January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law

Civil Procedure
Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process
as additional ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances
where a party without fault on his part has failed to a!ail of the ordinary
remedies of new trial appeal petition for relief or other appropriate remedies.
"aid rule explicitly pro!ides that it is not a!aila#le as a su#stitute for a
remedy which was lost due to the party$s own neglect in promptly a!ailing of
the same. %&he underlying reason is tracea#le to the notion that annulling
final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an
affecti!e administration of justice that once a judgment has #ecome final the
issue or cause in!ol!ed therein should #e laid to rest.'
(hile under "ection ) Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a *etition for Annulment
of Judgment may #e #ased only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction jurisprudence recogni+es lack of due process as additional
ground to annul a judgment. ,n Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court
declared that a final and executory judgment may still #e set aside if upon
mere inspection thereof its patent nullity can #e shown for ha!ing #een
issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona,
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo alan!ue,
"onny alan!ue, Reynaldo alan!ue, and #steban alan!ue, $r.% -.R. .o.
/70112. January 7 )3/0
Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration
in CA does not toll fifteen4day period to appeal; rule suspended in
exceptional cases to ser!e su#stantial justice. &he assailed CA resolution
upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the
CA does not toll the fifteen4day period to appeal citing &abaluyas
#nterprises, 'nc. v. $apson. 5owe!er in pre!ious cases we suspended this
rule in order to ser!e su#stantial justice.
,n arnes v. (adilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the
petitioner whose motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration was denied #y the CA. ,n the Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration of our 6ecision dated "eptem#er 03 )334 we held that7
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural
infirmity was not entirely attri#uta#le to the fault or negligence of the
petitioner. *etitioner$s counsel was understanda#ly confused with the
a#sence of an explicit prohi#ition in the )33) ,nternal Rules of the Court of
Appeals 8,RCA9 that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non4
extendi#le which was expressly stated in the Re!ised ,nternal Rules of the
Court of Appeals that was in effect prior to the ,RCA. &he lawyer$s
negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the petitioner
is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.
:ore significantly a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of
any showing that the re!iew sought is merely fri!olous and dilatory dictated
the setting aside of the resolutions of the CA in CA4-.R. "* .o. ;2170 and
<ranch )/1 in Ci!il Case .=. >422407)/2 as #oth are patently erroneous. x
x x
?urthermore the pri!ate respondents will not #e unjustly prejudiced #y the
suspension of the rules. (hat is su#ject of the appeal is only a @uestion of
law in!ol!ing the issue of forum shopping and not a factual matter in!ol!ing
the merits of each party$s respecti!e claims and defenses relating to the
enforcement of the :=A wherein petitioner was gi!en an option to purchase
the su#ject property. Aitigations should as much as possi#le #e decided on
their merits and not on mere technicalities. B!ery party4litigant should #e
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause freed from the constraint of technicalities.
After a conscientious !iew we hold that a suspension of the Rules is
warranted in this case since the delay of one week and two days in the filing
of the motion for reconsideration was not occasioned #y negligence on the
part of petitioner$s lawyer in charge of the case the latter ha!ing a !alid
excuse to immediately take lea!e of a#sence in !iew of her father$s sudden
demise. &here is likewise no showing that the re!iew sought is merely
*age 1 of 30
fri!olous and dilatory. )inston *. +arcia, in his capacity as (resident and
+eneral Mana!er of the +"'" v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. ,esoro; -.R.
.o. /;2331. January )C )3/0
Certification against forum shopping; "*A designating counsel to sign must
#e executed if party4pleader cannot sign. &he need to a#ide #y the Rules of
Court and the procedural re@uirements it imposes has #een constantly
underscored #y this Court. =ne of these procedural re@uirements is the
certificate of non4forum shopping which time and again has #een declared
as #asic necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
,n -da. De *ormoso v. (hilippine .ational ank, the Court reiterated the
guidelines respecting non4compliance with or su#mission of a defecti!e
certificate of non4forum shopping the rele!ant portions of which are as
follows7
49 As to certification against forum shopping non4compliance
therewith or a defect therein xxx is generally not cura#le #y its
su#se@uent su#mission or correction thereof unless there is a need
to relax the Rule on the ground of Dsu#stantial compliance or
presence of Dspecial circumstances or compelling reasons$.
xxxx
;9 ?inally the certification against forum shopping must #e executed
#y the party pleader not #y his counsel. ,f howe!er for reasona#le
or justifia#le reasons the party4pleader is una#le to sign he must
execute a "pecial *ower of Attorney designating his counsel of
record to sign on his #ehalf.
&he re@uirement that it is the petitioner not her counsel who should sign the
certificate of non4forum shopping is due to the fact that a %certification is a
peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party an
assurance gi!en to the court or other tri#unal that there are no pending cases
in!ol!ing #asically the same parties issues and causes of action. =#!iously
it is the petitioner and not always the counsel whose professional ser!ices
ha!e #een retained for a particular case who is in the #est position to know
whether EsheF actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.' *er
the a#o!e guidelines howe!er if a petitioner is una#le to sign a certification
for reasona#le or justifia#le reasons she must execute an "*A designating
her counsel of record to sign on her #ehalf. A certification which had #een
signed #y counsel without the proper authori+ation is defecti!e and
constitutes a !alid cause for dismissal of the petition. Mary Louise Anderson
v. #nri/ue &o, -.R. .o. /7)123. January 7 )3/0
Certification against forum shopping; non4compliance is not cura#le #y
su#se@uent su#mission unless there is su#stantial compliance or special
circumstance. ,n this light the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed
Anderson$s *etition for Re!iew on the ground that the certificate of non4forum
shopping attached thereto was signed #y Atty. =li!a on her #ehalf sans any
authority to do so. (hile the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this
error #y later su#mitting an "*A and #y explaining her failure to execute one
prior to the filing of the petition this does not automatically denote su#stantial
compliance. ,t must #e remem#ered that a defecti!e certification is generally
not cura#le #y its su#se@uent correction and while it is true that in some
cases the Court considered such a #elated su#mission as su#stantial
compliance it did so only on sufficient and justifia#le grounds that compelled
a li#eral approach while a!oiding the effecti!e negation of the intent of the
rule on non4forum shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v. #nri/ue &o, -.R. .o.
/7)123. January 7 )3/0
Certification against forum shopping and Gerification; ratification #y the <oard
of 6irectors. A closer look into the "*A and the Corporate "ecretary$s
Certificate su#mitted #y <*, re!eals that at the time the su#ject complaint
was filed on January ); /222 Ramos did not ha!e the express authority to
file and sign the !erification and certification against forum shopping attached
to <*,$s complaint. &he "*A which appointed Ramos andHor Atty. :ateo -.
6elegencia as <*,$s attorneys4in4fact in the case against the petitioners was
executed only on July C )33C. B!en the Corporate "ecretary$s Certificate
that named the officers authori+ed #y the <*,$s Bxecuti!e Committee to grant
and extend a "*A to other officers of the #ank was executed only on
?e#ruary )/ )337. &he Bxecuti!e Committee is part of the #ank$s permanent
organi+ation and in #etween meetings of <*,$s <oard of 6irectors
possesses and exercises all the powers of the #oard in the management and
direction of the #ank$s affairs.
*age 2 of 30
<*,$s su#se@uent execution of the "*A howe!er constituted a ratification of
Ramos$ unauthori+ed representation in the collection case filed against the
petitioners. A corporation can act only through natural persons duly
authori+ed for the purpose or #y a specific act of its #oard of directors and
can also ratify the unauthori+ed acts of its corporate officers. &he act of
ratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or
with insufficient authority.
,n (.CC "kyway ,raffic Mana!ement and "ecurity Division )orkers
0r!ani1ation 2(",M"D)03 v. (.CC "kyway Corporation, we considered
the su#se@uent execution of a #oard resolution authori+ing the Inion
*resident to represent the union in a petition filed against *.CC "kyway
Corporation as an act of ratification #y the union that cured the defect in the
petition$s !erification and certification against forum shopping. (e held that
%assuming that :r. "oriano 8*"&:"6(=$s *resident9 has no authority to file
the petition on ?e#ruary )7 )33; the passing on June 03 )33; of a <oard
Resolution authori+ing him to represent the union is deemed a ratification of
his prior execution on ?e#ruary )7 )33; of the !erification and certificate of
non4forum shopping thus curing any defects thereof.' "ps. #u!ene L. Lim
and Constancia Lim v. ,he Court of Appeals-Mindanao "tation, et al.%-.R.
.o. /2);/1 January 03 )3/0
Certification against forum shopping and Gerification; re@uirements not
jurisdictional. ,n any case it is settled that the re@uirements of !erification
and certification against forum shopping are not jurisdictional. Gerification is
re@uired to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition ha!e #een
made in good faith or are true and correct and not merely speculati!e. .on4
compliance with the !erification re@uirement does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defecti!e and is su#stantially complied with when signed #y
one who has ample knowledge of the truth of the allegations in the complaint
or petition and when matters alleged in the petition ha!e #een made in good
faith or are true ad correct. =n the other hand the certification against forum
shopping us re@uired #ased on the principle that a party litigant should not #e
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. (hile the
certification re@uirement is o#ligatory non4compliance or a defect in the
certificate could #e cured #y its su#se@uent correction or su#mission under
special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of %su#stantial
compliance.' "ps. #u!ene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. ,he Court of
Appeals-Mindanao "tation, et al.% -.R. .o. /2);/1 January 03 )3/0
Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a diso#edience
to the court #y acting in opposition to its authority justice and dignity and
signifies not only a willful disregard of the court$s order #ut such conduct
which tends to #ring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. &o #e considered contemptuous an act must #e clearly contrary to or
prohi#ited #y the order of the court. &hus a person cannot #e punished for
contempt for diso#edience of an order of the Court unless the act which is
for#idden or re@uired to #e done is clearly and exactly defined so that there
can #e no reasona#le dou#t or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is
for#idden or re@uired. Rivulet A!ro-'ndustrial Corporation v. Anthony
(arun!ao, .arciso . .ieto, in their capacity as 4ndersecretaries of Le!al
Affairs and *ield 0perations of the Department of A!rarian Reform, et
al., -.R. .o. /27137. January /4 )3/0
Bjectment; possession de facto ; distinction #etween forci#le entry and
unlawful detainer cases. At the outset it #ears to reiterate the settled rule
that the only @uestion that the courts resol!e in ejectment proceedings is7
who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises that is to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. ,t does not e!en
matter if a party$s title to the property is @uestiona#le. ,n an unlawful detainer
case the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of
the property in!ol!ed independent of any claim of ownership #y any of the
party litigants. (here the issue of ownership is raised #y any of the parties
the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right
to possess the property. &he adjudication is howe!er merely pro!isional and
would not #ar or prejudice an action #etween the same parties in!ol!ing title
to the property. $uanita #rmita5o, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
'sabelo #rmita5o v. Lailanie M. (a!las; -.R. .o. /7440;. January )0 )3/0
Bxecution; issuance of writ is trial court$s ministerial duty once decision is
final; writ of execution must conform to dispositi!e portion of judgment; order
of execution which !aries tenor of judgment is !oid. ,n the present case the
*age 3 of 30
Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and a#sol!e the
petitioners from their procedural lapse.
,t is undisputed that the CA 6ecision dated "eptem#er )2 )33; is already
final and executory. As a rule once a judgment #ecomes final and executory
all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. &he
pre!ailing party is entitled to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the
trial court$s ministerial duty. &he writ of execution howe!er must conform
su#stantially to e!ery essential particular of the judgment promulgated. ,t
must conform more particularly to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositi!e portion of the decision.
Clearly the R&C exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own
construal of the dispositi!e portion of the CA 6ecision when its terms are
explicit and need no further interpretation. ,t would also #e ine@uita#le for the
petitioners to pay and for the respondents who did not appeal the CA
decision or @uestioned the deletion of the /)J per annum interest to recei!e
more than what was awarded #y the CA. &he assailed R&C order of
execution dated 6ecem#er )/ )332 and the alias writ of execution dated
:ay /7 )3/3 are therefore !oid. &ime and again it has #een ruled that an
order of execution which !aries the tenor of the judgment or for that matter
exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. "pouses Ricardo and #lena
+ole1 v. "pouses Carlos and Amelita .avarro; -.R. .o. /2)10). January
03 )3/0
?orci#le entry; when proper; when issue of ownership can #e material and
rele!ant in resol!ing the issue of possession. "ection / Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court pro!ides when an action for forci#le entry and unlawful detainer is
proper7
"BC&,=. /. )ho may institute proceedin!s, and when. 6 "u#ject
to the pro!isions of the next succeeding section a person depri!ed
of the possession of any land or #uilding #y force intimidation
threat strategy or stealth or a lessor !endor !endee or other
person against whom the possession of any land or #uilding is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession #y !irtue of any contract express or implied or the
legal representati!es or assigns of any such lessor !endor !endee
or other person may at any time within one 8/9 year after such
unlawful depri!ation or withholding of possession #ring an action in
the proper :unicipal &rial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depri!ing of possession or any person or
persons claiming under them for the restitution of such possession
together with damages and costs. Eemphasis ours; italics suppliedF
Inder this pro!ision for a forci#le entry suit to prosper the plaintiff must
allege and pro!e7 8/9 prior physical possession of the property; and 8)9
unlawful depri!ation of it #y the defendant through force intimidation
strategy threat or stealth. As in any ci!il case the #urden of proof lies with
the complainants 8the respondents in this case9 who must esta#lish their
case #y preponderance of e!idence. ,n the present case the respondents
sufficiently alleged and pro!ed the re@uired elements.
(e agree too as we ha!e indicated in passing a#o!e that the issue of
ownership can #e material and rele!ant in resol!ing the issue of possession.
&he Rules in fact expressly allow this7 "ection /; Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court pro!ides that the issue of ownership shall #e resol!ed in deciding the
issue of possession if the @uestion of possession is intertwined with the issue
of ownership. <ut this pro!ision is only an exception and is allowed only in
this limited instanceK to determine the issue of possession and only if the
@uestion of possession cannot #e resol!ed without deciding the issue of
ownership. "a!e for this instance e!idence of ownership is not at all
material as in the present case. .enita 7uality *oods Corporation v.
Crisostomo +alabo, et al.% -.R. .o. /74/2/ January 03 )3/0
?orum "hopping; definition and nature. %?orum shopping is defined as an act
of a party against whom an ad!erse judgment or order has #een rendered in
one forum of seeking and possi#ly getting a fa!ora#le opinion in another
forum other than #y appeal or special ci!il action forcertiorari. ,t may also #e
the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a fa!ora#le
decision. x x x ,t is expressly prohi#ited xxx #ecause it trifles with and a#uses
court processes degrades the administration of justice and congest our
*age 4 of 30
court dockets. A willful and deli#erate !iolation of the rule against forum
shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case and may also
constitute direct contempt.' #strellla Aduan 0rpiano v. "pouses Antonio C.
,omas and Myrna 4. ,omas%-.R. .o. /7C;//. January /4 )3/0
-ra!e a#use of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari #ut not in
a petition for re!iew on certiorari. ,t is to #e noted that the a#o!e issues
raised #y petitioner alleged gra!e a#use of discretion committed #y the CA
which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule ;1 of the /227 Rules of
Ci!il *rocedure as amended #ut not in the present petition for re!iew
on certiorariunder Rule 41. &eirs of *austino C. '!nacio v. &ome ankers
"avin!s and ,rust Company, et al., -.R. .o. /777C0. January )0 )3/0
5ierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non4o#ser!ance results in
dismissal. (e emphasi+e that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the
"upreme Court Court of Appeals and the Regional &rial Courts to issue the
writs of certiorari prohi#ition mandamus @uo warranto ha#eas corpus and
injunction did not gi!e petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse. ,n ane1, $r. v. Concepcion, we
explained why to wit7
&he court must enjoin the o#ser!ance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts
and now affirms that the policy is not to #e ignored without serious
conse@uences the strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from ha!ing to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of
the lower courts and thus lea!e time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it the Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari
prohi#ition and mandamus only when a#solutely necessary or when serious
and important reasons justify an exception to the policy. xxx
Accordingly e!ery litigant must remem#er that the Court is not the only
judicial forum from which to seek and o#tain effecti!e redress of his or her
grie!ances. As a rule the Court is a court of last resort not a court of first
instance. 5ence e!ery litigant who #rings petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari prohi#ition and mandamus should e!er #e mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts the o#ser!ance of which is explicitly defined and
enjoined in "ection 4 of Rule ;1. "pouses Au!usto Dacudao and 0felia
Dacudao v. "ecretary of $ustice Raul +on1ales of the Department of
$ustice,-.R. .o. /CC31;. January C )3/0
,nterlocutory and ?inal orders; distinction. &his Court has laid down the
distinction #etween interlocutory and final orders as follows7
xxx A %final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case lea!ing
nothing more to #e done #y the Court in respect thereto e.g. an adjudication
on the merits which on the #asis of the e!idence presented at the trial
declares categorically what the rights and o#ligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground for instance of res judicata or prescription. =nce rendered the
task of the court is ended as far as deciding the contro!ersy or determining
the rights and lia#ilities of the litigants is concerned. .othing more remains to
#e done #y the court except to await the parties$ next mo!e 8which among
others may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration or
the taking of an appeal9 and ultimately of course to cause the execution of
the judgment once it #ecomes %final' or to use the esta#lished and more
distincti!e term %final and executory.'
xxxx
Con!ersely an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not
end the Court$s task of adjudicating the parties$ contentions and determining
their rights and lia#ilities as regards each other #ut o#!iously indicates that
other things remain to #e done #y the court is %interlocutory' e.g. an order
denying a motion to dismiss under Rule /; of the Rules or granting a motion
for extension of time to file a pleading or authori+ing amendment thereof or
granting or denying applications for postponement or production or
inspection of documents or things etc. unlike a %final' judgment or order
which is appeala#le. As a#o!e pointed out an %interlocutory' order may not
#e @uestioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
e!entually #e taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma.
Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris -. aldevia
*age of 30
v. $ose Antonio Ro8as and Court of Appeals, -.R. .o. /C1121. January 2
)3/0
,nterlocutory and ?inal orders; application to pro!isional remedies especially
to support pendente lite . &he assailed orders relati!e to the incident of
support pendent lite and support in arrears as the term suggests were
issued pending the rendition of the decision on the main action for
declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. &hey did not
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the
merits of petitioner$s claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and
other incidents as child custody support and conjugal assets. Ma. Carmina
Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris -. aldevia v. $ose
Antonio Ro8as and Court of Appeals, -.R. .o. /C1121. January 2 )3/0
,nterlocutory and ?inal orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not
appeal. &he remedy against an interlocutory order not su#ject of an appeal is
an appropriate special ci!il action under Rule ;1 pro!ided that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
gra!e a#use of discretion. 5a!ing chosen the wrong remedy in @uestioning
the su#ject interlocutory orders of the R&C petitioner$s appeal was correctly
dismissed #y the CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-
fact, Marycris -. aldevia v. $ose Antonio Ro8as and Court of Appeals, -.R.
.o. /C1121. January 2 )3/0
Judgment; compromise agreement. &here is no @uestion that the
foregoing A!reement was a compromise that the parties freely and
!oluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this
case. Inder Article )3)C of the Ci!il Code a compromise is a contract
where#y the parties #y making reciprocal concessions a!oid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly a compromise is either
judicial if the o#jecti!e is to put an end to a pending litigation or extrajudicial
if the o#jecti!e is to a!oid a litigation. As a contract a compromise is
perfected #y mutual consent. 5owe!er a judicial compromise while
immediately #inding #etween the parties upon its execution is not executory
until it is appro!ed #y the court and reduced to a judgment. &he !alidity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the re@uisites and
principles of contracts dictated #y law. Also the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not #e contrary to law morals good customs pu#lic policy
and pu#lic order.Land ank of the (hilippines v. &eirs of "pouses $or9a
Ri!or "oriano and Ma!in "oriano -.R. .o. /7C0/). January 03 )3/0
Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in ci!il cases; !oluntary appearance. ,n ci!il
cases jurisdiction o!er the person of the defendant may #e ac@uired either
#y ser!ice of summons or #y the defendant$s !oluntary appearance in court
and su#mission to its authority.
,n this case the :e&C ac@uired jurisdiction o!er the person of respondent
5ert+ #y reason of the latter$s !oluntary appearance in court. ,n (hilippine
Commercial 'nternational ank v. "pouses Dy, we had occasion to state7
*reliminarily jurisdiction o!er the defendant in a ci!il case is ac@uired either
#y the coerci!e power of legal processes exerted o!er his person or his
!oluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition one who seeks an
affirmati!e relief is deemed to ha!e su#mitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
,t is #y reason of this rule that we ha!e had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer for additional time to file answer for
reconsideration of a default judgment and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration is considered !oluntary su#mission to the court$s
jurisdiction. &his howe!er is tempered #y the concept of conditional
appearance such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge among others the court$s jurisdiction o!er his person cannot #e
considered to ha!e su#mitted to its authority.
*rescinding from the foregoing it is thus clear that7 8/9 special appearance
operates as an exception to the general rule on !oluntary appearance; 8)9
Accordingly o#jections to the jurisdiction of the court o!er the person of the
defendant must #e explicitly made i.e. set forth in an une@ui!ocal manner;
809 ?ailure to do so constitutes !oluntary su#mission to the jurisdiction of the
court especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmati!e
relief is filed and su#mitted to the court for resolution. 0ptima Realty
Corporation v. &ert1 (hil. #8clusive Cars, 'nc., -.R. .o. /C0301. January 2
)3/0
Litis pendentia% elements. Litis pendentia re@uires the concurrence of the
following elements7 8/9 identity of parties or at least their representation of
*age ! of 30
the same interests in #oth actions; 8)9 identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for the relief #eing founded on the same facts; and 809 identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases such that any
judgment that may #e rendered in the pending case regardless of which
party is successful would amount to res 9udicata in the other case. 0ptima
Realty Corporation v. &ert1 (hil. #8clusive Cars, 'nc., -.R. .o. /C0301.
January 2 )3/0
:otion to dismiss; remedy against denial is not appeal; denial may #e
assailed through a petition for certiorari. &he denial of a motion to dismiss as
an interlocutory order cannot #e the su#ject of an appeal until a final
judgment or order is rendered in the main case. An aggrie!ed party
howe!er may assail an interlocutory order through a petition for certiorari #ut
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with gra!e a#use of discretion."ps. #u!ene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v.
,he Court of Appeals-Mindanao "tation, et al.% -.R. .o. /2);/1. January 03
)3/0
*arties; authority of pri!ate counsel to represent local officials in suit. &he
present case stemmed from "pecial Ci!il Action )33)433/2 for mandamus
and damages. &he damages sought therein could ha!e resulted in personal
lia#ility hence petitioner cannot #e deemed to ha!e #een improperly
represented #y pri!ate counsel. ,n Alinsu! v. R,C r. :;, "an Carlos City,
.e!ros 0ccidental,the Court ruled that in instances like the present case
where personal lia#ility on the part of local go!ernment officials is sought
they may properly secure the ser!ices of pri!ate counsel explaining7
it can happen that a go!ernment official ostensi#ly acting in his
official capacity is later held to ha!e exceeded his authority. =n the
one hand his defense would ha!e then #een underwritten #y the
people$s money which ordinarily should ha!e #een his personal
expense. =n the other hand personal lia#ility can attach to him
without howe!er his ha!ing had the #enefit of assistance of a
counsel of his own choice. ,n Correa v. C*', the Court held that in the
discharge of go!ernmental functions municipal corporations are
responsi#le for the acts of its officers except if and when and only to
the extent that they ha!e acted #y authority of the law and in
conformity with the re@uirements thereof.
,n such instance this Court has sanctioned the representation #y pri!ate
counsel. ,n one case (e held that where rigid acceptance to the law on
representation of local affairs in court actions could depri!e a party of his
right to redress for a !alid grie!ance the hiring of a pri!ate counsel would #e
proper. And in Alburra v. ,orres, this Court also said that a pro!incial
go!ernor sued in his official capacity may engage the ser!ices of pri!ate
counsel when the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages which if due from the defendants must #e satisfied #y them in
their pri!ate capacity. Romeo +ontan!, in his official capacity as Mayor of
+ain1a, Camarines "ur v. #n!r. Cecilia Alayan% -.R. .o. /2/;2/. January
/; )3/0
*arties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Inder the
Rules parties may #e dropped or added #y order of the court on motion of
any party or on its own initiati!e at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are 9ust. ,ndeed it would ha!e #een just for the collection court to ha!e
allowed Bstrella to prosecute her annulment case #y dropping her as a party
plaintiff in the collection case not only so that she could protect her conjugal
share #ut also to pre!ent the interests of her co4plaintiffs from #eing
ad!ersely affected #y their conflicting actions in the same case. <y seeking
to #e dropped from the collection case Bstrella was foregoing collection of
her share in the amount that may #e due and owing from the sale. ,t does not
imply a wai!er in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.
(hile Bstrella correctly made use of the remedies a!aila#le to her K
amending the complaint and filing a motion to drop her as a party K she
committed a mistake in proceeding to file the annulment case directly after
these remedies were denied her #y the collection court without first
@uestioning or addressing the propriety of these denials. (hile she may ha!e
#een frustrated #y the collection court$s repeated rejection of her motions
and its apparent ina#ility to appreciate her plight her proper recourse
ne!ertheless should ha!e #een to file a petition for certiorari or otherwise
@uestion the trial courts denial of her motion to #e dropped as plaintiff citing
just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. ,ssues arising from joinder
or misjoinder of parties are the proper su#ject of certiorari. #strella Aduan
*age " of 30
0rpiano v. "pouses Antonio C. ,omas and Myrna 4. ,omas, -.R. .o.
/7C;//. January /4 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; contents; not an a#solute rule that
will lead to dismissal; li#eral construction. &he court significantly pointed out
in *.A., <ee Computer "ystems, 'nc. v. 0nline .etworks 'nternational,
'nc. that the re@uirement in "ection 4 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is not
meant to #e an a#solute rule whose !iolation would automatically lead to the
petition$s dismissal. &he Rules of Court has not #een intended to #e totally
rigid. ,n fact the Rules of Court pro!ides that the "upreme Court %may
re@uire or allow the filing of the such pleadings #riefs memoranda or
documents as it may deem necessary within such periods and under such
conditions as it may consider appropriate'; and %EiFf the petition is gi!en due
course the "upreme Court may re@uire the ele!ation of the complete record
of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen 8/19 days from notice.'
&hese pro!isions are in keeping with the o!erriding standard that procedural
rules should #e li#erally construed to promote their o#jecti!e and to assist the
parties in o#taining a just speedy and inexpensi!e determination of e!ery
action or proceeding. Metropolitan ank = ,rust Company v. Absolute
Mana!ement Corporation, -.R. .o. /7342C. January 2 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; only @uestions of law may #e
raised; exceptions. ,t is a settled rule indeed that in the exercise of our
power of re!iew the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re4examination of the e!idence presented #y the contending
parties during the trial of the case. &he Court relies on the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals or of the trial court and accepts such findings as
conclusi!ely and #inding unless any of the following exceptions o#tains
namely7 8a9 when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation
surmises or conjectures; 8#9 when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken a#surd or impossi#le; 8c9 when there is gra!e a#use of discretion;
8d9 when the judgment is #ased on a misapprehension of facts; 8e9 when the
findings of fact are conflicting; 8f9 when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals or the trial court went #eyond the issues of the case or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of #oth the appellant and the appellee; 8g9
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; 8h9 when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific e!idence on which they are #ased; 8i9
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner$s main and
reply #riefs are not disputed #y the respondent; 8j9 when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed a#sence of e!idence and contradicted #y the
e!idence on record; and 8k9 when the Court of Appeals or the trial court
manifestly o!erlooked certain rele!ant facts not disputed #y the parties
which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. 5owe!er
none of the aforementioned exception applies herein. "pecial (eople, 'nc.
*oundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto (. Cericos v. .estor M.
Canda, et al., -.R. .o. /;320). January /4 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; only @uestions of law may #e
raised; exceptions. ,t is well settled that in a petition for re!iew
on certiorari under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court only @uestions of law may
#e raised. &his Court in numerous instances has had the occasion to
explain that it is not its function to analy+e or weigh e!idence all o!er again.
As a rule the Court respects the factual findings of the CA and of @uasi4
judicial agencies like the 6AR gi!ing them a certain measure of finality.
&here are howe!er recogni+ed exceptions to this rule one of which is when
the findings of fact are conflicting. &eirs of Luis A. Luna and Reme!io A.
Luna, et al. v. Ruben ". Afable, et al., -.R. .o. /CC)22. January )0 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; only @uestions of law may #e
raised; exceptions. (e first address the procedural issue raised. Resol!ing
the contentions raised necessarily re@uires us to del!e into factual issues a
course not proper in a petition for re!iew on certiorari, for a Rule 41 petition
resol!es only @uestions of law not @uestions of fact. &his rule is read with the
e@ually settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusi!e
on the parties and are therefore not re!iewa#le #y this Court. <y way of
exception we resol!e factual issues when as here conflict attended the
findings of the :&CC and of the R&C on one hand and of the CA on the
other. =f minor note #ut which we deem important to point the petition
needlessly impleaded the CA in #reach of "ection 4 Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. .enita 7uality *oods Corporation v. Crisostomo +alabo, et al.% -.R.
.o. /74/2/. January 03 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; only @uestions of law may #e
raised; applica#le to expropriation cases. &his Court is not a trier of facts.
*age # of 30
>uestions of fact may not #e raised in a petition #rought under Rule 41 as
such petition may only raise @uestions of law. &his rule applies in
expropriation cases. :oreo!er factual findings of the trial court when
affirmed #y the CA are generally #inding on this Court. An e!aluation of the
case and the issues presented leads the Court to the conclusion that it is
unnecessary to de!iate from the findings of fact of the trial and appellate
courts.
Inder "ection C of Rule ;7 of the Rules of Court the trial court sitting as an
expropriation court may after hearing accept the commissioners$ report and
render judgment in accordance therewith. &his is what the trial court did in
this case. &he CA affirmed the trial court$s pronouncement in toto. -i!en
these facts the trial court and the CA$s identical findings of fact concerning
the issue of just compensation should #e accorded the greatest respect and
are #inding on the Court a#sent proof that they committed error in
esta#lishing the facts and in drawing conclusions from them. &here #eing no
showing that the trial court and the CA committed any error we thus accord
due respect to their findings. Republic of the (hilippines, represented by the
Department of (ublic )orks and &i!hways v. &eirs of "pouses (edro
autista and -alentina Malabanan-.R. .o. /C/)/C. January )C )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; re!iew errors of judgment; orders
granting execution are interlocutory and should #e su#ject of petition
for certiorari under Rule ;1; exceptions. &he petition filed in this case is one
for re!iew on certiorari under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. *etitions filed
under this rule #ring up for re!iew errors of judgment. ,t is an ordinary appeal
and the petition must only raise @uestions of law which must #e distinctly set
forth and discussed. &he present petition howe!er assails the R&C =rder of
execution dated 6ecem#er )/ )332 and alias writ of execution dated :ay
)7 )3/3. ,t is a settled rule that orders granting execution are interlocutory
orders; hence the petitioners should ha!e filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule ;1. &his is categorically pro!ided in Rule 4/ vi17
"ection /. "u#ject of appeal. K An appeal may #e taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter
therein when declared #y these Rules to #e applica#le.
.o appeal may #e taken from7
x x x x
8f9 An order of execution;
x x x x
,n all the a#o!e instances where the judgment or final order is not
appeala#le the aggrie!ed party may file an appropriate special ci!il action
under Rule ;1.
.e!ertheless there are exceptions to this rule one of which is when the writ
of execution !aries the judgment. &hus in "hu!o .oda = Co., Ltd. -. Court
of Appeals the Court acknowledged that in the past it considered an appeal
to #e a proper remedy when it is percei!ed that the order !aries or may not
#e in consonance with the essence of the judgment. =ther exceptions
include7 8/9 &here has #een a change in the situation of the parties making
execution ine@uita#le or unjust; 8)9 Bxecution is sought to #e enforced
against property exempt from execution; 809 ,t appears that the contro!ersy
has #een su#mitted to the judgment of the court; 849 &he terms of the
judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or 819 ,t appears that the writ of execution has #een impro!idently
issued or that it is defecti!e in su#stance or issued against the wrong party
or that the judgment de#t has #een paid or otherwise satisfied or the writ
issued without authority.
,n such case considerations of justice and e@uity dictate that there #e some
remedy a!aila#le to the aggrie!ed party. Aikewise the Court in the interest
of e@uity or when justice demands may interchangea#ly treat an appeal as a
petition for certiorari under Rule ;1 of the Re!ised Rules of Court and !ice
!ersa.
,n the present case the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition
and a#sol!e the petitioners from their procedural lapse. "pouses Ricardo
and #lena +ole1 v. "pouses Carlos and Amelita .avarro -.R. .o. /2)10).
January 03 )3/0
*age $ of 30
*leadings; relief. ,t is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in
the pleadings or in excess of what is #eing sought #y the party. &hey cannot
also grant a relief without first ascertaining the e!idence presented in court.
,n Development ank of the (hilippines v. ,ecson, this Court expounded
that7
6ue process considerations justify this re@uirement it is improper to enter an
order which exceeds the scope of relief sought #y the pleadings a#sent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to #e heard with
respect to the proposed relief. &he fundamental purpose of the re@uirement
that allegations of the complaint must pro!ide the measure of reco!ery is to
pre!ent surprise to the defendant.
.ota#ly the Rules is e!en more strict in safeguarding the right to due
process of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. ?or instance amendment to conform to the e!idence
presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. <ut the same is
not feasi#le when the defendant is declared in default #ecause "ection 08d9
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may #e
granted #y the courts to what has #een prayed for in the complaint. xxx
&he raison d>etre in limiting the extent of relief that may #e granted is that it
cannot #e presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow
himself to #e declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will #e
accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the
Complaint. .o dou#t the reason #ehind "ection 08d9 Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court is to safeguard defendant$s right to due process against unforeseen
and ar#itrarily issued judgment. &his to the mind of the Court is akin to the
!ery essence of due process. ,t em#odies %the sporting idea of fair play' and
for#ids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not gi!en the
opportunity to #e heard thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-
in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo alan!ue, "onny alan!ue, Reynaldo
alan!ue, and #steban alan!ue, $r.% -.R. .o. /70112. January 7 )3/0
*reliminary injunction; a#use of discretion if writ issued despite a#sence of
clear legal right. &he issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within
the discretion if the court taking cogni+ance of the case and is generally not
interfered with except in cases of manifest a#use. ?or the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction to #e proper it must #e shown that the in!asion of
the right sought to #e protected is material and su#stantial that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistaka#le and that there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to pre!ent serious damage. ,n the a#sence
of a clear legal right the issuance of a writ of injunction constitutes gra!e
a#use of discretion. ,ML +asket 'ndustries, 'nc. v. (' *amily "avin!s ank,
'nc., -.R. .o. /CC7;C. January 7 )3/0
*reliminary injunction; injuncti!e relief not issued for self4inflicted losses
which are damnum abs/ue in9uria . ,n arri!ing at a contrary conclusion the
Court of Appeals dwelt on the %gra!e and irremedia#le' financial losses
respondent was poised to sustain as a result of B= /1;$s enforcement
finding such prejudice %ine@uita#le.' .o dou#t #y importing used !ehicles in
contra!ention of the #an under B= /1; respondent risked sustaining losses.
"uch risk howe!er was self4 imposed. 5a!ing miscalculated its chances
respondent cannot look to courts for an injuncti!e relief against self4inflicted
losses which are in the nature of damnum abs/ue in9uria.,njunction will not
issue on the mere possi#ility that a litigant will sustain damage without proof
of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection. #8ecutive "ecretary,
"ecretary of *inance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of
Customs, (ort of Aparri, Ca!ayan, District Collector of Customs, (ort of "an
*ernando La 4nion, and &ead of the Land ,ransportation 0ffice v.
*orerunner Multi Resources, 'nc., -.R. .o. /220)4. January 7 )3/0
*reliminary injunction; re@uirement of actual and existing right. *etitioners$
argument fails to impress. &he CA did not nullify the =cto#er /1 )334 =rder
merely #ecause of the interchanged pages. ,nstead the CA determined that
the applicant Gitaliano was not a#le to show that he had an actual and
existing right that had to #e protected #y a preliminary injunction. &he most
that Gitaliano was a#le to pro!e was a future right #ased on his !ictory in the
suit. Contrasting this future right of Gitaliano with respondents$ existing right
under the -," the CA determined that the trial court should not ha!e
distur#ed the status @uo. -italiano A!uirre '' and *idel A!uirre v. *7?@,
'nc., .athaniel ocobo, (riscila ocobo, and Antonio De -illa, -.R. .o.
/73773. January 2 )3/0
*age 10 of 30
*reliminary injunction; re@uirement of clear legal right. ,t is a deeply ingrained
doctrine in *hilippine remedial law that a preliminary injuncti!e relief under
Rule 1C issues only upon a showing of the applicant$s %clear legal right' #eing
!iolated or under threat of !iolation #y the defendant. %Clear legal right'
within the meaning of Rule 1C contemplates a right clearly founded in or
granted #y law. Any hint of dou#t or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injuncti!e relief. ?or suits attacking the
!alidity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law as here the
applicant for preliminary injuncti!e relief #ears the added #urden of
o!ercoming the presumption of !alidity inhering in such laws or issuances.
&hese procedural #arriers to the issuance of a preliminary injuncti!e writ are
rooted on the e@uita#le nature of such relief preser!ing the status @uo while
at the same time restricting the course of action of the defendants e!en
#efore ad!erse judgment is rendered against them. #8ecutive "ecretary,
"ecretary of *inance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of
customs, (ort of Aparri, Ca!ayan, District Collector of Customs, (ort of "an
*ernando La 4nion, and &ead of the Land ,ransportation 0ffice v.
*orerunner Multi Resources, 'nc., -.R. .o. /220)4. January 7 )3/0
*reliminary injunction; re@uisites. "ection 0 Rule 1C of the Rules of Court
lists the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction7
"ec.0. +rounds for the issuance of preliminary in9unction. A A preliminary
injunction may #e granted when it is esta#lished7
8a9 that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part
of such relief consists un restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of or in re@uiring the performance of an act or
acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
8#9 that the commission continuance or non4performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would pro#a#ly work injustice to the
applicant; or
8c9 that a party court agency or a person doing threatening or is
attempting to do or is procuring or suffering to #e done some act or acts
pro#a#ly in !iolation of the right of the applicant respecting the su#ject of
the action or proceeding and tending to render the judgment ineffectual
As such a writ of preliminary injunction may #e issued only upon clear
showing of an existing legal right to #e protected during the pendency of the
principal action. &he re@uisites of a !alid injunction are the existence of a
right and its actual or threatened !iolations. &hus to #e entitled to an
injuncti!e writ the right to #e protected and the !iolation against that right
must #e shown. ,ML +asket 'ndustries, 'nc. v. (' *amily "avin!s ank,
'nc., -.R. .o. /CC7;C. January 7 )3/0
Res judicata; conclusi!eness of judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the
present case e!idently shows that the petitioner #roaches the issues similarly
raised and already resol!ed in -.R. .o. /7)24).
Inder the principle of conclusi!eness of judgment when a right or fact has
#een judicially tried and determined #y a court of competent jurisdiction or
when an opportunity for such trial has #een gi!en the judgment of the court
as long as it remains unre!ersed should #e conclusi!e upon the parties and
those in pri!ity with them. "tated differently conclusi!eness of judgment #ars
the re4litigation in a second case of a fact or @uestion already settled in a
pre!ious case.
&he adjudication in -.R. .o. /7)24) has #ecome #inding and conclusi!e on
the petitioner who can no longer @uestion the respondent$s entitlement to the
/)J legal interest awarded #y the CA. &he Court$s determination in -.R. .o.
/7)24) on the reckoning point of the /)J legal interest is likewise #inding on
the petitioner who cannot re4litigate the said matter anew through the present
recourse.
&hus the judgment in -.R. .o. /7)24) #ars the present case as the relief
sought in the latter is inextrica#ly related to the ruling in the former. City of
Cebu v. Apolonio M. Dedamo, $r.; -.R. .o. /7)C1). January 03 )3/0
Res judicata; elements. ,n &eirs of Ma8imino Derla v. &eirs of Catalina Derla
-da. de &ipolito, we enumerated the following as the elements of res
9udicataB
*age 11 of 30
8a9 &he former judgment or order must #e final;
8#9 ,t must #e a judgment or order on the merits that is it was rendered after
a consideration of the e!idence or stipulations su#mitted #y the parties at
the trial of the case;
8c9 ,t must ha!e #een rendered #y a court ha!ing jurisdiction o!er the
su#ject matter and the parties; and
8d9 &here must #e #etween the first and second actions identity of parties
of su#ject matter and of cause of action. &his re@uisite is satisfied if the
two 8)9 actions are su#stantially #etween the same parties.
,n the case at #ar the !alidity of the su#ject mortgage #etween *AA, and
*.< was the primary issue raised #y the parties and resol!ed #y the R&C
after the conclusion of a full4#lown trial. =n "eptem#er /3 )334 the issue
was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment no matter how
erroneous cannot #e changed e!en #y this Court. ,ne!ita#ly res
9udicata operates to #ar *AA, and *.< from raising the same issue lest there
will #e no end to litigation. (hilippine .ational ank, substituted by ,ranche C
2"(--AMC3, 'nc. v. Rina (arayno Lim and (uerto A1ul Land, 'nc., -.R. .o.
/7/;77. January 03 )3/0
Res judicata; effect of minute resolutions. ,n Alonso, we declared that a
%minute resolution may amount to a final action on the case #ut it is not a
precedent.' 5owe!er we continued to state that %it can not #ind non4parties
to the action.' Corollary thereto we can conclude that a minute resolution
while not a precedent relati!e to strangers to an action nonetheless #inds
the parties therein and calls for res 9udicata>s application.
.ationwide "ecurity and Allied "ervices, 'nc. v. -alderama is instructi!e
anent the effects of the issuance of a minute resolution vi1B
,t is true that although contained in a minute resolution our
dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case.
(hen we dismissed the petition we effecti!ely affirmed the CA ruling
#eing @uestioned. As a result our ruling in that case has already
#ecome final. x x
(ith respect to the same su#ject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties it constitutes res 9udicata. 5owe!er if
other parties or another su#ject matter 8e!en with the same parties
and issues9 is in!ol!ed the minute resolution is not #inding
precedent. x x x 8Inderlining ours9
,t is therefore clear from the a#o!e that for purposes of the application of res
9udicata, minute resolutions issued #y this Court are as much precedents as
promulgated decisions hence #inding upon the parties to the
action (hilippine .ational ank, substituted by ,ranche C 2"(--AMC3, 'nc. v.
Rina (arayno Lim and (uerto A1ul Land, 'nc., -.R. .o. /7/;77. January 03
)3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for Certiorari 8Rule ;19; nature; distinction #etween
excess of jurisdiction acts without jurisdiction and gra!e a#use of
discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character.
&he special ci!il action for certiorari lies only to correct acts rendered without
jurisdiction in excess of jurisdiction or with gra!e a#use of discretion.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction not errors of
procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As
long as the court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors committed in
the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment correcti#le #y an appeal or a petition for re!iew under Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court and not a petition for certiorari.
,n a petition for certiorari the pu#lic respondent acts without jurisdiction if it
does not ha!e the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of
jurisdiction where the respondent #eing clothed with the power to determine
the case o!ersteps its authority as determined #y law. &here is gra!e a#use
of discretion where the pu#lic respondent acts in a capricious whimsical
ar#itrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to #e said to
#e e@ui!alent to lack of jurisdiction. :ere a#use of discretion is not enough.
*age 12 of 30
Bxcess of jurisdiction as distinguished from a#sence of jurisdiction means
that an act though within the general power of a tri#unal #oard or officer is
not authori+ed and in!alid with respect to the particular proceeding #ecause
the conditions which alone authori+e the exercise of the general power in
respect of it are wanting. &he super!isory jurisdiction of the court to issue a
certiorari writ cannot #e exercised in order to re!iew the judgment of the
lower court as to intrinsic correctness either upon the law or the facts of the
case. ,n the a#sence of a showing that there is a reason for the court to
annul the decision of the concerned tri#unal or to su#stitute its own
judgment it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to in@uire
into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. )inston *. +arcia,
in his capacity as (resident and +eneral Mana!er of the +"'" v. Court of
Appeals and Rudy C. ,esoro -.R. .o. /;2331. January )C )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for Certiorari 8Rule ;19; nature; an extraordinary remedy;
judicial and @uasi4judicial functions. &he decision on whether or not to accept
a petition for certiorari as well as to grant due course thereto is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. A petition for certiorari #eing an
extraordinary remedy the party seeking to a!ail of the same must strictly
o#ser!e the procedural rules laid down #y law and non4o#ser!ance thereof
may not #e #rushed aside as mere technicality.
As pro!ided in "ection / Rule ;1 a writ of certiorari is directed against a
tri#unal exercising judicial or @uasi4judicial functions. Judicial functions are
exercised #y a #ody or officer clothed with authority to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in
contro!ersy. >uasi4judicial function is a term that applies to the action or
discretion of pu#lic administrati!e officers or #odies gi!en the authority to
in!estigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts hold hearings and draw
conclusions from them as a #asis for their official action using discretion of a
judicial nature.
&he Central <ank :onetary <oard 8now <"*4:<9 was created to perform
executi!e functions with respect to the esta#lishment operation or li@uidation
of #anking and credit institutions and #ranches and agencies thereof. ,t does
not perform judicial or @uasi4judicial functions. Certainly the issuance of C<
Circular .o. 231 was done in the exercise of an executi!e function. Certiorari
will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for ,ruth in Lendin!, 'nc. = #duardo
. 0la!uer v. an!ko "entral Monetary oard, Represented by its
Chairman, +overnor Armando M. ,etan!co, $r., etc., -.R. .o. /2)2C;.
January /1 )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for Certiorari 8Rule ;19; re@uisites; #urden of proof ?or a
special ci!il action of certiorari to prosper therefore the following re@uisites
must concur namely7 8a9 it must #e directed against a tri#unal #oard or
officer exercising judicial or @uasi4judicial functions; 8#9 the tri#unal #oard or
officer must ha!e acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with gra!e
a#use of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and 8c9 there
is no appeal nor any plain speedy and ade@uate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. &he #urden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the
assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with gra!e
a#use of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "pouses
Au!usto Dacudao and 0felia Dacudao v. "ecretary of $ustice Raul +on1ales
of the Department of $ustice, -.R. .o. /CC31;. January C )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for Certiorari 8Rule ;19; when a!aila#le. &he writ of
certiorari is a!aila#le only when any tri#unal #oard or officer exercising
judicial or @uasi4judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction or with gra!e a#use of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal nor any plain speedy and ade@uate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. %&he sole office of the writ of certiorari'
according to Delos "antos v. Metropolitan ank and ,rust CompanyB
xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction which includes the commission
of gra!e a#use of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. ,n this regard
mere a#use of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
&he a#use of discretion must #e gra!e which means either that the judicial or
@uasi4judicial power was exercised in an ar#itrary or despotic manner #y
reason of passion or personal hostility or that the respondent judge tri#unal
or #oard e!aded a positi!e duty or !irtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law such as when such judge tri#unal
or #oard exercising judicial or @uasi4judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to #e e@ui!alent to lack of jurisdiction.
*age 13 of 30
"pouses Au!usto Dacudao and 0felia Dacudao v. "ecretary of $ustice Raul
+on1ales of the Department of $ustice, -.R. .o. /CC31;. January C )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for Certiorari under Rule ;4; proper mode of re!iew of
C=:BABC en banc Resolutions not relating to pre4proclamation
contro!ersies. "ection 7 Article ,L of the /2C7 Constitution in part
su#stantially pro!ides that any decision order or ruling of any of the
Constitutional Commissions may #e #rought for re!iew to the "upreme Court
on certiorari within 03 days from receipt of a copy thereof. &he orders ruling
and decisions rendered or issued #y the C=:BABC en banc must #e final
and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or @uasi4judicial power. ?urther
"ection / Rule ;4 of the Rules of Court states that it shall go!ern the re!iew
of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the C=:BABC and the
Commission on Audit.
,n the case at #ar the now assailed Resolutions dated 6ecem#er )) )332
and :ay ; )3/3 were issued with finality #y the C=:BABC en banc. Inder
the Constitution and the Rules of Court the said Resolutions can #e
re!iewed #y way of filing #efore us a petition for certiorari. <esides the
issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the preparation
transmission receipt custody and appreciation of the election returns or to
the composition and the proceedings of the #oard of can!assers. (hat the
instant petition challenges is the authority of the :<=C to suspend ,#rahim$s
proclamation and of the C=:BABC en banc to issue the assailed
resolutions. &he crux of the instant *etition does not @ualify as one which can
#e raised as a pre4proclamation contro!ersy.<amarudin <. 'brahim v.
Commission on #lections and Rolan +. ua!as, -.R. .o./2))C2. January C
)3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for :andamus; exhaustion of administrati!e remedies. ,t
is axiomatic to #egin with that a party who seeks the inter!ention of a court
of law upon an administrati!e concern should first a!ail himself of all the
remedies afforded #y administrati!e processes. &he issues that an
administrati!e agency is authori+ed to decide should not #e summarily taken
away from it and su#mitted to a court of law without first gi!ing the agency
the opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deli#eration. &he court of
law must allow the administrati!e agency to carry out its functions and
discharge its responsi#ilities within the speciali+ed areas of its competence.
&his rests on the theory that the administrati!e authority is in a #etter position
to resol!e @uestions addressed to its particular expertise and that errors
committed #y su#ordinates in their resolution may #e rectified #y their
superiors if gi!en a chance to do so. "pecial (eople, 'nc. *oundation,
represented by its Chairman, Roberto (. Cericos v. .estor M. Canda, et
al., -.R. .o. /;320). January /4 )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for :andamus; nature; when a!aila#le. "imilarly the
petition could not #e one for mandamus which is a remedy a!aila#le only
when %any tri#unal corporation #oard officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office trust or station or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled and
there is no other plain speedy and ade@uate remedy in the ordinary course
of law the person aggrie!ed there#y may file a !erified petition in the proper
court.' &he main o#jecti!e of mandamus is to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. *lainly enough the writ
ofmandamus does not issue to control or re!iew the exercise of discretion or
to compel a course of conduct which it @uickly seems to us was what
petitioners would ha!e the "ecretary of Justice do in their fa!or.
Conse@uently their petition has not indicated how and where the "ecretary
of Justice$s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which they were un@uestiona#ly entitled. "pouses Au!usto
Dacudao and 0felia Dacudao v. "ecretary of $ustice Raul +on1ales of the
Department of $ustice, -.R. .o. /CC31;. January C )3/0
"pecial Ci!il Action for :andamus; nature; compels performance of
ministerial duties. A key principle to #e o#ser!ed in dealing with petitions
for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature not those that are
discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tri#unal
performs in a gi!en state of facts in a prescri#ed manner in o#edience to
the mandate of a legal authority without regard to or the exercise of its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. &he duty is
ministerial only when its discharge re@uires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment. "pecial (eople, 'nc. *oundation, represented by its
*age 14 of 30
Chairman, Roberti (. Cericos v. .estor M. Canda, et al., -.R. .o. /;320).
January /4 )3/0
Inlawful detainer; nature. -oing to the main issue in the instant petition it is
settled that in unlawful detainer one unlawfully withholds possession thereof
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract express or implied. ,n such case the possession was originally
lawful #ut #ecame unlawful #y the expiration or termination of the right to
possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisi!e for in such action
the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff$s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant$s right to continue in possession. $uanita
#rmita5o, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, 'sabelo #rmita5o v. Lailanie
M. (a!las -.R. .o. /7440;. January )0 )3/0
Inlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as
grounds. (e find that the R&C$s ruling upholding the ejectment of 5ert+ from
the #uilding premises was proper. *irst, respondent failed to pay rental
arrearages and utility #ills to =ptima; and second, the Contract of lease
expired without any re@uest from 5ert+ for a renegotiation thereof at least 23
days prior to its expiration.0ptima Realty Corporation v. &ert1 (hil. #8clusive
Cars, 'nc., -.R. .o. /C0301. January 2 )3/0
Inlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorney$s fees. As to
the award of monthly compensation we find that 5ert+ should pay ade@uate
compensation to =ptima since the former continued to occupy the leased
premises e!en after the expiration of the lease contract.
?inally we uphold the award of attorney$s fees in the amount of *03 333 and
judicial costs in the light of 5ert+ unjustifia#le and unlawful retention of the
leased premises thus forcing =ptima to file the instant case in order to
protect its rights and interest. 0ptima Realty Corporation v. &ert1 (hil.
#8clusive Cars, 'nc., -.R. .o. /C0301. January 2 )3/0
Special Proceedin%s
"ettlement of Bstate; claims include @uasi4contract and contingent
claims; ,n Maclan v. +arcia, :aclan filed a ci!il case to reco!er from Ru#en
-arcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land.
-arcia ac@uired the land as an heir of its pre!ious owner he set up the
defense that this claim should ha!e #een filed in the special proceedings to
settle the estate of his predecessor. :aclan on the other hand contended
that his claim arises from law and not from contract express or implied.
&hus it need not #e filed in the settlement of the estate of -arcia$s
predecessor as mandated #y "ection 1 Rule C7 of the Rules of Court 8now
"ection 1 Rule C;9.
&he court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent
as pre!ious possessor of the land is a kind of @uasi4contract. Citing Leun!
en v 0>rien, it explained that the term %implied contracts' as used in our
remedial law originated from the common law where o#ligations deri!ed
from @uasi4contracts and from law are #oth considered as implied contracts.
&hus the term @uasi4contract is included in the concept %implied contracts'
as used in the Rules of Court. Accordingly the lia#ilities of the deceased
arising from @uasi4contracts should #e filed as claims in the settlement of his
estate as pro!ided in "ection 1 Rule C; of the Rules of Court.
A distincti!e character of :etro#ank$s fourth4party complaint is its contingent
nature K the claim depends on the possi#ility that :etro#ank would #e
adjudged lia#le to A:C a future e!ent that may or may not happen. &his
characteristic unmistaka#ly marks the complaint as a contingent one that
must #e included in the claims falling under the terms of "ection 1 Rule C;
of the Rules of Court. Metropolitan ank = ,rust Company v. Absolute
Mana!ement Corporation, -.R. .o. /7342C. January 2 )3/0
"ettlement of Bstate; specific rules on settlement pre!ail o!er general
rules. (e read with appro!al the CA$s use of statutory construction principle
of le8 specialis dero!ate !enerali, leading to the conclusion that the specific
pro!isions of "ection 1 Rule C; of the Rules of Court should pre!ail o!er the
general pro!isions of "ection // Rule ; of the Rules of Court; the settlement
*age 1 of 30
of the estate of deceased persons 8where claims against the deceased
should #e filed9 is primarily go!erned #y the rules on special proceedings
while the rules pro!ided for ordinary claims including "ection // Rule ; of
the Rules of Court merely apply suppletorily. Metropolitan ank = ,rust
Company v. Absolute Mana!ement Corporation, -.R. .o. /7342C. January
2 )3/0
&ther Proceedin%s
Construction ,ndustry Ar#itration Commission 8C,AC9 jurisdiction; re@uisites.
<ased on "ection 4 of B.=. .o. /33C in order for the C,AC to ac@uire
jurisdiction two re@uisites must concur7 %first the dispute must somehow #e
related to a construction contract; and second the parties must ha!e agreed
to su#mit the dispute to ar#itration proceedings.' ,he Manila 'nsurance
Company, 'nc. v. "pouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, -.R. .o. /72;)C.
January /; )3/0
Construction ,ndustry Ar#itration Commission 8C,AC9 jurisdiction; monetary
claims under a construction contract. ,n )illiam +olan!co Construction
Corporation v. Ray urton Development Corporation, we declared that
monetary claims under a construction contract are disputes arising from
%differences in interpretation of the contract' #ecause the %matter of
ascertaining the duties and o#ligations of the parties under their contract all
in!ol!e interpretation of the pro!isions of the contract. ?ollowing our
reasoning in that case we find that the issue of whether respondent4spouses
are entitled to collect on the performance #ond issued #y petitioner is a
%dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of Ethe CCAF
#y reason of difference in the interpretation of the contract documents.' ,he
Manila 'nsurance Company, 'nc. v. "pouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, -.R.
.o. /72;)C. January /; )3/0
Construction ,ndustry Ar#itration Commission 8C,AC9 jurisdiction;
performance #ond. A careful reading of the *erformance <ond re!eals that
the %#ond is coterminous with the final acceptance of the project.' &hus the
fact that it was issued prior to the execution of the Construction Contract
Agreement does not affect its !alidity or effecti!ity.
,n fact in (rudential +uarantee and Assurance, 'nc. v. Anscor Land, 'nc., we
rejected the argument that the jurisdiction of C,AC is limited to the
construction industry and thus cannot #e extended to surety contracts. ,n
that case we declared that %although not the construction contract itself the
performance #ond is deemed as an associate of the main construction
contract that it cannot #e separated or se!ered from its principal. &he
*erformance <ond is significantly and su#stantially connected to the
construction contract that there can #e no dou#t it is the C,AC which has
jurisdiction o!er any dispute arising from or connected with it.' ,he Manila
'nsurance Company, 'nc. v. "pouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, -.R. .o.
/72;)C. January /; )3/0
Blection Cases; re!iew extends only to final decisions or resolutions of
C=:BABC en banc and not to interlocutory orders issued #y a di!ision . &he
petitioners$ resort to the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari to assail and
interlocutory order issued #y the C=:BABC ?irst 6i!ision is amiss. %A party
aggrie!ed #y an interlocutory order issued #y a 6i!ision of the C=:BABC in
an election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a
special ci!il action for certiorari. &he remedy is to seek the re!iew of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the 6i!ision in due
course.
x x x
&hus exceptionally this Court may take cogni+ance of a certiorari action
directed against an interlocutory order issued #y a 6i!ision of the C=:BABC
when the following circumstances are present7 first, the order was issued
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with gra!e a#use of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the
C=:BABC Rules of *rocedure the su#ject of the contro!ersy is a matter
which 8/9 the C=:BABC en banc may not sit and consider or 8)9 a 6i!ision is
not authori+ed to act or 809 the mem#ers of the 6i!ision unanimously !ote to
refer to the C=:BABC en banc. +overnor "adikul A. "ahali and -ice-
+overnor Ruby M. "ahali v. Commission on #lections 2*irst Division3,
Rashidin &. Matba and $ilkasi $. 4sman, -.R. .o. )3/72;. January /1 )3/0
*age 1! of 30
?inancial Reha#ilitation and ,nsol!ency Act; prospecti!e application of the
law. "ec. /4; of the ?R,A which makes it applica#le to %all further
proceedings in insol!ency suspension of payments and reha#ilitation cases
xxx except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application
would not #e feasi#le or would work injustice' still presupposes a
prospecti!e application. &he wording of the law clearly shows that it is
applica#le to all further proceedings. ,n no way could it #e made
retrospecti!ely applica#le to the "tay =rder issued #y the reha#ilitation court
#ack in )33). "itus Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust ank, et al., -.R.
.o. /C330;. January /; )3/0
5AIR<; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgage; ruling of 5AIR< affects only
the lot su#ject of the #uyer$s complaint. &he jurisdiction of the 5AIR< to
regulate the real estate trade is #road enough to include jurisdiction o!er
complaints for annulment of mortgage. &his is pursuant to the intent of *.6.
.o. 217 to protect hapless #uyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous
de!elopers which may constitute mortgages o!er condominium
projects sans the knowledge of the former and the consent of the 5AIR<.
,n *ar #ast ank, we held that7
Acts executed against the pro!isions of mandatory or prohi#itory
laws shall #e !oid. 5ence the mortgage o!er the lot is null and !oid
insofar as pri!ate respondent is concerned.
&he remedy granted #y the 5AIR< and sustained #y the =ffice of
the *resident is proper only insofar as it refers to the lot of
respondent. ,n short the mortgage contract is !oid as against him.
"ince there is no law stating the specifics of what should #e done
under the circumstances that which is in accord with e@uity should
#e ordered. &he remedy granted #y the 5AIR< in the first and the
second paragraphs of the dispositi!e portion of its 6ecision insofar
as it referred to respondent$s lot is in accord with e@uity.
&he 5AIR< howe!er went o!er#oard in its disposition in
paragraphs 0 and 4 which pertained not only to the lot #ut to the
entire parcel of land mortgaged. "uch ruling was improper. &he
su#ject of this litigation is limited only to the lot that respondent is
#uying not to the entire parcel of land. 5e has no personality or
standing to #ring suit on the whole property as he has actiona#le
interest o!er the su#ject lot only. 8Citations omitted and underlining
ours9
,n *ar #ast ank, we sustained the 5AIR< when it declared the mortgage
entered into #etween the su#di!ision de!eloper and the #ank as
unenforcea#le against the lot #uyer. 5owe!er we were categorical that the
5AIR< acted #eyond #ounds when it nullified the mortgage co!ering the
entire parcel of land of which the lot su#ject of the #uyer$s complaint is
merely a part.
,n the case now #efore us while it is within Aim$s right to file a complaint
#efore the 5AIR< to protect her right as a condominium unit #uyer she has
no standing to seek for the complete nullification of the su#ject mortgage.
"he has an actiona#le interest only o!er Init 4CC of Cluster 6ominiko of
Gista de Aoro no more and no less. (hilippine .ational ank, substituted by
,ranche C 2"(--AMC3, 'nc. v. Rina (arayno Lim and (uerto A1ul Land,
'nc., -.R. .o. /7/;77. January 03 )3/0
5AIR<; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or su#di!ision
units. "ection / of *6 .o. 217 limits the 5AIR<$s jurisdiction to three kinds
of cases7 8a9 unsound real estate #usiness practices; 8#9 claims in!ol!ing
refund and any other claims filed #y su#di!ision lot or condominium unit
#uyers against the project owner de!eloper dealer #roker or salesman; and
8c9 cases in!ol!ing specific performance of contractual and statutory
o#ligations filed #y #uyers of su#di!ision lots or condominium units against
the owner de!eloper dealer #roker or salesman. (hile paragraphs 8#9 and
8c9 limit the 5AIR< cases to those #etween the #uyer and the su#di!ision or
condominium owner de!eloper dealer #roker or salesman 8a9 is #road
enough to include third parties to the sales contract.
Jurisprudence consistently recogni+es the rationale #ehind the enactment of
*6 .o. 217 K to protect innocent lot #uyers from scheming de!elopers. ?or
this reason the Court has #roadly construed the jurisdiction of the 5AIR< to
include complaints for annulment of mortgages of condominium or
*age 1" of 30
su#di!ision units. ,ndeed in Manila ankin! Corporation v. "pouses Rabina
e!en if the mortgagee #ank was under recei!ershipHli@uidation the Court
declared that the 5AIR< retains jurisdiction o!er an action for the annulment
of the mortgage7
&he jurisdiction of the 5AIR< to regulate the real estate trade is
#road enough to include jurisdiction o!er complaints for annulment of
mortgage. &o disassociate the issue of nullity of mortgage and lodge
it separately with the li@uidation court would only cause
incon!enience to the parties and would not ser!e the ends of speedy
and inexpensi!e administration of justice as mandated #y the laws
!esting @uasi4judicial powers in the agency. (hilippine ank of
Communications v. (ridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio +on1ales,
ormacheco, 'nc., .a1ario "antos, ,eresita Chua ,ek, Charito 0n!
Lee, and #rnesto "ibal, -.R. .o. /11//0. January 2 )3/0
,ntra4corporate disputes; elements. &hus to #e considered as an intra4
corporate dispute the case7 8a9 must arise out of intra4corporate or
partnership relations; and 8#9 the nature of the @uestion su#ject of the
contro!ersy must #e such that it is intrinsically connected with the regulation
of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties$ rights and o#ligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. "o long
as these two criteria are satisfied the dispute is intra4corporate and the R&C
acting as a special commercial court has jurisdiction o!er it. -italiano
A!uirre '' and *idel A!uirre v. *7?@, 'nc., .athaniel ocobo, (riscila
ocobo, and Antonio De -illa, -.R. .o. /73773. January 2 )3/0
,ntra4corporate disputes; application to dissol!ed corporations. ,t #ears
reiterating that "ection /41 of the Corporation Code protects among others
the rights and remedies of corporate actors against other corporate actors.
&he statutory pro!ision assures an aggrie!ed party that the corporation$s
dissolution will not impair much less remo!e hisHher rights or remedies
against the corporation its stockholders directors and officers. ,t also states
that corporate dissolution will not extinguish any lia#ility already incurred #y
the corporation its stockholders directors or officers. ,n short "ection /41
preser!es a corporate actor$s cause of action and remedy against another
corporate actor. ,n so doing "ection /41 also preser!es the nature of the
contro!ersy #etween the parties as an intra4corporate dispute.
&he dissolution of the corporation simply prohi#its it from continuing its
#usiness. 5owe!er despite such dissolution the parties in!ol!ed in the
litigation are still corporate actors. &he dissolution does not automatically
con!ert the parties into total strangers or change their intra4corporate
relationships. .either does it change or terminate existing causes of action
which arose #ecause of the corporate ties #etween the parties. &hus a
cause of action in!ol!ing an intra4corporate contro!ersy remains and must #e
filed as an intra4corporate dispute despite the su#se@uent dissolution of the
corporation. -italiano A!uirre '' and *idel A!uirre v. *7?@, 'nc., .athaniel
ocobo, (riscila ocobo, and Antonio De -illa, -.R. .o. /73773. January 2
)3/0
Just compensation; compromise agreement. &here is no @uestion that the
foregoing A!reement was a compromise that the parties freely and
!oluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this
case. Inder Article )3)C of the Ci!il Code a compromise is a contract
where#y the parties #y making reciprocal concessions a!oid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly a compromise is either
judicial if the o#jecti!e is to put an end to a pending litigation or extrajudicial
if the o#jecti!e is to a!oid a litigation. As a contract a compromise is
perfected #y mutual consent. 5owe!er a judicial compromise while
immediately #inding #etween the parties upon its execution is not executory
until it is appro!ed #y the court and reduced to a judgment. &he !alidity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the re@uisites and
principles of contracts dictated #y law. Also the terms and conditions of a
compromise must not #e contrary to law morals good customs pu#lic policy
and pu#lic order.Land ank of the (hilippines v. &eirs of "pouses $or9a
Ri!or "oriano and Ma!in "oriano -.R. .o. /7C0/). January 03 )3/0
'vidence
B!idence; conclusi!e presumptions; estoppel against tenants. &he
conclusi!e presumption found in "ection ) 8#9 Rule /0/ of the Rules of
Court known as estoppel against tenants pro!ides as follows7
*age 1# of 30
"ec. ).Conclusive presumptions. A &he following are instances of
conclusi!e presumptions7
x x x x
8#9 the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant #etween them. 8Bmphasis supplied9
,t is clear from the a#o!e4@uoted pro!ision that what a tenant is estopped
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the landlord4tenant relation. ,f the title asserted is one that is alleged to ha!e
#een ac@uired su#se@uent to the commencement of that relation the
presumption will not apply. 5ence the tenant may show that the landlord$s
title has expired or #een con!eyed to another or himself; and he is not
estopped to deny a claim for rent if he has #een ousted or e!icted #y title
paramount. ,n the present case what respondent is claiming is her supposed
title to the su#ject property which she ac@uired su#se@uent to the
commencement of the landlord4tenant relation #etween her and petitioner.
5ence the presumption under "ection ) 8#9 Rule /0/ of the Rules of Court
does not apply. $uanita #rmita5o, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
'sabelo #rmita5o vs. Lailanie M. (a!las; -.R. .o. /7440;. January )0 )3/0
B!idence; disputa#le presumptions; presumption of regularity. &he court is
inclined to gi!e more e!identiary weight to the certification of the +oning
administrator #eing the officer ha!ing jurisdiction o!er the area where the
land in @uestion is situated and is therefore more familiar with the property
in issue. <esides this certification carried the presumption of regularity in its
issuance and respondents ha!e the #urden of o!ercoming this presumption.
Respondents howe!er failed to present any e!idence to re#ut that
presumption. &eirs of Luis A. Luna, et al. v. Ruben ". Afable, et al.% -.R. .o.
/CC)22. January )0 )3/0.
(e)ruary 2013 Philippines Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Civil Procedure
Actions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is
ground for dismissal. A complaint states a cause of action if it a!ers the
existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action namely7
8a9 &he legal right of the plaintiff;
8#9 &he correlati!e o#ligation of the defendant and
8c9 &he act or omission of the defendant in !iolation of said legal
right.
,f the allegations in the complaint do not a!er the concurrence of these
elements the complaint #ecomes !ulnera#le to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal of the Amended Complaint in
the present case would show that there is indeed no allegation of any act or
omission on the part of respondents which supposedly !iolated the legal
rights of petitioners. &hus the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action. (adilla Mercado, Dulueta
Mercado, et al. v. "pouses A!uedo #spina and Lourdes #spina%-.R. .o.
/702C7. ?e#ruary )1 )3/0
*age 1$ of 30
Actions; moot and academic principle. Gerily in +ancho-on v. "ecreatry of
Labor and #mployment, the Court emphatically stated that7
,t is a rule of uni!ersal application almost that courts of justice
constituted to pass upon su#stantial rights will not consider @uestions
in which no actual interests are in!ol!ed; they decline jurisdiction of
moot cases. And where the issue has #ecome moot and academic
there is no justicia#le contro!ersy so that a declaration thereon
would #e of no practical use or !alue. &here is no actual su#stantial
relief to which petitioners would #e entitled and which would #e
negated #y the dismissal of the petition.
Applying the a#o!e pronouncement there was no justicia#le contro!ersy
anymore in the instant petition in !iew of the expiration of the Compromise
Agreement sought to #e enforced. &here was no longer any purpose in
determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the R&C =rders
dated =cto#er 0/ )33/ and April /3 )33) since any declaration thereon
would #e of no practical use or !alue. <y the !ery admission of *A6& it can
no longer #e compelled to undo its act of #locking the telecommunication
calls and data from the *hilippines to 5ong Mong passing through the
RBAC54B&*, circuits since effecti!ely there were no more circuits to speak
of.
Clearly any decision of this Court on the present petition whether it #e an
affirmance or a re!ersal of the Amended 6ecision of the Court of Appeals
would #e e@ui!alent in effect to an affirmance or an in!alidation of the
challenged =rders of the R&C. <ut as can #e gleaned from the a#o!e
discussion and as succinctly put #y *A6& in its :emorandum there is
nothing more for the R&C to enforce andHor act upon. As such any
discussion on the matter would #e a mere surplusage.(hilippine Lon!
Distance ,elephone Company, 'nc. v. #astern ,elecom (hilippines% -.R. .o.
/;0307. ?e#ruary ; )3/0
Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justicia#le contro!ersy #y
!irtue of super!ening e!ents so that a declaration thereon would #e of no
practical use or !alue. Although the contro!ersy could ha!e ceased due to
the inter!ening appointment of and assumption #y Cadi+ as the "olicitor
-eneral during the pendency of this suit and such cessation of the
contro!ersy seemingly rendered moot and academic the resolution of the
issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the two positions #y
Agra the Court should still go forwards and resol!e the issue and not a#stain
from exercising its power of judicial re!iew #ecause this case comes under
se!eral of the well4recogni+ed exceptions o#tained namely7 8/9 there was a
gra!e !iolation of the Constitution; 8)9 the case in!ol!ed a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount pu#lic interest; 809 the
constitutional issue raised re@uired the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the <ench the <ar and the pu#lic; 849 the case was capa#le of
repetition yet e!ading re!iew.
,t is the same here. &he constitutionality of the concurrent holding #y Agra of
the two positions in the Ca#inet al#eit in acting capacities was as issue that
comes under all the recogni+ed exceptions. &he issue in!ol!es a pro#a#le
!iolation of the Constitution and relates to a situation of exceptional
character and of paramount pu#lic interest #y reason of its transcendental
importance to the people. &he resolution of the issue will also #e of the
greatest !alue to the <ench and the <ar in !iew of the #road powers wielded
through said positions. &he situation further calls for the re!iew #ecause the
situation is capa#le of repetition yet e!ading re!iew. ,n other words many
important and practical #enefits are still to #e gained were the Court to
proceed the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed. Dennis A..
*una v. Actin! "ecretary of $ustice Alberto C. A!ra, etc., et al.% -.R. .o.
/2/;44. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. &he rule on
separate trials in ci!il actions is found in "ection ) Rule 0/ of the Rules of
Court which reads7
"ection ). "eparate trials. A &he court in furtherance of con!enience
or to a!oid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim cross4
claim counterclaim or third4party complaint or of any separate issue
or of any num#er of claims cross4claims counterclaims third4party
complaints or issues.
*age 20 of 30
&he text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a
separate trial of any claim cross4claim counterclaim or third4party
complaint or of any separate issue or of any num#er of claims cross4claims
counterclaims third4party complaints or issues should #e held pro!ided that
the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of con!enience or to a!oid
prejudice to any party.
&he rule is almost identical with Rule 4)8#9 of the Inited "tates *ederal
Rules of Civil (rocedure8?ederal Rules9 a pro!ision that go!erns separate
trials in the Inited "tates ?ederal Courts 8I" ?ederal Courts9 x x x.
&he I" ?ederal Courts ha!e applied Rule 4)8#9 #y using se!eral principles
and parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may #e warranted
#ecause our rule on separate trials has #een patterned after the original
!ersion of Rule 4)8#9. &here is no o#stacle to adopting such principles and
parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials.
&his is #ecause generally speaking the Court has randomly accepted the
practices in the I" Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules
of procedure that ha!e themsel!es originated form or #een inspired #y the
practice and procedure in the ?ederal Courts and the !arious I" "tate
Courts.
x x x
<earing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined #y the
rele!ant I" case law we conclude that the "andigan#ayan committed gra!e
a#use of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian <ank
8:etro#ank9 on the ground that the issue against Asian <ank was distinct
and separate from that against the original defendants. &here#y the
"andigan#ayan !eered away from the general rule of ha!ing all the issues in
e!ery case tried at one time unreasona#ly shunting aside the dictum
in Corri!an, supra, that a %single trial will generally lessen the delay
expense and incon!enience to the parties and the courts.'
Bxceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are
extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues
raised in the same case or when separate trials of the issues will a!oid
prejudice or when separate trials of the issues will further con!enience or
when separate trials of the issues will promote justice or when separate
trials of the issues will gi!e a fair trial to all parties. =therwise the general
rule must apply. Metropolitan ank and ,rust Company, as successor-in-
interest of Asian ank Corporation v. &on. #dilberto +. "andoval, et al.% -.R.
.o. /;2;77. ?e#ruary /C )3/0
Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings
in lower court are #arred #y estoppel. As to the first issue there is no dispute
that the issue of timeliness of respondents$ :otion to 6ismiss petitioners$
Amended Complaint was not raised #y petitioners #efore the R&C. .either
was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents$ petition
forcertiorari filed with the CA. ,t was only in their :otion for Reconsideration
of the CA 6ecision that this matter was raised. ,t is well esta#lished that
issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in
the lower court are #arred #y estoppel. *oints of law theories issues and
arguments not #rought to the attention of the trial court ought not to #e
considered #y a re!iewing court as these cannot #e raised for the first time
on appeal. <asic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this
rule. (adilla Mercado, Dulueta Mercado, et al. v. "pouses A!uedo #spina
and Lourdes #spina% -.R. .o. /702C7. ?e#ruary )1 )3/0
Contempt; distinction #etween criminal and ci!il contempt. ,n (eople v.
+odoy, this Court made a distinction #etween criminal and ci!il contempt.
&he Court declared7
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or judge acting judicially; it is an act o#structing the
administration of justice which tends to #ring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. =n the other hand ci!il contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to #e done #y a court in a ci!il action for the #enefit of the
opposing party therein and is therefore an offense against the party in
whose #ehalf the !iolated order is made.
A criminal contempt #eing directed against the dignity and authority of the
court is an offense against organi+ed society and in addition is also held to
#e an offense against pu#lic justice which raises an issue #etween the pu#lic
and the accused and the proceedings to punish it are puniti!e. =n the other
*age 21 of 30
hand the proceedings to punish a ci!il contempt are remedial and for the
purpose of the preser!ation of the right of pri!ate persons. ,t has #een held
that ci!il contempt is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor #ut a power of the
court.
,t has further #een stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal
contempt and that no one can #e punished for a criminal contempt unless
the e!idence makes it cleat that he intended to commit it. =n the contrary
there is authority indicating that since the purpose of ci!il contempt
proceedings is remedial the defendant$s intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. 5ence good faith or the a#sence of intent to !iolate the court$s
order is not a defense in ci!il contempt.(hilip "i!rid A. *ortun v. (rima
$esusa . 7uinsayas, et al.% -.R. .o. /2417C. ?e#ruary /0 )3/0
Contempt; contempt akin to li#el and principle of pri!ileged communication
may #e in!oked in contempt proceeding. ,n (eople v. Castelo, the Court
ruled that contempt is akin to li#el and that the principle of pri!ileged
communication may #e in!oked in a contempt proceeding. &he Court ruled7
(hile the present case in!ol!es an incident of contempt the same is akin to a
case of li#el for #oth constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or
freedom of expression guaranteed #y our Constitution. "o what is considered
a pri!ilege in one may likewise #e considered in the other. &he same
safeguard should #e extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the
press or freedom of expression. &herefore this principle regarding pri!ileged
communications can also #e in!oked in fa!or of the appellant.
(hilip "i!rid A. *ortun v. (rima $esusa . 7uinsayas, et al.% -.R. .o.
/2417C. ?e#ruary /0 )3/0
Bxecution; execution pending appeal; not a #ar the continuance of the
appeal on the merits. ?irst of all as held in Le!aspi v. 0n!, %EeFxecution
pending appeal does not #ar the continuance of the appeal on the merits for
the Rules of Court precisely pro!ides for restitution according to e@uity in
case the executed judgment is re!ersed on appeal. 0. -entanilla #nterprises
Corporation v. Adelina ". ,an and "heriff Reynante +. -elas/ue1, (residin!
$ud!e% -.R. .o. /C30)1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
Bxecution; execution of R&C judgment does not automatically mean that
issues on appeal ha!e #ecome moot and academic; :oot and academic
principle. :oreo!er e!en assuming that the writ of execution in the instant
case were not !oid the execution of the R&C judgment cannot #e considered
as a super!ening e!ent that would automatically moot the issues in the
appealed case for accion publiciana, which is pending #efore the CA.
otherwise there would #e no use appealing a judgment once a writ of
execution is issued and satisfied. &hat situation would #e a#surd. =n the
contrary the Rules of Court in fact pro!ides for cases of re!ersal or
annulment of an executed judgment. "ection 1 of Rule 02 pro!ides that in
those cases there should #e restitution or reparation as warranted #y justice
and e@uity. &herefore #arring any super!ening e!ent there is still the
possi#ility of the appellate court$s re!ersal of the appealed decision K e!en if
already executed K and conse@uently of a restitution or a reparation.
,n any case the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana cannot in
any way #e characteri+ed as moot and academic. ,n 0smena ''' v. "ocial
"ecurity "ystem of the (hilippines, we defined a moot and academic case or
issue as follows7
A case or issue is considered not and academic when it ceases to
present a *usticia)le controversy #y !irtue of super!ening e!ents
so that an adjudication of the case or adeclaration on the issue
would )e o+ no practical value or use, ,n such instance there
is no actual su)stantial relie+ which a petitioner would )e
entitled to and which would #e negated #y the dismissal of the
petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction o!er such case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness K sa!e when among others a
compelling constitutional issue raised re@uires the formulation of
controlling principles to guide the #ench the #ar and the pu#lic; or
when the case is capa#le of repetition yet e!ading judicial re!iew.
Applying the a#o!e definition to the instant case it is o#!ious that there
remains an unresol!ed justicia#le contro!ersy in the appealed case
for accion publiciana. ,n particular did respondent4spouses =ria really
encroach on the land of the petitionerN ,f they did does he ha!e the right to
*age 22 of 30
reco!er possession of the propertyN ?urthermore without preempting the
disposition of the case for accion publiciana pending #efore the CA we note
that if the respondents #uilt structures on the su#ject land and if they were
#uilders in good faith they would #e entitled to appropriate rights under the
Ci!il Code. &his Court merely points out that there are still issues that the CA
needs to resol!e in the appealed case #efore it. Macario Dia1 Carpio v.
Court of Appeals, spouses +elacio +. +loria and Marcelina (re 0ria% -.R.
.o. /C0/3). ?e#ruary )7 )3/0
Bxecution; effects of !oid writ of execution; re@uirement of good reason in
execution pending appeal. ,n any case proceed to rule that #ecause the writ
of execution was !oid all actions and proceedings conducted pursuant to it
were also !oid and of no legal effect. &o recall this Court affirmed the
6ecision of the CA in CA4-.R. "* .o. C4;0) annulling the R&C$s =mni#us
=rder granting the :otion for ,mmediate Bxecution pending appeal. (e
affirmed the CA 6ecision #ecause of the R&C$s failure to state any reason
much less good reason for the issuance thereof as re@uired under "ection )
Rule 02. ,n the exercise #y the trial court of its discretionary power to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal we emphasi+e the need for strict
compliance with the re@uirement for the statement of good reason #ecause
execution pending appeal is the exception rather than the rule.
"ince the writ of execution was manifestly !oid for ha!ing #een issued
without compliance with the rules it is without any legal effect. ,n other
words it is as if no writ was issued at all. Conse@uently all actions taken
pursuant to the !oid writ of execution must #e deemed to ha!e not #een
taken and to ha!e had no effect. =therwise the Court would #e sanctioning a
!iolation of the right of due process of the judgment de#tors K respondent4
spouses herein. Macario Dia1 Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses +elacio
+. +loria and Marcelina (re 0ria% -.R. .o. /C0/3). ?e#ruary )7 )3/0
5ierarchy of courts; exceptions. "econd, while the principle of hierarchy of
courts does indeed re@uire that recourse should #e made to the lower courts
#efore they are made to the higher courts this principle is not an a#solute
rule and admits of certain exceptions under well4defined circumstances. ,n
se!eral cases we ha!e allowed direct in!ocation of this Court$s original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari on the ground of special and important
reasons clearly stated in the petition; when dictated #y pu#lic welfare and the
ad!ancement of pu#lic policy; when demanded #y the #roader interest of
justice; when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or when analogous
exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified our
immediate and direct handling of the case. Republic of the (hilippines v.
&on. Ramon ". Ca!uioa, etc., et al.% -.R. .o. /740C1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
Judgments; immuta#ility of judgments. &he issue on the nullity of :aniego$s
title had already #een foreclosed when this Court denied :aniego$s petition
for re!iew in the Resolution dated /0 July )3// which #ecame final and
executory on /2 January )3/). ,t is settled that a decision that has ac@uired
finality #ecomes immuta#le and unaltera#le and may no longer #e modified
in any respect e!en if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will #e made #y the court that
rendered it or #y the highest court of the land. &his is without prejudice
howe!er to the right of :aniego to reco!er from *o#lete what he paid to
Mapantay for the account of *o#lete otherwise there will #e unjust
enrichment #y *o#lete. Land ank of the (hilippines v. arbara "ampa!a
(oblete% -.R. .o. /2;177. ?e#ruary )1 )3/0
Judgments; pro hac !ice; nature. *etitioners point out that this Court has had
occasion to grant a motion for new trial after the judgment of con!iction had
#ecome final and executory. ,n (eople v. Licayan, all the accused were
con!icted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to death #y
the trial court. :ore than two years after their con!iction #ecame final and
executory the accused Aara and Aicayan filed an Irgent :otion to Re4=pen
the Case with Aea!e of Court. &hey attached thereto the "inumpaan!
"alaysay executed #y two of their co4accused in the case to the effect that
Aara and Aicayan had not participated in the commission of the crime. "ince
the ="- also recommended the opening of the case this Court remanded
the case to the trial court for the reception of newly disco!ered e!idence.
,t is worth pointing that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac
vice, which is a Aatin term used #y courts to refer to rulings rendered %for this
one particular occasion.' A ruling expressly @ualified as such cannot #e relied
upon as a precedent to go!ern other cases. Reynante ,ade9a, et al. v.
(eople of the (hilippines% -.R. .o. /4100;. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
*age 23 of 30
Judgments; !oid judgment; nature and effect; may #e resisted in any action
or proceeding. A !oid judgment or order has no legal and #inding effect
force or efficacy for any purpose. ,n contemplation of law it is non4existent.
"uch judgment or order may #e resisted in any action or proceeding
whene!er it is in!ol!ed. ,t is not e!en necessary to take any steps to !acate
or a!oid a !oid judgment or final order; it may simply #e ignored.
x x x
Accordingly a !oid judgment is no judgment at all. ,t cannot #e the source of
any right nor of any o#ligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it ha!e no legal effect. 5ence it can ne!er #ecome final and
any writ of execution #ased on it is !oid7 %8 8 8 it may be said to be a lawless
thin! which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at si!ht, or i!nored
wherever it e8hibits its head.E Land ank of the (hilippines v. "pouses
(lacido and Clara Dy 0rilla% -.R. .o. /24/;C. ?e#ruary /0 )3/0
Ai#eral construction of the rules. ,n many instances the Court adopted a
policy of li#erally construing its rules in order to promote a just speedy and
inexpensi!e disposition of e!ery action and proceeding. &he rules can #e
suspended on the following grounds7 8/9 matters of life li#erty honor or
property 8)9 the existence of special or compelling circumstances 809 the
merits of the case 849 a cause not entirely attri#uta#le to the fault or
negligence of the party fa!ored #y the suspension of the rules 819 a lack of
any showing that the re!iew sought is merely fri!olous and dilatory and 8;9
the other party will not #e unjustly prejudiced there#y. "ecretary Leila M. De
Lima, Director .onnatus R. Ro9as and Deputy Director Reynaldo 0.
#smeralda v. Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R. .o. )341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
:otions; notice and hearing re@uirements; effect of non4compliance; notice
re@uirement in the issuance of preliminary injunction. A motion for
inter!ention like any other motion has to comply with the mandatory
re@uirements of notice and hearing as well as proof of its ser!ice sa!e only
for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the
other parties. A motion which fails to comply with these re@uirements is a
worthless piece of paper that cannot and should not #e acted upon.
x x x
&he notice re@uirement is e!en more mandatory when the mo!ant asks for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction andHor a &R=. Inder "ection 1 Rule
1C of the Rules of Court no preliminary injunction shall #e granted without a
hearing and without prior notice to the party sought to #e enjoined the prior
notice under this re@uirement is as important as the hearing as no hearing
can meaningfully take place with #oth parties present or represented unless
a prior notice of the hearing is gi!en. Republic of the (hilippines v. &on.
Ramon ". Ca!uioa, etc., et al.% -.R. .o. /740C1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
:otions; motion to dismiss; defenses and o#jections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed wai!ed; exceptions. Inder
"ection / Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defenses and o#jections not pleaded
in the answer are deemed wai!ed with the following exceptions7 8/9 lack of
jurisdiction o!er the su#ject matter; 8)9 litis pendentia% 809 res 9udicata% and
849 prescription of the action. Clearly petitioner cannot change its defense
after the termination of the period of testimony and after the exhi#its of #oth
parties ha!e already #een admitted #y the court. &he non4inclusion of this
#elated defense in the pre4trial order #arred its consideration during the trial.
&o rule otherwise would put the ad!erse party at a disad!antage since he
could no longer offer e!idence to re#ut the new theory. ,ndeed parties are
#ound #y the delimitation of issues during the pre4trial. Licomcen, 'nc. v.
#n!r. "alvador Abain1a, etc.% -.R. .o. /227C/. ?e#ruary /C )3/0
.ew trial; newly4disco!ered e!idence; re@uisites. *etitioners premise their
motion for a new trial on the ground of newly4disco!ered e!idence i.e.
*laridel$s extrajudicial confession executed with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo
&ejoso Jr. and the spot report of the police on *laridel$s apprehension.
.ewly disco!ered e!idence refers to that which 8a9 is disco!ered after trial;
8#9 could not ha!e #een disco!ered and produced at the trial e!en with the
exercise of reasona#le diligence; 8c9 is material not merely cumulati!e
corro#orati!e or impeaching; and 8d9 is of such weight that it would pro#a#ly
change the judgment if admitted.
*age 24 of 30
&he most important re@uisite is that the e!idence could not ha!e #een
disco!ered and produced at the trial e!en with reasona#le diligence; hence
the term %newly4disco!ered.' &he confession of *laridel does not meet this
re@uisite. 5e participated in the trial #efore the R&C and e!en ga!e testimony
as to his defense. ,t was only after he and petitioners had #een con!icted #y
the trial court that he a#sconded. &hus the contention that his confession
could not ha!e #een o#tained during trial does not hold water. Reynante
,ade9a, et al. v. (eople of the (hilippines% -.R. .o. /4100;. ?e#ruary )3
)3/0F
*arties; duty of party to inform court of counsel$s death. &he Court strikes
down the argument that the CA 6ecision in CA4-.R. CG .o. 1CC/7 did not
attain finality #ecause petitioner$s counsel who died while the case was
pending #efore the CA was una#le to recei!e a copy thereof. &he CA was
correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that
would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. &he reason
gi!en #y petitioner that its former counsel had died #efore the CA 6ecision
was promulgated hence it was not properly notified of the judgment is too
tenuous to #e gi!en serious consideration. ,n Mo9ar, et al. v. A!ro
Commercial "ecurity "ervice A!ency, 'nc., the Court explained that it is the
party$s duty to inform the court of its counsel$s demise and failure to apprise
the court of such fact shall #e considered negligence on the part of said
party. Bxpounding further the Court stated7
x x x ,t is not the duty of the courts to in@uire during the progress of
a case whether the law firm or partnership representing one of the
litigants continues to exist lawfully whether the partners are still
ali!e or whether its associates are still connected with the firm.
x x x &hey cannot pass the #lame to the court which is not tasked to
monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their
counsel. x x x x
,n Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the !igilance that must #e
exercise #y a party7
x x x x
Aitigants who are represented #y counsel should not expect that all
they need to do is sit #ack relax and await the outcome of their
cases. Relief will not #e granted to a party who seeks a!oidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence. &he circumstances of this case
plainly show that petitioner only has himself to #lame. .either can he
in!oke due process. &he essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to #e heard. 6ue process is satisfied when the parties
are afforded a fair and reasona#le opportunity to explain their
respecti!e sides of the contro!ersy. (here a party such as
petitioner was afforded this opportunity to participate #ut failed to do
so he cannot complain of depri!ation of due process. ,f said
opportunity is not a!ailed of it is deemed wai!ed or forfeited without
!iolating the constitutional guarantee.
&hus for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of
record and ha!e said counsel su#stituted then ser!ice of the CA 6ecision at
the places or law office designated #y its counsel of record as his address is
sufficient notice. &he case then #ecame final and executory when no motion
for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period therefor. 0.
-entanilla #nterprises Corporation v. Adelina ". ,an and "heriff Reynante
+. -elas/ue1, (residin! $ud!e% -.R. .o. /C30)1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
*artition; stages; re@uisites. &he first stage in an action for partition is the
settlement of the issue of ownership. "uch an addition will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest in the su#ject property. ,n fact the parties
filing the action are re@uired #y the Rules of Court to set forth in their
complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. ,t would #e
premature to effect a partition until and unless the @uestion of ownership is
first definitely resol!ed. Carolina 2Carlina3 -da. De *i!uracion, et al. v. #milia
*i!uracion-+erilla% -.R. .o. /1/004. ?e#ruary /0 )3/0F
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; issues not raised #efore the courts
a @uo cannot #e raised for the first time on appeal; rationale for the rule;
exceptions. &he inconsistent postures taken #y the petitioners #reach the
*age 2 of 30
#asic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as
expressly adopted in Rule 44 "ection /1 of the Rules of Court which reads7
"ec /1. 7uestions that may be raised on appeal. A whether or not
the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court #elow he
may include in his assignment of errors any @uestion of law or fact
that has #een raised in the court #elow and which is within the issues
framed #y the parties.
?ortifying the rule the Court had repeatedly emphasi+ed that defenses not
pleaded in the answer may not #e raised for the first time on appeal. (hen a
party deli#erately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court #elow he will not #e permitted to change the same on
appeal #ecause to permit to do so would #e unfair to the ad!erse party. &he
Court had likewise in numerous times affirmed that points of law theories
issues and arguments not #rought to the attention of the lower court need not
#e and ordinarily will not #e considered #y a re!iewing court as these
cannot #e raised for the first time at such late stage. <asic considerations of
due process underlie this rule. ,t would #e unfair to the ad!erse party who
would ha!e no opportunity to present further e!idence material to the new
theory which it could ha!e done had it #een aware of it at the time of the
hearing #efore the trial court.
(hile a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual #ases
thereof would not re@uire presentation of any further e!idence #y the ad!erse
party in order to ena#le it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory
this exception does not howe!er o#tain in the case at hand. Carolina
2Carlina3 -da. De *i!uracion, et al. v. #milia *i!uracion-+erilla% -.R. .o.
/1/004. ?e#ruary /0 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; @uestions of fact generally not
re!iewa#le; exceptions; difference #etween @uestion of fact and @uestion of
law. (e note that the matters raised #y petitioner A&, in!ol!e @uestions of
fact which are generally not re!iewa#le in a petition for re!iew on certiorari
under Rule 41 of the /227 Rules of Ci!il *rocedure as amended as the
Court is not a trier of facts. "ection / thereof pro!ides that %EtFhe petition x x x
shall raise only @uestions of law which must #e distinctly set forth.'
A @uestion of law exists when the dou#t or contro!ersy concerns the correct
application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issued does not call for an examination of the pro#ati!e !alue of e!idence
presented the truth or falsehood of facts #eing admitted. A @uestion of fact
exists when the dou#t or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the @uery in!ites cali#ration of the whole e!idence considering
mainly the credi#ility of the witnesses the existence and rele!ancy of specific
surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole and the pro#a#ility of the situation.
&he well4entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only @uestions of law may
#e entertained #y this Court in a petition for re!iew on certiorari. &his rule
howe!er is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions such as when 8/9 the
conclusion is grounded on speculations surmises or conjectures; 8)9 the
inference is manifestly mistaken a#surd or impossi#le; 809 there is gra!e
a#use of discretion; 849 the judgment is #ased on a misapprehension of facts;
819 the findings of fact are conflicting; 8;9 there is no citation of specific
e!idence on which the factual findings are #ased; 79 the findings of a#sence
of facts are contradicted #y the presence of e!idence on record; 8C9 the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 829 the
findings of the Court of Appeals manifestly o!erlooked certain rele!ant and
undisputed facts that if properly considered would justify a different
conclusion; 8/39 the findings of the Court of Appeals are #eyond the issues of
the case; and 8//9 such findings are contrary to the admissions of #oth
parties. Asian ,erminals, 'nc. v. "imon #nterprises, 'nc.% -.R. .o. /77//;.
?e#ruary )7 )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; only @uestions of law may #e
raised. A petition for re!iew under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court specifically
pro!ides that only @uestions of law may #e raised su#ject to exceptional
circumstances which are not present in this case. 5ence factual findings of
the trial court especially if affirmed #y the CA are #inding on us. ,n this case
#oth the R&C and the CA found that the signatures of *o#lete and her
deceased hus#and in the 6eed dated // August )333 were forged #y
:aniego. ,n addition the e!idence is preponderant that :aniego did not pay
the consideration for the sale. "ince the issue on the genuineness of the
*age 2! of 30
6eed dated // August )333 is essentially a @uestion of fact we are not duty4
#ound to analy+e and weigh the e!idence again. Land ank of the
(hilippines v. arbara "ampa!a (oblete% -.R. .o. /2;177. ?e#ruary )1
)3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; resol!es only @uestions of law not
@uestions of fact. (e stress the settled rule that a petition for re!iew
on certiorari under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court resol!es only @uestions of
law not @uestions of fact. A @uestion to #e one of law must not examine the
pro#ati!e !alue of the e!idence presented #y the parties; otherwise the
@uestion is one of fact. (hether an express trust exists in this case is a
@uestion of fact whose resolution is not proper in a petition under Rule
F:. $oseph +oyanko, $r., as administrator of the #state of $oseph +oyanko,
"r. v. 4nited Coconut (lanters ank, Man!o Avenue ranch% -.R. .o.
/7232;. ?e#ruary ; )3/0
*etition for re!iew on certiorari 8Rule 419; change of theory on appeal
generally not allowed."econd we find that the petitioner changed the theory
of his case. &he petitioner argued #efore the lower courts that an express
trust exists #etween *AA,, as the trustee and the 5B,R" as the trustor4
#eneficiary. &he petitioner now asserts that the express trust exists #etween
*AA,, as the trustor and IC*< as the trustee with the 5B,R" as the
#eneficiaries. At this stage of the case such change of theory is simply not
allowed as it !iolates #asic rules of fair play justice and due process. =ur
rulings are clear K %a party who deli#erately adopts a certain theory upon
which the case was decided #y the lower court will not #e permitted to
change EitF on appeal' otherwise the lower courts will effecti!ely #e depri!ed
of the opportunity to decide on the merits of the case fairly. <esides courts of
justice are de!oid of jurisdiction to resol!e a @uestion not in issue. $oseph
+oyanko, $r., as administrator of the #state of $oseph +oyanko, "r. v.
4nited Coconut (lanters ank, Man!o Avenue ranch% -.R. .o. /7232;.
?e#ruary ; )3/0
*leadings; amended complaint; nature. :oreo!er respondent$s filing of their
:otion to 6ismiss Amended Complaint may not #e considered as a
circum!ention of the rules of procedure. Inder "ection C Rule /3 of the
Rules of Court an amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a
conse@uence the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer
considered part of the record. ,n the present case the Amended Complaint
is thus treated as an entirely new complaint. As such respondents had
e!ery right to mo!e for the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint. (ere it
not for the filing of the said :otion respondents would not ha!e #een a#le to
file a petition for certiorari #efore the CA which in turn rendered the
presently assailed judgment in their fa!or.(adilla Mercado, Dulueta Mercado,
et al. v. "pouses A!uedo #spina and Lourdes #spina% -.R. .o. /702C7.
?e#ruary )1 )3/0
"er!ice of *leadings; petition should #e ser!ed on counsel of party; effect of
ser!ice on party represented #y counsel of record; exceptions. Lastly, under
our rules of procedure ser!ice of the petition on a party when the party is
represented #y a counsel of record is a patent nullity and is not #inding upon
the party wrongfully ser!ed. &his rule howe!er is a procedural standard that
may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of su#stanti!e
justice manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the
case. *rocedural rules can #ow to su#stanti!e considerations through a
li#eral construction aimed at promoting their o#jecti!e of securing a just
speedy and inexpensi!e disposition of e!ery action and
proceeding. Republic of the (hilippines v. &on. Ramon ". Ca!uioa, etc., et
al.% -.R. .o. /740C1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
"pecial ci!il action for certiorari 8Rule ;19; reglementary period. *irst, we find
that the present petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to
the pri!ate respondents$ position the ;34day period within which to file the
petition for certiorari is counted from the Repu#lic$s receipt of the July 1
)33; order denying the latter$s motion for reconsideration. "ection 4 Rule ;1
of the Rules of Court is clear on this point K %-n case a motion +or
reconsideration or new trial is timely +iled.whether such motion is re@uired
or not the si/ty 0!01 day period shall )e counted +rom notice o+ the
denial o+ said motion,' Republic of the (hilippines v. &on. Ramon ".
Ca!uioa, etc., et al.% -.R. .o. /740C1. ?e#ruary )3 )3/0
"pecial ci!il action for certiorari 8Rule ;19; re@uisites. &he following re@uisites
must concur for a *etition for Certiorari to prosper namely7
*age 2" of 30
8a9 &he writ is directed against a tri#unal #oard or officer exercising judicial
or @uasi4judicial functions;
8#9 "uch tri#unal #oard or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with gra!e a#use of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and
8c9 &here is no appeal or any plain speedy and ade@uate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. "alvacion -illanueva, et al. v. (alawan Council
for "ustainable Development, etc., et al.% -.R. .o. /7C047. ?e#ruary )1
)3/0
Special Proceedin%s
(rit of amparo; nature; special proceeding. &he remedy of the (rit
of Amparo is an e@uita#le and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of
the people to life li#erty and security as enshrined in the /2C7 Constitution.
&he Rule on the (rit of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the "upreme
Court$s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. ,t aims to address concerns such as
among others extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
x x x
,t is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
:&CH:&CCH:C&Cs. ,t is mind4#oggling how this rule could possi#ly apply to
proceedings in an R&C. Aside from that this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ ofAmparo is
a special proceedin%, ,t is a remedy #y which a party seeks to esta#lish a
status a right or particular fact. ,t is not a ci!il nor a criminal action hence
the application of the Re!ised Rule on "ummary *rocedure is seriously
misplaced. "ecretary Leila M. De Lima, Director .onnatus R. Ro9as and
Deputy Director Reynaldo 0. #smeralda v. Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R. .o.
)341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
(rit of amparo; procedure. 6ue to the delicate and urgent nature of these
contro!ersies the procedure was de!ised to afford swift #ut decisi!e relief. ,t
is initiated through a petition to #e filed in a Regional &rial Court
"andigan#ayan the Court of Appeals or the "upreme Court. &he judge or
justice then makes an %immediate' e!aluation of the facts as alleged in the
petition and the affida!its su#mitted %with the attendant circumstances
detailed'. After e!aluation the judge has the option to issue the
2rit of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. 6ismissal is proper if the
petition and the supporting affida!its do not show that the petitioner$s right to
lie li#erty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not
unlawful. =n the other hand the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
presumpti!e judicial protection for the petitioner. &he court compels the
respondents to appear #efore a court of law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim relies are necessary.
&he respondents are re@uired to file a Return after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. &he Return ser!es as the responsi!e pleading to
the petition. Inlike an Answer the Return has other purposes aside form
identifying the issues in the case Respondents are also re@uired to detail the
actions they had taken to determine the fate or wherea#outs of the aggrie!ed
party.
,f the respondents are pu#lic officials or employees they are also re@uired to
state the actions they had taken to7 8i9 !erify the identity of the aggrie!ed
party; 8ii9 reco!er and preser!e e!idence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition; 8iii9 identify witnesses
and o#tain statements concerning the death or disappearance; 8i!9 determine
the cause manner location and time of death or disappearance as well as
any patter or practice that may ha!e #rought a#out the death or
disappearance; and 8!9 #ring the suspected offenders #efore a competent
court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that sHhe can
cali#rate the means and methods that will #e re@uired to further the
protections if any that will #e due to the petitioner.
&here will #e a summary hearin% only after the Return is filed to determine
the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. ,f the
Return is not filed the hearing will #e done e8 parte. After the hearing the
court will render the *ud%ment within ten 8/39 days from the time the petition
is su#mitted for decision.
*age 2# of 30
,f the allegations are pro!en with su#stantial e!idence the court shall grant
the pri!ilege of the writ and such reliefs as may #e proper ans appropriate.
&he judgment should contain measures which the judge !iews as essential
for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. &hese
measures must #e detailed enough o that the judge may #e a#le to !erify
and monitor the actions taken #y the respondents. ,t is this judgment that
could #e su#ject to appeal to the "upreme Court !ia Rule 41. After the
measures ha!e ser!ed their purpose the judgment will #e satisfied.
,n Amparo cases this is when the threats to the petitioner$s life li#erty and
security cease to exist as e!aluated #y the court that renders the judgment.
*arenthetically the case may also #e terminated through consolidation
should a su#se@uent case #e filed K either criminal or ci!il. Intil the full
satisfaction of the judgment the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows
!igilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional
rights. "ecretary Leila M. De Lima, Director .onnatus R. Ro9as and Deputy
Director Reynaldo 0. #smeralda v. Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R. .o.
)341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
(rit of Amparo; writ is an interlocutory order. &he %DecisionE dated )3 :arch
)3/) assailed #y the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that
is appeala#le under "ection /2 of the Rule on the (rit of Amparo. x x x
&his %DecisionE pertained to the issuance o+ the writ under "ection ; of the
Rule on the (rit ofAmparo, not the *ud%ment under "ection /C. &he
%DecisionE is thus an interlocutory order as suggested #y the fact that
temporary protection production and inspection orders were gi!en together
with the decision. &he temporary protection production and inspection orders
are interim relie+s that may #e granted #y the court upon filing of the petition
#ut before final judgment is rendered. "ecretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
.onnatus R. Ro9as and Deputy Director Reynaldo 0. #smeralda v.
Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R. .o. )341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
(rit of Amparo; the Return is the proper responsi!e pleading; memorandum
is a prohi#ited pleading. ?irst the insistence on filing an Answer was
inappropriate. ,t is the Return that ser!es as the responsi!e pleading for
petitions for the issuance of (rits of Amparo. &he re@uirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to pro!ide a speedy remedy
to those whose right to life li#erty and security are !iolated or are threatened
to #e !iolated. ,n utter disregard of the Rule on the (rit of Amparo, Judge
*ampilo insisted on issuing summons and re@uiring an Answer.
x x x
&he Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
su#ject to a hearing. 5ence it should #e done prior to the hearing not after.
A memorandum on the other hand is a synthesis of the claims of the party
litigants and is a final pleading usually re@uired #efore the case is su#mitted
for decision. =ne cannot su#stitute for the other since these su#missions
ha!e different functions in facilitating the suit.
:ore importantly a memorandum is a prohi#ited pleading under the Rule on
the writ of Amparo."ecretary Leila M. De Lima, Director .onnatus R. Ro9as
and Deputy Director Reynaldo 0. #smeralda v. Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R.
.o. )341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
(rit of Amparo; difference #etween the pri!ilege of the (rit of Amparo and
the actual order called the (rit of Amparo. 3he privile%e o+ the 2rit
o+ Amparo should #e distinguished from the actual order called the )rit of
Amparo. &he pri!ilege includes the a!ailment of the entire procedure outlined
in A.:. .o. 37424/)4"C the rule on the (rit of Amparo. After examining the
petition and its attached affida!its the Return and the e!idence presented in
the summary hearing the judgment should detail the re@uired acts from the
respondent that will mitigate if not totally eradicate the !iolation of or threat
to the petitioner$s life li#erty or security.
A judgment which simply grants %the pri!ilege of the writ' cannot #e
executed. ,t is tantamount to a failure of the judge to inter!ene and grant
judicial succor to the petitioner. *etitions filed to a!ail of the pri!ilege of the
(rit of Amparo arise out of !ery real and concrete circumstances. Judicial
responses cannot #e as tragically sym#olic or ritualistic as %granting the
pri!ilege of the (rit ofAmparo.' "ecretary Leila M. De Lima, Director
.onnatus R. Ro9as and Deputy Director Reynaldo 0. #smeralda v.
Ma!tan!!ol . +atdula% -.R. .o. )341)C. ?e#ruary /2 )3/0
*age 2$ of 30
'vidence
Administrati!e proceedings; @uantum of proof; su#stantial e!idence. ,t is well4
entrenched that in an administrati!e proceeding the @uantum of proof
re@uired for a finding of guilt is only su#stantial e!idence or such rele!ant
e!idence as a reasona#le mind might accept as ade@uate to support a
conclusion and not proof #eyond reasona#le dou#t which re@uires moral
certainty to justify affirmati!e findings. 0ffice of the 0mbudsman v. Rodri!o
v. Mapoy and Don #mmanuel R. Re!alario% -.R. .o. /27)22. ?e#ruary /0
)3/0
Ci!il cases; @uantum of proof; preponderance of e!idence; e!idence of
fraud. ,n ci!il cases #asic is the rule that the party making allegations has
the #urden of pro!ing them #y a preponderance of e!idence. :oreo!er
parties must rely on the strength of their own e!idence not upon the
weakness of the defense offered #y their proponent. &his principle e@ually
holds true e!en if the defendant had not #een gi!en the opportunity to
present e!idence #ecause of a default order. &he extent of the relief that may
#e granted can only #e as much as has #een alleged and pro!ed with
preponderant e!idence re@uired under "ection / of Rule /00 of the Re!ised
Rules of B!idence.
*reponderance of e!idence is the weight credit and !alue of the aggregate
e!idence on either side and is usually considered to #e synonymous with the
term %greater weight of the e!idence' or %greater weight of the credi#le
e!idence.' *reponderance of e!idence is a phrase which in the last analysis
means pro#a#ility of the truth. ,t is e!idence which is more con!incing to the
court as worthier of #elief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
As to fraud the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a
transaction must su#stantiate his allegation since it is presumed that a
person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that pri!ate transactions ha!e
#een fair and regular. &he Court has stressed time and again that allegations
must #e pro!en #y sufficient e!idence #ecause mere allegation is definitely
not e!idence. :oreo!er fraud is not presumed K it must #e pro!ed #y clear
and con!incing e!idence."pouses .ilo Ramos and #liadora Ramos v. Raul
0bispo and *ar #ast ank and ,rust Co.% -.R. .o. /20C34. ?e#ruary )7
)3/0
*age 30 of 30