Cause No.

03-14-00199-CV
___________________________________________________________________________________
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
___________________________________________________________________________________
STEVEN GREGORY SLOAT, ED BRYAN, CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL, DAVID J. LUBOW AND MONTY DRAKE

Appellants,
v.
MONIQUE RATHBUN

Appellee.
___________________________________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STEVEN GREGORY SLOAT
___________________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 207th Judicial District Court
of Comal County, Texas
Trial Court No. C-2013-1082B
Hon. Dib Waldrip of the 433rd Judicial District Court, Presiding

Jonathan H. Hull
State Bar No 10253350
Ashley B. Bowen
State Bar No. 24086926
Reagan Burrus, PLLC
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Tel. (830) 625-8026
Fax (830) 625-4433
Attorneys for Appellant
Steven Gregory Sloat

Oral Argument Requested
June 11, 2014
ACCEPTED
03-14-00199-CV
1531130
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
6/13/2014 9:33:46 AM
J EFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
6/13/2014 9:33:46 AM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk

i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

1. Appellant Steven Gregory Sloat
Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:
Jonathan H. Hull
Ashley B. Bowen
REAGAN BURRUS PLLC
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Telephone: 830.625.8026
Facsimile: 830.625.4433


2. Other Appellants
a. Church of Scientology International
Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:
Ricardo G. Cedillo
Isaac J. Huron
DAVIS, CEDILLO & MENDOZA, INC.
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: 210.822.6666
Facsimile: 210.822.1151

George H. Spencer, Jr.
CLEMENS & SPENCER
112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1300
San Antonio, Texas 78205-1531
Telephone: 210.227.7121
Facsimile: 210.227.0732

Bert H. Deixler
KENDALL BRILL KLIEGER
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725

ii
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: 310.272.7910
Facsimile: 310.556.2705


Additional Counsel on appeal:

Thomas S. Leatherbury
Marc A. Fuller
VINSON & ELKINS LLP
Trammell Crow Center
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
Telephone: 214.220.7792
Facsimile: 214.999.7792

Eric M. Lieberman
RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD,
KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN PC
45 Broadway, Suite 1700
New York, New York 10006
Telephone: 212.254.1111
Facsimile: 212.674.4614

b. David Lubow

Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:

Stephanie S. Bascon
State Bar No. 19356850
LAW OFFICE OF STEPHANIE S. BASCON, PLLC
297 W. San Antonio Street
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Telephone: 830-625-2940
Facsimile: 830-221-3441
sbascon@att.net



iii

c. Monty Drake
Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:
O. Paul Dunagan
SARLES & OUIMET
370 Founders Square
900 Jackson Street
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: 214.573.6300
Facsimile: 214.573.6306

d. Ed Bryan

Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:
Jonathan H. Hull
Ashley B. Bowen
REAGAN BURRUS PLLC
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Telephone: 830.625.8026
Facsimile: 830.625.4433


3. Appellee Monique Rathbun
Represented in the trial court and on appeal by:
Ray B. Jeffrey
A. Dannette Mitchell
JEFFREY & MITCHELL, P. C.
2631 Bulverde Road, Suite 105
Bulverde, Texas 78163
Telephone: 830.438.8935
Facsimile: 830.438.4958




iv
Marc F. Wiegand
THE WIEGAND LAW FIRM P.C.
434 N. Loop 1604 West, Suite 2201
San Antonio, Texas 78232
Telephone: 210.998.3289

Elliott S. Cappuccio
Leslie Sara Hyman
PULMAN, CAPPUCCIO, PULLEN, BENSON, & JONES, LLP
2161 N.W. Military Hwy., #400
San Antonio, Texas 78213
Telephone: 210.222.9494
Facsimile: 210.892.1610

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL.i-iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS..v-vi
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...vii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT....viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....ix
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.x
STANDARD OF REVIEW..x
ISSUES PRESENTED...xi-xii
STATEMENT OF FACTS1-2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT2-4
ARGUMENT...5-10
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SLOATS ANTI-
SLAPP MOTION TO DISMISS....5
A. The Commercial Speech Exemption Does Not Apply to Monique
Rathbuns Claims.....5

B. The Bodily Injury Exemption Does Not Apply to Headaches
and Nausea...........................5



vi
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MONIQUE
RATHBUNS CLAIMS WERE NOT BASED ON SLOATS FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS...5
A. Monique Rathbuns Claims Relate to and Arise from Sloats Exercise
of Petition Rights. 6
III. MONIQUE RATHBUNS CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
SHE DID NOT PRESENT CLEAR AND SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ANY CLAIM AGAINST SLOAT.......6
A. Sloat Never Disclosed any True Facts about Monique Rathbun in
Public, So Her Invasion of Privacy Claim for Public Disclosure of
Private Facts Must Be Dismissed.6
B. Monique Rathbuns Invasion of Privacy Claim for Intrusion on
Seclusion Should be Dismissed........6
C. Monique Rathbun Quit Her Job, so the Trial Court Erred When it Failed
to Dismiss Her Claim for Tortious Interference with
Contract....7
D. Monique Rathbuns Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Should Be Dismissed.8
E. There is No Authority for Holding Sloat Responsible for the Acts of
Others.......8
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES AND
COURT COSTS AGAINST THE APPELLANT AND IN FAILING TO
AWARD THE APPELLANT ITS FEES AND COSTS9
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER.9-10
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE...11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...12-13
APPENDIX


vii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Texas Appellate Cases

Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search, Inc.,
No. 03-12-00579-CV, 2014 WL 1432012,
*3 (Tex. App.Austin (April 11, 2014) ................................................................... x


Statutes, Acts & Torts

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Chapter 27 .............................................................. viii

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 27.001 et seq. (the Act) ....................................... ix

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 27.003, 27.008 ...................................................... x

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1) .......................................................................................... 11

Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3) .......................................................................................... 11

Tex. R. App. P. 9.7. ......................................................................................... 1-2, 5-9

Texas Citizens Participation Act ....................................................................... xiii-x

Texas Anti-SLAPP statute ..................................................................................... xiii


viii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument would assist the Court. The record is voluminous, and oral
argument would give the Court an opportunity to question counsel about the
proceedings in the trial court and the evidence relating to the issues on this appeal.
This case raises important questions about the interpretation of the States anti-
SLAPP statute, the Texas Citizens Participation Act, Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code Chapter 27. Oral argument would give the Court an opportunity to
question counsel regarding the basis for, and the potential implications of, the trial
courts novel and erroneous interpretation of this statute.

RECORD REFERENCES
The Reporters Record will be cited as [Vol.] RR [page].
The Clerks Record will be cited as [Vol.] CR [page].
The Supplemental Clerks Record will be cited SCR [page].


ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case This case arises out of an ongoing public controversy
between Defendant/Appellant Church of Scientology
International (the Church) and former Scientologist Marty
Rathbun and his wife, Plaintiff/Appellee Monique Rathbun,
who became outspoken and public critics of the Church and
its leadership. Monique Rathbun sued the Church, as well
as Sloat, and others in connection with this dispute.

Monique Rathbun asserted claims for invasion of privacy by
publication of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion,
tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 1CR28-40.

Trial court The Honorable Dib Waldrip of the 433rd Judicial District
Court in Comal County presides over the trial court
proceedings.

Course of
proceedings
The trial court denied Appellants Motion to Dismiss under
the Texas Citizens Participation Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code 27.001 et seq. (the Act). 31CR3753-77. The
trial court awarded attorneys fees and costs to Monique
Rathbun. Id.

Trial court
disposition
The trial court denied Appellants Motion to Dismiss on
March 14, 2014. Id. Appellants timely filed their Notice of
Appeal on April 2, 2014. 44CR5056-5059.




x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction in this accelerated interlocutory appeal because
Appellants appeal the trial courts denial of their motion to dismiss under the Texas
Citizens Participation Act (the Act). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 27.003,
27.008.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Act provides for an automatic right of appeal on an expedited basis, and
for de novo review on all issues. Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search, Inc., No. 03-12-
00579-CV, 2014 WL 1432012, *3 (Tex. App.Austin (April 11, 2014).











xi
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant Sloats Motion to Dismiss?

2. Did the trial court err in holding that the Acts exemption for legal actions
brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing
goods or services arising out of commercial activity applied to Appellant?

3. Did the trial court err in holding that the Acts exemption for legal actions
seeking recovery for bodily injury applied to Monique Rathbuns complaints of
headaches and nausea?

4. Did the trial court err in holding that Monique Rathbuns claims were not
based on, relate[d] to, or in response to Sloats exercise of his right of free
speech, right of association, or right of petition?

5. Did the trial court err in not dismissing Monique Rathbuns cause of action
for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts because (a) she failed to
provide clear and specific evidence that Sloat publicly disclosed any private facts
about her; (b) Monique Rathbun cannot seek relief for the alleged disclosure of
private facts about her husband; (c) she failed to provide clear and specific
evidence that Sloat disclosed private facts about her husband to more than a few
individuals, and not the public at large; (d) the alleged disclosure of facts about
Monique Rathbuns husband was a matter of legitimate public concern protected by
the First Amendment; and (e) the claim is barred by the statute of limitations?

6. Must the trial court dismiss Monique Rathbuns cause of action for invasion
of privacy by intrusion into seclusion when (a) she failed to provide clear and
specific evidence that Sloat intruded into private areas or matters that are within the
zone of privacy protection under Texas law; and (b) the acts of Sloat are protected
by the First Amendment?

7. Must the trial court dismiss Monique Rathbuns cause of action for intentional
interference with her employment contract because (a) Sloat had no contact or
involvement with Monique Rathbun until more than one year after she resigned from
her employment position; (b) Sloat never communicated with Monique Rathbun or
her employer; (c) Monique Rathbun failed to provide clear and specific evidence
that her employer breached or terminated her contract; and (d) the claim is barred by
the statute of limitations?


xii
8. Must the trial court dismiss Monique Rathbuns cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress when (a) she alleged it only as a gap filler and
asserts claims for the same acts under other torts and intentionally avoided alleging
other torts; (b) Monique Rathbun failed to provide clear and specific evidence
Appellant committed acts that meet the standard of outrageous conduct; and (c)
Appellants actions are protected by the First Amendment?

9. Must the trial court dismiss Monique Rathbuns claims for vicarious liability
and conspiracy when those claims are derivative of her substantive claims?

10. Did the trial court err in awarding attorneys fees and costs to Monique
Rathbun, and in failing to award fees to Appellant, when it found the Motion to
Dismiss was not frivolous and made no finding (nor could it have) that the Motion
was solely intended to delay under the Act?


1
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts from the
Churchs Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Steve Sloat
Sloat is a former Deputy U.S. Marshal. In early 2013, licensed investigator
J.R. Skaggs, hired Sloat to assist in his investigation into Rathbuns anti-Scientology
activities. 2CR302.
Sloat rented an adjacent vacant property next to Rathbuns residence/office
in Bulverde, Texas and set up a low resolution camera pointed at the Rathbuns
driveway intended to photograph the cars of visitors to the Rathbun residence/office.
2CR303-4. No camera was ever pointed at the Rathbuns house. Id.
Sloat never:
entered on to any property owned or leased by Monique Rathbun, or
went to her workplace;

peered into her home or photographed or filmed into the interior beyond
that which can be seen from a public thoroughfare;

used any form of microphone to overhear private conversations of
Monique Rathbun at her place of business or residence;

interfered with or wiretapped her telephone or Internet service;

physically blocked or interfered with her freedom of movement, or
physically touched or threatened her;


2
publicized any information about her;

had any communications with her; or

photographed or videotaped her. 2CR303-304.

In fact, Sloat and Monique Rathbun had never seen each other in person before
she filed this suit. 2CR304.


SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Preliminarily, Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Summary of the
argument from the Churchs Appellants Brief as well as that of Appellant Monty
Drake, a private investigator and David Lubow (in relation to Sloats position as an
investigator). TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Sloats actions were entirely lawful. Sloat set up surveillance cameras on an
adjacent property which took pictures of Monique Rathbuns driveway. Sloat never
took or received a photograph depicting Monique Rathbun or the interior of her
residence/office. These limited investigative activities are protected by the First
Amendment, and the Act is intended to dismiss suits like this one at an early stage.
Additionally, Sloat is entitled to protection and standing under the Act as he was
acting on behalf of the Church in furtherance of its right to petition under the First
Amendment.

3
Sloat assisted investigator Skaggs in an effort to obtain evidence of potential
significance to pending and possible litigation. Sloats participation in the petition
related activities of the Church investigator clearly related to matters of public
concern and community well-being. Monique Rathbuns claims against Sloat are
based on, relate to and arise out of Sloats petition related conduct.
The trial court order is fatally flawed because the court did not give separate
consideration to Sloats Motion to Dismiss. Instead, the court denied Sloats Motion
and ordered Sloat to pay Monique Rathbuns attorneys fees because of the alleged
conduct of other Defendants.
First, Rathbun generally alleges that Defendants committed certain acts
without identifying which Defendant did what. She attempts to hold Appellant Sloat
responsible for the alleged acts of all other Defendants, for the acts committed by
persons unknown and for acts allegedly committed by others more than two years
before Sloat was hired. She cannot do so without evidence supporting her vicarious
liability theories. Because she has none, Sloat can only be liable for his own acts
acts that are fully protected under the Act.
Monique Rathbun cannot assert a claim for invasion of privacy by publication
of private facts about her husband because: (1) it is restricted to invasion of her
privacy, not her husbands; (2) Sloat made no publication about Monique Rathbun
to the public; (3) any matters were of public interest; and (4) the claim is barred by

4
the statute of limitations.
Monique Rathbuns privacy claim for intrusion on seclusion fails to meet the
requirements that there be either a physical invasion of a persons property or
eavesdropping on anothers conversation with the aid of wiretaps, microphones, or
spying. It is undisputed that Sloat did none of these things.
Monique Rathbuns claim for intentional interference with her employment
contract likewise must be dismissed. Sloat never communicated with Monique
Rathbuns employer and, she voluntarily resigned.
Besides the fact that the IIED claim should be dismissed under the gap-filler
doctrine. The IIED claim also fails to meet Texass strict application of the
outrageousness element of the tort. Only the most extreme and outrageous acts will
support this claim, and the evidence showed that the actions of Sloat were never
extreme or outrageous.
Sloats actions are protected under the First Amendment and may not be the
predicate for claims of IIED or any other tort.
Finally, the trial court violated the Act by awarding costs and fees to Monique
Rathbun. The court acknowledged Appellants motion was not frivolous and made
no finding that the motion was undertaken exclusively for delay. The Act requires
such a finding in order to support a fee award, so the award was improper.


5
ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SLOATS ANTI-
SLAPP MOTION TO DISMISS.
A. The Commercial Speech Exemption Does Not Apply to Monique
Rathbuns Claims.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Argument from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Monique Rathbun does not allege, and does not provide any evidence, that
Sloat was offering any goods or services, much less that he was primarily engaged
in the business of selling or leasing goods or services. Section 27.010(b). Because
it was her burden to prove that the exemption applied to the conduct of Sloat, and
she failed to do so, the trial court erred in finding this exception applied.
B. The Bodily Injury Exemption Does Not Apply to Headaches and
Nausea.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Argument from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MONIQUE
RATHBUNS CLAIMS WERE NOT BASED ON SLOATS FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS.

Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Argument from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. Tex. R. App. P. 9.7.

6
A. Monique Rathbuns Claims Relate to and Arise from Sloats
Exercise of Petition Rights.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the opening
Appellate Briefs of the Church and Monty Drake. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
III. MONIQUE RATHBUNS CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
SHE DID NOT PRESENT CLEAR AND SPECIFIC EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT ANY CLAIM AGAINST SLOAT.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Argument from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
A. Sloat Never Disclosed any True Facts about Rathbun in Public, So
Her Invasion of Privacy Claim for Public Disclosure of Private
Facts Must Be Dismissed.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7
Monique Rathbun makes no allegation that Sloat published any private facts
about her and there is no evidence that Sloat published statements about her at all,
so her claim against Sloat must be dismissed.
B. Monique Rathbuns Invasion of Privacy Claim for Intrusion on
Seclusion Should Be Dismissed.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
It is undisputed that Sloat did not do any of the following:
Invade or enter Monique Rathbuns place of business or residence.

7
Peer into her home, photograph or film into the interior beyond what can be
seen from a public thoroughfare.
Use any form of microphone to overhear private conversations at her
business or home.
Engage, interfere with or wiretap Rathbuns telephone or Internet service.
Physically block, or interfere with her freedom of movement; or
Touch or threaten her or ever see her. 2CR303-304.
Sloats actions in setting up cameras on an adjacent property cameras that
were aimed not at the Rathbuns office or home, but instead on their driveway and
streets around their home do not meet any of these elements. Nor does the
communication between Sloat and Marty Rathbun.
Monique Rathbun has not shown by clear and specific evidence that the
limited actions of Sloat satisfy the elements of her claims, and because their actions
are protected by the rights of free speech and of association, these claims must be
dismissed.
C. Monique Rathbun Quit Her Job, so the Trial Court Erred When it
Failed to Dismiss Her Claim for Tortious Interference with
Contract.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7

8
Monique Rathbun quit her job over a year before Sloat was hired and first
placed his camera pointed at the Rathbuns driveway. 11CR1382; 2CR302-303.
In short, there is no evidence that Sloat did anything related to her employment
contract, and she makes no allegations against him related to her job.
D. Monique Rathbuns Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Should Be Dismissed.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7
Sloats acts of setting up a camera to observe a driveway do not rise to the
level of extreme, outrageous or reckless conduct under Texas law. He never
entered into Monique Rathbuns house, looked into the windows, photographed or
filmed the interior, or anything of the like. 2CR 303-304.
As such, Monique Rathbun has failed to provide clear and specific evidence
of IIED as it relates to Sloat.
E. There is No Authority for Holding Sloat Responsible for the Acts
of Others.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the argument from the briefs of the
Church and Monty Drake. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.7.
Monique Rathbun asserts a boiler-plate list against each Defendant for
various theories of vicarious liability, such as conspiracy, partnership, agency, joint
enterprise, respondeat superior, concert of action, ratification, assisting or

9
encouraging, and assisting and participating. 10CR1276 at 50. But she produced
no evidence, much less clear and specific evidence, to establish a prima facie case
for any of these theories against Sloat. Because of this these claims should be
dismissed.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COURT COSTS AGAINST THE APPELLANT AND IN FAILING
TO AWARD THE APPELLANT HIS FEES AND COSTS.
Sloat adopts and incorporates by reference the Arguments from the Churchs
Appellants Brief. Tex. R. App. P. 9.7. The court declined to rule that the motions
to dismiss were frivolous or filed solely for delay but nevertheless awarded
Monique Rathbun her costs and attorneys fees. Sloat had separate and independent
counsel who filed simple joinders in the Churchs expeditious and meritorious
motion to Dismiss. The courts predicate finding of fact does not apply to Sloat.
Nor justify any award of costs against him.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant Sloat prays that this Court reverse the trial courts order denying
his Motion to Dismiss and awarding fees and costs against him, grant his Motion to
Dismiss, and render judgment for him, dismissing all of Monique Rathbuns claims
with prejudice and remanding only for further proceedings concerning his claim for

10
attorneys fees and costs under the Act, together with such other and further relief to
which he may be entitled.
June 11, 2014
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jonathan H. Hull
Jonathan H. Hull
State Bar No 10253350
Ashley B. Bowen
State Bar No. 24086926
Reagan Burrus, PLLC
401 Main Plaza, Suite 200
New Braunfels, Texas 78130
Tel. (830) 625-8026
Fax (830) 625-4433
jhull@reaganburrus.com
abowen@reaganburrus.com

Attorneys for Appellant
Steven Gregory Sloat

11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned hereby certifies that
this Brief of Appellant complies with the applicable word count limitation because
it contains 1822 words, excluding the parts exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
In making this certification, the undersigned has relied on the word-count function
in Microsoft Word 2010, which was used to prepare the Brief of Appellant.
/s/ Jonathan H. Hull
Jonathan H. Hull


12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on June 11, 2014, the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was served on the following attorneys in accordance with the
requirements of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure via electronic filing or
email.
Marc F. Wiegand
THE WIEGAND LAW FIRM, P.C.
434 N. Loop 1604 West, Suite 2201
San Antonio, TX 78232

Thomas S. Leatherbury
Marc A. Fuller
Daniel L. Tobey
VINSON & ELKINS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201-2975

Ricardo G. Cedillo
Isaac J. Huron
Les J. Strieber III
DAVIS, CEDILLO &
MENDOZA, INC.
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212

George H. Spencer, Jr.
CLEMENS & SPENCER
112 E. Pecan Street, Suite 1300
San Antonio, Texas 78205-1531

Eric M. Lieberman
RABINOWITZ,BOUDIN, STANDARD,
KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN PC
45 Broadway, Suite 1700
New York, NY 10006
elieberman@rbskl.com


13
Ray B. Jeffrey
A. Dannette Mitchell
JEFFREY & MITCHELL, P. C.
2631 Bulverde Road, Suite 105
Bulverde, TX 78163

J. Iris Gibson
HAYNES & BOONE LLP
600 Congress Ave., Suite 1300
Austin, TX 78701

O. Paul Dunagan
SARLES & OUIMET
370 Founders Square
900 Jackson Street
Dallas, TX 75202

Bert H. Deixler
KENDALL BRILL KLIEGER
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Stephanie S. Bascon
LAW OFFICE OF STEPHANIE S. BASCON, PLLC
297 W. San Antonio Street
New Braunfels, TX 78130

Wallace B. Jefferson
Rachel Ekery
ALEXANDER DUBOSE JEFFERSON
& TOWNSEND, LLP
515 Congress Avenue, Suite 2350
Austin, TX 78701

/s/ Jonathan H. Hull
Jonathan H. Hull