Between Science and Technology

Author(s): Joseph Agassi

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 82-99
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY*
JOSEPH
AGASSIt
Boston University
and Tel-Aviv University
Basic research or fundamental research is distinct from both
pure
and
applied
research, in that it is
pure
research with
expected
useful results. The existence
of basic or fundamental research is
problematic,
at least for both inductivists
and instrumentalists, but also for
Popper. Assuming
scientific research to
be the search for
explanatory conjectures
and for
refutations,
and
assuming
technology
to be the search of
conjectures
and some corroborations, we
can
easily place
basic or fundamental research between science and technology
as a
part
of their
overlap.
As a bonus, the
present
view of basic or fundamental
research as an
overlap explains
the
specific hardship
basic research workers
encounter.
1.
Philosophical
Introduction. The
following discussion, concerning
a kind of research
technically
known in
many languages
as fundamental
research or as basic research. These two labels will be used here
as
synonyms
and
explained
at
length.
To
my surprise
I have met
a few
philosophers
of
science, knowledgeable
about
science,
who have
not met this term. I
say
to
my surprise,
because it is a
very widespread
term,
at least in all Western
European languages,
and
designates
a
very special
kind of
research, namely,
the research
performed by
engineers
and
technologists
and
applied scientists,
which is rather
theoretically
oriented. Indeed,
one
might suggest
that the term is
nothing
but the
engineer's synonym
of what in the
university
is known
as
pure
science.
Indeed,
it seems that the term is heard in
industry,
hardly
ever in the
university.
Whereas in
university
circles research
is divided into
pure
and
applied,
in
industry
it is
usually
divided
into basic or fundamental and the
rest,
the rest
being
characterized
variously
as bread-and-butter,
or
technical,
or useful
research,
at times
*Received
July 1978; revised
May
1979.
tA
short version of this
paper
was read at the
Lansing Meeting
of the
Philosophy
of Science Association
(1972).
The audience in the
meeting
has
kindly
favored me
with a friendly
and
stimulating
critical discussion. I have tried to make use of that
discussion
by expanding
this
paper, by adding points triggered by
Professor Noretta
Koertge's
comment, and
by
valuable
points
made
by
Professor J. 0. Wisdom and
by
other commentators. The
manuscript
was
carefully
corrected
by
James Hullett,
by
I. C. Jarvie,
and
by
Noretta
Koertge. My gratitude
to them all.
The final version was
prepared
while I was a
guest
of the Center for
Interdisciplinary
Research, Bielefeld,
on an Alexander von Humboldt senior
fellowship.
Philosophy of Science, 47
(1980) pp.
82-99.
Copyright
? 1980 by
the Philosophy
of Science Association.
82
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
even as
applied
research. There
are,
of
course,
other
divisions,
such
as the division of research into theoretical and
experimental
in the
exact
science,
or into
library
and field work in the social sciences.
But I will not discuss other divisions
except
to
say
that basic or
fundamental research is almost
always experimental, hardly
ever
theoretical.
Now,
there is a current orthodox view
according
to which basic
or fundamental research is
nothing
but
pure
scientific
research,
that
technology
is
applied
science,
and that
technological
research is an
exercise in
applied
science. Let me call this view the orthodox view
for short. Its
prevalence,
I have
explained elsewhere, explains why
there is so little discussion of the
philosophy
of
technology:
it makes
the
philosophy
of
technology part
and
parcel
of the
philosophy
of
science.' It is therefore mistaken. It also makes basic research identical
with
pure
science. This
very
identification will here be
empirically
refuted.
The
major
traditional
problem
of the
philosophy
of science is the
problem
of
induction,
which is the
problem
of the
empirical
validation
of theories: how does
experience
tell us that certain theories are
reliable?
As, clearly, applied
science is
(allegedly)
reliable on account
of its
application
of
(allegedly)
reliable theories. The situation is
reversed for most
philosophers
who
gave up
the
problem
of induction
as a bad
job. For,
the
majority
of such
philosophers
are convention-
alists, pragmatists,
relativists, instrumentalists,
and so
on,
who viewed
science as
essentially applied
science. Whereas inductivists view
technology
as
essentially
valid
knowledge,
instrumentalists view all
knowledge
as
know-how,
as
essentially
a tool for
application.
The
existence of
pure
science and of
technology
refutes both the inductivist
and the
pragmatist
view
by making
the
problem
of validation for
each so
very
different. Basic or fundamental research
being
a border-
line case
only sharpens
the
difficulty
for
both,
since it
requires
both
kinds of validation-the one
typical
of
pure
science and the one
typical
for
technology.
My major
concern, however,
is not critical but constructive. I have
to stress the critical side of
my
view
since,
to
my regret,
so
many
readers of earlier drafts of this
essay
failed to
comprehend
the
constructive
part
since
they
stuck to the traditional frame within which
it makes no sense. The constructive
part
of this
study
covers a
'The orthodox view is well
presented
in
Layton (1971), pp. 562-3;
note that the
term "basic research" is used as
synonymous
with
"pure
research" in his
example
there.
Layton's view,
that science and
technology
differ because their ends differ
(see
his beautiful
example
on
p. 577), agrees
with
my
view
(1966). Yet,
on the
whole,
I consider his view nearer to the traditional than to mine.
83
JOSEPH AGASSI
completely
different
aspect
of the situation: it is an
attempt
to
explain
the
plight
of the
person engaged
in some basic research. The
plight
is
well-known,
but all too often it is
technically explained away:
the
person engaged
in basic research is constrained
by
his
employers:
he is
given only
a
part
of his work week or limited
period
of time
for his
project.
This
constraint, however,
has also been
explained.
It
is, doubtless, quite
a
handicap,
but a
deeper
seated
handicap-as
will be
clearly
seen at the end of this
paper-lies
in the
very
nature
of basic research. I will show that basic research is not
only
a border-line
case but also an
overlap:
the demands from basic research are that
it should be successful both
by
the standards of
pure
science-i.e.,
offer testable
satisfactory explanations-and by
the standards of
technology, i.e.,
offer corroborations to
potentially
useful theories.
The fact that basic or fundamental research is within the
overlap
of science and
technology
is thus
very important,
since we can use
it in order to
explain
some
given
fact. If this is
true,
then the same
fact is also of some use for those who wish to
improve
their own
performance
as basic researchers.
To conclude this
general introductory part,
I wish to
say
a word
about demarcation. The
problem
of demarcation of science seems
to me to be a
problem
in
distributing
medals: who deserves a medal
and
why?
For
example,
when
Popper
demarcates
psychoanalysis
as
non-science and
relativity
as
science,
he
simply says
that Einstein
is a
good guy
but not Freud.
For,
he
rejects
and
replaces
an older
and better
problem, namely,
which
theory
is reliable and
why?
Regrettably,
however,
the sense of
reliability philosophers
had
usually
in mind is that of
credibility
or of a rational substitute for faith.
Fortunately,
this makes the
problem
insoluable. A better sense of
the
problem
is,
which
theory
is
applicable?
This is the
problem
of
demarcation of
technology,
and it could
only
be confused with the
problem,
which
theory
is credible? on the refuted
hypothesis
that
we
apply
what we believe in. I will not here list the refutations of
this
hypothesis again.
The situation merits
generalization:
a
problem
of demarcation
may
gain significance
or
not, depending
on the use of the demarcation.
Now what is
simpler
than to demarcate an artifact
by
its use and
an
activity by
its
purpose?
This
way
the
rationality
of science becomes
part
and
parcel
of a broader
theory
of
rationality, namely,
that of
rational action.
Research,
as an
activity,
is
goal-directed,
and can
so be studied. This
too,
has been elaborated
elsewhere,
and I will
not
expand
on it.2 I was forced to stress it
here, again,
on account
2See
my (1977), p. 88,
note 70 and references there to
papers by
Jarvie and
myself.
84
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of
my
failure to
communicate,
a failure rooted in another
popular
prejudice,
or
two, namely
a traditional
philosophical predilection
for
a
formal,
logical
or
linguistic
characterization and another tradition
of
construing
aims
psychologically
rather than
sociologically.
I must
stress this
because,
all too
obviously,
the chief difference between
scientific and
technological
research is a matter of
objectives:
scientific
research aims at increased
understanding
and
technological
research
at increased usefulness. Whatever else we
say,
this must stand until
criticized,
as a matter of
plain
observation. And basic
research,
to
repeat,
aims at both
enlightenment
and usefulness.
2. Historical Introduction. When St. Robert Cardinal
Bellarmino,
and
his
colleagues
the Jesuit astronomers of the Roman
College,
declared
Copernicanism-the
heliocentric
hypothesis-false,
and cited
religious
grounds, they
were
morally corrupt.
Since Galileo hinted3 that Bellar-
mino was motivated not
by
the love of truth but
by political
considera-
tions I will not discuss his motives. Yet one must
only praise
Bellarmino
and his
colleagues
for their
express
statement that
Copernicanism
as a
theory
was not faithful to the facts of the matter:
they
were
not so
corrupt
as to declare it false on
religious grounds
but true
on scientific
ones,
as some of their followers do
today.
It is of course
a weak
position
for a
religious
leader to declare
frankly
on
religious
and social
grounds,
that a doctrine
concerning
the
starry
heavens
is
scientifically objectionable-to
use our
idiom,
"philosophically
false",
to use theirs-but
holding honestly
a weak
position
is
superior
to
muddling
matters
by making
truth relative so as to cover
up
for
one's weakness. Bellarmino admitted from the start that
Copernicanism
was
technologically quite acceptable
and indeed a
great boon,
when
considered as mere
sleight-of-hand,
when not taken as a
physical
theory
at all,4 but as a mere mathematical device. This raised the
3See
my (1977), p.
156.
4The exact words of Bellarmino are
very important,
and for diverse
reasons; they
merit
quotation
in full.
"First,
I
say
it seems to me that
your
Reverence and
Signor
Galileo act
prudently
when
you
content
yourselves
with
speaking hypothetically
and
not
absolutely,
as I have
always
understood
Copernicus spoke.
For to
say
that the
assumption
that the Earth moves and the Sun stands still saves all the celestial
appearances
better than do eccentries and
epicycles
is to
speak
with excellent
good
sense and to run no risk whatever. Such a manner of
speaking
suffices for a
mathematician. But to want to affirm that the
Sun,
in
very truth,
is the center of
the Universe and
only
rotates on its axis without
travelling
from east to
west,
and
that the Earth is situated in the third
sphere
and revolves
very swiftly
around the
Sun,
is a
very dangerous
attitude and one calculated not
only
to arouse all Scholastic
philosophers
and
theologians
but also to
injure
our
holy
faith
by contradicting
the
Scripture."
See Bellarmino's famous letter to
Foscarini, quoted
in full in James Brodrick
(1928), pp. 358-360;
also
quoted
in
part
in
Giorgio
de Santillana
(1955), pp.
86-87
(see
also
p.
103 and
p.
131
there)
and in Arthur Koestler
(1959), pp.
454-455. Koestler
85
JOSEPH AGASSI
question,
is
technology,
whose chief end is
pragmatical, totally
devoid
of theoretical concern? In other words, has
technology
no interest,
however
subordinate,
in
questions
of the truth and
falsity
of theories?
Can we not
inquire
into the
question,
at
least, why
do some mathemati-
cal devices work better than others?
Technology
is considered mere
sleight-of-hand
in two
traditions,
a
reactionary philosophical one, and a dumb
technological
one. In
philosophy,
until
recently
the tradition was, much in reaction to
Bellarmino, militantly
realistic: scientific theories are true. And so,
the success of their
application
was to be
expected.
As to the
technology
not based on scientific
theory,
it is
traditionally
called
by
various
names, such as "a mere
hypothesis,"
or even "a mere
working
hypothesis,"
or "a fictitious
hypothesis"
or "an as if" or "a mere
instrument" or "a
computational device," etc. In the
technological
tradition-which is more
recent,
of
course-technology
is
quite
often
called a "black box." It is
very important
to notice
that, historically,
the idea that some
theories, though
not true, may
be
useful, is
quite
traditional: the consolation
price
for a
theory,
so to
speak,
was the
view of it as a useful
device-namely
a black box. When the crisis
of
physics
in the turn of the
century
raised doubts as to the truth
of
allegedly
established scientific truths, such as atomism and Newto-
nian mechanics,
the whole of science was often declared a mere set
of
working hypothesis
or
huge
black box.
A black box
operates
upon
instructions fed into it
by
unknown
mechanisms;
its innards cannot be studied. In
particular,
it cannot
be
opened, perhaps
because of an
explosive
which
miraculously ignites
whenever we
open it,
no matter in which
way
and under what
conditions.5 To be more
specific,
the idea one wishes to
convey is,
rather, that
nobody
wants to
open it-perhaps
out of sheer lack of
curiosity,
and
perhaps
out of the
despair
of the realization that
curiosity
takes us nowhere. The black box
operates
and that is the most
important
fact about
it; why
it
operates
we do not
know, perhaps
we cannot
ever
know, perhaps
we
may
even know some
day
but this is
totally
beside the
point.
The
question is,
I
propose,
what is the
point.
Since
Bellarmino,
the
point
had
radically altered,
as
Popper
has stressed.6 And
Bellarmino,
to
add,
both served
religion
and held as true some
physical theory.
says (p. 443)
". . . there had never been
any question
of
condemning
the
Copernican
system
as a
working hypothesis.
The biblical
objections
were
only
raised
against
the
claim that it was more than a
hypothesis,
that it was
rigorously proven
..."
5See
Bunge (1964).
6See
Popper, (1963).
86
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
But the claim that all science is a black box often comes from secular
circles, often circles of
technologists
who
simply
have
contempt
for
any
intellectual
curiosity
to
begin with,
whether
religious
or scientific.
Their
point, then,
is anti-intellectualism as
such, or rather anti-intellec-
tualism as a
corollary
for some unreasonable claims for action
philosophy
in its
present
technocratic
garb.7
The universal black box
is thus not
really
a
box,
but a
half-witty overgrown metaphor, serving
an anti-intellectualist
purpose.
That anti-intellectualism is
unfortunately
present
in
technological
circles is not
particularly surprising
since
it is
present
in almost all
circles,
of course.
Indeed,
it is
present
even in scientific
circles;
much to the
surprise
of those who still
follow the classical tradition and take science
seriously
as an intellectual
activity par
excellence. No
doubt,
the tradition is still alive and often
enough
scientists
pride
themselves on
having higher
aims than that
of
technology
and
they
even tend
(erroneously, perhaps)
to
deprecate
the aims of
technology.
At times men of science insist that
pursuing
the aims of science is the best
way
of
achieving
the aims of
technology.
Even scientists
who, under the
pressure
of
criticism,
tend to declare
science a hand-maid of
technology,
still are moved
by curiosity;
seldom
does one find scientists who are
proud
to be
technologists, though
they may
claim to be
superior
ones. This last claim is instrumentalism
proper,
or black-boxism. It confuses the aims of science with the
aims of
technology,
these
general
aims with
personal
aims of individual
scientists and
technologists, overlooking
the
point
that one
person
often
attempts
and sometimes succeeds in different
personal
ventures
which
incidentally
further
quite
different aims and at times more
public
ones.
Nevertheless,
a small idea
may
be
salvaged
from all
this confusion and
critically
examined.
The
question concerning
basic or fundamental research is
why pure
and
applied science,
or science and
technology, go
hand in hand?
Is science the same as
technology?
If
not, do
they largely overlap?
If
so, why
and how? If
not,
how is it that
they go
hand in hand?
I wish to stress this
question.
In the
popular
mind science and
technology
fuse. In the more careful studies the claim was
simple:
science unearths truth and so is a better tool for
technology
than
mere
guess-work
and rules of thumb. This claim was made
by
Sir
Francis Bacon and was the
philosophical
foundation for all
technology
that
may
claim rational status. It is a historical fact that when
rationality
was bullish
technology
was deemed scientific and when
rationality
7See
my (1977), p. 222, note 34, and references there.
Layton (1971)
demarcates
science from
technology by reference to their different institutionalized aims as reflected
in their different social control mechanisms.
87
JOSEPH AGASSI
was
bearish,
whether in the hands of
Bishop Berkeley
or
during
the
crisis of
physics
in the turn of the
century,
science was deemed
technological.
One
way
or the
other,
science and
technology
were
taken as one.
Only recently
has this been
questioned,
and
by
historians
of science who noticed that until the
age
of electronics and
radiation,
science contributed
precious
little to the
growth
of
technology,
that
the industrial revolution owes much less to scientific
theorizing
than
to the little
boy
who was in
charge
of
opening
and
closing
a valve
of a steam
engine
and
who, wanting
to
join
his friends in a
game,
tied the
rope
he was
supposed
to
pull
when the
piston
was down
to the
piston's
axle,
thus
inventing
the automatic valve.
Two conclusions
may
be drawn from the
story. One,
that science
and
technology
have shared in the classical
period
more an ethos
than a common fund of
knowledge.
Second,
that there is a fundamental
difference between
theories,
such as
Copernicus's
or
Newton's,
and
rules of thumb. The instrumentalist view of science as mere rules
of
thumb,
whether
Bellarmino's, Berkeley's,
or of the new instrumen-
talist
school,
is false and
ought
to be
rejected
on the basis of obvious
facts. Even if we view theories as mathematical
devices,
they
should
not be confused with other devices: even when viewed as
devices,
their broad
range
of
application puts
them
way apart: technology,
technical
devices, computational
devices, etc.,
all these are common
in all
societies,
scientific ideas like Euclidean
geometry
or Newtonian
mechanics are not.
Let us
return, then,
to the
question, why
do science and
technology
go
hand in hand? To make the discussion
interesting,
let us even
ignore
all cases of rules of
thumb,
shots in the
dark, pure
trial and
error,
both in science and in
technology.
Let
us, then,
concentrate
on the role of
theory
or of
theorizing-in
both science and
technology:
is all scientific and all
technological theory
mere
sleight-of-hand?
Or
is all
theory
in
both,
either true or false? Or is science concerned
with truth but not
utility
and
technology
with
utility
but not with
truth? This
narrowing
down to exclude non-theoretical
parts
of science
and of
technology may
render our discussion of science and
technology
incorrect,
but
perhaps
easier at an
opening stage.
3. The Observed Kinds of Research. We
may
remember that
already
at the dawn of modern science Sir Francis Bacon
suggested
that
black-box
technology-technology
based on no
theory whatsoever,
or on
(possibly)
defective, limited,
false theories-is not
objectionable,
but rather inferior to the use of
scientific, true, unlimited, perfect
88
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
theories;8
the best
technology,
to
put
Bacon's idea in another
idiom,
is scientific
technology, namely, applied
science
proper.
Bacon's idea sounds
very convincing-so
much so that one tends
to
forget
that he was in an
opposition.
His
major
idea was his
theory
of cautious
induction,
as
opposed
to the method of
hypothesis.
What
was
wrong
with
hypotheses,
he
said,
is that
they begin
as tentative
suggestions
and end as
dogmas:
when
they
are refuted
they ought
to be
rejected,
but instead
they
are rescued from the
refuting
evidence
by
ad hoc
adjustments.
Now,
one of the
arguments
in favor of
rescuing hypotheses
is that
they
are useful.
And,
Bacon
argued,
usefulness must be sacrificed on the altar of
truth, though
be it
only
temporarily:
it must be renounced in order to be
regained
with ever
increased
potency.
Not much has
changed
in these matters over the centuries: refuted
theories
repeatedly
were retained on the
ground
of their usefulness.
Finally,
the instrumentalist
philosophers
made a virtue of this
necessity
and declared all scientific
theories,
even
prior
to their
possible
refutations,
not
hypotheses,
not
putative truths,
but mere conventions.
According
to this
doctrine, conventionalism,
all
applied
science is
black-box
technology,
and all science is
applied
science.
They argued
this
way
because,
having
lost
hope
of ever
finding any perfect theory,
they
wished to leave room for the modification of scientific
theory.
This is
particularly
so with Pierre
Duhem,
who considered all
theory
as
likely
to be
defective,
and who therefore
preferred
to treat all
scientific
theory
as Bellarmino treated
Copernicanism.9
Duhem was
an ultra-Catholic
and, siding
with
Bellarmino,
he
actually
went much
further in his instrumentalism in the direction that I consider
nothing
short of anti-intellectualism. To
Bellarmino, Copernicanism
was def-
initely defective,
not
probably defective,
and so he was
justified
in
his own
attempt
to view its successful
application
as
black-boxy,
as mere mathematical
device,
no more than a
sleight-of-hand.
Moreover,
he said he was
open
to
persuasion
and would declare
Copernicanism
true
upon being
offered a
cogent proof.10 By contrast,
Duhem was not
open
to
persuasion,
and held all scientific
theory
to be
sleight-of-hand,
once and for all. In
particular,
he saw no
possibility
of ever
finding anything
like
cogent proof
of
any
scientific
8Sir Francis Bacon
(1620),
Preface to Great Instauration.
9Duhem,
(1954) argues
that
physical
laws are
approximate
and
provisional (Chapter
V section
3),
and that crucial
experiments
can never establish a
theory (Chapter VI,
section
3).
'OSee references in note 4.
89
JOSEPH AGASSI
theory.
He therefore denied that
any
scientific
theory
was ever a
picture
of the world. For his own
picture
of the world he chose
a
picture
that he
frankly put
as
quite independent
of science-Aristote-
lianism. " It was
allegedly
the same
picture
which Bellarmino had
three centuries
earlier, yet
Duhem differed from
Bellarmino,
both
in detail-which is to be
expected-and
in the utter
finality
of his
commitment,
as
opposed
to Bellarmino's readiness to hear
any proof
that Galileo
might
offer. This difference could be deemed
negligible,
but for the fact that whereas to the
reactionary
Bellarmino there
was still the
possibility (however remote)
of
distinguishing
between
science and
technology,
and
thereby allowing
that
Copernicanism
was
something
more than mere
sleight-of-hand, perhaps
even the
truth,
the
arch-reactionary
Duhem
gave up
all
possibility
of ever
making
such a distinction and hence of ever
changing
his views. And this
difference is rather
significant,
at least to Bellarmino and Duhem.
When
Popper
criticized Duhem's
pragmatist
or instrumentalist views
on the aim of
science,
in his
by
now famous "Three Views
Concerning
Human
Knowledge,"
he
rejected
the black-box view of
science,
but
not the black-box view of
technology.
He did not endorse it
either,
but he
lumped together,
as far as
technology
is
concerned, theories,
black-boxes and sheer rule of thumb. He claimed that Duhem was
in error when
viewing pure
science as
part
and
parcel
of
applied
science,
for black boxes and rules of thumb have their
places
in
technology,
but not in science.12 This
may
be
adequate enough
for
Popper,
as his sole concern is
pure
science,
but for those who find
technology
of some interest in
itself, Popper's
views
may
well be
improved upon.
But I think
Popper's
view
ought
to be criticized
anyway,
even for those who share the same limited concern that
he shows in that
essay. For,
I
think,
a broader view
may
be of
some use: it
may
be easier to criticize Duhem
by arguing
not
only
that not all science is
black-boxy technology,
but further that not
all
technology
is
black-boxy.
Indeed,
this further
argument may
turn
out to be the easier one: as a matter of fact theoretical research
in
technology
does
exist,
and has a
recognized
name-basic or
fundamental research. Not
only pure
scientific
research,
but even
technological
basic or fundamental research is more
rational,
less
'Duhem
expressed
his
hope
that the final
stage
of
physics-whether
to be achieved
or to serve as a
regulative
idea-will confirm his faith in Aristotelian
metaphysics.
It is not clear whether he said this in order to vindicate his faith in Aristotle or
his love for science or both. In
any case,
as Louis de
Broglie
has noted in his
introductory
essay
to the
English
translation of Duhem
(1954),
this idea of Duhem is an
afterthought,
and one that conflicts with Duhem's whole outlook. See also
my (1957).
12Karl R.
Popper, (1963), Chapter 2;
see
especially pp.
112-113.
90
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of a device or of a
sleight-of-hand,
than Duhem will allow. Duhem's
view makes it
impossible
to make sense of the
broadly accepted
distinction between
pure science,
basic
research,
and
technological
research. A follower of Duhem
may
well admit that
seemingly
these
activities
differ, yet
see no
difficulty
here: he
may
claim that all
of these
seemingly
distinct
activities-pure
science,
basic
research,
and
technological
research-are not
really distinct,
but
only
look
different.
Perhaps
he is
right: yet
the fact remains that at least on
the
surface,
as mere observed
facts,
most scientists and
technologists
distinguish
the three:
pure
and basic research look identical
yet
are
repeatedly
differentiated
by scientists, technologists,
and
technological
administrators. And for a reason that Duhem must
reject
a
priori,
no less. Let me
explain.
As soon as I notice that at least those who
insist on their endorsement of
pragmatism
or
instrumentalism, must,
for the sake of
consistency, give up
the distinction
they
hold between
the three
activities,
the
following
clarification of this distinction and
the
following advocacy
of it
notwithstanding.
Consider a historical
example: photography.
First
stage:
the camera
obscura-origins
unknown-and
photochemistry, perhaps
also
origins
unknown,
but it came to the fore with the
discovery
of
oxygen
and
photosynthesis by Joseph Priestly.
The two
phenomena
were
put
together by
a number of
experimentors just
before the turn of the
nineteenth
century.
The result was visible but
temporary pictures
on screens covered with
photosensitive
chemicals. Second
stage:
the
discovery
of the
fixative,
namely
the chemical that
stops
the
photo-
chemical
process
so that the
picture
is not
destroyed
when
exposed
to
light.
This was done
by
trial and
error, by Daguerre'3
and
by
Fox Talbot.14 The
major leap
was
Daguerre's suspicion
that he could
get
a latent
image,
an
image
not visible before the use of a fixative
which both reveals and fixes the
picture.
Photography
was
put
to an
important
use even before the
discovery
of the
fixative-by
Thomas
Young,
who also showed that
photosen-
sitivity depends
on the
wavelength
of the incidential
light.15 Young
made this
discovery
when he tried to show that radiant
heat,
namely
ultra-violet and infra-red
light,
are
light
waves: he created interference
patterns
with these kinds of
light
which were
momentarily
visible
on the
photo-plates.
The
fading
of the
photos
did not trouble him
'3See
W. Jerome
Harrison, (1887), pp. 24-25,
J. M. Eder
(1905), pp. 195-207, and
Beaumont Newhall
(1967), p.
46.
'4See Eder
(1905), pp. 239-44,
Beaumont Newhall
(1964), pp. 31-32,
and Newhall
(1967),
55-6.
15Eder
(1905), pp. 1089;
and Beaumont Newhall
(1967), p.
33.
91
JOSEPH AGASSI
in the
least,
since the
momentarily
visible interference
patterns
were
sufficient for his
purpose.
Unlike the invention of the
fixative,
which was both
intentional,
and arrived at
largely by
a shot in the
dark,
the invention of color
photography-by
James Clerk Maxwell-was the unintended result
of a
theory.
16
It was well known
by then,
we
remember,
that different
chemicals
may
be sensitive to different
wavelengths.
Maxwell's own
interest, however,
was not at all in color
photography,
not in
any
other
photography,
but rather in color vision. And he endorsed and
developed Young's theory
of vision
according
to which the human
eye
is sensitive to three and
only
three
colors,
from the combination
of which the brain
synthesizes
all the various shades
normally
seen.
Indeed,
the
eye analyzes light,
he
agreed,
into the three
components
it
sees,
and then the brain
synthesizes
the three colors so as to obtain
the
original
varied
picture
on its rich
spectrum
of colors. He arrived
then at the
corollary
that a
superposition
of three monochromatic
photographs may
thus result in color
photography proper,
since in
that case the
analysis
is
already
made
by
the
photographer
and so
the
eye
will not
distinguish
the trichromatic
picture composed
from
the three
superimposed pictures
from the
original picture
on its varied
and rich
spectrum
of colors. Tricolor
photography,
in
short,
is an
optical
illusion!
So much for
my
historical
example.
I wish to use
it,
let me
repeat,
as an illustration of the
fact, assuming
that it is a
fact,
that without
much
philosophical analysis
we
easily distinguish
different kinds of
activity, pure research,
basic
research,
and
technological
research.
And,
of
course,
when we
keep philosophical analysis
at arm's
length
at least
(but
also
otherwise,
in
my view),
the
purpose
of an
activity
may
be a
major
factor in our view of it.
Indeed,
in the
story just
told,
the
purposes
of the diverse activities are the first
things
that
color our views of them: we see here three cases of
experimental
activities or
experimental designs
or
experimental designs plus
their
performance.
In
Young's case,
his aim was to
design
an
experiment
to test a scientific
theory,
and he made a
discovery
that he could
use in that
design.
In the case of
Daguerre
and Fox
Talbot,
there
was a clear
technological
task and
attempts by
trial-and-error to execute
it
satisfactorily.
In the case of Maxwell there was the
finding,
as
an
after-thought,
of a new
application
for a
theory;
Maxwell's invention
of
(the design of)
color
photography
was,
as we call such
things,
a
by-product
of
pure
research. None of these
examples
is what is
'6See Eder
(1905), pp. 132, 428;
also Beaumont Newhall
(1964), p.
192. Also Helmut
and Alison
Gernsheim, (1955), p.
52.
92
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
called basic or fundamental research-research which is
pure
science,
but with an
eye
on its
technological by-products.
Basic or fundamental
research is conducted
by quite
a few
private
and
public
industrial
organizations
devoted to
technological concerns, including photo-
graphy.
The basic or fundamental research in the
photographic industry
is devoted these
days
to
photo-chemistry,
to theories of
vision,
to
electronics,
to mechanics of
speed photography,
to
thermodynamics
and to colloid
chemistry,
indeed to diverse fields of science. The
discoveries
resulting
from such research must be
judged
as scientific
discoveries whether
judged by
common-sense or
by any
known
criterion of scientific
discovery.
Nonetheless,
the intellectual or
theoretical value or interest of these discoveries is
often,
but
certainly
not
always,
rather narrow and is much smaller than their
technological
interest or usefulness.
4. Theories of Demarcation. Let us now turn from facts to
theorizing,
from the observed different research activities to the
philosopher's
attempt
at
distinguishing
between them. We
come, thus,
to the
problem
of the demarcation between science and
technology;
we shall
try
to extend it to demarcate each from basic or fundamental research.
To
begin
with the demarcation between science and
technology.
Usually
science is demarcated as a set of statements. But for our
end we need demarcate research activities.
Following
the tradition
we
may easily
view the difference between scientific and
technological
research as the difference in aim which leads to the difference in
the results of the
activity,
or rather in the
expected
result of the
activity:
science but not
technology
is viewed as
aiming
at
finding
the truth about the nature of
things.
This view renders basic or
fundamental research a
part
of
pure
scientific research.
Usually
the
difference between these two is taken to be
merely
a difference in
final aim: the
application
of the fruits of
pure
science is a
by-product,
whereas the
application
of the fruits of basic or fundamental research
is the
prime purpose.
Hence there
is,
in this
case,
no difference
in the
day
to
day
research conduct between those
engaged
in basic
or fundamental research and those
engaged
in
proper
scientific or
pure research;
the immediate aims of both activities are
identical;
the difference is
long term-pure
research can
go
on
indefinitely
whether with or without visible
applicability-not
so basic or funda-
mental research. And so the difference is not
entirely
a matter of
who is the
theoretician,
a
university professor
or an industrial re-
searcher. Such distinctions are
unhelpful anyhow,
in our
day
and
age,
when
pure
research has invaded
industry
and industrial research
the universities. The difference
depends primarily upon
the distinction
93
JOSEPH AGASSI
between the
long-term
and short-term interests:
knowledge gained
through
basic or fundamental research is seldom
interesting apart
from its usefulness;
in the short-run, then, fundamental research is
scientific, but in the
long-run
it is
technological.
Now, this is how I think
things
stand these
days;
this
reasoning
strikes me as the one in use and correct as far as it
goes,
but nevertheless
highly unsatisfactory.
The results of basic or fundamental research
may
in the
long
run be of
high
scientific interest; perhaps
this is
not often the case,
but it
happens
often
enough
to raise afresh the
problem
of demarcation between research in
pure
science and basic
fundamental research.
Moreover,
it seems rather
unsatisfactory
to
demarcate science from
technology
on the basis of a distinction between
interest and usefulness, because
apart
from its usefulness, technology
is itself
highly interesting
and often
fascinating.
To
deny
that basic
or fundamental research and its fruits are of interest
because,
often
enough, they
bear little interest for
pure science,
is
erroneous,
or
at least
parochial.
The fascination of basic or fundamental research
as of
technology
in
general usually
cannot be divorced from its
practicalness:
like functional architecture it fascinates us in its
very
usefulness,
in
constituting ingenious
and dextrous solutions to
problems
which
happen
to be
practical,
but also
challenging. Therefore,
a little
more
ought
to be said on the difference between
pure
research in
pure
science and in fundamental research.17
Science is often characterized
by
its
verifiability
or
confirmability;
this renders science and
technology
in
principle identical,
and this
in its turn does not enable us to
go beyond
the rather
superficial
solution I have outlined above. To
go further,
one needs
Popper's
demarcation of science.
According
to
Popper's philosophy-at
least
in the
way
I
usually present
it-scientific theories are refutable
explanations
of
empirical facts,
and
learning
from
experience
is the
same as
finding
some
empirical
refutations of some hitherto unrefuted
scientific theories. All this holds for
science,
not for
technology,
where
applicability
is based on
corroboration,
not on refutation. Let
me elaborate.
5. Success in Science and in
Technology. Traditionally,
scientific
theory
was
judged
successful when a new
prediction
based on it
agreed
17Here is also the
place
to
speak
of that bothersome
quality, elegance.
That better
inelegant argument
or
proof
than none is as obvious as that better an
elegant
one
than not. So much is
universally agreed, yet
the
topic
has
gained only passing
observations, and
usually
ones which
express annoyance. Evidently, elegance
adds
to our
understanding by clarifying
what factors play
what role in an
argument.
But
what sort of
understanding
is this?
Why
is it
always
easier to increase
elegance
with
the aid of advanced
knowledge
than without it?
94
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
with
experience
and failed
otherwise;
and a man of science was deemed
successful if his
theory
was successful. On a second
thought,
initial
success was the
ability
to solve a
problem
with the aid of a
theory;
often,
when a task was difficult
enough,
even initial success made
an
originator
of a
theory
successful. Thus we
find,
in classical
examples
from the
theory
of celestical
mechanics, Kepler, Newton,
and
Einstein,
feeling
that
they
had
great
success even
prior
to
any
new test.
What if initial success leads to a refutation rather than
agreement?
Back to the
drawing board,
of course. But does this mean that the
initial success is cancelled?
Traditionally
the answer
was, yes.
Some
of the effort
may
be
salvaged,
no
doubt,
if it can be
reused;
but
this is a
technicality,
no different from the fact that
Kepler improved
his research abilities while
encountering repeated
failure.
Opposed
to the traditional
theory
of
science,
there is
Popper's theory
of science as a Socratic
dialogue;18
we learn from
experience,
he
says,
in the act of
refuting
our
conjectures by empirical
means. The
failure of a
theory
that had initial success is what counts.
Now,
how shall we
judge
the success of a
theory,
or the
positive
result
of a test in which
prediction
is born out
by
the fact?
This,
I should
say,
makes the initial success of the
theory
all the more
impressive,
and so the
challenge
to refute it both harder and more
promising.
But,
to stress a
point,
if after initial success a refutation comes at
once,
there is a
gain
from
it,
not a loss.
This is
my
own
reading
of
Popper's theory.
His own
reading
is
different: he
says,
after the initial success of
solving
a
problem,
a
theory
should also
pass
some tests before it fails.'9 I fail to see
the merit of this
point
and see no merit in it at all. This is not to
say
that I do not
appreciate
the need of theories to
pass
some tests
successfully.
But a
completely
different
merit,
and one that
requires
a deviation from
Popper's theory
of the successful outcome of a
test, usually
known as accord with
experience
or as
confirmation,
and which he
prefers
to call corroboration.
Popper's theory
of corroboration is
very simple: corroborating
evidence or
positive
evidence is the
empirical
result of an
experiment
which, though
set to refute a
theory,
has failed to refute it.20
Popper
is not at all clear about the role of corroboration in science. In
my
presentation
of his
view,
as
repeated above,
corroboration
merely
18I have in mind Socrates's claim in Plato's
Gorgias,
that the loser in a debate
is the true winner.
[Added
in
proof:
The view of
Popper's philosophy
as the inclusion
of science in the field of Socratic
dialogues
is
developed
in his latest
publication,
the introduction to his Die Beide
Grundprobleme
of
1979.]
'9Popper (1963) pp. 217,
242.
20Popper (1959), Chapter
10 and
Appendix
ix.
95
JOSEPH AGASSI
increases the
explanatory power
of a
theory
and so enhances it as
a
good
scientific
explantion.2'
In
technology, however,
corroboration
is an
important precondition
for the license to
apply
a new
invention,
often
specified by
law.
Basic or fundamental
research,
I
contend,
is in between science
and
technology,
in the sense that it
operates
not
only
with
explanations
and
refutations;
it also must
operate
with corroborations. Let me
give
an
example.
Plasma
physics belongs largely
to theoretical
physics
and
largely
also to basic or fundamental research.
Hence,
the two
characterizations
richly overlap
in this field.
It is not hard to
separate
the concerns in this area of research.
The
purely
theoretical side of
plasma
physics
is the
general
interest
in
properties
of
elementary particles,
or the
special aspect
of this
interest which is in the
way
fast
elementary particles
interact with
strong electromagnetic
fields. The technical difficulties
besetting
the
empirical
side of this research resemble the technical difficulties of
the
technological
side of the research. The
technological
interest in
plasma
is the concern not in
just any elementary particle,
and
hardly
in
plasma
at
all,
but in the various
hydrogen
nuclei
which,
when
fast
(hot) enough may
fuse into helium and thus release nuclear
energy;
plasma physics
enters
merely
as the
hoped
for means of
achieving
controlled nuclear fusion. The basic or fundamental research into
the nature of
plasma,
then,
concerns the laws
regulating
the interaction
between fast
particles
and
electro-magnetic
fields
only
because the
hope
that the
knowledge
of these laws will enable us to control the
fast
particles
with the aid of
strong
fields. The basic or fundamental
researcher
may study
different interactions between
strong
fields and
different hot
particles,
but his central concern will
again
and
again
return to the interactions which
may help
him fuse
hydrogen
nuclei
into helium nuclei. He will therefore not be content with mere
refutations of his theories: sooner or later we will
hope
to see
positive
results which
may
be the
beginnings
of
technological application,
namely
the fusion of
hydrogen
nuclei into helium nuclei. When he
despairs
of these he will declare the basic or fundamental research
a failure. But it will be as basic or fundamental research that the
work will
fail;
it
may,
indeed, proceed
as
"purely"
theoretical from
then on.
Moreover,
even
though plasma
research
has,
in
fact,
not
succeeded as basic or fundamental
research,
it still
proceeds
with
ever
increasing ingenuity
and
unflagging hopes. Also,
even
though
unsuccessful,
it did
encourage,
as a
by-product,
another
technological
avenue of
research,
that of
attempting
to convert heat into
electricity
2'See my (1961)
and
(1968).
96
BETWEEN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
without the use of turbines
(magnetohydrodynamics).
This
research,
too,
has not
yet yielded
results. It is in
process,
but much too
technological
in nature as
yet
to count as basic or
fundamental;
but
I
may already
be out of date on this.
To
conclude,
I do not
reject
the demarcation between science and
technology by
their
aims,
nor do I
deny
that fundamental research
has scientific aims in the short run and
technological
ones in the
long
run. I
simply
find this not sufficient or
satisfactory
because
science and
technology may
each endorse the other's aims for a
while,
and the
interesting thing
is to characterize the
impact
of the endorse-
ment of such ends. The view I offer here is this.
Endorsing
the aims of
science,
the search for the
truth,
involves
looking
for
satisfactory explanatory hypotheses
and
attempting
to
refute them in the
hope
of
discovering
their
defects,
i.e. of
refuting
them.
Endorsing
the aim of
technology,
involves
looking
for
applicable
hypotheses
and
trying
to refute them in the
hope
of
failing,
in the
hope
that the refutation is unsuccessful.
Endorsing
the aim of basic
or fundamental research is
attempting
to do both at once: find a
satisfactory explanation
and test
it,
and
perhaps
also refute it-but
also find
possible
useful conclusions from it and corroborate these.
Before
leaving
this
matter,
I wish to make two observations. The
first
is,
I have been
making sociological
observations about the
place
of basic or fundamental research in
university
and in
industry.
It
is doubtless a
good question
whether I
got my
facts correct as a
sociologist,
let alone whether I
explained
them
satisfactorily.
I also
observe that
technologists speak very differently,
for
example,
after
spectacular
success than after
tragic
failure due to no-one's
flagrant
negligence (such
as the death of
astronauts),
that
they
talk
differently
to
grant
committees,
to
management,
and to scientists. I have not
discussed these
subtleties,
though they
do deserve discussion.
My
second
point
is this. I have not
yet exhausted,
here or elsewhere
in
my publications
on science and
technology,
even the list of
important
factors of
interplay
between the two. For
example,
when an established
and
widely accepted theory
is
refuted,
the
very
refutation
may
offer
a rich field of
attempts
to
improve upon
earlier
techniques.
For
example,
the
very
refutations of Kirchhoff's
theory
of radiation
facilitated the
improvement
of
spectroscopy.
I will mention
only
one
example.
Kirchhoff's most basic
assumption
was that all
spectra
are
atomic,
not molecular. The refutation of this basic
assumption
enables
one to make
spectra
reveal not
only
the elements in a
given compound
but also the chemical structure of that
compund.
The fact
(which
I have discussed
elsewhere)
that we wish to corroborate
every refuting
fact makes the
possible application
of refutations to
technology
a
97
JOSEPH AGASSI
straightforward
matter.
Similarly,
the role of shots in the dark and
of rules of thumb in science, in
technology,
and in their
interplay,
has
hardly
been studied. In
particular,
I do not mean to
suggest
that
the whole field of research is covered
by pure, applied, basic, and
technological
studies.
Let me mention one other area of the
interplay
between science
and
technology,
and one
point
within it, that of
working hypotheses
whose
job
is to
work, namely they
have to be corroborated in order
to
succeed, yet they
are as often
ancillary
to scientific research as
to
technological
ones. Indeed, one can
say,
the
technology
created
for the
purpose
of
enabling pure
scientific research to
proceed
is
at times
exciting-the
bubble chamber
may
be a
good example, though
I find the
tiny
cloud chamber
equally fascinating.
I will
say
no more
here of
working hypotheses,
as I have discussed them elsewhere.22
All I wish to
say
now is that all research that
requires
confirmation
or corroboration for its success
gambles
much more than one that
does not. And so, a humble researcher that takes a minor problem
in basic research or devises a
working hypothesis
to aid basic or
pure
research often does so out of
timidity
and fear of
risk-taking,
but in fact he takes a
bigger
risk than a
pure
researcher.
Many
a
doctoral student has
paid
for such an error
by
the loss of his chances
for an academic career. Much of the tensions and travails of the
basic or fundamental research that
goes
on in
industry may
likewise
be viewed as an unnoticed
large risk-taking,
that creates much
anxiety
and creates
unduly large pressure
on researchers to succeed when
success is often due to more luck than
design.
In all such cases
a research
project may
be better
designed by
the attention to
possible
failure
paid
in advance.
Especially
because basic or fundamental
research is conducted under unfavorable conditions and in a sense
of frustration of
people placed
in
industry
instead of in
pure
research
institutes,
it is
quite important
to
try
and see
things objectively
and
reduce
hardship whenever possible.
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my (1976), Chapter
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99