SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127064. August 31, 1999.]

FIVE STAR BUS COMPANY INC., and IGNACIO TORRES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE JAIME F.
BAUTISTA, RTC-Br. 75, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and SAMUEL KING SAGARAL II, respondents.
Carmelo & Millares Law Offices for petitioners.
Bernardo F. Ligsay for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On 9 November 1991, the Suzuki Supercarry Mini-Van driven by private respondent collided with a passenger bus owned and
operated by petitioner Five Star Bus Company and driven by co-petitioner Ignacio Torres. On 1 April 1992, private respondent
filed a civil action for damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. Trial ensued. After private
respondent rested his case, the trial court scheduled a total of six (6) hearing dates for the presentation of petitioners' evidence.
These were 25 April 1996, 9 May 1996, 2 July 1996, 16 July 1996, 8 August 1996 and 20 August 1996. The hearing set on May
9 was postponed when co-petitioner Torres failed to appear in court because he was then incarcerated. The hearing on 2 July
was moved to 16 July upon motion of petitioners. However, on said date, petitioners' counsel failed to appear on time, thus
prompting the trial court to declare petitioners' right to present evidence as waived and considered the case submitted for
resolution. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order. Pending a resolution of the said motion, petitioners
again moved to reset the 8 August hearing, citing as reason the conflict of schedule of their counsel. The trial court granted the
motion and transferred the hearing to August 10. It also set on the said date the hearing of petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. However, petitioners once again moved that the hearing be reset to 2 September 1996. The trial court
cancelled the hearing set for 20 August 1996 and instead issued an order on that day denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of its Order dated 16 July. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, the
Court of Appeals, in its decision, summarily dismissed their petition on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping
required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 was signed by counsel and not by petitioners' themselves. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition. AEIcTD
The Supreme Court is not unmindful of its ruling that substantial compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 is sufficient.
The Court, however, cannot apply the "substantial compliance" rule to petitioners and be as liberal minded. Counsel for
petitioners gave a rather frail excuse for his non-compliance, i.e., oversight and haste in ensuring that the petition would be filed
at the earliest possible time for the protection of his clients' interests thereby overlooking the aforesaid circular.
Contrary to petitioners' assertions, their failure to present their evidence was their own undoing. From the repeated resettings, it
can be gleaned that the delay in the proceeding was largely, if not mainly, due to petitioners. The case has been pending for a
long period of time, with the court often accommodating petitioners. Thus, there could be no grave abuse of discretion when the
trial court finally ordered petitioners' right to present evidence as waived to put an end to their footdragging. The Supreme Court,
therefore, affirmed the decision of the appellate court.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADINGS; SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 28-91; FORUM
SHOPPING; EXPLAINED. Circular No. 28-91 has its roots in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two (2) different fora, for such practice works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure. Forum shopping
has been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their
processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described
as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE RULE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR; REASON. We are not
unmindful of this Court's ruling in Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, Loyola v. Court of Appeals, and Kavinta v. Castillo, Jr. that
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 is sufficient. In the instant case, we cannot apply the "substantial compliance"
rule to petitioners and be as liberal minded. For one thing, counsel for petitioners gave a rather frail excuse for his noncompliance, i.e., oversight and haste in ensuring that the petition would be filed at the earliest possible time for the protection of
his clients' interests thereby overlooking the aforesaid circular. IcAaEH

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170049. March 14, 2008.]
GENEROSO A. JUABAN and FRANCIS M. ZOSA, petitioners, vs. RENE ESPINA and CEBU DISCOVERY BAY
PROPERTIES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
The Heirs of Bancale later entered into a 31 January 1997 Agreement to Sell and to Buy with respondent Rene
Espina (Espina), paragraph 5 of which states:
On 23 October 1997, Sheriff Gato served notice that the rights, shares, interests and participation of the Heirs of
Bancale in the subject properties were being levied on execution to satisfy the Writ of Execution dated 14 October
1997. This was done despite the fact that the Writ of Execution issued by the trial court specifically directed that the
attorney's fees were "to be taken from the money due from the buyer to the sellers under the agreement to buy and
sell." Thereafter, Sheriff Gato issued a Notice of Sale on Execution dated 24 October 1997, announcing that the
subject properties were to be sold at a public auction on 28 November 1997 at 2:00 p.m.
ISSUE:
WON espina alone can sign the certification against forum shopping
The personality of appellant Rene Espina to sue in his personal capacity finds basis in the Agreement to Sell and to
Buy. It is readily apparent in the Agreement that he has been designated as the "Second Party", in his personal
capacity, and not as agent or representative of a corporate entity. On the other hand, the Deed of Sale which was
subsequently executed, is based on the aforesaid Agreement. Therefore, there is no gainsaying that appellant
Rene Espina has a personal interest in the case. 7
Having been established as a real party in interest, respondent Espina has not only the personality to file the
complaint in Civil Case No. 4178-L, but also the authority to sign the certification against forum shopping as a
plaintiff therein. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. Nevertheless, the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance
with the provisions regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that
the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.
Thus, when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules.
ATcaHS
Thus, the certificate against forum shopping is not rendered invalid by the absence of the signature of an
authorized official of respondent CDPI. The signature of respondent Espina as one of the plaintiffs therein suffices.
The grounds alleged by petitioners and ruled upon by the trial court are thus (1) extinguishment, (2) litis pendentia,
and (3) lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of Rene Espina. Of these grounds, only litis pendentia is related to
the present allegation of petitioners concerning the defect in the Certification against Forum Shopping. Forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other. However, forum shopping as a ground for the dismissal of actions is distinct and
separate from the failure to submit a proper Certificate against Forum Shopping. One need not be held liable for
forum shopping for his complaint to be dismissed on the ground of an absence or a defect in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping. Conversely, one can be liable for forum shopping regardless of the presence or absence of a
Certification against Forum Shopping. The presence of a Certification in such a case would only have the effect of
making the person committing forum shopping additionally liable for perjury. Thus, we held in Spouses Melo v.
Court of Appeals: 15

Indeed, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from, and independent of, the
avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference in the treatment in terms of imposable sanctions
between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum
shopping. . . . .
There being no allegation of a defect in the Certification against Forum Shopping on the part of respondents,
neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals was able to rule thereon. Both courts only ruled on the issue concerning
litis pendentia, on which the Court of Appeals correctly held that: cTEICD
Appellees' charge that appellants are guilty of forum shopping is without legal basis. It has been held that "where
the elements of litis pendentia are not present or where final judgment in one will not amount to res judicata in the
other, there is no forum shopping. 16

1.

Guy vs. CA 510 SCRA 103

FACTS:
The private respondents who are minors, were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes and filed a petition for letters of
administration. They alleged in their petition that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
intestate leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00. However, his known heirs prayed for an appointment of a regular
administrator. Ant Michael Guy be appointed as Special Administrator of the Estate for the meantime.
Attached to private respondents petition was a Certification of Non forum Shopping signed by their counsel.
Contention of the petitioner: The petition should be dismiss since his father left no debts and his estate can be settled without
securing a letters of administration and that the non-forum shopping should have been signed by the respondents and not by
their lawyer. The claim of Remedios and her minor children had been paid and waived by reason of the Release and waiver of
Claim in exchange for the financial and educational
Assistance.
The RTC and CA denied the motion to dismiss of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be dismissed on the ground of failure to comply with the rules on certification of nonforum shopping;
HELD: The petition is DENIED.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff
or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case.
However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. So it is in the present
controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered
as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.

G.R. No. 143016

August 30, 2000

MR. & MRS. RONNIE DAR, MR. & MRS. RANDY ANGELES, MR. & MRS. JOY CONSTANTINO and
MR. & MRS. LIBERTY CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.

HON. ROSE MARIE ALONZO-LEGASTO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 41, Quezon City and NENITA CO BAUTISTA represented by
VICTORIO A. BAUTISTA, respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

If the petitioners are husband and wife and only one of them signs the petition (for review on certiorari
and mandamus), is the petition dismissible for violation of the Rule on Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify it under oath? This is the sole issue raised by petitioners Mr.
and Mrs. Ronnie Dar, Mr. and Mrs. Randy Angeles, Mr. and Mrs. Joy Constantino, and Mr. and Mrs.
Liberty Cruz.

Ruling:
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners
were sued jointly, or as "Mr. and Mrs." over a property in which they have a common interest. Such being the
case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of nonforum shopping.

G.R. No. 117186 June 29, 1995

EN BANC
DAVIDE, JR.,
J .:

ALAN M. LOYOLA,
petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JUDGE MARIA CARILLO ZALDIVAR in her capacity as thePresiding
Judge of the RTC, Kalibo, Branch 6; THE HON. EDUARDO R. AVELINO, in hiscapacity as the presiding
Judge of the MCTC, Macato-Tangalan, and ANICETO FERNANDEZIII,
respondents.
ALAN M. LOYOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

245 SCRA 477

Facts:
In the barangay election of May 1994, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers as the
duly elected Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Tangalan, Aklan on May 10, 1994.Private respondent Fernandez
filed an election protest against the petitioner on May 18, 1994.However, the petition was not accompanied by
a certification of non- forum shopping required under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 of the Supreme Court.
The following day, May 1994, the privaterespondent submitted to the MCTC his certification of non-forum
shopping.On May 25, 1994, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the protest due to private respondents failure
tostrictly comply with the Circular. The MCTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. The RTCof
Aklan denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Circular No. 04-94 is mandatory and jurisdictional, and whether it isapplicable in
election cases.
Held:
The filing of the certification was within the period for filing an election protest. When petitioner was
proclaimed as the Punong Barangay on May 10, 1994, respondent has ten days from suchproclamation within
which to file the election protest. In this case, when respondent filed hiscertificate of non-forum shopping on
My 19, 1994, it was within the reglementary period provided for in the Omnibus Election Code, thus, he still
has until May 20, 1994 to complete the requirements of his petition. Also, the fact that the Circular requires
that it should be strictly complied with merely under serves itsmandatory nature in that it cannot dispensed
with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but itdoes not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances.There is nothing in the Circular that indicates that it does not apply
to election cases. On the
contrary, it expressly provides that the requirements therein shall be strictly complied with in the
filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings in all courts and agenciesother than the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 155875

April 3, 2003

AGAPITO CRUZ FIEL, AVELINO QUIMSON REYES and ROY CONALES BONBON, petitioners,
vs.
KRIS SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and the COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
Facts:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks the nullification of the resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated 16 April 2002, as well as its reiterative resolution of 29 October 2002, dismissing
the case brought to it by petitioners for non-compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioners were employed by private respondent Kris Security Systems, Inc., as security guards and
were assigned posts at Dunkin Donut, lmus Central Kitchen Department, in lmus, Cavite. On different
dates in October 1998, private respondent terminated the services of petitioners. On 13 October 1998,
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Regional Arbitrating Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Private respondent contended that it did not dismiss petitioners
but that they were pulled out from their assignments due to the request of the client.
Issue:
"Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted correctly and in the interest of substantial justice when it
dismissed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the mere technicality that said
petition was signed, certified and verified by only three (3) out of four (4) named petitioners (all of whom
claim to have been illegally dismissed by their employer) considering the following circumstances:
Ruling:
The Court grants the petition.

The greater interest of justice would be served if the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners before the
Court of Appeals is adjudicated on its merits with respect to the three petitioners who have signed the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping, namely, Agapito C. Piel, Avelino Q. Reyes and Roy
C. Bonbon, than to make them all pay for the failure of their co-petitioner Diomedes Uray to observe his
own compliance with the rules. The three petitioners who have faithfully observed the rules mandated in
Section 5, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, by signing the requisite verification and

certification on non-forum shopping, should not be unduly prejudiced by the fault of their co-petitioner
who apparently has lost interest in pursuing his case.

Once again, we must stress that the technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate, the cause of justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable aim, the just
resolution of cases on their merits, however, cannot be sacrificed merely in order to achieve that
objective.4 Rules of procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice;
thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be
subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course.5

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated 16
April 2002 and 29 October 2002, are SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
adjudication on the merits of the petition before it.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 125671

January 28, 2000

CONDO SUITE CLUB TRAVEL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and FLORENCIO LALO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

On September 26, 1994, petitioner terminated the services of private respondent on the ground of loss of
confidence for the latter's malicious intent to defraud a guest of the hotel.5
On appeal, public respondent NLRC affirmed the order dismissing the complaint for diminution of salary,
but modified the decision of the labor arbiter as regards illegal dismissal. It held that the overbilling
incident is the singular handiwork of Landrigan as there is no evidence linking private respondent with
the anomaly. It also ordered the reinstatement of private respondent with backwages but only up to the
time when the offer of reinstatement was made on January 31, 1995. It disposed of the case as follows:

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition. It seeks to annul
the decision of public respondent ordering the reinstatement of private respondent. However, petitioner
does not state the grounds relied upon for said annulment. We note that petitioner imputes neither lack
or excess of jurisdiction, nor grave abuse of discretion, on the part of public respondent in rendering the
assailed judgment.
Issue:
Won petitioners counsel can execute certification against forum shopping
Ruling:
No.
Besides, petitioner did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certification
in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification of
non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless
clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a
cause for the dismissal of this action.9