Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPEATE COURT, T!E STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONA
POICE, "AROTAC NUE#O, IOIO a$% T!E REGIONA DIRECTOR, "UREAU O& ANIMA
INDUSTRY, REGION I#, IOIO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRU', J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades !tri"e #
but hear me first$ %t is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challen&es the
constitutionality of E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A.
The said e'ecutive order reads in full as follo,s-
./EREA!, the President has &iven orders prohibitin& the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slau&hterin& of carabaos not complyin& ,ith the re0uirements of
E'ecutive (rder No. )*) particularly ,ith respect to a&e1
./EREA!, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still mana&e
to circumvent the prohibition a&ainst inter+provincial movement of carabaos by
transportin& carabeef instead1 and
./EREA!, in order to achieve the purposes and ob2ectives of E'ecutive (rder No.
)*) and the prohibition a&ainst interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary
to stren&then the said E'ecutive (rder and provide for the disposition of the
carabaos and carabeef sub2ect of the violation1
N(., T/ERE3(RE, %, 3ER4%NAN4 E. MARC(!, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the po,ers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promul&ate the
follo,in&-
!ECT%(N 5. E'ecutive (rder No. )*) is hereby amended such that henceforth, no
carabao re&ardless of a&e, se', physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall
be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this E'ecutive (rder as amended shall be sub2ect to confiscation and
forfeiture by the &overnment, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat %nspection Commission may
ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deservin& farmers throu&h dispersal as the
4irector of Animal %ndustry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
!ECT%(N *. This E'ecutive (rder shall ta"e effect immediately.
4one in the City of Manila, this *6th day of (ctober, in the year of (ur 7ord, nineteen
hundred and ei&hty.
8!94.: 3ER4%NAN4
E. MARC(!
Preside
nt
Republic of the
Philippines
The petitioner had transported si' carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to %loilo on ;anuary 5<,
5=>?, ,hen they ,ere confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, %loilo, for
violation of the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Re&ional Trial Court of
%loilo City issued a ,rit of replevin upon his filin& of a supersedeas bond of P5*,@@@.@@. After
considerin& the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no lon&er be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the e'ecutive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lac" of authority and
also for its presumed validity.
2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the %ntermediate Appellate Court,(
)
,hich upheld the trial
court, (( and he has no, come before us in this petition for revie, on certiorari.
The thrust of his petition is that the e'ecutive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authoriAes outri&ht
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef bein& transported across provincial boundaries. /is claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed ,ithout accordin& the o,ner a ri&ht to be heard
before a competent and impartial court as &uaranteed by due process. /e complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a
challen&e to the improper e'ercise of the le&islative po,er by the former President under
Amendment No. ) of the 5=B< Constitution.
4
.hile also involvin& the same e'ecutive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles
5
is not applicable
here. The 0uestion raised there ,as the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the
(fficial 9aAette before it could be considered enforceable. .e imposed the re0uirement then on the
basis of due process of la,. %n doin& so, ho,ever, this Court did not, as contended by the !olicitor
9eneral, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A. That is an entirely
different matter.
This Court has declared that ,hile lo,er courts should observe a becomin& modesty in e'aminin&
constitutional 0uestions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolvin& the same ,henever
,arranted, sub2ect only to revie, by the hi&hest tribunal.
*
.e have 2urisdiction under the
Constitution to revie,, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the la, or rules of
court may provide, final 2ud&ments and orders of lo,er courts in, amon& others, all cases involvin&
the constitutionality of certain measures.
7
This simply means that the resolution of such cases may
be made in the first instance by these lo,er courts.
And ,hile it is true that la,s are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any
means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. %ndeed, if there be a clear sho,in& of their invalidity,
and of the need to declare them so, then ,ill be the time to ma"e the hammer fall, and heavily,
8
to
recall ;ustice 7aurelCs trenchant ,arnin&. !tated other,ise, courts should not follo, the path of least
resistance by simply presumin& the constitutionality of a la, ,hen it is 0uestioned. (n the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasin& another distin&uished
2urist,
9
and so heal the ,ound or e'cise the affliction.
;udicial po,er authoriAes this1 and ,hen the e'ercise is demanded, there should be no shir"in& of
the tas" for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition
un,orthy of the bench, especially this Court.
The challen&ed measure is denominated an e'ecutive order but it is really presidential decree,
promul&atin& a ne, rule instead of merely implementin& an e'istin& la,. %t ,as issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of ta"in& care that the la,s ,ere faithfully e'ecuted but in the e'ercise of
his le&islative authority under Amendment No. ). %t ,as provided thereunder that ,henever in his
2ud&ment there e'isted a &rave emer&ency or a threat or imminence thereof or ,henever the
le&islature failed or ,as unable to act ade0uately on any matter that in his 2ud&ment re0uired
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the e'i&ency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that ,ere to have the force and effect of la,. As there is no sho,in& of any e'i&ency to
2ustify the e'ercise of that e'traordinary po,er then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to 0uestion
the validity of the e'ecutive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the &rounds ,as
supposed to have been made by the President in his 2ud&ment, a phrase that ,ill lead to
protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, ,e reserve resolution of this matter until a
more appropriate occasion. 3or the nonce, ,e confine ourselves to the more fundamental 0uestion
of due process.
%t is part of the art of constitution+ma"in& that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and
unmista"able lan&ua&e to avoid controversies that mi&ht arise on their correct interpretation. That is
the %deal. %n the case of the due process clause, ho,ever, this rule ,as deliberately not follo,ed and
the ,ordin& ,as purposely "ept ambi&uous. %n fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly ,as
submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 5=<?, but it ,as re2ected by 4ele&ate ;ose P. 7aurel,
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Ri&hts, ,ho forcefully ar&ued a&ainst it. /e ,as sustained
by the body. 10
The due process clause ,as "ept intentionally va&ue so it ,ould remain also conveniently resilient.
This ,as felt necessary because due process is not, li"e some provisions of the fundamental la,, an
iron rule layin& do,n an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons.
3le'ibility must be the best virtue of the &uaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause ,as
meant to ma"e it adapt easily to every situation, enlar&in& or constrictin& its protection as the
chan&in& times and circumstances may re0uire.
A,are of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their o,n specific description of due process
lest they confine themselves in a le&al strait2ac"et that ,ill deprive them of the elbo, room they may
need to vary the meanin& of the clause ,henever indicated. %nstead, they have preferred to leave
the import of the protection open+ended, as it ,ere, to be &radually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and e'clusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise. 11 Thus, ;ustice 3eli'
3ran"furter of the D.!. !upreme Court, for e'ample, ,ould &o no farther than to define due process
# and in so doin& sums it all up # as nothin& more and nothin& less than the embodiment of the
sportin& %dea of fair play. 12
.hen the barons of En&land e'tracted from their soverei&n lie&e the reluctant promise that that
Cro,n ,ould thenceforth not proceed a&ainst the life liberty or property of any of its sub2ects e'cept
by the la,ful 2ud&ment of his peers or the la, of the land, they thereby ,on for themselves and their
pro&eny that splendid &uaranty of fairness that is no, the hallmar" of the free society. The solemn
vo, that Ein& ;ohn made at Runnymede in 5*56 has since then resounded throu&h the a&es, as a
rin&in& reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, ,hen confronted by the stern
visa&e of the la,, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearin& of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. %t is part of the sportin& %dea of fair play to hear
the other side before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those ,ho sit in 2ud&ment.
(bviously, one side is only one+half of the 0uestion1 the other half must also be considered if an
impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. %t is
indispensable that the t,o sides complement each other, as unto the bo, the arro,, in leadin& to
the correct rulin& after e'amination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in
its totality. A 2ud&ment based on less that this full appraisal, on the prete't that a hearin& is
unnecessary or useless, is tainted ,ith the vice of bias or intolerance or i&norance, or ,orst of all, in
repressive re&imes, the insolence of po,er.
The minimum re0uirements of due process are notice and hearin& 1) ,hich, &enerally spea"in&, may
not be dispensed ,ith because they are intended as a safe&uard a&ainst official arbitrariness. %t is a
&ratifyin& commentary on our 2udicial system that the 2urisprudence of this country is rich ,ith
applications of this &uaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of la, and the ancient rudiments of fair
play. .e have consistently declared that every person, faced by the a,esome po,er of the !tate, is
entitled to the la, of the land, ,hich 4aniel .ebster described almost t,o hundred years a&o in
the famous 4artmouth Colle&e Case, 14 as the la, ,hich hears before it condemns, ,hich proceeds
upon in0uiry and renders 2ud&ment only after trial. %t has to be so if the ri&hts of every person are to
be secured beyond the reach of officials ,ho, out of mista"en Aeal or plain arro&ance, ,ould
de&rade the due process clause into a ,orn and empty catch,ord.
This is not to say that notice and hearin& are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a
number of admitted e'ceptions. The conclusive presumption, for e'ample, bars the admission of
contrary evidence as lon& as such presumption is based on human e'perience or there is a rational
connection bet,een the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances ,hen the need for e'peditions action ,ill 2ustify omission of these re0uisites, as in the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se, li"e a mad do& on the loose, ,hich may be "illed on si&ht
because of the immediate dan&er it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Porno&raphic
materials, contaminated meat and narcotic dru&s are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sou&ht for a criminal offense may be cancelled ,ithout hearin&,
to compel his return to the country he has fled. 1* 3ilthy restaurants may be summarily padloc"ed in
the interest of the public health and ba,dy houses to protect the public morals. 17 %n such instances,
previous 2udicial hearin& may be omitted ,ithout violation of due process in vie, of the nature of the
property involved or the ur&ency of the need to protect the &eneral ,elfare from a clear and present
dan&er.
The protection of the &eneral ,elfare is the particular function of the police po,er ,hich both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police po,er is simply defined as the po,er
inherent in the !tate to re&ulate liberty and property for the promotion of the &eneral ,elfare. 18 By
reason of its function, it e'tends to all the &reat public needs and is described as the most pervasive,
the least limitable and the most demandin& of the three inherent po,ers of the !tate, far outpacin&
ta'ation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police
po,er, ,hich affects him even before he is born and follo,s him still after he is dead # from the
,omb to beyond the tomb # in practically everythin& he does or o,ns. %ts reach is virtually limitless.
%t is a ubi0uitous and often un,elcome intrusion. Even so, as lon& as the activity or the property has
some relevance to the public ,elfare, its re&ulation under the police po,er is not only proper but
necessary. And the 2ustification is found in the venerable 7atin ma'ims, Salus populi est suprema
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, ,hich call for the subordination of individual interests to
the benefit of the &reater number.
%t is this po,er that is no, invo"ed by the &overnment to 2ustify E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A,
amendin& the basic rule in E'ecutive (rder No. )*), prohibitin& the slau&hter of carabaos e'cept
under certain conditions. The ori&inal measure ,as issued for the reason, as e'pressed in one of its
.hereases, that present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers ,ho rely on them for ener&y needs. .e affirm at the outset the need
for such a measure. %n the face of the ,orsenin& ener&y crisis and the increased dependence of our
farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the &overnment ,ould have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not ta"en steps to protect and preserve them.
A similar prohibition ,as challen&ed in United States v. Toribio, 19 ,here a la, re&ulatin& the
re&istration, brandin& and slau&hter of lar&e cattle ,as claimed to be a deprivation of property
,ithout due process of la,. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for havin& slau&htered
his o,n carabao ,ithout the re0uired permit, and he appealed to the !upreme Court. The conviction
,as affirmed. The la, ,as sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate "illin&
of carabaos, ,hich ,ere then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stric"en many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in a&ricultural output,
,hich in turn had caused an incipient famine. 3urthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals
and the conse0uent increase in their price, cattle+rustlin& had spread alarmin&ly, necessitatin& more
effective measures for the re&istration and brandin& of these animals. The Court held that the
0uestioned statute ,as a valid e'ercise of the police po,er and declared in part as follo,s-
To 2ustify the !tate in thus interposin& its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public &enerally, as distin&uished from those of
a particular class, re0uire such interference1 and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. ...
3rom ,hat has been said, ,e thin" it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of
the statute under consideration ,as re0uired by the interests of the public &enerally,
as distin&uished from those of a particular class and that the prohibition of the
slau&hter of carabaos for human consumption, so lon& as these animals are fit for
a&ricultural ,or" or draft purposes ,as a reasonably necessary limitation on private
o,nership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by
their slau&hter by improvident o,ners, tempted either by &reed of momentary &ain,
or by a desire to en2oy the lu'ury of animal food, even ,hen by so doin& the
productive po,er of the community may be measurably and dan&erously affected.
%n the li&ht of the tests mentioned above, ,e hold ,ith the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor
manCs tractor, so to spea", has a direct relevance to the public ,elfare and so is a la,ful sub2ect of
E'ecutive (rder No. )*). The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for
the purpose sou&ht to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, a&ain follo,in& the
above+cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by bannin& the slau&hter of these animals e'cept ,here
they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the e'ecutive order ,ill be conservin& those still fit for farm ,or" or breedin& and
preventin& their improvident depletion.
But ,hile concedin& that the amendatory measure has the same la,ful sub2ect as the ori&inal
e'ecutive order, ,e cannot say ,ith e0ual certainty that it complies ,ith the second
re0uirement, viz., that there be a la,ful method. .e note that to stren&then the ori&inal measure,
E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughter of the carabaos but on
their movement, providin& that no carabao re&ardless of a&e, se', physical condition or purpose
8sic: and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The ob2ect of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection bet,een the means employed and the purpose
sou&ht to be achieved by the 0uestioned measure is missin&
.e do not see ho, the prohibition of the inter+provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slau&hter, considerin& that they can be "illed any,here, ,ith no less difficulty in one
province than in another. (bviously, retainin& the carabaos in one province ,ill not prevent their
slau&hter there, any more than movin& them to another province ,ill ma"e it easier to "ill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as other,ise, so says e'ecutive order, it
could be easily circumvented by simply "illin& the animal. Perhaps so. /o,ever, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of preventin& their slau&hter cannot be prohibited, it should follo,
that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation bet,een the means and the end ,ere to be assumed, ,e ,ould still
have to rec"on ,ith the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty
is outri&ht confiscation of the carabao or carabeef bein& transported, to be meted out by the
e'ecutive authorities, usually the police only. %n the Toribio Case, the statute ,as sustained because
the penalty prescribed ,as fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Dnder the challen&ed measure, si&nificantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property bein& transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the &overnment.
%n the instant case, the carabaos ,ere arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, ,ere
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and &iven
a supersedeas bond of P5*,@@@.@@, ,hich ,as ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos ,hen ordered by the trial court. The e'ecutive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, ,hich ,as carried out forthri&ht. The measure
struc" at once and pounced upon the petitioner ,ithout &ivin& him a chance to be heard, thus
denyin& him the centuries+old &uaranty of elementary fair play.
%t has already been remar"ed that there are occasions ,hen notice and hearin& may be validly
dispensed ,ith not,ithstandin& the usual re0uirement for these minimum &uarantees of due
process. %t is also conceded that summary action may be validly ta"en in administrative proceedin&s
as procedural due process is not necessarily 2udicial only.
20
%n the e'ceptional cases accepted,
ho,ever. there is a 2ustification for the omission of the ri&ht to a previous hearin&, to ,it,
the immediac of the problem sou&ht to be corrected and the urgenc of the need to correct it.
%n the case before us, there ,as no such pressure of time or action callin& for the petitionerCs
peremptory treatment. The properties involved ,ere not even inimical per se as to re0uire their
instant destruction. There certainly ,as no reason ,hy the offense prohibited by the e'ecutive order
should not have been proved first in a court of 2ustice, ,ith the accused bein& accorded all the ri&hts
safe&uarded to him under the Constitution. Considerin& that, as ,e held in Pesigan v.
Angeles,
21
E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of 2ustice, ,hich alone ,ould have had the authority
to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.
.e also mar", on top of all this, the 0uestionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated
property as prescribed in the 0uestioned e'ecutive order. %t is there authoriAed that the seiAed
property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman
of the National Meat %nspection Commissionma see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deservin&
farmers throu&h dispersal as the 4irector of Animal %ndustryma see fit, in the case of carabaos.
8Emphasis supplied.: The phrase !ma see fit! is an e'tremely &enerous and dan&erous condition, if
condition it is. %t is laden ,ith perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption.
(ne searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable &uidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the said officers must observe ,hen they ma"e their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. .ho shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their &enerosity and by
,hat criteria shall they be chosenF (nly the officers named can supply the ans,er, they and they
alone may choose the &rantee as they see fit, and in their o,n e'clusive discretion. 4efinitely, there
is here a rovin& commission, a ,ide and s,eepin& authority that is not canaliAed ,ithin ban"s that
"eep it from overflo,in&, in short, a clearly profli&ate and therefore invalid dele&ation of le&islative
po,ers.
To sum up then, ,e find that the challen&ed measure is an invalid e'ercise of the police po,er
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the la, and, ,orse, is unduly oppressive. 4ue process is violated because the o,ner of the
property confiscated is denied the ri&ht to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the po,er to ad2ud&e the &uilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on 2udicial functions and militates a&ainst the
doctrine of separation of po,ers. There is, finally, also an invalid dele&ation of le&islative po,ers to
the officers mentioned therein ,ho are &ranted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily ta"en. 3or these reasons, ,e hereby declare E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A
unconstitutional.
.e a&ree ,ith the respondent court, ho,ever, that the police station commander ,ho confiscated
the petitionerCs carabaos is not liable in dama&es for enforcin& the e'ecutive order in accordance
,ith its mandate. The la, ,as at that time presumptively valid, and it ,as his obli&ation, as a
member of the police, to enforce it. %t ,ould have been impertinent of him, bein& a mere subordinate
of the President, to declare the e'ecutive order unconstitutional and, on his o,n responsibility alone,
refuse to e'ecute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to 0uestion the order ,e no, annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his ri&hts as he sa, them,
this case ,ould never have reached us and the ta"in& of his property under the challen&ed measure
,ould have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. .e commend him for his spirit. .ithout the
present challen&e, the matter ,ould have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation
of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, ,ould have been perpetrated, allo,ed ,ithout protest,
and soon for&otten in the limbo of relin0uished ri&hts.
The stren&th of democracy lies not in the ri&hts it &uarantees but in the coura&e of the people to
invo"e them ,henever they are i&nored or violated. Ri&hts are but ,eapons on the ,all if, li"e
e'pensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Ri&hts, as ,eapons, must be a promise of
protection. They become truly meanin&ful, and fulfill the role assi&ned to them in the free society, if
they are "ept bri&ht and sharp ,ith use by those ,ho are not afraid to assert them.
./ERE3(RE, E'ecutive (rder No. )*)+A is hereby declared unconstitutional. E'cept as affirmed
above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
!( (R4ERE4.
Teehan"ee, #.$., %ap, &ernan, 'arvasa, Gutierrez, $r., Paras, Gancaco, Padilla (idin Sarmiento
and #ortes, $$., concur.
)elencio*+errera and &eliciano, $$., are on leave.
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners'''' 6 !r!"!os #ere on$is!te% "& t'e (o)ie $or '!vin* "een tr!ns(orte% $ro+ ,!s"!te to
I)oi)o in vio)!tion o$ -. 6/60A. 1e "ro2*'t !n !tion $or re()evin, '!))en*in* t'e onsit2tion!)it& o$ t'e -..
3'e tri!) o2rt s2st!ine% t'e on$is!tion o$ t'e !ni+!)s !n% %e)ine% to r2)e on t'e v!)i%it& o$ t'e )!# on t'e
*ro2n% t'!t it )!4e% !2t'orit& to %o so. Its %eision #!s !$$ir+e% "& t'e IAC. 1ene t'is (etition $or revie#.
1-56: (1) 7n%er t'e (rovision *r!ntin* t'e SC 82ris%ition to 9revie#, revise, reverse, +o%i$& or !$$ir+ on
!((e!) or ertior!ri, a+ ,h- .a/ or r0.-+ o1 co0r, 2a3 4ro56%- 16$a. 70%82-$,+ o1 .o/-r co0r,+9 6$ a.. ca+-+
6$5o.56$8 ,h- co$+,6,0,6o$a.6,3 o1 c-r,a6$ 2-a+0r-+, .o/-r co0r,+ ca$ 4a++ 04o$ ,h- 5a.6%6,3 o1 a +,a,0,- 6$ ,h-
16r+, 6$+,a$c-. 8*: There is no doubt that by bannin& the slau&hter of these animals 8e'cept ,here there at least B
yrs. old if male and 55 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit: the E( ,ill be conservin& those
still fit for farm ,or" or breedin& and preventin& their improvident depletion. .e do not see, ho,ever, ho, the
prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slau&hter, considerin& that they
can be "illed any,here, ,G no less difficulty in on province than in another. (bviously, retainin& the carabao in one
province ,ill not prevent their slau&hter there, any more than movin& them to another province ,ill ma"e it easier to
"ill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as other,ise, so says the E(, it could be
easily circumsbcribed by simply "illin& the animal. Perhaps so. /o,ever, if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventin& their slau&hter cannot be prohibited, it should follo, that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.