disk
-
P
R
: Relieving pressure (=ser press. +over press. +atm.
Press.)
psia
K
b
: Capacity correction factor due to back pressure. (Refer
Annexure-1, figure-30) The back pressure correction
factor applies to balanced bellows valves only. For
conventional and pilot operated valves use a value for K
b

=1.
-
K
c
: Combination correction factor,
=1.0 when rupture disk is not installed
=0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with
PSV
-
T : Relieving temperature R (=F +460)
Z : Compressibility factor at relieving conditions -
M : Mol. Wt of vapor or gas at relieving conditions lb/lbmole

If PSV back pressure P
CF
; flow is Critical ,
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8.1.2 Sizing for sub-critical flow:



The orifice area (for conventional and pilot operated valves) is calculated by the
formula,

( )
B R R c d
P P P M
T Z
K K F
W
A


=
2
735
(Eq.23)

For balanced pressure relief valves equation for critical flow should be used.

Where,
A : Required effective discharge area in
2

W : Required relieving rate lb/hr
F
2
: Coefficient of sub-critical flow. Refer Annexure-01,
figure-34 or use the following equation,

r
r
k
k
r F
k
k
k
1
1
1
1
2
2


Where,
k =sp. Heat ratio, Cp/Cv
r =ratio of back press. to relieving pressure; P
B
/P
R

-
K
d
: Effective coefficient of discharge =0.975, when PSV is
installed with or without Rupture disk
-
K
c
: Combination correction factor,
=1.0 when rupture disk is not installed
=0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with
PSV
-
Z : Compressibility factor at relieving conditions -
T : Relieving temperature R=(F+460)
M : Mol. Wt of vapor or gas at relieving conditions lb/lbmole
P
R
: Relieving pressure (=ser press. +over press. +Atm.
Press.)
psia
P
B
: Back pressure psia





If PSV back pressure P
CF
; flow is Sub-Critical ,
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8.2 Sizing for Steam Relief

Pressure relief devices in steam service that operate at critical flow conditions may be
sized using equation,
SH N c b d R
K K K K K P
W
A

=
5 . 51
(Eq.24)
Where,
A : Required effective discharge area in
2

W : Required relieving rate lb/hr
P
R
: Relieving pressure (=ser press. +over press. +atm. Press.) psia
K
d
: Effective coefficient of discharge =0.975, when PSV is installed
with or without Rupture disk
-
K
b
: Capacity correction factor due to backpressure. (Refer Annexure-
1, figure-30) The backpressure correction factor applies to
balanced bellows valves only. For conventional and pilot operated
valves use a value for K
b
=1.0.
-
K
c
: Combination correction factor,
=1.0 when rupture disk is not installed
=0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with PSV
-
K
N
: Correction factor for Napier Equation,






-
K
SH
: Superheat steam correction factor (Refer Annexure-1, Table-9).
For saturated steam at any pressure K
SH
=1
-

In accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler & Pressure vessel code, section I
Power Boiler, accumulated pressure shall be limited to 106% of the MAWP, and the
relieving capacity of 110% of calculated value is required.

8.3 Sizing for Liquid Relief

Valves in the liquid service that are designed in accordance with ASME code which
require a capacity certification may be sized using the equation,
B R v c w d
P P
G
K K K K
V
A

=
38
.(Eq.25)





= 1 where P
R
1500 psia
0.1906 x P
R
- 1000

0.2292 x P
R
- 1061
= where P
R
1500 psia
and 3200 psia
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Where,
A : Required effective discharge area in
2

V : Volumetric Flow rate U.S. gpm
K
d
: Rated co-efficient of discharge =0.65, when PSV is installed with
or without Rupture disk in combination
-
K
w
: Correction factor due to backpressure. If the backpressure is
atmospheric, use a value for K
w
of 1.0. The backpressure
correction factor applies to balanced bellow valves only (Refer
Annexure-1, figure-31). Conventional and pilot operated valves
require no special correction.
-
K
c
: Combination correction factor,
=1.0 when rupture disk is not installed
=0.9 when rupture disk is installed in combination with PSV
-
K
v
: Correction factor due to viscosity as determined from Annexure-
1, Figure-36 or from the following equation,

( ) ( )
1
5 . 1
Re
5 . 0
Re
N
75 . 342
N
878 . 2
9935 . 0

+ + =
V
K


Where N
Re
=Reynolds number. Refer equation mentioned below
to determine the value of N
Re
.
-
G : Specific gravity of the liquid at the flowing temperature referred to
water at standard conditions
-
P
R
: Relieving pressure (=ser press. +over press.) psig
P
B
: Back pressure psig

When a relief valve is sized for viscous liquid service, it should first be sized as if it were
for a nonviscous type application (i.e. K
v
=1.0) so that a preliminary required discharge
area, A, can be obtained. From API STD 526 standard orifice sizes, the next orifice size
larger than A should be used in determining the Reynolds number (N
Re
), from following
equation,

A
G V


=
2800
N
Re
..(Eq.26)
Where,
R : Reynolds Number -
Q : Flow rate at flowing temperature U.S. gpm
G : Specific gravity of the liquid at the flowing temperature
referred to water at standard conditions
-

: Absolute viscosity at flowing temperature cP
A : Effective discharge area in
2


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After the Reynolds number (N
Re
), is determined, the factor K
v
is obtained and correct the
preliminary required discharge area. If the corrected area exceeds the chosen standard
orifice area, the above calculation should be repeated using the next larger standard orifice
size.
9.0 DESIGN OF PIPING UPSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE

Piping upstream of a relief device should be designed with as few restrictions to flow as
possible and should not be pocketed.
The flow area through all pipe and fittings between a pressure vessel and its relief valve shall
be at least the same as that of the valve inlet (e.g. isolation valves shall be full bore).
Depending on the actual relief valve capacity, the pressure drop of the inlet piping and fittings
shall not exceed 3% of the valve set pressure (this is to avoid chatter, which will result in
significant seat damage and loss of capacity). Exceptions to this requirement are only allowed
in the case of a pilot-operated valve with a suitably arranged remote pilot connection close to
the source of overpressure. Refer Figure-4 & 5.
The above is especially applicable to relief valves handling gas or vapor. Relief valves in pure
liquid service require special attention, since in this case chatter may also be caused by the
acceleration of the (non expandable) liquid in the inlet piping: a change in pressure amounting
to more than 3% of the set pressure will readily occur and cause valve chatter.
In this case the likelihood of chatter can be limited by installing a relief valve with a special
liquid trim (linear flow characteristic) thereby avoiding the need to take the relief valve
capacity to determine the pressure drop of the inlet piping.
When two or more relief valves (spares not counted) are fitted on one connection, the cross-
sectional area of this connection shall be at least equal to the combined inlet areas of
the valves, and the above pressure drop requirement shall apply for the combined flow of the
valves.
Relief valves on cold process streams shall have an uninsulated inlet line of sufficient length to
prevent icing of the relief valve, in particular the disk and spring. Alternatively, heat tracing
may be required. Special attention shall be paid in this respect to valves, which discharge into
the atmosphere, i.e. in those having open outlets, which may become blocked with ice.
To avoid the need for special high temperature materials, relief valves on hot process streams
may be installed using an uninsulated length of inlet line, creating a cold dead ended leg
between the process stream and the relief valve. However, consideration should be given to
vapor condensation, deposit formation and solidification, which would affect operation of the
relief valve.













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Figure-4&5



10.0 DETERMINATION OF FLARE DESIGN CAPACITY

The first requirement in the design of a flare system is a detailed analysis of all possible
situations involving fluids discharged from pressure relief or emergency depressurizing
devices, or both to determine the maximum load condition. This section presents
guidelines on the method of calculations for maximum flare load for design of a flare
system.

STEP-1

Identify all the equipments (pressure vessels, heat exchangers, compressors etc.) and lines
that needs to be protected against overpressure and whose safety valve discharge is
connected to flare header.

STEP-2

Make a listing of all the safety valves with Tag nos. and service that are required to protect
equipments and lines identified in STEP-1

STEP-3

Study all the process systems and piece of equipments individually and make separate
evaluations for each relief valve for all applicable contingencies.
The contingencies as mentioned in section 6.2 should be considered while calculating the
relieving capacities of safety valves.

STEP-4

Check for Vapor depressurizing source from the P&IDs. Vapor depressurizing systems
are auxiliary facilities that provide means for rapidly reducing the pressure in equipment
by release of vapors. Depressurizing streams are frequently introduced into the same
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headers servicing pressure relief valves. If a common flare header is used, the loads
caused by depressurizing must be added to the loads of various pressure relief valves,
which might be expected to discharge simultaneously.

STEP-5

Prepare a Flare Load Summary table for the purpose of process system analysis. Typical
Flare Load Summary table is enclosed in Annexure -6. Flare Load summary should
include all the safety valves in the plant connected to a common flare header and all the
possible causes of over pressurization with corresponding relieving rates, phase, molecular
weight, temperature, pressure etc.

STEP-6

The contingency, which contributes to the maximum flare load, should be considered for
the flare system design. This requires careful consideration of potential occurrences that
could affect several vessels or systems and cause them to relieve simultaneously. The
maximum load is not necessarily the largest mass flow rate at any time but rather it is the
flow that will impose the highest-pressure drop in the system. Thus, the temperature and
molecular weight of the vapors must be known.
Since, the simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated contingencies is unlikely,
unrelated contingencies should not be used as a basis for determining the maximum
system load (e.g. it is extremely remote to have a power failure and fire at the same time).
Hence, the basis for maximum load should be either of following items:
1. Individual failure (Single contingency contributing the maximum load)
2. Emergency depressurization
3. Group failure (from any of below mentioned contingencies contributing to the
maximum cumulative load)
1) Fire Envelope
Potential fire areas shall be identified and clearly shown on a plot plan. The fire
areas / envelopes shall be numbered and each number shall be used for
calculating PSV outlet / Flare header sizing. Typical fire area (fire zone) of
2500 5000 ft2 should be assumed, depending on the drainage of the plot. The
height of the flame to be considered shall be 25 ft (7.62 m) from grade or a
platform on which liquid can accumulate (concrete platform).
2) Cooling water failure
3) General Power failure (Total or Partial)

NOTE (for Group failure cases):
a. General recommendation from member to author the API safety valve standard:
To size the lateral piping from the relief valve to main flare header for the relief
valve rated capacity, and then size the flare header based upon evaluation of the
expected simultaneous loads from the sources connected to the header. These
loads are the calculated relief loads from the equipment, not the valve capacities.
b. Estimate the properties of gases in the headers from the following mixture
relationships (i indicates the ith component).

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=
i
i
M
W
W
M
...(Eq.27)

( )

=
i
i
W
T W
T
.(Eq.28)

( )
( )

=
i i
i i i
M X
M X

...(Eq.29)

Where,
W
i
- Weight of component i in total stream
T
i
- Temperature of component i in total stream
X
i
- Weight fraction of component i in total stream

i
- Viscosity of component i in total stream
M
i
- Molecular weight of component I in total stream

11.0 SIZING OF FLARE HEADER



















The major criteria governing the sizing of headers are backpressure and gas velocity. Flare
header size large enough to prevent excessive backpressure on the plant safety valves and
to limit gas velocity and noise to acceptable levels. The procedure for sizing of flare
header is outlined below:

Individual discharge from
PSV to sub-header
Main flare header leading to KOD
KOD to Flare stack
Sub-headers in each section of
the plant to Main Flare Header
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a. Start at the flare tip, where outlet pressure is atmospheric and estimate the pressure
drop across the flare tip for the relief design flow. Typical tip drop is 2.0 psi as per
API-521 (This may be checked with manufacturer data). Pressure drop through seals
must also be included.

b. In certain cases, B/L pressures are provided in the ITB documents (design basis).
Hence, the start point would be at the B/L.

c. Determine the appropriate relief contingencies (Section 10, Step 6) yielding maximum
loads

d. Calculate the relevant fluid properties in case of Group failure contingencies.

e. Assume a measured size for flare header / sub header / PSV outlet line.

f. Estimate the equivalent pipe lengths between Flare tip Or B/L position and different
sections in the system for the above identified governing cases (Section 10, Step 6)
and estimate losses through fitting, expansion and contraction losses.

g. Limit the Mach no. of 0.2 (as per API-521) at the flare header.

h. Calculate the inlet pressure for each section of the line by adding the calculated
pressure drop for that section to the known outlet pressure.

i. Continue calculations, working towards the relief valve.

j. Check calculated backpressure at the relief valve against the maximum allowable
backpressure (MABP). The calculated backpressure should be less than the MABP.

k. Limit the MABP to about 10% of the set pressure for conventional relief valves and
40% of the set pressure for balanced -bellows relief valves (This may be checked with
manufacturer data)

l. The design shall also ensure that if two or more depressuring valves in any process
system are opened simultaneously, flow from the high-pressure system will not back
up into the low-pressure system sufficiently to overpressure it or hinder its operation.

m. Adjust header size until the calculated backpressure does not exceed the MABP for
each valve in the system (for the above identified Governing cases).

In-house developed MS-EXCEL based program (Flare.xls) for the above header sizing
procedure can be used for calculations.

Refer Annexure-7 for typical flare header design calculations / PSV outlet line sizing.
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12.0 DESIGN OF PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF RELIEF DEVICE

The discharge piping installation must provide for proper pressure relief device performance
and adequate drainage. Consideration should be given to the type of discharge system used, the
backpressure on the pressure relief device, and the set-pressure relationship of the pressure
relief devices in the system.

Auto-refrigeration during discharge can cool the outlet of the pressure relief device and the
discharge piping to the point that brittle fracture can occur. Materials must be selected which
are compatible with the expected temperature.

Once the maximum design load on each header, sub-header, and lateral has been ascertained it
is possible to size the downstream piping system. By starting from the tip of the flare or vent
stack where the pressure is atmospheric or critical, and adding each calculated pressure drop,
the built-up back pressure downstream of each relief or depressuring device can be determined.
Adjustments in the assumed line sizes may then be made in order to ensure that the operation
of the relief or depressuring device is not hindered. If the required piping becomes excessively
large, particularly in systems where low backpressures are allowed, it may be preferable to
replace non-balanced spring-loaded relief valves with balanced bellows types, thus increasing
the maximum allowablepressure and so meeting the following relief valve selection criteria:

i) Variable back pressure < 10% of set pressure; use non balanced spring loaded
relief valves;

ii) Variable back pressure < 21% of set pressure for fire cases and applying
equipment following ASME VIII; use non balanced
spring loaded relief valves;

iii) Variable back pressure < 50% of set pressure; use balanced-bellows spring-
loaded relief valves;

iv) Variable backpressure <= 70% of set pressure; use pilot-operated relief valves


Velocities in sub headers / PSV outlet lines may be higher, up to Mach no. 0.7.

The provision of small branches and instrument connections on flare relief systems shall be
avoided, because they are vulnerable to acoustically induced vibration.
Specific Criteria for sizing the flare header (Based on experience(s) in domestic
projects)

Pressure at the B/L of the individual plant: 1.5-kg/cm
2
g

Back pressure allowable at the PSV discharge: 1.7-kg/cm
2
g
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13.0 FLARE STACK SIZING

The sizing of a flare stack requires the determination of flare stack diameter and flare
stack height.


13.1 Flare Stack Diameter

Flare stack diameter is generally sized on a velocity basis, although pressure drop should
be checked. It may be desirable to permit a velocity of unto 0.5 Mach for a peak, short-
term, infrequent flow, with 0.2 Mach maintained for the more normal and frequent
conditions. The formula relating Mach No. to flare tip diameter is as follows :

M k
T
d P
W
no Mach

=
2
100
61 . 11
. ..
.(Eq.30)

Where W - Flow rate of gas, kg/s
k - Cp./Cv
M - Molecular weight of gas
P - Flowing pressure at the flare tip in kg/cm
2
a
d - Flare tip diameter, metre


13.2 Flare Stack Height

Flare stack height is generally based on radiant heat intensity generated by the flame.

(a) Thermal radiation calculations must be done to avoid dangerous exposure to personnel,
equipment and the surrounding area (tree, grass). The following formula is used for
finding the intensity of radiation.
2
4 R
Q
K
r

=
..(Eq.31)

Where K - Intensity of radiation, kW/m
2

- Emmisivity
Q
r
- Heat release due to combustion, kW
R - Distance from the midpoint of the flame to the
object being considered, Metre

A list of vendor recommended emissivity values for the most frequently flared gases
is as follows:
Carbon Monoxide 0.075
Hydrogen 0.075
Hydrogen Sulfide 0.07
Ammonia 0.07
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Methane 0.1
Propane 0.11
Butane 0.12
Ethylene 0.12
Propylene 0.13
The maximum value of emmisivity of any gas is 0.13 (as per GPSA)

The radiation levels commonly used for designs are:

Personnel, short time exposure: 1500 Btu/hr-ft
2
(or) 4.732 kW/m
2

Personnel, continuous exposure: 500 Btu/hr-ft
2
(or) 1.58 kW/m
2


Solar radiation adds to the calculated flame radiation and is dependent upon specific
atmospheric conditions and site locations. A typical design range is 250 to 330
Btu/hr-ft
2
(0.79-1.04 kW/m
2
).

(b) To calculate the intensity of radiation at different locations, it is necessary to
determine the length of the flame and its angle in relation to the stack (Refer
Annexure-8, Figure-A). A convenient expression to estimate length of flame Lf is
shown below:

( )
474 . 0
6
10 201 . 1

=
r f
Q L
..(Eq.32)
Where
Q
r
- Heat release due to combustion kW
L
f -
Length of flame in metre

The center of the flame is assumed to be located at a distance equal to 1/3 the length
of the flame from the tip. The angle of the flame results from the vectorial addition of
the velocity of the wind and the gas exit velocity.

ex
W
V
V
1
tan

=
..(Eq.33)
Where
V
w
- Wind velocity m/s
V
ex
- Exit gas velocity m/s

The co-ordinates of the flame center with respect to the tip are:

sin
3
f
C
L
X =
&
cos
3
f
C
L
Y =
....(Eq.34)

The distance from any point on the ground level to the center of the flame is:


( ) ( )
2 2
C S C
Y H X X R + + =
..(Eq.35)
At the stack base i.e. X =X
c
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( )
2
2
C S
Y H R + =
...(Eq.36)

C S
Y H R + =
..(Eq.37)
Where
X - Sterile radius, metre
H
s
- Height of the stack, metre

Flare stack height can be estimated based on the above equations.
14.0 DESIGN OF FLARE KNOCKOUT DRUM

A knockout drum is usually provided near the flare base, and serves to recover liquid
hydrocarbons, prevent liquid slugs, and remove large (300 - 600 micron) liquid particles.
All flare lines should be sloped toward the knockout drum to permit the liquid to drain
into the drum for removal. The design procedure is given below:

Calculate the dropout velocity of a particle in a stream by using the following equations.
( )
C
d g
U
V
V L p
d


15 . 1
..(Eq.38)
Where
U
d
- Dropout velocity, m/s
g - Acceleration due to gravity, 9.8 m/s
2

d
p
- Particle diameter, metre

L
- Density of liquid at operating conditions, kg/m
3

v - Density of the vapor at operating conditions, kg/m
3

C - Drag coefficient (Refer Annexure-8, Figure-B)

The economics of vessel design should be considered in selecting a drum size and may
influence the choice between a horizontal and vertical drum. When large liquid is
expected and vapour flow is high, a horizontal drum is often more economical.

14.1 Horizontal Knockout Drum

STEP-1
A horizontal vessel with an inside diameter D, and a cylindrical length L should be
assumed. This gives the following total cross-sectional area A
t
.
4
2
D
A
t

=
.(Eq.39)
STEP-2
Based on the liquid hold up t min., calculate the cross sectional area of the liquid
segment A
L
.
L
t Q
A
L
L

=
(Eq.40)
Where
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Q
L
- Liquid rate, in m
3
/min


STEP-3
Calculate the cross sectional area remaining for the vapor flow by
L t V
A A A =
(Eq.41)

STEP-4
Calculate the total diameter using the following equation.

V L
h h D + =
(Refer Annexure-9, Figure-C).(Eq.42)
Where
h
L
- Depth of all liquid accumulation, in metre.
h
V
- Vertical space for the vapor flow, in metre.
STEP-5
Calculate the liquid drop out time, in seconds
d
V
U
h
=
.(Eq.43)
STEP-6
Calculate the velocity of the vapor, in m/s
V
V
V
A
Q
U =
(Eq.44)
Where
Q
V
- Volumetric flow rate of vapor, in m
3
/s
STEP-7
Calculate the drum length, in metre
=
V
U L
min
.(Eq.45)
3 . 0
2 1 min
+ + + = N N L L
(Eq.46)
Where
N
1
- Feed (inlet) nozzle diameter, in metre
N
2
- Vapor outlet nozzle diameter, in metre
STEP-8
L must be less than or equal to the above assumed cylindrical length; otherwise, the
calculation must be repeated with a newly assumed cylindrical length.

14.2 Vertical Knockout Drum

STEP-1
If vertical vessel is considered, the vapor velocity is equal to the dropout velocity and the
drum diameter is determined as follows:
d
V
t
U
Q
A =
..(Eq.47)
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4
=
t
A
D
.(Eq.48)
STEP-2
Based on the liquid hold up t min., calculate the height of the liquid segment hl, in
metre.
t
L
L
A
t Q
h

=
..(Eq.49)
Where
Q
L
- Liquid rate, in m3/min
STEP-3
Height of the drum (in metre) can be determined as follows:
1
2 1 min
+ + + = N N h H
L
..(Eq. 50)
Where
h
L
- Height of liquid segment, in metre.
N
1
- Feed (inlet) nozzle diameter, in metre.
N
2
- Vapor outlet nozzle diameter, in metre.

15.0 DESIGN OF SEALS IN FLARE SYSTEM

To prevent air from entering into the flare system and forming explosive mixture prior to
the ignition point, it is necessary to seal the flare system. Sealing of a flare system
involves two aspects:

(i) Sealing of the flare stack
(ii) Sealing of piping headers


15.1 Sealing of the Flare Stack

This is also known as gas seal. This is a vendor-designed system. An effective stack seal is
one able to minimize air passage into the system while using low purge flow. As the gas
seal is a vendor specific item, the process designer has to specify the type of purge gas
available for the gas seal, point of injection of purge gas and quantity of purge gas.


15.2 Sealing of Piping Headers

The sealing of the piping headers up to the flare stack base is generally accomplished by
means of a liquid seal drum at the bottom of the flare stack. The most commonly found
seal is shown in Fig-4. A vacuum seal leg is dipped into a vertical seal drum filled with
water. Whenever a vacuum condition occurs the liquid level in the seal leg will rise and
break the vacuum thus preventing the ingress of air. The process design of seal drum will
include sizing the seal leg, depth of water seal and dimensions of seal drum.


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DESIGN METHOD:

The design method followed herewith is based on the recommended practice given by API
RP 521.

(a) Height of Seal Leg

The height of seal leg is calculated by a pressure balance at the stack bottom (Ref
Annexure-10, Figure-D).

2 1
P Y X P X + + = + ..(Eq. 51)

2 1
P P Y = ....(Eq.52)

Where
P
1
- Pressure at stack, in Metre
P
2
- Min. pressure expected at header, in Metre
Y - Height of seal/vacuum leg from top of liquid surface
(Minimum of 2.0 m as per Lummus spec.)
X - Water seal depth (normally 2 ft or 0.6 m)

(b) Diameter of seal drum

(i) Seal volume for vacuum break:

Total vertical height of seal pipe

d X Y h + + = ....(Eq.53)

Where
d - ID of seal pipe
Volume of pipe
( )
4
2
h d
V

=
...(Eq.54)

A minimum of V m
3
should be maintained for seal.

Diameter of seal drum

( )
V
X d D out
=

4
2 2

....(Eq.55)

From the above equation, diameter of seal drum D can be calculated. To
accommodate for liquid volume in horizontal pipe run up to nozzle projection and
for any other factors use 20% over design.
(ii) Seal volume with non vacuum conditions in flare stack :
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As per API,

d D = 2 ..(Eq.56)
Where
D - Seal drum diameter
d - Seal pipe diameter

(c) Height of seal drum

The height of the vapor space H
V
in a vertical drum should be approximately 0.5-
1.0 times the diameter D to provide disengaging space for entrained seal liquid. A
minimum dimension of 3 feet
(1 metre) is suggested in API RP 521.

Tan/Tan height of seal drum
* 5 . 0 + + = X H
V
..(Eq.57)

* Height of seal liquid below submerged inlet pipe assumed as 0.4- 0.5 m


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16.0 PURGING OF FLARE HEADER AND FLARE TIP

16.1 Procedure for Calculating Flare Header Purge

A large amount of purge gas is usually required after a hot release to prevent air from
entering the system when the system gas inventory cools and condenses. This additional
gas injection should be on automatic temperature and pressure control and the rate of gas
injection may be estimated as follows:

(a) Examine the process calculations of all the relief valves and isolate
the relief condition which has a potential for maximum percentage of condensation

(b) Calculate the maximum condensation on the basis of calculation of heat loss through
the flare header and latent heat of condensation.

(c) Convert condensation rate obtained in step (b) to kgmole/hr.

(d) Purge gas flow (PGR1) =2 x Rate of condensation (kgmole/hr)


16.2 Procedure for Calculating Flare Tip Purge

(a) Use purge gas velocity of 0.03 m/s for the flare tip.

(b) For the flare tip diameter, calculate the volumetric flow rate of purge gas at flare tip
conditions.

Purge gas rate (PGR2) =
3600 03 . 0
4
2

d
m
3
/hr..(Eq.58)

Where
d - Flare tip diameter, in Metre


17.0 P&I DIAGRAM FOR FLARE SYSTEM

The important features of P&I diagram of flare stack are as follows:

(a) Continuous Purge Gas Supply: To ensure that the flare system does not experience a
vacuum condition continuous purge gas through a pressure control valve controlling
the flare header pressure should be provided. An alarm for low flare header pressure
and purge failure should be provided.

(b) The flare header should drain by gravity towards the flare knock out drum. Thus the
flare header should slop continuously towards the flare knockout drum and no
pockets are allowed.

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(c) The flare knockout drum should be provided with pressure and temperature
indications.

(d) A seal should be maintained in the flare stack base to prevent flame backup and
ingress of oxygen. There should be continuous supply of make up water to the seal.
The overflow nozzles in the seal drum which discharges the condensed
hydrocarbons and water should be located high enough to allow the flow to take
place towards the flare knockout drum.

(e) When flame monitoring is specified, the status of each thermocouple installed on the
pilots shall be monitored by temperature trip amplifiers located in the panel
enclosure.

Refer Annexure-11 (Typical flare system P&I Diagram)
18.0 ANNEXURES

18.1 Annexure-1 [Tables, Figures (as per API-520/521)]

Tables
Sr.
No.
TABLE NO. DESCRIPTION
1 Table-8 Values of coefficient C (API-520, page-50)
2 Table-9 Superheat correction Factors, KSH (API 520, page-51)
3
4

Figures
Sr.
No.
FIGURE NO. DESCRIPTION
1 FIGURE-1 Pressure level relationships for pressure relief valves (API-520,
page-3)
2 FIGURE-2 Conventional Pressure relief valve (API-520, page-6)
3 FIGURE-3 Balanced-bellows pressure relief valve (API-520, page-7)
4 FIGURE-6 Pilot operated valve (API-520, page-11)
5 FIGURE-19 Pressure Relief Valve Operation Vapor / Gas service
6 FIGURE-22 Typical effects of superimposed back pressure on the opening
pressure of Conventional Pressure relief valves
7 FIGURE-23 Typical effects of superimposed back pressure on the set
pressure of Balanced Pressure relief valves
8 FIGURE-30 Backpressure correction factor Kb for balanced bellows
pressure relief valve (vapors and gases) (API-520, page-37)
9 FIGURE-31 Capacity correction factor, Kw Due to back pressure on
Balanced-Bellows pressure relief valves in liquid service. (API
520, page 38)
10 FIGURE-32 Curve for evaluating coefficient C in the flow equation from the
specific heat ratio, assuming ideal gas behavior (API 520, page
44)
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11 FIGURE-34 Values of F2 for sub critical flow (API 520, page-48)
12 FIGURE-36 Capacity correction factor, Kv, Due to viscosity (API 520, page
54)



Table-8







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Table-9















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Figure-1




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Figure-2


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Figure-3

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Figure-6, 7

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Figure-19















































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Figure-22

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Figure-23

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Figure-30







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Figure-31







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Figure-32










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Figure-34




















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Figure-36





















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18.2 Annexure-2 (Environment factor data)





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18.3 Annexure-3 (Vapor pressure and Heat of vaporization of pure single
component paraffin hydrocarbon liquids)

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18.4 Annexure-4 (Sizing for Two-phase Liquid/Vapor Relief)



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18.5 Annexure-5 (Examples for Calculation of Relief load)

18.5.1 External Fire

Single Component System













































Symbol Value Unit
P
set
3.50 barg
a 21 %
Tr 154.0
o
C
Pr 4.2 barg
P
b
2.06 barA
L 502.4 kcal / kg
k 1.33 (-)
M 18.02 Kg/Kmol
Vertical (-)
D 4.50 m
H 3.20 m
X 7.35 m
F 1.0
Formulae
A1 = 67.18993 m
2
Other Wetted Area (Piping) A2 = 6.718993 m
2
Total Wetted Area ( A
1
+A
2
) A = 73.9 m
2
Q = 1265241 Kcal / hr
W = 2518.394 Kg / hr
Data Input
Data
Bottom head area = 1.084 * D
2
Cylindrical surface area = x D x H
Wetted area (A
1
) =Cylindrical surface area +Bottom head area (Non skirted vessel)
Q
W = -----
L
Q = 37140 * F * A
0.82
Design Pressure / Set pressure
Relieving Temperature
Back Pressure
Latent Heat @ relieving condition
Cp / Cv @ 60 'F, ATM
Inside Dia
Accumulation
Relieving Pressure
Vessel Length
MW of Vapor/Gas
Type of vessel
Relief load (W) Calculation
Relieving capacity
Wetted area
Total heat absorption (In-Put)
Environmental Factor
Liquid Level for fire case
25 feet
( 7620 mm )
Wetted Surface Area P
set
=3.5 barg
3200 mm
BTM EL
4100 mm
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Multi-component System














































Symbol Value Unit
P
set
76.00 barg
a 21 %
T
r
278.0
o
C
P
r
92.0 barg
P
b
7.60 barA
L 305 kcal / kg
k 1.15 (-)
M 29.60 Kg/Kmol
Vertical (-)
D 6.50 m
H 3.70 m
X 33.91 m
F 1.0
Formulae
75.5553 m
2
45.799 m
2
A1 = 121.35 m
2
Other Wetted Area (Piping) A2 = 12.14 m
2
Total Wetted Area ( A
1
+A
2
) A = 133.5 m
2
Q = 2054514 Kcal / hr
W = 6736.112 Kg / hr
Simulation Approach
Q
H
Simulation Outputs
Relieving Temperature
Molecular Weight
Cp/Cv
Simulation Inputs Z factor
Relieving Pressure Flow rate (Y) kg/hr
Flow VF =5%
Composition
Vapor wt. Fraction
Latent heat = Q
H
/Y
Relieving capacity
Wetted area
Total heat absorption (In-Put)
Environmental Factor
Liquid Level for fire case
Cylindrical surface area = x D x H =
Bottom head area = 1.084 * D
2
=
Latent Heat @ relieving condition
Cp / Cv @ 60 'F, ATM
Inside Dia
Accumulation
Relieving Pressure
MW of Vapor/Gas
Type of vessel
Design Pressure / Set pressure
Relieving Temperature
Back Pressure
Data Input
Data
Wetted area (A
1
) =Cylindrical surface area +Bottom head area (Non skirted vessel)
Q
W = -----
L
Q = 37140 * F * A
0.82
Vessel Length (TL-TL)
Relief load (W) Calculation
1 2
3
25 feet
( 7620 mm ) BTM EL
3900 mm
6500 mm
200 mm
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Symbol Value Unit
P
set
150.90 psig
a 21 %
P
r
197.3 psia
T
W
1560 deg R
P
n
87.07 psia
T
n
567.27 deg R
M 19.60 lb/lbmole
Verticle (-)
D 1.50 ft
L 6.00 ft
Formula
1285.4
o
R
Unwetted Surface area (A') = Cylindrical surface area +Head area (Non skirted vessel)
+Piping surface area
28.274 ft
2
4.878 ft
2
Other unwetted Area (Piping) = 3.315 ft
2
36.468 ft
2
94.326 lb / hr
42.786 Kg / hr
Normal Operating Gas Pressure
2.168 x D
2
=
Cylindrical surface area = x D x L =
Head area =
MW of Vapor/Gas
Type of vessel
Inside Dia
Vessel Length (TL - TL)
Relief load (W) Calculation
Vessel Wall Temperature
Normal Operating GasTemperature
Data Input
Data
Design pressure / Set Pressure
Relieving Pressure
Accumulation
Total unwetted surface area (A') =
Gas Temperature T
r
=(P
1
/P
n
) x T
n
=
Relieving capacity, W =
25 feet
( 7620 mm )
( )

=
1506 . 1
25 . 1
'
1406 . 0
r
r W
r
T
T T A
P M W
Unwetted Surface Area
( Gas Expansion )
P
set
=10.4 barg
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18.5.2 Exit Block Or Blocked Outlet














Relief Load:
Relieving rate can be determined from material balance i.e highest value from all the cases and the properties
should be determined by simulation at relieving conditions.
Simulation Approach
Simulation Inputs Input Relieving Pressure
Normal Operating Temperature
Normal Operating Pressure
Composition
Simulation Outputs
Relieving Temperature
Relieving properties
Inadvertant Closing of Outlet (E.g. Control Valve )

Control Valve
Close
Wv
Wv
1 2
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18.5.3 Column Reflux Or Pump around failure


Symbol Value Unit
P
set
3.50 barg
a 16 % Multiple PRV
P
r
5.07 barA
T
r
10
0
C
P
b
2.06 barA
K
b
1.00 (-)
k 1.35 (-)
Z 0.97 (-)
M 24.40
Assumptions
1 Normal feed rate to column
2 Normal reboiler heat duty and vapor load to column
3 Vapor to feed stage considered same as outlet from reboiler (during normal operation)
4 Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers.
Relieving load will be the excess flow leaving the reflux drum top outlet. i.e 73283 Kg/hr.
Simulation Approach
Simulation Outputs
Relieving Temperature
Simulation Inputs Relieving properties
Relief Pressure
Composition
Vapor fraction
Relief load (W) Calculation
Data
Data Input
Design Pressure / Set Pressure
Relieving Pressure
Accumulation
Relieving Temperature
MW of Vapor/Gas
Back Pressure
Cp / Cv @ 60 'F, ATM
Compressibility Factor @ Relieving
Back Pressure Factor
1

V=133945 Kg/hr
V=73421 Kg/hr
L=60524 Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr
V=59815Kg/hr
L=74130 Kg/hr
L=60372 Kg/hr
Normal operation
At relieving condition
V=73664 Kg/hr
V=206825 Kg/hr V=147506 Kg/hr
L=59319 Kg/hr
V=29595 Kg/hr
L=2025623Kg/hr
V=177230 Kg/hr
V=146947 Kg/hr
L=59878 Kg/hr
V=73283 Kg/hr
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Data Input
Data Symbol Value Unit
Design Pressure of High Pressure side 7 barg
Design Pressure of Low Pressure side 3.5 barg
Set Pressure P
set
3.50 barg 451325 Pa A
Absolute upstream pressure based on
maximum operating pressure
P
1
5.10 barA
510000 Pa A
Accumulation a 10 %
Relieving Pressure P
r
4.86 barA
Relieving Temperature T
r
120
0
C
Back Pressure P
b
2.06 barA
Tube O.D D
o
38.10 mm
Tube Thickness t 3.40 mm
Tube I.D D
i
31.30 mm
Density of High Pressure Side

943.30 Kg/m3
When design pressure of the low pressure side is equal to or greater than 10/13 the design pressure
of the high pressure side no need to calculate relieving rate due to tube rupture.
(Design pressure of low pressure side) >= 10/13 x ( Design Pressure of High Pressure side)
3.5 >= 10/13 x 7
3.5 >= 5.385
Condition is not satisfying , so we have to follow tube repture case
C/s area of tube (A) = Di
2
/4

= 769.45 mm
2
A = 0.000769 m
2
Relieving Rtae (W) = 2 x 0.7 x A x (2(P
1
-P
set
) x )
0.5
= 11.33374 Kg/s
= 40801.45 Kg/hr
Relief load (W) Calculation
Process Gas In
BFW In
Process Gas Out
P
set
=3.5 barg
D.P =3.5 barg
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Symbol Val ue Unit
Flow rate @ normal operating condition m
n
10441.2 Kg/hr
Control valve upstream pressure P
1
26.6 barA 27.12402 Kg/cm
2
A
Control valve down stream pressure P
2
6.2 barA 6.32214 Kg/cm
2
A
Upstream fluid Temperature T
1
40
0
C 313 K
Upstream fluid density
L
18.374 Kg/m3
Design Pressure / Set Pressure P
set
10.40 barg
Accumulation a 10 %
Relieving Pressure P
r
12.45 barA
Relieving Temperature T
r
62
0
C
MW of Vapor / Gas M 18.40 Kg/kmol
Control Valve Pressure drop = 20.4 bar
Cal cul ati on for Cv
P
2 <= 0.5 x P
1
6.2 <= 13.3
Cv for Critical Vapor Flow
m
n
56.9 x P
1
x (M/T
1
)
0.5
= 27.903
For 80% openi ng of the val ve
34.878
From Cv selecti on table (3" gl obe val ve si ngle seat body)
47
Control Valve Cv +Bypass Valve Cv ( i.e 50 % of Control Valve)
47 +(47/2)
70.5
Critical flow rate through a failure opened control valve is calculated as follows
m = 56.9 x Cv x P
1
x (M/T
1
)
0.5
= 25871.4 Kg/hr
9492 Kg/hr
Cv selected =
Cv sel ect ed =
=
Gas flowing through vessel outlet at normal condition (m
1
) =
Cv value =
Selected Cv value =
Critical Vapor Fl ow
Data
Data Input
Rel i ef l oad (W) Cal cul ati on
P
set
=10.4 barg
m
1
W =m-m
1
m
P
1
T
1

L
P
2
Cv =
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Cv Selection Table for Control Valve
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18.5.4 Hydraulic / Thermal Expansion

Data Input
Data Symbol Value Unit
Design Condition :
Pressure(Tube side) 10 barg
Pressure(Shell side) 16.7 barg
Temperature T 48
o
C
Relieving Condition :
Pressure(Tube side) Pr 12.5 barg
Temperature Tr 48
o
C
Set pressure Pset 10 barg
Cubical Expansion Co-efficient B 0.0001
o
C
Total Heat transfer rate H 20094582.98 Kcal/hr
Specific Gravity G 1 (-)
Specific Heat of trapped Fluid C 1 Kcal/Kg
o
C
A 3/4" X 1 " relief valve is commonly used for thermal expansion.
Relieving Rate (V) =
B x H
997 x G x C
= 2.015505 m
3
/hr
= 2015.505 Kg/hr
Relief Load (W) Calculation
CWR
CWS
Pset=10 barg
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18.5.5 Air Fin Cooler / Condenser failure













Symbol Value Unit
P
set
3.50 barg
0.77 barg
a 10 %
P
r
3.85 barg
Assumptions
1) Normal feed rate to column
2) Normal reboiler heat duty and vapor load to column
3) Vapor to feed stage considered same as outlet from reboiler (during normal operation)
4) Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers.
From Figure.
Air fin cooler inlet =Air fin cooler outlet at failure
=133945 Kg/hr
Water cooled condensor outlet vapor flow rate =133242 Kg/hr
Relieving Rate = Condensor outlet flow rate(Vapor) - Reflux drum outlet flow rate (Vapor)
= 59669 Kg/hr
Data Input
Data
Design/Set Pressure
Operating Pressure
Accumulation
Relieving pressure
Relief Load (W) Calculation
Normal operation
At relieving condition

V=133945 Kg/hr
V=73421 Kg/hr
L=60524 Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr
V=133945 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr
V=133242Kg/hr
L=703Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr
V=59815Kg/hr
L=74130 Kg/hr
L=60372 Kg/hr
V=59669 Kg/hr
V=133242Kg/hr
L=703Kg/hr
L=703 Kg/hr
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The fluid properties at relieving conditions can be calculated by using simulation
Symbol Value Unit
F
F
207518 kg/hr
P
r
3.85 barg
y 1
Note-1
Feed = +
Output of simulation (Stream-2)
Symbol Value Unit
Tr 87.8
o
C
M 66.71738 -------
Z 0.919243 -------
----- 1.093393
These output of simulation (Relieving temperature & Fluid properties) can be
used as input for PSV sizing calculations
Composition of feed (Based on mixture of Note1)
Relieving pressure
Vapor fraction
Data
Calculation of fluid properties at relieving conditions
Compressibility factor of relieving fluid
Quantity of
noncondensable
vapors(73573 kg/hr )
Input for simulation (Stream-1)
Flowrate of feed (Note-1)
Cp/Cv of relieving fluid
Data
Quantity of Vapor condensed in
failed exchanger during normal
operation (74130 kg/hr)
Relieving temperature
Molecular weight of relieving fluid
Feed
Bottom
1
2
3
Overhead Vapor
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18.5.6 Cooling Water failure



















Symbol Value Unit
P
set
3.50 barg
0.77 barg
a 10 %
P
r
3.85 barA
Assumptions
1) Normal feed rate to column
2) Normal reboiler heat duty and vapor load to column
3) Vapor to feed stageconsidered same as outlet from reboiler (during normal operation)
4) Normal heat duty removal from the exchangers.
From Figure.
Vapors at water-cooled exchanger inlet =Vapor at water-cooled exchanger outlet (cooling water failure)
=74130 Kg/hr of vapor & 59815 kg/hr of liquid
Relief load (W) = Condensor outlet flow rate(Vapor)-Reflux drum outlet flow rate (Vapor)
= 557 Kg/hr
Data Input
Data
Design/Set Pressure
Operating Pressure
Accumulation
Relieving pressure
Relief Load (W) Calculation

V=133945 Kg/hr
V=73421 Kg/hr
L=60524 Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr
V=133945 Kg/hr V=133945 Kg/hr
V=73573 Kg/hr
V=59815Kg/hr
L=74130 Kg/hr
L=60372 Kg/hr
Normal operation
At relieving condition
V=557 Kg/hr
V=74130 Kg/hr
L=59815 Kg/hr
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18.5.7 Abnormal Heat Input from reboiler

In case of more flow of heating fluid (e.g. Inadvertent opening of control valve on
heating fluid inlet or outlet line), total heat flow to reboiler may increase which in turn
may increase vapor flow rate from reboiler to column. This may lead to over pressure
of the Column.

In such a scenario, additional vapor flowrate (required relieving flowrate) can be
calculated considering either of the following two approaches. This approach should be
evaluated on case-to-case basis.

Step 1:

Calculate heat duty during abnormal heat input to reboiler based on heat exchanger
geometry.


LMTD A Uc Q =
1


Where,
Q
1
=Total heat input during abnormal condition
A =Heat transfer area based on thermal rating (m2).
Uc =Clean overall Heat transfer co-efficient based on Thermal rating of
reboiler (Kcal/hr.m2.C)
LMTD =Log. Mean Temp Difference (Re-calculate LMTD considering process
side outlet temperature at relieving pressure, C)



Step 2:

Calculate maximum possible heating fluid flow rate based on size (selected Cv, refer
Section 7.5) of control valve present on its inlet or outlet line. Calculate possible heat
duty based on this flow rate as per following equation.

( ) ( )
HOT HOT
M Q =
2


Where,
Q
2
=Total heat input based on maximum possible flow rate of hot fluid
M
HOT
=Vapor flow rate of hot fluid to reboiler (kg/hr)

HOT
=Latent heat of hot fluid (Kcal/kg)


Step 3:
NOTE: If heat duty calculated by Step-1 is less than normal heat duty of reboiler,
there is no need to consider this relief scenario. No further calculations are required in
such a case.
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Consider the lower of the two values of heat duty (Q1 & Q2 calculated above) as
governing heat duty (Q) to find out process vapor flow from reboiler.



Step 4:
Calculate vapor flow rate from reboiler to column based on following equation.

Abnormal
Abnormal
Q
M

=


Where,
M
Abnormal
=Vapor flow rate of process fluid to column during abnormal condition
(kg/hr)

Abnormal
=Latent heat of process fluid (Kcal/kg)

Step 5:
Calculate required relieving flow rate based on following equation.

Normal Abnormal
M M W =


Where,
W =Required relieving rate (kg/hr)
M
Normal
=Vapor flow rate of process fluid to column during normal operation
(kg/hr)





















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18.5.8 Check valve mal-operation


Symbol Value Unit
P
1 70.25 kg/cm
2
A
T
1 40
o
C
M 19.47 (-)
K 1.21 (-)
Z 0.887 (-)
P
2 60 kg/cm
2
A
D
i 657 mm
Symbol Value Unit
P
2 60 kg/cm
2
A
T
2 35.87
o
C
M 19.47 (-)
K 1.215 (-)
Z 0.895 (-)
P
3 35 kg/cm
2
A
D
i 431.8 mm
Symbol Value Unit
P
3 35 kg/cm
2
A
T
3 24.88
o
C
M 19.47 (-)
K 1.239 (-)
Z 0.926 (-)
P
4 19.765 kg/cm
2
A
D
i 431.8 mm
Relief Load (W) Calculation
Downstream temperature
Molecular weight
Cp/Cv
Compressibility factor
Relieving pressure
Pipe bore
Data
Properties at above mentioned conditions :
Pipe bore
Downstream temperature
Data
Intermediate pressure (Note-1)
Data Input
Cp/Cv
Compressibility factor
Intermediate pressure (Note-1)
Molecular weight
Downstream pressure of first NRV
Downstream temperature
Cp/Cv
Compressibility factor
Intermediate pressure (Note-1)
Properties at above mentioned conditions (P
3
& T
3
): (Note-2)
Properties at above mentioned conditions (P
2
& T
2
): (Note-2)
M * P
1
* 11.7946
Density = ----------------------------
(273.15+T
1
) * Z
Mass flow
Volumetric Flow = ----------------------
Density
Note:
1) Downstream pressures are intermediate pressures and are obtained by satisfying the criticality condition [NON-CRITICAL =>(P
2
>Pc)].
2) The properties such as T
2
, T
3
, K, Z at the intermediate pressures can be calculated by using simulation.
Pipe bore
Molecular weight
Data
Intermediate pressure (Note-1)
P
1
=70.25 Kg/cm
2
A
P
4
=19.765 Kg/cm
2
A
Absorber 2
nd
2
nd
2
nd
1
st
Standby
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Find the mass flow rate at final bore value equal to bore actual value
Bore Actual = 33% of Di For First check valve
Bore Actual = 10% of Di For remaining each check valve
2
K * ---------
K +1
K +1
--------
K - 1
Factor C =2.8 *
Bore =
M
----------------------
Z * ( 273 +T
1
)
------------------------------------------
C * P
1
*
Mass Flow
K +1
----------
K - 1
2
---------
K +1
2
--------
K - 1
d' / d = -----------------------------------------------------------
2
-----
K P
2
---------
P
1
---
K +1
-------
K P
2
---------
P
1
0.25
---
Bore Final =
d' / d
X Bore
K
-------
K -- 1
2
----------
K +1
* P
1
Critical pressure =
If P
2
>Critical pressure then flow is "Noncritical" otherwise "Critical"
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Annexure-6 (Typical Flare Load Summary sheet)
*RESTRICTION ORIFICE CALCULATION by INST HAND BOOK (E.SATO)
BORE,mm 657 Full=28" 6C3AS BORE,mm 431.8 Full=20" 9C3AS BORE,mm 431.8 Full=20" 9C3AS
FLOW,kg/hr 63664.68282 FLOW,kg/hr 54077.16714 FLOW,kg/hr 31832.34141
73291.55456 Nm3/hr 62254.2903 36645.77728
1096.040106 m3/hr 1085.481414 1093.003606
MW 19.47 MW 19.47 MW 19.47
Cp/Cv 1.21 1.21 Cp/Cv 1.215 1.215 Cp/Cv 1.239 1.239
Z 0.887 Z 0.895 Z 0.926
P
1
,kg/cm2A 70.2584 68.901 barA P
2
,kg/cm
2
A 60 58.8408 barA P
3
,kg/cm
2
A 35 34.3238 barA
T
1
,?C 40 T
2
,?C 35.87 T
3
,?C 24.88
DENS 58.08608873 kg/m
3
DENS 49.81860257 kg/m
3
DENS 29.12372954 kg/m
3
Pc 39.52291234 kg/cm
2
A Pc 33.69438902 kg/cm
2
A Pc 19.49495324 kg/cm
2
A
FACTOR,C 1.821304411 FACTOR,C 1.823998064 FACTOR,C 1.83679161
CRITICAL(P
2
<P
1
*0.5) CRITICAL(P
3
<P
2
*0.5) CRITICAL(P
3
<P
4
*0.5)
BORE 43.34973168 mm 43.15489583 mm 43.17641515 mm
NONCRITICAL NONCRITICAL NONCRITICAL
P
2
,kg/cm
2
A 60 OK NONCRITICAL P
3
,kg/cm
2
A 35 OK NONCRITICAL P
4
,kg/cm
2
A 19.765 OK NONCRITICAL
0.036715796 0.037546103 0.04150499
0.020816252 0.037461013 0.041493352
d'/d 1.15242481 d'/d 1.000567377 d'/d 1.000070113
BORE,mm 49.9573063 APPLICABLE BORE,mm 43.17938092 APPLICABLE BORE,mm 43.17944239 APPLICABLE
218.781BORE x 33.33% 43.18BORE x 10% 43.18 BORE x 10%
Each of the remaining check valves in series is assumed to behave as a restriction orifice with a diameter equal to 1/10 the nominal diameter of the check valve.
Failed check valve behaves as a restriction orifice.As per section 7.12 orifice diameter equal to 1/3 the nominal diameter of the check valve.
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18.5.9 Liquid Overfill




















Knock-out Drum
LT LT LT
Symbol Val ue Uni t
71852.4 Kg/hr

L 988 Kg/m3
Di 3.5 m
L 8 m
L
H
4.8
m
HLL 3.2 m
Liquid Overfill scenario is not considered when below conditions are satisfying.
1 Residance time for vapour space >= 30 minute
2 Vessel has safety critical, independent high level alarm
Checki ng f or abov e scenar i o
Volume of vapor space = /4 x Di
2
x L
H
+ /24 x Di
3
= 51.79374 m
3
Flow rate (m3/h) = 72.7251 m
3
/hr
Residance time in vessel vapor space = Volume of vapor space
Flow rate (m
3
/hr)
= 0.712185 hrs
= 42.73111 minutes
Residance time in vessel vapor space >= 30 minutes
42.73111 >= 30 minutes
LT (2 out of 3) can be considered for safety critical,Independent high alarm level
Liquid overfill scenario need not to considered
Flow rate to KOD at rated condition
Fluid density
Vessel
Inside Diameter
TL-TL length
Length above HLL
High Liquid Level
Dat a Input
Dat a
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18.5.10 Alternate approach for PSV relief load calculations (Reduced
reboiler duty method)

This method describes the relief load calculation for the following
scenarios:
Loss of condenser
Loss of reflux
Loss of feed
Loss of upstream Reboiler

Tower Simulations:

Normal simulation: First simulate the tower for the normal operation based on the
process basis information provided. It is very important to match this simulation with
the actual process data available for the respective system.

Relief simulations: Tower simulations for various over pressure scenarios will be done
at reduced reboiler duty straightaway. Following is the procedure to determine the
reduced reboiler duty at a constant dirty UA


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For tower relief simulations, specify the number of trays equal to the actual number
of trays. If there are any convergence issues, then try reducing the number of trays,
If the tower does not converge even after reducing the number of trays, then use
multiple flash drum method.
























18.5.11 PVRV / PCV / Emergency load calculations for Tanks

The below calculation is based on API-2000.
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DESIGN DATA / INPUT:
1 Tank ID = 4 m
2 Tank T/T height = 5.11 m
3 Tank operating pressure = 0.004903 barg 50 mmWC(g) 0.4903 Kpa(g)
4 Tank working temperature = 50
5 Inbreathing N2 PCV = 113-PCV-1153
6 Outbreathing N2 PCV = 113-PCV-1152
7 Pressure & Vacuum Relief = 113-PVRV-1151
8 Emergency Venting by Blow-off Hatch. =
9 SP for 113-PCV-1153 = barg
10 SP for 113-PCV-1152 = barg
11 SP for 113-PVV-1151 = barg
12 SP for Blow-off Hatch = barg
13 Filling rate = 11 m/h
14 Emptying rate = 11 m/h
15 Tank Capacity = 64 m
16 Tank Design Presure = 29.4 mbarg 300 mmWC(g) 2.9420 Kpa(g)
-4.9 mbarg -50 mmWC(g) -0.4903 Kpa(g)
ASSUMPTIONS:
1 The Normal Boiling Point of tank liquid (50% LA) is less than 149C.
2 Blow-off hatch provided for Emergency Venting.
3 Density of Nitrogen is taken as 9.72 Kg/m
3
at 7.6 barg , 25
o
C. 9.72 Kg/m
3
CALCULATION:
(A) INBREATHING CALCULATION (VACUUM : EMPTY)
(1) As per API std. 2000, for boiling point < 149C ( Table-1B - Column -1)
The requirement for venting capacity for maximum liquid movement out of the tank should be equivalent to
0.94 Nm/h of Air for each cubic meter, per hour of maximum emptying rate.
Maximum Emptying rate = 11 m/h
Nm/h air required for this flow rate = 10.3 Nm/h of air
= 10.7 Nm/h of N2
(2) Thermal Inbreathing
From Table-2B, Column-2 of API Std. 2000,
Therefore, for tank capacity =64 m, by interpolation, Tank Capacity Inbreathing Outbreathing
Thermal venting capacity =3.37 +(64-20)* (16.9 -3.37) / (100-20) FP>=37.8 FP<37.8
= 10.8 Nm/h of Air m
3
Nm
3
/h Nm
3
/h Nm
3
/h
= 11.2 Nm/h of N2 1 1.69 1.01 1.69
20 3.37 2.02 3.37
100 16.9 10.1 16.9
(B) OUTBREATHING CALCULATION (PRESSURE : FILLING)
(1) As per API std. 2000, for boiling point < 149C ( Table-1B - Column -3)
The requirement for venting capacity for maximum liquid movement into the tank and the resulting vaporization
should be equivalent to 2.02 Nm/h for each cubic meter, per hour of maximum filling rate
Maximum Filling rate = 11 m/h
Nm/h air required for the above filling rate = 22.22 Nm/h of air Inbreathing Outbreathing
Nm/h N2 required = 23 Nm/h of N2
Liq. Moving
Out
Liq. Moving In
0
C
Nm
3
/h / m
3
/h Nm
3
/h / m
3
/h
(2) Thermal Outbreathing FP >=37.8 0.94 1.01
From Table-2B, Column-4 of API Std. 2000, BP>=148.9 0.94 1.01
Therefore, for tank capacity =64 m, by interpolation, FP<37.8 0.94 2.02
Thermal venting capacity =3.37 +(64-20)* (16.9 -3.37) / (100-20) BP<148.9 0.94 2.02
= 10.8 Nm/h of Air
11.2 Nm/h of N2
(3) Outbreathing Requirment for 113-PCV-1153 Fails Open ( Nitrogen)
The basis is 113-PCV-1153 fail open with upstream Max. N2 pressure at 7.6 barg
and downstream operating pressure of 0.004903 barg .The max flow(full bore) is 55 kg/h.
Max Flow (form CV calculation) = 55 kg/h
Molar Flow = 1.96 kgmol/h
Nm/h flow of N2 = 44.012 Nm/h 42.51 Nm/h of Air
As per API Std. 2000, " The Normal Venting capacity shall be atleast the sum of
the Venting requirements for Liquid movement and thermal effect - (Ref: Cl: 4.3.2 page 4)
Requirements for Thermal Venting Capacity API
2000, Table 2B
Normal Venting Requirements
API 2000, Table 1B
Flash / Boiling
Point
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(C) Emergency Venting capacity calculation:
(1) EXTERNAL FIRE CASE
Nm/h =881.55 x Q x F / L x (T/M)^0.5
Where,
Q =Heat input from fire exposure in watts = 224200*A
0.566
A =Weted surface area in m
F =environmental factor from table, 1B
L =Latent heat of vaporization at relieving Pr & Temp, in J /kg
T =Relieving temp in K
M =Molecular weight of vapor
Design pressure of the tank = 0.03 barg (<0.07 barg)
H=Height of Vertical tank = 5.11 m
Height to be considered as per API = 5.11 m
(Ref:Page 9 of API Std 2000 - notes below Table-3B)
Wetted Surface Area of Tank = (PI x D x H)
Wetted Surface Area Calculated , A = 64 m
Refering to given table on page-9 of API std 2000,
Heat Input to be considered , Q = 2364583.315 watts
Latent heat of vaporisation = 2218200 J /kg
Relieving temperature = 105.5 C
= 378.5 K
Molecular weight = 18.11 kg/kgmol
Environmental factor considered = 1
Venting requirement = 4296 Nm/h of AIR
(2) Steam coil tube rupture case
Amount of steam released from 2" ruptured coil = 12531 Kg/h
(from equation of tube rupture)
Latent heat of condensing steam at relieving P = 2252.6 KJ /Kg
Latent heat of tank liquid at relieving P = 2218.2 KJ /Kg
Amount of tank liquid vaporised = Heat released by condensed steam / Latent heat of tank liquid
= 12725 Kg/h
Vapour density = 0.8921 Kg/m3
Venting requirement = 14264 m3/h tank vapour (MolWt =18.11)
= 10197 Nm3/h of tank vapour
= 6368 Nm3/h of Air
(Vertical height or 9.14m whichever is lower)
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18.6 Annexure-6 (Typical Flare Load Summary sheet)


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18.7 Annexure-7 (Flare Header / PSV outlet line sizing)

18.7.1 Individual Failure Single contingency contributing the
maximum load)


LINE NO.
FROM PSV-328123 A/B/C/D SUBHEADER SUBHEADER FLARE KOD
TO SUBHEADER HEADER FLARE KOD B/L
Nominal Dia. inch 18 20 30 30
Pipe Class - A1A A1A A1A A1A
Schedule - S10 S10
I.D. mm 445.2 495.3 746.16 746.16
Length m 50 58 479 115
I Roughness mm 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500
N Flow Rate Nm3/hr 24,085.2 72,255.7 72,255.7 72,255.7
P Viscosity CP 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
U MW - 85.82 85.82 85.82 85.82
T Cp/Cv - 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08
Z - 0.909 0.909 0.909 0.909
Temp degC 125 125 125 125
Press., @In kg/cm2G 1.711 1.686 1.515 1.343
Press., @In BarG 1.679 1.653 1.486 1.317
Flow Area m2 0.156 0.193 0.437 0.437
Weight Flow kg/h 92221 276663 276663 276663
Weight Flow kg/s 25.617 76.851 76.851 76.851
Gas Density @In kg/m3 7.6782 7.6058 7.1285 6.6477
Volume Flow @In m3/s 3.336 10.104 10.781 11.561
Velocity @In m/s 21.432 52.442 24.654 26.438
Re. No. - 3.66E+06 9.88E+06 6.56E+06 6.56E+06
Fric. Factor - 0.01269 0.01219 0.01149 0.01149
Press., @Out kg/cm2G 1.686 1.515 1.343 1.300
Press., @Out BarG 1.653 1.486 1.317 1.275
GasDns @Out kg/m3
7.606 7.129 6.648 6.527
Vol. Flow @Out m3/s
3.368 10.781 11.561 11.774
Velocity @Out m/s
21.636 55.953 26.438 26.926
Mach no. @Out -
0.111 0.287 0.136 0.138
PIPE FRICTION LOSS 0.026 0.171 0.172 0.043
PSV Set Pressure (Kg/cm2G) 3.5
PSV Type (Conv./Balanced Bellows) Pilot operated
Acceptable Back Pressure (Kg/cm2G 1.93
Line size is acceptable or not Yes
Total Pressure Drop 0.41
90
O
Elbow
2 3 12 5
45
O
Elbow
Reducer
1
Expander
1
Gate valve
1
Flow thro' straight outlet tee
Flow thro' side outlet tee
Equivalent Length, meters 35.6 29.7 179.1 74.6
Straight Length, meters
7.0 14.0 150.0 20.0
Total length, meters 49.6 57.7 479.1 114.6
POWER LOST TO UNIT
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18.7.2 Group failure
18.7.2.1 Fire Envelope, Combined Cooling water

C
p
/C
v
Temp
o
C
68 m
1.23
135
7 m
1.16
172
5 m
1.4
143
Envel ope-8
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18.8 Annexure-8 (Flare stack, Figure-A, B)

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Flare Stack Height (Figure-A)



Determination of Drag Coefficient (Figure-B)



















D
r
a
g

C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
,

C

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18.9 Annexure-9 (Flare knock out drum, Figure-C)


18.10 Annexure-10 (Seal drum, Figure-D)


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18.11 Annexure-11 (Typical flare system P&I Diagram)


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18.12 Format for Relief load calculation sheets

19.0 OTHER REFERENCES

19.1 Handbook by Crosby

19.2 Questions and Answers for API-520 / 521