The Path to European Integration:

A Historical Institutionalist Analysis

Paul Pierson
*
Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley
November 199
Abstract
!any European and "meri#an observers of t$e EC $ave #riti#i%ed &inter'overnmentalist&
a##ounts for e(a''eratin' t$e e(tent of member state #ontrol over t$e pro#ess of European
inte'ration) *$is essay seeks to 'round t$ese #riti#isms in a $istori#al institutionalist& a##ount
t$at stresses t$e need to study European inte'ration as a politi#al pro#ess +$i#$ unfolds over
time) Su#$ a perspe#tive $i'$li'$ts t$e limits of member state #ontrol over lon',term
institutional development) -osses of #ontrol result from member state preo##upation +it$ s$ort,
term #on#erns, t$e ubi.uity of unintended #onse.uen#es, and pro#esses t$at &lo#k in& past
de#isions and make reassertions of member state aut$ority diffi#ult) Brief e(amination of t$e
evolution of EC so#ial poli#y su''ests t$e limitations of treatin' t$e EC as an institutional
&instrument& fa#ilitatin' #olle#tive a#tion amon' soverei'n states) /t is more useful to vie+
inte'ration as a pat$,dependent pro#ess t$at $as produ#ed a fra'mented but still dis#ernible
multi,tiered European polity)
*$e evolution of t$e European Community $as lon' fas#inated politi#al s#ientists) 0or four
de#ades, some of t$e +orld1s most endurin' nation states $ave #ondu#ted an e(traordinary
politi#al e(periment) Pro'ressin' sporadi#ally but in a #onsistent dire#tion, t$e member states of
t$e European Community $ave &pooled& in#reasin' areas of poli#y aut$ority, introdu#in'
prominent #olle#tive institutions) *$e #reation of t$ese institutions initiated a pro#ess +$i#$ $as
transformed t$e nature of European politi#s)
2o+ t$e evolution of t$ese arran'ements of #olle#tive 'overnan#e #an be e(plained and t$e
nature of t$e #urrent system understood remain matters of #onsiderable #ontroversy) 3it$in
"meri#an politi#al s#ien#e, it $as been students of international relations +$o $ave maintained
t$e most t$eoreti#ally,driven dis#ussions of t$e EC) 4espite si'nifi#ant internal disputes, t$e
dominant paradi'm in international relations s#$olars$ip re'ards European inte'ration as t$e
pra#ti#e of ordinary diploma#y under #onditions #reatin' unusual opportunities for t$e providin'
of #olle#tive 'oods t$rou'$ $i'$ly institutionali%ed e(#$an'e 5Garrett 19967 !orav#sik 19989)
0rom t$is &inter'overnmentalist& perspe#tive t$e EC is essentially a forum for interstate
bar'ainin') !ember states remain t$e only important a#tors at t$e European level) So#ietal
a#tors e(ert influen#e only t$rou'$ t$e domesti# politi#al stru#tures of member states) Poli#y,
makin' is made t$rou'$ ne'otiation amon' member states or t$rou'$ #arefully #ir#ums#ribed
dele'ations of aut$ority) 3$et$er relyin' on ne'otiation or dele'ation, C$iefs of Government
5&C:Gs&9 are at t$e $eart of t$e EC, and ea#$ member state seeks to ma(imi%e its o+n
advanta'e) 4ebate +it$in t$is perspe#tive $as #on#erned su#$ .uestions as +$y member states
desired #ertain observed out#omes, +$i#$ member states $ave t$e most influen#e on #olle#tive
de#ision,makin', and +$i#$ ali'nment of member state interests #an best e(plain poli#y or
institutional development in t$e EC 5!orav#sik 19917 -an'e 19987 !artin 19989)
*$is perspe#tive $as not been +it$out its #$allen'ers) European s#$olars $ave 'enerally depi#ted
t$e EC as a more #omple( and pluralisti# politi#al stru#ture, less firmly under member state
#ontrol) !u#$ of t$is s#$olars$ip is not parti#ularly #on#erned +it$ advan#in' broad t$eories of
inte'ration, #on#entratin' instead on t$e detailed investi'ation of day,to,day poli#y development
in areas +$ere t$e EC1s role is prominent) 0rom t$is perspe#tive, t$e Community looks more like
a sin'le 5if $i'$ly fra'mented9 polity t$an t$e site of diplomati# maneuverin' amon'
autonomous member states) 3it$in Europe, analyses t$at treat t$e European Community as a
.uasi,federal system ,, &an obvious referen#e point for t$e European Community& in t$e +ords
of one prominent analyst 54e$ousse 199;, p) 1<89 ,, are no+ .uite #ommon 5S#$arpf 19==7
!a>one 19969)
*$is is e.ually true +it$in t$e ranks of #omparativists +$o $ave turned t$eir attention re#ently to
t$e European Community 5Sbra'ia 19967 !arks 19987 "nderson 199?7 Pierson and -eibfried
199?b9) *$e prin#ipal reason for t$is ne+ interest is revealin'@ students of a +ide ran'e of
'overnment a#tivities, in#ludin' industrial, re'ional, so#ial, and environmental poli#ies, $ave
found t$at t$ey #an no lon'er understand t$e domesti# pro#esses and out#omes t$at interest t$em
+it$out addressin' t$e role of t$e EC) *$ese investi'ations also portray a #omple( and pluralisti#
politi#al pro#ess, not firmly under member state #ontrol and not e(pli#able in terms of simple
diplomati# bar'ainin') Comin' from t$e detailed investi'ation of parti#ular domesti# poli#y
arenas to address a strikin'ly ne+ p$enomenon, $o+ever, #omparativists possessed fe+
t$eoreti#al tools t$at appeared dire#tly appli#able) -ike European analysts, t$ey $ave tended to
depi#t t$e Community as a .uasi,federal, &multi,level& or &multi,tiered& politi#al system) Aet
t$ese terms are used more to des#ribe t$e #urrent state of affairs t$an to e(plain it) *$us, if a
'ro+in' body of detailed resear#$ reveals #onsiderable unease about t$e dominant /B models of
EC politi#s, #riti#s $ave so far $ad little to offer as an alternative to inter'overnmentalist
a##ounts)
/n pra#ti#e, t$e #riti#s of inter'overnmentalism $ave tried to move for+ard in t+o +ays) Some
$ave #ontinued to investi'ate parti#ular poli#y areas, #ontent to reveal t$e density and pluralism
of a#tual poli#ymakin' +$ile simply observin' t$at t$e fo#us of international relations t$eory on
'rand diploma#y amon' soverei'n member states does not s.uare +it$ +$at is a#tually o##urrin'
&on t$e 'round)& 2o+ever, it is almost al+ays possible, ex post, to posit some set of member
state preferen#es t$at re#on#iles observed out#omes +it$ t$e ima'e of near total member state
#ontrol) 3$ere poli#y out#omes do not #onform to t$e e(pe#ted preferen#es of member states,
t$ey may be e(plained as part of a &nested 'ame& or as an instan#e of side payments) 4ra+in' on
rational #$oi#e t$eory, inter'overnmentalism possesses fle(ible #on#eptual tools t$at #an
&e(plain& +$y member states +ould favor t$e observed out#omes 5Green and S$apiro 19=;9)
1
*$us, absent a t$eoreti#ally,based e(planation for t$e #onstraints on member states, t$ese
detailed investi'ations +ill not persuade proponents of inter'overnmentalism)
!ore t$eoreti#ally,oriented #riti#s $ave dra+n on aspe#ts of t$e &neo,fun#tionalist& tradition in
international relations, s$o+in' $o+ &spillover& pro#esses and t$e autonomous a#tions of
supranational a#tors 5in#ludin' t$e Commission and European Court of Custi#e9 #ontribute to
European poli#ymakin') Be#ent efforts to update neo,fun#tionalism $ave su##essfully
$i'$li'$ted important limitations in inter'overnmentalist a##ounts, and / +ill rely in part on
t$ese ar'uments in developin' my o+n analysis) Aet neo,fun#tionalism $as serious problems of
its o+n) Given t$e stron' institutional position of member states in t$e EC, neo,fun#tionalists
seem to attribute 'reater autonomy to supranational a#tors t$an #an plausibly be sustained)
"lt$ou'$ neo,fun#tionalist ar'uments about t$e independent a#tion of t$e Commission and
Court of Custi#e $ave some merit, t$ere is little doubt t$at t$e member states, a#tin' to'et$er in
t$e Coun#il, remain t$e most po+erful de#ision,makers) /n most #ases, it seems e.ually probable
t$at t$ese de#ision,makers a#t to se#ure t$eir o+n interests, +$atever t$ose are deemed to be)
Cru#ially, t$ese &prin#ipals& retain t$e le'al aut$ority to rein in t$eir &a'ents& if t$ey find it in
t$eir interests to do so) *$us at any given point in time t$e key propositions of
inter'overnmentalist t$eory are likely to $old)
*$is essay seeks to lay t$e foundation for a more persuasive a##ount of member state #onstraint)
!y fo#us is on t$e reasons +$y 'aps emer'e in member state #ontrol over t$e evolution of
European institutions and publi# poli#ies, on +$y t$ese 'aps are diffi#ult to #lose, and on $o+
t$ese openin's bot$ #reate room for a#tors ot$er t$an member states to influen#e t$e pro#ess of
European inte'ration +$ile simultaneously #onstrainin' t$e room for maneuver of all politi#al
a#tors) *$e basis for t$is #$allen'e to inter'overnmentalism lies in insi'$ts from +$at / +ill term
&$istori#al institutionalism& 5Steinmo and *$elen 19967 /kenberry 199;9) *$e label #overs a
diverse ran'e of s#$olars$ip, mu#$ of it +it$ little t$eoreti#al fo#us) /ndeed, a prin#ipal 'oal of
t$is essay is to stren't$en t$e t$eoreti#al foundations of $istori#al institutionalism) *$ere are,
$o+ever, t+o unifyin' t$emes +it$in t$is broad resear#$ orientation) *$is s#$olars$ip is
historical be#ause it re#o'ni%es t$at politi#al development must be understood as a pro#ess t$at
unfolds over time) /t is institutionalist be#ause it stresses t$at many of t$e #ontemporary
impli#ations of t$ese temporal pro#esses are embedded in institutions ,, +$et$er t$ese be formal
rules, poli#y stru#tures or norms)
6
*$e #ru#ial #laim / derive from $istori#al institutionalism is t$at a#tors may be in a stron' initial
position, seek to ma(imi%e t$eir interests, and nevert$eless #arry out institutional and poli#y
reforms t$at fundamentally transform t$eir o+n positions 5or t$ose of t$eir su##essors9 in +ays
t$at are unanti#ipated andDor undesired) "ttempts to #ut into on,'oin' so#ial pro#esses at a sin'le
point in time produ#e a &snaps$ot& vie+ t$at is distorted in #ru#ial respe#ts) Central parts of my
analysis emp$asi%e temporal aspe#ts of politi#s@ t$e la's bet+een de#isions and lon',term
#onse.uen#es, and t$e #onstraints t$at emer'e from so#ietal adaptations and s$ifts in poli#y
preferen#es t$at o##ur durin' t$e interim) 3$en European inte'ration is e(amined over time, t$e
'aps in member state #ontrol appear far more prominent t$an t$ey do in inter'overnmentalist
a##ounts)
/n #ontrast to t$e fun#tional a##ount of institutions +$i#$ underpins inter'overnmentalism,
$istori#al institutionalism stresses t$e diffi#ulties of sub>e#tin' institutional evolution to ti'$t
#ontrol) *+o brief $istori#al e(amples #an illustrate t$e broad point e(plored in t$is essay) *$e
first #on#erns t$e #$an'in' institutional position of state 'overnments in t$e United States 5Biker
19??9) Be#ause approval of t$e "meri#an #onstitution re.uired state ratifi#ation, t$e interests of
states re#eived #onsiderable attention in t$e pro#ess of institutional desi'n) *$e framers intended
t$e Senate to serve as a stron' support of state interests) /n an arran'ement t$at partly e#$oes t$e
EC1s emp$asis on member state parti#ipation in #olle#tive deliberations, state le'islatures +ere to
appoint senators, +$o +ere e(pe#ted to serve as dele'ates representin' states in t$e formation of
poli#y) :ver time, $o+ever, Senators seekin' 'reater autonomy +ere able to 'radually free
t$emselves from state oversi'$t) By t$e early 19<<s, t$e ena#tment of t$e 1Et$ "mendment
re.uirin' popular ele#tion of Senators only ratified t$e result of a len't$y erosion of state
le'islative #ontrol)
*$e development of Canadian federalism provides anot$er e(ample 53atts 19=E9) *$e desi'ners
of t$e Canadian federation sou'$t a $i'$ly #entrali%ed form of federalism ,, in part as a rea#tion
to t$e +ays in +$i#$ de#entrali%ation #ontributed to t$e $orrors of t$e "meri#an Civil 3ar) Aet
t$e Canadian federation is no+ far less #entrali%ed t$an t$e "meri#an one) "mon' t$e reasons@
t$e Canadian federation left to t$e provin#es sole responsibility for many a#tivities t$at +ere t$en
#onsidered trivial) 3it$ t$e 'ro+in' role of 'overnment in so#ial poli#y and e#onomi#
mana'ement, $o+ever, t$ese responsibilities turned out to be of tremendous importan#e)
/n bot$ t$ese #ases, t$e #urrent fun#tionin' of institutions #annot be derived from t$e aspirations
of t$e ori'inal desi'ners) Pro#esses evolvin' over time led to .uite une(pe#ted out#omes)
Similarly, / +ill ar'ue t$at +$at one makes of t$e EC depends on +$et$er one e(amines a
p$oto'rap$ or a movin' pi#ture) Cust as a film often reveals meanin's t$at #annot be dis#erned
from a sin'le p$oto'rap$, a vie+ of Europe1s development over time 'ives us a ri#$er sense of
t$e nature of t$e emer'in' European polity) "t any 'iven time, t$e diplomati# maneuverin'
amon' member states looms lar'e, and an inter'overnmentalist perspe#tive makes #onsiderable
sense) Seen as a $istori#al pro#ess, $o+ever, t$e s#ope of member state aut$ority appears far
more #ir#ums#ribed, and bot$ t$e interventions of ot$er a#tors and t$e #umulative #onstraints of
rule,based 'overnan#e more #onsiderable)
!y ar'ument is developed in t$ree sta'es) /n t$e first, / revie+ t$e main features of
inter'overnmentalist analyses of t$e EC) /n t$e se#ond, / develop a $istori#al institutionalist
#riti.ue) /n se#tion t$ree, / briefly apply t$ese $istori#al institutionalist ar'uments to one aspe#t
of European inte'ration, t$e development of so#ial poli#y) *$is appli#ation is $ardly intended as
a full test of my approa#$) Nonet$eless, $istori#al institutionalism1s appli#ability in an area +$ere
inter'overnmentalist analysis ou'$t to be on stron' 'round provides furt$er eviden#e of its
t$eoreti#al promise)
I Intergovernmentalist Theories and Member State Autonomy
*$e a##elerated a#tivity of t$e EC in t$e past de#ade #oin#ided +it$ a 'ro+in' fo#us amon'
international relations s#$olars on international re'imes, +$i#$ +ere #on#eptuali%ed as
institutionali%ed forms of #olle#tive a#tion amon' nation,states 5Frasner 19=87 Feo$ane 19=;7
2a''ard and Simmons 19=E9) 3$ile some analysts of European inte'ration $ave #ontinued to
e#$o t$e earlier international relations literature on neo,fun#tionalism, t$e dominant
inter'overnmentalist perspe#tive $as treated t$e EC as a standard 5albeit unusually +ell,
developed and multi,fa#eted9 international re'ime) /t +ould be unrealisti# to attempt a t$orou'$
revie+ of t$is diverse and sop$isti#ated literature $ere) /nstead, / fo#us on t$ree #ore features of
inter'overnmentalism@ a) t$e emp$asis on member state preo##upation +it$ soverei'nty7 b) t$e
depi#tion of institutions as instruments7 and c) t$e fo#us on &'rand bar'ains& amon' member
states)
A) The Centrality of Sovereignty.
/nter'overnmentalism itself 'enerally takes member state preferen#es as 'iven, fo#usin' instead
on $o+ member states seek to pursue t$ose preferen#es)
8
Aet despite t$is apparent openness,
inter'overnmentalist a##ounts tend to stress member state preo##upation +it$ preservin'
soverei'nty) "s Feo$ane maintains, &)))'overnments put a $i'$ value on t$e maintenan#e of t$eir
o+n autonomy, GsoH it is usually impossible to establis$ international institutions t$at e(er#ise
aut$ority over states& 5Feo$ane 19=;, p)==9)
:f #ourse, mu#$ of t$e +ritin' on international re'imes, of #ourse, arose as a rea#tion a'ainst
realist perspe#tives t$at +ere seen as puttin' too much +ei'$t on soverei'nty #on#erns
,,su''estin' t$at #olle#tive a#tion amon' states s$ould almost never be possible) Be'ime
t$eorists $ave ar'ued t$at in #onte(ts +$ere se#urity #on#erns $ave diminis$ed, nation states
may #are about absolute 'ains as +ell as relative ones) Nonet$eless, t$e realist fo#us on
soverei'nty #arries over into inter'overnmentalist treatments of t$e EC) !ost
inter'overnmentalist analyses su''est t$at member state preferen#es are $eavily +ei'$ted
to+ards preservin' soverei'nty, leadin' C$iefs of Government to be vi'ilant 'uardians of
national autonomy in evaluatin' proposals for international #ooperation) *$e issue is often posed
in prin#ipal,a'ent terms 5Garrett 19969) *$e prin#ipals 5member states9 may dele'ate #ertain
responsibilities to a'ents 5international institutions9, but only +it$ t$e stri#test oversi'$t) *$e
#ore #al#ulation for member states is +$et$er t$e benefits of #olle#tive a#tion out+ei'$ any
possible risk to autonomy) "##ordin' to !orav#sik, &GiHn t$e inter'overnmentalist vie+, t$e
uni.ue institutional stru#ture of t$e EC is a##eptable to national 'overnments only insofar as it
stren't$ens, rat$er t$an +eakens, t$eir #ontrol over domesti# affairs)))& 5!orav#sik 1998, p) ?<E,
emp$asis added9)
The Instrumentality of institutions.
3ork on international re'imes $as dra+n $eavily on t$e insi'$ts of *ransa#tion Cost E#onomi#s
5*CE9, +$i#$ analy%es institutions in fun#tional terms 53illiamson 19E?7 Feo$ane 19=;7 Nort$
199<9) "s !orav#sik summari%es, &modern re'ime t$eory vie+s international institutions as
deliberate instruments to improve t$e effi#ien#y of bar'ainin' bet+een states& 5!orav#sik 1998,
p)?<E9) 4ra+in' on sop$isti#ated +ork in 'ame t$eory and e#onomi# t$eories of or'ani%ations7
inter'overnmentalists note t$at #olle#tive a#tion amon' autonomous nation states is often desired
yet enormously diffi#ult) " #riti#al issue #on#erns problems of information) Un#ertainty about
t$e preferen#es, intentions, and reliability of ot$er a#tors makes a'reements diffi#ult to e(e#ute
and enfor#e) /nstitutions #an $elp surmount t$ese problems, redu#in' information asymmetries,
monitorin' #omplian#e, and #reatin' linka'es a#ross issues t$at diminis$ t$e likeli$ood of
defe#tion) "##ordin' to Feo$ane@
&0ar from bein' t$reats to 'overnments 5in +$i#$ #ase it +ould be $ard to understand +$y t$ey e(ist at all9, t$ey
permit 'overnments to attain ob>e#tives t$at +ould ot$er+ise be unattainable) *$ey do so in part by fa#ilitatin'
inter'overnmental a'reements) Be'imes fa#ilitate a'reements by raisin' t$e anti#ipated #osts of violatin' ot$ers1
property ri'$ts, by alterin' transa#tion #osts t$rou'$ t$e #lusterin' of issues, and by providin' reliable information
to members) Be'imes are relatively effi#ient institutions, #ompared +it$ t$e alternative of $avin' a myriad of
unrelated a'reements, sin#e t$eir prin#iples, rules, and institutions #reate linka'es amon' issues t$at 'ive a#tors
in#entives to rea#$ mutually benefi#ial a'reements& 5Feo$ane 19=;, p)9E9)
/n inter'overnmentalist a##ounts, self,#ons#ious, ma(imi%in' a#tors 5member states9 #reate
institutions be#ause t$ese institutions $elp t$em surmount #olle#tive a#tion problems and a#$ieve
'ains from e(#$an'e) *$e best +ay to understand t$e development of international institutions is
to identify t$e fun#tions t$at t$ey fulfill, espe#ially t$e lo+erin' of bar'ainin' #osts and t$e
redu#tion of un#ertainty t$rou'$ t$e provision of &a forum and vo#abulary for t$e si'nallin' of
preferen#es and intentions& 5Stone 199;, p);?9)
The Centrality of Intergovernmental Bargains.
Students of t$e EC fre.uently distin'uis$ bet+een t$e intermittent &'rand bar'ains& 5e)') t$e
*reaty of Bome, t$e Sin'le European "#t, !aastri#$t9 t$at establis$ basi# features of
institutional desi'n and t$e &day,to,day& poli#y,makin' in t$e Community t$at o##urs bet+een
t$ese a'reements) 0or inter'overnmentalists, t$e 'rand bar'ains are +$ere t$e a#tion is) Sin#e, as
!orav#sik puts it, &fun#tional re'ime t$eory vie+GsH))) international institutions as passive,
transa#tion,#ost redu#in' sets of rules&, it is t$e desi'n of t$ose rules t$at is #entral) *$e EC, $e
adds, &$as developed t$rou'$ a series of #elebrated inter'overnmental bar'ains, ea#$ of +$i#$
sets t$e a'enda for an intervenin' period of consolidation. *$e most fundamental task fa#in' a
t$eoreti#al a##ount of European inte'ration is to e(plain t$ese bar'ains& 5!orav#sik 1998, p)?<=,
;E8, emp$asis added9) *$e inter'overnmentalist resear#$ a'enda #learly refle#ts t$is line of
t$inkin', fo#usin' over+$elmin'ly on e(plainin' aspe#ts of t+o 'rand bar'ains@ t$e Sin'le
European "#t 5!orav#sik 19917 Garrett 19969 and t$e !aastri#$t *reaty 5Garrett 19987 -an'e
19987 !artin 19989) Politi#al developments durin' t$e periods bet+een t$ese bar'ains, or t$at
#on#ern matters t$at are not $otly,#ontested durin' t$ose bar'ains, $ave re#eived almost no
attention)
*$ese t$ree aspe#ts of inter'overnmentalist a##ounts are #losely #onne#ted) *$e depi#tion of
member states as profoundly #on#erned about soverei'nty #ontributes to a fun#tional vie+ of
re'imes) Given t$e preo##upation +it$ soverei'nty, t$e institutional underpinnin's for
#ooperation +ill only be #reated or e(tended after a #areful +ei'$in' of lon',term #osts and
benefits) *$e &benefits& are t$e transa#tion,#ost redu#in' fun#tions t$at re'imes perform, +$ile
t$e #osts often relate to any risk of lost autonomy) Similarly, t$e emp$asis on member state
bar'ains follo+s lo'i#ally from t$e fun#tional analysis of institutions) /f t$e EC is an
international re'ime in +$i#$ member states $ave #arefully desi'ned passive instruments to
allo+ t$em to #arry out #olle#tive 'oals, periods of &#onsolidation& are of little interest) /t is t$e
bar'ains t$emselves t$at #reate or #$an'e t$e rules of t$e 'ame, and t$at t$erefore demand
attention) *$e &post,bar'ain& period simply plays out t$e impli#ations intended in t$e 'rand
bar'ains) *o'et$er, t$ese t$ree positions $ave #ontributed to a po+erful ar'ument about t$e
pro#ess of European inte'ration) "s / su''est in t$e ne(t se#tion of t$is essay, $o+ever, all t$ree
are open to serious #$allen'e)
II A Historical Institutionalist Critique
&2istori#al institutionalism& is a loose term #overin' a ran'e of s#$olars$ip t$at $as tried to
#ombine so#ial s#ien#e #on#erns and met$ods +it$ a re#o'nition t$at so#ial pro#esses must be
understood as $istori#al p$enomena 5Steinmo and *$elen 19967 /kenberry 199;9) /n my o+n
usa'e, $istori#al institutionalism #uts a#ross t$e usual s$arp di#$otomy bet+een rational #$oi#e
and non,rational #$oi#e +ork, dra+in' instead on resear#$ +it$in bot$ traditions t$at emp$asi%es
t$e si'nifi#an#e of $istori#al pro#esses) *$us it in#ludes rational #$oi#e analyses t$at #onsider
issues of institutional evolution and pat$ dependen#e #ru#ial 5Nort$ 199<7 Fni'$t 19969) /t
e(#ludes mu#$ &$istori#al& resear#$ in politi#al s#ien#e t$at uses $istory only as a te#$ni.ue for
+idenin' t$e universe of available #ases)
*$e #ore ar'uments of $istori#al institutionalism #ontrast +it$ a more #ommon vie+ in t$e so#ial
s#ien#es, +$i#$, as !ar#$ and :lson observe, assumes 5often impli#itly9 t$at &institutions and
be$avior))) evolve t$rou'$ some form of effi#ient $istori#al pro#ess) "n effi#ient $istori#al
pro#ess ))) is one t$at moves rapidly to a uni.ue solution, #onditional on #urrent environmental
#onditions, and is independent of t$e $istori#al pat$& 5!ar#$ and :lson 19=9, pp)?,9) Given t$is
orientation, *$eda Sko#pol notes, &GaHnalysts typi#ally look only for syn#$roni# determinants of
poli#ies ,, for e(ample, in #urrent so#ial interests or in e(istin' politi#al allian#es) /n addition,
$o+ever, +e must e(amine patterns unfoldin' over time)))& 5Sko#pol 1996, p)?=9)
Be#ent resear#$ fo#usin' on institutional evolution and pat$ dependen#e $as #$allen'ed t$e
e(pe#tation t$at institutions embody t$e lon',term interests of t$ose responsible for ori'inal
institutional desi'n 5Frasner 19=97 Nort$ 199<9) 3$ere t$e le'al aut$ority of t$e institutional
desi'ners is as un.uestionable as t$at of t$e member states in t$e EC, / +ill ar'ue t$at su#$ a
#$allen'e must be based on t+o sets of #laims) 0irst, t$ere must be an a##ount of +$y &'aps& ,,
by +$i#$ / mean si'nifi#ant diver'en#es bet+een t$e institutional and poli#y preferen#es of
member states and t$e a#tual fun#tionin' of institutions and poli#ies ,, +ould emer'e) Se#ond,
#riti#s must e(plain +$y, on#e su#$ 'aps emer'e, t$ey #annot reliably be #losed) :ne #an find
s#attered elements of su#$ a##ounts in re#ent t$eoreti#al treatments of institutional #$an'e) 3$en
brou'$t to'et$er, t$ey provide a #ompellin' response to t$e #laim t$at institutional development
in t$e European Union #an be understood in fun#tional terms)
/ fo#us first on t$e fa#tors +$i#$ are likely to #reate #onsiderable 'aps in member state #ontrol)
0our are of fundamental importan#e@ t$e autonomous a#tions of European institutional a#tors, t$e
restri#ted time $ori%ons of de#ision,makers, t$e lar'e potential for unintended #onse.uen#es, and
t$e likeli$ood of #$an'es in C:G preferen#es over time) Ea#$ of t$ese fa#tors re.uires more
detailed dis#ussion)
The Partial Autonomy of EC Institutions.
*$e main #ontribution of re#ent neo,fun#tionalist analysis $as been to emp$asi%e t$e
autonomous role of supranational a#tors, espe#ially t$e Commission and t$e Court 5Sand$olt%
19967 Burley and !attli 19987 Boss 199;9) / be'in by summari%in' t$ese ar'uments and
su''estin' +$y, by t$emselves, t$ey #onstitute an inade.uate response to inter'overnmentalism)
*$e #entral ob>e#tions raised by neo,fun#tionalists #an be #ast in terms of t$e same prin#ipal,
a'ent frame+ork used in many inter'overnmentalist a##ounts) !ember states #reated t$e
European Community, and t$ey did so to serve t$eir o+n purposes) /n order to #arry out
#olle#tive tasks, $o+ever, t$e member states felt #ompelled to #reate ne+ institutions) "s *erry
!oe $as ar'ued, t$e results are predi#table@
" ne+ publi# a'en#y is literally a ne+ a#tor on t$e politi#al s#ene) /t $as its o+n interests, +$i#$ may diver'e from
t$ose of its #reators, and it typi#ally $as resour#es ,, e(pertise, dele'ated aut$ority ,, to strike out on its o+n s$ould
t$e opportunities arise) *$e politi#al 'ame is different no+@ t$ere are more players and more interests to be
a##ommodated 5!oe 199<, p)1619)
/n t$e European #onte(t, t$e member states1 problem $as been espe#ially diffi#ult) *$ey $ave
needed to #reate arran'ements t$at +ould allo+ reasonably effi#ient de#ision,makin' and
effe#tive enfor#ement despite t$e involvement of a lar'e number of 'overnments +it$ differin'
interests, and despite t$e need for de#ision,makin', implementation, and oversi'$t on a +ide
ran'e of #omple( and ti'$tly,#oupled poli#y arenas) *$ese #onsiderations 'enerated pressure to
'rant t$ose +$o run t$ese institutions #onsiderable aut$ority) *$us, t$e politi#al or'ans of t$e EC
are not +it$out resour#es7 as a result, t$ey are not simply passive tools of t$e member states)
:ver time, EC or'ani%ations +ill seek to use 'rants of aut$ority for t$eir o+n purposes, and
espe#ially to in#rease t$eir autonomy) *$ey +ill try to e(pand t$e 'aps in member state #ontrol,
and t$ey +ill use any a##umulated politi#al resour#es to resist efforts to #urtail t$eir aut$ority)
*$e result is an intri#ate, on,'oin' stru''le t$at is +ell,kno+n to students of t$e European Union
but +ould also be familiar to "meri#an observers of7 say, relations bet+een #on'ressional
#ommittees and administrative a'en#ies 5!#Cubbins and S#$+art% 19=;7 !oe 19=E7 Fie+iet
and !#Cubbins 19919) !ember states 'enerally 5but not al+ays9 seek to rein in EC institutions)
*$ey re#o'ni%e, $o+ever, t$at t$ese #ru#ial #olle#tive or'ani%ations #annot fun#tion +it$out
si'nifi#ant po+er, and t$at t$e aut$ority re.uired must 'ro+ as t$e tasks addressed at t$e
European level e(pand and be#ome more #omple()
0or t$eir part, European institutions su#$ as t$e Commission, t$e European Court of Custi#e, and
t$e European Parliament are al+ays lookin' for opportunities to en$an#e t$eir po+ers) Neo,
fun#tionalist analyses $ave emp$asi%ed t$e si'nifi#ant su##esses of t$ese supranational a#tors)
*$e Coun#il, to be sure, #ontinues to stand +at#$ over proposed le'islation, and a#tively prote#ts
member state interests) Aet t$e Commission, Parliament and Court possess #onsiderable ability
to advan#e t$eir o+n interests) 0or t$e Commission, t+o assets are parti#ularly important 5Boss
199;9) *$e first #on#erns t$e settin' of a'endas, a sour#e of influen#e +$i#$ it fre.uently s$ares
+it$ t$e European Parliament 5*sebelis 199;7 Garrett and *sebelis 199?9) C$oosin' +$i#$
proposals to #onsider is a tremendously important 5if fre.uently unappre#iated9 aspe#t of politi#s,
and $ere European institutional a#tors often $ave prima#y) :bviously, t$is po+er is far from
unlimited7 t$e Commission #annot e(pe#t to pass proposals t$at i'nore t$e preferen#es of
member states) Usually, $o+ever, it +ill $ave some room for maneuver 5Polla#k 199;7 Polla#k
199?9) Entrepreneurial European a#tors, su#$ as t$e 4elors Commission, may be able to frame
issues, desi'n pa#ka'es, and stru#ture t$e se.uen#e of proposals in +ays t$at ma(imi%e t$eir
room for independent initiative 5Biker 19=9) *$e e(pansion of .ualified ma>ority votin' $as
+idened t$e ran'e of possible &+innin' #oalitions,& furt$er in#reasin' t$e a'enda,settin' po+ers
of t$e Commission and Parliament) Neo,fun#tionalists $ave ar'ued persuasively t$at t$e
Commission1s effe#tive use of a'enda,settin' po+ers $as advan#ed European inte'ration and
in#reased its o+n role in poli#y reform 5Boss 199;9)
*$e Commission1s se#ond ma>or asset is its role as +$at Iolker Ei#$ener #alls &pro#ess
mana'er& 5Ei#$ener 19987 Peters 19969) Poli#y,makin' at t$e EC level, as many $ave noted, is
$eavily tilted to+ard re'ulation ,, a type of poli#y,makin' +it$ its o+n distin#tive .ualities
5-o+i 19;7 !a>one 19=99) *$e development of #omple( so#ial re'ulations re.uires t$e
assembly and #oordination of dense net+orks of e(perts) *$is task falls to t$e Commission, and
+it$ it #omes additional room for influen#e) Espe#ially in t$e labyrint$s of re'ulatory poli#y,
makin', t$is role may 'ive t$e Commission si'nifi#ant po+er)
*$e politi#al resour#es of t$e European Court are at least as si'nifi#ant) /f t$e United States in
t$e nineteent$ #entury $ad a &state of #ourts and parties& 5Sko+ronek 19=69, t$e EC looks at
times like a &state of #ourts and te#$no#rats& 5-eibfried 1996, p)6;99) /n t$e pro#ess of European
inte'ration, t$e European Court $as taken an a#tive, even for#in' stan#e, 'radually buildin' a
remarkable base of aut$ority and effe#tively &#onstitutionali%in'& t$e emer'in' European polity
53eiler 19917 Burley and !attli 19987 "lter 1999) *$e Court $as more e(tensive po+ers of
>udi#ial revie+ t$an most of its national #ounterparts, and fe+er impediments to a#tion t$an ot$er
EC de#ision,makin' bodies) /f t$e Coun#il is prone to 'ridlo#k, t$e ne#essity of de#idin' #ases
in#lines t$e ECC to a#tion) *$is in#lination is stren't$ened by rules allo+in' simple ma>ority
de#isions, and by a se#re#y 5neit$er a#tual votes nor dissentin' vie+s are made publi#9 t$at
s$elters >ud'es from member state and popular pressures) ECC >ud'es also s$are a #ommon
professional ba#k'round, le'al #ulture 5at least on t$e #ontinent9, and sense of mission t$at seems
to effe#tively limit t$e influen#e of t$e member states in >udi#ial de#ision,makin')
Neo,fun#tionalist a##ounts of t$ese supranational institutions $ave #ertainly demonstrated t$eir
prominent role in t$e EC, as even some inter'overnmentalists $ave a#kno+led'ed)
;
Aet t$e true
influen#e of t$e Court, Commission, and Parliament on poli#ymakin' and future institutional
development remains un#ertain) 4o t$ese or'ani%ations #reate 'enuine 'aps in member state
#ontrol, or do t$ey simply a#t as a'ents, fulfillin' monitorin', information,'at$erin', and
implementation roles under ti'$t member state s#rutinyJ "s -isa !artin, amon' ot$ers, $as
su''ested, autonomy may be more apparent t$an real@
Politi#ians and a#ademi# observers often infer from su#$ a pattern Gof a#tivityH autonomy of t$e Commission andDor
of 'overnment leaders) 2o+ever, #onsideration of institutional #onstraints leads us to e(amine dele'ation of
aut$ority be#ause of t$e #osts of e(er#isin' ti'$t #ontrol over a'ents, an optimal stru#ture of dele'ation may be one
+it$ little a#tive oversi'$t or overt interferen#e in t$e ne'otiatin' pro#ess from prin#ipals) "'ents rationally
anti#ipate t$e responses of t$ose t$ey represent) *$e la+ of anti#ipated rea#tions su''ests t$at +e #annot infer a la#k
of politi#al influen#e from a la#k of observed oversi'$t a#tivity) 5!artin 1998, p)18?9
*$us, +$at appears to be autonomy may simply refle#t t$e prin#ipals1 deft use of oversi'$t)
Belyin' on t$e dis#iplinin' po+er of anti#ipated rea#tions and t$e use of &fire alarms& ,, si'nals
derived from reportin' re.uirements or interest 'roup montorin' a#tivity ,, to identify si'nifi#ant
problems, member states #an stay in t$e ba#k'round +$ile remainin' firmly in #$ar'e
5!#Cubbins and S#$+art% 19=;9)
"'ain, 'iven t$e ease of assemblin' plausible ex post a##ounts of +$y 'iven out#omes served
member state interests, t$ese ar'uments about dele'ation are diffi#ult to refute, alt$ou'$ t$ey are
e.ually diffi#ult to demonstrate 5Garrett 199?7 Burley and !attli 199?9) *o fores$ado+ a point
pursued at len't$ belo+, t$e inter'overnmentalist #laim t$at supranational a#tors are a'ents
rat$er t$an autonomous a#tors is stren't$ened if +e believe t$at member states #an rea#t
po+erfully to observed losses of #ontrol) /f t$e Commission, Court and Parliament anti#ipate t$at
t$eir efforts to produ#e or e(ploit 'aps +ill be dete#ted, punis$ed, and reversed, t$ey are indeed
unlikely to strike out on t$eir o+n) *$us a #ru#ial problem +it$ neo,fun#tionalism is t$at it la#ks
a #o$erent a##ount of +$y t$e t$reat of su#$ a member state rea#tion is not al+ays #redible) /
address t$is problem in a moment)
Before pro#eedin' to t$at issue, $o+ever, t$e #ase for #onstraints on member state #ontrol #an be
'reatly stren't$ened if ot$er sour#es of 'aps #an be identified) 2ere, t$e $istori#al institutionalist
fo#us on t$e temporal dimension of politi#s is invaluable) /t $i'$li'$ts t$ree additional sour#es of
'aps@ t$e s$ort time,$ori%ons of de#ision,makers, t$e prevalen#e of unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es,
and t$e prospe#t of s$iftin' member state poli#y preferen#es)
The estricte! Time Hori"ons of Political #ecision$ma%ers.
" statement attributed to 4avid Sto#kman, Bea'an1s bud'et dire#tor, is unusual amon' politi#al
de#ision,makers only for its #andor) "sked by an advisor to #onsider pension reforms to #ombat
so#ial se#urity1s severe lon',term finan#in' problems, $e dismissed t$e idea out of $and,
e(#laimin' t$at $e $ad no interest in +astin' &a lot of politi#al #apital on some ot$er 'uy1s
problem in Gt$e yearH 6<1<)))& 5.uoted in Greider 19=6, p);89)
!any of t$e impli#ations of politi#al de#isions ,, espe#ially #omple( poli#y interventions or
ma>or institutional reforms ,, only play out in t$e lon',run 5Garrett and -an'e 199;9) Aet
politi#al de#ision,makers are fre.uently most interested in t$e s$ort,term #onse.uen#es of t$eir
a#tions7 lon',term effe#ts are often $eavily dis#ounted) *$e prin#ipal reason is t$e lo'i# of
ele#toral politi#s) Feynes on#e noted t$at in t$e lon',run +e are all dead7 for politi#ians in
demo#rati# polities, ele#toral deat$ #an #ome mu#$ faster) Sin#e t$e de#isions of voters t$at
determine politi#al su##ess are taken in t$e s$ort,run, politi#ians are likely to employ a $i'$
dis#ount rate) *$ey $ave a stron' in#entive to pay attention to lon',term #onse.uen#es only if
t$ese be#ome politi#ally salient, or +$en t$ey $ave little reason to fear s$ort,term ele#toral
retribution)
*$e 'ap bet+een s$ort,term interests and lon',term #onse.uen#es is often i'nored in ar'uments
about institutional desi'n and reform) "s a number of #riti#s $ave noted, #$oi#e,t$eoreti#
treatments of institutions often make an intentionalist or fun#tionalist falla#y, ar'uin' t$at t$e
lon',term effe#ts of institutions e(plain +$y de#ision,makers introdu#e t$em 5Bates 19=E7
Fni'$t 19967 2all and *aylor 199;9) /nstead, lon',term institutional #onse.uen#es are often t$e
by,produ#ts of a#tions taken for s$ort,term politi#al reasons) *$e evolution of t$e Con'ressional
#ommittee system in t$e United States ,, a #entral institutional feature of #ontemporary
"meri#an 'overnan#e ,, is a 'ood e(ample) "s Fennet$ S$epsle notes, 2enry Clay and $is
supporters introdu#ed t$e system to furt$er t$eir immediate politi#al 'oals +it$out re'ard to
lon',term #onse.uen#es@ &G*H$e lastin' effe#ts of t$is institutional innovation #ould $ardly $ave
been anti#ipated, mu#$ less desired, by Clay) *$ey +ere by,produ#ts 5and proved to be t$e more
endurin' and important produ#ts9 of self,interested leaders$ip be$avior& 5S$epsle 19=9, p) 1;19)
/n t$is #ase, t$e system1s lon',term fun#tionin' +as not t$e 'oal of t$e a#tors +$o #reated it) By
t$e same token, t$e reasons for t$e institution1s invention #annot be derived from an analysis of
its lon',term effe#ts)
Be#o'ni%in' t$e importan#e of poli#y,makers1 $i'$ dis#ount rates raises a #$allen'e for
inter'overnmentalist t$eories of t$e European Community) "s noted above, most international
relations approa#$es to European inte'ration stress t$e tena#ity +it$ +$i#$ nation states #lin' to
all aspe#ts of national soverei'nty) *$e desi'n of #olle#tive institutions is assumed to refle#t t$is
preo##upation) Aet in demo#rati# polities, sustained po+er re.uires ele#toral vindi#ation) Under
many #ir#umstan#es, t$e first #on#ern of national 'overnments is not +it$ soverei'nty per se, but
+it$ #reatin' t$e #onditions for #ontinued domesti# politi#al su##ess) By e(tension, +$ere t$e
time,$ori%ons of de#ision,makers are restri#ted, functional ar'uments t$at are #entral to
transa#tion,#ost vie+s of international re'imes also #ome into .uestion) Bat$er t$an bein'
treated as t$e 'oals of poli#ymakers under su#$ #ir#umstan#es, lon',term institutional effe#ts
s$ould often be seen as t$e by-products of t$eir purposive be$avior)
&nanticipate! Conse'uences.
Gaps in member state #ontrol o##ur not only be#ause lon',term #onse.uen#es tend to be $eavily
dis#ounted) Even if poli#ymakers do fo#us on lon',term effe#ts, unintended #onse.uen#es are
likely to be +idespread) Comple( so#ial pro#esses involvin' lar'e number of a#tors al+ays
'enerate elaborate feedba#k loops and si'nifi#ant intera#tion effe#ts +$i#$ de#ision,makers
#annot $ope to fully #ompre$end 52irs#$ 19EE7 S#$ellin' 19E=7 Ian Pari>s 19=67 Perro+ 19=;7
Cervis 19989) 3$ile so#ial s#ientists possess limited tools for dealin' +it$ su#$ out#omes, many
models ,, su#$ as #ore neo,#lassi#al ar'uments about t$e dynami#s of market systems ,, are
based on t$em)
Unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es are likely to be of parti#ular si'nifi#an#e in t$e European Union
be#ause of t$e presen#e of $i'$ issue density 5Pierson and -eibfried 199?a9) /n s$arp #ontrast to
any e(istin' international or'ani%ation, t$e ran'e of de#isions made at t$e European level runs
almost t$e full 'amut of traditionally &domesti#& issues, from t$e settin' of a'ri#ultural pri#es to
t$e re'ulation of auto emissions and fuel #ontent to t$e ne'otiation of international trade
a'reements) /n t$e past de#ade, t$ere $as been a massive e(pansion of EC de#ision,makin',
primarily be#ause of t$e sin'le market pro>e#t) *$e s$eer s#ope of t$is de#ision,makin' limits
t$e ability of member states to firmly #ontrol t$e development of poli#y)
*$e profound impli#ations of e(panded poli#y a#tivity need to be underlined) "s t$e number of
de#isions made and t$e number of a#tors involved 'ro+s, intera#tions ,, amon' a#tors and
amon' poli#ies ,, in#rease 'eometri#ally 5Beer 19E=9) 0i'ure 1 offers a simple illustration) *$e
#onne#tions bet+een t$e points #ould represent eit$er relations$ips amon' a#tors or amon'
'overnmental a#tivities) 3it$ 6 points 50i'ure la9, t$ere is only one #onne#tion7 +it$ an
e(pansion to four points 50i'ure lb9, t$ere are si( #onne#tions7 +it$ an e(pansion to ei'$t points
51#9, t$ere are 6=) *$is is t$e kind of pro#ess t$at $as been under+ay in t$e EC)
Gro+in' issue density $as t+o distin#t #onse.uen#es) 0irst, it 'enerates problems of overload)
"s European,level de#ision,makin' be#omes bot$ more prevalent and more #omple(, it pla#es
'ro+in' demands on t$e &'ate keepers& of member state soverei'nty) /n t$is #onte(t, time
#onstraints, s#ar#ities of information, and t$e need to dele'ate de#isions to e(perts may promote
unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es and lead to #onsiderable 'aps in member state #ontrol) !ember state
s#rutiny +ill usually be e(tensive in t$e formation of t$e 'rand interstate bar'ains +$i#$ are t$e
favorite sub>e#t for inter'overnmentalists, su#$ as t$e *reaty of Bome, t$e Sin'le European "#t,
and t$e !aastri#$t *reaty) /n t$e intervals bet+een t$ese a'reements $o+ever, fles$ must be
added to t$e skeletal frame+orks) /n t$is #onte(t, +$ere mu#$ poli#y a#tually evolves, t$e ability
of member states to #ontrol t$e pro#ess is likely to be +eaker) "s Gary !arks $as put it,
&GbHeyond and beneat$ t$e $i'$ly visible politi#s of member state bar'ainin' lies a dimly lit
pro#ess of institutional formation)))& 5!arks 1998, p);<89) !arks, for instan#e, $as demonstrated
$o+ t$e Commission e(ploited its more detailed kno+led'e of t$e poli#y pro#ess and its
mana'er role in poli#y formation to 'enerate influen#e over t$e stru#tural funds t$at t$e Britis$
'overnment failed to anti#ipate)
"s $as already been dis#ussed, problems of overload are espe#ially #onse.uential +$en member
states must #ontend +it$ supranational or'ani%ations +$i#$ are ea'er to e(tend t$eir aut$ority) /n
t$e development of #omple( re'ulatory >ud'ments and t$e le'al determination of +$at previous
de#isions a#tually re.uire, essential poli#y,makin' aut$ority is often in t$e $ands of bodies of
e(perts, +$ere t$e Commission plays a #ru#ial role, or in t$e $ands of t$e Court) *$is is, of
#ourse, one of t$e #entral insi'$ts of prin#ipal,a'ent t$eory) "'ents #an use t$eir 'reater
information about t$eir o+n a#tivities and t$e re.uirements #onne#ted to t$eir +ork to a#$ieve
autonomy from prin#ipals) Asymmetrical access to information, +$i#$ is ubi.uitous in #omple(
de#ision,makin' pro#esses, provides a foundation for influen#e 5!oe 19=;9)
*$e se#ond #onse.uen#e of issue density is t$e oft,#ited pro#ess of spillover@ t$e tenden#y of
tasks adopted to $ave important #onse.uen#es for realms outside t$ose ori'inally intended, or to
empo+er a#tors +$o 'enerate ne+ demands for e(tended intervention 52aas 19?=9) :ne of t$e
key ar'uments in mu#$ +ritin' on #ontemporary politi#al e#onomies stresses pre#isely t$e
embeddedness of e#onomi# a#tion +it$in net+orks of ti'$tly,#oupled so#ial and politi#al
institutions 52all 19=7 Nort$ 199<7 Garrett and -an'e 199;9) Efforts to inte'rate some aspe#ts
of #omple( modern so#ieties +it$out #$an'in' ot$er #omponents may prove problemati#
be#ause t$e se#tors to be inte'rated #annot be effe#tively isolated) *$e more &ti'$tly #oupled&
'overnment poli#ies are, t$e more likely it is t$at a#tions in one realm +ill $ave unanti#ipated
effe#ts in ot$ers 5Perro+ 19=;9) !#Namara, for e(ample, $as demonstrated t$e si'nifi#an#e of
su#$ intera#tion effe#ts in t$e #ases of monetary and a'ri#ultural poli#ies 5!#Namara 19989)
Similar #onne#tions bet+een t$e sin'le market initiative and so#ial poli#y development $ave also
been do#umented 5-eibfried and Pierson 199?9) "s t$e density of EC poli#ymakin' in#reases,
su#$ intera#tion effe#ts be#ome more prevalent, unintended #onse.uen#es multiply, and t$e
prospe#t of 'aps in member state #ontrol +ill 'ro+)
Shifts in C() Policy Preferences.
/nter'overnmentalist t$eories tend to treat t$e institutional and poli#y preferen#es of t$e member
states as essentially fi(ed) *$is is one of a number of #ru#ial respe#ts in +$i#$
inter'overnmentalism involves a too,easy translation from t$e +orld of e#onomi# or'ani%ations
to t$e +orld of politi#s) /t may make some sense to assume stable preferen#es +$en studyin'
firms, or even +$en one dis#usses t$e endurin' issues of 'rand diploma#y) 2o+ever, as one
moves from traditional forei'n poli#y issues su#$ as national se#urity to+ard t$e traditionally
&domesti#& #on#erns +$ere t$e EC $as be#ome .uite si'nifi#ant, t$is be#omes a more dubious
premise)
*$e poli#y preferen#es of member states may s$ift for a number of reasons) "ltered
#ir#umstan#es or ne+ information may lead 'overnments to .uestion previous arran'ements)
E.ually important, #$an'es in 'overnment o##ur fre.uently, and 'overnments of different
partisan #omple(ions often $ave .uite distin#t vie+s on poli#y matters dealt +it$ at t$e EC level)
Governments #ome and 'o) Ea#$ in$erits a set of arran'ements from t$e past7 ea#$ tries to pla#e
its o+n imprint on t$is $erita'e) *$e result, over time, is t$at evolvin' arran'ements +ill diver'e
from t$e intentions of ori'inal desi'ners, +$ile any ne+ly,arrivin' C:G is likely to find
institutional and poli#y arran'ements #onsiderably out of syn#$ +it$ its o+n preferen#es)
*$us, t$ere are a number of reasons +$y 'aps in member state #ontrol are likely to emer'e) *+o
'eneral points about t$ese sour#es of 'aps deserve emp$asis) 0irst, most of t$ese pro#esses $ave
a temporal .uality t$at makes t$em invisible to a syn#$roni# analysis of institutional and poli#y
#$oi#e) *$e role of restri#ted time $ori%ons, unintended #onse.uen#es, and s$iftin' member state
preferen#es +ill only be evident if +e e(amine politi#al pro#esses over time) Se#ond, most of t$e
pro#esses $i'$li'$ted are mu#$ more likely to be prevalent in t$e European Community t$an in
t$e more purely &international& settin's +$i#$ +ere t$e sub>e#t of ori'inal efforts to develop and
refine re'ime t$eory) Be#ause many of t$e more &domesti#& issues +$i#$ t$e EC #onsiders $ave
si'nifi#ant ele#toral impli#ations, t$e time,$ori%ons of de#ision,makers are likely to be s$orter)
Unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es are also more prevalent, be#ause unlike a typi#al international
re'ime, t$e EC deals +it$ many ti'$tly,#oupled issues) Ele#toral turnover is more likely to #ause
s$ifts in C:G preferen#es on t$e more domesti# issues +$i#$ t$e EC #onsiders t$an on t$e
traditional diplomati# a'enda of most international re'imes) /n s$ort, t$e EC1s fo#us on #ore
#on#erns of traditional domesti# politi#s makes it more prone to all t$e sour#es of 'aps in
member state #ontrol +$i#$ $istori#al institutionalism identifies)
"t t$is point, $o+ever, t$e #laim of member state #onstraint is in#omplete) *ransa#tion #ost
approa#$es are #ompatible +it$ t$e possibility of at least some sorts of 'aps, alt$ou'$ t$ese are
rarely addressed in pra#ti#e) "fter all, +$ile it $as not emp$asi%ed unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es
53illiamson 1998, p) 119, *CE is based in lar'e part on $o+ un#ertainty about future events
provokes parti#ular or'ani%ational responses) /t is not enou'$ to demonstrate t$at 'aps emer'e7
one must also s$o+ t$at on#e su#$ losses of #ontrol take pla#e t$ey often #annot be #orre#ted)
0or inter'overnmentalists, even +$ere t$e possibility of 'aps is a#kno+led'ed, t$ese losses of
#ontrol are #onsidered t$eoreti#ally unproblemati#) S$ould out#omes o##ur +$i#$ prin#ipals do
not desire, *CE des#ribes t+o routes to restored effi#ien#y@ #ompetition and learnin')
?
Competitive pressures in a market so#iety mean t$at ne+ or'ani%ations +it$ more effi#ient
stru#tures +ill develop, eventually repla#in' suboptimal or'ani%ations) -earnin' pro#esses
amon' prin#ipals #an also lead to #orre#tion) "##ordin' to 3illiamson, one #an rely on
&)))t$e 1far,si'$ted propensity1 or 1rational spirit1 t$at e#onomi#s as#ribes to e#onomi# a#tors)
:n#e t$e unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es are understood, t$ese effe#ts +ill t$ereafter be anti#ipated
and t$e ramifi#ations #an be folded ba#k into t$e or'ani%ational desi'n) Un+anted #osts +ill t$en
be miti'ated and unanti#ipated benefits +ill be en$an#ed) Better e#onomi# performan#e +ill
ordinarily result& 53illiamson 1998, pp)11,1E9)
Bot$ t$ese #orre#tive me#$anisms, $o+ever, are of limited appli#ability +$en one s$ifts from
3illiamson1s fo#us on firms in private markets to t$e +orld of politi#al institutions 5!oe 19=;7
!oe 199<9) *$is is #learest for t$e me#$anism of #ompetition) Politi#al institutions rarely
#onfront a dense environment of #ompetin' institutions +$i#$ +ill instantly #apitali%e on
ineffi#ient performan#e, s+oopin' in to #arry off an institution1s &#ustomers& and drive it into
&bankrupt#y)& Politi#al environments are typi#ally more &permissive& 5Frasner 19=97 Po+ell and
4i!a''io 19919) 3it$in Europe, t$ere is not$in' like a marketpla#e for #ompetition amon'
international re'imes, in +$i#$ ne+ market entrants #an demonstrate t$at t$eir effi#ien#y
5$o+ever t$at mi'$t be defined and measured9 is 'reater t$an t$e EC1s)
3$ile ar'uments based on #ompetition are +eak, learnin' ar'uments +ould appear to be more
appli#able to politi#al environments) /ndeed, Gary !arks, +$o $as pointed to t$e si'nifi#an#e of
unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es in limitin' member state #ontrol, #on#edes t$at t$e use of su#$
ar'uments &is tri#ky in t$e #onte(t of on'oin' politi#al relations$ips +$ere learnin' takes pla#e&
5!arks 1998, p);<89) *$e pro#ess t$rou'$ +$i#$ a#tors &learn& about 'aps in #ontrol and $o+ to
address t$em $as re#eived little attention 5!#Cubbins and S#$+art% 19=;9) 2o+ever, at least on
t$e bi''est issues, inter'overnmentalists #an reasonably assert t$at member states +ill 'radually
be#ome a+are of undesired or unanti#ipated out#omes, and +ill be#ome more adept at
developin' effe#tive responses over time) -earnin' t$us seems to offer an effe#tive me#$anism
for #losin' 'aps and returnin' institutional and poli#y desi'ns to an &effi#ient& 5from t$e point of
vie+ of t$e member states9 pat$)
Aet t$e effi#a#y of learnin' ar'ument depends #ru#ially on t$e #apa#ity of member states to fold
ne+ understandin's &ba#k into t$e or'ani%ational desi'n)& Put differently, on#e 'aps appear and
are identified, $o+ easy is it for prin#ipals to re'ain #ontrolJ 2ere t$e distin#tion bet+een
e#onomi# and politi#al institutions be#omes #ru#ial) /n e#onomi# or'ani%ations, o+ners 5or
prin#ipals9 may fa#e fe+ barriers to su#$ efforts) /n t$e political +orld, $o+ever 5and t$e #ase of
t$e EC in parti#ular9, in#orporatin' ne+ understandin's into institutions and poli#ies is no simple
task) *$e ne(t sta'e of t$e ar'ument, t$en, is to #onsider +$y 'aps, even +$en identified, mi'$t
be $ard to #lose) *$ere are t$ree broad reasons@ t$e resistan#e of EC institutional a#tors7 t$e
institutional obsta#les to reform +it$in t$e EC, and t$e sunk #osts asso#iated +it$ previous
a#tions) /f t$ese barriers are suffi#iently $i'$, learnin' +ill not provide a suffi#ient basis for
#orre#tion, and member state #ontrol +ill be #onstrained)
The esistance of Supranational Actors.
*o t$e e(tent t$at neo,fun#tionalism $as $ad an impli#it ar'ument about t$e diffi#ulty of #losin'
'aps, it $as #entered on supranational a#tors) *$e Court, Commission and Parliament $ave
a##umulated si'nifi#ant politi#al resour#es) *$ey #an be e(pe#ted to use t$ese resour#es to resist
member state efforts to e(er#ise 'reater #ontrol over t$eir a#tivities) Aet neo,fun#tionalism $as
failed to address t$e .uestion of +$y, in an open #onfrontation bet+een member states and
supranational a#tors, t$e latter #ould ever be e(pe#ted to prevail) !ember states, after all, $ave
substantial oversi'$t po+ers, alon' +it$ #ontrol over bud'ets and appointments) !ore
fundamentally, t$ey possess t$e le'al aut$ority to determine 5and alter9 t$e basi# rules of t$e
'ame, in#ludin' t$ose affe#tin' t$e very e(isten#e of t$e EC1s supranational or'ani%ations) *$e
resour#es of t$e Court, Commission and Parliament, su#$ as t$e #apa#ity to play off one member
state a'ainst anot$er in t$e a'enda,settin' pro#ess and per$aps e(ploit information asymmetries,
are not trivial, but t$ey are #learly modest by #omparison) " persuasive a##ount of member state
#onstraint must dra+ on more t$an t$e politi#al resour#es of supranational a#tors)
Institutional Barriers to eform.
*$e efforts of prin#ipals to reassert #ontrol +ill be fa#ilitated if t$ey #an easily redesi'n poli#ies
and institutions) /n t$e e#onomi# realm, prin#ipals are 'enerally in a stron' position to remake
t$eir or'ani%ations as t$ey #$oose) -ines of aut$ority are #lear, and t$e relevant de#ision,makers
are likely to s$are t$e same broad 'oal of ma(imi%in' profits) /n politi#s, $o+ever, t$e temporal
dimension raises distin#t problems) Politi#al de#ision,makers kno+ t$at #ontinuous institutional
#ontrol is unlikely) *$is la#k of #ontinuous #ontrol $as impli#ations bot$ for $o+ institutions are
desi'ned and for t$e prospe#ts of #$an'in' institutions on#e t$ey are #reated) /n parti#ular, t$ose
desi'nin' institutions must #onsider t$e likeli$ood t$at future 'overnments +ill be ea'er to
overturn t$eir desi'ns, or to turn t$e institutions t$ey #reate to ot$er purposes) "s !oe notes, t$e
desi'ners of institutions &))) do not +ant 1t$eir1 a'en#ies to fall under t$e #ontrol of opponents)
"nd 'iven t$e +ay publi# aut$ority is allo#ated and e(er#ised in a demo#ra#y, t$ey often #an
only s$ut out t$eir opponents by s$uttin' t$emselves out too) /n many #ases, t$en, t$ey purposely
#reate stru#tures t$at even t$ey #annot #ontrol& 5!oe 199<, p)16?9)
*$us, politi#al institutions are often &sti#ky& ,, spe#ifi#ally desi'ned to $inder t$e pro#ess of
institutional and poli#y reform) *$is is, of #ourse, far more true of some national polities t$an
ot$ers 53eaver and Bo#kman 19989) Aet t$e barriers in most national politi#al systems pale in
#omparison to t$e obsta#les present in t$e EC) /n prin#iple, t$e member states de#ide@ t$ey $ave
t$e aut$ority, if t$ey so #$oose, to reform or even abolis$ t$e Court, Commission, or Parliament)
But in fa#t, t$e rules of t$e 'ame +it$in t$e Community +ere desi'ned to in$ibit even modest
#$an'es of #ourse) *$e same re.uirements t$at makes initial de#ision,makin' diffi#ult also
makes previously,ena#ted reforms $ard to undo, even if t$ose reforms turn out to be
une(pe#tedly #ostly or to infrin'e on member state soverei'nty)
Efforts to employ t$e most radi#al ve$i#le of institutional redesi'n, a *reaty revision, fa#e
e(tremely $i'$ barriers@ unanimous member state a'reement, plus ratifi#ation by national
parliaments and 5in some #ases9 ele#torates) Given t$e #$an#es for disa'reements amon' C:Gs,
let alone t$e problems #onne#ted to ratifi#ation, t$e #$an#es of a#$ievin' su#$ an e(traordinary
de'ree of #onsensus are 'enerally .uite lo+) Use of t$is pro#ess is no+ +idely re#o'ni%ed to be
e(traordinarily diffi#ult and unpredi#table) "s !ark Polla#k notes, &t$e t$reat of *reaty revision
is essentially t$e 1nu#lear option1 ,, e(#eedin'ly effe#tive, but diffi#ult to use ,, and is t$erefore a
relatively ineffe#tive and non,#redible means of member state #ontrol& 5Polla#k 199?, p)8<9)
Efforts to produ#e more modest #$an'es in #ourse #onfront more modest $urdles, but t$ese
remain far tou'$er t$an t$e obsta#les fa#in', for e(ample, a Con'ressional #ommittee tryin' to
rein in a ro'ue federal a'en#y) !ember states +ill often be divided on si'nifi#ant issues, but in
many poli#y areas #$an'e re.uire a unanimous vote of t$e member states) /n ot$er #ases,
Kualified !a>ority Iotin' is t$e rule) *$is makes reform easier, but t$e standard ,, rou'$ly
?DEt$s of t$e +ei'$ted votes of member states ,, still presents a t$res$old t$at is #onsiderably
tou'$er to #ross t$an t$at re.uired in most demo#rati# institutions 5Polla#k 199;7 Polla#k 199?9)
*$e e(tent to +$i#$ t$ese barriers #onstrain member states $as re#ently been .uestioned) 3$ere
it +as on#e understood t$at parti#ipation in t$e EC +as an all,or,not$in' proposition, !aastri#$t
$as en$an#ed t$e prospe#ts for a Europe &a la #arte,& or a Europe of &variable 'eometries)&
Britain and 4enmark re#eived opt,outs on monetary union7 t$e eleven ot$er member states
#ir#umvented t$e Britis$ veto by optin' &up and out& +it$ t$e So#ial Proto#ol) "s Ceff "nderson
summari%es t$e ne+ situation, &G!aastri#$tH and atta#$ed proto#ols establis$ed an important
pre#edent, openin' t$e door to a multitra#k Europe in +$i#$ t$e treaties and resultin' se#ondary
le'islation do not apply uniformly to ea#$ member& 5"nderson 199?, p);;99) *$is ne+
fle(ibility, $o+ever, refers only to additional treaty obli'ations) !ember state 'overnments may
be able to obtain opt,outs from future treaty provisions) Unless t$ey su##eed in navi'atin' t$e
diffi#ult EC de#ision rules for reversin' #ourse, $o+ever, t$ey are not free to revie+ and dis#ard
t$e #ommitments of previous 'overnments, even if t$ose earlier 'overnments +ere pre,o##upied
by s$ort,term 'oals, $ad .uite different poli#y preferen#es, or a#ted in +ays t$at produ#ed many
unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es) "nd as ne+ poli#ies are ena#ted, t$e s#ope of t$is restri#tive acquis
communautaire #ontinues to 'ro+)
*$e rules 'overnin' institutional and poli#y reform in t$e European Community #reate +$at
0rit% S#$arpf #alls a &>oint,de#ision trap&, makin' member state efforts to #lose 'aps in #ontrol
$i'$ly problemati# 5S#$arpf 19==9) *$e e(tent of t$e institutional obsta#les +ill vary from issue
to issue) :bviously, if t$e benefits of a#tin' are $i'$ enou'$, member states +ill be able to a#t)
But often t$e benefits must be .uite $i'$) /n s$uttin' out t$eir potential su##essors, C:GS $ave
indeed s$ut t$emselves out as +ell)
Sun% Costs an! the ising Price of E*it.
*$e evolution of EC poli#y over time may #onstrain member states not only be#ause institutional
arran'ements make a reversal of #ourse difficult +$en member states dis#over unanti#ipated
#onse.uen#es or t$eir poli#y preferen#es #$an'e) /ndividual and or'ani%ational adaptations to
previous de#isions may also 'enerate massive sunk #osts t$at make poli#y reversal unattractive.
3$en a#tors adapt to t$e ne+ rules of t$e 'ame by makin' e(tensive #ommitments based on t$e
e(pe#tation t$at t$ese rules +ill #ontinue, previous de#isions may &lo#k,in& member states to
poli#y options t$at t$ey +ould not no+ #$oose to initiate) Put anot$er +ay, so#ial adaptation to
EC institutions and poli#ies drasti#ally in#reases t$e #ost of e(it from e(istin' arran'ements for
member states) Bat$er t$an refle#tin' t$e benefits of institutionali%ed e(#$an'e, #ontinuin'
inte'ration #ould easily refle#t t$e risin' #osts of &non,Europe)&
Be#ent +ork on pat$ dependen#e $as emp$asi%ed t$e +ays in +$i#$ initial institutional or poli#y
de#isions ,, even suboptimal ones ,, #an be#ome self,reinfor#in' over time 5Frasner 19=97 Nort$
199<9) *$ese initial #$oi#es en#oura'e t$e emer'en#e of elaborate so#ial and e#onomi#
net+orks, 'reatly in#reasin' t$e #ost of adoptin' on#e,possible alternatives and t$erefore
in$ibitin' e(it from a #urrent poli#y pat$) !a>or initiatives $ave ma>or so#ial #onse.uen#es)
/ndividuals make important #ommitments in response to 'overnment a#tions) *$ese
#ommitments, in turn, may vastly in#rease t$e disruption #aused by poli#y s$ifts or institutional
reforms, effe#tively &lo#kin' in& previous de#isions 5Pierson 19967 Pierson 19989)
3ork on te#$nolo'i#al #$an'e $as revealed some of t$e #ir#umstan#es #ondu#ive to pat$
dependen#e 54avid 19=?7 "rt$ur 19==7 "rt$ur 19=99) *$e #ru#ial idea is t$e prevalen#e of
in#reasin' returns, +$i#$ en#oura'e a fo#us on a sin'le alternative and #ontinued movement
do+n a spe#ifi# pat$ on#e initial steps are taken) Large set-up or fixed costs are likely to #reate
in#reasin' returns to furt$er investment in a 'iven te#$nolo'y, providin' individuals +it$ a
stron' in#entive to identify and sti#k +it$ a sin'le option) Substantial learning effects #onne#ted
to t$e operation of #omple( systems provide an additional sour#e of in#reasin' returns) Co-
ordination effects o##ur +$en t$e individual re#eives in#reased benefits from a parti#ular a#tivity
if ot$ers also adopt t$e same option) 0inally, adaptive expectations o##ur +$en individuals feel a
need to &pi#k t$e ri'$t $orse& be#ause options t$at fail to +in broad a##eptan#e +ill $ave
dra+ba#ks later on) Under t$ese #onditions, individual e(pe#tations about usa'e patterns may
be#ome self,fulfillin')
"s Nort$ $as ar'ued, all of t$ese ar'uments #an be e(tended from studies of te#$nolo'i#al
#$an'e to ot$er so#ial pro#esses, makin' pat$,dependen#e a #ommon feature of institutional
evolution 5Nort$ 199<, pp)98,?9) Pat$ dependen#e may o##ur in poli#y development as +ell,
sin#e poli#ies #an also #onstitute #ru#ial systems of rules, in#entives, and #onstraints 5Pierson
1998, pp) <E,=9) /n #onte(ts of #omple( so#ial interdependen#e ne+ institutions and poli#ies
+ill often 'enerate $i'$ fi(ed #osts, learnin' effe#ts, #oordination effe#ts, and adaptive
e(pe#tations) 0or e(ample, $ousin' and transportation poli#ies in t$e United States after 3orld
3ar // en#oura'ed massive investments in parti#ular spatial patterns of +ork, #onsumption, and
residen#e) :n#e in pla#e, t$ese patterns s$arply #onstrained t$e alternatives available to
poli#ymakers on issues ran'in' from ener'y poli#y to s#$ool dese're'ation 54anielson 19E7
Ca#kson 19=?9) !any of t$e #ommitments t$at lo#ked in suburbani%ation +ere literally #ast in
#on#rete, but t$is need not be t$e #ase) So#ial Se#urity in t$e United States be#ame 'radually
lo#ked,in t$rou'$ its finan#in' system, +$i#$ #reated a kind of rollin' inter'enerational #ontra#t
5Pierson 19969) /nstitutions and poli#ies may en#oura'e individuals and or'ani%ations to develop
parti#ular skills, make #ertain investments, pur#$ase parti#ular 'oods, or devote time and money
to #ertain or'ani%ations) "ll t$ese de#isions 'enerate sunk #osts) *$at is to say, t$ey #reate
#ommitments) /n many #ases, initial a#tions pus$ individual be$avior onto pat$s t$at are $ard to
reverse)
-o#k,in ar'uments $ave re#eived relatively little attention +it$in politi#al s#ien#e, in part
be#ause t$ese pro#esses $ave a tenden#y to depoliti#i%e issues) By a##eleratin' t$e momentum
be$ind one pat$, t$ey render previously viable alternatives implausible) *$e result is often not
t$e kind of #onfli#t over t$e fore'one alternative t$at politi#al s#ientists +ould .ui#kly identify,
but t$e absen#e of #onfli#t) -o#k,in leads to +$at Ba#$ra#$ and Barat% #alled &non,de#isions&
5Ba#$ra#$ and Barat% 1969) *$is aspe#t of politi#s #an probably be identified only t$rou'$
#areful, t$eoreti#ally,'rounded $istori#al investi'ation of $o+ so#ial adaptations to institutional
and poli#y #onstraints alter t$e #onte(t for future de#ision,makin')
:ver time, as so#ial a#tors make #ommitments based on e(istin' institutions and poli#ies, t$e
#ost of &e(it& from e(istin' arran'ements rises) 3it$in t$e European Community, dense
net+orks of so#ial, politi#al, and e#onomi# a#tivity $ave 'ro+n up around past institutional and
poli#y de#isions) /n spe#ulatin' about a $ypot$eti#al effort to stem t$e po+er of Court and
Commission, member states must ask t$emselves if t$is #an be done +it$out, for instan#e,
>eopardi%in' t$e sin'le market pro>e#t) *$us, sunk #osts may dramati#ally redu#e a member state
'overnment1s room for maneuver) /n t$e EC, one #an see t$is development in t$e 'ro+in'
implausibility of member state &e(it t$reats)& 3$ile &soverei'n& member states remain free to
tear up treaties and +alk a+ay at any time, t$e #onstantly in#reasin' #osts of e(it in a densely
inte'rated polity $ave rendered t$is option virtually unt$inkable for EC member states)
3illiamson1s #onfident assertion t$at learnin' allo+s firms to ad>ust to unanti#ipated
#onse.uen#es applies far less +ell to an analysis of politi#s) !ember state learnin' from past
events may lead, as it did at !aastri#$t, to 'reater restri#tions on supranational a#tors in new
initiatives 54e$ousse 19989) Be#apturin' 'round in previously institutionali%ed fields of a#tivity,
$o+ever, +ill often be .uite diffi#ult) !ember states do not in$erit a blank slate t$at t$ey #an
remake at +ill +$en t$eir poli#y preferen#es s$ift or unintended #onse.uen#es be#ome visible)
4e#ision rules $amper reform, +$ile e(tensive adaptations to e(istin' arran'ements in#rease t$e
asso#iated #osts) *$us a #entral fa#t of life for member states is t$e acquis communautaire, t$e
#orpus of e(istin' le'islation and pra#ti#e) "s !i#$ael S$a#kleton notes, &G$Ho+ever mu#$
!ember States mi'$t deplore #ertain aspe#ts of Community poli#y, t$ere is no .uestion t$at all
find t$emselves lo#ked into a system +$i#$ narro+s do+n t$e areas for possible #$an'e and
obli'es t$em to t$ink of in#remental revision of e(istin' arran'ements& 5S$a#kleton 1998, p)6<9)
Cust as $as al+ays been true in domesti# politi#s, ne+ 'overnments in member states no+ find
t$at t$e dead +ei'$t of previous institutional and poli#y de#isions at t$e European level seriously
limits t$eir room for maneuver)
*$e need to e(amine politi#al pro#esses over time is t$e #ru#ial feature linkin' all t$e ar'uments
presented in t$is se#tion) None of t$ese pro#esses are likely to be #aptured by a &snaps$ot& vie+)
2istori#al institutionalism provides a #lear a##ount of +$y 'aps emer'e in member state
aut$ority) !ember states are often preo##upied +it$ s$ort,term out#omes) *$eir de#isions are
#ertain to produ#e all sorts of unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es) *$e preferen#es of member states
may also s$ift, leavin' t$em +it$ formal institutions and $i'$ly,developed poli#ies t$at do not fit
t$eir #urrent needs) "t least as important, $istori#al institutionalism provides a #o$erent a##ount
of +$y learnin' pro#esses and &fire alarms& may not be suffi#ient to prompt t$e reassertion of
member state #ontrol) /f member states de#ide t$at t$eir a'ents $ave #aptured too mu#$
aut$ority, t$ey may +ell seek to rein t$em in) Gaps, $o+ever, open possibilities for autonomous
a#tion by supranational a#tors, +$i#$ may in turn produ#e politi#al resour#es t$at make t$em
more si'nifi#ant players in t$e ne(t round of de#ision,makin') 4e#ision rules and t$e
proliferation of sunk #osts may make t$e pri#e of reassertin' #ontrol too $i'$)
/n s$ort, $istori#al institutionalist analysis #an in#orporate key aspe#ts of neo,fun#tionalism
+$ile offerin' a stron'er and e(panded analyti#al foundation for an a##ount of member state
#onstraint) *$ere are important points of #ompatibility bet+een t$e t+o approa#$es) Bot$ su''est
t$at unintended #onse.uen#es, in#ludin' spillover, are likely to be si'nifi#ant for institutional
development) Bot$ point to t$e si'nifi#an#e of supranational a#tors) " #ru#ial differen#e is t$at
neo,fun#tionalism sees politi#al #ontrol as a %ero,sum p$enomenon, +it$ aut$ority 'radually
transferred from member states to supranational a#tors, +$ile $istori#al institutionalism
emp$asi%es $o+ t$e evolution of rules and poli#ies alon' +it$ so#ial adaptations #reate an
in#reasin'ly stru#tured polity +$i#$ restri#ts t$e options available to all politi#al a#tors) 3$at
$as been missin' from neofun#tionalism,, and +$at $istori#al institutionalist ar'uments #an
supply ,, is a more #onvin#in' analysis of member state #onstraint) /nter'overnmentalists
#$allen'e neo,fun#tionalism +it$ t+o key .uestions@ +$y +ould member states lose #ontrol, and
even if t$ey did +$y +ould t$ey not subse.uently reassert itJ 2istori#al institutionalism 'ives
#lear and plausible ans+ers to bot$)
*$e #ru#ial #ontrasts bet+een an inter'overnmentalist and a $istori#al institutionalist a##ount #an
be seen in 0i'ure //) 3$ile inter'overnmentalists fo#us on t$e initial bar'ain at time *
<
, $istori#al
institutionalism emp$asi%es t$e need to analyse t$e #onse.uen#es of t$at bar'ain over time)
4oin' so reveals t$e potential for #onsiderable 'aps in member state #ontrol to emer'e 5*
1
9)
3$en t$e time of t$e ne(t &'rand bar'ain arrives 5*
6
9, member states +ill a'ain be #entral a#tors,
but in a #onsiderably altered #onte(t) !ember states may dominate de#ision,makin' in t$ese
inter'overnmental bar'ains, and a#tively pursue t$eir interests, but t$ey do so +it$in #onstraints
5fre.uently unplanned and often $ardly visible9 #reated by t$eir prede#essors and t$e mi#ro,level
rea#tions to t$ose pre#edin' de#isions) Studyin' pro#esses of poli#y and institutional #$an'e
over time reveals t$at 'aps may +ell be e(tensive and t$e prospe#ts for re#apturin' lost #ontrol
are often .uite limited) "s t$e ne(t se#tion demonstrates, t$is $as been true in at least one
si'nifi#ant 5and une(pe#ted9 area of European poli#y development)
III The Case of European Social olicy
So#ial poli#y is +idely #onsidered to be an area +$ere member state #ontrol remains
un#$allen'ed) *$e need for a#tion at t$e European level $as not been self,evident, and member
states $ave been .uite sensitive to intrusions on a #ore area of national soverei'nty) "##ounts of
European so#ial poli#y 'enerally present a minimalist interpretation of European Union
involvement 5!osley 199<7 Stree#k and S#$mitter 19917 -an'e 19969) *$e European
Commission1s dire#t attempt to #onstru#t a si'nifi#ant &so#ial dimension& ,, areas of so#ial poli#y
#ompeten#e +$ere uniform or at least minimum standards are set at t$e EC level ,, $as been a
sa'a of $i'$ aspirations and modest results) *$e debates of t$e past fe+ de#ades $ave been
dominated by &#$eap talk& produ#ed in t$e #onfident kno+led'e t$at t$e re.uirements of
unanimous European Coun#il votes meant t$at ambitious blueprints +ould remain une(e#uted
5-an'e 19969)
*$e obsta#les to an a#tivist role for Brussels in so#ial poli#y development $ave al+ays been
formidable) "s noted, EC institutions make it mu#$ easier to blo#k reforms t$an to ena#t t$em)
*$e so#ial for#es most sympat$eti# to European,level a#tivity ,, labor unions and so#ial
demo#rati# parties ,, $ave $ad relatively little influen#e in t$e past fifteen years) *$e member
states t$emselves, +$i#$ serve as 'atekeepers for initiatives t$at re.uire Coun#il approval,
>ealously prote#t so#ial poli#y prero'atives) E#onomi# and 'eopoliti#al #$an'es sin#e 3orld 3ar
// $ave 'radually diminis$ed t$e s#ope of national soverei'nty in a variety of domains) *$e
+elfare state remains one of t$e fe+ key realms of poli#y #ompeten#e +$ere national
'overnments still appear to rei'n supreme) Given t$e popularity of most so#ial pro'rams,
national e(e#utives +ill usually resist losses of so#ial poli#y aut$ority) *$e a'endas of member
states 'enerally #reated only narro+, market,related openin's for so#ial le'islation, and t$en only
by super,ma>ority vote)
Aet even in t$is area ,, +$ere an inter'overnmentalist a##ount seems $i'$ly plausible ,, a
$istori#al institutionalist perspe#tive #asts t$e development of European poli#y in .uite a
different li'$t) *$ose seekin' a more t$orou'$ analysis s$ould look else+$ere 5-eibfried and
Pierson 199?9) 2ere / dis#uss t$ree aspe#ts of poli#y development +$i#$ point to si'nifi#ant
initiatives t$at $ave e(tended beyond t$e firm #ontrol of member states@ 519 interventions on
issues of 'ender e.uality7 569 t$e e(pansion of $ealt$ and safety re'ulations7 and 589 t$e re#ent
ena#tment of t$e &So#ial Proto#ol)& Ea#$ of t$ese developments illustrates important aspe#ts of
an $istori#al institutionalist a##ount)
The EC an! )en!er E'uality.
*$e European Community $as assumed a #entral role in t$e development of poli#ies to promote
'ender e.uality) /t is #lear t$at member states did not seek t$is out#ome) Bat$er, t$e EC1s
e(tensive role must be #onsidered an unintended by,produ#t of t$e Community1s ori'inal
institutional desi'n) *$e key development +as t$e in#lusion of "rti#le 119 of t$e *reaty of
Bome, re.uirin' member states to &))) ensure and maintain t$e appli#ation of t$e prin#iple t$at
men and +omen s$ould re#eive e.ual pay for e.ual +ork)& *$is provision 're+ out of a len't$y
fi'$t bet+een Germany and 0ran#e over t$e more 'eneral $armoni%ation of so#ial poli#y) *$e
Germans, +$o re>e#ted #alls for $armoni%ation, eventually +on) "rti#le 119 +as #onsidered
&merely $ortatory& ,, a fa#e,savin' #on#ession to 0ran#e rat$er t$an a basis for poli#y 52oskyns
19=, p)8<?7 !il+ard 1996, pp)6<9,17 !orav#sik 199;, p)6E9) /ndeed, t$e mandate to address
pay ine.uities lay dormant for almost t+o de#ades)
"rti#le 1191s broad +ordin', $o+ever, offered untapped potential) "n openin' o##urred +$en
t$e poli#y preferen#es of member states s$ifted in t$e early 1 9E<s ,, t$e $i'$ tide of so#ial
demo#rati# sentiment in t$e EC and a time +$en +omen1s movements +ere 'at$erin' stren't$ in
many #ountries) Politi#ians ea'erly sou'$t a symboli# response to t$ese ne+ demands) /n t$is
#onte(t, t$e Coun#il a'reed to several dire#tives +$i#$ 'ave t$e &e.ual treatment& provision
some #ontent) Cat$erine 2oskyns summari%es t$e atmosp$ere at t$e time@
)))) dire#tives +ere passed +it$out mu#$ a+areness of t$eir #onse.uen#es) *ime and a'ain intervie+s +it$ national
offi#ials $ave s$o+n t$at t$ose +$o ne'otiated t$e ori'inal provisions $ad no idea +$at for#e t$ey +ould prove to
$ave or t$e le'islative up$eaval t$ey +ould provoke) *$is is undoubtedly one of t$e reasons +$y 'overnments $ave
been so relu#tant sin#e 19E= to adopt ne+ dire#tives in t$is field 52oskyns 19=, p)8<9)
*$is 'ro+in' relu#tan#e refle#ted bot$ 'ro+in' member state a+areness of unintended
#onse.uen#es and yet anot$er s$ift in member state poli#y preferen#es, t$is time a##ompanyin'
t$e ri'$t+ard drift in t$e ideolo'i#al #omple(ion of member state 'overnments after 19E9)
/f t$e member states soon be#ame $esitant, $o+ever, t$eir o+n initiatives $ad pus$ed t$e EC far
do+n a pat$ +$ere member states #ould no lon'er fully #ontrol t$e evolution of poli#y) *$e
passa'e of t$e dire#tives, ba#ked by t$e no+ far from symboli# "rti#le 119, transferred
#onsiderable influen#e over 'ender poli#y to t$e ECC) :ver t$e past fifteen years, t$e European
Court of Custi#e 5ECC9 $as played a #ru#ial a#tivist role, spurred on by +omen ? 'roups +$i#$
sa+ a si'nifi#ant opportunity to advan#e t$eir a'endas) *$e Court $as turned "rti#le 119 and t$e
dire#tives into a broad set of re.uirements and pro$ibitions related to t$e treatment of +omen
+orkers 5:stner and -e+is 199?9)
*$e ECC1s e(pansive interpretations of "rti#le 119 and t$e various 4ire#tives $ave re.uired
e(tensive national reforms of so#ial se#urity la+ and #orporate employment pra#ti#es) *$e
impa#t on one member state +as des#ribed by /reland1s Coint Committee on Se#ondary
-e'islation of t$e EC@
*$e Community $as brou'$t about #$an'es in employment pra#ti#es +$i#$ mi'$t ot$er+ise $ave taken de#ades to
a#$ieve) /ris$ +omen $ave t$e Community to t$ank for t$e removal of t$e marria'e bar in employment, t$e
introdu#tion of maternity leave, 'reater opportunities to train at a skilled trade, prote#tion a'ainst dismissal on
pre'nan#y, t$e disappearan#e of advertisements spe#ifyin' t$e se( of an appli#ant for a >ob and 'reater e.uality in
t$e so#ial +elfare #ode) "fter farmers, /ris$ +omen in employment $ave probably benefited most from entry to t$e
EEC 5.uoted in !an'an 1998, p)E69)
*$is #on#lusion may be 'enerous, but fe+ doubt t$e broad impa#t of EC interventions) *o take
>ust one important re#ent e(ample, ECC de#isions $ave $ad a dramati# impa#t on publi# and
private pension s#$emes) *$e Court1s insisten#e on e.ual retirement a'es in publi# pension
s#$emes for#ed reform in a number of #ountries) 3$en in Barber t$e ECC made a similar rulin'
for o##upational pensions, fear t$at t$e rulin' mi'$t be applied retroa#tively 5at a #ost to private
insurers estimated at up to Lsterl7;< billion in Britain and 8? billion 4! in Germany9 fueled
&+$at is probably t$e most intense lobbyin' #ampai'n yet seen in Brussels& 5!a%ey and
Bi#$ardson 1998, p) 1?9) /n t$is instan#e, member states +ere in fa#t able to limit t$e dama'e,
but it took a lot to do so@ a unanimous a'reement to add a &Barber proto#ol& to t$e !aastri#$t
*reaty) *$e proto#ol states t$at Barber +ill not be applied retroa#tively, t$us preemptin' an
interpretation t$at many a'reed +ould be a dubious appli#ation of European la+) *$e
prospe#tive impa#t of t$e Court1s rulin', $o+ever, remains profound)

*$ere #ontinue to be #onsiderable #onstraints on EC 'ender poli#y 5:stner and -e+is 199?9) "s
+it$ mu#$ European re'ulation, a #lose #onne#tion to t$e &market,buildin'& pro>e#t limits t$e
ran'e of possible interventions) /ssues of 'ender e.uity +$i#$ #annot be linked dire#tly to t$e
+orkpla#e remain out of bounds) !ember state implementation $as been uneven) *$e point,
$o+ever, is not to praise or #riti#i%e EC 'ender poli#ies) Bat$er, it is to take note of t$eir
#onsiderable impa#t and to demonstrate t$e $istori#al pro#esses t$rou'$ +$i#$ t$is e(tension of
supranational aut$ority took pla#e)
/t is also true t$at member states retain t$e #apa#ity, as in t$e #ase of Barber, to modify out#omes
+$en t$ese are so una##eptable t$at t$ey mobili%e unanimous member state opinion) Gaps, in
ot$er +ords, invariably $ave some limit 5Polla#k 199;9) Su#$ #ompensatory steps, $o+ever, are
likely to be rare) !ember states may +ell +is$ t$at t$e Community $ad never be#ome a#tive in
pursuin' issues of 'ender e.uality) /t is .uite anot$er t$in', $o+ever, to publi#ly stop or reverse
su#$ efforts on#e t$ey $ave been ena#ted and in#orporated in national la+s, $ave motivated
t$ousands of firms to ad>ust t$eir labor market pra#ti#es, and $ave en$an#ed t$e monitorin' and
mobili%in' #apa#ities of national and transnational interest 'roups)
*$e EC $as t$us #ome to play a ma>or role in t$e development of 'ender poli#ies, and it is t$e
ECC t$at no+ determines +$at t$e often va'ue EC rules re.uire) *$is out#ome #annot $ave been
intended or desired by eit$er t$e makers of t$e *reaty or t$e #urrent C:Gs of member states)
/nstitutional desi'ners, bot$ in t$e 19?<s and 19E<s, +ere often preo##upied +it$ t$e s$ort,term
and symboli# #onse.uen#es of t$eir a#tions7 many lon',term effe#ts +ere eit$er i'nored or
unanti#ipated) C$an'es in member state preferen#es at later dates led to une(pe#ted s$ifts in
#ourse t$at $ave proven $ard to reverse) :t$er a#tors 5notably t$e ECC but also t$e Commission
and European +omen1s 'roups9 +ere .ui#k to sei%e t$ese opportunities, and member states $ave
found it diffi#ult to #lose t$e resultin' 'aps) /ndeed, t$e #ase of 'ender e.uality reveals all of t$e
features of institutional evolution stressed in Part // of t$is essay)
+or%place Health an! Safety.
"not$er instan#e of 'aps in member state #ontrol #an be seen in t$e development of $ealt$ and
safety re'ulations)
E
:penin's for $ealt$ and safety re'ulation #ame +it$ t$e Sin'le European
"#t, +$i#$ allo+ed .ualified ma>ority votin' on t$ese issues) Poli#ymakers +ere #on#erned t$at
national restri#tions #ould be trade barriers in dis'uise) *$e e(pansion of EC a#tivity in t$is
domain $as been remarkable 5Ei#$ener 19989) By late 199;, 69 ne+ dire#tives $ad been passed
under t$e ne+ pro#edures introdu#ed +it$ t$e SE") !any of t$ese +ere broad &frame+ork&
dire#tives #overin' a ran'e of more spe#ifi# re'ulatory a#tivity 5!artin and Boss 199;9)
Even more surprisin'ly, a very $i'$ level of standards $as 'enerally been a#$ieved ,, often
$i'$er t$an t$at of any member state) *o be sure, t$e use of .ualified ma>ority votin' $as been
#ru#ial) Aet t$e out#ome of very $i'$ $armoni%ation seems diffi#ult to e(plain in terms of simple
inter'overnmental bar'ainin') Constru#tin' t$e sin'le market mi'$t re.uire $armoni%ation of
$ealt$ and safety standards for products. *$ere is, $o+ever, no #lear need for $armoni%ed
standards for produ#tion processes. 2ere as +ell, $o+ever, t$e European Union $as been $i'$ly
interventionist) Nor is it #lear +$y member states +it$ lo+ standards s$ould a##ede to
si'nifi#antly $i'$er ones)
"s Ei#$ener1s detailed investi'ation do#uments, t$e Commission1s &pro#ess mana'er& role ,,a
dele'ation of aut$ority re.uired to pursue #omple( re'ulatory poli#ies ,, appears to $ave been
#riti#al in t$is lo+,profile environment 5Ei#$ener 19989) !u#$ of t$e #ru#ial de#ision,makin'
took pla#e in #ommittees #omposed of poli#y e(perts) Bepresentatives +it$in t$ese #ommittees
+ere often interested in innovation, $avin' 'ravitated to+ards Brussels be#ause it seemed to be
&+$ere t$e a#tion is& on re'ulatory issues) /n t$is te#$no#rati# #onte(t, &best pra#ti#es& from
many member states 5and from #ountries t$en outside t$e EC, su#$ as S+eden9 +ere pie#ed
to'et$er to form a .uite interventionist stru#ture of so#ial re'ulation) "t t$e same time, t$e
Commission played a #entral part in >oinin' to'et$er t$e +ork of different #ommittees and
in#orporatin' #on#erns of ot$er a#tors su#$ as t$e European Parliament ,, all t$e +$ile a#tively
promotin' parti#ularly innovative proposals)
*$rou'$out, t$e member states appear to $ave played only a loose supervisory role) *$is +as
espe#ially true for t$e lo+,standard states of t$e EC1s sout$ern rim) *$ese states $ad t$e most to
lose from t$e ena#tment of $i'$ standards, sin#e t$eir ad>ustment #osts +ould be $i'$est 5-an'e
19989) Aet t$ese member states found t$eir limited supplies of spe#ialists eit$er #o,opted in t$e
&#onsensual& #ommittee pro#ess or over+$elmed by t$e enormity of t$e re'ulatory task)
2ealt$ and safety poli#y reveals $o+ t$e #omple(ity of re'ulatory poli#y,makin' in a settin' of
$i'$ issue density may 'enerate #onsiderable 'aps in #ontrol) *$us +$ile t$e Commission, like
ot$er a#tors in t$e EC, operates under #onsiderable #onstraints, it +ill often be able to advan#e its
o+n a'enda) "s Ei#$ener #on#ludes, &GtH$e #omple(, opa.ue and Commission,dominated
de#ision,makin' pro#ess leads to results +$i#$ +ould never be e(pe#ted from simple inter,
'overnmental bar'ainin' +it$in t$e Coun#il& 5Ei#$ener 1998, p);9)
The ,aastricht Social Protocol.
" final illustration of t$e $istori#al dynami#s of institutionali%ation #an be seen in t$e &So#ial
Proto#ol& ena#ted as part of t$e !aastri#$t *reaty ne'otiations) *$e So#ial Proto#ol 're+ out of
#ontinuin' efforts to modestly en$an#e t$e #apa#ity for a#tivist so#ial poli#y at t$e EC level) *$e
Proto#ol itself allo+s .ualified ma>ority votin' on a ran'e of important issues, in#ludin' +orkin'
#onditions, 'ender e.uality +it$ re'ard to labor market opportunities and treatment at +ork, and
t$e inte'ration of persons e(#luded from t$e labor market) "lready, t$e Commission $as used t$e
So#ial Proto#ol tra#k to pus$ t$rou'$ t$e lon',stalled European 3orks Coun#il 4ire#tive and is
pursuin' ot$er initiatives 50alkner 199?9)
3$ile it is impossible to kno+ at t$is sta'e $o+ t$e So#ial Proto#ol +ill play out, t$is e(er#ise in
institutional reform a'ain supports key parts of t$e $istori#al institutionalist ar'ument) *$e
ena#tment of t$e So#ial Proto#ol is very diffi#ult to re#on#ile +it$ a simple model of
inter'overnmentalist bar'ainin' amon' soverei'nty,fo#used member states 5Boss 199;, p)1919)
*$e eleven member states a##edin' to t$e Proto#ol +ere not introdu#in' a #arefully,desi'ned
&instrument)& *$e member states $ad in fa#t e(pe#ted Britain to si'n a mu#$,+atered,do+n
#lause on so#ial poli#y, but t$e !a>or 'overnment re>e#ted all proposed versions) 0a#ed +it$ t$e
prospe#t t$at Britis$ intransi'en#e +ould prompt a disastrous breakdo+n of t$e !aastri#$t
#onferen#e, t$e member states rus$ed to adopt 5at 4elors1 su''estion9 a last,minute solution) *$e
$astily,#obbled to'et$er a'reement, +$i#$ e(#ludes Britain, #ommitted t$e ot$er eleven member
states to a mu#$ more ambitious earlier draft on so#ial poli#y) *$is version $ad been desi'ned as
a bar'ainin' #$ip in t$e e(pe#tation t$at Britain +ould eventually a##ede to a #ontentless
#ompromise) !ember states, +$i#$ $ad e(ploited Britain1s e(pe#ted position to en'a'e in #$eap
talk, suddenly found t$emselves e(posed)
*$at Britain preferred to blo#k any a'reement rat$er t$an a##ept t$e lar'ely symboli# alternative
+aitin' in t$e +in's is e.ually instru#tive) /t illustrates $o+ t$e lon',term institutional
#onse.uen#es of t$e Proto#ol s$ould be seen as t$e by,produ#ts of a de#ision made to meet
various s$ort,term domesti# ob>e#tives) /f !a>or $ad truly +is$ed to preserve so#ial poli#y
autonomy, a solution +as readily available) Britain1s refusal to a'ree appears to $ave $ad less to
do +it$ some lon',si'$ted vie+s of soverei'nty t$an +it$ !a>or1s need to pla#ate ri'$t,+in'
*ories by takin' a tou'$ publi# stan#e)
/ndeed, t$e !a>or 'overnment1s strate'y #learly #reated a 'reater lon',term t$reat to Britis$
autonomy) C$oosin' to opt,out means t$at Britain +ill not parti#ipate in de#isions t$at it +ill
$ave to abide by if a future 'overnment >oins t$e Proto#ol)
=
*$e Conservatives +ill likely resist
pressures to si'n t$e Proto#ol, but a -abour 'overnment +ould probably reverse t$at #$oi#e)
*$us t$e status .uo #an be maintained only if it is ratified at every Britis$ ele#tion) " single
-abour vi#tory +ould produ#e an institutional #$an'e t$at #ould not subse.uently be reversed
+it$out provokin' a #onstitutional #risis in Europe) /n s$ort, t$e !a>or 'overnment a##epted a
#onsiderable lon',term t$reat to Britis$ soverei'nty in t$e sp$ere of so#ial poli#y in return for an
important s$ort,run symboli# vi#tory, +$i#$ it needed for domesti# politi#al reasons)
0inally, one s$ould note t$at t$e So#ial Proto#ol leaves tremendous room for unanti#ipated
#onse.uen#es 5B$odes 199?9) Bat$er t$an bein' an e(ample of 3illiamson1s &far,si'$ted
propensity& in institutional desi'n, t$e arran'ement #learly refle#ts a $arried and desperate effort
to keep t$e !aastri#$t ne'otiations from #omin' unravelled alto'et$er) -e'al ambi'uities
abound) Not only is t$e +$ole le'al basis of t$e Proto#ol open to #$allen'e, but, as !artin
B$odes notes, &t$e boundaries are blurred bet+een areas sub>e#t to K!I, t$ose sub>e#t to
unanimity and t$ose +$ere t$e a'reement eleven $ave no #ompeten#e at all& 5B$odes 199?,
p)11;9) /t is, of #ourse, t$e ECC t$at +ill determine $o+ t$ese ambi'uities are resolved) 0urt$er
un#ertainties in#lude +$et$er and +$en Britain +ill &opt,in& to t$e a'reement, and +$at t$e
#onse.uen#es +ill be if it remains on t$e outside) Even +it$ several years $indsi'$t, t$ese
un#ertainties remain) *$ey +ere #learly very mu#$ a part of t$e atmosp$ere in t$e s$ort period
durin' +$i#$ t$e Proto#ol a'reement +as rea#$ed)
/t is only no+ be#omin' possible to study t$e stream of #onse.uen#es flo+in' from t$e
Proto#ol1s ena#tment ,, an important aspe#t of an $istori#al institutionalist investi'ation 50alkner
199?9) Aet t$e pro#ess of institutional desi'n itself appears to be .uite in line +it$ t$e 'eneral
frame+ork advan#ed in t$is essay) /ndeed, alon' +it$ t$e earlier dis#ussion of "rti#le 119, t$e
#ase of t$e So#ial Proto#ol reveals t$at $istori#al institutionalist ar'uments are relevant not only
durin' t$e day,to,day a#tivities bet+een t$e &'rand bar'ains&, but for understandin' t$e 'rand
bar'ains t$emselves)
The Evolution of European Social Policy.
" more #omplete revie+ of so#ial poli#y issues +ould reveal furt$er #onstraints on member state
autonomy) "mon' t$e most important $ave been spillovers from t$e sin'le market pro>e#t)
En#oura'in' t$e mobility of labor $as not been a $i'$,profile issue in t$e EC, but it $as
'radually prompted an in#remental e(pansion of Community re'ulations and, espe#ially, #ourt
de#isions t$at $ave seriously eroded national +elfare state soverei'nties 5-eibfried and Pierson
199?9) So#ial poli#y #ases a##ount for a 'ro+in' s$are of t$e rapidly risin' ECC #aseload,
in#reasin' from 8)8M of total #ases in 19= to =)1M in 1996 5Caporaso and Feeler 1998, *able
19) !ember states are no+ pro$ibited from pursuin' a ran'e of so#ial poli#y options be#ause
t$eir a#tions +ould be in#ompatible +it$ t$e sin'le market pro>e#t) 0urt$ermore, as individuals,
firms, and non,profit or'ani%ations adapt to ne+ opportunities made available by t$e sin'le
market 5e)'), /n private pensions and $ealt$ servi#es9, t$ese mi#ro,level #ommitments +ill furt$er
restri#t t$e poli#y options available to national +elfare states) !ember state so#ial poli#ies are
in#reasin'ly firmly embedded in a dense set of &$ard& Community re.uirements and
pro$ibitions, as +ell as &soft& in#entives and disin#entives)
*$us European inte'ration $as 'enerated a partial but nonet$eless si'nifi#ant development of
European,level so#ial poli#ies) *$e pro#esses t$at produ#ed t$is out#ome provide po+erful
illustrations of t$e institutional dynami#s dis#ussed in Se#tion // of t$is essay) /n a number of
instan#es, t$e s$ort,term preo##upations of institutional desi'ners $ave led t$em to make
de#isions t$at undermined lon',term member state #ontrol) Unanti#ipated #onse.uen#es $ave
been +idespread, espe#ially as t$e density of EC a#tivity $as 'ro+n) S$ifts in member state
preferen#es led to une(pe#ted e(ploitation of opportunities #reated earlier 5e)'), "rti#le 119 in
t$e 19E<s9 as +ell as 'ro+in' frustration +it$ previous #ommitments 5t$e Gender E.uality
4ire#tives in t$e 19=<s9) /n s$ort, even t$ou'$ so#ial poli#y is +idely seen as an area of firm
member state #ontrol +it$ a minimal EC role, a $istori#al institutionalist perspe#tive $i'$li'$ts
t$e 'ro+in' si'nifi#an#e of European poli#y, t$e influen#e of a#tors ot$er t$an member states,
and t$e mountin' #onstraints on member state initiative)
!" Conclusion
*$e ar'uments advan#ed in t$is essay present ma>or #$allen'es for an inter'overnmentalist
a##ount of European inte'ration) By providin' e(pli#it mi#ro,foundations for an analysis t$at
pla#es mu#$ more emp$asis on member state #onstraint, $istori#al institutionalism in#reases t$e
pressure on inter'overnmentalists to offer #onvin#in' eviden#e t$at t$e #ausal pro#esses t$ey
posit are a#tually at +ork) Bat$er t$an simply inferrin' preferen#es post hoc from an
e(amination of out#omes, inter'overnmentalists +ill need to s$o+ t$at t$e desire to a#$ieve
t$ese fun#tional out#omes a#tually motivated key de#ision,makers)
9
/n prin#iple, important aspe#ts of an $istori#al institutionalist analysis #ould be inte'rated +it$
inter'overnmentalism) /ndeed, t$is essay a##epts t$e startin' point of inter'overnmentalism@ t$at
member states are t$e #entral institution,builders of t$e European Community, and t$at t$ey do
so to serve t$eir o+n purposes) "lt$ou'$ it $as rarely been done in pra#ti#e, many
inter'overnmentalist ar'uments #ould in#orporate a temporal dimension) Feo$ane, for instan#e,
$as re#o'ni%ed t$e possibility t$at C:Gs mi'$t anti#ipate t$e potential for preferen#e s$ifts in
su##essor 'overnments 5Feo$ane 19=;, p)1 1E9) :t$er #$allen'es, $o+ever, +ill not be so easy
to re#on#ile, su#$ as t$e possibility t$at C:Gs employ a $i'$ dis#ount rate in makin' de#isions
about institutional desi'n, t$at unintended #onse.uen#es are ubi.uitous, and t$at 'aps t$at
emer'e are diffi#ult to #lose) /t is $ard to see $o+ t$ese fa#tors #ould be systemati#ally
in#orporated into inter'overnmentalism +it$out underminin' t$e t$ree pillars of t$at approa#$@
t$e emp$asis on member state soverei'nty #on#erns, t$e treatment of institutions as instruments,
and t$e nearly e(#lusive fo#us on 'rand bar'ains)
*$e #$allen'e for t$ose +is$in' to advan#e a $istori#al institutionalist a##ount is also dauntin')
*$e temporal pro#esses outlined $ere +ould $ave to be #arefully spe#ified to 'enerate #lear
$ypot$eses #on#ernin' su#$ matters as +$en +e s$ould e(pe#t poli#y,makers to employ s$ort
time,$ori%ons, +$en to e(pe#t t$at unintended #onse.uen#es +ill be +idespread, or $o+
parti#ular de#ision rules influen#e t$e prospe#ts for #losin' 'aps in #ontrol) "s !ark Polla#k $as
persuasively ar'ued, su#$ analyses s$ould fo#us on t$e fa#tors t$at #an e(plain variation in
out#omes a#ross issues and amon' institutional arenas, as +ell as over time 5Polla#k 199;7
Polla#k 199?9) *o develop t$e $istori#al institutionalist line of ar'ument +ill re.uire diffi#ult
efforts to tra#e t$e motivations of politi#al a#tors in order to separate t$e intended from t$e
unintended) 4eterminin' t$e impa#t of sunk #osts on #urrent de#ision,makin' also represents a
#onsiderable #$allen'e) Studyin' politi#al arenas in detail over lon' periods of time is arduous)
*$e evidentiary re.uirements en#oura'e a fo#us on detailed analyses of parti#ular #ases,
renderin' investi'ations vulnerable to t$e #riti.ue t$at t$e #ases e(amined are unrepresentative)
2o+ever, if one a##epts t$e #on#lusion t$at inter'overnmentalists must no+ s$o+ t$at t$e
pro#esses t$ey $ypot$esi%e are a#tually at +ork, rat$er t$an simply inferrin' t$ose pro#esses
from observed out#omes, it is not #lear t$at t$eir resear#$ tasks are any less formidable)
*$e purpose of t$e #urrent investi'ation is not to pursue t$ese diffi#ult .uestions but to set an
a'enda by identifyin' plausible #ausal pro#esses t$at #an lead to 'ro+in' #onstraints on C:Gs
over time) 3$ile only t$e first step, su#$ an effort #an be a prelude to empiri#ally,'rounded
resear#$, as demonstrated by t$e brief dis#ussion of EC so#ial poli#y) /ndeed, t$is first step is a
si'nifi#ant one) 2istori#al institutionalist ar'uments #an provide a #ompellin' a##ount for a
remarkable development t$at is +idely a##epted by European s#$olars and most "meri#ans
+orkin' in t$e field of #omparative politi#s@ t$e European Community is no lon'er simply a
multilateral instrument, limited in s#ope and firmly under t$e #ontrol of individual member
states) /nstead, t$e EC possesses #$ara#teristi#s of a supranational entity, in#ludin' e(tensive
bureau#rati# #ompeten#ies, unified >udi#ial #ontrol and si'nifi#ant #apa#ities to develop or
modify poli#ies) 3it$in Europe, a +ide ran'e of poli#ies #lassi#ally seen as &domesti#& #an no
lon'er be understood +it$out a#kno+led'in' t$e European Community1s role +it$in a $i'$ly
fra'mented but in#reasin'ly inte'rated polity) 2istori#al institutionalism provides t$e analyti#al
tools for t$inkin' of t$e EC not as an international or'ani%ation, but as t$e #entral level ,, albeit
still a +eak one ,, of an emer'ent multi,tiered system of 'overnan#e) *$e po+er of t$e member
states in t$is polity is not merely &pooled& but in#reasin'ly #onstrained)
/t +ould be folly to su''est t$at t$e member states do not play a #entral part in poli#y
development +it$in t$e European Union) Bat$er, my point is t$at t$ey do so in a #onte(t t$at
t$ey do not 5even #olle#tively9 fully #ontrol) "r'uments about inter'overnmental bar'ainin'
e(a''erate t$e e(tent of member state po+er) /n t$eir fo#us on 'rand inter'overnmental
bar'ains, t$ey fail to #apture t$e 'radually unfoldin' impli#ations of a very #omple( and
ambitious a'enda of s$ared de#ision,makin') 3$ile t$e member states remain e(tremely
po+erful, tra#in' t$e pro#ess of inte'ration over time su''ests t$at t$eir influen#e is in#reasin'ly
#ir#ums#ribed) *$e pat$ to European inte'ration $as embedded member states in a dense
institutional environment t$at #annot be understood in t$e lan'ua'e of inter,state bar'ainin')
#ote $% Paul Pierson, Center for European Studies and 4ept) of Government, 2arvard University
Ba#k)
#ote &% " 'ood e(ample 5amon' many possible ones9 is Peter -an'e1s analysis of t$e !aastri#$t
So#ial Proto#ol 5-an'e 19989) -an'e may +ell be #orre#t in ar'uin' t$at poor member states
si'ned t$e Proto#ol be#ause of side payments, but $e provides no a#tual eviden#e t$at t$is +as
t$e #ase) Ba#k)
#ote '% *$rou'$out, / rely on Nort$1s definition of institutions@ &)))t$e rules of t$e 'ame in a
so#iety or, more formally,))) t$e $umanly devised #onstraints t$at s$ape $uman intera#tion&
5Nort$ 199<, p)89) Ba#k)
#ote (% !orav#sik $as outlined a &liberal inter'overnmentalist& vie+ in +$i#$ &liberal& t$eories
of member state preferen#e formation are used to supplement inter'overnmentalist t$eories of
member state bar'ainin' 5!orav#sik 19989) Ba#k)
#ote )% Consider for instan#e !orav#sik1s strikin' a#kno+led'ment of t$e 'ro+in' po+er of t$e
ECC@ &)))t$e de#isions of t$e Court #learly trans#end +$at +as initially foreseen and desired by
most national 'overnments) *$e 1#onstitutionali%ation1 of t$e *reaty of Bome +as une(pe#ted) /t
is impossible, moreover, to ar'ue t$at t$e #urrent system is t$e one to +$i#$ all national
'overnments +ould #urrently #onsent, as re#ent e(pli#it limitations on t$e Court in t$e
!aastri#$t *reaty demonstrate)& !orav#sik, &Preferen#es and Po+er,& p)?18) Ba#k)
#ote *% "n alternative +ay to dis#ount t$e si'nifi#an#e of unintended effe#ts +ould be to treat
t$em as random &noise)& Aet +$ile t$is may be appropriate in studyin' mass populations 5e)'),
t$e dynami#s of publi# opinion9, it seems inappropriate +$en sin'le unintended effe#ts may be
.uite lar'e and pro#esses may be pat$ dependent) *$ere is little reason to t$ink t$at su#$ effe#ts
+ill some$o+ &balan#e out&, leavin' an analyst free to study t$e &systemati#& elements) *o take
an e(ample dis#ussed later in t$is essay, it +ould be diffi#ult to e(amine t$e dynami#s of 'ender
issues in Europe by treatin' t$e role of "rti#le 119 as &noise)& Ba#k)
#ote +% *$e ECC up$eld t$e solution found in !aastri#$t in Ten ever 5Case 1<9D91 of :#tober
, 19989) Estimated #osts of full retroa#tivity for Germany are from Claus Beren%, &2at die
betriebli#$e "ltersversor'un' %ukunfti' no#$ eine C$an#eJ& !eue "eitschrift fur Arbeitsrecht, 11
5no) 9D1 <, 199;9, pp)8=?,89< 5part 19, ;88,;8= 5part 69, pp);8E7 for Britain, from !a%ey and
Bi#$ardson, &*ransferen#e of Po+er,& p) 1?) Ba#k)
#ote ,% *$e follo+in' a##ount dra+s $eavily on Ei#$ener 1998) See also !artin and Boss 199;)
Ba#k)
#ote -% ln t$is sense, t$e #urrent situation may parallel t$e development of t$e Common
"'ri#ultural Poli#y, +$ere Britain1s lon' absen#e from t$e development of poli#y left it in a
+eak position to pursue its 'oal of poli#y liberali%ation +it$in t$e EC 5Feeler 199?9) Ba#k)
#ote .% !orav#sik 1991 provides a 'ood e(ample of su#$ an effort) 2istori#al institutionalist
ar'uments, $o+ever, su''est t$e need to 'o beyond even !orav#sik1s ambitious attempt to
supplement inter'overnmentalism +it$ a &liberal& t$eory of C:G preferen#e formation)
!orav#sik1s a##ount #onsiders only t$e syn#$roni# domesti# sour#es of C:G preferen#es,
i'norin' t$e possibility of si'nifi#ant feedba#k effe#ts from previous rounds of
institutionali%ation) 0or a #riti.ue of $is interpretation alon' t$ese lines see Cameron 1996) Ba#k)