G.R. Nos.

79937-38 February 13, 1989

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and
MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta,
Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case
when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire
insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent
Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer
within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of
actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation
and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners'
counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who
was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with
twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court
thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the
other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to
Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC
directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its
payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket
fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered
in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily
assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the
docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August
30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional
defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his
assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the
case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with the
Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not
indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as
actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint
however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint
and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and
that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The
reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of
Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986,
or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
1

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion
thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable
respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the
basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00.
2

Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court,
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
3

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and
proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the
amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount
sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee
that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should
be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA,
4
as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far as it is
inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively
to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester
ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in
Magaspi v. Ramolete,
5
wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case
even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating
the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
6

In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres,
7
this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket
fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before
the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the case,
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee,
instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving
notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee
only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First Instance
did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.
In Lee vs. Republic,
8
the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by
sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing
fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court
ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration
should be filed at least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court
concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal
effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
In Malimit vs. Degamo,
9
the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an
original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was
mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after the
proclamation as provided therefor by law.
10
However, the required docket fees were paid only after the
expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed
to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was mailed.
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez,
11
this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a
court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when
petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a separate
action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then
pending before the same court.
Then in Magaspi,
12
this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee,
the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also
prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that
defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property
is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00,
the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to
which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of
land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the
correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the
defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's
fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended
complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The
trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and
then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of
P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the
case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case
was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the
correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of
property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also one, for damages, We
upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended
complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the
original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action
for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of
P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of
defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and, after hearing, the
issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the
defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The
plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff
valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total
amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based
on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as well as its
designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the
plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about
P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount
of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other
cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the
amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as instructed.
In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no
amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there was no such original
complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court were declared null and
void.
13

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee
which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this
case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated.
The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment
with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less
than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of
his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the
private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not
less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of
P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16,
1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the
decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be
reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the
promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of
P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the
docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint
amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint
but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was decided by
this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the
respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional
docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the
total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby
instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent
considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the supplemental
complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
















G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987
and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by
petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case
for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the
amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages.
2
While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with
prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.
3

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the
defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs
but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom
in the amounts specified therein.
4
However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to
attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said
amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction
permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.
5

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the
action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid.
6

In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the
allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and
specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is
not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling in the
amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court
together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile
plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on September 12,
1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any
mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint
was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the re- assessment of the
docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial
court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking
for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00.
7
Still no amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said
amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the
damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
property.
8
An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of
the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to
P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.
9

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for
damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the
payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since
the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were
proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing
fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as alleged in
the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment
of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes
there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint.
This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not
to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded
when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner
through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages
being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of
October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the amended
complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment
of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente for petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific performance with
damages is presented by this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the lower court
has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the prescribed docket
fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and
supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated April 5, 1989. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this
petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00 as
docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real properties
involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private respondents failed
to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended
and supplemental complaint.
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
1
a similar case involving an action for
specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed value
thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific performance with damages
although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant to Manchester, the amount of
the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the amount of damages stated in the
complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount of
exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in accordance to
Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the exemplary damages
is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the
part of the private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages being prayed for. The trial
court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion
2
in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also)
the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is
stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same
has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of the complaint there is
a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is left to the discretion of the
Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that any award thereafter shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum,
3
this Court had occasion to make the
clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to "damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be specified. While it is true that
the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion
of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the
basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the
appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although
specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor
speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material
defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment
of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the exemplary
damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period.
4

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from the record the
claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not
specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their
pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate
reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.
SO ORDERED.















G.R. No. 89747 July 20, 1990
MAERSK-TABACALERA SHIPPING AGENCY (FILIPINAS), INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MONET'S EXPORT AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR
VICENTE TAGLE, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated July 12, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 18124 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City in Civil Case No. 7480
which awarded damages to the plaintiff, now private respondent, Monet's Export and Manufacturing
(Monet for short) against the petitioner Maersk- Tabacalera Shipping Agency (Filipinas), Inc., (Maersk for
short) for breach of a (contract of carriage. The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
On May 21, 1985, a complaint for damages was filed by plaintiff Monet's Export and
Manufacturing Corporation (Monet's) and/or Vicente Tagle against defendants Maersk
Tabacalera Shipping (Maersk) and the New Asia Enterprises (New Asia) and/or Manuel
Ranola, alleging, among other things, that plaintiff, like defendant New Asia, is engaged
in the export of locally-made handicrafts and products, while defendant Maersk Line is
engaged in furnishing containerized services through which Monet's and New Asia
normally ship their goods; that on March 11, 1984, plaintiff, after complying with all the
export and custom requirements, loaded its goods in Maersk's container to be delivered
on or before March 15, 1984 to Manila for immediate trans-shipment to its port of
destination; that through fraud and malice, and without prior notice to Monet's, Maersk
unloaded the goods at New Asia's factory site at Tagas, Daraga, Albay to give way to the
latter's own export shipment; that Monet's shipment was later returned to its
warehouse at Banag, Daraga, Albay; and that because of this occurrence, Monet's had
to secure another shipper, thereby incurring unnecessary expenses as well as suffering
mental anguish, worry and sleepless nights thinking of the possibility of losing its trading
partners which would seriously doubt Monet's capacity as a respectable exporter.
Monet's likewise alleged having suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages (p. 1,
Record).
Answering the complaint, Maersk contended that contrary to Monet's allegations, the
latter's shipment was loaded on March 10, 1984 in Maersk container subject to the
condition that the bill of lading would be issued upon Monet's compliance with all the
necessary export papers prior to the departure of the truck bearing said container for
Manila on March 11, 1984. Maersk further alleged that Monet's knew that the subject
goods would not be brought to Manila without submitting all the necessary export
papers, as without them, Maersk would incur charges on the cargo when deposited at
the customs warehouse in Manila and would subsequently be not allowed to export the
goods by custom authorities. (p. 16, Record).itc-asl
Defendant New Asia, for its part, denied any liability in favor of Monet's, alleging that
Monet's has no cause of action against it not being a party to the contract of carriage
between Monet and Maersk (p. 24, Record).
Defendants during the hearing of February 17, 1986 were considered as in default for
their failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference despite proper notice.
Subsequently, the order of default in regard to defendant Maersk was lifted and the
latter was allowed to cross-examine all the witnesses of Monet's. Defendant New Asia
did not move for the lifting of the order of default and accordingly remained as in
default. (p. 204, Record.)
On March 28, 1988, the appealed judgment was rendered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Maersk Shipping Line is found to be liable
to plaintiff for damages in the following amounts: For breach of contract of carriage,
P50,000.00; for moral damages brought about by the wanton bad faith employed by
defendant shipping line in the performance of its contractual obligation, P50,000.00;
and as exemplary damages, another P50,000.00 and for attomey's fees, P20,000.00.
Defendant New Asia Enterprises is exonerated of any liability, there being no valid cause
of action by plaintiff against it. New Asia Enterprises cannot be made answerable for
whatever action or violation of contracted obligation defendant Maersk Line may have
committed against plaintiff because they are 2 separate corporations and there is no
proof of any collusion between them. (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
Maersk appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the trial court
on July 12, 1989.
Hence, the instant petition wherein Maersk raises the following issues:
1. Respondent court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court despite the
obvious fact that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the action because private respondents did not specify their claims for damages and the
correct filing fees were not paid.
2. It was error for respondent court to have awarded P50,000.00 for "breach of
contract" because this is not a form of damage and petitioner has a right to know for
what it is being made to pay.
3. Respondent court erred also in awarding moral damages to a corporation that was
not shown to have a good reputation that was damaged.
4. Again, respondent court erred in awarding exemplary damages in the absense of
evidence that petitioner acted in a wanton or malevolent manner.
5. Finally, respondent court erred in awarding attorney's fees without any explanation
for such an award. (pp. 13-14, Rollo.)
Petitioner's allegation that the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals were
void for lack of jurisdiction (p. 75, Rollo) as Monet did not pay the correct filing fee on its
claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, the amounts of which were not
specified in the body and prayer of its complaint, is anchored in the following ruling of
this Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA (149 SCRA 526 [1987])
... the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
P410.00 as docket fee. ...
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assestment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with the
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts
sought in the amended pleading. (Emphasis supplied; pp. 568-569.)
Unlike Manchester, however, where the jurisdictional issue arising from insufficiency of the docket fee
paid, was seasonably raised in the answer of the defendant in the trial court, in this case the issue is
being raised for the first time in this Court. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court
without question. It filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative reliefs, and actively took part in the trial (p.
53, Rollo). A party who voluntarily participates in the trial cannot later on raise the issue of the court's
lack of jurisdiction (Tan Boon Bee & Co. v. Judge Jarencio, 163 SCRA 205).
Maersk should have raised its objection to the trial court s jurisdiction when the case was still in that
court. It should not have waited for an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals before waking up to
raise the question of jurisdiction. As this Court remarked in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 37:
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced ... and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
A party may be barred by laches from invoking his plea (of lack of jurisdiction) for the
first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea. (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29,
34.)
Since this is a case where some of the claims (for moral and exemplary damages) were not specified in
the plaintiff s pleading and were left for determination by the court, the applicable rule is the third rule
set out in the decision of this Court in Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al. vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, et
al., 170 SCRA 274, to wit:
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
The Clerk of Court of the trial court shall assess and collect the proper additional fees on the totality of
the judgment for the private respondent (Id).
Monet's counsel in the trial court, Attorney Jesus Salazar, is hereby reprimanded for his unethical
practice of not specifying the amount of damages sought in the body and prayer of his complaint in
order to defraud the Government of the proper fee for docketing said complaint. He is warned that a
repetition of that malpractice will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. However, the Clerk of Court of the
trial court shall assess and collect the fees due on the judgment as if the same amounts were specified in
the complaint. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.