Gilles Deleuze

An Apprenticeship in Philosophy
Michael Hardt
-iii-
1993 by the Regents of the University of Minnesota
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-iv-
Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Introduction: Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism ix
Preliminar !emark "he #arl Deleuze: $ome %ethodological
Princi&les xvii
Cha&ter '( )ergsonian *ntolog: "he Positive %ovement of
)eing '
Cha&ter +( ,ietzschean #thics: From #fficient Power to an
#thics of Affirmation +-
-v-
9)7 1he eing of eco*ing' 1he /thical "ynthesis of the /fficient .ill
9)0 1he 1otal Criti<!e as the %o!ndation of eing
Re*ar4' 1he /nd of =ele!#e>s Anti-Hegelianis*
9)8 Pathos and ?oy' 1o-ard a Practice of Affir*ative eing
Cha&ter .: $&inozian Practice: Affirmation and /o 0-
$&eculation
3)1 "!bstance and the Real =istinction' "ing!larity
3)9 /@pressive Attrib!tes and the %or*al =istinction' Univocity
Re*ar4' Antological "pec!lation
3)3 1he Po-ers of eing
*ntological #x&ression
3): 1he 5nterpretation of the Attrib!tes' Proble*s of a Materialist Antology
Re*ar4' "pec!lative Prod!ction and 1heoretical Practice
3)7 Co*batting the Privileges of 1ho!ght
Re*ar4' %ro* %orsch!ng to =arstell!ng
Power
3)0 1he 1r!e and the Ade<!ate
3)8 .hat a ody Can =o
Practice
3)6 Co**on &otions' 1he Asse*blages of Co*posable eing
3)9 1he Constit!tion of Reason
Re*ar4' 1heoretical Practice and Practical Constit!tion
3)1B 1he Art of Argani#ation' 1o-ard a Political Asse*blage
Cha&ter 1: Conclusion: An A&&renticeshi& in Philoso&h ''+
:)1 Antology
:)9 Affir*ation
:)3 Practice
:): Constit!tion
,otes '+.
2orks Cited '..
Index '.3
-vi-
Acknowledgments
5 -o!ld li4e to ac4no-ledge$ -ith respect and affection$ t-o of *y teachers$ Charles
Altieri and Antonio &egri)
-vii-
Introduction
Hegel and the Foundations of Poststructuralism
Continental poststr!ct!ralis* has proble*ati#ed the fo!ndations of philosophical and
political tho!ght) Perhaps da##led by the i*pact of this theoretical r!pt!re$ diverse
A*erican a!thors have e*braced this *ove*ent as the ina!g!ration of a
postphilosophical c!lt!re -here philosophical clai*s and political C!dg*ents ad*it no
C!stification and rest on no fo!ndation) 1his proble*atic$ ho-ever$ settles too easily into
a ne- opposition that obsc!res the real possibilities afforded by conte*porary
Continental theory) At the hands of both its s!pporters and its detractors$
poststr!ct!ralis* has been incorporated into a series of Anglo-A*erican debates-bet-een
*odernists and post*odernists$ bet-een co**!nitarians and liberals-in s!ch a -ay as to
*isdirect and bl!nt its force) 1he i*portance of poststr!ct!ralis* cannot be capt!red by
posing a ne- series of oppositions$ b!t only by recogni#ing the n!ances and alternatives
it proposes -ithin *odernity$ -ithin the philosophical tradition$ -ithin the conte*porary
field of social practices) 5f -e loo4 closely at the historical develop*ent of
poststr!ct!ralist tho!ght$ at the co*ple@ social and theoretical press!res it enco!ntered
and the tools it constr!cted to face the*$ -e can recapt!re so*e of its critical and
constr!ctive po-ers) Poststr!ct!ralis*$ -e find$ is not oriented si*ply to-ard the
negation of theoretical fo!ndations$ b!t rather to-ard the e@ploration of ne- gro!nds for
philosophical and political in<!iryD it is involved not si*ply in the reCection of the
tradition of political and philosophical disco!rse$ b!t *ore i*portantly in the
-i@-
artic!lation and affir*ation of alternative lineages that arise fro* -ithin the tradition
itself)
1he roots of poststr!ct!ralis* and its !nifying basis lie$ in large part$ in a general
opposition not to the philosophical tradition tout court b!t specifically to the Hegelian
tradition) %or the generation of Continental thin4ers that ca*e to *at!rity in the 190Bs$
Hegel -as the fig!re of order and a!thority that served as the foc!s of antagonis*)
=ele!#e spea4s for his entire cohort' E.hat 5 detested above all -as Hegelianis* and the
dialecticF 2E+ettre G Michel CressoleF 11B3) 5n order to appreciate this antagonis*$
ho-ever$ -e *!st reali#e that$ in the do*ain of Continental theory d!ring this period$
Hegel -as !bi<!ito!s) As a res!lt of infl!ential interpretations by theorists as diverse as
HoCIve$ ,ra*sci$ "artre$ and obbio$ Hegel had co*e to do*inate the theoretical
hori#on as the inel!ctable centerpiece of philosophical spec!lation$ social theory$ and
political practice) 5n 1906$ it appeared to %ranJois ChKtelet that every philosopher had to
begin -ith Hegel' ELHegelM deter*ined a hori#on$ a lang!age$ a code that -e are still at
the very heart of today) Hegel$ by this fact$ is our Plato' the one -ho deli*its-
ideologically or scientifically$ positively or negatively-the theoretical possibilities of
theoryF 2Hegel 93) Any acco!nt of Continental poststr!ct!ralis* *!st ta4e this
fra*e-or4 of generali#ed Hegelianis* as its point of depart!re)
1he first proble* of poststr!ct!ralis*$ then$ is ho- to evade a Hegelian fo!ndation) 5n
order to !nderstand the e@tent of this proble*$ ho-ever$ -e have to recogni#e the serio!s
restrictions facing s!ch a proCect in the specific social and historical conte@t) ChKtelet
arg!es$ in c!rio!sly dialectical fashion$ that the only viable proCect to co!nter
Hegelianis* is to *a4e Hegel the negative fo!ndation of philosophy) 1hose -ho neglect
the initial step of addressing and actively reCecting Hegel$ he clai*s$ those -ho atte*pt
si*ply to t!rn their bac4s on Hegel$ r!n the ris4 of ending !p as *ere repetitions of the
Hegelian proble*atic) ECertainly$ there are *any conte*porary philosophical proCects
that ignore Hegelianis*N) 1hey are dealing -ith the false *eaning of absol!te
beginnings$ and$ *oreover$ they deprive the*selves of a good point of s!pport) 5t is
better-li4e Mar@ and &iet#sche-to begin -ith Hegel than to end !p -ith hi*F 2:3)
Hegelianis* -as s!ch a po-erf!l vorte@ that in atte*pting to ignore it one -o!ld
inevitably be s!c4ed in by its po-er) Anly anti-Hegelianis* provided the negative point
of s!pport necessary for a post-Hegelian or even a non-Hegelian proCect)
%ro* this point of vie-$ the early -or4s of ,illes =ele!#e are e@e*plary of the entire
generation of poststr!ct!ralist thin4ers) 5n his early investigations into the history of
philosophy -e can see an intense concentration of the generali#ed anti-Hegelianis* of
the ti*e) =ele!#e atte*pted to confront Hegel
-@-
and dialectical tho!ght head-on$ as ChKtelet said one *!st$ -ith a rigoro!s philosophical
ref!tationD he engaged Hegelianis* not in order to salvage its -orth-hile ele*ents$ not
to e@tract Ethe rational 4ernel fro* the *ystical shell$ F b!t rather to artic!late a total
criti<!e and a reCection of the negative dialectical fra*e-or4 so as to achieve a real
a!tono*y$ a theoretical separation fro* the entire Hegelian proble*atic) 1he
philosophers that =ele!#e selects as partisans in this str!ggle 2ergson$ &iet#sche$ and
"pino#a3 appear to allo- hi* s!ccessive steps to-ard the reali#ation of this proCect)
Many recent critics of %rench poststr!ct!ralis*$ ho-ever$ have charged that the
poststr!ct!ralists did not !nderstand Hegel and$ -ith a facile anti-Hegelianis*$ *issed
the *ost po-erf!l thr!st of his tho!ght)
1
=ele!#e is the *ost i*portant e@a*ple to
consider in this regard beca!se he *o!nts the *ost foc!sed and precise attac4 on
Hegelianis*) &onetheless$ perhaps since this c!lt!ral and philosophical paradig* -as so
tenacio!s$ the atte*pted deracination fro* the Hegelian terrain is not i**ediately
s!ccessf!l) .e find that =ele!#e often poses his proCect not only in the traditional
lang!age of Hegelianis* b!t also in ter*s of typical Hegelian proble*s-the
deter*ination of being$ the !nity of the Ane and the M!ltiple$ and so on) Parado@ically$
in his effort to establish Hegel as a negative fo!ndation for his tho!ght$ =ele!#e *ay
appear to be very Hegelian)
5f Hegelianis* is the first proble* of poststr!ct!ralis*$ then$ anti-Hegelianis* <!ic4ly
presents itself as the second) 5n *any respects$ Hegelianis* is the *ost diffic!lt of
adversaries beca!se it possesses s!ch an e@traordinary capacity to rec!perate opposition)
Many Anglo-A*erican a!thors$ see4ing to disco!nt the r!pt!re of Continental
poststr!ct!ralis*$ have rightly e*phasi#ed this dile**a) ?!dith !tler presents the
challenge for anti-Hegelians in very clear ter*s' EReferences to a >brea4> -ith Hegel are
al*ost al-ays i*possible$ if only beca!se Hegel has *ade the very notion of >brea4ing
-ith> into the central tenet of his dialecticF 2Subjects of Desire 16:3) 5t *ay see*$ then$
fro* this perspective$ that to be anti-Hegelian$ thro!gh a dialectical t-ist$ beco*es a
position *ore Hegelian than everD in effect$ one *ight clai* that the effort to be an
EotherF to Hegel can al-ays be folded into an EotherF -ithin Hegel) 1here is in fact a
gro-ing literat!re that e@tends this line of arg!*ent$ clai*ing that the -or4 of
conte*porary anti-Hegelians consists *erely in !nconscio!s repetitions of Hegelian
dra*as -itho!t the po-er of the Hegelian s!bCect and the rigor and clarity of the
Hegelian logic)
9

1he proble* of rec!peration that faces the anti-Hegelian fo!ndation of poststr!ct!ralis*
offers a second and *ore i*portant e@planation for o!r selection of =ele!#e in this st!dy
Altho!gh n!*ero!s a!thors have *ade i*portant contrib!tions to o!r criti<!e of Hegel$
=ele!#e has gone the f!rthest in e@tricating hi*self fro* the proble*s of anti-
Hegelianis* and constr!cting
-@i-
an alternative terrain for tho!ght-no longer post-Hegelian b!t rather separate fro* the
proble* of Hegel) 5f o!r first reason for proposing =ele!#e as an e@e*plary
poststr!ct!ralist thin4er -as that he is representative of the antagonis* to Hegelianis*$
o!r second is that he is ano*alo!s in his e@tension of that proCect a-ay fro* Hegel
to-ard a separate$ alternative terrain) 1here are t-o central ele*ents of this passage that
=ele!#e develops in different registers and on different planes of tho!ght' a
nondialectical conception of negation and a constit!tive theory of practice) .e cannot
!nderstand these ele*ents$ 5 repeat$ if -e *erely oppose the* to Hegelian conceptions of
negation and practice) .e *!st recogni#e their n!ances and pose the* on an alternative
plane) 1hese t-o the*es$ then$ negation and practice$ !nderstood -ith their ne- for*s$
co*prise the fo!ndation of the ne- terrain that post-str!ct!ralis* has to offer for
philosophical and political tho!ght$ a terrain for conte*porary research)
+et !s briefly e@a*ine the general o!tlines of these t-o central ele*ents of =ele!#e>s
proCect) 1he concept of negation that lies at the center of dialectical tho!ght see*s to
pose the *ost serio!s challenge for any theory that clai*s to be anti- or post-Hegelian)
E&ondialectical difference$ F ?!dith !tler -rites$ Edespite its vario!s for*s$ is the labor
of the negative -hich has lost its >*agic>F 216:3) 1he nondialectical concept of negation
that -e find in =ele!#e>s total criti<!e certainly contains none of the *agical effect of the
dialectic) 1he dialectical negation is al-ays directed to-ard the *iracle of res!rrection' 5t
is a negation E-hich s!persedes in s!ch a -ay as to preserve and *aintain -hat is
s!perseded$ and conse<!ently s!rvives its o-n s!persessionF 2Phenomenology of Spirit
O1663) &ondialectical negation is *ore si*ple and *ore absol!te) .ith no faith in the
beyond$ in the event!al res!rrection$ negation beco*es an e@tre*e *o*ent of nihilis*'
5n Hegelian ter*s$ it points to the death of the other) Hegel considers this p!re death$ Ethe
absol!te +ord$ F *erely an abstract conception of negationD in the conte*porary -orld$
ho-ever$ the absol!te character of negation has beco*e dreadf!lly concrete$ and the
*agical res!rrection i*plicit in the dialectical negation appears *erely as s!perstition)
&ondialectical negation is absol!te not in the sense that everything present is negated b!t
in that -hat is negated is attac4ed -ith f!ll$ !nrestrained force) An the one hand$ a!thors
li4e =ele!#e propose this nondialectical concept of negation not in the pro*otion of
nihilis*$ b!t *erely as the recognition of an ele*ent of o!r -orld) .e can sit!ate this
theoretical position in relation to the field of En!clear criticis*$ F b!t not in the sense that
n!clear -eapons pose the threat of negation$ not in the sense that they pose the !niversal
fear of death' 1his is *erely the Estanding negationF of a Hegelian fra*e-or4$ preserving
the given order) 1he negation of the bo*b is nondialectical in its act!ality$ not in the
planning
-@ii-
roo*s of .ashington b!t in the streets of Hiroshi*a$ as an agent of total destr!ction)
1here is nothing positive in the nondialectical negation$ no *agical res!rrection' 5t is
p!re) An the other hand$ -ith an eye to-ard the philosophical tradition$ -e can locate this
radical conception of negation in the *ethodological proposals of certain "cholastic
a!thors s!ch as Roger acon) 1he p!re negation is the first *o*ent of a precritical
conception of criti<!e' pars destruens, pars construens) 1he i*portant characteristics are
the p!rity and a!tono*y of the t-o critical *o*ents) &egation clears the terrain for
creationD it is a bipartite se<!ence that precl!des any third$ synthetic *o*ent) 1h!s -e
can at least gest!re to-ard solid gro!nds for this radical$ nondialectical negation' 5t is as
ne- as the destr!ctive force of conte*porary -arfare and as old as the precritical
s4epticis* of the "cholastics)
1he radicality of negation forces =ele!#e to engage <!estions of the lo-est order$
<!estions of the nat!re of being) =ele!#e>s total criti<!e involves a destr!ction so
absol!te that it beco*es necessary to <!estion -hat *a4es reality possible) .e sho!ld
e*phasi#e that$ on one hand$ the reCection of Hegelian ontology does not lead =ele!#e to
so*e for* of deontological tho!ght) Altho!gh he denies any preconstit!ted str!ct!re of
being or any ideological order of e@istence$ =ele!#e still operates on the highest planes of
ontological spec!lation) Ance again$ to reCect Hegelian ontology is not to reCect ontology
tout court) =ele!#e insists instead on alternatives -ithin the ontological tradition) An the
other hand$ ho-ever$ -e sho!ld be caref!l fro* the o!tset to disting!ish this fro* a
Heideggerian ret!rn to ontology$ *ost i*portantly beca!se =ele!#e -ill only accept
Es!perficialF responses to the <!estion E.hat *a4es being possiblePF 5n other -ords$ he
li*its !s to a strictly i**anent and *aterialist ontological disco!rse that ref!ses any
deep or hidden fo!ndation of being) 1here is nothing veiled or negative abo!t =ele!#e>s
beingD it is f!lly e@pressed in the -orld) eing$ in this sense$ is s!perficial$ positive$ and
f!ll) =ele!#e ref!ses any Eintellect!alistF acco!nt of being$ any acco!nt that in any -ay
s!bordinates being to tho!ght$ that poses thin4ing as the s!pre*e for* of being)
3
1here
are n!*ero!s contrib!tions to this proCect of a *aterialist ontology thro!gho!t the history
of philosophy-s!ch as "pino#a$ Mar@$ &iet#sche$ and +!creti!s-and -e -ill refer to the*
in o!r disc!ssion to provide ill!strative points of reference) .e -ill foc!s$ ho-ever$ on
=ele!#e>s constit!tive conception of practice as a fo!ndation of ontology) 1he radical
negation of the nondialectical pars destruens e*phasi#es that no preconstit!ted order is
available to define the organi#ation of being) Practice provides the ter*s for a *aterial
pars construens; practice is -hat *a4es the constit!tion of being possible) 1he
investigation of the nat!re of po-er allo-s =ele!#e to bring s!bstance to the *aterialist
disco!rse and
-@iii-
to raise the theory of practice to the level of ontology) 1he fo!ndation of being$ then$
resides both on a corporeal and on a *ental plane$ in the co*ple@ dyna*ics of behavior$
in the s!perficial interactions of bodies) 1his is not an Alth!sserian Etheoretical practice$
F b!t rather a *ore practical conception of practice$ a!tono*o!s of any Etheoricist
tendency$ F a Epractical practiceF that is oriented principally to-ard the ontological rather
than the episte*ological real*) 1he only nat!re available to ontological disco!rse is an
absol!tely artificial conception of nat!re$ a hybrid nat!re$ a nat!re prod!ced in practice-
f!rther re*oved than a second nat!re$ an nth nat!re) 1his approach to ontology is as ne-
as the infinitely plastic !niverse of cyborgs and as old as the tradition of *aterialist
philosophy) .hat -ill be i*portant thro!gho!t o!r disc!ssion is that the traditionally
f!nda*ental ter*s-s!ch as necessity$ reason$ nat!re$ and being-tho!gh sha4en fro* their
transcendental fi@ity$ still serve as a fo!ndation beca!se they ac<!ire a certain
consistency and s!bstance in o!r -orld) eing$ no- historici#ed and *ateriali#ed$ is
deli*ited by the o!ter bo!nds of the conte*porary i*agination$ of the conte*porary
field of practice)
5 elaborate these conceptions of nondialectical negation and constit!tive practice in
=ele!#e>s -or4 by reading the evol!tion of his tho!ght$ that is$ by follo-ing the
progression of critical <!estions that g!ide his investigations d!ring s!ccessive periods)
1he evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght !nfolds as he directs his attention se<!entially to a
series of a!thors in the philosophical canon and poses the* each a specific <!estion) His
-or4 on ergson offers a criti<!e of negative ontology and proposes in its stead an
absol!tely positive *ove*ent of being that rests on an efficient and internal notion of
ca!sality) 1o the negative *ove*ent of deter*ination$ he opposes the positive *ove*ent
of differentiationD to the dialectical !nity of the Ane and the M!ltiple$ he opposes the
irred!cible *!ltiplicity of beco*ing) 1he <!estion of the organi#ation or the constit!tion
of the -orld$ ho-ever$ of the being of beco*ing$ p!shes =ele!#e to pose these
ontological iss!es in ethical ter*s) &iet#sche allo-s hi* to transpose the res!lts of
ontological spec!lation to an ethical hori#on$ to the field of forces$ of sense and val!e$
-here the positive *ove*ent of being beco*es the affir*ation of being) 1he the*atic of
po-er in &iet#sche provides the theoretical passage that lin4s ergsonian ontology to an
ethics of active e@pression) "pino#a covers this sa*e passage and e@tends it to practice)
?!st as &iet#sche poses the affir*ation of spec!lation$ "pino#a poses the affir*ation of
practice$ or Coy$ at the center of ontology) =ele!#e arg!es that "pino#a>s is an ontological
conception of practiceD "pino#a conceives practice$ that is$ as constit!tive of being) 5n the
precritical -orld of "pino#a>s practical philosophy$ =ele!#e>s tho!ght finally discovers a
real a!tono*y fro* the Hegelian proble*atic)
-@iv-
Ane lesson to be learned fro* this philosophical proCect is to highlight the n!ances that
define an antagonis*) Ance -e stop clo!ding the iss!e -ith cr!de oppositions and
recogni#e instead the specificity of an antagonis*$ -e can begin to bring o!t finer
n!ances in o!r ter*inology) %or e@a*ple$ -hen 5 pose the <!estion of the foundations of
poststr!ct!ralist tho!ght 5 *ean to contest the clai* that this tho!ght is properly
characteri#ed as antifo!ndationalis*) 1o pose the iss!e as an e@cl!sive opposition is$ in
effect$ to credit the ene*y -ith too *!ch force$ -ith too *!ch theoretical terrain)
Poststr!ct!ralis* does criti<!e a certain notion of fo!ndation$ b!t only to affir* another
notion that is *ore ade<!ate to its ends) Against a transcendental fo!ndation -e find an
i**anent oneD against a given$ teleological fo!ndation -e find a *aterial$ open one)
:
A
si*ilar n!ance *!st be *ade in o!r disc!ssion of ca!sality) .hen -e loo4 closely at
=ele!#e>s criti<!e of ca!sality -e find not only a po-erf!l reCection of the final ca!se and
the for*al ca!se$ b!t also an e<!ally po-erf!l affir*ation of the efficient ca!se as central
to his philosophical proCect) =ele!#e>s ontology dra-s on the tradition of ca!sal
arg!*ents and develops notions of both being>s Eprod!ctivityF and its Eprod!cibility$ F
that is$ of its aptit!des to prod!ce and to be prod!ced) 5 -ill arg!e that efficient ca!sality$
in fact$ provides a 4ey to a coherent acco!nt of =ele!#e>s entire disco!rse on difference)
1he n!ances in the !se of Efo!ndationF and Eca!salityF are perhaps best s!**ari#ed by
the distinction bet-een order and organi#ation) y the order of being$ of tr!th$ or of
society 5 intend the str!ct!re i*posed as necessary and eternal fro* above$ fro* o!tside
the *aterial scene of forcesD 5 !se organi#ation$ on the other hand$ to designate the
coordination and acc!*!lation of accidental 2in the philosophical sense$ i)e)$
nonnecessary3 enco!nters and develop*ents fro* belo-$ fro* -ithin the i**anent field
of forces) 5n other -ords$ 5 do not conceive of organi#ation as a bl!eprint of develop*ent
or as the proCected vision of an avant-garde$ b!t rather as an i**anent creation or
co*position of a relationship of consistency and coordination) 5n this sense$ organi#ation$
the co*position of creative forces$ is al-ays an art)
1hro!gho!t this st!dy -e -ill enco!nter !nresolved proble*s and propositions that are
po-erf!lly s!ggestive b!t perhaps not clearly and rigoro!sly deli*ited) .e do not loo4
to =ele!#e here$ ho-ever$ si*ply to find the sol!tions to conte*porary theoretical
proble*s) More i*portant$ -e in<!ire into his tho!ght in order to investigate the
proposals of a ne- proble*atic for research after the poststr!ct!ralist r!pt!re$ to test o!r
footing on a terrain -here ne- gro!nds of philosophical and political tho!ght are
possible) .hat -e as4 of =ele!#e$ above all$ is to teach !s the conte*porary possibilities
of philosophy)
-@v-
Preliminar !emark
"he #arl Deleuze: $ome %ethodological Princi&les
5n the 5ntrod!ction to Instincts et institutions, a collection of te@ts edited by =ele!#e in
1973$ -e see the general o!tlines of a philosophical and political proCect beginning to
ta4e shape as a theory of the instit!tion) EContrary to the theories of la- that p!t the
positive o!tside of the social 2nat!ral rights3 and the social in the negative 2contract!al
li*itation3$ the theory of the instit!tion p!ts the negative o!tside of the social 2needs3 in
order to present society as essentially positive and inventive 2original *eans of
satisfaction3F 2i@3) 1his sche*atic presentation of a theory of the instit!tion already gives
!s t-o f!nda*ental ele*ents of =ele!#e>s proCect' 5t designates the attac4 on Ethe
negativeF as a political tas4 and it poses the central prod!ctive obCect of philosophy as the
constr!ction of a p!rely positive$ inventive society) .e can already recogni#e latent here
a po-erf!l notion of constit!tion and a s!ggestive gli*pse of a radically de*ocratic
theory) Ad*ittedly$ tho!gh$ at this early point =ele!#e>s !se of Ethe negativeF and Ethe
positiveF is rather vag!e and th!s the proposition can only provide an initial int!ition of a
proCect) Ane co!ld atte*pt to read =ele!#e>s boo4 on H!*e$ Empiricism and
Subjectivity, -ith its foc!s on association and belief$ as an early atte*pt to address
directly this politicophilosophical proCect)
1
Ho-ever$ the general develop*ent of
=ele!#e>s tho!ght does not i**ediately follo- this lineD it beco*es clear that =ele!#e
re<!ires an e@tensive ontological deto!r before arriving at this positive political proCect)
1here is not the space nor the ter*s for this constr!ctive proCect -itho!t first cond!cting
a broad destr!ctive operation) =ele!#e>s early -or4 th!s
-@vii-
al-ays ta4es the for* of a criti<!e' pars destruens, pars construens) 1hro!gho!t this
period$ the c!tting edge of =ele!#e>s tho!ght is a persistent$ i*placable siege on
Hegelianis*$ an attac4 on the negative) /ven in his very first p!blished article$ E=!
Christ G la bo!rgeoisie$ F p!blished -hen he -as only t-enty-one years old$ -e can
already recogni#e anti-Hegelianis* as a driving force of his tho!ght' .hat characteri#es
Hegel better$ after all$ than the strict contin!ity bet-een Christianity and bo!rgeois
tho!ghtP 5t is i*portant to establish and clarify the ter*s of this antagonis* fro* the
o!tset in order to gain a clear perspective on the sense and traCectory of =ele!#e>s overall
proCect) 1he vario!s mots d'ordre heralded by =ele!#e in this period-the destr!ction of
the negative$ the affir*ation of the positive-lac4 their f!ll po-er and significance -hen
they are not fir*ly gro!nded in an antagonistic engage*ent of Hegel) As =ele!#e hi*self
asserts -hile reading &iet#sche$ in order to gain an ade<!ate !nderstanding of a
philosophical proCect one *!st recogni#e against -ho* its principal concepts are directed
2iet!sche and Philosophy 6$ 1093) 1his$ then$ constit!tes o!r first *ethodological
principle for reading =ele!#e' "ecogni!e the object and the terms of the primary
antagonism)
=ele!#e>s deto!r$ tho!gh$ is not only an attac4 b!t also the establish*ent of ne- terrain'
1he early int!ition of a positive political proCect is recast by *eans of the long passage
that -e -ill follo--fro* ergson to &iet#sche and finally to "pino#a) =ele!#e re<!ires a
positive ontology in order to establish a positive theory of ethics and social organi#ation)
1his long passage thro!gh the history of .estern philosophy forges a *!ltifario!s edifice
on the highest planes of *etaphysical *editation that s!pports and infor*s the entire
breadth of =ele!#e>s -or4) Ane can certainly recogni#e$ even in the early -or4s$ a desire
to *ove a-ay fro* philosophy$ to depart fro* his training and branch o!t into other
fields' biology$ psychology$ art$ *athe*atics$ politics$ literat!re) Many read =ele!#e>s
-or4 as a reCection of .estern philosophical tho!ght and hence the proposition of a
postphilosophical or post*odern disco!rse) 5ndeed$ =ele!#e hi*self provides n!*ero!s
state*ents to s!bstantiate s!ch an interpretation)
9
Ho-ever$ -hen -e loo4 closely at his
arg!*ents$ -e find that not only is his tho!ght sat!rated -ith the .estern philosophical
tradition$ b!t even -hen his e@a*ples see* E!nphilosophicalF the coherence of his
positions and the *ode of e@planation that s!pports the* re*ain on the highest logical
and ontological planes)
3
5f$ then$ -e are to read =ele!#e>s -or4 as an attac4 or betrayal
of ele*ents of the .estern *etaphysical tradition$ -e have to !nderstand this as an
affir*ation of other ele*ents of that sa*e tradition) 5n other -ords$ -e cannot read
=ele!#e>s -or4 as tho!ght Eo!tsideF or EbeyondF the philosophical tradition$ or even as
an effective line of flight fro* that bloc4D rather -e *!st see it as the affir*ation of a
2discontin!-
-@viii-
o!s$ b!t coherent3 line of tho!ght that has re*ained s!ppressed and dor*ant$ b!t
nonetheless deeply e*bedded -ithin that sa*e tradition) =ele!#e does not anno!nce the
end of *etaphysics$ b!t on the contrary see4s to rediscover the *ost coherent and l!cid
plane of *etaphysical tho!ght)
:
5f -e -anted to insist on his reCection of a certain for*
of philosophical in<!iry$ -e -o!ld have to pose the state*ent in parado@ical for* and
say 2borro-ing a phrase fro* Alth!sser3 that =ele!#e develops Ea nonphilosophical
theory of philosophy)F 5n any case$ if in the co!rse of this st!dy o!r references to the
resonances bet-een =ele!#e>s -or4 and other positions in the philosophical tradition
see* at ti*es e@cessive$ it is precisely to e*phasi#e the properly philosophical nat!re of
his tho!ght) Here$ then$ -e have o!r second *ethodological principle' "ead Deleu!e
philosophically)
=ele!#e>s Co!rney thro!gh the history of philosophy ta4es a pec!liar for*) /ven tho!gh
=ele!#e>s *onographs serve as e@cellent introd!ctions$ they never provide a
co*prehensive s!**ary of a philosopher>s -or4D instead$ =ele!#e selects the specific
aspects of a philosopher>s tho!ght that *a4e a positive contrib!tion to his o-n proCect at
that point) As &iet#schean or as "pino#ist$ =ele!#e does not accept all of &iet#sche or all
of "pino#a) 5f a philosopher presents arg!*ents -ith -hich =ele!#e *ight find fa!lt$ he
does not criti<!e the* b!t si*ply leaves the* o!t of his disc!ssion) Might it be said$
then$ that =ele!#e is an !nfaithf!l readerP Certainly not) 5f his readings are partial$ they
are nonetheless very rigoro!s and precise$ -ith *etic!lo!s care and sensitivity to the
selected topicsD -hat =ele!#e forfeits in co*prehensiveness$ he gains in intensity of
foc!s) 5n effect$ =ele!#e>s early -or4s are Ep!nct!al interventionsF-he *a4es s!rgical
incisions in the corp!s of the history of philosophy) 1his leads !s to o!r third
*ethodological principle' "ecogni!e Deleu!e's selectivity)
5n each of the stages of this philosophical Co!rney$ =ele!#e adds a specific point that
b!ilds and depends on the previo!s res!lts) /ach of =ele!#e>s philosophical *onographs
is directed to-ard a very specific <!estion$ and vie-ed as an ense*ble the develop*ent
of these philosophical <!estions reveals the evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght) Aften$
=ele!#e>s e@planations appear inco*plete beca!se he ta4es for granted and fails to repeat
the res!lts of his previo!s research) 2%or e@a*ple$ as -e -ill see belo-$ *any of
=ele!#e>s clai*s for &iet#sche>s attac4 on the dialectic re*ain obsc!re !nless -e read
into the* a ergsonian criti<!e of a negative ontological *ove*ent)3 1herefore$
=ele!#e>s early -or4 constr!cts an odd sort of history of philosophy in -hich the
connecting lin4s depend not on act!al philosophical historiography b!t on the evol!tion
of =ele!#e>s o-n tho!ght) y evol!tion 5 do not *ean to s!ggest a !nilinear or
teleological progression$ b!t rather a sort of theoretical process of aggregation)
-@i@-
%oc!sing on this progression highlights the *ove*ent in =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ and -hat
e*erges is the process of =ele!#e>s o-n philosophical ed!cation$ his apprenticeship in
philosophy) 1he lines of this ed!cational Co!rney help e@plain the co!nterhistorical
develop*ent ergson-&iet#sche-"pino#a that g!ides =ele!#e fro* ontology to ethics
and politics)
7
Hence$ -e can posit a final *ethodological principle' "ead Deleu!e's
thought as an evolution)
.hen -e loo4 at =ele!#e>s early -or4 fro* a historical perspective$ as an evol!tion$ the
*ost stri4ing fact is that he -rote his first boo4 -hen he -as rather yo!ng 2he -as
t-enty-eight years old in 1973 -hen Empiricism and Subjectivity appeared3 and then
-aited eight years before p!blishing his ne@t boo4) /ight years *ight not see* li4e a
very long brea4 for so*e a!thors$ b!t for =ele!#e$ -ho after 1909 consistently p!blished
a boo4 each year$ eight years represents an enor*o!s gap) E5t>s li4e a hole in *y life$ an
eight-year hole) 1hat is -hat 5 find interesting in lives$ the holes they have$ the lac!nas$
so*eti*es dra*atic$ so*eti*es notN) Perhaps it is in the holes that the *ove*ent ta4es
placeF 2E"ignes et QvQne*entsF 163) 1his eight-year hole in =ele!#e>s intellect!al life
does in fact represent a period of *ove*ent$ a dra*atic reorientation of his philosophical
approach) =!ring this period$ in effect$ he shifts fro* the H!*e-ergson a@is that
characteri#es his very early -or4 to the &iet#sche-"pino#a identity that carries his -or4
to its *at!rity) 5n order to read this hole in =ele!#e>s intellect!al life$ -e *!st try to
interpret -hat this reorientation can *ean$ -hat ne- possibilities it affords =ele!#e$ and
ho- it characteri#es the evol!tion of his tho!ght)
1his foc!s on the evol!tion of =ele!#e>s philosophical ed!cation best e@plains -hy 5
have chosen in the follo-ing st!dy to deal e@cl!sively -ith his early -ritings) 5n these
-or4s =ele!#e develops a technical vocab!lary and concept!al fo!ndation that serve hi*
thro!gh the entire traCectory of his career) 1he positions of the later -or4s can appear
obsc!re$ even !ntenable$ -hen -e do not place the* in the conte@t of these early
investigations) 5ndeed$ so*e of the *ost spectac!lar innovations in -hat one *ight call
his *at!re -or4-the *aCor independent philosophical te@ts 2Diff#rence et r#p#tition and
$he %ogic of Sense3$ the collaborations -ith %Qli@ ,!attari$ the cine*a st!dies$ and the
latest -or4s-are in large part re-or4ings of the cl!ster of proble*s developed in this
for*ative period of intense and independent research) 1he profo!nd originality of
=ele!#e>s voice is perhaps d!e to the fact that d!ring these years he -as not follo-ing the
sa*e co!rse as the *aCority of his generation)
0
1his is the period of =ele!#e>s
s!bterranean research-the period in -hich he forged ne- paths$ o!tside of the li*elight
and co**onplaces of p!blic %rench c!lt!ral debates-that perhaps allo-ed hi* to s!rface
-ith s!ch a
-@@-
profo!nd i*pact later) 5f$ in fact$ as Michel %o!ca!lt s!spected$ this difference does co*e
to *ar4 o!r cent!ry$ if o!r ti*es do beco*e =ele!#ian$ this early -or4$ the s!bterranean
=ele!#e$ -ill hold the 4ey to the for*ative develop*ents that *ade this ne- paradig*
possible)
-@@i-
Cha&ter '
)ergsonian *ntolog
"he Positive %ovement of )eing
5n the -or4 of Henri ergson$ one *ight e@pect to find a psychology or a
pheno*enology of perception) 5t *ay see* strange at first$ then$ that -hat =ele!#e finds
principally is an ontology' an absol!tely positive logic of being rooted in ti*e) As -e
have noted$ tho!gh$ =ele!#e does not *ove directly to the positive proCect b!t rather
approaches first by *eans of a critical$ aggressive *o*ent' E.hat ergson essentially
reproaches his predecessors forN)F 2E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 893)
=ele!#e reads ergson as a pole*ic against the do*inant philosophical tradition$ and the
fa!lts of his predecessors are fo!nd in their *ost concentrated for* in Hegel>s logicD
ergson criti<!es several philosophical arg!*ents$ b!t behind each of these =ele!#e
finds Hegel occ!pying an e@tre*e$ e@aggerated position) =ele!#e does not clai* that a
direct antagonis* against Hegel is -hat pri*arily drives ergson>s tho!ght$ b!t his
reading of ergson contin!ally retains the attac4 on Hegel as its o-n critical edge) 5n
=ele!#e>s interpretation$ ergson does not challenge the central criteria for being
inherited fro* the ontological tradition-si*plicity$ reality$ perfection$ !nity$ *!ltiplicity$
and so on-b!t rather he foc!ses on the ontological *ove*ent that is posed to address
these criteria) E=ifferenceF is the ergsonian ter* that plays the central role in this
disc!ssion of ontological *ove*ent) .e sho!ld be especially attentive at this point$
beca!se =ele!#e>s interpretation of ergson 2for*!lated as early as 19703 stands at the
head of a long disco!rse on difference in %rench tho!ght that constit!tes a theoretical
to!chstone for poststr!ct!ral-
-1-
is*) Here -e find a partic!lar and rigoro!s !sage of the ter*) 5n =ele!#e>s reading$
ergson>s difference does not principally refer to a <!idditas or to a static contrast of
<!alities in real beingD rather$ difference *ar4s the real dyna*ic of being-it is the
*ove*ent that gr o!nds being) 1h!s$ ergson>s difference relates pri*arily to the
te*poral$ not the spatial$ di*ension of being) 1he essential tas4 that =ele!#e sets for
hi*self in the investigation of ergson>s concept of difference$ then$ is t-ofold) %irst$ he
*!st !se ergson>s criti<!e of the ontological tradition to reveal the -ea4ness of Hegel>s
dialectic and its negative logic of being$ as a false conception of difference) 1his attac4 is
directed against t-o fo!ndational *o*ents of Hegel>s logic' the deter*ination of being
and the dialectic of the Ane and the M!ltiple) "econd$ he *!st elaborate ergson>s
positive *ove*ent of being in difference and sho- ho- this *ove*ent provides a viable
alternative for ontology) 5t is precisely the aggressive *o*ent against Hegelian logic that
prepares the gro!nd for the prod!ctive *o*ent)
=ele!#e>s -or4 on ergson$ ho-ever$ presents a co*plication-and at the sa*e ti*e an
opport!nity-for st!dying the evol!tion of his tho!ght beca!se it is cond!cted in t-o
distinct periods' one in the *id-197Bs and another in the *id-190Bs) 1he *aCor res!lt of
the first period is an article titled E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergson$ F -hich
-as p!blished in %es #tudes bergsoniennes in 1970 b!t -ritten at least t-o years earlier
and presented to the EAssociation des a*ies de ergsonF in May 197:) 1his early article
is very dense and contains the *aCor points of =ele!#e>s reading of ergson) =ele!#e
p!blished t-o other ergson te@ts in this period$ b!t neither s!bstantially *odifies the
early essay) 1he first is a chapter on ergson for a collection edited by Merlea!-Ponty$
%es philosophes c#l&bres 219703$ and the second is a selection of ergson te@ts$ '#moire
et vie 219783) 1he res!lt of =ele!#e>s second period of ergson st!dy is (ergsonism,
p!blished in 1900) 1his short boo4 ta4es !p *!ch of the arg!*ent presented in the early
article b!t sho-s a change in foc!s and offers so*e very interesting additions to the
original interpretation$ additions that sho- the infl!ence of =ele!#e>s intense &iet#sche
period in the intervening years) 1hese t-o phases of ergson st!dy$ then$ provide an
e@cellent opport!nity to read the orientation of =ele!#e>s early proCect$ beca!se they
straddle not only the -or4 on &iet#sche 219093 b!t also the long p!blication gap$ the
Eeight-year holeF that$ as =ele!#e s!ggests$ *ay be a site of considerable reorientation of
the proCect)
'(' Determination and #fficient Difference
=ele!#e>s early reading of ergson is gro!nded on an attac4 against the negative process
of deter*ination) 1he specter that loo*s over this <!es1
-9-
tion thro!gho!t Modern philosophy is Hegel>s reading and criti<!e of "pino#a) Hegel
ta4es a phrase fro* one of "pino#a>s letters and$ t!rning it bac4 against "pino#a$ *a4es it
a central *a@i* of his o-n logic' EA*nis deter*inatio est negatioF 2Science of %ogic
1133)
1
1his phrase describes for Hegel the process of deter*ination and the state of
deter*inateness) 1he %ogic begins -ith p!re being in its si*ple i**ediacyD b!t this
si*ple being has no <!ality$ no difference-it is e*pty and e<!ivalent to its opposite$
nothingness) 5t is necessary that being actively negate nothingness to *ar4 its difference
fro* it) =eter*inate being s!bs!*es this opposition$ and this difference bet-een being
and nothingness at its core defines the fo!ndation of the real differences and <!alities that
constit!te its reality) &egation defines this state of deter*inateness in t-o senses' 5t is a
static contrast based on the finit!de of <!alities and a dyna*ic conflict based on the
antagonis* of differences 2see 1aylor 933-383) 5n the first sense$ deter*inateness
involves negation beca!se <!alities are li*ited and th!s contrast$ or passively negate$
-hat is other than the*selves 2in the sense that red negates green$ yello-$ etc)3) 5n the
second sense$ ho-ever$ there is an active negation that ani*ates deter*inateness$ beca!se
deter*inate things are in a ca!sal interaction -ith each other) 1he e@istence of so*ething
is the active negation of so*ething else) 1herefore$ even the state of deter*inateness is
essentially a negative movement) 1his insistence on a negative *ove*ent of
deter*ination is also the heart of Hegel>s criti<!e of "pino#a) "ince "pino#a>s being is
absol!tely positive$ in other -ords since in "pino#a p!re being does not actively negate
nothingness and does not proceed thro!gh a negative *ove*ent$ it lac4s the f!nda*ental
difference that co!ld define its real e@istence) 5n Hegel>s eyes$ "pino#a>s ontology and any
s!ch positive$ affir*ative ontology *!st re*ain abstract and indifferent) EReality as th!s
conceived Las perfection and affir*ationM is ass!*ed to s!rvive -hen all negation has
been tho!ght a-ayD b!t to do this is to do a-ay -ith all deter*inatenessF 2Science of
%ogic 1193) &egation cannot *erely be passively Etho!ght a-ay$ F Hegel *aintains$ b!t
*!st be actively engaged and really negated-this is the role of the process of
deter*ination) Conse<!ently$ finally$ inevitably$ beca!se "pino#a>s being is not held
different fro* nothingness as its opposite$ it dissolves into nothingness C!st as does
"pino#a hi*self in Hegel>s Ro*antic i*agination' E1he ca!se of his death -as
cons!*ption$ fro* -hich he had long been a s!ffererD this -as in har*ony -ith his
syste* of philosophy$ according to -hich all partic!larity and individ!ality pass a-ay in
the one s!bstanceF 2%ectures on the History of Philosophy 9783) 1his pole*ic against
"pino#a constit!tes one of Hegel>s strongest arg!*ents for the ontological *ove*ent of
negation' eing not deter*ined thro!gh negation -ill re*ain indifferent and abstract$ and
finally$ since it is not held different fro* its opposite$ it -ill fade
-3-
into nothingness) Hegel insists that if -e are to recogni#e difference$ the real difference
that characteri#es the partic!larity and individ!ality of being$ -e *!st first recogni#e the
negative *ove*ent of beingD or else$ -e *!st disappear along -ith "pino#a in
Eacos*is*$ F in the indifference of p!re$ positive ontology)
=ele!#e>s early reading of ergson see*s to accept the Hegelian for*!lation that the
deter*ination of being *!st be characteri#ed by negation) Rather than challenging that
for*!lation$ =ele!#e charges that the process of ontological deter*ination itself
!nder*ines the real gro!nding of beingD he clai*s that the difference constit!ted by the
negative *ove*ent of deter*ination is a false notion of difference) Hence$ the process of
deter*ination both destroys the s!bstantial nat!re of being and fails to grasp the
concreteness and specificity of real being) Here$ -ith the reCection of deter*ination$ -e
can recogni#e the anti-Hegelian approach of =ele!#e>s early -or4$ his reaction to the
dialectic of negation) 5n this process$ ho-ever$ =ele!#e>s critical *ethod ta4es on an
interesting for*) He does not attac4 the dialectic directly$ b!t rather he introd!ces a third
philosophical position that he locates bet-een ergson and the dialectic) =ele!#e
engages this pro@i*ate ene*y on the specific fa!lt that *ar4s its ins!fficiency$ and then
he proceeds to sho- that Hegel$ the f!nda*ental ene*y$ carries this fa!lt to its e@tre*e)
5n the ergson st!dies$ =ele!#e engages Mechanicis* and Platonis* as the pro@i*ate
ene*ies$ and in the &iet#sche st!dy he brings in Hant) 1he advantage of first addressing
these pro@i*ate ene*ies is that they provide a co**on gro!nd on -hich to -or4 o!t the
attac4 that can be s!bse<!ently e@tended to the dialectic) 5ndeed$ as =ele!#e>s tho!ght
evolves -e -ill see that he has contin!ally greater diffic!lty in finding a co**on terrain
for addressing the Hegelian position) More i*portant$ tho!gh$ this *ethod of
triang!lation sho-s !s that even in this early -or4 =ele!#e has a proble*atic relation to
opposition) 5t is clear that =ele!#e is attac4ing the dialectic as the f!nda*ental ene*y$
b!t this *ethod affords hi* an obli<!e post!re -ith regard to Hegel so that he does not
have to stand in direct opposition)
+i4e ergson$ the Mechanicists try to theori#e an e*pirical evol!tion of the differences
of being$ b!t in doing so Mechanicis* destroys the s!bstantial$ necessary <!ality of
being) =ele!#e>s ergsonian challenge to Mechanicis* ta4es the for* of a c!rio!s
proposition' 5n order for being to be necessary$ it *!st be indeter*inate) 1his disc!ssion
of ontological deter*ination t!rns on an analysis of the nat!re of difference) 1he for* of
difference proposed by the process of deter*ination$ =ele!#e arg!es$ al-ays re*ains
e@ternal to being and therefore fails to provide it -ith an essential$ necessary fo!ndation)
1hese are the ter*s =ele!#e !ses to criti<!e the si*ple deter*ination of Mechanicis*'
Eergson sho-s that vital
-:-
difference is an internal difference) !t also$ that internal difference cannot be conceived
as a si*ple determination) a deter*ination can be accidental$ at least it can only s!stain
its being thro!gh a ca!se$ an end$ or a chance Lelle ne pe!t tenir son Rtre <!e d>!ne ca!se$
d>!ne fin o! d>!n hasardM$ and it therefore i*plies a s!bsistent e@teriorityF 2E+a
conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 993) A Mechanistic deter*ination of being$
-hile it atte*pts to trace the evol!tion of reality$ destroys the necessity of being) 1he
e@ternal difference of deter*ination is al-ays reliant on an EotherF 2as ca!se$ end$ or
chance3 and th!s it introd!ces an accidental <!ality into beingD in other -ords$
deter*ination i*plies a *ere s!bsistent e@teriority$ not a s!bstantial interiority)
Right a-ay$ ho-ever$ -e have to find =ele!#e>s e@planation p!##ling) 5n effect$ =ele!#e
has reversed the ter*s of the traditional ontological proble*atic here) He does not
<!estion ho- being can gain deter*inacy$ ho- being can s!stain its difference$ b!t rather
ho- difference Ecan s!stain its being Lpe!t tenir son RtreM)F =ele!#e gives difference a
radically ne- role) =ifference fo!nds beingD it provides being -ith its necessity$ its
s!bstantiality) .e cannot !nderstand this arg!*ent for internal difference over e@ternal
difference !nless -e recogni#e the ontologically f!nda*ental role that difference is
re<!ired to fill) 5 -o!ld s!ggest that -e can best !nderstand =ele!#e>s e@planation
thro!gh reference to "cholastic conceptions of the ontological centrality of ca!sality and
the prod!ctivity of being)
9
5n *any respects =ele!#e reads ergsonian ontology as a
"cholasticis* in -hich the disco!rse on ca!sality is replaced -ith a disc!ssion of
difference)
3
.e do not have to depart very far fro* the te@t to read the clai* that
deter*ination Ecan only s!stain its being thro!gh a ca!se$ an end$ or a chanceF as an
attac4 on three conceptions of ca!sality that are inade<!ate for the fo!ndation of being'
213 *aterial-a p!rely physical ca!se that gives rise to an e@ternal effectD 293 final-a ca!se
that refers to the end or goal in the prod!ction of its effectD 233 accidental-a ca!se that has
a co*pletely contingent relation to its effect) .hat is central in each case is that the ca!se
re*ains e@ternal to its effect and therefore can only s!stain the possibility of being) %or
being to be necessary$ the f!nda*ental ontological ca!se *!st be internal to its effect)
1his internal ca!se is the efficient ca!se that plays the central role in "cholastic
ontological fo!ndations) %!rther*ore$ it is only the efficient ca!se$ precisely beca!se of
its internal nat!re$ that can s!stain being as s!bstance$ as causa sui)
:
5n the ergsonian
conte@t$ then$ -e *ight say that efficient difference is the difference that is the internal
*otor of being' 5t s!stains being>s necessity and real s!bstantiality) 1hro!gh this internal
prod!ctive dyna*ic$ the being of efficient difference is causa sui) 1he deter*ination of
Mechanicis* cannot fill this role beca!se it is constit!ted by an e@ternal$ *aterial
ca!sality) .e sho!ld e*pha-
-7-
si#e here that =ele!#e>s arg!*ent is certainly not a criti<!e of ca!sality tout court, b!t
rather a reCection of e@ternal conceptions of ca!se in favor of an internal$ efficient notion)
After having laid o!t the ter*s of an attac4 on the e@ternal difference of deter*ination
-ith the criti<!e of Mechanicis*$ =ele!#e engages Plato$ a second pro@i*ate ene*y$ to
refine the attac4) =ele!#e recogni#es that Plato shares -ith ergson the proCect to
constr!ct a philosophy of difference 2E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 973$
b!t -hat =ele!#e challenges in Plato is the principle of finality) Ance again$ the criti<!e
is foc!sed on the e@ternal nat!re of difference -ith the ontological criteria as *eas!re) 5n
ergson difference is driven by an internal *otor 2-hich ergson calls int!ition3$
-hereas in Plato this role is only filled by an e@ternal inspiration fro* the finality' 1he
difference of the thing can only be acco!nted for by its destination$ the ,ood 2973) 5f -e
translate this into ca!sal disco!rse$ -e can say that Plato tries to fo!nd being on the final
ca!se) Altho!gh ergson$ li4e Plato$ does conceive of the artic!lations of reality in ter*s
of f!nctions and ends$ in ergson there is no separation bet-een difference and the thing$
bet-een ca!se and effect' E1he thing and the corresponding end are in fact one and the
sa*eN) 1here is no longer any roo* to tal4 abo!t an end' .hen difference has beco*e
the thing itself$ there is no longer roo* to say that the thing receives its difference fro*
an endF 2903) Ance again$ the disc!ssion of difference is perfectly consistent -ith a ca!sal
ontological arg!*ent' ergson>s efficient difference is contrasted to Plato>s final
difference) 1he 4ey to the arg!*ent t!rns$ as it did in the case of Mechanicis*$ on the
need for difference to s!stain a s!bstantial nat!re$ on its ontological centrality) ergson
presents difference as causa sui, s!pported by an internal dyna*ic$ -hile Plato>s
difference is forced to rely on the e@ternal s!pport of finality) Hence$ Platonic difference
is not capable of s!pporting being in its s!bstantiality and necessity)
1his e@planation of the fa!lts of Mechanicis* and Platonis* provides !s -ith a *eans of
!nderstanding the ergsonian distinction that =ele!#e finds so i*portant bet-een
Edifferences of nat!reF and Edifferences of degree)F E.hat ergson essentially
reproaches his predecessors for is not having seen the real differences of nat!reN) .here
there -ere differences of nat!re$ they only recogni#ed differences of degreeF 2893) At
ti*es it see*s as if =ele!#e and ergson are !sing these ter*s to disting!ish bet-een
<!alitative and <!antitative differences$ b!t$ especially given the s-eeping clai* abo!t
the originality of this conception in the history of philosophy$ this interpretation proves
inade<!ate) .e gain a *!ch clearer perspective if -e refer$ once again$ to the tradition of
"cholastic ca!sal arg!*ents' E=ifferences of nat!reF appear as those differences that
i*ply ne-
-0-
cessity and s!bstance$ corresponding to the "cholastic causae per se; th!s$ Edifferences
of degreeF are those that i*ply accidents$ causae per accidens)
7
E1hin4ing internal
difference as s!ch$ as p!re internal difference$ arriving at a p!re concept of difference$
raising difference to the absol!te-that is the sense of ergson>s effortF 29B3) .hile
Mechanicis* and Platonis* do s!cceed in thin4ing difference$ they only arrive at
contingent differences *per accidens+; ergson>s conception of internal difference leads
!s to recogni#e s!bstantial differences *per se+)
Hegelianis*$ ho-ever$ is the f!nda*ental target -e find at the base of each of these
criti<!esD Hegel is the one -ho ta4es the e@teriority of difference to its e@tre*e) EAne can
even$ based on certain of ergson>s te@ts$ foresee the obCections that he -o!ld *a4e to a
dialectic of the Hegelian type$ -hich he is *!ch f!rther fro* than that of PlatoF 2903)
Ane *ight e@pect that -ith the criti<!e of Platonic finality as an introd!ction =ele!#e
-o!ld *o!nt an attac4 against the final ca!se and teleology in Hegel-in effect$ he already
has the -eapons for s!ch an attac4 at his disposal) 5nstead$ he t!rns bac4 to the process of
deter*ination and the basic negative *ove*ent of the dialectic$ to the fo!nding *o*ent
of Hegel>s logic) E5n ergsonNthe thing differs -ith itself first, immediately) According
to Hegel$ the thing differs -ith itself beca!se it differs first -ith all that it is notF 2903) 5n
ergson$ the thing i**ediately differs -ith itselfD in other -ords$ the difference of the
thing is s!stained thro!gh an internal$ efficient prod!ction) 1he co**on fa!lt of
Mechanicis* and Platonis* is that they both conceive of difference as dependent on an
e@ternal s!pportD ho-ever$ they each identify specific e@ternal s!pports 2an e@ternal
*aterial thing in Mechanicis* and a f!nction or finality in Plato3$ and th!s the e@teriority
of difference in each case is li*ited) Hegelian dialectics ta4es e@ternal difference to its
e@tre*e$ to absol!te e@teriority$ Eall the -ay to contradiction)F 1he dialectic presents the
thing differing -ith an !nli*ited other$ E-ith all that it is notF-this is absol!te e@teriority)
5n effect$ if -e ignore the <!estion of historiography$ Hegel appears to gather the fa!lts of
Mechanicis* and Platonis* and repeat the* in their p!re for* by ta4ing e@ternal
difference to its e@tre*e)
1he ergsonian criti<!e is obvio!s -hen -e foc!s on the ca!sality i*plied by the
dialectic) %ro* the very first *o*ents of Science of %ogic-fro* p!re being to
nothingness to deter*inate being-the dialectic is constit!ted by a dyna*ic in -hich the
ca!se is absol!tely e@ternal to its effect' 1his is the essence of a dialectic of contradiction)
1he process of the *ediation in the opposite necessarily depends on an e@ternal ca!sality)
As s!ch$ Hegel>s logic of being is v!lnerable to a "cholastic response' A conception of
being fo!nded on an e@ternal ca!se cannot s!stain the necessity or s!bstantiality of being
beca!se a ca!se e@ternal to its effect cannot be
-8-
necessaryD the s!ccessive e@ternal *ediations that fo!nd dialectical being cannot
constit!te causae per se b!t *!st rather be recogni#ed as causae per accidens) 1h!s$
beca!se of the contingency of this e@ternal ca!sal *ove*ent$ the being of the dialectic is
the e@tre*e case of a Es!bsistent e@teriority)F 1he core of a ergsonian attac4 on the
Hegelian concept of dialectical *ediation$ then$ is that it cannot s!stain being as
necessary and s!bstantial)
&ot only does the Hegelian dialectic$ li4e Mechanicis* and Platonis*$ introd!ce
accident into being$ b!t it also fails to grasp the concreteness and sing!larity of being'
E&o-$ if the obCection that ergson co!ld raise against Platonis* -as that it re*ained a
conception of difference that is still e,ternal, the obCection that he *a4es to a dialectic of
contradictions is that it re*ains a conception of difference that is only abstractF 290-983)
1he logic of this f!rther attac4 is not i**ediately clear) Ho- does it follo- that the
difference of dialectical difference is abstract *erely fro* the condition that its s!pport is
absol!tely e@ternalP =ele!#e bac4s !p this clai* by <!oting ergson on the logic of
e@ternal perception' E5t is hardly concrete reality on -hich one can ta4e at the sa*e ti*e
t-o opposing vie-s$ and s!bs!*e conse<!ently the t-o antagonistic conceptsN) 1his
co*bination 2of t-o contradictory concepts3 cannot present either a diversity of degree or
a variety of for*s' 5t is or it is notF 290-98$ cited fro* %a Pens#e et le 'ouvant 196$ 9B83)
Ance again$ the arg!*ent is *ost clearly !nderstood in ter*s of ca!sality) %irst$ ergson
clai*s that a dialectic of opposites re*ains a *ere Eco*binationF of t-o ter*s$ not a
synthesis$ beca!se the ter*s re*ain absol!tely e@ternal to one another and th!s cannot
for* a coherent$ necessary ca!sal chain) 1his charge is bac4ed once again by the
principle that an e@ternal ca!se cannot be necessary) "econd$ ergson clai*s that the
res!lt of this co*bination of abstract concepts cannot prod!ce so*ething concrete and
real) 1his clai* is based on another f!nda*ental principle of ca!sality' An effect cannot
contain *ore reality or perfection than its ca!se) 1he heart of a ergsonian attac4 on the
Hegelian concept of dialectical synthesis$ then$ is that its res!lt *!st re*ain both
contingent and abstract)
Up to this point -e have considered =ele!#e>s ergsonian attac4 on Hegel>s negative
ontological *ove*ent as it is presented in =ele!#e>s first phase of ergson st!dy$ and
*ainly in the early article E+a conception de la difference che# ergson)F =ele!#e has
attrib!ted difference -ith an ontologically fo!ndational role and then constr!cted a scale
for eval!ating vario!s conceptions of difference based on their capacity to f!lfill this role)
.e have fo!nd that$ beca!se of the ontological de*ands at its core$ =ele!#e>s disc!ssion
on difference can be clearly !nderstood if it is contin!ally referred to a "cholastic
disco!rse on ca!sality) ergson>s internal
-6-
difference$ appearing as an efficient ca!sality$ grasps differences of nat!re or differences
that s!pport s!bstance in its necessity and realityD the e@ternal difference presented by the
pro@i*ate ene*ies$ Mechanicis* and Platonis*$ is only capable of carrying differences
of degree that cannot s!pport being as necessaryD finally$ the Hegelian dialectic$ -ith its
absol!tely e@ternal negative *ove*ent$ can grasp neither differences of nat!re nor
differences of degree-the being of the dialectic re*ains not only contingent b!t also
abstract) E1hat -hich carries neither degrees nor n!ances is an abstractionF 2983)
0
1he
negative *ove*ent of dialectical deter*ination$ -hile p!rporting to establish the basis
for real difference$ act!ally ignores difference altogether) =ele!#e has *anaged to t!rn
Hegel>s arg!*ent for deter*ination co*pletely !pside do-n) Hegel proposes the
negative *ove*ent of deter*ination on the basis of the charge that "pino#a>s positive
*ove*ent re*ains abstract and indifferentD here$ ho-ever$ on the basis of classic
ontological arg!*entation$ =ele!#e t!rns the charge of abstraction against Hegel and
clai*s that dialectical deter*ination ignores difference' EAne has s!bstit!ted for
difference the ga*e of deter*inationF 2903) 1he antagonistic proCect against Hegel is
clearly the driving force of this arg!*ent) .hen =ele!#e clai*s that Enot only is vital
difference not a deter*ination$ b!t it is rather the contrary-given the choice it -o!ld be
indeter*ination itselfF 2993$ it is very clear Eagainst -ho*F these concepts are directed)
5ndeed$ the acceptance of the ter* Eindeter*inationF to describe ergson>s difference
sho!ld be read principally as a ref!tation of the negative *ove*ent of the dialectic) .e
sho!ld note here that this early article is the only occasion on -hich =ele!#e attac4s the
Hegelian dialectic directly$ on its o-n ter*s$ and perhaps for this reason it is his *ost
po-erf!l criti<!e) +ater$ -hen =ele!#e ret!rns to attac4 the dialectic in the second
ergson phase of st!dy$ in his -or4 on &iet#sche or in Diff#rence et r#p#tition, he al-ays
addresses an e@trapolation or derivation of the dialectic)
1his direct antagonistic fo!ndation$ ho-ever$ already raises a serio!s proble*' 1he
radical opposition to the dialectic appears to force !s to read ergsonian being as
Eindeter*inateF in the Hegelian sense) .e -ill find later$ ho-ever$ that Hegel>s clai*s
abo!t the attrib!tes of the state of deter*inate being-<!ality$ finit!de$ and reality-are
e<!ally clai*ed by the being of ergson>s internal difference)
8
=ele!#e feels the need to
correct this false i*pression$ -arning !s not to conf!se ergsonian Eindeter*inationF
-ith irrationality or abstraction' E.hen LergsonM tal4s abo!t deter*ination he does not
invite !s to abandon reason$ b!t to arrive at the tr!e reason of the thing in the process of
*a4ing itself$ the philosophical reason that is not deter*ination b!t differenceF
2EergsonF 9993) .e -ill find$ in fact$ that ergson>s Eindeter*inationF has little to do
-ith Hegel>s Edeter-
-9-
*ination$ F b!t rather it relates to an idea of the creativity and originality of real being'
-l'impr#visible. the !nforeseeable) ergson>s ter* is neither consistent -ith nor opposite
to Hegel>s) .e -ill ret!rn to the specifics of ergson>s positive ontologyD it is s!fficient
at this point to recogni#e the force and the initial conse<!ences of the antagonistic
fo!ndation of =ele!#e>s arg!*ent)
'(+ %ulti&licit in the Passage from 4ualit to 4uantit
.hen =ele!#e ret!rns to ergson in the *id-190Bs to -rite (ergsonism, he ta4es !p
again *any of his early arg!*ents$ b!t his pole*ical fo!ndation changes slightly) 1he
analysis still contains an attac4 against the negative *ove*ent of deter*ination$ b!t no-
the central critical foc!s is directed to-ard the proble* of the Ane and the M!ltiple) 1his
reorientation$ ho-ever$ does not by any *eans *ar4 a depart!re fro* the earlier analysis$
b!t si*ply a progression' .e can i*agine that =ele!#e has *erely contin!ed in his
reading of E1he =octrine of eingF in Hegel>s Science of %ogic, *oving fro* chapter 9
on deter*inate being to chapter 3 on the constr!ction of being-for-self thro!gh the
dialectical relationship of the Ane and the M!ltiple) 5t is still the opposition to Hegel>s
ontological proble*atic that provides the dyna*ic for =ele!#e>s e@position of ergson>s
positionD it is as if =ele!#e has *erely descended one level deeper into Hegel>s logic of
being$ -ith ergson$ his (irgil$ close at his side)
5t sho!ld co*e as no s!rprise$ therefore$ that -hen =ele!#e approaches the proble* of
the Ane and the M!ltiple in (ergsonism, his criti<!e of the dialectical sol!tion is very
si*ilar to the earlier criti<!e of the dialectical process of deter*ination) E1here are *any
theories in philosophy that co*bine the one and the *!ltiple) 1hey share the
characteristic of clai*ing to reconstr!ct the real -ith general ideasF 2(ergsonism :3-::3)
=ele!#e provides !s -ith t-o e@a*ples of this generali#ing negative *ove*ent' E.e are
told that the "elf is one 2thesis3 and it is *!ltiple 2antithesis3$ then it is the !nity of the
*!ltiple 2synthesis3) Ar else -e are told that the Ane is already *!ltiple$ that eing
passes into nonbeing and prod!ces beco*ingF 2::3) =ele!#e has three arg!*ents ready in
his arsenal fro* the earlier attac4 on deter*ination) 213 Contradiction is a *isreading of
difference that can only be achieved by posing general$ i*precise ter*s that are abstract
fro* reality) eing in general$ nonbeing in general$ the Ane in general$ the M!ltiple in
general' 1hese ter*s are too large$ too abstract to grasp the specificity and sing!larity of
realityD they are c!t too big and hang loosely on reality$ as ergson says$ Eli4e baggy
clothesF 2::3) 293 1he negative *ove*ent of the dialectic violates the real relations of
being) Eergson critici#es the dialectic for being a false movement, that is$
-1B-
a *ove*ent of the abstract concept$ -hich goes fro* one opposite to the other only by
*eans of i*precisionF 2::3) As -e fo!nd earlier$ pole*ics abo!t false and real
*ove*ents of being have their fo!ndation in ca!sal ontological arg!*ents' 1he dialectic
of contradiction can only i*ply causae per accidens) 233 %inally$ the dialectical synthesis
cannot grasp the plane of reality by co*bining opposed abstract concepts'
Af -hat !se is a dialectic that believes itself to be re!nited -ith the real -hen it
co*pensates for the inade<!acy of a concept that is too broad or too general by invo4ing
the opposite concept$ -hich is no less broad and generalP 1he concrete -ill never be
attained by co*bining the inade<!acy of one concept -ith the inade<!acy of its opposite)
1he sing!lar -ill never be attained by correcting a generality -ith another generality)
2::3
As -e have noted$ the principle that an effect cannot contain *ore reality than its ca!se
denies the po-er of the dialectical synthesis to *ove fro* abstraction to reality$ fro*
generality to sing!larity)
.e sho!ld pa!se for a *o*ent$ tho!gh$ to eval!ate =ele!#e>s characteri#ation of the
dialectic) E1he "elf is one 2thesis3 and it is *!ltiple 2antithesis3$ then it is the !nity of the
*!ltiple 2synthesis3F-certainly$ Hegel>s treat*ent of the Ane and the M!ltiple is *!ch
*ore co*ple@ than this) 5s =ele!#e *erely setting !p a stra- *anP A Hegelian co!ld
-ell obCect that =ele!#e>s characteri#ation is presented in Einappropriate for*F since it
e@presses the Ane and the M!ltiple as propositions' E1his tr!th is to be grasped and
e@pressed only as a beco*ing$ as a process$ a rep!lsion and attraction-not as being$ -hich
in a proposition has the character of a stable !nityF 2Science of %ogic 1893) 1his is
certainly a valid charge against =ele!#e>s *oc4 dialecticD -e have seen else-here$
ho-ever$ that =ele!#e>s principal charge is not that the dialectic fails to recogni#e being
in ter*s of a dyna*ic$ a process$ b!t that the *ove*ent of the dialectic is a false
*ove*ent) +et !s vent!re into the co*ple@ity of Hegel>s arg!*ent$ then$ to ga!ge the
validity of =ele!#e>s attac4) %or Hegel$ the *ove*ent bet-een the Ane and the M!ltiple
represents a higher level of *ediation than the *ove*ent of deter*ination and
constit!tes a logical passage fro* the <!ality to the <!antity of being) =eter*inate being$
the res!lt of the previo!s develop*ent$ gives -ay to the abstract$ posited !nity of being-
for-one) 1his Ane enters the <!antitative do*ain thro!gh the dialectical process of
rep!lsion and attraction$ -hich is si*!ltaneo!sly internal and e@ternal in its co*ple@
*ove*ent of self-relation'
1he one as infinitely self-related-infinitely$ as the posited negation of negation-is the
*ediation in -hich it repels fro* itself its o-n self as its absol!te 2that is$ abstract3
otherness, 2the many3$ and in relating itself
-11-
negatively to this its non-being$ that is$ in s!blating it$ it is only self-relationD and one is
only this becoming in -hich it is no longer deter*ined as having a beginning, that is$ is
no longer posited as an i**ediate$ affir*ative being$ neither is it as res!lt$ as having
restored itself as the one$ that is$ the one as e<!ally immediate and e@cl!dingD the process
-hich it is posits and contains it thro!gho!t only as s!blated)
2Science of %ogic 1883
1he infinitely self-related one$ a posited indeter*ination$ enters into relation -ith its
abstract and *!ltiple other$ its nonbeing$ and thro!gh the s!blation of this opposition -e
get the beco*ing of the Ane$ a reali#ed ideality)
5t is very easy to apply =ele!#e>s charges against the negative ontological *ove*ent to
this passage) 1he initial *ove*ent of the Ane into its opposite$ into its nonbeing$ is
co*pletely e@ternal and can only i*ply an accidental relation) %!rther*ore$ this
*ove*ent bet-een ter*s 2Hegel calls the* Eabsol!teF3 clai*s to arrive at a deter*inate
synthesis) E1he one one Nis the reali#ed ideality$ posited in the oneD it is attraction
thro!gh the *ediation of rep!lsion$ and it contains this *ediation -ith itself as its
determinationF 218:3) 1he *ere fact of abstract *ediation res!lts in a real deter*ination)
As -e have seen$ C!st as =ele!#e charges that e@ternal *ediation i*plies an accidental
relation$ he also ref!ses a dialectics of contradictions the po-er of real synthesis' 1he
Eco*biningF and ECoiningF of abstract ter*s cannot have a real$ concrete res!lt) 1o these
t-o attac4s -e can add the charge that the very ter*s that Hegel !ses are i*precise) %or
this arg!*ent$ =ele!#e invo4es Plato and his *etaphor of the good coo4 -ho ta4es care
to *a4e his c!ts in the right place according to the artic!lations of reality 2see
(ergsonism :7 and EergsonF 9973) .hat Hegelian ter*inology lac4s is close attention
to the specificity and sing!larity of real being' Hegel appears as a careless dialectical
b!tcher -hen co*pared to Plato>s fine talents) 1o arrive at a sing!lar conception of !nity
and *!ltiplicity in real being -e have to begin by as4ing$ in Platonic fashion$ .hich
being$ -hich !nity$ -hich pl!ralityP E.hat ergson calls for-against the dialectic$
against a general conception of opposites 2the Ane and the M!ltiple3-is an ac!te
perception of the >-hat> and the >ho- *any> of -hat he calls the >n!ance> or the potential
n!*berF 2(ergsonism :73)
.hat has =ele!#e gained$ then$ in this second phase of ergson st!dy$ by refoc!sing his
attac4 fro* the proble* of deter*ination to that of the Ane and the M!ltiple$ fro* the
disc!ssion of <!ality to the passage fro* <!ality to <!antityP As al-ays$ Hegel is very
clear abo!t the sta4es in the disc!ssion) =escribing the defects of the conception of one
and *any a*ong the ancient ato*ists$ -ho give precedence to *!ltiplicity$ he pro-
-19-
vides a s!ggestive analogy' EPhysics -ith its *olec!les and particles s!ffers fro* the
ato*$ this principle of e@tre*e e@ternality$ -hich is th!s !tterly devoid of the &otion$ C!st
as *!ch as does the theory of the "tate -hich starts fro* the partic!lar -ill of
individ!alsF 2Science of %ogic 1083) 1he passage fro* <!ality to <!antity reveals at the
heart of an ontological proble*$ a political proble*) 1he sta4es are <!ite high) 5t is clear
to Hegel that the relationship bet-een the Ane and the M!ltiple is an 2analogical3
fo!ndation for a theory of social organi#ation$ an ontological basis for politics) 1o attac4
the dialectical !nity of the Ane and the M!ltiple$ then$ is to attac4 the pri*acy of the
"tate in the for*ation of society$ to insist on the real pl!rality of society) Here -e begin
to see traces of the *ove*ent that has ta4en place in =ele!#e>s Eeight-year holeF' 1he
slight shift in foc!s in his attac4 on Hegelian logic$ fro* chapter 9 to chapter 3 of E1he
=octrine of eing$ F brings ontology into the sphere of politics)
.hat this ne- attac4 gives rise to specifically is a ne- conception of *!ltiplicity) E1he
notion of *!ltiplicity saves !s fro* thin4ing in ter*s of >Ane and M!ltiple>F 2(ergsonism
:33) 1his is -here =ele!#e *anages to establish his preferred triang!lar config!ration of
ene*ies$ beca!se -e find there are t-o types of *!ltiplicities) 1he pro@i*ate ene*ies
are ,))R Rie*ann and Albert /insteinD these thin4ers are able to conceive of
*!ltiplicities$ b!t *erely of n!*erical$ <!antitative *!ltiplicities that only s!cceed in
grasping differences of degree 239-3:3) ergson$ in contrast$ reali#es a <!alitative
*!ltiplicity fo!nded on differences of nat!re) 1he first$ the *!ltiplicity of e@teriority$ is a
*!ltiplicity of EorderFD ergson>s internal *!ltiplicity is a *!ltiplicity of Eorgani#ationF
2(ergsonism 363) 1he Hegelian dialectic$ of co!rse$ occ!pies the third$ e@tre*e position$
!nable to thin4 *!ltiplicity at all beca!se it recogni#es neither differences of nat!re nor
differences of degree) 1he config!ration of pro@i*ate ene*ies$ tho!gh$ allo-s =ele!#e>s
ergson a detach*ent fro* the Hegelian terrain' E%or ergson it is not a <!estion of
opposing the M!ltiple to the Ane b!t$ on the contrary$ of disting!ishing t-o types of
*!ltiplicityF 2393) .e -ill ret!rn to analy#e this positive proCect of *!ltiplicity belo-$
b!t it is i*portant no- to recogni#e the clarity of the political fra*e-or4 of the proCect
that has res!lted fro* the criti<!e' =ele!#e has created a position to advocate a pl!ralis*
of organi#ation against a pl!ralis* of order) And this is far re*oved fro* Hegel>s "tate
philosophy of the !nity of the Ane and the M!ltiple)
'(. "he Positive #manation of )eing
+et !s t!rn no- fro* the aggressive *o*ent directed against the Hegelian dialectic to the
positive alternative that =ele!#e finds in ergson) 1he
-13-
ter*s of the alternative are already given by the criti<!e' 1hro!gh a positive$ internal
*ove*ent$ being *!st beco*e <!alified and concrete in its sing!larity and specificity)
1his iss!e of <!ality is co**on in both of =ele!#e>s periods of ergson st!dy$ b!t since$
as -e noted$ =ele!#e>s concerns *ove to the passage fro* <!ality to <!antity in the
second period$ ergson>s alternative logic of being *!st also address the <!estion of
!nity and *!ltiplicity) .e can begin to approach ergson>s position by trying to sit!ate it
in traditional ontological ter*s) 5n effect$ -e do find a conception of p!re being in
ergson' 1he virt!al is the si*plicity of being$ in itself$ p!re recollection *le souvenir
pur+) Ho-ever$ p!re$ virt!al being is not abstract and indifferent$ and neither does it enter
into relation -ith -hat is other than itself-it is real and <!alified thro!gh the internal
process of differentiation' E=ifference is not a deter*ination b!t$ in this essential
relationship -ith life$ a differentiationF 2E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF
933) eing differs -ith itself i**ediately$ internally) 5t does not loo4 o!tside itself for an
other or a force of *ediation beca!se its difference rises fro* its very core$ fro* Ethe
e@plosive internal force that life carries -ithin itselfF 2E+a conception de la diffQrence
che# ergsonF 933)
6
1his #lan vital that ani*ates being$ this vital process of
differentiation$ lin4s the p!re essence and the real e@istence of being' E(irt!ality e@ists in
s!ch a -ay that it is reali#ed in dissociating itself$ that it is forced to dissociate itself in
order to reali#e itself) =ifferention is the *ove*ent of a virt!ality that is act!ali#ng
itselfF 2933) ergson sets !p$ then$ t-o concepts of being' (irt!al being is p!re$
transcendental being in that it is infinite and si*pleD act!ali#ed being is real being in that
it is different$ <!alified$ and li*ited) .e have already seen ho- =ele!#e foc!ses on
ontological *ove*ent as the loc!s of ergson>s originality) 1he central constr!ctive tas4
of =ele!#e>s reading of ergson$ then$ is to elaborate the positive *ove*ent of being
bet-een the virt!al and the act!al that s!pports the necessity of being and affords being
both sa*eness and difference$ both !nity and *!ltiplicity)
1his disc!ssion of ontological *ove*ent relies on ergson>s clai* of a f!nda*ental
difference bet-een ti*e and space$ bet-een d!ration and *atter)
9
"pace is only capable
of containing differences of degree and th!s presents *erely a <!antitative variationD ti*e
contains differences of nat!re and th!s is the tr!e *edi!* of s!bstance) E1he division
occ!rs bet-een d!ration$ -hich >tends> for its part to ta4e on or bear all the differences of
nat!re 2beca!se it is endo-ed -ith the po-er of <!alitatively varying -ith itself3$ and
space$ -hich never presents anything b!t differences of degree 2since it is a <!antitative
ho*ogeneity3F 2(ergsonism 31$ *odified3) =!ration is the do*ain in -hich -e can find
the pri*ary ontological *ove*ent beca!se d!ration$ -hich is co*posed of differences
-1:-
of nat!re$ is able to differ <!alitatively -ith itself) "pace$ or *atter$ -hich contains only
differences of degree$ is the do*ain of *odal *ove*ent beca!se space cannot differ -ith
itself$ b!t rather repeats) E/verything that ergson says al-ays co*es bac4 to this'
d!ration is /hat differs /ith itself) Matter$ on the contrary$ is -hat does not differ -ith
itself$ -hat repeatsF 2E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 663) 1he ontological
criterion ass!*ed here is differing -ith self$ internal difference) Ance again$ the
disc!ssion appears as a si*ple transposition of ca!sal fo!ndations of being' "!bstance
that is ca!se of itself *causa sui+ beco*es s!bstance that differs -ith itself) 5ndeed$
=ele!#e characteri#es the distinction bet-een d!ration and *atter precisely in the
traditional ter*s of a s!bstance-*ode relationship' E=!ration is li4e a natura naturans,
and *atter a natura naturataF 2(ergsonism 93$ *odified3) .hy is it$ tho!gh$ that
d!ration can differ -ith itself and *atter cannotP 1he e@planation follo-s fro* o!r first
observations abo!t ergson>s difference) 1he disc!ssion of difference in ergson is not
directed to-ard disting!ishing a <!idditas or a stateD it is not oriented to-ard a location
of essence$ b!t rather to-ard the identification of an essential *ove*ent$ a process$ in
ti*e) 5n the second phase of ergson st!dy$ =ele!#e e@tends this distinction bet-een
d!ration and *atter to the t-o distinct types of *!ltiplicity' "pace reveals a *!ltiplicity
of e@teriority$ a n!*erical *!ltiplicity of <!antitative differentiation$ a *!ltiplicity of
orderD p!re d!ration presents an internal *!ltiplicity$ a heterogeneity of <!alitative
differentiation$ a *!ltiplicity of organi#ation 2(ergsonism 363) %!rther*ore$ =ele!#e
arg!es not only that the do*ain of d!ration provides a *ore profo!nd *!ltiplicity than
space$ b!t also that it poses a *ore profo!nd !nity) 1he *odal nat!re of space$ in effect$
does not afford it an inherent !nity) 1o recogni#e the essential nat!re of being as a
s!bstantial !nity$ then$ -e have to thin4 being in ter*s of ti*e' Ea single 1i*e$ one$
!niversal$ i*personalF 2863)
&o- that along -ith ergson and =ele!#e -e have adopted an ontological perspective
fir*ly gro!nded in d!ration$ -e still need to see ho- the virt!al and the act!al
co**!nicate) ergson>s disc!ssion is very strong in analy#ing the !nfolding of the
virt!al in the act!al--hat =ele!#e calls the process of differentiation or act!ali#ation) 5n
this regard$ ergson is a philosopher of the e*anation of being$ and the Platonic
resonances are very strong) 1his is precisely the conte@t in -hich =ele!#e notes the
Platonic passage very dear to ergson in -hich he co*pares the philosopher to the good
coo4$ E-ho c!ts according to the nat!ral artic!lationsF 2EergsonF 9973) Recogni#ing the
conto!r of being in the real differences of nat!re is the tas4 of the philosopher$ beca!se
the process of differentiation is the basic *ove*ent of life) Elan vital is presented in
e@actly these ter*s' E5t is al-ays a case of a virt!ality in the process of being act!ali#ed$
a si*-
-17-
plicity in the process of differentiating$ a totality in the process of dividing' Proceeding
>by dissociation and division$ > by >dichoto*y$ > is the essence of lifeF 2(ergsonism 9:3)
P!re being-as virt!ality$ si*plicity$ totality-e*anates or act!ali#es thro!gh a process of
differentiation$ a process that *ar4s or c!ts along the lines of the differences of nat!re)
1his is ho- differentiation addresses the ontological criteria of <!ality and <!antity'
(irt!al being$ as !nity$ !nfolds and reveals its real *!ltiple differences) Ho-ever$ -e
sho!ld be caref!l not to e@aggerate the si*ilarities to Platonis*) 1here are at least t-o
aspects that disting!ish =ele!#e>s description of ergsonian act!ali#ation fro* Platonic
e*anation) %irst$ =ele!#e clai*s that the act!ali#ation of Ethe virt!al .holeF is not a
degradation of being-it is not the li*itation or copying of the ideal in the real-b!t instead
ergson>s act!ali#ation is the positive prod!ction of the act!ality and *!ltiplicity of the
-orld' EAne only has to replace the act!al ter*s in the *ove*ent that prod!ces the*$
that is bring the* bac4 to the virt!ality act!ali#ed in the*$ in order to see that
differentiation is never a negation b!t a creation$ and that difference is never negative b!t
essentially positive and creativeF 2(ergsonism 1B33) "econd$ as -e have seen$ =ele!#e
arg!es that ergson>s ontological *ove*ent relies on an absol!tely i**anent$ efficient
prod!ction of being driven by Ethe e@plosive internal force that life carries -ithin itself)F
1here is no roo* for Platonic finalis* as a force of order) 5n this conte@t$ then$ -e can
!nderstand ergson>s ontological *ove*ent as creative e*anation of being free fro* the
order of the Platonic 5deal 21B7-03)
Ho-ever$ as =ele!#e *a4es very clear$ if -e are to !nderstand ergson>s e*anation of
being correctly$ -e sho!ld not conceive it as a differentiation in space b!t an
Eact!ali#ationF in ti*e) 2&ote that here the disc!ssion relies heavily on the pri*ary
%rench *eaning of actuel as Econte*poraryF3 1his is -here ergson>s theory of *e*ory
co*es into play) 5n the past ergson finds p!re being-Ea recollection that is p!re$ virt!al$
i*passive$ inactive$ in itselfF 2(ergsonism 813) 1he creative *ove*ent fro* the past
!nity to the present *!ltiplicity is the process of act!ali#ation) "it!ating ergson>s
e*anation of being in ti*e allo-s =ele!#e to de*onstrate the force of his ter*inology$
-hich reveals the i*portant difference bet-een ergson>s and other conceptions of
ontological *ove*ent) 1his disc!ssion is presented thro!gh an enig*atic constellation of
ter*s that constit!tes a very co*ple@ arg!*ent) 1he general goal of this disc!ssion is to
offer an ade<!ate criti<!e of the notion of the possible) =ele!#e asserts that it is essential
that -e conceive of the ergsonian e*anation of being$ differentiation$ as a relationship
bet-een the virtual and the actual, rather than as a relationship bet-een the possible and
the real)
1B
After setting !p these t-o co!ples 2virt!al-act!al and possible-real3$
-10-
=ele!#e proceeds to note that the transcendental ter* of each co!ple relates positively to
the i**anent ter* of the opposite co!ple) 1he possible is never real$ even tho!gh it *ay
be act!alD ho-ever$ -hile the virt!al *ay not be act!al$ it is nonetheless real) 5n other
-ords$ there are several conte*porary 2act!al3 possibilities of -hich so*e *ay be
reali#ed in the f!t!reD in contrast$ virt!alities are al-ays real 2in the past$ in *e*ory3 and
*ay beco*e act!ali#ed in the present) =ele!#e invo4es Pro!st for a definition of the
states of virt!ality' Ereal -itho!t being act!al$ ideal -itho!t being abstractF 2903) 1he
essential point here is that the virt!al is real and the possible is not' 1his is =ele!#e>s
basis for asserting that the *ove*ent of being *!st be !nderstood in ter*s of the virt!al-
act!al relationship rather than the possible-real relationship) 1o !nderstand this
eval!ation -e need once again to refer to the ca!sal arg!*ents of "cholastic ontology) A
f!nda*ental principle of ca!sality that -e had occasion to invo4e earlier is that an effect
cannot have *ore reality than its ca!se) 1he ontological *ove*ent fro* the virt!al to the
act!al is consistent -ith this principle since the virt!al is C!st as real as the act!al) 1he
progression fro* the possible to the real$ ho-ever$ is clearly a violation of this principle
and on this basis *!st be reCected as a *odel of ontological *ove*ent) .e sho!ld note
that$ even tho!gh =ele!#e *a4es no e@plicit reference to the "cholastics here$ the *ode
of e@planation and the very ter*s of the disc!ssion are thoro!ghly "cholastic) (irt!al is
the "cholastic ter* to describe the ideal or transcendentalD the virt!al "cholastic ,od is
not in any-ay abstract or possible$ it is the ens realissimum, the *ost real being) %inally$
act!ali#ation is the "cholastic *eans of describing the fa*iliar Aristotelian passage fro*
the virt!al into act)
11
5n this conte@t$ ergson>s !sage beco*es even *ore interesting'
ergson>s Eact!ali#ationF *aintains the Aristotelian *eaning and adds to it the te*poral
di*ension s!ggested by the *odern %rench !sage) 5n ergson$ the passage fro*
virt!ality to act ta4es place only in d!ration)
.hat is at sta4e for =ele!#e in this enig*atic gro!p of ter*s-in reCecting the possible and
advocating Eact!ali#ationF over Ereali#ationF-is the very nat!re of the e*anation of being
and the principle that directs it) =ele!#e elaborates this eval!ation by adding a f!rther
constellation of ter*s) 1he process of reali#ation is g!ided by t-o r!les' rese*blance and
li*itation) An the contrary$ the process of act!ali#ation is g!ided by difference and
creation) =ele!#e e@plains that$ fro* the first point of vie-$ the real is tho!ght to be in
the i*age of 2th!s to resemble3 the possible that it reali#es-Eit si*ply has e@istence or
reality added to it$ -hich is translated by saying that$ fro* the point of vie- of the
concept$ there is no difference bet-een the possible and the realF 2(ergsonism 98$
e*phasis added3) %!rther*ore$ since all the possibilities cannot be reali#ed$
-18-
since the real* of the possible is greater than the real* of the real$ there *!st be a
process of limitation that deter*ines -hich possibilities -ill EpassF into reality 1h!s$
=ele!#e finds a sort of prefor*is* in the co!ple possibility-reality$ in that all of reality is
already given or deter*ined in the possibleD reality pree@ists itself in the Epse!do-
act!alityF of the possible and only e*anates thro!gh a li*itation g!ided by rese*blances
2963) 1herefore$ since there is no difference bet-een the possible and the real 2fro* the
point of vie- of the concept3$ since the i*age of reality is already given in the possible$
the passage of reali#ation cannot be a creation)
An the contrary$ in order for the virt!al to beco*e act!al$ it *!st create its o-n ter*s of
act!ali#ation) E1he reason for this is si*ple' .hile the real is the i*age and li4eness of
the possible that it reali#es$ the act!al$ on the other hand does not rese*ble the virt!ality
that it e*bodiesF 2(ergsonism 983) 1he difference bet-een the virt!al and the act!al is
-hat re<!ires that the process of act!ali#ation be a creation) .ith no prefor*ed order to
dictate its for*$ the process of the act!ali#ation of being *!st be a creative evol!tion$ an
original prod!ction of the *!ltiplicity of act!al being thro!gh differentiation) .e can
partially !nderstand this co*ple@ disc!ssion as a criti<!e of the *ove*ent of the for*al
ca!se 2possible-real3 and an affir*ation of that of the efficient ca!se 2virt!al-act!al3) 1he
sta4es of the disc!ssion appear *ore clearly$ tho!gh$ if -e pose the iss!e in ter*s of the
principle that deter*ines the coherence of being$ as a criti<!e of order and an affir*ation
of organi!ation) /arlier -e cited a distinction that =ele!#e *a4es bet-een the
E*!ltiplicity of orderF and the E*!ltiplicity of organi#ationF 2363) 1he reali#ation of the
possible clearly gives rise to a *!ltiplicity of order$ a static *!ltiplicity$ beca!se all of
real being is pregiven or predeter*ined in the Epse!do-act!alityF of the possible) 1he
act!ali#ation of the virt!al$ on the other hand$ presents a dyna*ic *!ltiplicity in -hich
the process of differentiation creates the original arrange*ent or coherence of act!al
being' 1his is the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation) 1he *!ltiplicity of order is Edeter*inateF
in that it is prefor*ed and staticD the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation is Eindeter*inateF in
that it is creative and original-organi#ation is al-ays !nforeseeable)
19
.itho!t the
bl!eprint of order$ the creative process of organi#ation is al-ays an art)
.e have sho-n that =ele!#e presents the ergsonian act!ali#ation of being as a dyna*ic
and original e*anation$ as a creative evol!tion free fro* the ordering restraints of both
Platonic finalis* 2final ca!se3 and the reali#ation of the possible 2for*al ca!se3)
Ho-ever$ this for*!lation begs the i*portant <!estion$ -hich has been inherent in the
disc!ssion all along' %ree fro* any deter*ined order or prefor*is*$ -hat constit!tes the
creative *echanis* in ergsonian being that is capable of contin!ally for*ing a ne-$
original being$ a ne- plane of co*positionP .hat is the
-16-
basis of ergsonian organi#ationP 1his is precisely the point on -hich one co!ld *o!nt a
Hegelian co!nteroffensive) 5f -e ret!rn to Hegel>s criti<!e of "pino#a -e can recogni#e a
press!re that also applies to ergson>s position) Hegel finally characteri#es "pino#a>s
positive *ove*ent of being as an !nrec!perative e*anationis*'
5n the oriental conception of emanation the absol!te is the light -hich ill!*ines itself)
Anly it not only ill!*ines itself b!t also emanates) 5ts e*anations are distancings fro* its
!ndi**ed clarityD the s!ccessive prod!ctions are less perfect than the preceding ones
fro* -hich they arise) 1he process of e*anation is ta4en only as a happening, the
beco*ing only as a progressive loss) 1h!s being increasingly obsc!res itself and night$
the negative$ is the final ter* of the series$ -hich does not ret!rn to the pri*al light)
2Science of %ogic 736-393
Clearly$ it is tr!e that ergson>s *ove*ent$ li4e that of "pino#a$ does lac4 the Ereflection-
into-selfF that Hegel identifies as the *issing ele*ent here) Ho-ever$ as -e have seen$
ergson insists that Es!ccessive prod!ctionsF are not Eless perfectFD the *ove*ent is not
a Eprogressive loss$ F b!t rather$ the differentiation constit!ted by #lan vital is a creative
process that prod!ces ne- e<!ally perfect artic!lations) ergson *ight very -ell respond
in "pino#ian fashion that act!ality is perfection) Ho-ever$ the Hegelian attac4 serves as a
press!re to bac4 !p this ergsonian clai* -ith an i**anent creative *echanis*) Hegel
recogni#es that a positive ontological *ove*ent can acco!nt for the beco*ing of being
2as e*anation3$ b!t$ he as4s$ Ho- can it acco!nt for the being of beco*ingP %!rther*ore$
Hegel>s analogy bet-een physics and politics ret!rns as a serio!s political challenge)
Along -ith the ancient ato*ists$ =ele!#e and ergson ref!se the prefor*is* of the
*!ltiplicity in the !nityD they ref!se the order of the "tate$ and insist instead on the
originality and freedo* of the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation) %ro* a Hegelian perspective$
this is C!st as *ad as trying to base a "tate on the individ!al -ills of its citi#ens) 1he
attac4 on order 2the order of finalis*$ of the possible$ of the dialectic3 creates both the
space for and the need for an organi#ational dyna*ic' the organi#ation of the act!al$ the
organi#ation of the *!ltiplicity) Responding to this is the final tas4 posed in =ele!#e>s
reading of ergson)
'(1 "he )eing of )ecoming and the *ganization of the Actual
1he <!estion of creative organi#ation poses a serio!s proble*$ and$ finally$ this is the
point on -hich ergson>s tho!ght see*s to prove ins!fficient for =ele!#e) 1he need for
act!al organi#ation obvio!sly beco*es *!ch *ore i*portant as =ele!#e *oves to his
second phase of ergson st!dy$ as he
-19-
shifts foc!s fro* the iss!e of <!ality to the passage bet-een <!ality and <!antity) 5n o!r
analysis !p to this point -e have seen that ergson is very effective in describing the
e*anative *ove*ent fro* a !nity to a *!ltiplicity$ the process of differentiation or
act!ali#ation) !t no- -e discover a need for a co*ple*entary organi#ational *ove*ent
in the opposite direction$ fro* a *!ltiplicity to a !nity) Unfort!nately$ this organi#ational
*ove*ent is nearly absent in ergson>s tho!ght) 1here are$ nonetheless$ several points at
-hich =ele!#e>s reading s!ggests that -e *ight find an ans-er to this need in ergson)
=ele!#e see*s to s!ggest that there is a convergent *ove*ent of the act!al' E1he real is
not only that -hich is c!t o!t 0se d#coupe1 according to nat!ral artic!lations or
differences of nat!reD it is also that -hich intersects again 0se recoupe1 along paths
converging to-ard the sa*e ideal or virt!al pointF 2(ergsonism 993) .hat e@actly is this
process of recoupetnent or intersection that relates the act!al *!ltiplicity to a virt!al
!nityP =ele!#e does not treat this point e@tensively) 5t see*s$ ho-ever$ that in order to
*a4e sense of this passage -e cannot read recoupement as a creative process that
organi#es a ne- virt!al point of !nity$ b!t rather *erely as a process that traces the lines
of the nat!ral artic!lations bac4 to the original point of depart!re) "ecoupement is a
ergsonian -ay of e@pressing the "cholastic principle that being is !nivocalD -e can
verify that being is al-ays and every-here said in the sa*e -ay$ that is$ beca!se all of
reality can be traced bac4 along convergent paths to one !ni<!e virt!al point) 1his theory
of !nivocity opposes a theory of the analogy of being) .hat is i*portant for !s here is
that -hile !nivocity i*plies a general e<!ality and co**onality of being$ it does so only
on the virt!al plane)
13
.hat -e are in need of$ ho-ever$ is a *eans of co**!nication
bet-een the t-o planes) 1his passage s!ggests$ and indeed -e often find in ergson>s
-or4$ that the !nity only appears on the plane of the virt!al) .hat =ele!#e>s arg!*ent
de*ands at this point$ on the contrary$ is a *echanis* for the organi#ation of the act!al
*!ltiplicity)
.e find another e@a*ple of the co**!nication bet-een the virt!al and the act!al in
ergson>s t-o *ove*ents of *e*ory' the Erecollection-*e*oryF that dilates or enlarges
in an incl!sive *ove*ent to-ard the past and the Econtraction-*e*oryF that
concentrates to-ard the f!t!re as a process of partic!lari#ation 2(ergsonism 793) 5n other
-ords$ loo4ing bac4-ard -e see the !niversal 2recollection-*e*ory3 and loo4ing
for-ard -e see the individ!al 2contraction-*e*ory3) .hat -o!ld be necessary for the
creative organi#ation of the act!al$ on the contrary$ -o!ld be an enlarging$ incl!sive
*ove*ent oriented to-ard the f!t!re capable of prod!cing a ne- !nity) Ho-ever$
ergson is insistent on the te*poral directions of the *ove*ents) 1he !nity of the virt!al
resides only in the past and -e can never really *ove bac4-ard to-ard that point' E.e
do not *ove fro* the
-9B-
present to the past$ fro* perception to recollection$ b!t fro* the past to the present$ fro*
recollection to perceptionF 2033) 5n these ter*s$ the organi#ation of the act!al -o!ld have
to be a *ove*ent fro* perception to a ne- ErecollectionF that -o!ld be a f!t!re *e*ory
2a sort of futur ant#rieur or f!t!re perfect in the gra**atical sense3 as a co**on point of
real organi#ation)
=ele!#e does his best to address serio!sly the <!estion of organi#ation and sociali#ation
in the final pages of (ergsonism 21B0-193) 5n *any of his *aCor -or4s 2in his st!dies of
both &iet#sche and "pino#a$ for e@a*ple3$ =ele!#e presents in the final pages his densest
and *ost el!sive arg!*ent that points the -ay to-ard f!t!re research) 5n this final
section of (ergsonism, =ele!#e tries to e@plain the h!*an capacity for creativity$ the
capability to ta4e control of the process of differentiation or act!ali#ation and to go
beyond the EplaneF or EplanF of nat!re' EMan is capable of b!rning the plans$ of going
beyond both his o-n plan and his o-n condition$ in order finally to e@press nat!ring
&at!re 0natura naturans1F 21B83) 1he e@planation of this h!*an freedo* and creativity$
tho!gh$ is not i**ediately obvio!s) Certainly$ society is for*ed on the basis of h!*an
intelligence$ b!t =ele!#e notes that there is not a direct *ove*ent bet-een intelligence
and society) 5nstead$ society is *ore directly a res!lt of Eirrational factors)F =ele!#e
identifies Evirt!al instinctF and Ethe fable-*a4ing f!nctionF *la fonction fabulatrice+ as
the forces that lead to the creation of obligations and of gods) 1hese forces$ ho-ever$
cannot acco!nt for the h!*an po-ers of creativity
1:

%or sol!tion$ -e have to go bac4 to analy#e the gap that e@ists bet-een h!*an
intelligence and sociali#ation) E.hat is it that appears in the interval bet-een intelligence
and societyNP .e cannot reply' 5t is int!itionF 21B93) 1he int!ition is that sa*e
Ee@plosive internal force that life carries -ithin itself that -e noted earlier as the positive
dyna*ic of being) Here$ ho-ever$ this notion is filled o!t *ore clearly) More precisely$
=ele!#e adds soon after$ -hat fills this gap bet-een intelligence and sociability is the
origin of int!ition$ -hich is creative e*otion 211B3) 1his original prod!ction of
sociability thro!gh creative e*otion leads !s bac4 to ergson>s plane of !nity in *e*ory$
b!t this ti*e it is a ne- *e*ory) EAnd -hat is this creative e*otion$ if not precisely a
cos*ic Me*ory$ that act!ali#es all the levels at the sa*e ti*e$ that liberates *an fro*
the plan or the level to -hich he belongs$ in order to *a4e hi* a creator$ ade<!ate to the
-hole *ove*ent of creationPF 2111$ *odified3) .ith the cos*ic Me*ory$ =ele!#e has
arrived at a *ystical ergsonian sociability that is available to the Eprivileged so!lsF
21113 and that is capable of tracing the design of an open society$ a society of creators)
1he incarnation of the cos*ic Me*ory Eleaps fro* one so!l to another$ >every no- and
then$ > crossing closed
-91-
desertsF 21113) .hat -e have here so!nds distinctly li4e a -ea4 echo of the voice of
Sarath!stra on the *o!ntaintops' creative pathos$ prod!ctive e*otion$ a co**!nity of
active creators -ho go beyond the plane of nat!re and h!*an beings) Ho-ever$
s!ggestive as this brief e@planation of a ergsonian social theory *ight be$ it re*ains in
this final section obsc!re and !ndeveloped) %!rther*ore$ the rest of =ele!#e>s -or4 on
ergson does not serve to s!pport this theory) 5n effect$ -e have to refer to =ele!#e>s
&iet#sche to give these clai*s real coherence and a solid gro!nding)
17

1his final section of (ergsonism is the *ost notable positive arg!*ent in the second
phase of ergson st!dy that does not appear in the first$ and it perfectly corresponds to
the shift fro* the proble*atic of <!ality to that of the passage fro* <!ality to <!antity
that -e noted in the attac4 on Hegel) 1his t-ofold shift bet-een the t-o ergson st!dies
sho-s clearly one aspect of the *ove*ent that ta4es place in =ele!#e>s Eeight-year holeFD
in effect$ =ele!#e feels the press!re to bring the ontological to the social and the ethical)
5n (ergsonism =ele!#e s!cceeds in addressing this press!re to an e@tent) More i*portant$
ho-ever$ this reorientation anno!nces the need for and the advent of &iet#sche in
=ele!#e>s tho!ght) &iet#sche gives =ele!#e the *eans to e@plore the real being of
beco*ing and the positive organi#ation of the act!al *!ltiplicity) %!rther*ore$ by
shifting the terrain fro* the plane of logic to that of val!es$ &iet#sche allo-s =ele!#e to
translate the positive ontology he has developed thro!gh the st!dy of ergson to-ard a
positive ethics)
!emark: Deleuze and Inter&retation
efore t!rning to &iet#sche$ let !s ta4e a *o*ent to consider t-o criti<!es of =ele!#e>s
reading of ergson that -ill help !s clarify the characteristics of =ele!#e>s interpretative
strategy) At the o!tset of o!r essay$ -e noted that the pec!liarities of =ele!#e>s -or4
re<!ire that -e 4eep a series of *ethodological principles in *ind) Ane aspect that *a4es
=ele!#e>s -or4 so !n!s!al is that he brings to each of his philosophical st!dies a very
specific <!estion that foc!ses and defines his vision) 5n the case of the ergson st!dies$
-e have fo!nd that =ele!#e is principally concerned -ith developing an ade<!ate
criti<!e of the negative ontological *ove*ent of the dialectic and elaborating an
alternative logic of the positive$ creative *ove*ent of being) 1he selection involved in
=ele!#e>s narro- foc!s is -hat see*s to conf!se so*e of his readers and to irritate
others) 1he criti<!es of ,illian Rose 2E1he &e- ergsonis*F3 and Madeleine
arthQle*y-Mada!le 2E+ire ergsonF3 offer !s t-o e@a*ples of this proble*) 5n these
-99-
criti<!es -e can discern t-o *ethods of reading =ele!#e that lead to interpretative
diffic!lties' %irst$ by failing to recogni#e =ele!#e>s selectivity$ these a!thors conflate
=ele!#e>s positions -ith those of the philosophers he addresses$ and second$ by ignoring
the evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ they conf!se the different proCects that g!ide his
vario!s -or4s) 5n addition$ the diversity of perspective bet-een these t-o critics -ill
serve to ill!strate the slippage that res!lts fro* the gap bet-een the Anglophone and the
%rench traditions of ergson interpretation)
1hro!gho!t E1he &e- ergsonis*F 2chapter 0 of Dialectic of ihilism3$ Rose reads
ergson>s -or4 and =ele!#e>s interpretation as if they constit!ted a perfect contin!!*)
"he concl!des her brief disc!ssion of (ergsonism -ith an a*big!o!s attrib!tion that
ill!strates this conf!sion very clearly' EAn =ele!#e>s reading ergson prod!ces a
aturphilosophie -hich c!l*inates at the point -hen #lan vital >beco*es conscio!s of
itself in the *e*ory of >*an>F 2Rose 1B13) 1o bac4 this clai* she cites the final page of
(ergsonism 2119 in the /nglish edition3$ -hich s!pports the second half of her sentence
in part b!t does not s!pport the first half at all) &ot only does =ele!#e not *ention
aturphilosophie in this passage$ b!t he has spent the previo!s pages 21B0-193 arg!ing
that ergson sho-s ho- -e can go beyond the plan of nat!re and create a ne- h!*an
nat!re$ beyond the h!*an condition) Here =ele!#e is dra-ing principally on ergson>s
late -or4 %es deu, sources de la morale et de la religion 219393) Rose derives the idea of
aturphilosophie not fro* =ele!#e b!t fro* ergson>s earliest -or4$ Essai sur les
donn#es imm#diates de la conscience 216693$ -hich she reads as consistent -ith the -or4
of Co*te 2Rose 963) 21herefore$ to add to the conf!sion$ -e have a co*pletely ahistorical
reading of ergson that fails to disting!ish bet-een his early and late -or4s)3 1he central
point here$ tho!gh$ is not that ergson>s tho!ght does or does not constit!te a
aturphilosophie; rather$ it is that this aspect does not for* a part of =ele!#e>s proCect$
that this is not -hat =ele!#e ta4es fro* ergson)
.e find a si*ilar proble* of interpretation in the essay by Madeleine arthQle*y-
Mada!le$ a %rench ergson specialist$ and it is interesting that in her reading it is
precisely these sa*e pages of (ergsonism that create the greatest irritation) Her reaction$
ho-ever$ co*es fro* a very different perspective fro* that of Rose$ since she is
gro!nded in the %rench spirit!al reading of ergson rather than the Anglo-"a@on
positivist reading) arthQle*y-Mada!le>s pri*ary obCection is that =ele!#e tries to read
%es deu, sources as a &iet#schean and antih!*anist te@t -hen in fact it de*onstrates the
profo!ndly religio!s character of ergson>s tho!ght' E1he process of >going beyond the
h!*an condition$ > -hich is in effect the vocation of philosophy for ergson$ cannot be
for*!lated in ter*s of the >inh!*an> or the >s!perh!*an)> N5n any case$ the principal
concl!sion
-93-
that -e ta4e fro* this interpretation is that ergson is not &iet#scheF 2E+ire ergsonF 60$
19B3) arthQle*y-Mada!le is a very caref!l reader of ergson and$ to a certain e@tent$
one has to accept her criticis*) ergson is indeed not &iet#sche) %or o!r p!rposes$
=ele!#e>s 2perhaps strained and !ns!ccessf!l3 effort to bring the t-o together in these
pages indicates the i*portant effect that the period of &iet#sche st!dy has had on his
tho!ght and the need to *ove beyond the ergsonian fra*e-or4) 1he *ain iss!e at sta4e
in the conflict -ith arthQle*y-Mada!le$ ho-ever$ is ho- one interprets a philosopher)
arthQle*y-Mada!le is reacting pri*arily against =ele!#e>s principle of selection'
E5nterpreting a doctrine s!pposes that one has acco!nted for all the ter*s of the
ense*ble) &o- it does not see* to *e that this is the case here) 5 -o!ld contest Mr)
=ele!#e>s !se of (ergsonism as the title of his st!dyF 219B3) 1he first type of proble* in
reading =ele!#e$ then$ -hich -e find in both Rose and arthQle*y-Mada!le$ res!lts
fro* a fail!re to recogni#e or accept =ele!#e>s selectivity and$ th!s$ fro* a conf!sion
both of his !se of so!rces and of his relationship to the philosopher he st!dies)
1he second type of proble* res!lts fro* a *isreading of =ele!#e>s proCects$ fro* a
fail!re to recogni#e =ele!#e>s evol!tion) 1his proble* arises pri*arily in Rose>s criti<!e)
5t is certainly strange that -hen Rose see4s to engage =ele!#e>s -or4 in relation to her
general the*e abo!t C!ridicis* and poststr!ct!ralis* she -o!ld choose to read
(ergsonism-any of his other st!dies in the history of philosophy 2on Hant$ H!*e$
&iet#sche$ or "pino#a3 -o!ld have been *ore ade<!ate to her tas4) As -e have seen$
=ele!#e>s investigation of ergson is foc!sed pri*arily on ontological iss!es$ and$
altho!gh it flirts -ith the <!estion of ethics$ it gives no solid gro!nds for a disc!ssion of
la-) .ith this in *ind$ then$ it sho!ld co*e as no s!rprise that Rose has diffic!lty
-riting directly abo!t =ele!#e>s ergson) 5n fact$ she dedicates less than t-o of the
t-enty-one pages to (ergsonism 299-1BB3D these are prefaced by a reading of ergson>s
Essai sur les donn#es imm#diates de la conscience in relation to Co*te and positivis*
and follo-ed by a reading of sections of =ele!#e>s Diff#rence et r#p#tition, co*bined
-ith s*all additions fro* &iet#sche and =!ns "cot!s) Rose repeatedly refers to the intent
of =ele!#e>s ne- ergsonis* as the atte*pt to fo!nd an Eontological inC!sticeF 299$ 1B:$
1B63) "he s!bstantiates this clai* -ith a <!ote fro* a section of Diff#rence et r#p#tition
in -hich =ele!#e is disc!ssing the !nivocity of being in =!ns "cot!s$ &iet#sche$ and
"pino#a' EUnivocal eing is both no*adic distrib!tion and cro-ned anarchyF 2<!oted by
Rose 99$ =ele!#e 773) 1he proble* here is <!ite si*ple' 5n the cited passage$ =ele!#e is
dealing neither -ith ergson nor -ith C!stice) 5 have arg!ed that in =ele!#e>s treat*ent of
ergson -e can find the s!ggestion of a concept of !nivocal being$ b!t that does not
-9:-
*ean that -e can transfer the =!ns "cot!s-"pino#a-&iet#sche ne@!s directly to ergson'
1his is a si*ple *ethodological iss!e) More i*portant$ tho!gh$ this passage reveals the
inade<!acy of Rose>s entire arg!*ent) 5t is abs!rd to read the state*ent that !nivocal
being is Ecro-ned anarchyF as a directly political state*ent$ or even as a state*ent abo!t
C!stice) "!ch a clai* atte*pts to collapse a co*ple@ develop*ent fro* ontology to
politics and to ass!*e that s!ch a develop*ent ad*its only one sol!tion) 21his is
apparently ho- Rose can co*e to the point of attrib!ting "cot!s>s ethics to =ele!#e
L1B8M--ith the belief$ one *!st ass!*e$ that there can only be one ethics that corresponds
to a !nivocal conception of being)3 At the very *ost$ !nivocity gives !s an int!ition of
politics thro!gh its i*plication of an ontological e<!ality and participationD this e<!ality
is -hat Ecro-nsF the anarchy of being in =ele!#e>s acco!nt 2Diff#rence et r#p#tition 773)
5 -o!ld *aintain$ ho-ever$ that in order to bring this int!ition to a veritable conception
of C!stice in =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ to *ove in effect fro* ontology to politics$ -e need to
pass thro!gh at least t-o *ore i*portant phases) %irst$ -e *!st loo4 at the conception of
efficient po-er 2force internal to its *anifestation3 developed in the st!dy of &iet#sche$
beca!se this fo!nds an attac4 on la- and C!ridicis*)
10
"econd$ -e *!st t!rn to the st!dy
of "pino#a for its investigation of co**on notions$ of socially constit!tive practice and
of right$ so that =ele!#e can elaborate a positive alternative to la-) 2us vers!s le,) 1his a
*!ch *ore ade<!ate for*!lation of =ele!#e>s position against legalis* and C!ridicis*)
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Cha&ter +
,ietzschean #thics
From #fficient Power to an #thics of Affirmation
5n order to appreciate =ele!#e>s -or4 on &iet#sche -e have to sit!ate it in the conte@t of
the develop*ent of =ele!#e>s o-n proCect) iet!sche and Philosophy is the concrete
res!lt of the Eeight-year holeF in =ele!#e>s intellect!al life$ the longest gap in his prolific
career) According to =ele!#e$ tho!gh$ s!ch a gap is not indicative of inactivityD on the
contrary$ Eperhaps it is in the holes that the *ove*ent ta4es placeF 2E"ignes et
QvQne*entsF 163) 1he -or4 on &iet#sche$ then$ -ill perhaps give !s a 4ey to reading the
*ove*ent that ani*ates =ele!#e>s early -or4) 1his st!dy of &iet#sche is the intervention
that gives rise to the i*portant differences bet-een the t-o phases of ergson st!dy that
-e disc!ssed in chapter 1) .e can s!**ari#e this reorientation by saying that ergson>s
positive$ logical dyna*is* has entered a ne- hori#on$ a field of forces$ -here all the
logical iss!es are posed no- in ter*s of sense and val!e) An this ne- terrain$ all 4inds of
ne- fig!res i**ediately spring !p) Most i*portant$ the heart of the ergsonian logical
disc!ssion is transfor*ed into an analysis of the nat!re of po-er) 1he analysis of po-er
provides the basis for the f!nda*ental passage in =ele!#e>s st!dy of &iet#sche' fro* the
ontological fo!ndation of po-er to the ethical creation of being) %inally$ -e sho!ld refer
the st!dy of &iet#sche not only bac4 to the previo!s -or4 on ergson$ b!t also for-ard
to the s!bse<!ent st!dy of "pino#a) .e -ill find that =ele!#e>s constr!ction of an ethical
hori#on -ithin the fra*e-or4 of &iet#sche>s tho!ght brings to light the <!estions that
*a4e possible 2or indeed necessary3 his s!bse<!ent investigation of "pino#ian practice)
-90-
+(' "he Paradox of #nemies
5n the st!dy of &iet#sche$ as in that of ergson$ =ele!#e>s analysis is driven by an
antagonis* to-ard Hegel) Here$ ho-ever$ =ele!#e>s strategy of triang!lation that -e
disc!ssed earlier 2"ection 1)13 beco*es *ore co*plicated and *ore a*big!o!s)
Altho!gh iet!sche and Philosophy contains so*e of =ele!#e>s harshest rhetoric against
Hegel$ the pole*ical foc!s is already *oving a-ay fro* Hegel in i*portant -ays) As in
the ergson st!dies$ =ele!#e brings in other antagonists -ho are closer to &iet#sche>s
position and -ho share so*e of his concerns in order to *aintain the vast distance fro*
HegelD =ele!#e ref!ses to descend and str!ggle on Hegel>s o-n terrain) Ance again$ -e
find that Hegel inherits the fa!lts of the pro@i*ate antagonists and ta4es the* to their
e@tre*e$ as a sort of negative raising to the nth po-er)
1he a*big!ities in =ele!#e>s position$ ho-ever$ are all those related to his developing
conceptions of antagonis* and opposition) =ele!#e gives see*ingly contradictory
indications abo!t the best -ay to choose and relate to one>s ene*y) 5n several passages$
-e find that =ele!#e vie-s the f!nda*ental antagonis* to-ard Hegel as an !rgent and
central ele*ent of his reading of &iet#sche' E.e -ill *is!nderstand the -hole of
&iet#sche>s -or4 if -e do not see >against -ho*> its principal concepts are directed)
Hegelian the*es are present in this -or4 as the ene*y against -hich it fightsF 21093)
EAnti-Hegelianis* r!ns thro!gh &iet#sche>s -or4 as its c!tting edgeF 263) And finally$
&iet#sche>s philosophy for*s Ean absol!te anti-dialecticsF 21973) 5n these passages the
need for a direct confrontation -ith Hegel is very clear) 5n other passages$ ho-ever$
=ele!#e tries to displace the relationship to Hegel$ to destroy its binary character -ith the
sa*e type of triang!lar config!ration -e fo!nd in the ergson st!dies'
&iet#sche>s relation to Hant is li4e Mar@>s to Hegel' &iet#sche stands criti<!e on its feet$
C!st as Mar@ does -ith the dialecticNthe dialectic co*es fro* the original Hantian for*
of the criti<!e) 1here -o!ld have been no need to p!t the dialectic bac4 on its feet$ nor
Eto doF any for* of dialectics if criti<!e itself had not been standing on its head fro* the
start) 2693
5n this passage it see*s that Hegel is not of real concern to &iet#scheD the dialectic
constit!tes a false proble*) 5nstead$ &iet#sche addresses Hant as his pro@i*ate ene*y)
1hese t-o stances for* a parado@' 5s &iet#sche>s pri*ary antagonis* -ith Hant$ the
pro@i*ate ene*y$ or -ith Hegel$ the !lti*ate ene*yP =ele!#e has to navigate bet-een
"cylla and Charybdis) Posing &iet#sche as the !lti*ate anti-Hegel presents a real dangerD
&iet#sche
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appears in the position of negation$ of reaction$ of ressentiment) And f!rther*ore$
absol!te opposition see*s 2in a Hegelian fra*e-or43 to i*ply the initiation of a ne-
dialectical process) Ho-ever$ if -e try instead to foc!s only on a pro@i*ate ene*y 2s!ch
as Hant3 and do not recogni#e anti-Hegelianis* as the f!nda*ental driving force$ E-e
-ill *is!nderstand the -hole of &iet#sche>s -or4F 21093)
.e can get a preli*inary idea of =ele!#e>s treat*ent of this proble* of ene*ies by
loo4ing at his reading of $he (irth of $ragedy) =ele!#e finds that this early te@t presents
a Ese*i-dialecticalF arg!*ent based on the =ionys!sTApollo antithesis 2133) =ele!#e
gives an elegant e@planation of this proble* in ter*s of an evol!tion of &iet#sche>s
tho!ght that resolves the antino*ic co!ple in t-o directions' on one hand$ to-ard a *ore
profo!nd opposition 2=ionys!sT"ocrates or$ later$ =ionys!sTChrist3 and$ on the other
hand$ to-ard a co*ple*entarity 2=ionys!sTAriadne3 21:3) 5n the second co!ple$ that of
co*ple*entarity$ the ene*y has co*pletely disappeared and the relationship is one of
*!t!al affir*ationD this co!ple is prod!ctive$ b!t cannot s!ffice on its o-n beca!se it
does not provide &iet#sche a -eapon -ith -hich to attac4 his ene*ies) 1he first co!ple
does constit!te a -eapon$ b!t in a proble*atical fashion) According to =ele!#e$
&iet#sche first shifts fro* Apollo to "ocrates as the real ene*y of =ionys!s$ b!t this
proves ins!fficient beca!se E"ocrates is too ,ree4$ a little too Apollonian at the o!tset
beca!se of his clarity$ a little too =ionysian in the endF 21:3) .hen "ocrates proves to be
*erely a pro@i*ate ene*y$ &iet#sche discovers the f!nda*ental ene*y in Christ) Here$
ho-ever$ -ith the Antichrist and the opposition and negation it i*plies$ -e see* to r!n
the ris4 of initiating a ne- dialectic) =ele!#e clai*s that this is not the case' E1he
opposition of =ionys!s or Sarath!stra to Christ is not a dialectical opposition$ b!t
opposition to the dialectic itself 2183) .hat e@actly is this nondialectical negation$ and
-hat *ar4s its difference fro* dialectical negationP .e do not have the *eans to give
the ans-er yet$ b!t the <!estion itself sets the tone and the tas4 for =ele!#e>s reading) 1he
ans-er -ill have to be fo!nd in &iet#sche>s total criti<!eD it *!st constit!te an absol!tely
destr!ctive negation that spares nothing fro* its force and rec!perates nothing fro* its
ene*yD it *!st be an absol!te aggression that offers no pardons$ ta4es no prisoners$
pillages no goodsD it *!st *ar4 the death of the ene*y$ -ith no res!rrection) 1his is the
radical$ nondialectical negation that =ele!#e>s reading of &iet#sche *!st develop)
+(+ "he "ranscendental %ethod and the Partial Criti5ue
Hant>s enor*o!s contrib!tion to philosophy is to conceive of an i**anent criti<!e that is
both total and positive) Hant$ ho-ever$ fails to carry o!t this
-96-
proCect$ and th!s &iet#sche>s role$ according to =ele!#e$ is to correct Hant>s errors and
salvage the proCect 2693) 1he principal fa!lt of the Hantian criti<!e is that of
transcendental philosophy itself) 5n other -ords$ Hant>s discovery of a do*ain beyond the
sensible is the creation of a region o!tside the bo!nds of the criti<!e that effectively
f!nctions as a ref!ge against critical forces$ as a li*itation on critical po-ers) A total
criti<!e$ on the contrary$ re<!ires a *aterialistic$ *onistic perspective in -hich the entire
!nified hori#on is open and v!lnerable to the criti<!e>s destabili#ing in<!iry) 1herefore$ it
is the transcendental *ethod itself that re<!ires 2or allo-s3 that the criti<!e re*ain
partial) .ith the ideal val!es safely protected in the s!prasensible$ the Hantian criti<!e
can proceed to treat clai*s to tr!th and *orality -itho!t endangering tr!th and *orality
the*selves) Hant effectively grants i**!nity to the established val!es of the r!ling order
and Eth!s total criti<!e t!rns into a politics of co*pro*iseF 2693) Hant>s critical reason
f!nctions to reinforce the established val!es and *a4e !s obedient to the*' E.hen -e
stop obeying ,od$ the "tate$ o!r parents$ reason appears and pers!ades !s to contin!e
being docileF 2993) 1he very positing of the transcendental plane and the conse<!ent
partiality of the criti<!e$ then$ is -hat allo-s Hantianis* to be conservative) Under the
cloa4 of disinterest$ Hant appears as a passive "tate f!nctionary$ a traditional intellect!al
in ,ra*scian ter*s$ legiti*ating the val!es of the r!ling po-ers and protecting the*
fro* critical forces) %inally$ Hant>s criti<!e is too polite$ restrained by the Eh!*ble
recognition of the rights of the criticisedF 2693) Hant is too genteel$ too -ell *annered$
too ti*id to <!estion serio!sly the f!nda*ental established val!es) 5n contrast$ the total
criti<!e recogni#es no restraints$ no li*its on its po-er$ and is therefore necessarily
ins!rrectionalD a total criti<!e *!st be an all-o!t attac4 on the established val!es and the
r!ling po-ers they s!pport) Criti<!e is al-ays violence-this is not the real iss!e) 1he
iss!e is the e@tent of$ and the li*its on$ the reign of criti<!e>s destr!ctive force)
1he Hantian criti<!e not only fails to be total$ b!t it also fails to be positiveD in effect$ the
fail!re to be total obstr!cts the possibility of being positive) 1he negative$ destr!ctive
*o*ent of the criti<!e *pars destruens+ that dra-s the total hori#on into <!estion and
destabili#es previo!sly e@isting po-ers *!st clear the terrain to allo- the prod!ctive
*o*ent *pars canstruens+ to release or create ne- po-ers-destr!ction opens the -ay for
creation) 1herefore$ Hant>s do!ble fail!re is really one) 1his concl!sion follo-s directly
fro* &iet#sche>s foc!s on val!es' EAne of the principal *otifs of &iet#sche>s -or4 is that
Hant had not carried o!t a tr!e criti<!e beca!se he -as not able to pose the proble* of
criti<!e in ter*s of val!esF 213) 1he partiality of the first destr!ctive *o*ent of the
criti<!e allo-s the essential established val!es to end!re and therefore fails to clear the
gro!nd necessary for the val!e-creating$
-99-
constr!ctive po-er) 1he Eactive instanceF 2693 that the Hantian criti<!e lac4s is precisely
that -hich tr!ly legislates' 1o legislate is not to legiti*ate order and preserve val!es$ b!t
precisely the opposite$ to create ne- val!es 2913) 1his criti<!e of val!es forces !s to
consider the <!estion of interest and perspective) "ince -e can accept no transcendental
standpoint e@ternal to the plane of forces that deter*ines and legiti*ates absol!te
4no-ledge and !niversal val!es$ -e *!st locate the perspective on the i**anent plane
and identify the interests it serves) 1herefore$ the only possible principle of a total
criti<!e is perspectivis* 29B3)
1his attac4 on Hant>s transcendental *ethod$ invo4ing perspectivis*$ goes hand in hand
-ith the &iet#schean attac4 on Platonic idealis*) =ele!#e approaches this iss!e by
considering Ethe for* of the <!estionF that ani*ates philosophical in<!iry) 1he central
<!estion for Platonic in<!iry$ =ele!#e clai*s$ is EU!>est-ce <!ePF' E.hat is bea!ty$ -hat
is C!stice$ etcPF 2803) &iet#sche$ tho!gh$ -ants to change the central <!estion to EU!iPF'
E.ho is bea!tif!lP$ F or rather$ E.hich one is bea!tif!lPF Ance again$ the foc!s of the
attac4 is the transcendental *ethod) EU!>est-ce <!ePF is the transcendental <!estion par
e@cellence that see4s an ideal that stands above$ as a s!prasensible principle ordering the
vario!s *aterial instantiations) EU!iPF is a *aterialist <!estion that loo4s to the
*ove*ent of real forces fro* a specific perspective) 5n effect$ the t-o <!estions point to
different -orlds for their ans-ers) =ele!#e -ill later call the *aterialist <!estion Ethe
*ethod of dra*ati#ationF and insist that it is the pri*ary for* of in<!iry thro!gho!t the
history of philosophy 2e@cept perhaps in the -or4 of Hegel3)
1
1he *ethod of
dra*ati#ation$ then$ is an elaboration of perspectivis* as part of a criti<!e of interest and
val!e' E5t is not eno!gh to pose the abstract <!estion >-hat is tr!thP> *3u'est4ce 3ue le
vrai+FD rather -e *!st as4 E-ho -ants tr!th *3ui veut le vrai+, -hen and -here$ ho- and
ho- *!chPF 2E+a *Qthode de dra*atisationF 973) 1he obCect of the attac4 in the <!estion
EU!>est-ce <!ePF is the transcendental space that it i*plies$ and that provides a sanct!ary
for established val!es fro* the destr!ctive po-er of in<!iry and criti<!e) 1his
transcendental space i**!ne fro* the criti<!e is the loc!s of order) .e can certainly
detect a ergsonian inspiration in this arg!*ent) 1he <!estion EU!>est-ce <!ePF re*ains
abstract beca!se it i*plies t-o errors' 213 5t see4s essence in a static <!idditas rather than
in a dyna*ic of *ove*ent 2and th!s can only reveal differences of degree$ not
differences of nat!re3D and 293 it ass!*es either a for*al or a final ca!se 2the for* of
C!stice and tr!th$ of the ?!st and the 1r!e3 as the ordering principle of reality) 1he
<!estion EU!iPF that brings !s to the terrain of -ill and val!e as4s for an i**anent
dyna*ic of being$ an internal$ efficient force of differentiation)
-3B-
!emark: Deleuze6s $election of the 7Im&ersonal8 ,ietzsche
.e *!st be caref!l -ith the <!estion EU!iPF$ ho-ever$ beca!se in =ele!#e>s &iet#sche
the ans-er it see4s -ill never be fo!nd in an individ!al or collective s!bCect$ b!t rather in
a pres!bCective force or -ill) 1he diffic!lties presented for the /nglish translation of this
passage serve to highlight the proble*' H!gh 1o*linson notes that E-hoF cannot
f!nction as a translation of E<!iF beca!se it directs in<!iry to-ard a personD therefore$ at
=ele!#e>s s!ggestion he translates E<!iF as E-hich oneF 29B8$ note 33) =ele!#e tries to
e@plain this n!ance f!rther in his preface to the /nglish translation' EHere -e *!st rid
o!rselves of all >personalist> references) 1he one thatNdoes not refer to an individ!al$ to a
person$ b!t rather to an event$ that is$ to the forces in their vario!s relationships in a
proposition or a pheno*enon$ and the genetic relationship that deter*ines these forces
2po-er3F 2@i3) 1his insistence on the i*personal nat!re of the <!estion EU!iPF casts a
different light on =ele!#e>s charge that the <!estion EU!>est-ce <!ePF is abstract) 1he
i*personal EU!iPF is not *ore concrete beca!se it locates specific s!bCects or agents$ b!t
beca!se it operates on the *aterialist terrain of an efficient ca!sality)
5t is often a strain to read &iet#sche -itho!t adopting personalist references) &ot only is
there a long tradition of reading &iet#sche in this -ay$ b!t also it -o!ld not be diffic!lt to
cite several passages in -hich -e cannot help b!t read &iet#sche Epersonally)F Here -e
have a very clear e@a*ple of =ele!#e>s selectivity) 5n effect$ =ele!#e brings a ergsonian
approach to &iet#sche so as to read hi* in logical ter*s$ that is$ as a logic of the -ill and
val!e that ani*ates the field of pres!bCective forces) .henever -e as4 the <!estion
EU!iPF -e are going to loo4 to a certain -ill to po-er for the response 2cf) 733) =ele!#e>s
research *oves fro* a ergsonian logic of being to a &iet#schean logic of the -ill) 5t is
clear$ then$ ho- =ele!#e>s selection fits in -ith the scope of his proCect) 1he
Ei*personalF interpretative strategy can also be seen as a political selection) 5n fact$
=ele!#e>s reading has$ *ade s!ch a profo!nd i*pression on &iet#sche st!dies partly
beca!se it s!cceeds in *a4ing so *!ch of &iet#sche>s tho!ght -hile avoiding or
effectively diff!sing the force of arg!*ents abo!t &iet#sche>s individ!alis* and
reactionary politics$ nearly all of -hich are centered aro!nd a EpersonalistF interpretation
and selection) 5 -ill arg!e$ ho-ever$ that altho!gh this selection *ay be necessary for
=ele!#e$ it is effectively this Ei*personalF aspect that *ar4s the li*it of =ele!#e>s
develop*ent of ethical and political veins in &iet#sche)
-31-
+(. $lave 9ogic and #fficient Power
1h!s far -e have considered =ele!#e>s &iet#schean attac4s on the pro@i*ate ene*ies$
Hant and Plato) 1he direct &iet#schean attac4 on Hegel$ the f!nda*ental ene*y$ appears
first in ergsonian for*) As in the -or4s on ergson$ =ele!#e>s initial charge against the
dialectic is once again that it is driven by a negative *ove*ent that cannot arrive at a
concrete$ sing!lar conception of being) Contradiction and opposition can only give
abstract res!lts 21783 and can only lead to an abstract deter*ination of being$ blind to its
s!btle n!ances$ to its sing!larity' E1he being of Hegelian logic is *erely >tho!ght> being$
p!re and e*pty$ that affir*s itself by passing into its o-n opposite) !t this being -as
never different fro* its opposite$ it never had to pass into -hat it already -as) Hegelian
being is p!re and si*ple nothingnessF 21633) 1he core of this attac4 is that Hegelian
being is abstract$ not really different fro* its opposite) =ele!#e$ ho-ever$ provides no
s!bstantial fo!ndation for these clai*s here$ and therefore they can so!nd rather hollo-
!nless -e read ergson>s criti<!e of deter*ination into the*) .e have seen that ergson
arg!es that difference is only conceived as opposition thro!gh an abstraction fro* real
differences$ by an i*precise vie- of realityD real difference does not go Eall the -ayF to
opposition) Moreover$ the *ove*ent i*plied by this Hegelian being Epassing into its
oppositeF is a co*pletely e@ternal$ and th!s false$ *ove*ent that can never *ove closer
to a real$ concrete affir*ation) Hence$ Hegelian ontological *ove*ent re*ains abstract
and accidental) 5n effect$ =ele!#e>s &iet#sche ta4es this ergsonian analysis of the
abstract character of the negative ontological *ove*ent of deter*ination for granted)
Ance -e recogni#e that ergsonian arg!*ents are f!nctioning as the fo!ndation for this
disc!ssion$ then$ it sho!ld be no s!rprise that =ele!#e finds a ergsonian alternative in
&iet#sche' E%or the spec!lative ele*ent of negation$ opposition or contradiction$
&iet#sche s!bstit!tes the practical ele*ent of differenceF 293) 1his is very re*iniscent of
ergson$ e@cept that -e can note that the ter*s of the conflict have beco*e *ore
concrete-no- the Espec!lative ele*entF is contrasted -ith the Epractical ele*ent)F 5n
fact$ the advent of &iet#sche in =ele!#e>s tho!ght transfor*s the ergsonian theoretical
scene -ith a very i*portant contrib!tion) .e no longer have p!rely logical categories
2e@ternal vs) internal difference$ and negative vs) positive ontological *ove*ent3$ b!t
no- the logic is presented in ter*s of volition and val!e 2negation vs) affir*ation$ and
interiority vs) e@teriority3) 1his shift to the hori#on of forces *ar4s the tendency in
=ele!#e>s tho!ght that -e noted earlier in the second phase of ergson st!dy) 1he
transposition to the terrain of val!es *ar4s the beginning of o!r traCectory fro* ontology
to ethics and politics)
-39-
1he co*ple@ity of this ne- terrain and the i*portance of &iet#sche>s transfor*ation
beco*e evident as =ele!#e treats &iet#sche>s pole*ic against slave logic and thereby
develops a ne- attac4 on the Hegelian dialectic' E&iet#sche presents the dialectic as the
spec!lation of the pleb$ as the -ay of thin4ing of the slave' the abstract tho!ght of
contradiction then prevails over the concrete feeling of positive differenceF 21B3) An this
ne- terrain -e have dra*atic personae representing the t-o philosophical *ethods' the
slave of abstract spec!lation vers!s the *aster of concrete pathos and practice) .e are
entering a very diffic!lt passage$ tho!gh$ and sho!ld be caref!l to recogni#e fro* the
o!tset the specific foc!s and pole*ical content of =ele!#e>s arg!*ent) Clearly$ =ele!#e
is reading 5n the 6enealogy of 'orals as a harsh attac4 against Hegel-b!t against -hich
HegelP "ince -e are dealing -ith the *aster and the slave$ it see*s obvio!s that
=ele!#e>s target is the Phenomenology of Spirit, or perhaps HoCIve>s pop!lari#ed version
of it) Ho-ever$ if -e posit this as the foc!s$ =ele!#e>s attac4 see*s so*e-hat
*isdirected) 5n a very caref!l and intelligent st!dy of iet!sche and Philosophy, ?ean
.ahl notes the shortco*ings of this attac4' E5sn>t there in the Phenomenology of Spirit
so*ething *ore profo!nd that is able to resist the &iet#schean criti<!ePF 230:3) .ahl is
!ndo!btedly correct in noting that =ele!#e>s &iet#sche does not directly confront Hegel>s
central foc!s in the Phenomenology; b!t this sho!ld indicate to !s that perhaps -e have
*isinterpreted the pri*ary target) Here -e need to refine the first *ethodological
principle -e presented in the EPreli*inary Re*ar4F' 5t is necessary not only to recogni#e
Eagainst -ho*F the pole*ic is directed$ b!t against -hich specific arg!*ent)
.e gain a *ore ade<!ate vie- of the &iet#schean attac4 presented here if -e read it as a
contin!ation of the pole*ic against Hegel>s Science of %ogic) 5n effect$ =ele!#e has ta4en
the logical attac4 developed in ergson and added the <!estion of -ill-E.ho -ills a
negative ontological *ove*entPF 1his is the *ethod of dra*ati#ation' 5n ergson$
=ele!#e as4s the Platonic <!estion E.hat is the negative logic of beingPFD b!t no-$ -ith
&iet#sche$ he can *a4e the disc!ssion *ore concrete by dra*ati#ing the investigation in
ter*s of -ill) .e sho!ld be caref!l to 4eep in *ind$ tho!gh$ that the <!estion EU!iPF
does not find its ans-er in an individ!al$ a gro!p$ or even a social classD rather$ EU!iPF
leads !s to identify a 4ind of force$ or a specific <!ality of -ill) 5n this dra*ati#ation$
then$ the slave is the persona -ho plays the -ill to a negative *ove*ent) &iet#sche
presents the slave syllogis* as the false atte*pt to arrive at self-affir*ation) Ance again$
even tho!gh -e are dealing -ith the <!estion of self-affir*ation$ the disc!ssion has
nothing to do -ith the s!bCect of conscio!sness$ b!t rather deals strictly -ith a logic of
val!ation dra*ati#ed in ter*s of t-o personae) 1he slave plays the negative logic of
val!ation' EVo! are evilD therefore 5 a*
-33-
good)F 1he *aster>s syllogis* is the inverse' E5 a* goodD therefore yo! are evilF 21193)
=ele!#e brilliantly brings this bac4 to the <!estion of logical *ove*ent by foc!sing on
the different f!nction of EthereforeF in the t-o cases) 5n the *aster>s syllogis*$ the first
cla!se is independent and th!s carries the essential$ positive state*entD EthereforeF
*erely introd!ces a negative correlate) Master logic appears in =ele!#e>s description as a
sort of efficient ca!sality of val!ation-the effect is co*pletely internal to the ca!se and
co*es forth thro!gh a logical e*anation) E1hereforeF *ar4s the necessity of an internal
*ove*ent) 5n the slave>s syllogis*$ ho-ever$ EthereforeF plays a co*pletely different
roleD it atte*pts to reverse the negative first cla!se to arrive at a positive concl!sion)
"lave logic tries to operate a co*pletely e@ternal *ove*ent by !sing the logical operator
EthereforeF to relate the t-o opposite cla!ses) 5f -e try to pose this logic in ca!sal ter*s$
-e find that the slave>s EthereforeF can only *ar4 a causa per accidens) %!rther*ore$ the
slave>s second cla!se cannot be a real affir*ation beca!se the effect 2E5 a* goodF3 cannot
contain *ore perfection or reality than its ca!se 2EVo! are evilF3) E1his is the strange
syllogis* of the slave' he needs t-o negations in order to prod!ce an appearance of
affir*ationF 21913) =ele!#e is clearly dra-ing on the ergsonian logical charges against
the negative *ove*ent of the dialectic) 1he affir*ation of the slave$ li4e the
deter*ination of the dialectic$ is a false *ove*ent that *erely prod!ces a Es!bsistent
e@teriority)F
.hile this first &iet#schean attac4 on slave logic is loo4ing bac4 to ergson for its
fo!ndation 2since no- -ill and force have co*e into play3$ =ele!#e is also able to
develop a f!rther$ and *ore po-erf!l$ acc!sation$ -hich loo4s for-ard to "pino#a)
&egation ta4es on a different for* in the field of forces' 1he second negation of the slave
syllogis* 2contained in EthereforeF3 is a p!rely logical negation$ -hereas the first
negation 2EVo! are evilF3 is a negative evaluation) =ele!#e e@plains that the negative
val!e given to the other fro* the slave perspective is not attrib!ted si*ply beca!se the
other is strong$ b!t beca!se the other does not restrain that strength) 1his is -here
=ele!#e locates the pri*ary slave paralogis*' 1he initial eval!ative negation is based on
Ethe fiction of a force separated fro* -hat it can doF 21933) 1he slave logic negates the
force of the strong not by opposing it -ith another force$ b!t by the EfictionF of dividing
it into t-o parts) 1his fictitio!s division creates the space for the i*p!tation of evil' 5t is
not evil to be strong$ b!t it is evil to carry that strength into action) 1he slave>s eval!ative
negation is based on a false conception of the nat!re of po-er) 1he slave *aintains that
po-er is a capacity$ e@terior or transcendent to the field of forces$ that can be *anifest in
action or not) 1his separation of po-er into t-o parts allo-s for the creation of a
Efictitio!sF ca!sal relationship' E1he *anifestation is t!rned into an effect that is re-
-3:-
ferred to the force as if it -ere a distinct and separated ca!seF 21933) 1he slave sets !p a
relationship in -hich force appears as *erely a for*al ca!se-force represents a possible
*anifestation)
9
&iet#sche>s *aster$ ho-ever$ insists that po-er e@ists only en acte and
cannot be separated fro* its *anifestation' EConcrete force is that -hich goes to its
!lti*ate conse<!ences$ to the li*it of po-er or desireF 2733) 1he *aster conceives an
internal$ necessary relationship bet-een a force and its *anifestation)
.hat is the reasoning behind =ele!#e>s clai* hereP y -hat logic is slave po-er *erely
a Efiction$ F and *aster po-er *ore real or concreteP Abvio!sly$ this cannot be read as
si*ply an e*pirical observation beca!se &iet#sche -o!ld be the first to say that slave
po-er is very real$ and$ indeed$ it is the *ore prevalent conception in history$ to s!ch an
e@tent that Ethe strong al-ays have to be defended against the -ea4F 2763) 1o !nderstand
this arg!*ent$ -e have to bring it bac4 once again to the ontological plane)
3
As -e noted
earlier$ in "cholastic ontologies the essence of being is its Eprod!ctivityF and its
Eprod!cibility$ F or$ in "pino#ian ter*s$ po-er is the essence of being 2Ethics 5P3:3)
1herefore$ the slave conception is a EfictionF precisely beca!se it introd!ces an accidental
<!ality into the po-er of being by setting !p an e@ternal ca!sal relation) 1he *aster logic
provides a *ore s!bstantial conception of po-er by posing the effect$ the *anifestation
internal to the ca!se$ that is$ internal to being) 1his eval!ation follo-s fro* a *aterialist
conception of being$ and .illia* Ac4ha*$ one of the strictest *aterialists in the .estern
tradition$ e@presses the point clearly'
1he distinction bet-een potential e@istence 0ens in potentia1 and act!al e@istence 0ens in
actu1Ndoes not *ean that so*ething that is not in the !niverse$ b!t can e@ist in the
!niverse$ is tr!ly a being$ or that so*ething else that is in the !niverse is also a being)
Rather$ -hen Aristotle divides EbeingF into potentiality and act!alityNhe has in *ind
that the na*e EbeingF is predicated of so*e thing by *eans of the verb Eis$ F in a
proposition that *erely states a fact concerning a thing and is not e<!ivalent to a
proposition containing the *ode of possibilityN) Hence$ Aristotle declares in the sa*e
place that Ebeing is divisible into potential and act!al$ as 4no-ledge and rest areFD b!t
nothing is 4no-ing or resting !nless it is act!ally 4no-ing or resting) 2Philosophical
7ritings 993
Ac4ha*>s insight leads !s directly to the n!cle!s of =ele!#e>s &iet#schean distinction
bet-een *aster po-er and slave po-er) 1o say that Ethe na*e >being> is predicated of
so*e thing by *eans of the verb >is>F is to say that the po-er of being is necessarily$
efficiently lin4ed to its *anifestation$ that the force of being is inseparable fro* E-hat it
can do)F 1he slave>s conception of po-er is a EfictionF beca!se it fails to recogni#e the
real s!b-
-37-
stantial nat!re of being$ and tries to *aintain a separation bet-een the potential and the
act!al thro!gh a notion of possibility) "lave po-er is real and certainly does e@ist$ b!t it
cannot e@ist as a real e@pression of s!bstance) 1he *aster conception of po-er reveals
being in its act!al prod!ctivityD in other -ords$ it e@presses the essence of being as the
act!al and efficient 2not *erely possible or for*al3 po-er of being) %ra*ing the
disc!ssion in these ter*s$ -e can see that &iet#sche>s arg!*ent has to do not -ith the
<!antity of po-er$ b!t -ith its <!ality) E.hat &iet#sche calls -ea4 or slavish is not the
least strong b!t that -hich$ -hatever its strength$ is separated fro* -hat it can doF 2013)
1he entire disc!ssion of po-er has little to do -ith strength or capacity$ b!t -ith the
relation bet-een essence and *anifestation$ bet-een po-er and -hat it can do) .hat
&iet#sche contrib!tes to this disco!rse on po-er is an eval!ation-he C!dges the po-er
internal to its *anifestation as noble)
:

1his analysis of the nat!re of po-er is already very s!ggestive of an ethics) =ele!#e
brings o!t the ethical and political i*plications of the t-o types of po-er -ith an
interesting co*parison bet-een &iet#sche and Callicles'
Callicles strives to disting!ish nat!re and la-) /verything that separates a force fro*
-hat it can do he calls la-) +a-$ in this sense$ e@presses the tri!*ph of the -ea4 over the
strong) &iet#sche adds' the tri!*ph of reaction over action) 5ndeed$ everything that
separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated fro* -hat it can do) /very
force that goes to the li*it of its po-er is$ on the contrary$ active) 5t is not a la- that
every force goes to the li*it$ it is even the opposite of a la-) 276-793
1his passage presents a terrain that is very close to that of "pino#a>s political -ritings)
%irst "pino#a affir*s that po-erWvirt!eWright$ and then he opposes jus to le,) 1his
for*!lation serves "pino#a as an e@tension of his ethics and as the fo!ndation for a
viable$ de*ocratic politics) Ho-ever$ at this point in o!r reading of =ele!#e>s &iet#sche$
-e do not yet have the practical$ constr!ctive ele*ents necessary to elaborate this ethical
and political terrain) .e have a s!bstantial theory of po-er that can serve as an attac4 on
C!ridicis* 2based on the conception of po-er it i*plies3$ b!t -e do yet not have any
positive alternative to co*ple*ent this attac4) 1o fill o!t this alternative -e -ill have to
-ait !ntil -e can elaborate a conception of ethical practice) %or the *o*ent$ then$ -e can
only read the &iet#schean analysis of po-er as s!ggestive of a f!t!re ethics and politics)
.e have *ade great progress in fleshing o!t the logic and val!e of &iet#sche>s distinction
bet-een *aster po-er and slave po-er) Ho-ever$ it is clear that Hegel>s *aster and slave
do not tread directly on this sa*e terrain) Hegel>s slave is interested in conscio!sness and
independenceD he
-30-
is too preocc!pied -ith his death$ and too b!sy thin4ing abo!t his -or4$ to pose the
<!estion of val!e)
7
/vidently$ the preceding disc!ssion has not been dealing -ith the
Phenomenology) =ele!#e directs the &iet#schean attac4 not against Hegel>s *aster and
slave$ b!t against an e@trapolation fro* Hegel>s Science of %ogic) .e no longer as4 the
<!estion E.hat is the dialectical logic of beingPF b!t E.ho -ills this logicPF 1his is the
line of reasoning that leads !s to *aster and slave val!ation and to the t-o conceptions of
po-er) 1h!s$ =ele!#e cond!cts a second-order criti<!e of Hegel that b!ilds on
ergsonian logic and loo4s for-ard to "pino#ian politics) .e sho!ld note that =ele!#e>s
tactics for attac4ing Hegel have changed so*e-hat) /ven if the rhetoric has intensified$
the pole*ic no longer applies directly to Hegel>s arg!*entD it addresses a derivation fro*
Hegel$ an i*plication of his dialectic) 1his ne- tactic affords =ele!#e a greater a!tono*y
fro* Hegelian ter*inology$ and$ in effect$ it transports the dialectic to =ele!#e>s terrain
2in this case$ of sense and val!e3 so that he can carry o!t the co*bat there)
!emark: "he !esurgence of ,egativit
A parenthesis abo!t "teven Ho!lgate>s response to =ele!#e>s charges against slave logic
in Hegel, iet!sche and the 8riticism of 'etaphysics can help !s fra*e the i*portance of
the arg!*ents -e have presented) Ho!lgate>s proCect is to defend Hegel against the recent
charges -ielded by the %rench &iet#scheans 2=ele!#e in partic!lar3 and$ li4e a good
Hegelian$ to go bac4 on the offensive$ de*onstrating that not only is Hegel inv!lnerable
to &iet#schean criti<!es$ b!t he act!ally co*pletes the &iet#schean proCect better than
&iet#sche hi*self did) He *a4es t-o central co!nterattac4s against =ele!#e>s
&iet#scheanis*' 213 5t fails to appreciate that Hegel>s negative logic is re<!ired for
deter*ination$ and 293 its conception of self does not *eet the re<!ire*ents to achieve
gen!ine interiority) ,iven o!r reading of the evol!tion of =ele!#e>s -or4 and the
develop*ent of his proCect$ it sho!ld be clear that these t-o points are -ell off the *ar4)
Ho!lgate e@plains'
Hegel>s dialectic is not in fact based !pon an initial e,ternal negation of the specific
differences bet-een things$ and does not therefore constit!te a flight into an abstract
-orld of fictional concepts as =ele!#e assertsN) According to Hegel>s Science of %ogic,
a thing *!st be in itself the negation of so*ething elseNif it is to have any deter*inate
characteristicsNat all) 1he notion of so*ething real or specific that is not negatively
deter*ined$ or *ediated$ is precisely -hat dialectical philosophy sho-s !p to be an
i*possibility) Ho-ever$ =ele!#e fails to see Hegel>s point) 283
-38-
EA*nis deter*inatio est negatio)F Ho!lgate re*inds !s that if -e -ant deter*ination$ -e
*!st have negation) =ele!#e has sho-n !s in his st!dies on ergson that he agrees -ith
this point-b!t =ele!#e is not the one -ho -ants deter*ination) .e have seen that the
negative *ove*ent of deter*ination that fo!nds Hegelian being is$ by definition$ a
co*pletely e@ternal *ove*ent) %!rther$ -hen -e considered this *ove*ent in a ca!sal
fra*e-or4$ -e fo!nd that this e@ternal fo!ndation is abstract$ that it cannot ade<!ately
s!pport being as s!bstance$ as causa sui) .e *!st ad*it that =ele!#e does not repeat this
arg!*ent in iet!sche and Philosophy; as -e have said$ he ta4es the ergsonian point for
granted and b!ilds on it) Ho-ever$ -e have co*e bac4 to this arg!*ent so *any ti*es
no- that it can only appear co*ical -hen Ho!lgate clai*s that$ li4e &iet#sche$ =ele!#e
does not have an ade<!ate fa*iliarity -ith Hegel the logician$ doctor subtilis) E.hat are
the conse<!ences of =ele!#e>s fail!re to appreciate Hegel>s so*e-hat rarefied point of
logicPF 263) ?ean .ahl is *!ch closer to the *ar4 -hen he clai*s that =ele!#e at ti*es
falls into rhetorical e@aggerations by giving in to his !nbridled hatred for Hegel)
0

Ho!lgate>s second charge sho-s a si*ilar conf!sion of =ele!#e>s proCect) He reads
=ele!#e>s &iet#schean criti<!e as if it re*ained a refor*ist endeavor$ content to critici#e
Hegel>s *eans$ not his ends) 1h!s$ C!st as
Ho!lgate ass!*es that =ele!#e is striving for deter*ination$ -hich i*plies negation$ so
too he ass!*es as another goal the interiority of self-conscio!sness$ -hich li4e-ise
proves to re<!ire negation' E=ele!#e th!s r!les o!t the possibility that tr!e$ concrete
selfhood is to be !nderstood in ter*s of the negation of$ or *ediation by$ the otherF 283)
And f!rther' E5n contrast to Hegel$ =ele!#e does not believe that gen!ine self-
conscio!sness re<!ires conscio!sness of the other>s recognition of oneselfF 263) Ho!lgate
is ass!*ing that =ele!#e>s proCect is to refine or co*plete Hegel>s arg!*entD =ele!#e$ on
the contrary$ -ants to have nothing to do -ith self-conscio!sness and the self it gives rise
to 2cf) iet!sche and Philosophy 39$ :1-:9$ 6B3) Along -ith &iet#sche$ he vie-s it as a
sic4ness$ a ressentiment ca!sed by the reflection of a force bac4 into itself) .hat =ele!#e
is searching for$ instead$ is a prod!ctive e@teriority that is based on affir*ation 2303) .e
can see this point clearly if -e 4eep in *ind the i*plications of &iet#sche>s t-o types of
po-er) %inally$ Ho!lgate sho-s !s one reason -hy =ele!#e *ight choose not to address
directly the *aster and slave of Hegel>s Phenomenology) 1he entire terrain is oriented
to-ard pro*oting the sic4ness of interiority and self-conscio!sness)
+(1 $lave 9a:or and the Insurrectional Criti5ue
5s it tr!e$ as ?ean .ahl clai*s$ that there is so*ething richer and *ore pro-
-36-
fo!nd in Hegel>s analysis of the *aster-slave dialectic that escapes the &iet#schean
criti<!eP Ar$ on the contrary$ has =ele!#e already provided !s -ith the -eapons for an
ade<!ate &iet#schean attac4P +et !s try to test =ele!#e>s &iet#schean challenge by
bringing it onto Hegel>s o-n terrain) Hegel>s slave does not reason$ E1he *aster is evilD
therefore 5 a* goodFD instead$ -e can pose Hegel>s slave syllogis* as E5 fear death and 5
a* constrained to -or4D therefore 5 a* an independent self-conscio!sness)F 1he logic of
this syllogis* ta4es t-o ro!tes-one i*plicit path in relation to the *aster$ and one
e@plicit path in relation to the obCect of the slave>s labor--hich are lin4ed together as a
progression to describe the ed!cation of the slave)
1he i*plicit path is fo!nded on the slave>s confrontation -ith death$ Ethe absol!te +ord)F
5n this enco!nter$ the slave !ndergoes the negation of everything that is solid and stable
in its being' E!t this p!re !niversal *ove*ent$ the absol!te *elting-a-ay of everything
stable$ is the si*ple$ essential nat!re of self-conscio!sness$ absol!te negativity$ pure
being4for4self -hich is implicit in this conscio!snessF 2Phenomenology O19:3) An a first
consideration$ the i*plicit process see*s to develop the follo-ing logic' 1he initial self-
conscio!sness of the slave$ a si*ple being-for-self$ is negated in death and then
res!rrected as an affir*ation of life and as a p!re being-for-self) Ho-ever$ -e cannot
!nderstand the logic of this passage !nless -e note that this E*elting-a-ay of everything
stableF is not$ properly spea4ing$ an absol!te or total negation$ beca!se it preserves the
Eessential nat!reF of the conscio!sness !nder siege) 1he death of the slave -o!ld not
serve Hegel>s p!rposes' He -ants to destroy all that is inessential in the slave$ b!t to stop
at the threshold of essence) 1his partial aggression$ this restraint of the destr!ctive force
of dialectical negation is -hat allo-s for conservation-it is a negation E-hich s!persedes
in s!ch a -ay as to preserve and *aintain -hat is s!persededF 2O1663)
&o-$ ass!*ing -e do accept that it is the opposition 2albeit partial3 -ith death that
affir*s the life of the slave$ -e can already vent!re a ergsonian response to this i*plicit
process) 5f the difference that ani*ates life is its opposition to death$ that is$ if the
difference of life is absol!tely e@ternal$ then life appears as *erely !ns!bstantial$ as a
res!lt of chance or ha#ard$ a Es!bsistent e@teriority)F %!rther*ore$ -hen -e pose death in
general as a contradiction of life in general$ -e are dealing in ter*s too i*precise and too
abstract to arrive at the sing!larity and concreteness of the difference that defines real life
and s!bCectivity) 5n effect$ -e are dressing life in baggy clothes) +ife and death in their
abstract opposition are indifferent) 1herefore$ the affir*ation of life that the slave attains
Ein principleF thro!gh the confrontation -ith death can only be abstract and hollo-)
-39-
Hegel$ ho-ever$ i**ediately follo-s -ith a response to this challenge' E1his *o*ent of
p!re being-for-self is also e,plicit for the bonds*an$ for in the lord it e@ists for hi* as his
object) %!rther*ore$ his conscio!sness is not this dissol!tion of everything stable *erely
in principleD in his service he actually brings this abo!tF 2O19:3) Here the slave no longer
faces Ethe absol!te +ord$ F abstract death$ b!t he confronts a partic!lar *aster and is
forced to -or4) 1his e@plicit negation ta4es t-o for*s that are lin4ed together in a
progressive *ove*ent' a for*al negation in the slave>s relation to the *aster$ and an
act!al negation in the slave>s relation to his labor) 5n the *aster$ the slave is confronted
by an independent self-conscio!sness that negates hi*) Ho-ever$ the slave cannot gain
recognition fro* the *aster$ and th!s this for* of opposition can only give hi* Ethe
beginning of -isdo*)F 1he second e@plicit relationship reveals the slave>s essential
nat!re$ allo-ing hi* to beco*e Econscio!s of -hat he tr!ly isF 2O1973) 1he slave co*es
o!t of hi*self by engaging the thing as obCect of his laborD he loses or negates hi*self
and finds hi*self in the thingD finally$ he retrieves the essential nat!re of hi*self thro!gh
his negation or transfor*ation of the thing) 1hro!gh his forced labor$ then$ the slave
negates a specific other 2the aspect of hi*self that has gone o!t of hi*self3 thro!gh
-or4ing or transfor*ing it$ C!st as the *aster negates the obCect of his desire in
cons!*ing it) 1he pri*ary difference bet-een these t-o negations 2*aster desire and
slave labor3 lies in the fact that the obCect of the *aster>s desire appears as a dependent$
transitory other$ and therefore can provide only fleeting satisfactionD the obCect of the
slave>s labor$ ho-ever$ resists his negation$ and th!s appears as per*anent and
independent' E.or4Nis desire held in chec4$ fleetingness staved offF 2O1973) Master
desire$ li4e death$ is too thoro!gh in its negation for Hegel>s p!rposes' 5t is the total
destr!ction of the other and the end of the relationship) .or4$ ho-ever$ li4e the near-
death Hegel posits in fear$ is a EdialecticalF or partial negation that allo-s the Eessential
nat!reF of the other to s!rvive and th!s perpet!ates the relationship) .e can !nderstand
this entire co*ple@ process$ fro* the initial i*plicit relationship to the final e@plicit
relationship$ as the progressive ed!cation of the slave) 1he first *o*ent$ the slave>s
confrontation -ith death$ dissolves the fi@ity of his life and foc!ses his attention on the
!niversal 2Charles 1aylor$ Hegel 1773) 1his ed!cational fear prepares the slave for his
-or4) 1h!s prepared$ the slave is able$ in the second$ e@plicit *o*ent of labor$ to achieve
his tr!e self-reali#ation' He beco*es Econscio!s of -hat he tr!ly is)F
.e sho!ld ta4e a *o*ent here to clarify the ter*s of o!r reading of this passage) 1here
is a great deal of slippage and a*big!ity regarding the level of abstraction and the
register of Hegel>s arg!*ent$ -hich leave it open to a variety of interpretations) 5t is not
clear e@actly -here -e sho!ld loo4 to
-:B-
locate the *aster and the slave-in real individ!alsP in social classesP in the logical
*ove*ent of "piritP .hat is !nclear is the nat!re of the contents -e sho!ld attrib!te to
the agents of the dra*a) "ho!ld -e read the *aster-slave dialectic in personalist ter*s$ or
rather as an i*personal$ logical dra*a of beingP A Hegelian *ight i**ediately obCect to
the for* of these <!estions$ insisting that Hegel>s analysis spans the different registers
and effectively !nites the* in the *ove*ent of historical being) "pirit$ -hich is al-ays
e*bodied$ is si*!ltaneo!sly the individ!al s!bCect$ the sociohistorical s!bCect$ and the
essence of beingD th!s$ Hegel>s arg!*ent slips co*fortably bet-een personal and
i*personal references$ and bet-een *icrocos* and *acrocos*) An this basis$ *any
interpreters invo4e a personalist reading to pose the *aster-slave relation as the
affir*ation of a liberal ethics of *!t!al respect that spans both the personal and for*al
registers' EMen see4 and need the recognition of their fello-sF 21aylor 1793)
8
Ho-ever$
-hen -e refer bac4 to the arg!*ent$ it is clear that the personalist hypothesis provides
certain diffic!lties for a consistent reading of the te@t) 1he *aster ter* presents
diffic!lties beca!se$ in effect$ it can only s!ccessf!lly fit into a personali#ed *old for
brief sections of the analysis) 5n the i*plicit half of the passage$ the *aster *oves to the
e@tre*e e@tension of its role' E1he absol!te +ordF is death) 1his sho!ld already indicate
to !s that the *aster cannot be read in personal ter*s) +ater in the te@t$ ho-ever$ the
slave discovers his other in the obCect of his labor$ and thro!gh his interaction -ith this
obCect the slave gains the necessary self-recognition) 5f -e read this section as the h!*an
need to gain ac4no-ledg*ent fro* another h!*an$ ho- co!ld the slave possibly find
satisfaction thro!gh his relation to the obCect of his laborP 1he -or4ing slave gains a
reflected i*age of hi*self fro* the thing$ b!t never gains ac4no-ledg*ent fro* a
h!*an or personal other) 5ndeed$ -e can only *aintain the coherence of the passage if
-e attrib!te no personal contents to the *aster role and read it as an i*personal$ logical
role or as an obCective other) 1he <!estion re*ains$ ho-ever$ -hether -e sho!ld read the
slave>s dra*a in personal or i*personal ter*s$ as a develop*ent of a personal$ h!*an
conscio!sness 2individ!al or collective3 in an obCective -orld$ or as a p!rely logical
develop*ent) +et !s e@plore these t-o possibilities in t!rn)
5f -e read the te@t fro* a strictly logical perspective$ the *aster-slave dra*a ill!strates
the conflict bet-een t-o for*s of negation) 1he *aster negation is the villain of the
dra*a beca!se it totally destroys its obCect and ends the relationship 2the *aster$ in its
desireTcons!*ption$ brings on the death of the other3D in contrast$ the slave negation is the
hero beca!se it operates a partial destr!ction and perpet!ates its obCect 2the slave in its
labor3) Master negation does not hold bac4 its po-ers b!t attac4s -ith f!ll force$ -hile
slave negation is the *odel of restraint' Edesire held in chec4$
-:1-
fleetingness staved off)F 1his is -here =ele!#e>s &iet#sche can finally enter the
disc!ssion) Master negation is si*ply destr!ctive force carried thro!gh to its logical
concl!sion$ a force inseparable fro* its *anifestation) "lave negation is force Eheld in
chec4$ F that is$ restrained fro* f!ll e@pression) 1his is the EfictionF at the essence of
slave po-er) &iet#sche recogni#es that this slave negation is the reflective *o*ent of
self-conscio!sness$ the interiori#ation of force' E.hatever the reason that an active force
is falsified$ deprived of its conditions of operation and separated fro* -hat it can do$ it is
turned bac9 inside, turned bac9 against itself 2iet!sche and Philosophy 198-963) 1his is
perfectly coherent -ith the Hegelian arg!*ent) 1he essence of the slave that e*erges
victorio!sly fro* the dialectic is the !niversal essence of being' p!re self-conscio!sness)
5nteriority is the essence of Hegelian being) Here -e can see Hegel and &iet#sche on the
sa*e terrain$ *arching in precisely opposite directions) oth see4 to locate essence in the
*ove*ent of being$ b!t Hegel discovers a force reflected bac4 into itself 2self-
conscio!sness or interiority3$ and &iet#sche proposes a force that e*erges !nhaltingly
o!tside itself 2the -ill to po-er or e@teriority3) 1he disc!ssion co*es bac4 once again to
the nat!re of po-er) 5f$ in both cases$ the essence of being is po-er$ they are t-o
radically different conceptions of po-er) A!r ter*s are cl!*sy$ b!t the distinction is
clear' An one side$ there is po-er separated fro* -hat it can do$ Hegelian reflection$
Ac4ha*>s ens in potentia, or "pino#a>s potestas; on the other side$ there is po-er internal
to its *anifestation$ Ac4ha*>s ens in actu and "pino#a>s potentia) .e have seen that a
*odified "cholastic arg!*ent is available to =ele!#e to defend the EefficientF conception
of po-er in logical ter*s) Here$ ho-ever$ =ele!#e follo-s &iet#sche>s arg!*ent and
sho-s a series of negative practical effects that are conse<!ent on this slave victory of
interiority$ s!ch as pain$ g!ilt$ and sin 2iet!sche and Philosophy 196-313) Ance again -e
can see -hy =ele!#e *ight choose not to address Hegel>s *aster-slave dialectic directly$
beca!se the entire disc!ssion is directed to-ard self-conscio!sness$ to-ard interiority$ a
condition antithetical to Coy and affir*ation)
%!rther*ore$ in these sa*e logical ter*s and in a perfectly coherent fashion$ the
Eed!cationF of the slave reveals a critical *ethod of partial negations) 1he first *o*ent
of the criti<!e is the slave>s close confrontation -ith$ or fear of$ deathD this *o*ent is the
pars destruens, b!t it is a li*ited pars destruens since the Eessential nat!reF of the slave
is spared) 1his confrontation p!rports to free the slave fro* the fi@ity of its previo!sly
stable conditions and allo-s it to operate the second *o*ent of the criti<!e$ the pars
construens, thro!gh the slave>s labor) 1his second *o*ent$ ho-ever$ is not properly a
pars construens) 5t is not really prod!ctive$ b!t rather revelatoryD the slave is not created
or s!bstantially transfor*ed in this second
-:9-
*o*ent$ b!t rather Ebeco*es conscio!s of -hat he tr!ly isF 21973) Charles 1aylor>s ter*
for this *o*ent of labor-a Estanding negationF-is ade<!ate beca!se it sho-s that there is
really no progression here) Posed in these logical ter*s$ then$ -e can finally *a4e good
on =ele!#e>s clai* cited earlier that it is precisely the errors of the Hantian criti<!e that
lead to the Hegelian dialectic) +i4e the Hantian criti<!e$ the dialectical criti<!e described
by the ed!cation of the slave is neither total nor positive) 1he partiality of its destr!ctive
*o*ent spares precisely -hat ta4es the place of creation in the prod!ctive *o*ent$ the
Eessential nat!reF of the slave) Ho-ever$ -hile Hant Esee*s to have conf!sed the
positivity of criti<!e -ith a h!*ble recognition of the rights of the criticisedF 2iet!sche
and Philosophy 693$ this Hegelian slave criti<!e has *ade the critici#ed into the hero of
the dra*a) 1he tri!*ph of this dialectical criti<!e is that the essential nat!re of the slave
s!rvives and is revealed in p!re for* in a stable config!ration of partial$ EstandingF
negations) Anly the *aster>s active negation$ the !nrestrained attac4$ the death of the
adversary can lead to a total criti<!e$ and therefore to the opport!nity for a positive$
original creation' E=estr!ction as the active destr!ction of the *an -ho -ants to perish
and to be overco*e anno!nces the creatorF 21863) 1he differences bet-een the t-o types
of po-er$ then$ are directly related to the t-o types of criti<!e) &iet#sche>s *aster po-er$
in -hich force is internal to its *anifestation$ 4no-s no restraint and th!s operates a total
criti<!eD -hen po-er is separated fro* -hat it can do$ on the other hand$ the pars
destruens that initiates the criti<!e can only be partial)
All of this -e have discovered by reading Hegel>s arg!*ent as if the slave -ere an
i*personal force playing o!t a logical position) Ho-ever$ if -e are to e*phasi#e the
ed!cational Co!rney of the slave as the develop*ent of a partic!lar self-conscio!sness$ as
Hegel does$ it see*s that -e have to fill the slave -ith so*e general personal contents)
.hat e@actly is the Eessential nat!reF of the slave that s!rvives the onsla!ght of critical
forces and e*erges victorio!s fro* the develop*entP Hegel -o!ld have !s believe that
the slave essence is content-less as p!re self-conscio!sness$ and that this essence is not
partic!lar to the slave$ b!t is the very essence of being) 1he coherence of Hegel>s
arg!*ent$ ho-ever$ relies on the differential relationship bet-een the slave and its
*aster) 1he *ove*ent that defines and reveals essence cannot develop -ith any actor$
b!t is dependent on a specific position in the relationship) .e see$ of co!rse$ that the
*aster does not e*body this *ove*ent) "ince the logic of the dra*a t!rns on the slave>s
position in the relationship$ the essence of the slave has to involve his servit!de)
6
1he
first *o*ent of the criti<!e 2the fear of death$ the relation to the *aster3 *a4es the slave
*ore intent on its activity$ and the second *o*ent 2-or43 is its p!re e@pression) 5t is
precisely slave labor
-:3-
that s!rvives and is p!rified thro!gh the critical ed!cation) 1he te@t *a4es clear$
ho-ever$ that the -or4 of the slave cannot be considered as creative energy or prod!ctive
forceD on the contrary$ the slave>s -or4 is f!nda*entally his role in a EstandingF
relationship)
1he tradition of Mar@ist tho!ght has 4no-n all too *any interpretations that 2directly or
indirectly3 e@alt this Hegelian proposition' 1he -or4er occ!pies an e@alted position
beca!se his or her -or4 e@presses h!*an essence) 1h!s$ the history of the -or4ers>
str!ggle beco*es an ed!cational dra*a that assa!lts$ E*elting a-ay$ F the inessential
character of the -or4er in order to affir* the essential nat!re of -or4) 1he -or4er is
liberated inas*!ch as -or4 is affir*ed as his or her essence) 1his is the "ta4hanovite
EdignityF of the -or4er) Mar@ -ill have no part of this' +eave it to the bosses to sing the
praises of -or4) .hat is at iss!e here is not the description of the -or4er>s e@istence in a
relationship$ b!t the proposition that this role constit!tes the essence of the -or4er) Mar@
*a4es a perfectly analogo!s arg!*ent in relation to the "tate' EHegel is not to be bla*ed
beca!se he describes the e@istence of the Modern "tate s!ch as it is$ b!t beca!se he
passes off -hat it is as the essence of the StateF 2ECriti<!e of Hegel>s Philosophy of
RightF 033) 1his is -here -e can see =ele!#e>s &iet#sche and Mar@ very close to one
another$ in an !nrestrained attac4 on the essence of established val!es) 1hey both
conceive of real essence not as -or4$ b!t as a force' po-er$ the -ill to po-er$ living
labor$ creation)
9
!t in order to liberate that force$ to provide the roo* for the pars
construens, the constr!ctive$ transfor*ative force$ they *!st both cond!ct a radical$ total
criti<!e$ an !nli*ited pars destruens, attac4ing the essence of the established val!es) 5f
the -or4er is to reach a point of gen!ine affir*ation$ of self-valori#ation$ the attac4 has
to be directed at the Eessence$ F at the val!es that define the -or4er as s!ch-against
servit!de$ against -or4)
1B
5n this conte@t$ &iet#sche appears in the position of Mar@ist
-or4eris*' E5n order to str!ggle against capital$ the -or4ing class *!st str!ggle against
itself inas*!ch as it is capitalN) .or4ers> str!ggle against -or4$ str!ggle of the -or4er
against hi*self inas*!ch as -or4erF 21ronti 90B3) 1he -or4er attac4ing -or4$ attac4ing
hi*self inas*!ch as -or4er$ is a bea!tif!l *eans of !nderstanding &iet#sche>s E*an -ho
-ants to perish and to be overco*e)F 5n attac4ing hi*self$ he is attac4ing the relationship
that has been posed as his essence-only after this EessenceF is destroyed can he tr!ly be
able to create) A Hegelian partial criti<!e is at best a refor*is*$ preserving the essence of
-hat it attac4s-it Es!persedes in s!ch a -ay as to preserve and *aintain -hat is
s!persededF 2Phenomenology O1663) A total criti<!e is necessarily an ins!rrectional
criti<!e) And only that !nrestrained destr!ction of established EessenceF can allo- for
gen!ine cre-
-::-
ation) =ele!#e>s &iet#sche appears as a prophet of -hat +enin calls Ethe art of
ins!rrection)F
11

!emark: "he 2ill to 2orkers6 Power and the $ocial $nthesis
5s iet!sche and Philosophy an !nti*ely hy*n to the -or4ers of >06P 1hro!gh =ele!#e>s
reading$ -e have fo!nd a s!rprisingly strong confl!ence bet-een &iet#sche and Mar@
2and even +enin3 in ter*s of the po-er$ the radicality$ and the creativity of the practical
criti<!e) Ho-ever$ -e are not prepared here to confront the &iet#sche-Mar@ <!estion in
all its co*ple@ity) 5n this ERe*ar4$ F 5 -ish only to to!ch on the <!estion$ so*e-hat
indirectly$ by considering =ele!#e>s &iet#schean arg!*ents in ter*s of &anni alestrini>s
:ogliamo tutto 2.e -ant everything3$ a si*ple$ bea!tif!l 5talian novel that reco!nts the
story of a -or4er at the %5A1 plant in the late 190Bs and his involve*ent in the for*ation
of the political *ove*ent Potere operaio 2.or4ers> Po-er3)
19
.hat interests *e initially
in this co*parison is the radical attac4 on the established notion of essence as a
precondition for change and creation) 5n &iet#schean ter*s$ =ele!#e often e@presses this
as the attac4 on E*anF or as a *o*ent in the effort to go beyond *an$ to create ne-
ter*s and val!es of h!*an e@istence 2iet!sche and Philosophy 0:-07D also ;oucault
131-:13) 1his is the sa*e notion e@pressed by the -or4ers> Eref!sal of -or4$ F an attac4
against their established essence so as to be able to create ne- ter*s of e@istence) &ote
that the -or4ers> ref!sal is not only a ref!sal to -or4 b!t a ref!sal of -or4$ that is$ a
ref!sal of a specific e@isting relation of prod!ction) 5n other -ords$ the -or4ers> attac4 on
-or4$ their violent pars destruens, is directed precisely at their o-n essence)
5n the first section of :ogliamo tutto, the protagonist cannot yet pose his desires in s!ch
political ter*sD nonetheless$ -hat he hates *ost of all is precisely -hat defines his social
e@istence and -hat is presented to hi* as his essence) 1h!s$ he cannot !nderstand -hy
anyone -o!ld -ant to celebrate -or4 on May =ay' E.hat a Co4e to celebrate labor
dayN) 5 never !nderstood -hy -or4 o!ght to be celebratedF 28:3) .or4ers -ho accept
the established val!e of -or4 appear to hi* as closed$ bloc4ed fro* -hat they can do$
and it is precisely this acceptance of the established val!es as essence that *a4es the*
dangero!s' E1hic4 people obt!se -itho!t the least bit of i*agination dangero!s) &ot
fascists C!st obt!se) 1hose in the PC5 L5talian Co**!nist PartyM -ere bread and -or4) 5
-as a '3ualun3uista' Lnonideological$ val!e-lessM at least 5 -as rec!perable) !t they
co*pletely accepted -or4 and for the* -or4 -as everythingF 267-603) 1hose -ho accept
Ebread and -or4F as their essence as -or4ers are !nable to i*agine$ !nable to create) 1he
danger they present is that of a forced stasis$ a dead-
-:7-
ening of creative po-ers$ and a perpet!ation of the established essence) 5n this conte@t$ a
-3ualun3uista. is already in a better position) 1he lac4 of val!es$ of beliefs$ provides a
space on -hich i*agination and creation can act) %ro* this position$ fro* the recognition
of his antagonis* to-ard -or4 as a relation of prod!ction$ the protagonist begins a
progressively *ore political attac4 on -or4 itself) 1h!s far$ -e are still on the terrain of
=ele!#e>s &iet#sche$ -ith the total criti<!e of established val!es) Here -e have a
developed e@a*ple of the -or4er attac4ing -or4$ and therefore attac4ing hi*self
inas*!ch as -or4er-a bea!tif!l instance of &iet#sche>s E*an -ho -ants to perish$ F the
active and liberatory destr!ction that *!st be disting!ished fro* the passivity of the Elast
*an$ F the PC5ista -ho co*pletely accepts -or4 2cf) iet!sche and Philosophy 18:3)
1he protagonist of :ogliamo tutto, ho-ever$ only gains the real po-er to carry o!t this
destr!ctive proCect -hen he begins to recogni#e his co**onality -ith the other -or4ers)
1he voice of the narrative ta4es on a contin!ally broader scope$ shifting fro* first person
sing!lar to first person pl!ral as the *ass of -or4ers begin to recogni#e -hat they can do
and -hat they can beco*e' EAll the st!ff all the -ealth -e prod!ce is o!rsN) .e -ant
everything) All the -ealth all the po-er and no -or4F 21963) 1he e@pansion of the
collective e@pression is *atched by an e@pansion of the -ill) 5t is precisely the -ealth of
the collectivity that provides the basis for the violent radicality of criti<!e' E.hat began
to co*e !p -as the desire to str!ggle not beca!se the -or4 not beca!se the boss -ere bad
b!t beca!se they e@ist) .hat began to co*e o!t -as the de*and to -ant po-er$ in shortF
21963) 1he recognition of collective desires goes hand in hand -ith the develop*ent and
e@pansion of collective practice) 1he -or4ers> stri4es b!ild to the point -here they spill
o!tside of the factory as de*onstrations in the streets and violent conflict involving large
parts of the city) %inally$ this collective destr!ctive e@pression$ this *o*ent of intense
violence$ opens the possibility for the s!bse<!ent Coy and creation' E!t no- the thing
that *oved the* *ore than anger -as Coy) 1he Coy of being finally strong) Af
discovering that these de*ands that this str!ggle -ere the de*ands of everyone that it
-as the str!ggle of everyoneF 21813) 1his is the cli*a@ of the novel$ the point -here the
str!ggle transfor*s fro* a pars destruens driven by hatred for the bosses and -or4 to a
pars construens of -or4ers> Coy in feeling their po-er) 5n this focal point$ the str!ggle is
converted fro* negation to affir*ation) 1his is the ho!r of E*idnight$ F &iet#sche>s
trans*!tation 2iet!sche and Philosophy 181-873) 1he -or4ers> attac4 on their essence as
-or4ers arrives at a *o*ent -hen they are able to Ego beyond$ F to discover a terrain of
creation and Coy beyond the E-or4er)F
-:0-
5 -o!ld li4e to e*phasi#e t-o ele*ents of this -or4ers> trans*!tation) 1he first is that
the entire critical *ove*ent is necessarily tied to a broadening *ove*ent of the
collectivity) 1he -or4ers> recognition of their co**onality and their e@pression in
collective action ta4e the for* of a spatial or social synthesis, co*posing an e@pansive
and coherent body of desire' As the body of -or4ers e@pands$ their -ill and po-er gro-)
1he synthesis involved in the -or4ers> collectivity is an eternal ret!rn of the -ill not in
ti*e b!t in space$ the ret!rn of the -ill laterally thro!gho!t the *ass of -or4ers) 5t -o!ld
be a poor for*!lation to say that the -or4ers are po-erf!l beca!se they co*e together-
this -o!ld i*ply a calc!lation of individ!al sacrifice for achieving e@trinsic collective
goods) Rather$ the -or4ers> po-er and their Coy lie precisely in the fact that they -ill and
act together) 1he -or4ers for* a po-erf!l asse*blage) 1he second ele*ent 5 -o!ld li4e
to e*phasi#e is that the trans*!tation co*es abo!t thro!gh the practice of the -or4ers)
Precisely -hen the -or4ers Eact!ali#eF their criti<!e$ -hen they pass into action in the
factory and in the streets$ they achieve the constr!ctive *o*ent of Coy and creation) 1he
Eact!ali#ationF of the -or4ers is a practice of Coy) 1hese t-o ele*ents give !s the ter*s
for the re*ainder of o!r st!dy of =ele!#e>s &iet#sche' Ho- does &iet#sche conceive a
real synthesis of forces$ and ho- do these forces *anifest the*selves in ter*s of
practiceP
+(0 "he )eing of )ecoming: "he #thical $nthesis of the #fficient 2ill
.hen =ele!#e approaches the <!estion of a &iet#schean synthesis$ he co*es bac4 once
again to the affir*ation of *!ltiplicity and the attac4 on the dialectic) EHegel -anted to
ridic!le pl!ralis*F 2iet!sche and Philosophy :3' 1he dialectic of the Ane and the
M!ltiple sets !p a false i*age of *!ltiplicity that is easily rec!perable in the !nity of the
Ane) .e have treated this charge at so*e length in the second phase of ergson st!dy
2"ection 1)33) As -e have seen$ the *ost potent ergsonian attac4 against the dialectic in
this regard is the constr!ction of a veritable *!ltiplicity$ of differences of nat!re) .e find
this sa*e attac4 in =ele!#e>s &iet#sche' EPl!ralis* so*eti*es appears to be dialectical-
b!t it is its *ost ferocio!s ene*y$ its only profo!nd ene*yF 263) Pl!ralis* or *!ltiplicity
is so dangero!s for the dialectic precisely beca!se it is irred!cible to !nity) 1hro!gh the
analysis of ergson>s -or4$ =ele!#e brings o!t the irred!cibility and e*inence of
*!ltiplicity in clear$ logical ter*sD b!t$ as -e have seen$ in this conte@t =ele!#e only
s!cceeds in posing the co*ple*entary *o*ent of the organi#ation of the M!ltiple in
very -ea4 ter*s) 5ndeed$ it see*s that the irred!cibility of the *!ltiplicity prohibits any
idea of organi#ation) .e have arg!ed that the fail!re to provide an ade<!ate notion of
organi#ation
-:8-
is -hat *a4es =ele!#e>s ergson *ost v!lnerable to a Hegelian co!nterattac4) 1his is
-here &iet#sche provides =ele!#e -ith an enor*o!s advance)
E1he ga*e has t-o *o*ents that are those of the dicethro--the dice that is thro-n and
the dice that falls bac4F 2973) 1he t-o *o*ents of the dicethro- constit!te the basic
ele*ents of &iet#sche>s alternative to the dialectic of the Ane and the M!ltiple) 1he first
*o*ent of the ga*e is the easier to !nderstand) 1he thro- of the dice is the affir*ation
of chance and *!ltiplicity precisely beca!se it is the ref!sal of control' ?!st as -e sa- in
the ergson st!dies$ this is not the *!ltiplicity of orderD there is nothing prefor*ed in the
possibility of this *o*ent-it is the indeter*inate$ the !nforeseeable) 1his is ergson>s
creative evol!tion 2or e*anation3 of being$ and in &iet#schean ter*s this is the beco*ing
of being' p!re *!ltiplicity) 1he *o*ent that the dice fall bac4$ ho-ever$ is *ore obsc!re
and *ore co*ple@' E1he dice that are thro-n once are the affir*ation of chance, the
co*bination that they for* on falling is the affir*ation of necessity) &ecessity is
affir*ed of chance in e@actly the sa*e sense that being is affir*ed of beco*ing and
!nity is affir*ed of *!ltiplicityF 2903) 1he falling bac4 of the dice is not *erely a
confir*ation of the necessity of the given$ of *!ltiple realityD this -o!ld *erely be a
deter*inis*$ and it -o!ld ris4 negating rather than affir*ing the first *o*ent of the
ga*e) 5nstead$ the falling bac4 of the dice is a *o*ent of the organi#ation of !nity-it is
not the passive revelation$ b!t the active creation of being) 1o !nderstand this$ -e have to
relate the dicethro- *etaphor to the eternal ret!rn'
1he dice that fall bac4 necessarily affir* the n!*ber or the destiny that brings the dice
bac4N) 1he eternal ret!rn is the second *o*ent$ the res!lt of the dicethro-$ the
affir*ation of necessity$ the n!*ber that brings together all the parts of chance) !t it is
also the ret!rn of the first *o*ent$ the repetition of the dicethro-$ the reprod!ction and
reaffir*ation of chance itself) 298-96$ e*phasis *ine3
1he dicethro- *etaphor is ad*ittedly so*e-hat strained at this point$ b!t -e *!st
recogni#e the second *o*ent as a *o*ent of organi#ation that constr!cts !nity$ that
constit!tes being by bringing together Eall the parts of chanceF created in the first
*o*ent-not according to any prefor*ed order$ b!t in an original organi#ation) 1he ret!rn
of the dice is an affir*ation of the dicethro- in that it constit!tes the original ele*ents of
chance in a coherent -hole) &ot only does the first *o*ent 2of *!ltiplicity and
beco*ing3 i*ply the second *o*ent 2of !nity and being3$ b!t this second *o*ent is also
the ret!rn of the first' 1he t-o *o*ents i*ply one another
-:6-
as a perpet!al series of shattering and gathering$ as a centrif!gal *o*ent and a
centripetal *o*ent$ as e*anation and constit!tion)
.hat is the logic of the synthesis or constit!tion of being in the eternal ret!rnP .e can no
longer pose this <!estion on a p!rely logical planeD &iet#sche has transfor*ed the terrain$
so that -e can only consider s!ch ontological <!estions in ter*s of force and val!e'
1he synthesis is one of forces$ of their difference and their reprod!ctionD the eternal
ret!rn is the synthesis that has as its principle the -ill to po-er) .e sho!ld not be
s!rprised by the -ord E-illFD /hich one apart fro* the -ill is capable of serving as the
principle of a synthesis of forces by deter*ining the relation of force -ith forcesP 27B3
.e have seen fro* the o!tset that the -ill is the dyna*ic that *oves and ani*ates the
hori#on of force and val!e' 1he logic of the synthesis$ then$ is the logic of the -ill) 1he
-ill to po-er is the principle of the synthesis that *ar4s the being of beco*ing$ the !nity
of the *!ltiplicity and the necessity of chance) Ho-$ tho!gh$ does the -ill provide a
fo!ndation for beingP .e are not so far fro* the "cholastic hori#on that -e earlier dre-
on so heavily) 5n effect$ the -ill to po-er is the principle of the eternal ret!rn in that it
plays the role of a pri*ary ca!se$ defining the necessity and s!bstantiality of being)
&iet#sche>s terrain$ ho-ever$ <!ic4ly transfor*s this logicalTontological point into an
ethics) 1he eternal ret!rn of the -ill is an ethics inas*!ch as it is a Eselective ontologyF
2893)
13
5t is selective beca!se not every -ill ret!rns' &egation co*es only onceD only
affir*ation ret!rns) 1he eternal ret!rn is the selection of the affir*ative -ill as being)
eing is not given in &iet#scheD being *!st be -illed) 5n this sense$ ethics co*es before
ontology in &iet#sche) 1he ethical -ill is the -ill that ret!rnsD the ethical -ill is the -ill
that -ills being) 1his is the sense in -hich the eternal ret!rn is a te*poral synthesis of
forces' 5t de*ands that the -ill to po-er -ills !nity in ti*e) =ele!#e for*!lates the
ethical selection of the eternal ret!rn as a practical r!le for the -ill' E.hatever yo! -ill$
-ill it in s!ch a -ay that yo! also -ill its eternal ret!rnF 2063) .e sho!ld note here$
ho-ever$ that -hen -e read =ele!#e>s r!le of the eternal ret!rn$ -e *!st be caref!l not to
e*phasi#e the -ord Ealso)F 1his EalsoF can be very *isleading beca!se the eternal ret!rn
is not separate fro* the -ill$ b!t internal to it) EHo- does the eternal ret!rn perfor* the
selection hereP 5t is the thought of the eternal ret!rn that selects) 5t *a4es -illing
so*ething -holeF 2093) 1he ethical -ill is -hole$ internal to its ret!rn' EAl-ays do -hat
yo! -illF 2iet!sche and Philosophy 09$ <!oted fro* $hus Spa9e <arathustra 1913) 1he
principle of the eternal ret!rn as being is the efficient -ill as an ethical -ill)
-:9-
.e can no- trace a bea!tif!l traCectory of this f!nda*ental idea of efficiency and
internality' fro* the logical centrality of efficient difference 2the difference internal to the
thing3$ to the ontological centrality of efficient po-er 2the force internal to its
*anifestation3$ and no- to the ethical centrality of the efficient -ill$ the principle of the
eternal ret!rn) A "cholastic logic r!ns thro!gh this series as the g!iding thread$ providing
it a *aterialist$ *etaphysical fo!ndation' 1he internal nat!re of the ca!se to its effect is
-hat s!pports the necessity$ s!bstantiality$ sing!larity$ and !nivocity of being) 1his is
ho- -e can !nderstand the eternal ret!rn of the efficient -ill as the ethical pillar of a
&iet#schean philosophy of being) .e as4ed o!rselves earlier$ in o!r analysis of =ele!#e>s
-or4 on ergson 2"ection 1)33 ho- a philosophy of Eindeter*inationF can also be a
philosophy of being$ ho- -e can have both beco*ing and being) Here -e have a
&iet#schean ans-er) 1he dicethro- 2the *o*ent of beco*ing$ of indeter*ination3 is
follo-ed by dice falling bac4 2the selection of being3$ -hich in t!rn leads to a ne-
dicethro- 1he ontological selection does not negate the indeter*ination of the dicethro-$
b!t enhances it$ affir*s it$ C!st as the eternal ret!rn is an affir*ation of the -ill)
%inally$ p!re being is attained in &iet#sche as an achieved state$ a finality$ and it is
presented in the persona of Ariadne) 1he love of Ariadne for =ionys!s is the affir*ation
of the eternal ret!rnD it is a do!ble affir*ation$ the raising of the being of beco*ing to its
highest po-er) =ionys!s is the god of affir*ation$ b!t it ta4es Ariadne to affir*
affir*ation itself' E/ternal affir*ation of being$ eternally 5 a* yo!r affir*ationF 2168$
<!oted fro* Dionysian Dithyrambs3) =ionys!s>s affir*ation *ar4s the being of
beco*ingD therefore$ since Ariadne ta4es =ionys!s for the obCect of her affir*ation$ she
*ar4s the p!re affir*ation of being) Ariadne>s affir*ation is a do!ble affir*ation 2Ethe
>yes> that responds to >yes>F LEMystIre d>ArianeF 17M3$ or$ *ore properly$ it is a spiraling$
infinite affir*ation-affir*ation raised to the nth po-er) Ariadne>s creation of p!re being
is an ethical act$ an act of love)
+(- "he "otal Criti5ue as the Foundation of )eing
An this ethical terrain of the efficient$ affir*ative -ill$ =ele!#e reproposes the dra*a of
the total criti<!e$ one last ti*e$ no- in ter*s of val!ation-as Etrans*!tation)F =ele!#e
presents the criti<!e this ti*e thro!gh a co*bination of ref!rbished Hantian and
"cholastic ter*s) 5n effect$ trans*!tation *oves fro* Hantianis* to "cholasticis* in that
it *oves fro* a criti<!e of 4no-ledge to a fo!ndation of being)
1:
Here$ also$ -e find
=ele!#e>s final attac4 on the Hegelian dialectic$ albeit in distant$ indirect for*) As -e
have
-7B-
already seen$ the standpoint of the criti<!e$ free fro* its transcendental instance$ is the
-ill to po-er) &o- the antagonistic *o*ent$ the pars destruens of the criti<!e$ is played
by nihilis*) =ele!#e e@plains that nihilis* is the ratio cognoscendi of the -ill to po-er'
E.hat -e in fact 9no/ of the -ill to po-er is s!ffering and tort!reF 2183$ e*phasis
*ine3) =ele!#e has e@plained at great length that nihilis*$ as a proCect of interiority and
conscio!sness$ is f!ll of pain and s!fferingD ho-ever$ this sa*e nihilis* is -hat reveals
Eall the val!es 4no-n or 4no-able !p to the presentF 21893) .e gain 4no-ledge of
o!rselves and o!r present thro!gh the s!ffering of the negative -ill to po-er) As Hant
has ta!ght !s$ tho!gh$ there is a beyond to this 4no-ledge' E.e >thin4> the -ill to po-er
in a for* distinct fro* that in -hich -e 4no- it) 21h!s the thought of the eternal ret!rn
goes beyond all the la-s of o!r 9no/ledge)3F 2189-833) &ihilis* itself is -hat ta4es !s
beyond interiority$ beyond s!ffering' 1he po-er of the negative in this criti<!e does not
operate a Hegelian Estanding negationFD instead$ this Eco*pletedF nihilis* is an active
-ill to nothingness-Eself-destr!ction$ active destr!ctionF 218:3) Co*pleted nihilis* is
self-destr!ction in t-o senses' Co*pletion *eans that nihilis* defeats itself so that the
final act of the negative -ill to po-er is to e@ting!ish itselfD also$ the co*pletion of
nihilis* is the end of E*anF as a constr!cted interiority-it is the s!icide of the Elast *an)F
At the li*it of this destr!ction$ at *idnight$ the focal point$ there is a transfor*ation$ a
conversion fro* 4no-ledge to creation$ fro* savage negation to absol!te affir*ation$
fro* painf!l interiority to Coyf!l e@teriority' E1he legislator ta4es the place of the
>scholar$ > creation ta9es the place of 9no/ledge itself and affir*ation ta4es the place of
all negationsF 21833) Affir*ation$ the pars construens of the -ill to po-er$ is Ethe
!n4no-n Coy$ the !n4no-n happiness$ the !n4no-n ,odF 21833 that is beyond the ratio
cognoscendi) .ith the active co*pletion of nihilis* and the trans*!tation to affir*ation
and creation$ -e are finally finished -ith negativity$ interiority$ and conscio!sness as
s!ch) /@teriority is the condition for the gro!nding of being' 1he ratio essendi of the -ill
to po-er$ =ele!#e e@plains$ is affir*ation) 1hese ter*s allo- =ele!#e to refor*!late a
state*ent of Sarath!stra as an ontological ethics' E5 love the one -ho *a4es !se of
nihilis* as the ratio cognoscendi of the -ill to po-er$ b!t -ho finds in the -ill to po-er
a ratio essendi in -hich *an is overco*e and therefore nihilis* is defeatedF 218:3)
eing is pri*ary over 4no-ledge) +i4e Ariadne$ Sarath!stra loves being$ the creation and
affir*ation of being) /@teriority$ affir*ation$ the efficient -ill to po-er' 1his is the ratio
that s!pports being$ and this is -hat Sarath!stra loves)
-71-
!emark: "he #nd of Deleuze6s Anti;Hegelianism
.e noted at the o!tset of this chapter that one of the central goals in =ele!#e>s st!dy of
&iet#sche is to flesh o!t an alternative to dialectical opposition that -o!ld be an
Eopposition to the dialectic itselfF 2183) 5t is precisely the dialectic>s ability to rec!perate
opposition that is often !sed to criti<!e conte*porary anti-Hegelians s!ch as =ele!#e)
?!dith !tler forcef!lly poses the <!estion of an opposition to Hegelianis* in Subjects of
Desire) E.hat constit!tes the latest stage of post-Hegelianis* as a stage definitively
beyond the dialecticP Are these positions still ha!nted by the dialectic$ even as they clai*
to be in !tter opposition to itP .hat is the nat!re of this >opposition$ > and is it perchance a
for* that Hegel hi*self has prefig!redPF 21803) !tler ans-ers these <!estions in strictly
Hegelian fashion' EReferences to a >brea4> -ith Hegel are al*ost al-ays i*possible$ if
only beca!se Hegel has *ade the very notion of >brea4ing -ith> into the central tenet of
the dialecticF 2163-6:3) %ro* this perspective$ opposition itself is essentially dialectical$
and hence Eopposition to the dialectic itself can only *ean a reinforce*ent or repetition
of the dialectic) 5n other -ords$ any effort to be an EotherF to Hegelianis* can be
effectively rec!perated as an EotherF -ithin Hegelianis*)
1hro!gh o!r reading of =ele!#e>s &iet#sche -e have e@plored t-o points that co!ld
constit!te ade<!ate responses to !tler>s proposition) =ele!#e>s elaboration of the total
criti<!e provides !s a direct response by sho-ing that there are t-o different types of
opposition) =ialectical opposition is a restrained$ partial attac4 that see4s to Epreserve and
*aintainF its ene*yD it is a sort of lo--intensity -arfare that can be prolonged
indefinitely in a Estanding negation)F 5n effect$ the dialectic pillages and refor*s the
essence of its predecessor thro!gh a partial criti<!e) 1herefore$ the Ebrea4ing -ithF that is
a central tenet of the dialect can only be a partial r!pt!re$ preserving the contin!ity that
characteri#es the prefi@ Epost)F &ondialectical opposition$ ho-ever$ is that -hich
operates a co*plete r!pt!re -ith its opponent thro!gh an !nrestrained$ savage attac4) 1he
res!lt of this profo!nd opposition is a separation that prohibits the rec!peration of
relations) 5t -o!ld be a *ista4e$ then$ to call this &iet#schean position Epost-Hegelian$ F
as if it b!ilt on$ refor*ed$ or co*pleted Hegelianis*) =ele!#e>s clai* is that the
&iet#schean total criti<!e is a Epost-HantianF position-it corrects the Hantian errors to
reali#e the goals of Hant>s o-n original proCect) Hant>s criti<!e allo-s established val!es
to persist on the transcendental plane as essence) 1his e@ception is a res!lt of Hant>s
inco*pleteness$ and this is the f!nda*ental error that &iet#sche corrects) 5n Hegel>s
dialectical criti<!e$ ho-ever$ the established val!es that are posed as essence are
presented as the central protagonist of the critical dra*a) 5t
-79-
is i*possible to conceive of the &iet#schean total criti<!e and its !nrestrained pars
destruens as a refor* of this position-it can only appear as a profo!nd r!pt!re) At this
point$ -e can clearly see the need for =ele!#e>s care in positioning the relation to
pro@i*ate and f!nda*ental ene*ies) =ele!#e>s &iet#sche can appear as Epost-HantianF
b!t only Eanti-HegelianF' 1he difference is bet-een refor* and r!pt!re) Posed in
historiographic ter*s$ !tler>s Hegelian clai* is that there are only contin!o!s lines in
the history of philosophy$ refor*ed to a greater or lesser e@tent as differences of degree)
=ele!#e$ on the contrary$ insists that the history of philosophy contains real
discontin!ities$ veritable differences of nat!re$ and that discontin!ity is the only -ay of
posing the Hegel-&iet#sche relationship' E1here is no possible co*pro*ise bet-een
Hegel and &iet#scheF 21973)
=ele!#e offers !s$ ho-ever$ a second response) As -e have proceeded thro!gh the
evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght -e have seen the terrain on -hich he can address
Hegelianis* constantly shrin4ing$ and -e have seen that his attac4s on the dialectic have
beco*e *ore and *ore indirect) 1he ergsonian attac4 on the Ane and the M!ltiple$ and
the &iet#schean attac4 on the *aster-slave relation$ are carried o!t on planes co*pletely
re*oved fro* Hegel>s disco!rse) =ele!#e>s strategy of developing a total opposition to
the dialectic is acco*panied by another strategy' to *ove a-ay fro* the dialectic$ to
forget the dialectic) .e have arrived at the end of =ele!#e>s anti-Hegelianis*) /ven
tho!gh rhetoric against the dialectic -ill reappear$ in the opening of Diff#rence et
r#p#tition, for e@a*ple$ it is only to repeat the arg!*ents developed in these early
st!dies$ not to develop ne- ones) 1he develop*ent of a total opposition to the dialectic
see*s to have been an intellect!al c!re for =ele!#e' 5t has e@orcised Hegel and created
an a!tono*o!s plane for tho!ght$ one that is no longer anti-Hegelian$ b!t that$ <!ite
si*ply$ has forgotten the dialectic)
+(3 Pathos and /o: "oward a Practice of Affirmative )eing
A philosophy of Coy is necessarily a philosophy of practice) 1hro!gho!t =ele!#e>s
reading of &iet#sche -e have the i*pression that practice plays a central role$ b!t the
ter*s never co*e o!t clearly) 5t is very clear$ on the other hand$ -hat =ele!#e>s
&iet#sche is not' 5t is not an investigation of conscio!snessD it is not only a refor*ation of
the !nderstanding or an e*endation of the intellectD in short$ it is not the constr!ction of
an interiority$ b!t a creation of e@teriority thro!gh the po-er of affir*ation) 1he
e@teriority of tho!ght and of the -ill$ ho-ever$ is not yet an ade<!ate characteri#ation$
beca!se &iet#schean affir*ation is also corporeal) .e have one last passage to *a4e in
o!r reading of =ele!#e>s &iet#sche' fro* -ill to appetite and desire$ fro* e@teriority to
practice)
-73-
=ele!#e>s elaboration of &iet#schean e@teriority rediscovers a "pino#ian proposition'
E.ill to po-er is *anifested as a po-er to be affected Lpo!voir d>Rtre affectQMF 209$
*odified3)
17
"pino#a conceives a positive relation bet-een a body>s po-er to be affected
and its po-er to effect 2see "ection 3)83' E1he *ore -ays a body co!ld be affected the
*ore force it hadF 2093) 1-o aspects of this "pino#ian conception interest =ele!#e in the
conte@t of &iet#sche>s -or4) %irst$ this po-er to be affected never deals -ith a possibility$
b!t it is al-ays act!ali#ed in relations -ith other bodies) "econd$ this po-er defines the
receptivity of a body not as a passivity$ b!t as Ean affectivity, a sensibility$ a sensationF
2093) .hat this notion affords =ele!#e is a *eans of posing inner e@perience as a *ode
of corporeal e@teriority) 1he receptivity of a body is closely tied to its active e@ternal
e@pression' Affectivity is an attrib!te of the body>s po-er) 5n &iet#sche$ as in "pino#a$
then$ pathos does not involve a body Es!fferingF passionsD on the contrary$ pathos
involves the affects that *ar4 the activity of the body$ the creation that is Coy)
1o arrive at a practical conception of Coy$ ho-ever$ this rich sense of the po-er of the
affectivity of bodies *!st be acco*panied by an elaboration of the activity of bodies in
practice) 1he very last section of iet!sche and Philosophy approaches this proble*'
&iet#sche>s practical teaching is that difference is happyD that *!ltiplicity$ beco*ing and
chance are ade<!ate obCects of Coy by the*selves and that only Coy ret!rnsN) &ot since
+!creti!s has the critical enterprise that characteri#es philosophy been ta4en so far 2-ith
the e@ception of "pino#a3) +!creti!s e@poses the tro!ble of the so!l and those -ho need it
to establish their po-er-"pino#a e@poses sorro-$ all the ca!ses of sorro- and all those
-ho fo!nd their po-er at the heart of this sorro--&iet#sche e@poses ressentiment, bad
conscience and the po-er of the negative that serves as their principle) 219B3
1his history of practical philosophies of Coy 2+!creti!s$ "pino#a$ &iet#sche3 is very
s!ggestive) Ho-ever$ in =ele!#e>s &iet#sche there are t-o ele*ents that bloc4 the
develop*ent of a practical str!ggle against the sad passions' ele*ents that direct !s
for-ard to the st!dy of "pino#a) %irst$ =ele!#e>s Ei*personalF reading of &iet#sche
bloc4s the develop*ent of a theory of practice beca!se it li*its o!r conception of agents
to the interplay of forces) .e have noted that -hen =ele!#e as4s the <!estion EU!iPF he
avoids all EpersonalistF references$ and loo4s rather to a specific -ill to po-er) At this
point$ ho-ever$ -e need to loo4 not only to the -ill$ b!t also to the appetite and desire)
10

1he attrib!tes of a practical agent *!st be EpersonalistF in so*e sense-for a theory of
practice -e do not need an individ!alist theory$ b!t -e do need a corporeal and desiring
agent)
-7:-
"pino#a is e@e*plary in this regard -hen he defines the agent of practice$ the
E5ndivid!al$ F as a body or gro!p of bodies recogni#ed for its co**on *ove*ent$ its
co**on behavior$ its co**on desire 2Ethics 55P13=ef3) A corporeal agent s!ch as
"pino#a>s can lead a str!ggle against the sad passions and discover a practice of Coy)
"econd$ =ele!#e>s st!dy of &iet#sche fails to arrive at a theory of practice beca!se it does
not arrive at a conception of a spatial or social synthesis) 1he &iet#schean synthesis$ the
eternal ret!rn$ is a te*poral synthesis that proCects the -ill to po-er in ti*e) "pino#a -ill
sho- !s$ ho-ever$ that a practice of Coy ta4es place on the plane of sociality' "pino#a>s
co**on notions$ for e@a*ple$ provide the ter*s for an e@pansive collectivity$ for the
creation of society$ and th!s constit!te a po-erf!l -eapon against the sad passions) 1his
final section of iet!sche and Philosophy, then$ is already loo4ing for-ard to the ne@t
passage in =ele!#e>s evol!tion' fro* &iet#schean affir*ation to "pino#ian practice)
-77-
Cha&ter .
$&inozian Practice
Affirmation and /o
Ane can recogni#e i**ediately that =ele!#e>s reading of "pino#a has a different <!ality
than his treat*ent of other philosophers) 1here is a certain *odesty and ca!tion before
"pino#a that -e do not find else-here) .e sho!ld 4eep in *ind$ of co!rse$ that =ele!#e
presented E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a as the historical portion of his doctoral
thesis$ b!t this fact can only provide a partial e@planation for the change in tone) As -e
have seen$ =ele!#e often presents his investigations in the history of philosophy in the
for* of e@tre*e si*plicity$ as the elaboration of a single idea' ontological positivity for
ergson$ ethical affir*ation for &iet#sche) 1hese st!dies ta4e the for* of clean-c!t
Ce-els) 1hey pose the essential idea fro* -hich an entire philosophical doctrine follo-s)
5n co*parison$ =ele!#e>s -or4 on "pino#a is very raggedD it is spilling over -ith
!nderdeveloped insights and !nresolved proble*s) Precisely for this reason it is a *ore
open -or4$ and at the sa*e ti*e a -or4 that is less accessible to a general p!blic)
1

E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a appears as a set of -or4ing notes that do not
present a co*pleted interpretation$ b!t rather propose a series of interpretative strategies
in the process of develop*ent) 1herefore$ the theoretical passages that -e -ill follo-
here are necessarily co*ple@$ and often elliptical'
5t -as on "pino#a that 5 -or4ed the *ost serio!sly according to the nor*s of the history
of philosophy-b!t it -as "pino#a *ore than any other that gave *e the feeling of a g!st
of air that p!shes yo! on the bac4
-70-
each ti*e yo! read hi*$ a -itch>s broo*stic4 that he *o!nts yo! atop) .e have not yet
beg!n to !nderstand "pino#a$ and 5 *yself no *ore than others) 2Dialogues 173
"pino#a re*ains an enig*a)
A!r tas4 is to discern ho- the reading of "pino#a contrib!tes to the develop*ent and
evol!tion of =ele!#e>s proCect) +et !s go bac4 to o!r initial *ethodological principles)
.e presented as a hypothesis at the o!tset$ and -e have confir*ed in o!r first t-o
chapters$ that there is an evol!tion in =ele!#e>s early tho!ght) His historical *onographs
approach the -or4 of the individ!al philosophers according to the de*ands of his o-n
intellect!al proCect) .ith ergson$ =ele!#e develops an ontology) .ith &iet#sche$ he
sets that ontology in *otion to constit!te an ethics) .ith "pino#a$ -e -ill ta4e a f!rther
step in this evol!tion$ to-ard politics$ b!ilding a ne- -ing onto the str!ct!re of a
ergsonian ontology and a &iet#schean ethics) A partic!lar and i*portant aspect of
=ele!#e>s evol!tion is that it does not involve e@changing one theoretical perspective for
another$ b!t rather it is a process of acc!*!lation and constit!tion) 5n other -ords$ each
step$ each ne- terrain of investigation$ is a constr!ction that never abandons or negates$
b!t rather reproposes the ter*s of its predecessor) =ele!#e carries his baggage -ith hi*)
&iet#schean ethics is ergsonian ontology transported to the field of val!eD "pino#ian
politics is ergsonian ontology and &iet#schean ethics transported to the field of practice)
Antology inheres in ethics$ -hich in t!rn inheres in politics) "pino#a>s politics is an
ontological politics in that$ thro!gh a rich analysis of po-er and a concept!al elaboration
of practice$ the principles that ani*ate being are the very sa*e principles that ani*ate an
ethics and a practical constit!tion of political organi#ation)
5n the st!dy of "pino#a$ ho-ever$ =ele!#e does not i**ediately proceed beyond his
previo!s res!ltsD rather$ he ta4es a fe- steps bac4 in order to prepare the leap ahead) 5n
effect$ in =ele!#e>s reading of "pino#a -e can find a s!**ary of the entire evol!tion) 5n
the first half of his st!dy$ corresponding ro!ghly to his reading of the first t-o boo4s of
the Ethics, -e find a reelaboration of the terrain that he treated in his st!dy of ergson
2the plenit!de of being$ the positivity of difference$ the proble* of e*anation$ etc)3D in
the second half of =ele!#e>s reading$ treating the final boo4s of the Ethics, -e find a
re-or4ing and e@tension of the &iet#schean terrain 2the affir*ation of being$ the ethics of
po-er and activity$ etc)3) ergson and &iet#sche breathe life into "pino#a$ standing as his
pri*ary predecessors' 5n =ele!#e>s inverted history of philosophy$ "pino#a see*s to be
able to loo4 bac4 and see that he too is not alone on the *o!ntaintops)
9

-78-
A!r foc!s on this =ele!#ian evol!tion allo-s !s to recogni#e another thesis that is
i*portant in the conte@t of "pino#a st!dies) 1hro!gho!t E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a, -e can see that =ele!#e treats the "pino#ian syste* as t-o distinct *o*ents$ as
t-o perspectives of tho!ght$ one spec!lative and another practical) 1his distinction
bet-een spec!lation and practice$ -hich re*ains i*plicit in =ele!#e>s -or4$ is both a
theoretical clai* and an interpretative strategy) 5n other -ords$ altho!gh =ele!#e does
not highlight this distinction$ -e can see that it clearly constit!tes a challenge to the
traditional co**entaries on "pino#ian tho!ght) %or e@a*ple$ %erdinand Al<!iQ$ one of
the *ost ac!te readers$ *aintains that$ !nli4e =escartes$ "pino#a is not a Ephilosopher of
*ethodF -ho starts fro* the h!*an point of vie- to b!ild to-ard a divine perspective$
b!t rather a Ephilosopher of syste*F setting o!t directly fro* the point of vie- of ,od'
1he Ethics is principally a syste*atic$ rather than a *ethodological$ te@t 2ature et v#rit#
3:3) =ele!#e$ ho-ever$ presents the Ethics as a do!ble te@t that proceeds fro* both of the
perspectives identified by Al<!iQ' 1he first *o*ent of the Ethics, spec!lative and
analytic$ proceeds in the centrif!gal direction fro* ,od to the thing in order to discover
and e@press the principles that ani*ate the syste* of beingD the second *o*ent of the
Ethics, practical and synthetic$ *oves in the centripetal direction fro* the thing to ,od
by forging an ethical *ethod and a political line of cond!ct) 1he t-o *o*ents are
f!nda*entally lin4ed' 1he *o*ent of research$ the ;orschung, prepares the terrain for
the *o*ent of presentation and practice$ the Darstellung) 1he t-o *o*ents cover the
sa*e terrain of being$ b!t fro* different perspectives) Ane of the i*portant conse<!ences
of recogni#ing these t-o *o*ents of "pino#a>s tho!ght$ as -e -ill see$ is that there are
s!bstantial n!ances in "pino#a>s *aCor concepts 2!niversal$ absol!te$ ade<!ate$ necessary$
rational$ etc)3 -hen one considers the* fro* one perspective or the other) 5n reading
=ele!#e>s previo!s -or4s$ -e have insisted at length on the i*portance of his critical
proced!re' pars destruens, pars construens) Here -e are presented -ith a si*ilar
proced!re$ b!t the *o*ent of opposition$ of antagonis*$ of destr!ction$ has changed) .e
still find a =ele!#ian opposition in E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 2to =escartes$
to +eibni#$ to the "cholastics$ etc)3$ b!t this opposition no longer plays a fo!ndational
role) Rather than a destr!ctive *o*ent follo-ed by a constr!ctive *o*ent$ =ele!#e>s
"pino#a presents a spec!lative$ logical investigation follo-ed by a practical$ ethical
constit!tion' ;orschung follo-ed by Darstellung) 1he t-o *o*ents$ then$ spec!lation
and practice$ are f!nda*entally lin4ed$ b!t they re*ain a!tono*o!s and distinct-each
-ith its o-n *ethod and ani*ating spirit) E1he sense of Coy appears as the properly
ethical senseD it is to practice -hat affir*ation itself is to spec!lationN) A philosophy of
p!re affir*ation$ the Ethics
-76-
is also a philosophy of the Coy corresponding to s!ch affir*ationF 2E,pressionism in
Philosophy) Spino!a 989$ *odified3) 1he affir*ation of spec!lation and the Coy of
practice are the t-o threads that -eave together to for* the general design of the Ethics)
Contin!ally in =ele!#e>s reading of the Ethics, -e can feel the tendency to *ove fro* the
first *o*ent to the second$ fro* spec!lation to practice$ fro* affir*ation to Coy) 1he
catalyst that allo-s =ele!#e to *a4e this passage is the "pino#ian analysis of po-er) 5n
the ontological do*ain$ the investigation of the str!ct!re of po-er occ!pies a privileged
position$ beca!se the essence of being is its prod!ctive ca!sal dyna*ic) 8ausa sui is the
essential pillar that s!pports being$ in that being is defined in its po-er to e@ist and
prod!ce) All disc!ssions of po-er$ prod!ctivity$ and ca!sality in =ele!#e$ as in "pino#a$
refer !s bac4 to this ontological fo!ndation) 1he analysis of po-er$ tho!gh$ is not only an
ele*ent that brings !s bac4 to first principles$ it is also the passage that allo-s the
disc!ssion to forge ahead onto ne- terrain) 5n the st!dy of &iet#sche$ -e fo!nd that by
recogni#ing the distinction -ithin po-er bet-een the active and the reactive$ -e -ere
able to transfor* the ontological disc!ssion into an ethics) 5n this st!dy of "pino#a$ the
sa*e passage thro!gh po-er gains a richer and *ore e@tensive f!nction) Here -e find an
entire syste* of distinctions -ithin po-er' bet-een spontaneity and affectivity$ bet-een
actions and passions$ bet-een Coy and sadness) 1his analysis sets the ter*s for a real
conversion -ithin the contin!ity of the theoretical fra*e-or4) 1he investigation of po-er
constit!tes the end of spec!lation and the beginning of practice' 5t arrives at the ho!r of
*idnight$ as a &iet#schean trans*!tation) Po-er is the cr!cial lin4$ the point of passage
fro* spec!lation to practice) 1he elaboration of this passage -ill for* the pivot of o!r
st!dy) ?!st as the $heses on ;euerbach and $he 6erman Ideology are said to constit!te a
Ebrea4F in Mar@>s tho!ght$ so too the analysis of po-er f!nctions as a point of conversion
in "pino#a' 5t is the *o*ent in -hich -e stop striving to thin4 the -orld$ and begin to
create it) $&eculation
.(' $u:stance and the !eal Distinction: $ingularit
1he opening of the Ethics is re*ar4able) 5t is precisely these initial passages that have
inspired so *any readers$ in a*a#e*ent and irritation$ in ad*iration and da*nation$ to
declare that the Ethics is an i*possible$ inco*prehensible te@t-ho- can one possibly
e*bar4 on a proCect starting fro* the idea of ,od$ fro* the absol!teP 1his re*ar4able
opening$ ho-ever$ does not appear as proble*atic to =ele!#e) An the contrary$
-79-
he see*s to be perfectly at ease -ith "pino#a>s initial step' Along -ith Merlea!-Ponty$ he
sees seventeenth-cent!ry tho!ght generally as Ean innocent -ay of setting o!t in one>s
thin4ing fro* the infiniteF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 96$ *odified3) "tarting
-ith the infinite is not i*possible$ b!t rather <!ite nat!ral$ for =ele!#e) .e sho!ld be
caref!l$ tho!gh$ not to *isread this innocence-infinite does not *ean indefiniteD the
infinite s!bstance is not indeter*inate) 1his is the challenge that provides an initial 4ey to
=ele!#e>s analysis and that$ according to =ele!#e$ orients and do*inates the first boo4 of
the Ethics) .hat 4ind of distinction is there in the infinite$ in the absol!tely infinite
nat!re of ,odP .e sho!ld note i**ediately a ergsonian resonance in this proble*atic)
1he connections bet-een ergsonis* and "pino#is* are -ell 4no-n$ and$ altho!gh -e
find no direct references in the te@t$ -e can be certain that =ele!#e is sensitive to the
co**on feat!res of the t-o philosophies)
3
Ho-ever$ =ele!#e brings the t-o doctrines
together in an !n!s!al and co*ple@ -ay) 5n effect$ =ele!#e !ses the opening of the
Ethics as a rereading of ergson' He presents the proofs of the e@istence of ,od and the
sing!larity of s!bstance as an e@tended *editation on the positive nat!re of difference
and the real fo!ndation of being)
1o approach the <!estion of distinctions in "pino#a$ of co!rse$ -e *!st ass!*e
=escartes>s position as a point of depart!re) =ele!#e notes the three distinctions of being
in Cartesian philosophy' 213 a real distinction bet-een t-o s!bstances$ 293 a *odal
distinction bet-een a s!bstance and a *ode that it i*plies$ and 233 a concept!al
distinction *distinction de raison+ bet-een a s!bstance and an attrib!te 2993) 1he first
error in this syste* of distinctions$ fro* a "pino#ian point of vie-$ is the proposition of
n!*ber in the definition of s!bstance) y affir*ing the e@istence of t-o s!bstances$
=escartes presents the real distinction as a n!*erical distinction) According to =ele!#e$
"pino#a challenges this Cartesian idea fro* t-o angles in the opening of the Ethics)
%irst$ he arg!es that a n!*erical distinction is never real 2Ethics 5P1-P63$ and then that a
real distinction is never n!*erical 2P9-P113)
:
5n other -ords$ -hile traditional
interpretations have generally identified "pino#a>s s!bstance -ith the n!*ber one or -ith
infinity$ =ele!#e insists that s!bstance is co*pletely re*oved fro* the real* of n!*ber)
"pino#a>s first de*onstration$ that a n!*erical distinction is never real$ rests on the
definition of the internal ca!sality of s!bstance 2P0C3) &!*ber cannot have a s!bstantial
nat!re$ beca!se n!*ber involves a li*itation and th!s re<!ires an e@ternal ca!se'
E.hatever is of s!ch a nat!re that there can be *any individ!als of that nat!re *!stN
have an e@ternal ca!se to e@istF 2P6"93) %ro* the definition of s!bstance 2=33 -e 4no-
that it cannot involve an e@ternal ca!se) A n!*erical distinction$ then$ cannot pertain to
s!bstanceD or$ in other -ords$ a n!*erical
-0B-
distinction cannot be a real distinction) "tarting -ith P9$ ho-ever$ "pino#a proceeds to
the inverse arg!*ent$ -hich is really the *ore f!nda*ental one' Having sho-n that each
attrib!te corresponds to the sa*e s!bstance 2i)e)$ the n!*erical distinction is not real3$ he
proceeds to de*onstrate that s!bstance envelops all the attrib!tes 2i)e)$ the real distinction
is not n!*erical3) 1his second proof consists of t-o parts) "pino#a proposes first that the
*ore reality a thing has$ the *ore attrib!tes it *!st have 2P93$ and second$ he proposes
that the *ore attrib!tes a thing has$ the *ore e@istence it has 2P11"3) 1he t-o points
essentially cover the sa*e gro!nd$ and serve together to *a4e the definition of ,od 2=03
a real definition' An absol!tely infinite being 2,od$ ens realissimum3 consists of an
absol!te infinity of attrib!tes) ,od is both !ni<!e and absol!te) 5t -o!ld be abs!rd to
*aintain at this point that -e are dealing -ith a n!*erical do*ain in -hich the t-o
endpoints$ one and infinity$ are !nited) "pino#a>s s!bstance is posed o!tside of n!*berD
the real distinction is not n!*erical)
.hy$ tho!gh$ does this co*ple@ logical develop*ent of the real distinction appear as
f!nda*ental to =ele!#eP .e sho!ld be a-are that "pino#a does not !se the ter* Ereal
distinctionF -hen he disc!sses s!bstance$ even tho!gh he is certain to be fa*iliar -ith its
!sage in Cartesian and "cholastic philosophy) =ele!#e introd!ces this ter* beca!se it
serves to highlight the f!nda*ental relation bet-een being and difference) 1his strained
and tendentio!s !sage of the Ereal distinctionF sho!ld dra- o!r attention to =ele!#e>s
original conception of difference) =escartes>s real distinction is relational 2there is a
distinction bet-een , and y3D or$ *ore e@plicitly$ it proposes a concept of difference that
is entirely fo!nded on negation 2, is different fro* y3) "pino#a>s challenge is to eli*inate
the relational$ or negative$ aspect of the real distinction) Rather than pose the real
distinction as a Edistinction bet-eenF or a Edifference fro*$ F "pino#a -ants to identify
the real distinction in itself 2there is a distinction in ,; or rather$ , is different3)
7
Ance
again$ -e have to be sensitive to the ergsonian resonances here' E=issociated fro* any
n!*erical distinction$ real distinction is carried into the absol!te) 5t beco*es capable of
e@pressing the difference in being and conse<!ently it brings abo!t the restr!ct!ring of
other distinctionsF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 39$ *odified3) 1his state*ent
bears a stri4ing rese*blance to a passage in =ele!#e>s early essay on ergson' E1hin4ing
internal difference as s!ch$ as p!re internal difference$ arriving at a p!re concept of
difference$ raising difference to the absol!te-that is the sense of ergson>s effortF 2E+a
conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 9B3) .hat -e find in co**on here is the
ontological gro!nding of difference and the central role of difference in the fo!ndation of
being) 5n both ergson and "pino#a$ the essential characteristic of difference is$ on one
side$ its internal ca!sality$ and$ on the other$ its i**ersion in the
-01-
absol!te) As 5 have insisted at length$ =ele!#e>s reading of ergsonian difference depends
heavily on a conception of a being that is prod!ctive$ of an internal and efficient ca!sal
dyna*ic that can be traced bac4 to the *aterialist tradition and to the "cholastics) 1his
conception ta4es on its f!ll i*port in "pino#a' E"pino#a>s ontology is do*inated by the
notions of a cause of itself, in itself and through itself. 2E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a 1093) 1his internal ca!sal dyna*ic is -hat ani*ates the real distinction of being)
1his is the absol!tely positive difference that both s!pports being in itself and provides
the basis for all the differences that characteri#e real being) 1o this e@tent$ there is a
positive correspondence bet-een ergson>s difference of nat!re and "pino#a>s real
distinction' Eon opposita sed diversa is the for*!la of a ne- logic) Real distinction
appeared to open !p a ne- conception of the negative$ free fro* opposition and
privationF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 0B3) 5n both cases$ a special conception
of difference ta4es the place of opposition' 5t is a difference that is co*pletely positive$
that refers neither to an e@ternal ca!se nor to e@ternal *ediation-p!re difference$
difference in itself$ difference raised to the absol!te)
.e sho!ld d-ell a *o*ent on this point$ beca!se its sense is not i**ediately evident)
.hat can be *eant by a distinction that is not n!*ericalP 5n other -ords$ ho- can
so*ething be different -hen it is absol!tely infinite and indivisibleP .hat is a difference
that involves no otherP Ho- can -e conceive of the absol!te -itho!t negationP 1he
enor*o!s diffic!lties posed by these <!estions point to the a*bitio!s tas4 of the opening
of the Ethics) E"pino#a needed all the reso!rces of an original concept!al fra*e to bring
o!t the po-er and the act!ality of positive infinityF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a 963) Here -e are confronted -ith the "pino#ian principle of the sing!larity of
being) As a first appro@i*ation$ -e co!ld say that sing!larity is the !nion of *onis* -ith
the absol!te positivity of pantheis*' 1he !ni<!e s!bstance directly inf!ses and ani*ates
the entire -orld) 1he proble* -ith this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic
interpretation of s!bstance$ and allo-s for a conf!sion bet-een the infinite and the
indefinite) 5n other -ords$ fro* an idealist perspective$ absol!te s!bstance *ight be read
as an indeter*ination$ and pantheis* *ight be read as acos*is*) =ele!#e>s reading$
ho-ever$ closes off this possibility) eing is sing!lar not only in that it is !ni<!e and
absol!tely infinite$ b!t$ *ore i*portant$ in that it is remar9able) 1his is the i*possible
opening of the Ethics) "ing!lar being as s!bstance is not Edistinct fro*F or Edifferent
fro*F any thing o!tside itselfD if it -ere$ -e -o!ld have to conceive it partly thro!gh
another thing$ and th!s it -o!ld not be s!bstance) And yet$ being is not indifferent) Here
-e can begin to appreciate the radicality of "pino#a>s definition of s!bstance' Ey
s!bstance 5 !nder-
-09-
stand -hat is in itself and is conceived thro!gh itself$ i)e)$ that -hose concept does not
re<!ire the concept of another thing$ fro* -hich it *!st be for*edF 2=33) 1he distinction
of being rises fro* -ithin) 8ausa sui *eans that being is both infinite and definite' eing
is re*ar4able) 1he first tas4 of the real distinction$ then$ is to define being as sing!lar$ to
recogni#e its difference -itho!t reference to$ or dependence on$ any other thing) 1he real
nonn!*erical distinction defines the sing!larity of being$ in that being is absol!tely
infinite and indivisible at the sa*e ti*e that it is distinct and deter*inate) "ing!larity$ in
=ele!#e$ has nothing to do -ith individ!ality or partic!larity) 5t is$ rather$ the correlate of
efficient ca!sality and internal difference' 1he sing!lar is re*ar4able beca!se it is
different in itself)
.(+ #x&ressive Attri:utes and the Formal Distinction: <nivocit
At this point$ it see*s that -e can identify =ele!#e>s reading of ergsonian virt!ality
-ith that of "pino#ian s!bstance in that both propose sing!lar conceptions of being
ani*ated by an absol!tely positive and internal difference)
0
Ance -e propose this
co**on terrain of the sing!larity of being$ ho-ever$ "pino#a>s conception of the
attrib!tes rises !p as a real depart!re and as a profo!nd contrib!tion) .e have established
th!s far that the real distinction is not a n!*erical distinction$ or$ in ergsonian ter*s$
that a difference of nat!re is not a difference of degreeD no-$ -ith "pino#a>s theory of the
attrib!tes$ =ele!#e -ill e@tend this arg!*ent beyond ergson to sho- that the real
distinction is also a for*al distinction) 1hro!gh the investigation of the for*al distinction
of the attrib!tes$ =ele!#e arrives at a second "pino#ian principle of ontology' the
principle of the !nivocity of being) 5n order to grasp the !nivocity of being$ -e have to
begin -ith an investigation of its vocality$ its e@pressivity) 1he "pino#ian attrib!tes$ on
=ele!#e>s reading$ are the e@pressions of being) 1raditionally$ the proble* of the
attrib!tes of ,od is closely tied to that of divine na*es) "pino#a transfor*s> this tradition
by giving the attrib!te the active role in divine e@pression' E1he attrib!te is no longer
attrib!ted$ b!t is in so*e sense >attrib!tive)> /ach attrib!te e@presses an essence$ and
attrib!tes it to s!bstanceF 2:73) 1he iss!e of divine na*es beco*es a proble*atic of
divine e@pression)
=ele!#e sets !p a si*ple progression of theological paradig*s to sit!ate "pino#a>s theory
of e@pressive attrib!tes) &egative theologies in general affir* that ,od is the ca!se of the
-orld$ b!t deny that the essence of the -orld is the essence of ,od) 5n other -ords$
altho!gh the -orld is a divine e@pression$ the divine essence al-ays s!rpasses or
transcends the essence of its e@pression' E.hat conceals also e@presses$ b!t -hat e@-
-03-
presses still concealsF 2733) 1h!s$ ,od as essence or s!bstance can only be defined
negatively$ as an e*inent$ transcendent$ and concealed so!rce of e@pression) 1he ,od of
negative theology is e@pressive$ b!t -ith a certain essential reserve) Positive theologies$
on the contrary$ affir* ,od as both ca!se and essence of the -orld) Ho-ever$ a*ong
these theories there are i*portant distinctions in the -ay that they affir* ,od>s positivity)
=ele!#e finds it *ost i*portant to disting!ish e@pressive theologies fro* analogical
theologies) 5n the 1ho*istic tradition$ for e@a*ple$ the <!alities attrib!ted to ,od i*ply
an analogical relation bet-een ,od and the creat!res of the -orld) 1his conception both
elevates ,od to an e*inent position and renders the e@pression of being e<!ivocal) ,od
and the creat!res are different in for*$ and th!s cannot be said in the sa*e sense$ b!t
analogy is e*ployed precisely to bridge this gap) Analogy proposes to reconcile the
essential identity and the for*al difference bet-een ,od and things) "pino#a>s theory of
the attrib!te reverses this for*!la' EAttrib!tes are for*s co**on to ,od$ -hose essence
they constit!te$ and to *odes or creat!res -hich i*ply the* essentiallyF 2:83) "pino#a>s
attrib!te$ in contrast to theories of analogy$ proposes a co**onality of for* and a
distinction of essences' E"pino#a>s *ethod is neither abstract nor analogical) 5t is a for*al
*ethod based on co**!nityF 2:63) 1his "pino#ian distinction of essence$ tho!gh$ sho!ld
not be referred bac4 to a negative theological conception) 1hro!gh the attrib!tes 2the
e@pressions3$ s!bstance 2the e@pressing agent3 is absol!tely i**anent in the -orld of
*odes 2the e@pressed3) 1he distinction bet-een the essence of the e@pressing agent and
the essence of the e@pressed does not deny the i**anence of the one in the other) 1he
divine is absol!tely e@pressedD nothing is hiddenD there is neither reserve nor e@cess)
"pino#a>s conception of the sing!larity of being sho-s clearly his opposition to this
negative theological paradig*' 5**anence is opposed to e*inenceD pantheis* is
opposed to transcendence) "pino#a>s ,od is f!lly e@pressed in the -orld$ -itho!t reserve)
"pino#ian *onis* opposes all d!alis*$ both negative and analogical) 1he central
ele*ent that allo-s for this absol!te e@pression is the co**onality of for*s contained in
the attrib!te)
1he distinction bet-een e@pression and analogy beco*es clearer -hen =ele!#e
disting!ishes attrib!tes fro* properties) EProperties are not properly spea4ing attrib!tes$
precisely beca!se they are not e,pressiveF 27B3) 1he properties of ,od 2o*nipotence$
o*niscience$ perfection$ etc)3 do not e@press anything of the nat!re of ,od' Properties are
*!te) 1hey appear to !s as signs$ as revelations$ as co**and*ents) Properties are
notions i*pressed on !s that cannot *a4e !s !nderstand anything abo!t nat!re$ beca!se
they do not present !s -ith a co**on for*) =ele!#e disting!ishes$ therefore$ bet-een
t-o senses of Ethe -ord of ,odF' one
-0:-
that refers to the attrib!te as e@pression$ and another that refers to the property as sign' E=
sign al/ays attaches to a property; it al-ays signifies a co**and*entD and it gro!nds
o!r obedience) E,pression al/ays relates to an attribute; it e@presses an essence$ that is$
a nat!re in the infinitiveD it *a4es it 4no-n to !sF 2783) Ance again$ the e@pression of the
attrib!tes can only ta4e place thro!gh the co**on for*s of being) 1his conception can
be seen fro* t-o sides' An one hand$ by *eans of the attrib!tes$ ,od is absol!tely
immanent 2f!lly e@pressed3 in the -orld of the *odesD and on the other hand$ thro!gh the
co**on for*s of the attrib!tes$ the *odes participate f!lly in divine s!bstance)
5**anence and participation are the t-o sides of the e@pression of the attrib!tes) 5t is this
participation that disting!ishes bet-een the !nderstanding given by the e@pressive
attrib!tes and the obedience i*posed by the analogo!s properties) A syste* of signs tells
!s nothing abo!t beingD the *!te signs and the co**and*ents of se*iology close off
ontology) Anly e@pression can open !p o!r 4no-ledge of being)
8

1h!s far$ -e have criti<!ed negative theology and analogical positive theology on the
basis of the e@pression of the attrib!tes thro!gh the co**on for*s of being) 1o an
e@tent$ the conception of co**on for*s is i*plied by the real distinction' 1he sing!larity
of being re<!ires the absol!te i**anence of the divine in the -orld$ beca!se if ,od -ere
not absol!tely i**anent$ -e -o!ld need to disting!ish bet-een t-o s!bstances)
Absol!te i**anence$ ho-ever$ is a necessary$ b!t not s!fficient$ condition for !nivocity)
1he attrib!tes are not only characteri#ed by an internal co**on for* 2that follo-s fro*
i**anence3$ b!t also by an e@ternal pl!rality) 5n other -ords$ in order to p!rs!e this
theory of an e@pressive positive theology$ the for*al co**onality e*bodied in each
infinite attrib!te has to be co*ple*ented by the for*al distinction a*ong the different
attrib!tes) 1he divine essence is not only e@pressed in one attrib!te$ b!t in an infinite
n!*ber of formally distinct attrib!tes) 1o fill o!t this positive theological fra*e-or4$
then$ =ele!#e traces "pino#a>s theory of the attrib!tes bac4 to =!ns "cot!s'
6
E5t -as
-itho!t do!bt "cot!s -ho p!rs!ed farther than any other the enterprise of a positive
theology) He deno!nces at once the negative e*inence of the &eoplatonists and the
pse!doaffir*ation of the 1ho*istsF 2033) 1he positive theology of =!ns "cot!s is
characteri#ed by the theory of the for*al distinction) 1his concept provides a logical
*echanis* -hereby he can *aintain both the differences a*ong the attrib!tes and the
co**onality -ithin each attrib!te' 1he attrib!tes are for*ally distinct and ontologically
identical) E1here are here as it -ere t-o orders$ that of for*al reason and that of being$
-ith the pl!rality in one perfectly according -ith the si*plicity of the otherF 20:3) 1he
positive e@pression of the for*ally distinct attrib!tes constit!tes$ for "pino#a as for =!ns
"cot!s$
-07-
a conception of the !nivocity of being) >nivocity means precisely that being is e,pressed
al/ays and every/here in the same voice; in other -ords$ the attrib!tes each e@press
being in a different for* b!t in the sa*e sense) 1herefore$ !nivocity i*plies a for*al
difference bet-een attrib!tes$ b!t a real and absol!te ontological co**onality a*ong the
attrib!tes)
=ele!#e is caref!l to point o!t$ ho-ever$ that "pino#a>s theory of !nivocal being -ell
s!rpasses that of =!ns "cot!s$ than4s to the "pino#ian conception of the e@pressivity of
the attrib!tes) 5n =!ns "cot!s$ -hat are called attrib!tes-C!stice$ goodness$ -isdo*$ and
so on-are really *erely properties) 5n the final analysis$ =!ns "cot!s re*ains too *!ch of
a theologian$ and th!s he cannot abandon a certain e*inence of the divine' E%or his
theological$ that is to say >creationist$ > perspective forced hi* to conceive !nivocal eing
as a neutrali!ed, indifferent conceptF 2083) 5n =!ns "cot!s$ ,od the creator is not the
ca!se of all things in the same sense that it is the ca!se of itself) "ince !nivocal being in
=!ns "cot!s is not absol!tely sing!lar$ it re*ains so*e-hat indifferent$ so*e-hat
ine@pressive) "pino#a>s real distinction$ tho!gh$ elevates !nivocity to the level of
affir*ation) 5n the "pino#ian attrib!te$ the e@pression of being is the affir*ation of being'
EAttrib!tes are affir*ationsD b!t affir*ation$ in its essence is al-ays for*al$ act!al$
!nivocal' therein lies its e@pressivity) "pino#a>s philosophy is a philosophy of p!re
affir*ation) Affir*ation is the spec!lative principle on -hich hangs the -hole of the
EthicsF 20B3) 5n the "pino#ian conte@t$ =ele!#e gives affir*ation an original and precise
definition' 5t is a spec!lative principle based on the absol!te sing!larity and !nivocity of
being$ or$ in other -ords$ on the f!ll e@pressivity of being) And here$ once again$ -e can
recogni#e a typical ergsonian appreciation of "pino#a' E"pino#a allo-s !s to p!t a
finger on -hat is heroic in spec!lationF 2Ecrits et paroles 7683) Affir*ation constit!tes
the pinnacle$ the heroic *o*ent of a p!re$ spec!lative philosophy)
!emark: *ntological $&eculation
+et !s pa!se for a *o*ent and consider caref!lly the gro!nd -e have covered) 5n effect$
=ele!#e has read the first t-o great steps of the "pino#ian syste*$ the elaborations of
s!bstance and the attrib!tes$ as an alternative logic of spec!lation-not in opposition to$
b!t co*pletely a!tono*o!s fro*$ the Hegelian progression) 1his concept!al a!tono*y
de*onstrates not only ho- "pino#a represents a t!rning point in the evol!tion of
=ele!#e>s -or4$ b!t also ho- =ele!#e>s interpretation constit!tes a revol!tion for "pino#a
st!dies$ -hich had been long do*inated in Continental philosophy by a Hegelian reading)
5n reading =ele!#e>s st!dy of &iet#sche$ -e arg!ed that =ele!#e -as disengaging his
o-n tho!ght fro* the dialec-
-00-
tical terrain thro!gh the theory of the total criti<!e) 5n "pino#a$ this process is co*plete)
Ho-ever$ even tho!gh there is no *ention of Hegel in the entire te@t$ -e can easily
constr!ct a co*parison -ith Hegelian ontology in order to de*onstrate the i*portant
concept!al a!tono*y *ar4ed by =ele!#e>s "pino#ian fo!ndation) Hegel>s o-n
interpretation and criti<!e of "pino#ian ontology$ in fact$ serve to highlight the
differences of =ele!#e>s -or4D fro* a Hegelian perspective$ -e -ill be able to recogni#e
the radical depart!re constit!ted by =ele!#e>s reading of the sing!larity of s!bstance and
the !nivocity of the attrib!tes in "pino#a)
1he cr!@ of the iss!e here is the Hegelian conception of deter*ination) Hegel clai*s not
only that "pino#ian s!bstance is indeter*inate$ b!t that all deter*inations are dissolved
in the absol!te 2Science of %ogic 7303) According to Hegel$ the !ni<!e and absol!te being
of "pino#is* cannot provide a basis for deter*ination or difference beca!se it involves
no other or li*itation) =eter*inate being *!st negate and s!bs!*e its other -ithin itself
in order to attain <!ality and reality) 1he "pino#ian conception of sing!larity is a logical
i*possibility) 1he definition of being as sing!lar is precisely -hat irritates Hegel *ost$
and it is the point that he ref!ses to recogni#e' "pino#is*$ he clai*s$ is an acos*is*)
"ing!larity is$ in fact$ a real threat to Hegel beca!se it constit!tes the ref!sal of the
spec!lative fo!ndation of dialectics) 5n this conte@t -e can !nderstand clearly the
theoretical de*ands that co!ld drive Hegel to give this final C!dge*ent of "pino#a' E1he
ca!se of his death -as cons!*ption$ fro* -hich he had long been a s!ffererD this -as in
har*ony -ith his syste* of philosophy$ according to -hich all partic!larity and
individ!ality pass a-ay in the one s!bstanceF 2%ectures on the History of Philosophy
9783) .hen deter*ination is denied$ so too "pino#a the philosopher dissolves into
nothingness)
=ele!#e>s reading of the real distinction stands in sharp contrast 2b!t not oppositionX3 to
this interpretation) As -e have arg!ed$ the real distinction presents being as different in
itself) "ing!lar being is not different fro* anything o!tside being$ and neither is it
indifferent or abstract' 5t is si*ply re*ar4able) 5t -o!ld be false$ then$ to set !p an
opposition bet-een sing!lar being and deter*inate being) "ing!larity is and is not
deter*ination) 5n other -ords$ "pino#a>s being$ the !ni<!e s!bstance$ is deter*inate in
the sense that it is <!alified$ that it is different) Ho-ever$ it is not deter*inate in the sense
of being li*ited) 1his is -here =ele!#e>s disc!ssion of n!*ber co*es into play) 5f
s!bstance -ere to be li*ited 2or to have n!*ber3 it -o!ld have to involve an e@ternal
ca!se) "!bstance$ on the contrary$ is absol!tely infinite$ it is ca!se of itself) 8ausa sui
cannot be read in any ideal sense' eing is the *aterial and efficient ca!se of itself$ and
this contin!al act of self-prod!ction brings -ith it all the real deter*inations of the -orld)
EA*nis deter*inatio est negatioFP Clearly$ there is no
-08-
roo* for this e<!ation in =ele!#e>s "pino#a-not even as a point of opposition) eing is
never indeter*inateD it brings -ith it i**ediately all the freshness and *ateriality of
reality) 5 -o!ld arg!e that here$ -ith this real concept!al a!tono*y fro* the Hegelian
proble*atic$ -e can recogni#e a significant evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght) 5n the earlier
ergson st!dies$ -e noted a certain e<!ivocation on this iss!e) 1here -as a tendency for
=ele!#e$ along -ith ergson$ to oppose deter*ination$ and to affir* indeter*ination
instead) 1he proposition of indeter*ination allo-ed that being -o!ld not be restricted or
constrained by an e@ternal ca!se) oth aspects of this position$ the opposition to
deter*ination and the acceptance of indeter*ination$ have proved to be proble*atic) 5n
effect$ in opposing the rhyth* of the dialectical process of deter*ination$ =ele!#e -as
accepting its opposite 2indeter*ination3$ and th!s re*ained loc4ed on the dialectical
terrain) Ho-ever$ in the "pino#ian conte@t$ -e find that deter*ination and
indeter*ination are e<!ally inade<!ate ter*s) "ing!larity is the concept that *ar4s the
internal difference$ the real distinction that <!alifies absol!tely infinite being as real
-itho!t reco!rse to a dialectic of negations) 1he concept of sing!larity constit!tes the real
dislocation fro* the Hegelian theoretical hori#on)
1his difference in the t-o interpretations of the "pino#ian s!bstance contin!es and
develops in the interpretations of the attrib!tes) 1o a great e@tent$ Hegel>s reading of the
attrib!te follo-s directly fro* his interpretation of s!bstance' "ince s!bstance is an
infinite indeter*ination$ the attrib!te serves to li*it s!bstance$ to deter*ine it 2Science of
%ogic 7383) Hegel conceives of the theoretical *ove*ent fro* s!bstance to the attrib!tes
as the shado- i*age of the dialectic of deter*ination$ -hich is doo*ed to fail!re
beca!se it o*its the f!nda*ental play of negations) =ele!#e>s reading of the attrib!te
*oves in a very different direction$ again based on his different interpretation of
s!bstance) "ince$ in his vie-$ s!bstance is already real and <!alified$ there is no <!estion
of deter*ination$ b!t rather$ according to =ele!#e$ the attrib!tes fill the role of
e@pression) 1hro!gh the attrib!tes -e recogni#e the absol!te i**anence or e@pressivity
of being) %!rther*ore$ the infinite and e<!al e@pressions constit!te the !nivocity of
being$ in that it is al-ays and every-here e@pressed in the sa*e voice)
5f the central iss!e in the interpretation of s!bstance is deter*ination$ the interpretation of
the attrib!tes foc!ses on e*anation) =ele!#e>s theory of e@pression effectively constit!tes
a challenge to Hegel>s C!dg*ent that "pino#is* is an Eoriental conception of emanationF
2Science of %ogic 7363) According to Hegel$ the "pino#ian *ove*ent of being is an
irrec!perative series of degradations' E1he process of e*anation is ta4en only as a
happening, the beco*ing only as a progressive lossF 27393) =ele!#e of-
-06-
fers !s a response to this Hegelian criti<!e in the for* of an e@tended analysis of the
relation bet-een e*anation and i**anence in the history of philosophy) As one *ight
e@pect$ this =ele!#ian history of philosophy co*pletely disregards the Hegelian and
dialectical tradition$ by considering only positive ontological processes) 1his positive
*ove*ent is precisely -hat philosophies of e*anation and i**anence share' oth are
ani*ated by an internal ca!sality) E1heir co**on characteristic is that neither leaves
itself' they prod!ce /hile remaining in themselvesF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a 1813) "ince being is sing!lar$ its prod!ction can involve no other) &onetheless$
there is an i*portant difference in the -ay in -hich the e*anative ca!se and the
i**anent ca!se prod!ce) EA ca!se is i**anentN-hen its effect is >i**anate> Li**anQM
in the ca!se$ rather than e*anating fro* it) .hat defines an i**anent ca!se is that its
effect is in it-in it$ of co!rse$ as in so*ething else$ b!t still being and re*aining in itF
21893) 1he difference bet-een the essence of the i**anent ca!se and the essence of its
effect$ therefore$ can never be interpreted as a degradation' At the level of essences$ there
is an absol!te ontological e<!ality bet-een ca!se and effect) 5n an e*anative process$ on
the other hand$ the e@ternality of the effect -ith respect to the ca!se allo-s for a
s!ccessive degradation in the ca!sal chain and an ine<!ality of essences)
.e can clearly see at this point that "pino#a>s ontology is a philosophy of i**anence$
not e*anation) 1he essential e<!ality of i**anence de*ands a !nivocal being' E&ot
only is being e<!al in itself$ b!t it appears e<!ally present in all beingsF 21833)
5**anence denies any for* of e*inence or hierarchy in being' 1he principle of the
!nivocity of the attrib!tes re<!ires that being be e@pressed e<!ally in all of its for*s)
1herefore$ !nivocal e@pression is inco*patible -ith e*anation) .hat =ele!#e>s
e@planation *a4es clear is that "pino#a>s ontology$ a co*bination of i**anence and
e@pression$ is not s!sceptible to the Hegelian criti<!e of the dispersion$ the Eprogressive
lossF of being) =ele!#e e@plains this -ith the ter*s of *edieval philosophy$ citing
&icholas of C!sa' E,od is the !niversal co*plication$ in the sense that everything is in itD
and the !niversal e@plication$ in the sense that it is in everythingF 21873) 1he i**anence
and e@pression of "pino#is*$ according to =ele!#e$ presents a *odern version of this
*edieval co!ple$ complicare4e,plicare) 5nas*!ch as e@pression is an e@plicative or
centrif!gal *ove*ent$ it is also a co*plicative or centripetal *ove*ent$ gathering being
bac4 -ithin itself) =ele!#e>s analysis$ then$ not only presents "pino#a as an alternative
logic of ontological spec!lation$ b!t also provides !s -ith the ter*s to respond to the
Hegelian criti<!e of "pino#a)
.e have th!s far treated =ele!#e>s reading of the opening of the Ethics 2ro!ghly as far as
5P1:3$ -hich presents in co*pact for* the principles of ontological spec!lation) .e
sho!ld be very clear abo!t the si*plicity of
-09-
-hat has been developed th!s far' Ea logical constit!tion of s!bstance$ a >co*position> in
-hich there is nothing physicalF 2893) 1his logical constit!tion developed in the opening
of the Ethics consists of t-o principles' sing!larity and !nivocity) .e can affir* this
sa*e clai* in another -ay by saying that in the opening of the Ethics, "pino#a sho-s
that the definition of ,od 2=03 is not *erely a no*inal definition$ b!t a real definition'
E1his is the only definition that presents !s -ith a nat!re$ the e@pressive nat!re of the
absol!teF 2613) 1hro!gh the e@pression of the absol!te as sing!lar and !nivocal$ "pino#a
acco*plishes a logical constit!tion of the idea of ,od) 5f -e read this theological
ter*inology in a traditional sense$ tho!gh$ -e -ill certainly be disappointed) ergson$ for
one$ reacts to the p!rely logical character of "pino#a>s presentation' E1he ,od of the first
part of the Ethics is engendered o!tside of all e@perience$ as a circle -o!ld be for a
geo*etrician -ho has never seen oneF 2<!oted in MossQ-astide$ Eergson et "pino#aF
81$ fro* ergson>s co!rse at the CollIge de %rance$ 19193) "pino#a is not$ ho-ever$
constr!cting an i*age or idea of ,od in any conventional sense) He is e@cavating being
in order to discover the real ontological principles of spec!lation) .hat "pino#a has
arrived at is si*ply the f!nda*ental genetic principles$ sing!larity and !nivocity$ that
g!ide the prod!ction and constit!tion of being) 1here is nothing hypothetical abo!t the
opening of the Ethics, thenD instead$ it is a spec!lative develop*ent of the genetic
se<!ence of being$ Ea genealogy of s!bstanceF 2=ele!#e$ E"pino#a et la *Qthode gQnQrale
de M) ,!ero!ltF :393) 1he principles that de*onstrate the reality of the definition of ,od
2=03 are those of the life of s!bstance itselfD they are the a priori constit!tion of being
2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 613) .hen =ele!#e says that this definition is a
genetic definition$ he *eans precisely that the principles of being are active and
constr!ctive' %ro* these principles being itself !nfolds)
1his is all -e 4no- abo!t being 2abo!t ,od3 at this point in the analysis' 5t is sing!lar
and it is !nivocal) 1here is an i*plicit pole*ic in this affir*ation abo!t the nat!re and the
li*its of spec!lation) 1he tr!ths that -e can learn thro!gh spec!lation are very fe- and
very si*ple) "pec!lation does not constit!te the -orld or constr!ct beingD it *erely can
provide !s -ith the f!nda*ental principles by -hich being is constit!ted) "pino#a is
clearly conscio!s of this fact$ and if -e de*and *ore of his spec!lation -e are bo!nd to
be disappointed$ as ergson is$ -ith his E,od *ade of ice)F "pino#a>s real constit!tion of
being ta4es place in another field of activity$ in an ontological practice$ -hich is
a!tono*o!s fro* the field of spec!lation) An this point$ -e can see clearly -hy
"pino#ian tho!ght is not rec!perable -ithin a Hegelian 2or -ithin any idealist3
fra*e-or4) Antological spec!lation is not prod!ctiveD it is not constit!tive of being)
"pec!lation
-8B-
*erely traces the conto!rs of being>s prod!ctive dyna*ic) "oon -e -ill t!rn o!r attention
to the constit!tive nat!re of "pino#ian practice$ b!t first -e sho!ld investigate a third and
final ontological principle' the principle of the po-ers of being$ -itho!t -hich "pino#a>s
tho!ght -o!ld re*ain spec!lative and never *a4e the conversion to a practical
philosophy)
.(. "he Powers of )eing
1he seeds of the "pino#ian principle of po-er can be fo!nd in the a posteriori proofs of
the e@istence of ,od) =ele!#e prepares his treat*ent of these proofs by first presenting
the Cartesian a priori proof as a fra*e-or4) =escartes>s proof is based on the <!antities
of perfection or reality' A ca!se *!st have at least as *!ch reality as its effectD the ca!se
of an idea *!st have at least as *!ch for*al reality as the idea has obCective realityD no-
5 have the idea of an infinitely perfect beingD and so on) =ele!#e clai*s that "pino#a
ta4es !p this Cartesian proof in his Short $reatise -ith an original *odification) +i4e
=escartes$ "pino#a begins fro* the idea of ,od and asserts that the ca!se of this idea
*!st e@ist and contain for*ally all that the idea contains obCectively 2Short $reatise 5'33)
Ho-ever$ the Cartesian a@io* abo!t the <!antities of perfection or reality is not s!fficient
to s!pport this proof) 5n its place$ "pino#a s!bstit!tes an a@io* of po-er that lin4s the
po-er to thin4 -ith the po-er to e@ist or act' E1he intellect has no *ore po-er to 4no-
than its obCects have to e@ist and actD the po-er to thin4 and 4no- cannot be greater than
a necessarily correlative po-er of e@istingF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 60$
*odified3) =ele!#e presents this a priori proof of the Short $reatise, ho-ever$ as *erely
a *idpoint in "pino#a>s develop*ent)
1he a@io* of po-er attains a *at!re deploy*ent in the a posteriori proofs in the Ethics)
"pino#a offers three de*onstrations of the proposition that ,od necessarily e@ists$ b!t
=ele!#e is pri*arily interested in the third beca!se in this proof "pino#a no longer passes
thro!gh the idea of ,od and the po-er to thin4$ b!t begins directly -ith the po-er to
e@ist) "pino#a>s arg!*ent proceeds as follo-s' 213 1o be able to e@ist is to have po-erD
293 it -o!ld be abs!rd to say that finite beings e@ist -hile an absol!tely infinite being
does not e@ist$ beca!se that -o!ld be to say that the finite beings are *ore po-erf!lD 233
therefore$ either nothing e@ists or an absol!tely infinite being also e@istsD 2:3 since -e
e@ist$ an absol!tely infinite being necessarily e@ists 25P11=33) 1he i*portance of this
proof for o!r p!rposes is not its logical coherence$ b!t rather its !se of Ethe po-er to
e@istF in the logical fo!ndation) "pino#a *a4es po-er a principle of being)
Po-er is the essence of being that presents essence in e@istence) 1he inti*ate ne@!s in
"pino#a that !nites ca!se$ po-er$ prod!ction$ and es-
-81-
sence is the dyna*ic core that *a4es his spec!lative syste* into a dyna*ic proCect) E1he
identity of po-er and essence *eans' po-er is al-ays act or$ at least$ in action 0en acte1F
2933) ,od prod!ces as it e@ists) Many co**entators have recogni#ed in "pino#a>s
conception of po-er a nat!ralis* that is in direct opposition to =escartes$ and that dra-s
on the -or4 of Renaissance thin4ers s!ch as ,iordano r!no) %erdinand Al<!iQ$ for
e@a*ple$ e@plains that this "pino#ian ne@!s constit!tes an active principle' E"pino#a>s
nat!re 2is3 above all spontaneity$ an active principle of develop*entF 2ature et v#rit# 93)
9
=ele!#e accepts this conception of "pino#a>s nat!ralis*$ b!t for hi* it presents only
half the pict!re) 5n effect$ =ele!#e co*ple*ents the reference to Renaissance nat!ralis*
-ith a second reference$ a reference to *odern *aterialis* 2Hobbes$ in partic!lar3)
"pino#a>s conception of po-er is not only a principle of action$ =ele!#e clai*s$ b!t also$
to the sa*e e@tent$ a principle of affection) 5n other -ords$ the essence of nat!re as po-er
i*plies e<!ally a prod!ction and a sensibility' EAll po-er bears -ith it a corresponding
and inseparable po-er to be affectedF 2933) Po-er in "pino#a has t-o sides that are
al-ays e<!al and indivisible' the po-er to effect and the po-er to be affected$ prod!ction
and sensibility) 1herefore$ "pino#a can add a second aspect to the affir*ation of the a
posteriori proof of ,od' &ot only does ,od have an absol!tely infinite po-er to e@ist$
,od also has the po-er to be affected in an absol!tely infinite n!*ber of -ays)
1his is precisely the point at -hich$ in iet!sche and Philosophy, =ele!#e identified a
lin4 bet-een "pino#a and &iet#sche 2093) A -ill to po-er is al-ays acco*panied by a
feeling of po-er) %!rther*ore$ this &iet#schean pathos does not involve a body
Es!fferingF fro* passionsD rather$ pathos plays an active$ prod!ctive role) 1he "pino#ian
co!ple po-er-affectivity echoes so*e of these &iet#schean ele*ents) A!r !se of the ter*
EsensibilityF to try to describe the po-er to be affected *ay -ell be *isleading) An
affection in "pino#ian ter*inology *ay be an action or a passion$ depending on -hether
the affection res!lts fro* an internal or an e@ternal ca!se) 1herefore$ the po-er to e@ist of
a *ode al-ays corresponds to a po-er to be affected$ and this po-er to be affected Eis
al-ays filled$ either by affections prod!ced by e@ternal things 2called passive affections3$
or by affections e@plained by the *ode>s o-n essence 2called active affections3F
2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 93$ *odified3) 1he plenit!de of being$ in "pino#a
as in &iet#sche$ *eans not only that being is al-ays and every-here f!lly e@pressed$
-itho!t any transcendental and ineffable reserve$ b!t also that the po-er to be affected$
-hich corresponds to the po-er to e@ist$ is co*pletely filled -ith active and passive
affections)
-89-
1hese t-o distinctions constit!te o!r initial essay in discerning the internal str!ct!re of
po-er)
.e can begin to see at this point ho- "pino#a>s proposition of the e<!ivalence bet-een
the po-er to e@ist and the po-er to be affected can lead !s to-ard a practical theory) 1o
!nderstand the nat!re of po-er -e have to discover the internal str!ct!res of po-erD b!t
-hen -e investigate the first side of the e<!ation$ the po-er to e@ist$ po-er appears as
p!re spontaneity) 5ts str!ct!re is opa<!e to !s$ and o!r analysis is bloc4ed) Ho-ever$ once
"pino#a has proposed the e<!ivalence bet-een the po-er to e@ist and the po-er to be
affected$ -e can shift o!r investigation to the other side of the e<!ation) Here -e find a
tr!ly differentiated str!ct!re and a rich terrain for o!r analysis) .hen -e pose the
<!estion of ca!se in this conte@t$ -e find a real distinction' A!r po-er to be affected is
constit!ted by active affections 2internally ca!sed3 and passive affections 2e@ternally
ca!sed3) 5**ediately$ this distinction s!ggests the o!tlines of an ethical$ and !lti*ately
practical$ proCect' Ho- can -e favor active affections so that o!r po-er to be affected
-ill be filled to a greater e@tent -ith active rather than passive affectionsP At this point$
ho-ever$ -e are !nable to address this tas4$ beca!se -e still 4no- too little abo!t the
str!ct!re of po-er)
&onetheless$ -e sho!ld note that "pino#a>s principle of po-er al-ays presents itself as a
principle of conversion-a conversion fro* spec!lation to practice$ fro* the analysis of
being to the constit!tion of being) "pino#a>s po-er enters the scene at the ho!r of
*idnight$ at the *o*ent of &iet#sche>s trans*!tation) 1his conversion is possible
beca!se "pino#a>s analysis of the internal str!ct!re of po-er$ pressing the <!estion of the
ca!sal dyna*ic at every point$ ill!*inates the real steps that -e can ta4e in constit!ting
o!rselves and o!r -orld thro!gh practice) .e *!st be patient$ tho!gh$ and not C!*p too
far ahead) .ith "pino#a>s proposition of the principle of po-er$ -e have only opened the
door 2or as Alth!sser *ight say$ Eno!s avons o!vert des voiesF3 to-ard the develop*ent
of an ontological practice) At present$ there is *ore -or4 to be done in order to prepare
this terrainD -e *!st t!rn bac4 to the three ontological principles -e have identified-
sing!larity$ !nivocity$ and po-er-and develop the* into a f!ll spec!lative logic of being)
-83-
*ntological #x&ression
.(1 "he Inter&retation of the Attri:utes: Pro:lems of a %aterialist *ntolog
As -e have seen$ the "pino#ian theory of the attrib!te solves *any proble*sD b!t it also
raises *any others) Ane of the *ost serio!s diffic!lties that it poses is the threat of an
idealist or s!bCectivist tendency in "pino#a>s tho!ght) .hat is *ost i*portant to =ele!#e
in this regard is to *aintain a strictly *aterialist interpretation of "pino#a>s ontology 2and
-e -ill see that there are several tensions involved -ith *aintaining this position3) 1his
disc!ssion -ill help !s flesh o!t the role that *aterialis* plays in =ele!#e>s tho!ght)
Materialis* sho!ld never be conf!sed -ith a si*ple priority of body over *ind$ of the
physical over the intellect!al) Rather$ *aterialis* repeatedly appears in the history of
philosophy as a corrective to idealis*$ as a denial of the priority of *ind over body)
"pino#a corrects =escartes C!st as Mar@ corrects Hegel) 1his *aterialist correction is not
an inversion of the priority$ b!t the proposition of an e<!ality in principle bet-een the
corporeal and the intellect!al) =ele!#e *a4es clear that this ref!sal of the priority of the
intellect serves to point to-ard and reinforce the priority of being e<!ally over all of its
attrib!tes 2tho!ght$ e@tension$ etc)3) %ro* this perspective$ the only tr!e ontology *!st be
*aterialist) Any privilege of the intellect$ in other -ords$ -o!ld s!bvert the ontological
str!ct!re of the syste*$ so that not only *atter b!t also being itself -o!ld so*eho- be
dependent on tho!ght) =ele!#e finds it necessary$ then$ to co*bat an idealist acco!nt of
being not only in order to valori#e the *aterial -orld$ b!t *ore i*portant to preserve the
coherence of the ontological perspective) 1he intellect!al and the corporeal are e<!al
e@pressions of being' 1his is the f!nda*ental principle of a *aterialist ontology)
5n the conte@t of the "pino#ian syste*$ -e can identify the central iss!e in the very
definition of the attrib!te' Ey attrib!te 5 !nderstand /hat the intellect perceives of a
substance, as constit!ting its essenceF 2Ethics 5=:$ *y e*phasis3) Ane of the proble*s
that presents itself i**ediately is that the definition grants a certain priority to the
attrib!te of tho!ght over the other attrib!tes' 1ho!ght is the *eans of perceiving all the
attrib!tes of s!bstance$ incl!ding tho!ght itself) "everal e@a*ples ill!strating the role of
the attrib!te$ s!ch as those in +etter 9 to "i*on de (ries$ give an even *ore proble*atic
e@planation) 5n this letter$ "pino#a offers t-o e@a*ples of ho- in the attrib!tes Eone and
the sa*e thing can be designated by t-o na*es)F 1he first of these t-o is perhaps the
*ore proble*atic' E5 say that by 5srael 5 !nderstand the third patriarchD 5 !nderstand the
sa*e by ?acob$
-8:-
the na*e that -as given hi* beca!se he had sei#ed his brother>s heel)F 1he distinction
here is *erely no*inal and$ *ore i*portant$ the difference resides not in the obCect
perceived b!t in the perceiving s!bCect$ not directly in being b!t in the intellect)
5n "pino#a st!dies there is a long-standing controversy over the interpretation of the
attrib!tes)
1B
1he n!cle!s of the disp!te involves the position of the attrib!te -ith respect
to s!bstance on one side$ and -ith respect to the intellect on the other' 5t is a <!estion of
the priority of ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi) 1he idealist or s!bCectivist
interpretation defines the attrib!te pri*arily as a for* of 4no-ledge$ and not as a for* of
being) Hegel>s presentation in the Science of %ogic is the se*inal reading in this tradition)
11
As -e noted earlier$ Hegel conceives of the attrib!te as the deter*ination or li*itation
of s!bstance that is dependent on the intellect and that Eproceeds o!tside the absol!teF
27363$ that is$ E-hich appears as e@ternal and i**ediate over against s!bstanceF 27383)
Martial ,!ero!lt points o!t that there is a logical contradiction in this reading that
-ea4ens the fo!ndations of "pino#ian ontology' 1he attrib!tes cannot be dependent on
the intellect beca!se the intellect is a *ode of tho!ght$ and therefore ontologically
posterior to the attrib!tes) E5n fact$ if the attrib!tes -ere to res!lt fro* the idea that the
intellect had of s!bstance$ the intellect -o!ld be anterior to the*$ and conse<!ently
anterior to the attrib!te of -hich it is a *ode$ -hich is abs!rdF 25$ 7B3) Hegel hi*self
recogni#es this contradiction$ b!t see*s to credit it to an error in the "pino#ian syste*
rather than to a fa!lt of his interpretation 2Science of %ogic 7383) Ho-ever$ the pri*ary
iss!e at sta4e here$ 5 -o!ld *aintain$ is not the logical contradiction of the s!bCectivist
reading$ b!t rather the priority that it grants to the intellect) 1he <!estion$ 5 repeat$ is the
relative i*port of the ratio essendi and the ratio cognoscendi in the syste* as a -hole)
.hat is at sta4e$ in other -ords$ are the very ter*s of a *aterialist ontology$ an ontology
that does not fo!nd being in tho!ght)
=ele!#e provides !s -ith an alternative reading of the "pino#ian attrib!tes-an obCectivist$
ontological interpretation) According to =ele!#e$ -hen "pino#a presents the attrib!te as
*erely a -ay of 4no-ing or conceiving$ as in +etter 9$ he is giving only a partial or
si*plified e@planation of the attrib!te>s real role 2013) 1he attrib!te does not depend on
the intellectD on the contrary$ the intellect plays only a secondary role in the f!nctioning
of the attrib!tes$ as an obCective and invisible agent of representation) EAll for*ally
distinct attrib!tes are referred by the intellect to an ontologically single s!bstance) !t the
intellect only reprod!ces obCectively the nat!re of the for*s it apprehendsF 2073) 5n other
-ords$ the relation of the attrib!tes to s!bstance is prior to and independent of the
intellect>s apprehension of this relationD the intellect *erely reprod!ces in
-87-
obCective or cognitive ter*s the pri*ary ontological relation) 1he ratio essendi is prior to
the ratio cognoscendi) 1his obCectivist interpretation s!cceeds in preserving the
ontological integrity of the syste*$ and it resolves the contradiction posed by granting a
fo!ndational role to the intellect in the theory of the attrib!tes) &onetheless$ -e *!st
recogni#e that -e cannot *aintain this thesis -itho!t a certain strain) +et !s ret!rn$ for
e@a*ple$ to the definition of the attrib!tes' Ey attrib!te 5 !nderstand /hat the intellect
perceives of a substance, as constit!ting its essenceF 2Ethics 5=:$ *y e*phasis3) Ho-
can the obCectivist interpretation acco!nt for this E<!od intellect!s de s!bstantiK percipitF
-itho!t giving a fo!ndational role to the intellectP 2And -e sho!ld note that reference to
the original +atin offers !s no -ay o!t in this dile**a)3 %!rther*ore$ even if -e are to
accept the intellect as secondary in the fo!ndation of the attrib!te$ ho- are -e to
!nderstand -hat =ele!#e describes as its EobCective reprod!ctionF of the nat!re of the
for*s it apprehendsP 1his Ereprod!ctionF is certainly a very -ea4 conception of
e@pression)
=ele!#e does not see* to be dist!rbed by these proble*s 2or perhaps he is deter*ined
not to be sidetrac4ed by the*3$ and he does not treat this iss!e in any depth) .hat is
clear$ ho-ever$ is the insistence of =ele!#e>s effort to preserve the ontological integrity of
the syste* and co*bat any priority of tho!ght over the other attrib!tes$ even -hen this
effort see*s to go against clear state*ents in the te@t) 1he sta4es here go -ell beyond the
real* of "pino#a st!dies$ and refer instead to the nat!re of the ret!rn to ontology central
to =ele!#e>s philosophy and the radical difference it *ar4s -ith respect to other
conte*porary philosophical positions) =ele!#e>s philosophy has to be recogni#ed in its
difference fro* both the idealist ontological tradition and any deontological approach to
philosophyD instead$ thro!gh the interpretation of the attrib!tes =ele!#e is -or4ing o!t
the di*ensions of a *aterialist ontology)
!emark: $&eculative Production and "heoretical Practice
.hen -e broaden o!r perspective beyond the specific <!estions of "pino#a
interpretation$ -e can see that =ele!#e>s obCectivist reading *ar4s hi* as radically o!t of
sync -ith the intellect!al *ove*ents of his ti*e$ as s!staining a precario!sly
*inoritarian theoretical position) 1he intellect!al hege*ony in 190Bs %rance of the
E*asters of s!spicion$ F the partisans of the trilogy Mar@-&iet#sche-%re!d$
19
altho!gh to
a certain e@tent anti-Hegelian$ nonetheless 2if -e can allo- o!rselves a transposition to
the terrain of the "pino#ian controversy3 have to be co!nted on the side of a s!bCectivist
reading of the attrib!tes) 1he vario!s mots d'ordre that sprang !p fro* different ca*ps
thro!gho!t the %rench intellect!al scene in this
-80-
period all insist on the fo!ndational role of the intellect$ of the ratio cognoscendi;
consider$ for e@a*ple$ the i*portance of the -idespread disco!rse on Evision$ F on the
seen and the non-seen$ or rather the foc!s on EinterpretationF as a privileged field of
investigation) =ele!#e>s proposition of an obCectivist ontological spec!lation in "pino#a
r!ns co!nter to this entire strea* of tho!ght) 1he general trend$ in fact$ see*s to
constit!te a forcef!l attac4 on =ele!#e>s position)
"o as not to fall into abstract generali#ation$ let !s briefly investigate Alth!sser>s reading
of Mar@ as an e@a*ple-perhaps not a representative e@a*ple$ b!t certainly one that -as
infl!ential) Ane ele*ent that Alth!sser -ants to bring into foc!s$ and to bring into
<!estion$ is the act of reading itself' reading Mar@>s 8apital, reading the classical
econo*ists$ reading capitalist society) Alth!sser -ants !s to find in Mar@ a revol!tion in
the theory of 4no-ledge' E.e *!st co*pletely reorgani#e the idea -e have of
4no-ledge$ -e *!st abandon the spec!lar *yths of i**ediate vision and reading$ and
conceive 4no-ledge as a prod!ctionF 2"eading 8apital 9:3) .e can disting!ish t-o
ele*ents in Alth!sser>s effort to conceive of 4no-ledge as a prod!ction) %irst$ -e *!st
grasp that there is a distinction bet-een the obCect of 4no-ledge and the real obCect-or$ to
follo- Alth!sser in a "pino#ian e@a*ple$ there is a distinction bet-een the idea of a
circle and a really e@isting circle 2:Bff)3) As a second step$ ho-ever$ -e *!st recogni#e
that the i*portance of this distinction lies in the fact that the t-o do*ains e@ist !nder
different conditions' .hile the real obCect is given$ the tho!ght obCect is prod!ced in a
specific relation to reality) E&o do!bt there is a relation bet-een thought-abo!t-the-real
and this real, b!t it is a relation of 4no-ledgeF 2683) Alth!sser>s insistence on the
centrality of ratio cognoscendi is a characteristic central to pheno*enological
spec!lation) efore -e can consider real things in the*selves$ according to
pheno*enologists$ -e *!st consider ho- these things are presented to o!r
conscio!sness$ to o!r intellect) 1his is -here the "pino#ian attrib!te reappears at the heart
of the disc!ssion' E<!od intellect!s de s!bstantiK percipit)F Alth!sser>s strategy of
reading$ along -ith pheno*enological spec!lation in general$ coincides perfectly -ith a
s!bCectivist interpretation of the attrib!te) "!bCectivist reading p!ts an end to the *yth of
p!re spec!lation$ of a Espec!larF spec!lation' 1here is no innocent or obCective reading of
the -orld$ of society$ of political econo*y)
At first sight$ Alth!sser>s criti<!e$ -hich in this respect is representative of a general
intellect!al *ove*ent$ see*s to fall directly and heavily on =ele!#e>s obCectivist reading
of the attrib!tes) =ele!#e gives the intellect precisely the Espec!larF role that Alth!sser
deno!nces' E1he intellect only reproduces objectively the nat!re of the for*s it
apprehendsF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 073) Ho- can =ele!#e possibly
*aintain the
-88-
theory of a spec!lar$ obCective intellectP Ho-$ -hen the entire %rench philosophical
co**!nity is foc!sing on the productive nat!re of 4no-ledge$ can =ele!#e relegate the
apprehension of the intellect to a reproductive roleP .e are certainly faced -ith
conflicting positions here) =ele!#e>s philosophy is not a pheno*enology) Ho-ever$ -hen
-e e@a*ine the *atter closely$ -e find that in certain respects the Alth!sserian criti<!e
does not$ in fact$ directly address =ele!#e>s arg!*ent) %irst of all$ =ele!#e is not ignoring
the centrality of prod!ctionD rather$ he gives the f!nctioning of the intellect a reprod!ctive
role in the theory of the attrib!te$ beca!se the pri*ary prod!ction is else-here) .e have
e*phasi#ed thro!gho!t o!r reading of =ele!#e>s vario!s -or4s that his ontology is
fo!nded on the conception that being is a prod!ctive dyna*ic) 5n the ergson st!dy$ -e
related this conception to the ca!sal disco!rse of the "cholastics$ and in "pino#a -e can
trace it to Renaissance nat!ralis*) .e co!ld s!**ari#e =ele!#e>s ontology in precisely
these ter*s' eing is prod!ctive in direct$ i**ediate$ and absol!tely positive ter*s)
/very disc!ssion of ca!sality and difference is based on this fo!ndation) .ith this in
*ind$ -e can interpret =ele!#e>s position on the reproductive role of the intellect as
principally an affir*ation of the productive role of being) 1h!s$ -e can ha#ard a
preli*inary =ele!#ian response to o!r first Alth!sserian criti<!e' ringing cognitive
prod!ction to center stage in philosophy *as4s the f!nda*ental prod!ctive dyna*ic of
being that is really antecedent to the intellect$ in logical and ontological ter*s)
1his first response$ ho-ever$ can only serve partially to deflect the criti<!e$ not ans-er it)
.e can approach a *ore ade<!ate e@planation of =ele!#e>s position if -e bring into
<!estion the domain proper to spec!lation) =ele!#e>s spec!lation does clai* an obCective
representation$ b!t it applies *erely to a very specific terrain) "ociety$ capital$ and its
econo*y are not appropriate obCects of spec!lationD rather$ in =ele!#e$ spec!lation is
bro!ght to bear e@cl!sively on ontological iss!es$ and$ as -e have insisted$ it arrives at
very fe-$ and very si*ple$ ontological principles) Against a pheno*enological
spec!lation$ =ele!#e poses a p!rely ontological spec!lation) .hat -o!ld it *ean to
conceive of this ontological spec!lation as prod!ctionP .e -o!ld have to say$ in line
-ith a s!bCectivist ontology$ that sing!larity$ !nivocity$ and po-er are not principles of
being 2as real obCects3$ b!t rather prod!cts of o!r intellect!al activity 2as obCects of o!r
4no-ledge3) 5n other -ords$ -e -o!ld have to say that they are not act!ally principles of
being$ b!t rather E<!od intellect!s de s!bstantiK percipit)F 1his s!bCectivi#ation of being
-o!ld !nder*ine the ontological fo!ndation of the "pino#ian syste* in its entirety) 1he
obCectivist interpretation of the attrib!tes clai*s si*ply that there are certain principles of
being that are prior to$ and independent of$ the prod!ctive po-er of tho!ghtD
-86-
these principles constit!te the field of spec!lation) =ele!#e$ then$ tries to preserve the
specificity of ontology -ithin its specific do*ain) .hat lies o!tside of the real* of
ontological spec!lation is treated by =ele!#e in e*pirical ter*s-it -ill be the fo!ndation
of =ele!#e>s conception of practice)
1his second =ele!#ian response$ ho-ever$ is still open to a f!rther Alth!sserian criti<!e)
1he recognition of the prod!ction involved in 4no-ledge and its distinction fro* reality$
according to Alth!sser$ is the defining factor of all *aterialis*' E5f -e do not respect it$
-e inevitably fall into either spec!lative idealis* or e*piricist idealis*F 2"eading
8apital 683) Alth!sser>s *aterialist and pheno*enological spec!lation is precisely -hat
allo-s hi* to propose his fa*o!s concept of practice -ithin theory$ Ethe theory of
theoretical practice)F 1he obCectivist interpretation of the attrib!tes$ on the contrary$
banishes practice fro* the field of spec!lation) =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ then$ appears as
idealis* on both sides of this practicotheoretical synthesis' a spec!lative idealis* and an
e*pirical idealis* held loosely together in one philosophy) Clearly$ =ele!#e>s conception
of practice does not escape Alth!sser>s indict*ent' E5t is eno!gh to prono!nce the -ord
practice, -hich$ !nderstood in an ideological 2e*piricist or idealist3 -ay$ is only the
*irror i*age$ the co!nter-connotation of theory 2the pair of >contraries> practice and
theory co*posing the t-o ter*s of a spec!lar field3$ to reveal the play on -ords that is its
seatF 278-763) %ro* this perspective$ =ele!#e>s practice$ -hich pretends to be
a!tono*o!s fro* spec!lation$ is *erely the co*pliant spec!lar co!nterpart to obCectivist
and idealist spec!lation in a fra!d!lent -ord ga*e) =ra-ing on one of Alth!sser>s
favorite te@ts$ the $heses on ;euerbach, -e have to level the acc!sation that =ele!#e>s
philosophy can have no practical po-erD it can *erely atte*pt to thin4 the -orld$ not
change it)
.ith the criti<!e of practice$ -e have to!ched the heart of the *atter$ b!t -e do not yet
have control of the ter*s to investigate it f!rther) Alth!sser>s challenge can serve$ for the
present$ as a critical a@is to orient o!r disc!ssion and highlight the difference *ar4ed by
=ele!#e>s approach) P!re ontology and absol!te *aterialis*' 1hese are the
co*ple*entary positions that =ele!#e s!stains against the tide of his conte*poraries)
.(0 Com:atting the Privileges of "hought
.e *!st ret!rn no- to consider in greater depth =ele!#e>s treat*ent of the "pino#ian
attrib!tes) 1he sta4es in the disc!ssion of the attrib!tes sho!ld be clear) 1he obCectivist
interpretation of the attrib!tes see*s open to the criti<!e fro* a pheno*enological
perspective that it i*plies an ide-
-89-
alist conception of ontology and th!s precl!des a theoretical practice$ or any real notion
of practice) =ele!#e>s concerns$ ho-ever$ point in a very different direction) 1he real
danger$ according to hi*$ is that the attrib!te of tho!ght be given a priority over the other
attrib!tes$ that the *ind be given priority over the body) 1his intellect!alist conception of
ontology -o!ld not only destroy the !nivocity of being$ b!t -o!ld also s!bordinate any
*aterial and corporeal conception of being to the intellect!al real*) 1his disc!ssion -ill
necessarily be co*ple@$ and at points =ele!#e>s interpretation -ill see* strained -ith
respect to "pino#a>s te@t$ b!t this co*ple@ity and this tension sho!ld only indicate to !s
ho- i*portant this point is for =ele!#e>s philosophy$ ho- i*portant it is to co*bat the
privileges of tho!ght)
=ele!#e artic!lates his idea of the e<!ality of the attrib!tes thro!gh a theory of
ontological parallelis*)
13
1he idea of a parallelis* of the attrib!tes sho!ld not be
considered as another principle of beingD rather$ it is si*ply a logical e@tension or
develop*ent of the idea of the !nivocity of being) 5f being is al-ays and every-here said
in the sa*e -ay$ then the attrib!tes *!st be e<!al e@pressions) 5n other -ords$ if$ vie-ed
fro* above$ !nivocity appears as the absol!te !nifor*ity of the -hole$ then vie-ed fro*
belo- it appears as the e<!al participation of all the constit!ent parts) .e can identify
three ele*ents that constit!te =ele!#e>s theory of ontological parallelis*' a!tono*y$
e<!ality$ and !nity)
1he a!tono*y of the attrib!tes sho!ld be !nderstood fore*ost as a reCection of the
Cartesian conception of the pri*acy of the *ind over the body) "pino#a clai*s$ in
opposition to =escartes$ that the *ind neither controls nor s!ffers fro* the body$ and
si*ilarly the body neither controls nor s!ffers fro* the *ind) 1here is a real separation
bet-een the attrib!tes) "pino#a conceives the *ind$ then$ as a Espirit!al a!to*atonF
2$reatise on the Emendation of the Intellect 673 beca!se in thin4ing the *ind obeys only
the la-s of tho!ght 2cf) E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 1:B3) 1he sa*e$ of co!rse$
*!st be said of the body' 1he body is a corporeal a!to*aton beca!se in *ove*ent and
rest the body obeys only the la-s of e@tension) 1his conception of the a!tono*y of the
attrib!tes rests on one of the principles of efficient ca!sality' 5nsofar as t-o things are
different$ one cannot be the ca!se of the other 2cf) Ethics 5P33) 1he attrib!tes$ then$
constit!te independent series of ca!se and effect)
1he proposition of parallelis*$ ho-ever$ goes beyond a *ere separation bet-een the
attrib!tes) E1he order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of
thingsF 255P8$ e*phasis *ine3) "pino#a>s proposition clai*s not only that the attrib!tes
are a!tono*o!s$ b!t also that they are organi#ed in a parallel order' EAnd indeed$ identity
of connection *eans not only the a!tono*y of corresponding series$ b!t an
-6B-
isono*y$ that is$ an e<!ality of principle bet-een a!tono*o!s or independent seriesF
2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 1B63) A second co*ponent of parallelis*$ then$ is
the establish*ent of an e<!ality of principle a*ong all the attrib!tes$ specifically bet-een
the t-o attrib!tes accessible to !s$ tho!ght and e@tension) 1his is the co*plete reCection
of the Cartesian position' &ot only is the body for*ally independent of the *ind$ b!t it is
also e<!al to the *ind in principle) .e *!st !nderstand e<!ality of principle here in
ter*s of ontological participation) 1he body and the *ind both participate in being in
a!tono*o!s and e<!al -ays) Ance again$ this proposition follo-s directly fro* the
principle of !nivocity' Corporeality and tho!ght are e<!al e@pressions of being$ said in
the sa*e voice)
.e can already recogni#e that e<!ality does not s!ffice to e@plain ontological
parallelis*) 1he different attrib!tes are not only e<!al e@pressions of beingD they are$ in a
certain sense$ the same e,pression) 5n other -ords$ the *odes of the vario!s attrib!tes are
the sa*e fro* the point of vie- of s!bstance)
,od prod!ces things in all attrib!tes at once' he prod!ces the* in the sa*e order in each$
and so there is a correspondence bet-een *odes of different attrib!tes) !t beca!se
attrib!tes are really distinct this correspondence$ or identity of order$ e@cl!des any ca!sal
action of one on another) eca!se the attrib!tes are all e<!al$ there is an identity of
connection bet-een *odes differing in attrib!te) eca!se attrib!tes constit!te one and the
sa*e s!bstance$ *odes that differ in attrib!te for* one and the sa*e *odification) 211B3
1he s!bstantial *odification *modificatio+ is the !nity of *odes that are prod!ced in
parallel in the different attrib!tes by a single affection of s!bstance) 1he concept of the
*odification itself is the de*onstration of -hat =ele!#e calls the ontological parallelis*'
1he *odes prod!ced a!tono*o!sly and e<!ally in the different attrib!tes appear as a
!nity fro* the point of vie- of s!bstance in the for* of the s!bstantial *odification 2see
Spino!a) Practical Philosophy3) 5n =ele!#e>s interpretation$ this theory of "pino#ian
parallelis* f!nctions not so *!ch as an analysis of the organi#ation of being$
1:
b!t rather
as a central lesson for spec!lation$ one that -ill g!ide !s thro!gho!t o!r st!dy of the
Ethics) /very proposition -e affir* -ith regard to one of the attrib!tes *!st be affir*ed
e<!ally -ith regard to the other attrib!te) 5n other -ords$ each ti*e -e recogni#e an
aspect of the str!ct!re or f!nction of the *ind$ -e *!st as4 o!rselves ho- -e can
recogni#e a parallel str!ct!re or f!nction of the body$ and vice versa) 2%or e@a*ple$ if -e
are to affir* a certain nat!re of a tr!e idea of the *ind$ -e *!st also affir* a parallel
nat!re of a tr!e act of the body)3
17

-61-
=ele!#e>s reading of ontological parallelis* is an original interpretation in "pino#a
st!dies) 1he bea!tif!l si*plicity of it consists in the fact that it follo-s very directly fro*
the principle of !nivocity) 5f being is e@pressed al-ays and every-here in the sa*e voice$
then all its attrib!tes *!st be str!ct!red as parallel e@pressionsD the s!bstantial !nity of
the *odification$ -hich straddles the different attrib!tes$ testifies to the !nivocity of
being) %!rther*ore$ the diffic!lties that -e foc!sed on earlier regarding the priority of
tho!ght in the fo!ndation of the attrib!te see* to be resolved 2or at least left behind3 by
the theory of the e<!ality and ontological parallelis* of the attrib!tes) .e sho!ld
recogni#e$ nonetheless$ that -hile =ele!#e>s interpretation fits very -ell -ith the general
spirit of "pino#a>s ontological syste*$ it does not agree -ith "pino#a>s act!al state*ent in
Proposition 8' E1he order and connection of ideas is the sa*e as the order and connection
of thingsF 255P83) =ele!#e recogni#es that here "pino#a is not proposing an ontological
parallelis*$ b!t rather an epistemological parallelis* 2993) 1his parallelis* is not
established e<!ally a*ong the vario!s attrib!tes$ b!t rather it foc!ses pri*arily on the
attrib!te of tho!ght$ establishing the relationship bet-een an idea and its EobCectF 2Eres
ideata$ obCect!* ideaeF3) 1he proble* is posed *ost clearly in the corollary of this
proposition' E,od>s act!al po-er of thin4ing is e<!al to its act!al po-er of actingF 2P8C3)
1o appreciate the depth of this proble*$ -e *!st 4eep in *ind that EactionF in "pino#a>s
ter*inology does not refer only to the *ove*ent and rest of the body$ b!t e<!ally to all
the attrib!tes) 2"ee$ for e@a*ple$ 555=3)3) 1his for*!la of P8C$ then$ is proposing an
e<!ality$ b!t not the e<!ality of the *ind and the bodyD on the contrary$ the essence of
tho!ght 2the po-er of thin4ing3 is e<!ated to the essence of being 2the po-er of acting3)
1herefore$ -e are thro-n bac4 on the sa*e proble*atic terrain of the s!bCectivist
interpretation of the attrib!te)
=ele!#e certainly recogni#es this as a serio!s proble*) Ance again -e are confronted by
-hat see*s to be a "pino#ian tendency to privilege tho!ght over the other attrib!tes) 1he
theory of episte*ological parallelis*$ =ele!#e clai*s$ Eforces !s to confer on the
attrib!te of tho!ght a sing!lar privilege' this attrib!te *!st contain as *any irred!cible
ideas as there are *odes of different attrib!tesD still *ore$ as *any ideas as there are
attrib!tes) 1his privilege see*s in flagrant contradiction -ith all the de*ands of
ontological parallelis*F 211:3) 1he privilege that see*s to be accorded to tho!ght here
goes against the general design of the ontological syste*) 5n a first atte*pt to resolve this
proble*$ =ele!#e e@plains that in the scholi!* to this proposition "pino#a proceeds fro*
the episte*ological parallelis* to the ontological parallelis*$ generali#ing the case of
tho!ght 2of the idea and its obCect3 to all of the attrib!tes) 5n this -ay$ =ele!#e proposes
episte*ological parallelis* as secondary$ as *erely a
-69-
Edeto!rF 2993 for reaching ontological parallelis*$ the *ore profo!nd theory) 1his
reading$ ho-ever$ is not very -ell s!bstantiated in the te@t) 1he scholi!* is so*e-hat
s!ggestive of ontological parallelis*$ b!t certainly does not state it clearlyD the *ost
s!ggestive s!pporting state*ent$ in fact$ is very -ea4' E5 !nderstand the sa*e concerning
the other attrib!tesF 255P8"3) 5 do not thin4 that this diffic!lty sho!ld dra- into <!estion
=ele!#e>s proposal of an ontological parallelis*-indeed$ there is s!fficient evidence
else-here in "pino#a>s -or4 to s!pport this thesis) 1he tas4 here is to find a -ay to
reconcile the t-o parallelis*s so that they do not contradict one anotherD or better$ to
discover a -ay of avoiding the episte*ological parallelis* altogether)
=ele!#e e*bar4s$ then$ on a *ore involved disc!ssion in order to address this tas4) 1he
i**ediate obCect of this disc!ssion is to re-or4 the interpretation of the episte*ological
parallelis* proposed in 55P8) 1he f!nda*ental goal$ tho!gh$ -hich -e sho!ld 4eep in
*ind thro!gho!t this co*ple@ arg!*ent$ is to co*bat the privileges of tho!ght and
thereby preserve the ontological fo!ndation of the philosophical fra*e-or4) .e *!st be
caref!l$ =ele!#e begins$ not to conf!se the attrib!tes of being -ith the po-ers of being'
E1he distinction of po-ers and attrib!tes has an essential i*portance in "pino#is*F
21163) .hile being has an infinity of attrib!tes$ it has only t-o po-ers' the po-er to e@ist
and act$ and the po-er to thin4 and 4no- 21B33) 1he first po-er$ the po-er to e@ist$ is the
formal essence of ,od) All the attrib!tes participate e<!ally in this essence$ in the po-er
to e@ist$ as for*ally distinct e@pressions) 1his is a restate*ent of ontological parallelis*)
1he second po-er$ then$ the po-er to thin4$ is the objective essence of ,od) E,od>s
absol!te essence is for*al in the attrib!tes that constit!te its nat!re$ and obCective in the
idea that necessarily represents this nat!reF 219B3) 1he sa*e attrib!tes that are
disting!ished for*ally in ,od are disting!ished obCectively in the idea of ,od) 1his
for*!lation of the t-o po-ers gives =ele!#e the opport!nity to co*bat the notion of the
e*inence of tho!ght over the other attrib!tes by s!bs!*ing the episte*ological
perspective -ithin the ontological) E1he attrib!te of tho!ght is to the po-er to thin4 -hat
all attrib!tes 2incl!ding tho!ght3 are to the po-er to e@ist and actF 21993) 1his slippage
bet-een po-ers and attrib!tes sets the ter*s for a priority bet-een the t-o po-ers) /ven
tho!gh =ele!#e affir*ed earlier that the po-ers are in so*e sense e<!al$ here -e find
that the po-er to thin4 2obCective essence3 is dependent on the po-er to e@ist 2for*al
essence3' EAbCective being -o!ld a*o!nt to nothing did it not itself have a for*al being
in the attrib!te of tho!ghtF 21993) =ele!#e>s clai* of the priority of the ontological po-er
2the po-er to e@ist3 over the episte*ological po-er 2the po-er to thin43 th!s preserves
the e<!ality a*ong the attrib!tes)
-63-
%inally$ ho-ever$ there arises yet another case in -hich it appears that tho!ght is
privileged over the other attrib!tes) 5n the *ind there are not only ideas that correspond to
obCects *res ideata+, b!t also ideas of these ideas$ and still other ideas of these ideas of
ideas$ and so on to infinity' E.hence this final apparent privilege of the attrib!te of
tho!ght$ -hich is the gro!nd of a capacity of ideas to reflect the*selves ad infinit!*)
"pino#a so*eti*es says that the idea of an idea has to the idea the sa*e relation as the
idea to its obCectF 21973) efore -e enter into the details of this arg!*ent$ -hich can
easily see* tedio!s and arcane$ -e sho!ld try once again to clarify -hat is at sta4e here)
"everal co**entators have arg!ed that the proble* of the idea of the idea in "pino#a is
the proble* of conscio!sness$ or rather the proble* of the reflection of the *ind) "ylvain
Sac$ for e@a*ple$ poses the concept in this -ay' EConscio!sness is the idea of the idea) 5t
is !nited to the *ind C!st as the *ind is !nited to the bodyF 2%'id#e de vie 196D see also
191-963) Altho!gh =ele!#e does not pose the iss!e in these ter*s$ Sac>s proposition
*a4es clear the danger presented for =ele!#e by this "pino#ian e@a*ple) 1he idea of the
idea$ as conscio!sness$ see*s to be constr!cting an interiority -ithin the *ind that$ as
Sac says$ is !nited -ith the *ind as the *ind is !nited -ith the body) 1he principal threat
of interiority in this case is the creation of a priority of the *ind over the body and the
s!bs!*ption of the dyna*ic of being -ithin a *ental dyna*ic of reflection) As -e have
seen several ti*es$ tho!gh$ =ele!#e is not a philosopher of conscio!sness' .hat this
*eans is$ on the one hand$ that he *aintains the priority of ratio essendi over ratio
cognoscendi, and$ on the other hand$ that he ref!ses any s!bordination of the body to the
*ind) 1herefore$ it is <!ite clear that -hen =ele!#e approaches this iss!e his *ain
concern -ill be to preserve the ontological e<!ality of the attrib!tes) 1he basic proble*$
then$ can be posed <!ite si*ply) .hile the idea and its obCect are conceived !nder t-o
separate attrib!tes$ the idea of the idea and the idea are both conceived !nder the attrib!te
of tho!ght) .hat does it *ean$ then$ to say that there is the sa*e relationship bet-een the
idea and the obCect as there is bet-een the idea of the idea and the ideaP 1he clai* that
the t-o cases constit!te the sa*e relationship see*s to give tho!ght the capacity to
s!bs!*e the relationship to all of the attrib!tes -ithin itself' 5ts priority as the attrib!te of
reflection see*s to give it the capacity to reprod!ce the inter-attrib!te dyna*ic
co*pletely -ithin tho!ght itself) 1he threat of an idealist perspective$ a philosophy of
conscio!sness$ still ha!nts the "pino#ian syste*)
=ele!#e once again calls on the distinction of po-ers to address this diffic!lty' 1he t-o
cases cannot be considered the sa*e -hen considered fro* the point of vie- of
attrib!tes$ he arg!es$ b!t only -hen considered fro* the point of vie- of po-ers 211B-
113) 5n other -ords$ the co**on
-6:-
relationship in the t-o cases sho!ld be e@plained by referring the first ter* to the for*al
po-er and the second to the obCective po-er) 1he first case is very si*ple) 1he res
ideata, as a *ode of being 2pertaining to one of the attrib!tes3$ has a certain po-er to
e@ist$ and is th!s an e@pression of for*al essence) 1he idea of this obCect$ ho-ever$ refers
not to the po-er to e@ist b!t to the po-er to thin4$ and is th!s an e@pression of obCective
essence) .e can apply this sa*e logic to the second case beca!se an idea is also a *ode
of being) A *ode of tho!ght$ C!st li4e a *ode of any attrib!te$ can be referred to the
po-er to e@ist$ as for*al essence) .hen an idea is th!s conceived$ -e can relate another
idea to that idea$ referring no- to the po-er to thin4' 1his idea of the idea is an
e@pression of obCective essence) 1he co**on relationship that "pino#a is referring to$
then$ is that in each case the t-o ter*s refer to the t-o different po-ers' the po-er to
e@ist and the po-er to thin4) 1his si*ilarity$ ho-ever$ points to an i*portant difference
-hen -e consider the t-o cases fro* the point of vie- of the attrib!tes) 5n the first case$
there is a for*al distinction bet-een an idea and its obCect beca!se they are *odes of
different attrib!tes) 5n the second case$ tho!gh$ bet-een the idea of the idea and the idea$
there is no for*al distinction beca!se they are both *odes of tho!ght)
%ro* this point of vie- -e see the !nity of an idea and the idea of that idea$ insofar as
they are given in ,od -ith the sa*e necessity$ by the same po/er to thin9? 1here is
conse<!ently only a concept!al distinction *distinction de raison+ bet-een the t-o ideas'
the idea of an idea is the for* of that idea$ referred as s!ch to the po-er to thin4) 21903
=ele!#e is satisfied -ith this sol!tion) He has ans-ered the intellect!alist challenge
posed by conscio!sness by a reference to the different po-ers and$ finally$ to the
ontological hierarchy of distinctions) 1he distinction involved in the dyna*ic of
conscio!sness is not the real distinction that fo!nds being$ not the for*al distinction that
differentiates the attrib!tes$ b!t *erely a concept!al distinction *distinction de raison+)
.e can pose this clearly in ergsonian ter*s' Conscio!sness does not *ar4 a difference
of nat!re$ b!t *erely a difference of degree) .e have to ad*it$ nonetheless$ that the
*ind>s capacity for reflection 2conscio!sness$ the idea of the idea3 does give tho!ght a
certain privilege over the other attrib!tes) =ele!#e>s arg!*ent$ ho-ever$ dra-ing on the
different po-ers and distinctions$ atte*pts to sho- that this privilege is ontologically
insignificant)
!emark: From Forschung to Darstellung
5n the previo!s section -e analy#ed several e@a*ples of =ele!#e>s effort to preserve the
!nivocity of being on the basis of an ontological parallelis*
-67-
a*ong the attrib!tes) 1he opponent in each case is an intellect!alist reading of "pino#a>s
ontology$ -hich at several points see*s to give a real privilege to tho!ghtD =ele!#e>s
strategy$ -hich -e have seen several ti*es in o!r st!dy$ is to s!bordinate ratio
cognoscendi to ratio essendi) 1he =ele!#ian arg!*ents certainly have a very strong
fo!ndation in "pino#a>s ontology$ in the ontological parallelis* of the attrib!tesD
nonetheless$ these arg!*ents appear -ea4 -hen$ in "pino#a>s psychology and
episte*ology$ the proble* of privilege contin!ally reappears) 1o a certain e@tent$ the
privileges of tho!ght and the proble* of the attrib!tes sho!ld be e@plained as a resid!e of
Cartesianis* in "pino#a>s tho!ght$ b!t this e@planation is not s!fficient on its o-n) 1he
theory of the attrib!tes re*ains a proble* in =ele!#e>s "pino#a)
"o*e readers of "pino#a$ -ho$ li4e =ele!#e$ recogni#e the centrality of the !nivocity of
being$ have tried to resolve this proble* by clai*ing an evol!tion in "pino#a>s tho!ght'
Antonio &egri$ for e@a*ple$ arg!es that the theory of the attrib!tes disappears as "pino#a
proceeds fro* the pantheistic !topia that characteri#es the first phase of his tho!ght$ to
the constit!tive dis!topia of his *at!rity) 1he attrib!tes do indeed disappear fro* the
Ethics after Part 55 2-ith only a brief reappearance in Part (3$ and &egri lin4s this fact to
historical evidence that "pino#a drafted the Ethics d!ring t-o distinct periods$ fro* 1001
to 1007 and fro* 108B to 1087 2$he Savage =nomaly :63) &egri arg!es$ then$ that
"pino#a>s philosophical transfor*ation bet-een these t-o periods precipitates the
reCection of the attrib!tes 2793) &egri>s arg!*ent has co*e !nder serio!s criti<!e$ b!t it
clearly points to t-o iss!es that 2even if -e are to <!estion his e@planation3 *!st be
addressed' 1he theory of the attrib!tes re*ains proble*atic in the conte@t of the
"pino#ian syste*$ and the attrib!tes are relatively absent fro* the latter half of the
Ethics)
5t see*s to *e that there is an alternative or co*ple*entary e@planation$ available in
=ele!#e>s -or4 itself$ to acco!nt for the disappearance of the attrib!tes) .e co!ld arg!e$
consistently -ith =ele!#e>s interpretation$ 5 believe$ that tho!ght is privileged in the
theory of the attrib!tes only in li*ited or accidental ter*s' 1ho!ght is the principal *eans
of h!*an spec!lation$ and the theory of the attrib!tes is lin4ed to a *ode of in<!iry) 5f
-e i*agine that there is so*ething s!bstantial abo!t the priority of tho!ght over the other
attrib!tes$ -e are *erely conf!sing the for* of o!r research -ith the nat!re of being) 1he
attrib!tes appear in the Ethics not as a for* of being$ b!t as a *ode of in<!iry$ as a
scientific ;orschung) Mar@ *a4es clear the distinction bet-een ;orschung and
Darstellung, bet-een the *ode of in<!iry and the *ode of presentation' EAf co!rse the
*ethod of presentation 0Darstellung1 *!st differ in for* fro* the *ethod of in<!iry
0;orschung1) 1he latter has to appropriate the *aterial in detail$ to analyse its
-60-
different for*s of develop*ent and to trac4 do-n their inner connection) Anly after this
-or4 has been done can the real *ove*ent be appropriately presentedF 28apital, vol)
1$1B93) %ollo-ing this logic$ the t-o phases of "pino#a>s tho!ght$ -hich &egri proposes
historically$ can be identified -ith t-o *o*ents or approaches in "pino#a>s -or4)
10
1he
;orschung of the Ethics, the *o*ent of spec!lation$ relies on the theory of the attrib!tes
Eto trac4 do-n the inner connectionF of being) 1ho!ght is given a certain priority in this
*o*ent$ as the *odel of o!r spec!lation) EAnly after this -or4 has been done$ F Mar@
says$ Ecan the real *ove*ent be appropriately presented)F .hat does it *ean to present
appropriately the real *ove*ent of beingP Here it *eans to present being as it *a4es
itself$ in the process of its constit!tion) 5n other -ords$ only after the analytical *o*ent
has bro!ght to light all the distinctions of the terrain can this sa*e terrain be traversed a
second ti*e -ith a different bearing$ -ith a practical attit!de$ appropriately presenting
the Einner connectionsF and the Ereal *ove*entF of being in the process of its o-n
constit!tion) .hen the *o*ent of research is co*plete$ therefore$ after Part 55 of the
Ethics, the attrib!tes no longer have a role and they drop o!t of the disc!ssion) As -e
*ove for-ard in "pino#a>s syste* of e*endation$ as -e shift fro* spec!lation to
practice$ any priority of tho!ght grad!ally disappears) 5n fact$ =ele!#e presents a
po-erf!l arg!*ent that "pino#a>s theory of practice initially privileges the attrib!te of
e@tension' 1he body is the *odel of practice) 1his see*s to *e$ then$ a consistent
=ele!#ian e@planation of the <!estions of priority) 5n o!r research of being$ in the
*o*ent of spec!lation$ the *ind plays the initial role of *odelD si*ilarly$ in "pino#a>s
Darstellung, in o!r practice of being$ the body plays a parallel role)
Ho- does "pino#a *a4e this shift fro* ;orschung to Darstellung, fro* spec!lation to
practiceP =ele!#e>s -or4 *a4es clear that the hinge or the pivot that artic!lates these t-o
*o*ents is the the*atic of po-er) "pino#a>s disc!ssion of po-er carries the developed
ontological fo!ndation onto the terrain of practice) 5t constit!tes$ as -e clai*ed earlier$
the f!nda*ental passage$ the &iet#schean trans*!tation' the ho!r of *idnight) 1he
spec!lative ;orschung of po-er yields to its practical Darstellung? +et !s t!rn o!r
attention$ then$ to "pino#a>s develop*ent of the the*atic of po-er) Power
.(- "he "rue and the Ade5uate
1he <!estion of the attrib!tes has to!ched on "pino#a>s episte*ology$ b!t really it has
only scratched the s!rface) 1h!s far$ -e have treated =ele!#e>s
-68-
defense against an intellect!alist reading of "pino#a>s episte*ology) 1his defense rests
pri*arily on a conception of ontological parallelis* that is developed thro!gh an
e@tension of the principle of !nivocity) &o- -e sho!ld t!rn to =ele!#e>s positive
e@position of "pino#ian episte*ology$ and specifically to "pino#a>s proposal that -e shift
o!r attention fro* the tr!e idea to the ade<!ate idea as a *ore coherent and !sef!l
category of spec!lation) 1here is certainly a close relation bet-een tr!th and being in
"pino#a$ b!t this ne@!s reveals not the intellect!al character of being$ b!t rather the
ontological criteria of tr!th) .e -ill see that "pino#a>s disc!ssion of ade<!acy brings the
episte*ological debate bac4 to an ontological plane) 1he essential role in the arg!*ent is
played by an ontological conception of the internal ca!sality$ or the sing!lar prod!ction$
of being) 1he ade<!ate is defined as being' that -hich envelops and e@presses its ca!se)
%ro* one of his earliest -or4s$ the Emendation of the Intellect, "pino#a searches for an
intrinsic definition of the tr!e idea) ?!st as real being is ca!se of itself and gains its
distinction fro* -ithin$ so too the tr!e idea *!st be defined thro!gh an internal ca!sality)
According to "pino#a$ as -e have seen$ the *ind is a spirit!al a!to*aton that prod!ces
ideas a!tono*o!sly$ that is$ -ith reference only to the attrib!te of tho!ght) 1his basis
provides "pino#a -ith a forcef!l criti<!e of the traditional correspondence theory of tr!th
that is i*plied by the episte*ological parallelis* disc!ssed earlier' 1he tr!e idea is the
idea that agrees or corresponds -ith its obCect *res ideata+) 1he correspondence theory$
-hich poses *erely a for*al agree*ent$ is blind to the prod!ction process and th!s
cannot f!lfill "pino#a>s initial criterion for the tr!e idea' E1he conception of tr!th as
correspondence gives !s no definition$ either for*al or *aterial$ of tr!thD it proposes a
p!rely no*inal definition$ an e@trinsic designationF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a 1313) 5n episte*ology$ the e@trinsic designation gives a -ea4 conception of
tr!th$ C!st as in ontology the e@ternal ca!se provides a -ea4 definition of being) 1he
e@ternal definition$ as -e sa- in the ergson st!dy$ i*plies *erely a Es!bsistent
e@teriority)F 2"ee "ection 1)1)3 .e can already note fro* this criti<!e of the
correspondence theory that an ontological logic provides the fo!ndation for "pino#a>s
episte*ological investigation)
5n this conte@t$ the Cartesian proposition of Eclear and distinctF as the condition for tr!th
provides !s -ith a *!ch *ore pro*ising strategy beca!se it addresses not only the for*
b!t also the content of the idea) =ele!#e arg!es$ ho-ever$ that the conception of clear and
distinct is ins!fficient for a "pino#ian theory of tr!th in three respects) %irst$ -hile the
Cartesian proposition does s!cceed in referring to the content of the idea$ this reference
re*ains s!perficial as a ErepresentativeF content 21393) 1he content of the clear and
distinct idea cannot be a real content beca!se Eclear
-66-
and distinctF does not recogni#e or co*prehend the efficient ca!se of that idea) .e 4no-
that since the *ind is a spirit!al a!to*aton the pro@i*ate ca!se of any idea is al-ays
another idea$ b!t the s!perficiality of representation is precisely its detach*ent fro* this
ca!se) "econd$ the for* of the clear and distinct idea also re*ains s!perficial in the for*
of a Epsychological conscio!snessF 21393) 1his Cartesian for* does not attain the logical
for* of the idea that -o!ld e@plain the connection and order of ideas one to the other)
1he s!perficiality in this case is d!e to the detach*ent fro* the for*al ca!se of the idea$
-hich is precisely o!r po-er to thin4) 1hird$ the Cartesian conception does not s!cceed
in posing the !nity of the content and the for* of the tr!e ideaD in other -ords$ =escartes
does not recogni#e the spirit!al a!to*aton Ethat reprod!ces reality in prod!cing ideas in
their d!e orderF 21793) 5n short$ the criti<!es of the Eclear and distinctF strategy all spring
fro* the fact that it atte*pts to define the tr!e -hile only referring to the idea itselfD the
Cartesian strategy does not deal -ith the causes of ideas$ and th!s it cannot e@plain the
process of their prod!ction) Ance again$ in the foc!s on ca!sality and prod!ction$ -e can
recogni#e "pino#a>s ontological approach to tr!th) =ele!#e relates this criti<!e to his
notion of e@pression' 1o be e@pressive$ an idea *!st e@plain or envelop its ca!se) EA
clear and distinct idea is still ine@pressive$ and re*ains !ne@plained) ,ood eno!gh for
recognition$ b!t !nable to provide a real principle of 4no-ledgeF 2179-733) Precisely
beca!se of its fail!re to e@press or e@plain the tr!e idea by *eans of its ca!se$ the
conception of tr!th as clear and distinct does not give !s the ter*s to ans-er o!r
f!nda*ental <!estions' .here does tr!th co*e fro* and -hat can it do for !s-or$ as
&iet#sche *ight as4$ .hy do -e -ant tr!thP A "pino#ian definition of tr!th *!st
involve the e@pression of ca!sality$ prod!ction$ and po-er)
1he ontological criti<!e of the clear and distinct idea prepares the ter*s for "pino#a>s
shift fro* the tr!e idea to the ade<!ate idea) 1he essential feat!re of "pino#a>s conception
of tr!th is the internal relation of an idea to its ca!se' E1he ade<!ate idea is precisely the
idea as e@pressing its ca!seF 2133$ *odified3) .e can contrast this -ith the Cartesian
theory on all three points C!st presented) %irst$ the ade<!ate idea presents its content as
the e@pression of its pro@i*ate efficient ca!se 2another idea3) "econd$ the for* of the
ade<!ate idea is a logical for* that is e@plained by its for*al ca!se 2the po-er to thin43'
E1he ade<!ate idea is the idea that e@presses its o-n ca!se and is e@plained by o!r o-n
po-erF 21713) 1hird$ the content and the for* of the ade<!ate idea are !nited in the
*ove*ent internal to the attrib!te of tho!ght' E1he spirit!al a!to*aton$ *anifested in the
concatenation of ideas$ is the !nity of logical for* and e@pressive contentF 21733) .e can
see "pino#a>s insistence on replacing the Cartesian clear and distinct -ith his conception
of ade<!ateness as an ontologi#ation
-69-
of episte*ology) E"pino#a>s ontology is do*inated by the notions of a ca!se of itself$ in
itself and thro!gh itself 21093) "pino#a>s episte*ology$ too$ is do*inated by this sa*e
foc!s on ca!sality' 1r!th$ li4e being$ is sing!lar insofar as it envelops and e@presses its
o-n ca!se) 1hro!gh the ca!sal chain e@pressed by the ade<!ate idea$ thro!gh the *ove
fro* the tr!e to the ade<!ate$ "pino#a>s episte*ology ta4es on an ontological character)
"pino#a>s revol!tion in episte*ology is to apply these sa*e ontological criteria that
define being as sing!lar to the real* of tr!th) Along -ith 1ho*as Mar4$ a perceptive
A*erican co**entator$ =ele!#e sho-s that "pino#a>s theory of tr!th is a theory of
Eontological tr!th)F
18

Ade<!ate ideas are e@pressive$ and inade<!ate ideas are *!te)
16
5n other -ords$ the
distinctive characteristic of an ade<!ate idea is that it tells !s so*ething abo!t the
str!ct!re and connections of being 2or at least the attrib!te of tho!ght3 thro!gh a direct
e@pression of its efficient and for*al ca!ses) %ro* an ontological perspective$ the
inade<!ate idea tells !s nothing beca!se -e cannot recogni#e its place in the prod!ctive
str!ct!re of tho!ghtD it is not sit!ated in the dyna*ic ca!sal *echanis* of the spirit!al
a!to*aton) Ane i*portance of the ade<!ate idea$ then$ is that thro!gh the e@pression of
its ca!ses it increases o!r po-er of tho!ghtD the *ore ade<!ate ideas -e have$ the *ore
-e 4no- abo!t the str!ct!re and connections of being$ and the greater o!r po-er to thin4)
Ade<!acy is infectio!s$ giving rise to al-ays greater e@pression) E.hatever ideas follo-
in the Mind fro* ideas that are ade<!ate in the *ind are also ade<!ateF 255P:B3) "pino#a$
ho-ever$ acco*panies this clai* -ith a realistic assess*ent of o!r condition) 1he vast
*aCority of the ideas -e have are inade<!ate ideas) At this point$ it is obvio!s ho-
"pino#a -o!ld ans-er the &iet#schean <!estion posed earlier' .e -ant tr!th$ or rather
ade<!acy$ in order to increase o!r po-er to thin4) 1he strategy of the ade<!ate idea
*a4es the <!estion of tr!th a proCect of po-er) Ance the <!estion of po-er enters the
disc!ssion$ ho-ever$ this episte*ological disco!rse <!ic4ly transfor*s into an ethical
proCect) E"pino#a as4s' Ho- do -e co*e to for* and prod!ce ade<!ate ideas$ -hen -e
necessarily have so *any inade<!ate ones that divert o!r po-er and separate !s fro*
-hat -e can doPF 21:6$ *odified3) Here$ in this transfor*ation of the episte*ological
to-ard the ethical$ -e see a co*bined application of the principle of sing!larity 2an
absol!tely infinite being as ca!se of itself$ the ade<!ate idea as enveloping its ca!se3 and
the principle of po-er 2being as prod!ctivity$ tr!th as creation3D the principle of
sing!larity gives !s the ter*s for the definition of the ade<!ate idea$ and the principle of
po-er transfor*s this definition into a proCect)
efore *oving on$ let !s pa!se for a *o*ent to recogni#e the i*portance of ontological
parallelis* and its relation to the "pino#ian concep-
-9B-
tion of ade<!acy) .e clai*ed earlier that if -e are to *aintain =ele!#e>s conception of
ontological parallelis*$ then in principle the character or *ove*ent of one attrib!te *!st
in so*e sense correspond to that of the other attrib!tes$ beca!se f!nda*entally all of
the* refer e<!ally to the character or *ove*ent of being) 1he concept of tr!th presents
an interesting test for this theory) %ollo-ing a Cartesian theory$ for e@a*ple$ -e -o!ld
be forced to pose$ parallel to o!r conception of a clear and distinct idea or a clear and
distinct action of the *ind$ so*e conception of a clear and distinct action of the body)
"ince Cartesian tr!th does not acco!nt for *ove*ent and prod!ction$ it is not easily
applicable to the corporeal plane) "pino#ian ade<!acy$ on the other hand$ since it refers to
the nat!re of being itself and to the genealogy of its prod!ction$ applies to all the
attrib!tes e<!ally' ?!st li4e an ade<!ate action of the *ind$ an ade<!ate action of the
body is e@pressive in that it e@plains or envelops its ca!se) 1he ade<!ate is that -hich
discloses the prod!ctive dyna*ic of being)
.(3 2hat a )od Can Do
.ith the conception of ade<!acy$ "pino#a is able to develop the episte*ological
fra*e-or4 to the point -here he can pose an initial ethical <!estion$ an initial <!estion of
po-er) Ane aspect of the very steep path that "pino#a is leading !s on -ill direct !s to
proceed fro* inade<!ate ideas to ade<!ate ones) .e can easily pose this ethical goal
*ore generally as the increase of o!r po-er to thin4$ or *ore generally still as the
increase of o!r po-er to e@ist and act' Ho- can -e increase o!r po-er to e@ist$ or$ in
theological ter*s$ ho- can -e approach ,od 2the infinite po-er to e@ist and act3P At this
point$ ho-ever$ -ith only an episte*ological fo!ndation$ -e have very little idea ho-
this operation is possibleD -e are still far fro* being able to e*bar4 on an ethical
practice) 5n fact$ posing the ethical <!estion in s!ch grand ter*s is e*pty and pointless
-itho!t so*e specific and concrete *eans of addressing o!r goal)
A f!rther *o*ent of spec!lation is needed) "pino#a !ses the *ind as the pri*ary *odel
of spec!lationD no- -e have to shift o!r concentration to the body$ fro* episte*ology to
physics$ beca!se it is the body that -ill reveal a *odel of practice) E"pino#a does see* to
ad*it that -e have to pass thro!gh an e*pirical st!dy of bodies in order to 4no- their
relations$ and ho- they are co*posedF 29193) .e -ill see$ ho-ever$ in the long passage
fro* physics to ethics$ that the criterion of ade<!acy$ of e@pressing or enveloping the
ca!se$ re*ains central to the develop*ent of "pino#a>s arg!*ent) "pino#ian physics is an
e*pirical investigation to try to deter*ine the la-s of the interaction of bodies' the
enco!nters of bodies$ their co*position and deco*position$ their co*patibility 2or
co*posability3$ and
-91-
their conflict) A body is not a fi@ed !nit -ith a stable or static internal str!ct!re) An the
contrary$ a body is a dyna*ic relationship -hose internal str!ct!re and e@ternal li*its are
s!bCect to change) .hat -e identify as a body is *erely a te*porarily stable relationship
255P13=ef3)
19
1his proposition of the dyna*ic nat!re of bodies$ of the contin!al fl!@ of
their internal dyna*ic$ allo-s "pino#a a rich !nderstanding of the interaction a*ong
bodies) .hen t-o bodies *eet$ there is an enco!nter bet-een t-o dyna*ic relationships'
/ither they are indifferent to each other$ or they are co*patible and together co*pose a
ne- relationship$ a ne- bodyD or$ rather$ they are inco*patible and one body deco*poses
the relationship of the other$ destroying it$ C!st as a poison deco*poses the blood 2cf)
+etter 39 to Henry Aldenberg3) 1his physical !niverse of bodies at *otion and rest$ in
!nion and conflict$ -ill provide the conte@t in -hich -e can delve deeper into the
f!nctioning and str!ct!re of po-er' E5n order to really thin4 in ter*s of po-er$ one *!st
first pose the <!estion in relation to the bodyF 29783) "pino#a>s physics are the
cornerstone of his ethics)
=ele!#e is fascinated by a passage in one of the early scholia of oo4 555' E&o one has
yet deter*ined -hat the ody can doN) %or no one has yet co*e to 4no- the str!ct!re
of the ody so acc!rately that he co!ld e@plain all its f!nctionsF 2555P9"3) 1he <!estion of
po-er 2-hat a body can do3 is i**ediately related to the internal str!ct!re of the body)
1his charts the initial direction of o!r investigation' 1o !nderstand the nat!re of po-er$
-e *!st first discover the internal str!ct!re of the body$ -e *!st deco*pose the !nity of
the body according to its lines of artic!lation$ its differences of nat!re) =ele!#e re*inds
!s that the investigation of this str!ct!re *!st be cond!cted not in ter*s of the po-er to
act 2spontaneity3$ b!t rather in ter*s of the po-er to be affected' EA body>s str!ct!re is
the co*position of its relation) .hat a body can do is the nat!re and the li*its of its
po-er to be affectedF 29163) 1he hori#on of affectivity$ then$ -ill provide the terrain for
o!r spec!lation and reveal f!rther distinctions -ithin the body$ distinctions -ithin po-er)
An a first level in o!r *odel of po-er$ -e find that the po-er to be affected is filled by
active affections and passive affections) 1he i*portance of this distinction is clear' 1o the
e@tent that o!r po-er to be affected is filled by active affections$ it relates directly to o!r
po-er to act$ b!t to the e@tent that it is filled by passive affections$ it relates only to o!r
po-er to feel or s!ffer *puissance de p@tir+) Passive affections really *ar4 o!r lac4 of
po-er) Ance again$ the essential logic of the arg!*ent refers to e@pression and
prod!ction' 1he active is distinct fro* the passive in its relation to the ca!se) EA!r force
of s!ffering affirms nothing$ beca!se it e,presses nothing at all' it >envelops> only o!r
i*potence$ that is to say$ the lo/est degree of our po/er to actF 299:$ *odified3) .e said
earlier that the po-er to be
-99-
affected de*onstrates the plenit!de of being in that it is al-ays co*pletely filled -ith
active and passive affectionsD yet the po-er to be affected only appears as plenit!de fro*
the physical point of vie-) %ro* the ethical point of vie-$ on the contrary$ the po-er to
be affected varies -idely according to its co*position) 1o the e@tent that it is filled -ith
passive affections$ it is red!ced to its *ini*!*$ and to the e@tent that it is filled -ith
active affections$ it is increased to its *a@i*!*) E.hence the i*portance of the ethical
<!estion) 7e do not even 9no/ /hat a body can do, "pino#a says) 1hat is' 7e do not
even 9no/ of /hat affections /e are capable, nor the e,tent of our po/er) Ho- co!ld -e
4no- this in advancePF 29903) 1his$ then$ is the first order of b!siness in preparing the
terrain for an ethical proCect' 5nvestigate -hat affects -e are capable of$ discover -hat
o!r body can do)
"pino#a>s theory of conatus 2or striving3 *ar4s precisely the intersection of prod!ction
and affection that is so i*portant to =ele!#e' E1he variations of conatus as it is
deter*ined by this or that affection are the dyna*ic variations of o!r po-er to actF 29313)
8onatus is the physical instantiation of the ontological principle of po-er) An one hand$
it is the essence of being insofar as being is prod!ctiveD it is the *otor that ani*ates being
as the -orld) 1o this e@tent$ conatus is "pino#a>s contin!ation of the legacy of
Renaissance nat!ralis*' eing is spontaneity$ p!re activity) An the other hand$ ho-ever$
conatus is also the instantiation of the ontological principle of po-er in that conatus is a
sensibilityD it is driven by not only the actions$ b!t also the passions$ of the *ind and the
body 2see$ for e@a*ple$ 555P93) 5t is this rich synthesis of spontaneity and affectivity that
*ar4s the contin!ity bet-een the ontological principle of po-er and conatus)
At this point the ethical proCect re<!ires a *o*ent of e*pirical realis*) .hen "pino#a
begins to ta4e stoc4 of the state of o!r body$ of o!r po-er$ he notes that$ by necessity$ o!r
po-er to be affected is largely filled by passive affections) ,od$ or &at!re$ is co*pletely
filled -ith active affections$ beca!se there is no ca!se e@ternal to it) Ho-ever$ Ethe force
by -hich a *an perseveres in e@isting is li*ited$ and infinitely s!rpassed by the po-er of
e@ternal ca!sesF 25(P33) 1o the e@tent that o!r po-er is s!rpassed by the po-er of &at!re
as a -hole$ to the e@tent that e@ternal forces are *ore po-erf!l than o!r o-n forces$ -e
-ill be filled -ith passive affections) &o-$ since passive affections largely constit!te o!r
e@istence$ -e sho!ld foc!s o!r investigation on these affections to see if -e can *a4e
*eaningf!l distinctions a*ong the*)
.ithin the do*ain of e@tension$ passive affections are characteri#ed by enco!nters
bet-een o!r body and other bodies-enco!nters that can appear as rando* beca!se they
are not ca!sed by !s) 1he order of passions$
-93-
then$ is the order of chance enco!nters$ of the fortuitus occursus 29363) A si*ple
enco!nter bet-een t-o bodies$ ho-ever$ poses an e@tre*ely rich and co*ple@ scene for
analysis$ beca!se one body itself is not a fi@ed !nit -ith a static str!ct!re$ b!t rather a
dyna*ic relationship -hose internal str!ct!re and e@ternal li*its are open and
contin!ally s!bCect to change) As -e noted earlier$ -hat "pino#a identifies as a body or
an individ!al is si*ply a te*porarily stable asse*blage of coordinated ele*ents 2Ethics
55P13=ef3) An enco!nter bet-een t-o bodies$ then$ -ill be characteri#ed by the
co*posability or the inco*posability of their t-o relationships) &o-$ given this dyna*ic
conception of bodies and their interactions$ =ele!#e proposes t-o cases of chance
enco!nters that -ill allo- !s to disting!ish t-o types of passive affections$ and th!s
descend one *ore level in o!r *odel of po-er) 5n the first case$ 5 *eet a body -hose
internal relationship is co*patible -ith the internal relationship of *y body$ and th!s the
t-o bodies together co*pose a ne- relationship) .e can say$ then$ that this e@ternal
body Eagrees -ith *y nat!reF or that it is EgoodF or E!sef!lF for *e) %!rther*ore$ this
enco!nter prod!ces an affection in *e that itself agrees -ith or is good for *y nat!re' 5t
is a Coyf!l enco!nter in that it increases *y po-er to act) 1he first case of chance
enco!nter$ then$ res!lts in a Coyf!l passive affection beca!se it presents a Eco*posableF
relationship and th!s increases *y po-er to act) 5n the second case of chance enco!nter$
tho!gh$ 5 *eet a body -hose internal relationship is not co*patible -ith that of *y bodyD
this body does not agree -ith *y nat!re) /ither one body -ill deco*pose the relationship
of the other or both bodies -ill be deco*posed) 5n either case$ the i*portant fact is that
there -ill be no increase of po-er$ beca!se a body cannot gain po-er fro* so*ething
that does not agree -ith it) "ince this enco!nter res!lts in a decrease of po-er$ the
affection prod!ced by it is sadness) Act!al enco!nters$ of co!rse$ are *ore co*plicated
than either of these t-o li*it cases' 1here *ay be different degrees of partial
co*patibility and partial conflict in an enco!nter$ or$ f!rther$ the affects can co*bine in a
*yriad of -ays 2the sadness of -hat 5 hate brings *e Coy$ etc)3) 1hese t-o cases$
ho-ever$ Coyf!l passive affections and sad passive affections$ provide !s -ith the li*it
cases of possible enco!nters$ and th!s they allo- !s to posit a f!rther distinction$
describing a second level in o!r *odel of po-er)
-9:-
5t is once again ti*e for a *o*ent of "pino#a>s realis*) .hat is the relative fre<!ency of
Coyf!l and sad enco!ntersP 5n principle$ or rather in the abstract$ h!*ans agree in nat!re$
and th!s h!*an enco!nters o!ght to be p!rely Coyf!l) Ho-ever$ this is only tr!e to the
e@tent that o!r po-er to be affected is filled by active affections) E5nsofar as *en are
s!bCect to passions$ they cannot be said to agree in nat!reF 25(P393) 1herefore$ in reality$
h!*ans agree very little -ith one another$ and the large *aCority of chance enco!nters
are sad)
At each point in the investigation of the str!ct!re of the body -here -e have recogni#ed a
distinction$ -e have also recogni#ed that the h!*an condition lies largely on the -ea4
side of the e<!ation' A!r po-er to be affected is filled largely by passive affections rather
than active affectionsD and$ f!rther$ o!r passive affections are constit!ted largely by sad
passive affections rather than Coyf!l passive affections) Ane co!ld easily be disheartened
at this point by "pino#a>s pessi*istic appraisal of the h!*an condition-b!t that -o!ld be
to *iss the point of the proCect) 1he investigation of the internal str!ct!re of po-er and
the realistic eval!ation of o!r condition are oriented to-ard refining the ethical <!estion
so that it can provide the basis for an ethical practiceD -hat *ay appear as pessi*is* is
"pino#a>s practical perspective) 1o appreciate the richness of this approach$ consider the
typical &iet#schean ethical *andate' eco*e active) Ho- can s!ch an ethical proposition
be transfor*ed into an ethical practiceP 5n other -ords$ thro!gh &iet#sche -e can clearly
recogni#e the desire$ the po-er 2and in this sense the good3 of beco*ing active$ b!t -e
find no *eans to follo- it thro!gh in practice) "pino#a too recogni#es ethics as an iss!e
of beco*ing active$ b!t he delves one step deeper to enrich that ethical perspective) E1he
ethical <!estion falls then$ in "pino#a$ into t-o parts' Ho/ can /e come to produce
active affectionsA !t first of all' Ho/ can /e come to e,perience a ma,imum of joyful
passionsA 29:03) 1hro!gh the investigation of po-er$ "pino#a has no- prepared the
terrain for the conversion fro* spec!lation to practice that -ill set his ethics in *otion)
Practice
.(= Common ,otions: "he Assem:lages of Com&osa:le )eing
1hro!gh "pino#a>s investigation of the str!ct!re of po-er and his realistic esti*ation of
the h!*an condition -e have arrived at the li*it of spec!lation) 1he h!*an condition
resides principally in the point of the *ini*!* of po-erD -hen -e adopt this position$
-e can adopt too a tr!ly ethical position) 1his is the end of spec!lation and the beginning
of practiceD
-97-
this is the *o*ent of trans*!tation-the ho!r of *idnight) "pino#ian spec!lation has
ill!*inated the terrain of po-er$ defined its pri*ary str!ct!resD no-$ -e *!st convert
this spec!lative dyna*ic into a practical proCect) Ho- can -e effect this trans*!tationP
.here can -e find the i*pet!s to p!t a practical proCect in *otionP A first hint that
=ele!#e gives !s is that -e *!st shift o!r foc!s fro* affir*ation to Coy) E1he sense of
Coy appears as the properly ethical senseD it is to practice -hat affir*ation itself is to
spec!lationF 29893) ?oy$ in other -ords$ is the affir*ation of being in the *o*ent of its
practical constit!tionD o!r increase of po-er is the affir*ative constit!tion of being itself)
5t is not i**ediately evident$ ho-ever$ ho- o!r practice can begin -ith Coy) ?!st li4e
&iet#sche>s ethical *andate Ebeco*e active$ F so too a "pino#ian *andate s!ch as
Ebeco*e Coyf!lF lac4s the *echanis* by -hich to initiate a practical proCect) =ele!#e
atte*pts another tac4$ presenting the proCect in negative for*$ to give it a *ore practical
thr!st' 1he first practical tas4 of the Ethics, he clai*s$ is to co*bat sadness' E1he
deval!ation of sad passions$ and the den!nciation of those -ho c!ltivate and depend on
the*$ for* the practical obCect of philosophyF 298BD see also Spino!a) Practical
Philosophy 97-993) .e have already noted$ tho!gh$ that in reality *ost of o!r passions
are sad passions$ that *ost chance enco!nters a*ong bodies are inco*patible and
destr!ctive) Ho- can -e begin a practice of Coy fro* s!ch a stateP 1he attac4 on sadness
still lac4s an initial practical 4ey)
.e sho!ld begin instead by loo4ing *ore closely at "pino#a>s physics of bodies' E&o one
has yet co*e to 4no- the str!ct!re 0fabrica1 of the ody so acc!rately that he co!ld
e@plain all its f!nctionsF 2555P9"3) .hat does "pino#a *ean by str!ct!reP E5t is a syste*
of relations bet-een the parts of a body$ F =ele!#e e@plains) Ey in<!iring ho- these
relations vary fro* one body to another$ -e have a -ay of directly deter*ining the
rese*blances bet-een t-o bodies$ ho-ever disparate they *ay beF 29863) A!r
investigation of the str!ct!re or relationships that constit!te the body allo-s !s to
recogni#e co**on relationships that e@ist bet-een o!r body and another body) An
enco!nter bet-een o!r body and this other body -ill necessarily be Coyf!l$ beca!se the
co**on relationship g!arantees a co*patibility and the opport!nity to co*pose a ne-
relationship$ thereby increasing o!r po-er) Precisely in this -ay the analysis of bodies
allo-s !s to begin a practical proCect) y recogni#ing si*ilar co*positions or
relationships a*ong bodies$ -e have the criteria necessary for a first ethical selection of
Coy' .e are able to favor co*patible enco!nters 2Coyf!l passions3 and avoid inco*patible
enco!nters 2sad passions3) .hen -e *a4e this selection$ -e are prod!cing co**on
notions' EA co**on notion is al-ays an idea of a si*ilarity of co*position in e@isting
*odesF 29873) 1he
-90-
for*ation of the co**on notion constit!tes the first step of an ethical practice)
1his conception of the prod!ction of co**on notions$ ho-ever$ is not yet precise eno!gh
to be practical) .e *!st *a4e a distinction$ =ele!#e e@plains$ bet-een co**on notions
that are *ore !niversal and co**on notions that are less !niversal) 1he *ost !niversal
co**on notions are those that recogni#e a si*ilarity fro* a very general point of vie-'
1hey *ay involve$ at the e@tre*e$ -hat is co**on to all bodies$ s!ch as e@tension$
*otion$ and rest) 1hese very !niversal co**on notions$ ho-ever$ are precisely those that
are least !sef!l to !s) An the other hand$ the least !niversal co**on notions are in fact
those that i**ediately present !s -ith the greatest !tility) 1hese notions are those that
represent a si*ilar co*position bet-een t-o bodies that directly agree -ith each other$
fro* their o-n local points of vie-) ?!st as -e contin!ally descended -ithin the internal
str!ct!re of po-er$ here too -e *!st descend to the lo-est$ *ost local$ level of
co**onality to initiate o!r practical proCect) E1hro!gh s!ch notions -e !nderstand
agree*ents bet-een *odes' they go beyond an e@ternal perception of agree*ents
observed by chance$ to find in a si*ilarity of co*position an internal and necessary
reason for an agree*ent of bodiesF 29803) .e can see$ then$ especially in the *ost
specific of cases$ that the co**on notion discovers an internal logic$ that the co**on
notion envelops and e@plains its ca!se$ or$ in other -ords$ that the co**on notion is an
ade<!ate idea' ECo**on notions in general are necessarily ade<!ateD in other -ords$
co**on notions are ideas that are for*ally e@plained by o!r po-er to thin4 and that$
*aterially$ e@press the idea of ,od as their efficient ca!seF 29893) 1he co**on notion
provides !s the *eans to constr!ct for o!rselves an ade<!ate idea)
1he first ade<!ate idea -e can have is the recognition of so*ething in co**on bet-een
t-o bodiesD this ade<!ate idea i**ediately leads to another ade<!ate idea-in this -ay$ -e
can begin o!r constr!ctive proCect to beco*e active) =ele!#e$ ho-ever$ is not yet
satisfied that -e have presented this initial *o*ent in s!fficiently practical ter*s' E1here
is$ tho!gh$ a danger that the co**on notion *ight appear to intervene li4e a *iracle$
!nless -e e@plain ho- -e co*e to for* itN) Precisely$ ho- do -e for* 2co**on
notions3$ in -hat favorable circ!*stancesP Ho- do -e arrive at o!r po-er to actPF 296B-
613) .hen -e consider the "pino#ian theory of co**on notions$ =ele!#e -arns !s$ -e
sho!ld be caref!l to avoid t-o dangero!s interpretative errors) 1he first error -ith respect
to the co**on notions -o!ld be Eoverloo4ing their biological sense in favor of their
*athe*atical senseF 29613) 5n other -ords$ -e sho!ld re*e*ber that co**on notions
refer principally to a physics of bodies$ not a logic of tho!ght' .e -o!ld do better to
locate the* as rising !p fro* a Hobbesian
-98-
*aterial terrain$ rather than fro* a Cartesian *athe*atical !niverse) 1he second
interpretative error -e *ight *a4e -ith respect to the co**on notions -o!ld be
Eoverloo4ing their practical f!nction in favor of their spec!lative contentF 29613) .hen
co**on notions are first introd!ced in oo4 55 of the Ethics, they are introd!ced
precisely in their logical order$ fro* the spec!lative point of vie-) 1his spec!lative
presentation regards the co**ons notions as *oving fro* the *ost !niversal 2*otion$
rest$ etc)3 to-ard the least !niversal) 1he practical progression of co**on notions in
oo4 ( is e@actly the opposite' .e *ove fro* the least !niversal 2a specific co*patible
relationship bet-een t-o bodies3 to-ard the *ost !niversal) Co**on notions are not
pri*arily a spec!lative for* of analysis$ b!t a practical tool of constit!tion)
Here$ to begin the practical progression$ -e can ass!*e that by chance -e e@perience a
co*patible enco!nter) .e can translate the fa*o!s episte*ological point of depart!re of
"pino#a>s Emendation of the Intellect, Ehabe*!s eni* idea* ver!*F 2-e have a tr!e
idea$ or -e have at least one tr!e idea3$ to the real* of bodies and passions' Ehabe*!s
eni* affectione* passa* laeta*F 2-e have at least one Coyf!l passive affection3) 1his
e@perience of Coy is the spar4 that sets the ethical progression in *otion' E.hen -e
enco!nter a body that agrees -ith o!r o-n$ -hen -e e@perience a Coyf!l passive
affection$ -e are ind!ced to for* the idea of -hat is co**on to that body and o!r o-nF
29693) 1he process begins -ith the e@perience of Coy) 1his chance enco!nter -ith a
co*patible body allo-s !s$ or ind!ces !s$ to recogni#e a co**on relationship$ to for* a
co**on notion) 1here are t-o processes going on here$ ho-ever$ -hich =ele!#e insists
*!st be 4ept distinct) 5n the first *o*ent$ -e strive to avoid the sad passions that
di*inish o!r po-er to act and acc!*!late Coyf!l passions) 1his effort of selection does
increase o!r po-er$ b!t never to the point of beco*ing active' ?oyf!l passions are al-ays
the res!lt of an e@ternal ca!seD they al-ays indicate an inade<!ate idea) E.e *!st then$
by the aid of joyful passions, for* the idea of -hat is co**on to so*e e@ternal body and
o!r o-n) %or this idea alone$ this co**on notion$ is ade<!ateF 29633) 1he first *o*ent$
the acc!*!lation of Coyf!l passions$ prepares the condition for this leap that provides !s
-ith an ade<!ate idea)
+et !s loo4 *ore closely at this second *o*ent$ at the EleapF fro* the Coyf!l passion to
the co**on notion) Ho- do -e *a4e this leapP Ho- do -e *a4e an enco!nter
ade<!ateP .e 4no- that Coy is the e@perience of an affection that agrees -ith o!r nat!re$
an affection that increases o!r po-er) 1he sa*e Coy is constit!ted by a Coyf!l passive
affection and a Coyf!l active affectionD the only difference is that a Coyf!l passion arises
fro* an e@ternal ca!se$ -hile a Coyf!l action arises fro* an internal ca!se' E.hen
"pino#a s!ggests that -hat agrees -ith reason *ay also be born of it$ he *eans that
-96-
fro* every passive Coy there *ay arise an active Coy disting!ished fro* it only by its
ca!seF 298:-873) 1he passage fro* passive Coy to active Coy involves s!bstit!ting an
internal ca!se for an e@ternal ca!seD or$ *ore precisely$ it involves enveloping or
co*prehending the ca!se -ithin the enco!nter itself) 1his corporeal logic is parallel to
the episte*ological logic of ade<!acy that -e disc!ssed earlier) 1he ne- enco!nter is
ade<!ate 2and active3 beca!se it e@presses its o-n ca!seD that is$ it e@presses the co**on
relationship bet-een t-o bodies) 1his operation of enveloping the ca!se$ ho-ever$ still
re*ains obsc!re !ntil -e recogni#e that a Coyf!l passion presents !s necessarily -ith a
sit!ation of co**onality' A Coyf!l passion can only arise fro* an e@ternal body that is
co*posed of a relationship co**on to o!r body) .hen o!r *ind for*s an idea of the
co**on relationship shared bet-een this body and o!r body 2a co**on notion3$ the
Coyf!l affection ceases to be passive and beco*es active' E5t is distinct fro* the passive
feeling fro* -hich -e began$ b!t distinct only in its ca!se' its ca!se is no longer an
inade<!ate idea of an obCect that agrees -ith !s$ b!t the necessarily ade<!ate idea of -hat
is co**on to that obCect and o!rselvesF 296:3) 1his process of enveloping or
co*prehending the ca!se of an enco!nter allo-s "pino#a to clai* that Ean affect -hich is
a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as -e for* a clear and distinct idea of itF 2(P33)
1his process of enveloping the ca!se$ then$ constit!tes the EleapF to action and ade<!acy)
1he co**on notions constit!te for =ele!#e the Eontological r!pt!reF of "pino#a>s
tho!ght that *ar4s the co*pletion of the transfor*ation fro* spec!lation to practice)
ECo**on notions are one of the f!nda*ental discoveries of the EthicsF 2999D see also
Spino!a) Practical Philosophy, chapter 7$ in partic!lar 11:ff)3) .ith the establish*ent of
the practical perspective$ "pino#a has provided a radically ne- vision of ontology) eing
can no longer be considered a given arrange*ent or orderD here being is the asse*blage
of co*posable relationships) .e sho!ld 4eep in *ind$ ho-ever$ that the essential
ele*ent for ontological constit!tion re*ains the "pino#ian foc!s on ca!sality$ on being>s
Eprod!ctivityF and Eprod!cibility)F 1he co**on notion is the asse*blage of t-o
co*posable relationships to create a ne-$ *ore po-erf!l relationship$ a ne-$ *ore
po-erf!l body-this asse*blage$ ho-ever$ is not *erely a chance co*position b!t an
ontological constit!tion$ beca!se the process envelops the ca!se -ithin the ne- body
itself) .e are s!ddenly thro-n bac4 to the opening definition of the Ethics-EPer ca!sa s!i
intelligoNF-b!t no- -e read it -ith an entirely different attit!de) 8ausa sui, ca!se of
itself$ has ac<!ired a ne-$ practical *eaning) 1he essential characteristic of "pino#ian
ontological constit!tion is ade<!acy$ that is$ the e@pression of the ca!sal chain of being)
1he practical strategy of the for*ation of co**on notions$ of ontological asse*-
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blages$ has forged the ontological investigation into an ethical proCect' eco*e active$
beco*e ade<!ate$ beco*e being) "pino#ian practice is beginning to cli*b !p the sa*e
ladder that the analysis of "pino#ian spec!lation has constr!cted *oving do-n-ard)
Constit!tive practice defines the prod!ctive series' Coyf!l passive affectionsYco**on
notionsYactive affections)
"pec!lation has *apped the terrain of po-er$ and no- practice is inhabiting that terrain$
breathing life into its internal str!ct!re) Practice is *oving !p-ard$ constr!cting the
relations of being fro* belo-) 1he driving *otor that ani*ates this entire operation is
conatus) .hen "pino#ian physics is transported to an ethical plane$ -e no longer see
si*ply bodies in *otion and rest$ b!t rather -e find bodies inf!sed -ith desire) As -e
*ove fro* sadness to Coy$ fro* passions to actions$ -e are discovering the path of the
increase of o!r po-er) .e sho!ld contin!ally 4eep in *ind that this path of corporeal and
spirit!al e*endation is not si*ply presented as a vag!e ethical *andateD -hen "pino#a
poses Ebeco*ing activeF as a goal$ he also presents the practical *eans of attaining this
goal) E1here is a -hole learning process involved in co**on notions$ in o!r becoming
active) -e sho!ld not overloo4 the i*portance in "pino#is* of the proble* of an
ed!cational processF 29663) 1he "pino#ian path to beatit!de is an apprenticeship in
po-er$ an ed!cation in virt!e)
.(> "he Constitution of !eason
"pino#ian practice al-ays begins -ith the body as *odel) Ho-ever$ -hile the co**on
notions set off fro* a corporeal do*ain$ they also constr!ct a theory of ideas that is
parallel to the theory of bodies) 1his constit!tive episte*ology that -e find in the
beginning of Part ( of the Ethics is radically different fro* the given$ prefor*ed
episte*ology presented in Part 55$ and this difference is d!e in large part to the
conversion fro* spec!lation to practice acco*plished on the corporeal plane in Parts 555
and 5('
5n Part 1-o of the Ethics "pino#a considers the spec!lative content of co**on notionsD
he s!pposes the* given or potentially givenN) At the opening of Part %ive he analy#es
the practical f!nction of co**on notions$ s!pposed givenD this f!nction consists in the
co**on notion
-1BB-
being the ca!se of an ade<!ate idea of an affection$ that is$ of an active Coy) 29603
1he t-o episte*ological arg!*ents share the sa*e categories and ter*inology$ b!t they
approach the topic fro* different perspectives$ -ith different attit!des) 5n Part 55$ in the
spec!lative *o*ent$ "pino#a laid o!t the *athe*atical and logical order of the three
different 4inds of ideas$ b!t in Part ( "pino#a>s practical perspective p!ts this
episte*ological order in *otion) 1he co**on notion$ recogni#ed no- as a constr!ctive
agent$ as an asse*blage$ is the *echanis* by -hich the *ind *oves fro* a passion to an
action$ fro* an inade<!ate idea to an ade<!ate idea$ fro* i*agination to reason) 1he
for*ation of co**on notions is the practical constit!tion of reason)
1he theory that episte*ology can be constit!ted in practice rests on a notion of the
*ateriality of the intellect that solidly locates "pino#ian tho!ght both philosophically in
the *aterialist tradition and historically in the age of the birth of *odern ind!stry) An
early passage fro* the Emendation of the Intellect disc!ssing the *ethod of i*proving
o!r *inds ill!strates these connections very clearly'
Matters here stand as they do -ith corporeal toolsN) ?!st as *en$ in the beginning$ -ere
able to *a4e the easiest things -ith the tools they -ere born -ith 2ho-ever laborio!sly
and i*perfectly3$ and once these had been *ade$ *ade other$ *ore diffic!lt things -ith
less labor and *ore perfectly$ and so$ proceeding grad!ally fro* the si*plest -or4s to
tools$ and fro* tools to other -or4s and tools$ reached the point -here they acco*plished
so *any and so diffic!lt things -ith little labor$ in the sa*e -ay the intellect$ by its
inborn po-er$ *a4es intellect!al tools for itself$ by -hich it -or4s still other tools$ or the
po-er of searching f!rther$ and so proceeds by stages$ !ntil it reaches the pinnacle of
-isdo*)
2Emendation of the Intellect 3B-313
1he *ind forges the co**on notion fro* inade<!ate ideas$ C!st as the body forges a
ha**er fro* iron) 1he co**on notion serves as a practical tool in o!r effort to-ard the
pinnacle of -isdo*)
1his practical and *aterial perspective provides a ne- fo!ndation and a ne- dyna*ic of
*ove*ent for "pino#a>s syste* of the different 4inds of 4no-ledge' the first 4ind
2i*agination$ opinion$ and revelation3$ the second 4ind 2reason3$ and the third 4ind
2int!ition3) "pino#a directs !s to analy#e the lo-est 4ind of 4no-ledge in the sa*e -ay
that he insisted -e foc!s on the passions) %irst$ he operates a deval!ation' EHno-ledge of
the first 4ind is the only ca!se of falsity$ -hereas 4no-ledge of the second and of the
third 4ind is necessarily tr!eF 2Ethics 55P:13) Ho-ever$ C!st as -e have seen -ith regard
to the passions$ once "pino#a operates this deval!-
-1B1-
ation he also adopts a realistic attit!de and clai*s that the vast *aCority of o!r ideas
reside in the first 4ind of 4no-ledge) 1hose philosophers -ho pers!ade the*selves that
h!*ans can live strictly by the dictates of reason$ "pino#a is fond of saying$ end !p
si*ply c!rsing and be*oaning$ rather than !nderstanding$ h!*an nat!re) .e cannot
si*ply e@cl!de or negate the first 4ind of 4no-ledge$ b!t rather -e *!st !se it as o!r
point of depart!re) 1he practical proCect of episte*ology$ then$ is the *ove*ent fro* the
first to the second and third 4inds of 4no-ledge) At this point$ "pino#a can reassess the
val!e of the first 4ind of 4no-ledge -ith a different attit!de' /ven tho!gh it is the only
so!rce of falsity$ the first 4ind of 4no-ledge is nonetheless co*posed of ideas that may
be true)
1his revalori#ation does not yet give !s a practical point of depart!re) At this point$ C!st
as -e have recogni#ed the distinction bet-een Coyf!l passions and sad passions$ -e *!st
discover a relevant distinction -ithin the first 4ind of 4no-ledge) .hat i*agination$
opinion$ and revelation have in co**on is that in each an idea is characteri#ed by signs
rather than by e@pressionD in other -ords$ an idea of the first 4ind depends on an e@ternal
rather than an internal ca!se$ and is th!s inade<!ate) Ho-ever$ !nli4e the other t-o
for*s$ i*agination arises fro* the chance enco!nters bet-een bodies' E1his 4no-ledge
is obtained thro!gh >vag!e e@perience> 0e,perientia vaga1, and >vag!e> relates$
ety*ologically$ to the accidental character of enco!ntersF 29693) "pino#ian i*agination is
a *aterial i*agination in that it provides the possibility of reading the co**onality and
conflict in the enco!nters a*ong bodies) "ince it operates on the *aterial plane$ -here
constit!tive relationships are possible$ the i*agination presents !s -ith indicative signs)
An this terrain$ the analysis can open !p to the consideration of co**on notions and
co*posable relationships) An the other hand$ the other t-o for*s of the first 4ind of
4no-ledge$ opinion and revelation$ present no corporeal enco!nter$ b!t *erely opa<!e
*andates' 1hey *erely provide !s -ith imperative signs) 1he ca!ses of these ideas
re*ain obsc!re to !s$ and th!s they cannot indicate the real genealogy of their for*ation$
their real prod!ctive str!ct!re) 1herefore$ -hile all of the ideas of the first 4ind *ay be
tr!e$ the i*agination is disting!ished fro* opinion and revelation beca!se an idea that
arises fro* the *aterial field of i*agination gives indications of its ca!se) 5n other -ords$
since the i*agination presents !s -ith corporeal relationships$ it is open to the la-s of
co*posability) 1he i*agination not only *ay be tr!e$ b!t$ thro!gh the indication of its
ca!se$ it may be ade3uate)
1he co**on notion de*onstrates the practical force of this distinction and p!ts it in
*otion) E5f -e consider their origin$ co**on notions find in i*agination the very
conditions of their for*ation) 5f -e consider their practical f!nction$ *oreover$ they
apply only to things that can be i*ag-
-1B9-
inedF 299:3) Co**on notions$ as asse*blages$ are the practical pivotD they are b!ilding
bloc4s that arise on the terrain of the i*agination to constit!te reason) 1he prod!ction of
co**on notions sho-s that there is -hat =ele!#e calls a Ec!rio!s har*onyF bet-een the
i*agination and reason) 1hro!gh the co**on notion$ i*agination and reason are lin4ed
on a contin!!* as different stages or planes in the process of intellect!al constit!tion)
Ho-ever$ there re*ains a real difference bet-een the*) 1he i*agination begins by
affir*ing the presence of an obCect$ b!t no *atter ho- strong or intense an i*agination
*ay be$ -e contin!e to regard the i*agined obCect as present in a possible or contingent
-ay) 1he specific property of reason is to consider things as necessary) 1he co**on
notion$ then$ transfor*s the fl!ct!ation and contingency of i*agination into the
per*anence and consistency of reason' EAn affect -hich arises fro* reason is necessarily
related to the co**on properties of things$ -hich -e al-ays regard as presentNand
-hich /e al/ays imagine in the same /ayF 2(P8=e*$ e*phasis *ine3) Here reason is
presented as an intensified i*agination that has gained the po-er to s!stain its i*agining
by *eans of the constr!ction of the co**on notion) E&ecessity$ presence and fre<!ency
are the three characteristics of co**on notionsF 29903) Reason is the i*agination that
ret!rns$ the refrain)
/arlier$ -e fo!nd that the central difference bet-een the Coyf!l passive affection and the
Coyf!l active affection is the e@ternal ca!se of the for*er and the internal ca!se of the
later) 1he co**on notion operates the transfor*ation$ *aintaining the affection -hile
enveloping or co*prehending the ca!se) Here$ in the episte*ological do*ain$ -e are
presented -ith a corresponding fra*e-or4 of constit!tion thro!gh asse*blage) 1he
i*agination$ li4e the Coyf!l passion$ is the condition that allo-s !s to begin the process)
1he central difference bet-een the i*agination and reason is the contingency of the
for*er and the necessity of the latter) 1he co**on notion operates the transfor*ation
that *a4es the i*agination per*anentD it is the passage to reason) 1herefore$ -e can plot
an episte*ological constr!ction parallel to o!r earlier diagra* of the str!ct!re of the
affects) A constit!tive episte*ological practice is defined by the series' i*agination
Yco**on notionYreason)
1he 4eystone of "pino#a>s revol!tion in episte*ology is his conception of
-1B3-
the role of the co**on notion as the lin4 bet-een i*agination and reason) "pino#a
de*ystifies reason) 5n the spec!lative arg!*ent of Part 55$ reason -as defined in a
Cartesian$ *athe*atical spirit) Reason -as a given syste* of necessary tr!th$ and th!s
the prod!ction of reason -as co*pletely obsc!re) 1herefore$ the first 4ind of 4no-ledge$
the so!rce of all error$ co!ld play no positive role in a proCect for tr!thD the only strategy
co!ld be its negation) &o-$ in the practical *o*ent of "pino#a>s tho!ght$ -e find an
i*portant distinction bet-een the different for*s of the first 4ind of 4no-ledge and a
valori#ation of the i*agination) 1he i*agination provides a real 2if fl!ct!ating and
contingent3 indication of the state of bodies and relationships that are present) 1he
co**on notion intervenes -ith the capacity to *a4e o!r i*agining per*anent and
necessary' 1he asse*blage does not negate the i*agination$ b!t instead carries it to the
plane of reason) 1he operation of the co**on notion *a4es clear that the "pino#ian
process of constit!tion is not at all dialectical) 1he progressive *ove*ent to a f!rther
stage is not acco*plished thro!gh the negation of the present stage$ b!t rather thro!gh its
co*position$ preserving it -ith greater intensity and s!bstance) 5n this conte@t$
contingency and necessity$ i*agination and reason are not e@cl!sive and opposing
co!ples$ b!t rather they are platea!s lin4ed together on a prod!ctive contin!!* by the
process of constit!tion)
!emark: "heoretical Practice and Practical Constitution
&o- that -e have artic!lated the basic ele*ents of =ele!#e>s conception of practice in
"pino#ian philosophy$ -e can ret!rn to Alth!sser and reconsider the strength of the
pheno*enological criti<!e -e posed earlier) 1he cr!@ of the iss!e$ fro* the perspective
of o!r st!dy$ is the relationship bet-een spec!lation 2or theory3 and practice) .e have
seen that =ele!#e reads "pino#a as an e@tended dra*a dealing -ith the for* of this
relationship' 5n the first sections of the Ethics, "pino#a investigates being fro* a
spec!lative perspective and discovers the f!nda*ental ontological principlesD later$ fro*
a practical perspective$ "pino#a leads !s to-ard a real constit!tion of being in corporeal
and episte*ological ter*s) Ane of the *ost i*portant contrib!tions of =ele!#e>s
interpretation is to discover and clarify these t-o related *o*ents in "pino#a>s tho!ght'
spec!lation and practice) An this specific point$ -e *ay be te*pted to say that the
positions presented by Alth!sser and =ele!#e are finally not so distant beca!se$ in certain
regards$ Alth!sser presents a si*ilar relationship bet-een theory and practice)
%irst -e find that theory dra-s fro* practice' EPosing and resolving o!r theoretical
proble* !lti*ately consists in theoretically e@pressing the >so-
-1B:-
l!tion$ > e,isting in the practical state, that Mar@ist practice has givenF 2;or 'ar, 107$
*odified3) 5nversely$ practice is dependent on theory) 1his is best e@pressed by one of
Alth!sser>s favorite <!otations fro* +enin' E.itho!t theory$ no revol!tionary practiceF
21003) Reading =ele!#e>s "pino#a$ -e have also developed a certain interdependent
relationship bet-een theory and practice) Antological spec!lation prepares the terrain for
a constit!tive practiceD or rather$ after ontological spec!lation 2as ;orschung3 has bro!ght
to light the distinctions of the terrain$ this sa*e terrain is traversed a second ti*e in a
different direction$ -ith a different bearing$ -ith a practical attit!de 2as Darstellung3$
presenting the Einner connectionsF and the Ereal *ove*entF of being in the process of its
o-n constit!tion) 5n an intervie- -ith Michel %o!ca!lt$ =ele!#e gives a slightly
different$ b!t 5 thin4 co*patible e@planation of this relationship$ as a series of relays
bet-een theory and practice' EPractice is a set of relays fro* one theoretical point to
another$ theory is a relay fro* one practice to another) &o theory can develop -itho!t
event!ally enco!ntering a -all$ a practice is necessary for piercing this -allF
2E5ntellect!als and Po-erF 9B03) 1h!s$ !sing this i*age of relays$ -e can give a
=ele!#ian reading to +enin>s insight) E.itho!t theory$ no revol!tionary practiceF'
.itho!t theory there is no terrain on -hich practice can arise$ C!st as inversely$ -itho!t
practice$ there is no terrain for theory) /ach provides the conditions for the e@istence and
develop*ent of the other)
.hen -e loo4 *ore closely$ ho-ever$ at Alth!sser>s conception of the relationship
bet-een theory and practice$ -e find a f!nda*ental difference that is often *as4ed$ b!t
al-ays present$ in his -or4) 1he interrelation bet-een theory and practice in Alth!sser
al-ays concedes$ in the final instance$ a priority to theoryD practice is contin!ally
!nder*ined$ rec!perated$ s!bs!*ed) Consider$ for e@a*ple$ ho- Alth!sser interprets
+enin>s *otto' E>.itho!t theory$ no revol!tionary practice)> ,enerali#ing it' theory is
essential to practiceF 2;or 'ar, 1003) Alth!sser>s e@tension of +enin involves an
i*portant *odification) 1he relation bet-een theory and practice in +enin>s *otto co!ld
be read as a relationship of e<!ality$ b!t Alth!sser poses theory as pri*ary$ as the essence
of practice) 1he Actober Revol!tion gives Alth!sser a concrete e@a*ple' E1he practice of
the olshevi4 Party -as based on the dialectic in 8apital, on Mar@ist >theory>F 21873) 1he
pri*acy given to theory here allo-s Alth!sser to s!bs!*e practice -ithin theory itself)
Altho!gh$ of co!rse$ there are other for*s of practice$ Alth!sser>s analysis al-ays tends
to foc!s on Etheoretical practiceF as the central political for*$ the archetype of practice)
1heoretical practice is a synthesis of theory and practice$ b!t a synthesis that al-ays
*aintains the priority of theory)
-1B7-
/ven -hen$ years later$ Alth!sser is addressing this position as a proble*$ in the spirit of
self-criticis*$ he does not s!bstantially *odify this essential relation bet-een theory and
practice) Alth!sser clai*s to -ant to correct the EtheoreticistF error 2Essays in Self4
8riticism 1B7$ 196$ 1:93 that s4e-ed his analysis$ and$ specifically$ he sees the need to
revise his Etheory of theoretical practice$ F -hich represented the c!l*inating point of
this theoreticist tendency 21:83) Here$ as al-ays$ ho-ever$ Alth!sser is very s!btle in his
self-criticis*) .hen he see*s to be *odifying a past position$ his arg!*ent serves
instead to reinforce that sa*e position) His self-criticis* of the theory of theoretical
practice f!nctions in e@actly this -ay' E5n theoretically overesti*ating philosophy$ 5
!nderesti*ated it politically, as those -ho correctly acc!sed *e of not >bringing in> the
class str!ggle -ere <!ic4 to point o!tF 217B3) .e have to read this sentence very
caref!lly Alth!sser has been critici#ed 2correctly3 for not having given s!fficient
i*portance to the class str!ggle as a force of political practice) Accepting this criti<!e$ he
refra*es the disc!ssion of theory and practice in ter*s of philosophy) His error -as to
*isC!dge philosophy-in overesti*ating philosophy theoretically$ he !nderesti*ated it
politically) He *!st e@tend his !nderstanding of philosophy to appreciate its practical$
political po-er) An this basis$ he gives a 2ne-P3 definition of the theory-practice
relationship) Philosophy is Epolitics in theory$ F or$ *ore specifically$ Ephilosophy is$ in
the last instance$ class str!ggle in theoryF 217B3) "ocial practice is present$ b!t only
insofar as it is /ithin theory) 1he displace*ent of the proble* to philosophy allo-s
Alth!sser to s!bs!*e practice -ithin theory once again as a secondary and dependent
ele*ent)
=ele!#e>s vie- of the relationship bet-een theory and practice$ in contrast$ e*phasi#es
that the t-o activities re*ain a!tono*o!s and e<!al in principle) 5n =ele!#e there is no
synthesis of theory and practice$ and no priority of one over the other) .e have sho-n at
great length that$ in effect$ =ele!#e poses the pri*ary condition for a *aterialist
philosophy as the criti<!e of any Etheoreticist tendency$ F of any privileging of tho!ght)
2"ee "ections 3): and 3)7)3 +et !s propose$ then$ as a first appro@i*ation$ that theory
relates to practice as the activity of the *ind relates to the activity of the body$ -ith no
direct ca!sal relationship and no priority bet-een the t-o) E1he ody cannot deter*ine
the Mind to thin4ing$ and the Mind cannot deter*ine the ody to *otion$ to rest or to
anything else 2if there is anything else3F 2Ethics 555P93) .e sho!ld 4eep in *ind$ of
co!rse$ that there is not an identity bet-een the t-o co!ples *indTbody and theoryT
practice' A!r spec!lation investigates the principles of being e<!ally in the do*ain of
tho!ght and that of e@tensionD si*ilarly$ the practical constit!tion of being involves both
the *ind and the body) 1he co**on relationship -e are pointing to is the a!tono*y and
e<!ality of the ter*s in each
-1B0-
co!ple) 5n this sense$ =ele!#e can i*agine the relationship as a series of relays) 5t *ight
even *a4e sense in this conte@t to spea4 of a theoretical a!to*aton and a practical
a!to*aton as e@pressions that e<!ally refer bac4 to the po-er of being)
1hese arg!*ents for a!tono*y$ ho-ever$ sho!ld be read above all as pole*ical
positions) ?!st as "pino#a>s clai* of the a!tono*y of the attrib!tes is an attac4 against the
Cartesian pri*acy of tho!ght$ against the theoretical fra*e-or4 that effectively
s!bs!*es the body -ithin the order of the *ind$ so too o!r =ele!#ian clai* of the
a!tono*y of practice is a reaction to conceptions of a pri*acy of theory that effectively
s!bs!*e practice -ithin theory) %or e@a*ple$ -hen -e pose the <!estion of a fo!ndation
or ca!se of a practical act$ s!ch as the 1918 olshevi4 ins!rrection$ -e cannot loo4 to a
theoretical reason that deter*ined it$ s!ch as Mar@>s !se of the dialectic in 8apital, b!t
instead -e *!st search for an acc!*!lation of desires$ i*aginations$ and po-ers that
coincide and beco*e necessary in the eventD -e need to search$ in other -ords$ for the
co**on notions that transfor*ed the Coyf!l passions of the revol!tionary enco!nter into
actions) Ance again$ this proposition of the relative a!tono*y of a constit!tive practice
sho!ld be read as a pole*ical position$ as an atte*pt to bring practice o!t fro* the
shado- of theory and recogni#e its f!ll force) ?!st as "pino#a said of the body$ =ele!#e
*ight say$ no one has yet deter*ined -hat practice can do) 1he artic!lation of the
practical f!nction of the co**on notion in "pino#a$ ho-ever$ is a large step to-ard
discovering the po-er of social practice)
%inally$ in contrast to =ele!#e$ Alth!sser re*ains too Hegelian in the contin!al
ree*ergence of the priority of theory and the contin!al s!bs!*ption of practice -ithin
the theoretical do*ain) 1he central proCect of *aterialist philosophy$ in its *any
historical g!ises$ is precisely to co*bat this proposition of priority$ to challenge the
notion of interrelation as s!bs!*ption' ring the body o!t fro* the shado- of the *ind$
bring practice o!t fro* the shado- of theory$ in all its a!tono*y and dignity$ to try to
discover -hat it can do) .ith his conception of a practice of co**on notions$ a
*aterialist practice of constit!tion that ref!ses to be rec!perated -ithin the *ove*ent of
theory$ =ele!#e has co*pletely re*oved hi*self fro* the Hegelian terrain) 1his practical
practice cannot be s!bs!*ed -ithin the !nfolding of spirit in its progressive
instantiations) 1he logic of constit!tion reveals a progression that *arches to a different
beat$ that acc!*!lates its ele*ents fro* belo- in open$ nonteleological for*s as original$
!nforeseeable$ creative str!ct!res) 1he *ove*ent of a Hegelian practice is al-ays
rec!perated -ithin the logic of order$ dictated fro* above$ -hereas a =ele!#ian practice
rises fro* belo- thro!gh an open logic of organi#ation)
-1B8-
.('? "he Art of *rganization: "oward a Political Assem:lage
Politics arises in "pino#a as a <!estion of bodies) E5n order to really thin4 in ter*s of
po-er$ one *!st pose the <!estion in relation to the bodyF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy)
Spino!a 9783) 1he introd!ction of the ontological principle of po-er -as the 4ey that
opened the field of "pino#ian practice for =ele!#e$ and the <!estion of the po-er of the
body served as its pri*ary terrain$ as its *odel) .e have seen that =ele!#e>s
interpretation of the co**on notions in ter*s of the logic of asse*blage has bro!ght to
light the real constit!tive force of "pino#ian practice' A passive affection constit!tes an
active affection$ i*agination constit!tes reason) 1he co**on notion is an ontological
*echanis* that forges being o!t of beco*ing$ necessity o!t of chance) 5t is the
ontological asse*blage -hereby the chance Coyf!l enco!nter is *ade ade<!ateD the Coyf!l
enco!nter ret!rns) %ro* the beginning$ =ele!#e has posed the co**on notion and its
process of asse*blage as part of an ethical proCect 2beco*ing active$ beco*ing ade<!ate$
beco*ing Coyf!l3$ b!t ho- can -e recogni#e this process in properly political ter*sP
.hat is the "pino#ian process of political constit!tion$ or rather$ -hat is a political
asse*blageP
"pino#a is able to pose political <!estions directly in ontological ter*s by constr!cting a
passage thro!gh the C!ridical do*ain) 1he theory of po-er and bodies is bro!ght closer to
political practice in the for* of a theory of right' EAll that a body can do 2its po-er3$ is
also its >nat!ral right>F 29783) "pino#a>s theory of nat!ral right$ along -ith that of Hobbes$
is greatly different fro* the nat!ral la- of the ancients) 1he ancients defined nat!ral la-
in ter*s of perfectionD they conceived of nat!re as oriented to-ard its ends$ to-ard a final
ca!se) "pino#a$ as -e have seen on several occasions$ al-ays reCects the final ca!se for
the efficient ca!se' E1he la- of nat!re is no longer referred to a final perfection b!t to the
initial desire$ to the strongest >appetite>F 29793) 1o !nderstand this proposition of nat!ral
right -e have to recogni#e that "pino#a>s ontological logic of asse*blage and
constit!tion g!ides the reasoning here' organi#ation vers!s order) 1he prod!ctivity of
being itself is the *otor that ani*ates the entire disco!rse on right) +et !s ta4e a *o*ent
to -or4 thro!gh this constit!tive proced!re$ -hich sho!ld by no- be very fa*iliar)
.e start -ith a devalori#ation) ?!st as -e have seen on other terrains$ "pino#a insists that
-e begin o!r political tho!ght fro* the lo-est level of o!r po-er$ fro* the lo-est point
of social organi#ation$ -ith a typically Machiavellian ritorno ai principi) ?!st as no one is
born rational$ so too no one is born citi#en) "ince no order is predeter*ined$ every
ele*ent of "pino#ian society *!st be constit!ted internally -ith the ele*ents at hand$ by
the constit!ent s!bCects 2be they ignorant or learned3$ on the basis of
-1B6-
the e@isting affections 2be they passions or actions3) And -e 4no- that the h!*an
condition is characteri#ed predo*inantly by o!r -ea4ness$ that o!r po-er to be affected
is filled largely by passions) 1his devalori#ation$ ho-ever$ is also an affir*ation of o!r
freedo*) .hen "pino#a insists that o!r nat!ral right is coe@tensive -ith o!r po-er$ this
*eans that no social order can be i*posed by any transcendent ele*ents$ anything
o!tside of the i**anent field of forces$ and th!s any conception of d!ty or *orality *!st
be secondary and dependent on the assertion of o!r po-er) E1r!e nat!ral la-s are nor*s
of po-er$ not r!les of d!tyF 29063) 1he e@pression of po-er free fro* any *oral order is
the pri*ary ethical principle of society) EP!shing to the !t*ost -hat one can do Laller
C!s<!>a! bo!t de ce <!>on pe!tM is the properly ethical tas4) 5t is here that the Ethics ta4es
the body as *odelD for every body e@tends its po-er as far as it can) 5n a sense every
being$ each *o*ent$ p!shes to the !t*ost -hat it can doF 29093) 1his ethical for*!lation
does not pri*arily place the accent on the li*itation *le bout+ of o!r po-er$ b!t rather it
poses a dyna*ic bet-een the li*it and -hat -e can do-each ti*e -e reach an e@tre*e
point$ -hat -e can do rises !p to *ove beyond) 1he ethical tas4 highlights o!r
perseverance$ o!r *aterial conatus *oving in the -orld to e@press o!r po-er beyond the
given li*its of the present arrange*ent$ the present order) 1his ethical perseverance is the
open e@pression of *!ltiplicity) "pino#a>s conception of nat!ral right$ then$ poses the
freedo* fro* order$ the freedo* of *!ltiplicity$ the freedo* of society in anarchy)
1he society described by the state of nat!re itself$ ho-ever$ presents !s -ith an !nlivable
condition$ or$ *ore acc!rately$ it presents !s -ith the *ini*!* point of o!r po-er) 5n the
state of nat!re th!s conceived$ 5 e@perience chance enco!nters -ith other bodies that$
since -e are predo*inantly deter*ined by passions$ have very little in co**on -ith *y
o-n) 1herefore$ in this condition$ not only is *y po-er to be affected filled
predo*inantly by passive affections$ b!t also those passive affections are *ostly sad) ?!st
as previo!sly -e have *oved fro* passive affections to active affections and fro*
i*agination to reason$ here -e *!st discover a passage for the increase of o!r po-er
fro* nat!ral right to civil right) E1here co!ld be only one -ay to *a4e the state of nat!re
livable' by striving to organi!e its encountersF 290B-013) 1he civil state is the state of
nat!re *ade livableD or$ *ore precisely$ it is the state of nat!re inf!sed -ith the proCect of
the increase of o!r po-er) And$ as -e have seen$ the increase of o!r po-er involves the
organi#ation of co*posable relationships' E5f t-o co*e together and !nite their strength$
they have Cointly *ore po-er$ and conse<!ently *ore right over nat!re$ than either of
the* aloneD and the *ore there be that Coin in alliance$ the *ore right they -ill
collectively possessF 2Political $reatise 55'133) 1he heart of "pino#ian politics$ then$ is
-1B9-
oriented to-ard the organi#ation of social enco!nters so as to enco!rage !sef!l and
co*posable relationshipsD it is Ethis art of organi#ing enco!ntersF 29093) &at!ral right is
not negated in the passage to civil right$ as it is in dialectical conceptions of society$ b!t
rather it is preserved and intensified$ C!st as i*agination is fortified in reason) 5n this
transfor*ation the *!ltiplicity of society is forged into a *!ltit!de)
9B
1he *!ltit!de
re*ains contingent in that it is al-ays open to antagonis* and conflict$ b!t in its dyna*ic
of increasing po-er it attains a plane of consistencyD it has the capacity to pose social
nor*ativity as civil right) 1he *!ltit!de is *!ltiplicity *ade po-erf!l) "pino#a>s
conception of civil right$ then$ co*ple*ents the first notion of freedo* -ith a second'
fro* the freedo* fro* order to the freedo* of organi#ationD the freedo* of *!ltiplicity
beco*es the freedo* of the *!ltit!de) And the r!le of the *!ltit!de is de*ocracy' E1his
right$ -hich is defined by the po-er of the *!ltit!de$ is generally called a "tate) And it is
absol!tely controlled by he -ho thro!gh co**on consent *anages the affairs of the
rep!blicN) 5f this charge belongs to a co!ncil co*posed of the general *!ltit!de$ then
the "tate is called a de*ocracyF 2Political $reatise 55'183) 5n the passage of freedo*$
then$ fro* *!ltiplicity to *!ltit!de$ "pino#a co*poses and intensifies anarchy in
de*ocracy) "pino#ian de*ocracy$ the absol!te r!le of the *!ltit!de thro!gh the e<!ality
of its constit!ent *e*bers$ is fo!nded on the Eart of organi#ing enco!ntersF 29093)
1his vision of the freedo* and organi#ation of social enco!nters is$ in effect$ an
e@tension of =ele!#e>s ontological theory of co**on notions) An the episte*ological
plane$ -e have seen ho- the co**on notion is the *echanis* by -hich practice
constit!tes an order of 4no-ledgeD the practical passage fro* the Coyf!l passive affection
to the active affection$ C!st li4e the passage fro* i*agination to reason$ develops thro!gh
the co**on notion) &o-$ the theory of ontological parallelis* tells !s that if -e can
identify s!ch a practical passage in the real* of tho!ght$ -e *!st be able to recogni#e a
si*ilar passage in the real* of e@tension) 5n other -ords$ if -e are to p!rs!e =ele!#e>s
interpretation of parallelis* consistently$ -e have to discover a corporeal co**on notion
that serves to organi#e the chance$ inade<!ate$ and predo*inantly sad enco!nters of
social bodies into coherent$ ade<!ate$ and Coyf!l enco!nters$ C!st as on the basis of
inade<!ate ideas 2i*agination3 the intellect!al co**on notion constit!tes ade<!ate ideas
2reason3) P!shed to its concept!al li*its$ ontological parallelis* *eans that the
constit!tion of 4no-ledge$ the intellect!al constit!tion of co**!nity$ *!st be e<!alled
and co*ple*ented by a corporeal constit!tion of co**!nity) 1he corporeal co**on
notion$ the ade<!ate social body$ is given *aterial for* in the *!ltit!de)
-11B-
1hese o!tlines of "pino#ian freedo* and de*ocracy provide !s -ith a general political
orientation$ b!t the central ele*ent$ the process of the for*ation of the *!ltit!de$ the
process of political asse*blage$ ris4s appearing obsc!re and *ysterio!s !ntil -e flesh o!t
its concrete constit!tive *echanis*s) 1his$ ho-ever$ is the li*it of =ele!#e>s analysis in
E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a) 5n effect$ this is the li*it of a EtheoryF of
de*ocracy$ the point at -hich theory r!ns into a -all) Anly social practice can brea4
thro!gh this -all$ by giving body to the process of political asse*blage)
-111-
Cha&ter 1
Conclusion
An A&&renticeshi& in Philoso&h
.e have navigated thro!gh =ele!#e>s early -or4 to discern a po-erf!l line of
develop*ent$ a progressive evol!tion' ergson$ &iet#sche$ "pino#a) 1his is not$ ho-ever$
*erely an e@ercise in the history of philosophy) 5t is tr!e that part of *y interest in this
st!dy has been to de*onstrate thro!gh =ele!#e>s -or4 that the history of *etaphysics is
not dead$ that it contains po-erf!l and radical alternatives still very alive in the
conte*porary proble*s -e face) 1hese philosophers for* a fo!ndation for =ele!#e>s
tho!ght in that they provide the *aterial for his o-n ed!cation$ for his apprenticeship in
philosophy) =ele!#e>s -or4$ ho-ever$ does not stop -ith a revalori#ation of this
alternative tradition' He selects -hat is living and transfor*s it$ *a4ing it ade<!ate to his
concerns) 5n this -ay$ he both *a4es the history of philosophy his o-n and *a4es it ne-)
1oday$ an e*erging generation is being schooled in =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ developing a ne-
taste for philosophy) 5n this st!dy 5 have tried to read =ele!#e>s -or4 !sing his *ethod of
selection and transfor*ation in order to p!rs!e *y o-n ed!cation$ *y o-n
apprenticeship in philosophy) 5 have tried to *a4e his -or4 *y o-n) 5n the process$ 5
have fleshed o!t a cl!ster of fo!r the*es that coalesce in *y *ind as the core of this
endeavor' ontology$ affir*ation$ practice$ and constit!tion)
1(' *ntolog
=ele!#e>s ontology is gro!nded in the conceptions of difference and sin-
-119-
g!larity that he discovers in ergson and "pino#a) ergsonian difference defines$ above
all$ the principle of the positive movement of being$ that is$ the te*poral principle of
ontological artic!lation and differentiation) ergson does not as4 -hat being is$ b!t ho-
it *oves) 1his foc!s on ontological *ove*ent can easily be sit!ated in the conte@t of
traditional philosophical disc!ssions on the nat!re of ca!sality) ergsonian difference
*!st first be disting!ished fro* the difference of the Mechanicists$ -ho pose an
e*pirical evol!tion in -hich each deter*ination is ca!sed by a *aterial EotherF thro!gh
an accidental relation) 1he ontological *ove*ent of the Mechanicists rests on a cr!de
conception of the *aterial ca!se that ris4s posing being as p!rely contingent$ as a
Es!bsistent e@teriority)F An the other hand$ ho-ever$ ergsonian difference *!st be
disting!ished fro* Platonic difference$ -hich relies not on a *aterial ca!se$ b!t a final
ca!se) 1he Platonic ontological *ove*ent is e<!ally e@ternal in that it is deter*ined by
its end$ by its finality) %inally$ ergsonian difference *!st be disting!ished above all
fro* Hegelian difference$ -hich rests on an EabstractF conception of ca!sality' abstract
in the sense that the negative *ove*ent of contradictions poses a ca!se that is absol!tely
e@ternal to its effect) Apposition$ =ele!#e clai*s$ is too cr!de a notion to capt!re the
n!ances that *ar4 real differencesD it hangs loosely on reality li4e baggy clothes)
ergson>s difference$ in contrast to all these versions$ is defined by a notion of efficient
ca!sality) 1he *ove*ent of being is a progression of internal differences in that the ca!se
al-ays inheres -ithin its effect) 5n this -ay$ ontological *ove*ent is freed fro* any play
of negations and is posed instead as absol!tely positive$ as an internal differentiation)
5n the "pino#ian conte@t$ the positivity of being is characteri#ed by its sing!larity and its
!nivocal e@pression) 1he sing!larity of "pino#a>s being is not defined by its difference
fro* an other$ fro* nonbeing$ b!t rather by the fact that being is different in itself)
E=issociated fro* any n!*erical distinction$ real distinction is carried into the absol!te)
5t beco*es capable of e@pressing the difference in being and conse<!ently it brings abo!t
the restr!ct!ring of other distinctionsF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 393)
"pino#ian being is re*ar4ableD it is different -itho!t any e@ternal reference) 5n other
-ords$ being is sing!lar) Ance again$ this logic points to the tradition of ca!sal
arg!*ents) ?!st as being is ca!se of itself and th!s s!pported by an internal ca!sal
str!ct!re$ so too being is different in itself and th!s s!stained thro!gh a notion of internal
or efficient difference) 1he e@pression of this internal difference is precisely the
*ove*ent of being) /@pression is the opening of being that *a4es clear its internal
ca!sal str!ct!re$ its genealogy$ and th!s the e@pression of sing!lar being cannot b!t be
!nivocal' eing is e@pressed al-ays and every-here in the same voice) 1he sing!lar and
!nivocal e@pression of being is$ in the "pino#ian
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conte@t$ the highest possible affir*ation of being) And this proposition casts o!r tho!ght
on the highest plane of ontological spec!lation)
1here sho!ld be no do!bt at this point that this =ele!#ian conception of ontology is
radically distinct fro* the Hegelian and Heideggerian conceptions$ partic!larly -ith
regard to its positivity and its *aterialis*) 5n "pino#ian shorthand$ -e co!ld say that
=ele!#e has displaced the center of ontological spec!lation fro* Eo*nis deter*inatio est
negatioF to Enon opposita sed diversaF-fro* negation to difference) 1his strategy stri4es
at the very first *oves of Hegel>s logic$ the progression fro* p!re being to deter*inate
being$ and$ *ore i*portant$ it stri4es at the *ove*ent of the entire dialectical syste*) 5n
essence$ =ele!#e appeals to the precritical -orld of "pino#a and the "cholastics to
de*onstrate the -ea4ness of Hegelian ontology) 1he being that *!st see4 an e@ternal
s!pport for its difference$ the being that *!st loo4 to negation for its fo!ndation$ is no
being at all) As -e 4no- fro* "cholastic arg!*ents abo!t the Eprod!ctivityF and
Eprod!cibilityF of being-its aptit!des to prod!ce and to be prod!ced-a thing cannot be the
necessary ca!se of so*ething o!tside itself$ and an effect cannot have *ore perfection or
reality than its ca!se) 2"ee /tienne ,ilson$ %a philosophie au 'oyen =ge 797)3 1he
dignity of being is precisely its po-er$ its internal prod!ction-that is$ the efficient ca!sal
genealogy that rises fro* -ithin$ the positive difference that *ar4s its sing!larity) Real
being is sing!lar and !nivocalD it is different in itself) %ro* this efficient difference at the
heart of being flo-s the real *!ltiplicity of the -orld) 5n co*parison$ Hegelian being can
*anage neither a real !nity nor a real *!ltiplicity-it is abstract in the sense that it can
grasp neither its po-er to prod!ce nor its po-er to be prod!ced)
Anly *aterialis* can ade<!ately grasp this !nderstanding of being) Materialis* *!st be
!nderstood here as a pole*ical position that co*bats any priority afforded to tho!ght
over *atter$ to *ind over body$ not in order to invert that relationship and give *atter the
sa*e privilege$ b!t rather to establish an e<!ality bet-een the t-o real*s) =ele!#e>s
ontology re<!ires a *aterialist perspective beca!se any priority accorded to tho!ght
-o!ld -ea4en the internal str!ct!re of being) Materialis*$ then$ is not only a ref!sal of
the s!bordination of the corporeal to the *ental -orld$ b!t also an e@altation of being
-ith respect to both real*s) =ele!#e ref!ses any idealistic conception that in so*e -ay
s!bordinates being to tho!ght) E1he being of Hegelian logic$ F for e@a*ple$ Eis *erely
>tho!ght> being$ p!re and e*ptyF 2iet!sche and Philosophy 1633) =ele!#e>s being is
logically prior to$ and co*prehensive of$ tho!ght and e@tension e<!ally) 1his logical
priority$ ho-ever$ does not *ean that being e@ists at a distance fro* the act!al -orldD
there is no separation bet-een being and nat!re) Any ter* s!ch as being-in-the--orld
-o!ld have no sense in =ele!#e>s ontol-
-11:-
ogy beca!se being is al-ays already act!alD it is al-ays f!lly e@pressed in body and
tho!ght) Anly a *aterialist approach can ade<!ately acco!nt for both this s!perficiality
and this plenit!de)
A first lesson -e can dra- fro* =ele!#e>s philosophy$ then$ is that -hat so*e s!ppose to
be the *asterline of *etaphysical spec!lation-fro* Plato to Hegel and Heidegger-does
not have a *onopoly on ontological tho!ght) He brings o!t the coherence of an
alternative tradition-fro* +!creti!s and =!ns "cot!s to "pino#a and ergson-that is
e<!ally rich and varied) 5n effect$ to contest the clai*s of an idealist ontology -e do not
need to go all the -ay to the opposite and propose a deontological perspective$ b!t rather
-e can p!rs!e the *aterialist ontological tradition as an alternative) Ane of the
advantages of choosing this alternative is that it allo-s !s to bring o!t the prod!ctivity
and prod!cibility of nat!re$ and hence o!r po-er to act and o!r po-er to be affected) A
positive$ *aterialist ontology is above all an ontology of po-er)
1(+ Affirmation
+i4e the notion of positive ontology$ so too the concept of affir*ation has been
*is!nderstood and ridic!led by the Hegelian tradition) 1he great thin4ers of the %ran4f!rt
"chool$ for e@a*ple$ have conceived of affir*ation as a passive acceptance of the
conte*porary state of affairs$ as a naive and irresponsible opti*is*) 2"ee$ for e@a*ple$
Herbert Marc!se$ "eason and "evolution viiff)3 Conte*porary Hegelians contin!e this
vein of criticis* -hen they clai* that philosophies of affir*ation re*ain i*potent
beca!se they have deprived the*selves of the po-er of negation$ they have lost the
E*agicF of the labor of the negative 2?!dith !tler$ Subjects of Desire 163-6:D see also
*y E+a renaissance hQgQlienne a*Qricaine et l>intQriorisation d! conflitF 13:-363)
Affir*ation is th!s conceived as !ncritical$ or even anticritical$ thin4ing) Here -e are
once again faced -ith a n!ance or an alternative that is *is!nderstood as a polar
opposition) 5n other -ords$ =ele!#ian affir*ation does indeed contest the Hegelian for*
of negation and criti<!e$ b!t it does not reCect negation and criti<!e tout court; rather it
highlights the n!ances that for* alternative conceptions of negation and criti<!e *ore
ade<!ate to his proCect)
Affir*ation$ then$ is not opposed to criti<!e) An the contrary$ it is based on a total$
thoro!ghgoing criti<!e that p!shes the forces of negation to their li*it) Affir*ation is
inti*ately tied to antagonis*) 1he for* of the =ele!#ian criti<!e har4s bac4 to the
"cholastic philosophical method) pars destruens, pars construens) 1he 4ey to this
alternative conception is the absol!te$ nondialectical character of the negative *o*ent)
1his is the -ay in -hich &iet#sche Eco*pletesF the Hantian proCect$ according to
=ele!#e)
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1he Hantian criti<!e *!st re*ain partial and inco*plete beca!se it g!ards the
s!prasensible as a privileged terrain$ protecting it fro* the destr!ctive forces of the
criti<!e' Hant can treat clai*s to tr!th and *orality -itho!t endangering tr!th and
*orality the*selves) 1he transcendental reserve shields the essential order fro* any
radical destr!ction or restr!ct!ring) &iet#sche -ants to give the critical forces free reign$
to !nleash the* across the !nli*ited hori#on so that all val!es of the established order
-o!ld be at ris4) EAne of the principal *otifs of &iet#sche>s -or4 is that Hant had not
carried o!t a tr!e criti<!e beca!se he -as not able to pose the proble* of criti<!e in
ter*s of val!esF 2iet!sche and Philosophy 13) 1he total criti<!e is al-ays ins!rrectionalD
it is an !nrestrained attac4 on the established val!es and the r!ling po-ers they s!pportD it
is a mise en cause of the entire conte*porary hori#on) 1he negation that for*s the core of
the total criti<!e is nondialectical precisely beca!se it ref!ses the conservative attit!de of
the dialectic' 5t does not rec!perate the essence of its ene*y$ it does not Epreserve and
*aintain -hat is s!persededF 2Phenomenology of Spirit O1663) 1here is th!s no *agical
res!rrection of the other -ithin the sa*e$ b!t rather a p!re and !nco*pro*ising
antagonis*) 1his is not to say that all that is present is negated$ b!t si*ply that -hat is
negated is attac4ed -ith !nrestrained force)
=ele!#e>s affir*ative philosophy does not ref!se or ignore the po-er of the negative$
then$ b!t rather points to-ard a different concept of negation-a negation that opens the
field of affir*ation) 1he destr!ction -itho!t reserve creates the space for free and
original creative forces) 1he slave logic of the dialectic tries to p!ll an affir*ation o!t of
the s!persession of the negation$ b!t in this case the affir*ation is already prefig!red in
the negation-it is *erely a repetition of the sa*e) 1he *aster logic$ in contrast$ engenders
a tr!e affir*ation that stands on a separate footing) 5n itself$ this negation involves no
preservation$ b!t rather a real r!pt!re$ a trans*!tation) 1he s!bse<!ent affir*ation$ then$
loo4s only to its o-n po-er) 1he love of Ariadne for =ionys!s is perhaps the !lti*ate
e@pression of this affir*ation in &iet#sche>s -or4) =ionys!s is the god of affir*ation$ b!t
only Ariadne can affir* affir*ation itself' E/ternal affir*ation of being$ eternally 5 a*
yo!r affir*ationF 2iet!sche and Philosophy 1683) Ariadne>s affir*ation is a do!ble
affir*ation$ the affir*ation of affir*ation itself$ Ethe >yes> that responds to >yes>F
2EMystIre d>ArianeF 1713) 1his is a spiraling affir*ation that feeds on its o-n po-er$ the
affir*ation that ret!rns' affir*ation raised to the nth po-er) Ariadne>s affir*ation of
being is an ethical act$ an act of love)
5t sho!ld be clear that this =ele!#ian affir*ation is not a *ere acceptance of -hat is) 1he
yes of the ass$ the yes of the one -ho does not 4no- ho- to say no$ is *erely the
caricat!re of affir*ation) An the contrary$ only
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the one -ho 4no-s ho- to -ield a po-erf!l negation can pose a real affir*ation) 1he no
of the total criti<!e$ the e@pression of an !nrestrained negation$ is liberating-it *a4es one
lighter) E1o affir* is not to ta4e responsibility for$ to ta4e on the b!rden of -hat is$ b!t to
release$ to set free -hat lives) 1o affir* is to !nb!rden' not to load life -ith the -eight of
higher val!es$ b!t to create ne- val!es -hich are those of life$ -hich *a4e life light and
activeF 2iet!sche and Philosophy 1673) Affir*ation is not the acceptance of beingD
=ele!#e -o!ld have it instead that affir*ation is act!ally the creation of being) 1he
concept of affir*ation allo-s =ele!#e to transport the po-er of his ontology to the
terrain of sense and val!e$ and th!s to for*!late an ethics of being) /thics here is
precisely a line of cond!ct$ or a practical g!ide$ for the e@pression of po-er$ for the
active prod!ction of being)
1(. Practice
Affir*ation$ ho-ever$ is not eno!gh for a =ele!#ian ethics) An ethical proCect cannot
re*ain on the plane of spec!lation$ b!t *!st find an aven!e to enter the field of practice)
"pino#a>s conception of Coy gives =ele!#e the 4ey to this ne- terrain' E1he sense of Coy
appears as the properly ethical senseD it is to practice -hat affir*ation itself is to
spec!lationN) A philosophy of p!re affir*ation$ the Ethics is also a philosophy of the
Coy corresponding to s!ch affir*ationF 2E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 9893) 1he
affir*ation of spec!lation$ then$ *!st be co*ple*ented by the Coy of practice) 1his is
ho- ethics reali#es its f!ll constr!ctive force$ as a practical constit!tion of being) 5n
effect$ affir*ative spec!lation needs a corresponding Coyf!l practice to *a4e good on its
clai*s to creativity and activity) Affir*ation by itself$ in other -ords$ ris4s appearing as
si*ply that -hich grasps and selects the being that isD Coy is properly the *o*ent that
creates the being to co*e)
M!ch of =ele!#e>s -or4 is concerned -ith the proble* of practice' Ho- can -e set the
creative forces in *otionP Ho- can -e *a4e philosophy tr!ly practicalP =ele!#e finds
the 4ey in the investigation of po-er) 1he *obile and *alleable conception of being
fo!nd in ergson and "pino#a already prepares the terrain for this -or4' =ele!#e>s
ontology foc!ses on the *ove*ent of being$ on its genealogy of ca!sal relations$ on its
Eprod!ctivityF and Eprod!cibility)F 1he the*atic of po-er and prod!ction$ then$ already
occ!pies an essential position) 5n &iet#sche$ =ele!#e discerns a distinction bet-een t-o
<!alities of po-er$ the active and the reactive$ that is$ po-er lin4ed to -hat it can do and
po-er separated fro* -hat it can do) 5n "pino#a$ this sa*e distinction is given a richer
definition -ith respect to the ade<!ate and the inade<!ate' 1he ade<!ate is that
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-hich e@presses 2or envelops or co*prehends3 its ca!seD the inade<!ate is *!te) +i4e the
active$ the ade<!ate is lin4ed for-ard to -hat it can doD b!t it is also lin4ed bac4-ard to
its internal genealogy of affects$ the genealogy of its o-n prod!ction) 1he ade<!ate gives
f!ll vie- to both the prod!ctivity and the prod!cibility of being) 1his is the cr!cial
relation that opens !p the field of po-er for =ele!#e' Corresponding to the po-er of
being to act and e@ist is its po-er to be affected) 1his po-er of prod!cibility provides the
co**!nicating corridor bet-een ontology and practice)
1he i*portance of the po-er to be affected is that it reveals distinctions -ithin o!r
po-erD the po-er to act and e@ist$ in contrast$ appears as p!re spontaneity$
!ndifferentiated$ and th!s re*ains opa<!e to o!r analysis) .e *!st delve$ then$ into the
distinctions -ithin po-er$ -ithin o!r affectivity$ in order to discover the point of
depart!re for an ethical practice) =ele!#e>s investigation of o!r po-er to be affected
reveals t-o tiers of distinctions' At the first level$ he poses the distinction bet-een active
affections and passive affectionsD and at the second$ he poses the distinction bet-een
Coyf!l passive affections and sad passive affections) As =ele!#e for*!lates each of these
distinctions -ithin o!r po-er$ he also recogni#es that the h!*an condition lies
principally on the -ea4 side of the e<!ation' A!r po-er to be affected is do*inated by
passive rather than active affections$ and the *aCority of o!r passive affections are sad
rather than Coyf!l) 1his "pino#ian Epessi*is*F is precisely the point of depart!re for a
Coyf!l practice) .ith this realistic assess*ent of o!r condition$ -e are ready to set o!t on
the steep path to increase o!r po-er$ to beco*e Coyf!l$ to beco*e active)
=ele!#e begins the elaboration of practice on the field of chance enco!nters and foc!ses
on the enco!nters -ith bodies that agree -ith o!r nat!re$ that increase o!r po-er'
enco!nters that engender Coyf!l passions) A Coyf!l passion$ since it is a passion$ is al-ays
the res!lt of an e@ternal ca!se$ and th!s al-ays indicates an inade<!ate ideaD ho-ever$
since it is Coyf!l$ it nonetheless opens an aven!e to-ard ade<!acy' E.e *!st then$ by the
aid of joyful passions, for* the idea of -hat is co**on to so*e e@ternal body and o!r
o-n) %or this idea alone$ this co**on notion$ is ade<!ateF 2E,pressionism in
Philosophy) Spino!a 9633) ?oyf!l passions are the precondition for practiceD they are the
ra- *aterial for the constr!ction of the co**on notion) 5n effect$ the co**on notion is
already latent in the Coyf!l passion$ beca!se Coy necessarily res!lts fro* an enco!nter
-ith a body that has a relationship that is co*patible or co*posable -ith o!r o-n) 1he
Coy of the enco!nter is precisely the co*position of the t-o bodies in a ne-$ *ore
po-erf!l body) .hen o!r *ind for*s an idea of the co**on relationship shared
bet-een this body and o!r body 2a co**on notion3$ the Coyf!l affection ceases to be
passive and beco*es active) 1he
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constr!ction of the co**on notion is$ in effect$ the enveloping or co*prehension of the
ca!se of the affection$ and an affection that e@presses its ca!se is no longer passive$ b!t
active) 1he Coy of the active affection is no longer contingent on a chance enco!nterD the
Coy s!pported by the co**on notion is the Coy that ret!rns) 1his is the practical process
that fleshes o!t =ele!#e>s ethical *andates' eco*e Coyf!l$ beco*e active)
?oyf!l practice brings ethics bac4 to ontology-it e@ploits the prod!cibility or
co*posability of being) 1his is perhaps the largest payoff for =ele!#e>s e@tensive and
co*ple@ investigation into ontology) eing is a hybrid str!ct!re constit!ted thro!gh
Coyf!l practice) .hen the co**on notion envelops the ca!se of a Coyf!l enco!nter$ and
th!s *a4es that enco!nter ade<!ate$ it is *a4ing a ne- incision into being$ constr!cting a
ne- asse*blage of its str!ct!re) .hat raises this enco!nter to the level of being is
precisely its co*prehension of the ca!seD "!bstance$ as "pino#a tells !s$ is that -hich is
ca!se of itself) 1he practice of Coy is the constr!ction of ontological asse*blages$ and
th!s the active constit!tion of being)
1(1 Constitution
Many A*erican a!thors have tried to pose the general <!estion of the political
conse<!ences of poststr!ct!ralis*) "!ch investigations have led to a -ide range of
C!dg*ents across the political spectr!*) 5ndeed$ one sho!ld not e@pect to find a clear
response to s!ch a <!estion abo!t a broad theoretical *ove*ent) %or e@a*ple$ d!ring the
past 17B years$ Hegel>s philosophy has served as a pri*ary s!pport for a -ide variety of
political positions$ both regressive and progressive$ *any of -hich have differed greatly
fro* Hegel>s o-n political vie-s) Ane sho!ld not$ of co!rse$ loo4 for the political
position that follo-s necessary fro* a theoretical body of -or4) 1here is not one$ b!t
*any corridors one can follo- for the passage to action) 5t -ill not be very fr!itf!l$ then$
to atte*pt a general definition of the politics of poststr!ct!ralis*$ or even of the politics
of =ele!#e>s philosophy 5t is *ore appropriate and *ore prod!ctive to as4 o!rselves$
.hat can =ele!#e>s tho!ght afford !sP .hat can -e *a4e of =ele!#eP 5n other -ords$
-hat are the !sef!l tools -e find in his philosophy for f!rthering o!r o-n political
endeavorsP 5n this spirit$ 5 have tried to discover in =ele!#e so*e tools for the
constit!tion of a radical de*ocracy) 1he distinctions that 5 have tried to highlight in
=ele!#e>s -or4 pose the *!ltiplicity of organi#ation against the *!ltiplicity of order$ and
the asse*blages of po-er *les agencements de la puissance+ against the deploy*ents of
po-er *les dispositifs du pouvoir+) /ach of these distinctions hinges on a notion of
constit!tion that re*ains latent$ b!t nonetheless central$ in =ele!#e>s tho!ght) %ro* this
perspective$ =ele!#e can help
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!s develop a dyna*ic conception of de*ocratic society as open$ hori#ontal$ and
collective)
1o an e@tent$ this vision of de*ocracy coincides -ith that of liberalis*) Perhaps the *ost
i*portant single tenet of liberal de*ocratic theory is that the ends of society be
indeter*inate$ and th!s that the *ove*ent of society re*ain open to the -ill of its
constit!ent *e*bers) 1he priority of right over good is tho!ght to ins!re that the freedo*
of society>s develop*ent is not constricted or closed by an e@ternally deter*ined telos)
1his political ref!sal of teleology leads directly to a philosophical ref!sal of ontology$
beca!se ontology itself is pres!*ed to carry -ith it a transcendental deter*ination of the
good) =eontology$ then$ is the only philosophical position that can s!pport a de*ocratic
society open to a *!ltiplicity of ends) +iberal thin4ers -ho reason in this fashion have$ in
effect$ too <!ic4ly accepted the Platonic and Hegelian clai*s abo!t the lin4 bet-een
ontology and social teleologyD they are still too tied to the logic of contradictions$ and
th!s they *iss the i*portant n!ances) 5n other -ords$ in opposition to an ontological
vision that deter*ines a conservative$ closed society$ they believe that a deontological
theory is necessary to allo- for a de*ocratic$ open society) Ane need not$ ho-ever$ *a4e
this leap to the opposite pole$ one need not reCect ontology tout court, in order to affir*
the openness of ends in society) 1he tradition of .estern *etaphysics is not of a piece$ it
is not a *onolithic bloc4$ b!t rather contains -ithin itself radical alternatives) 21he fact
that the tradition appears to so*e so thin in alternatives is really only evidence of the
-ea4 state of conte*porary philosophical in<!iry3 .hen =ele!#e interrogates ergson$
&iet#sche$ and "pino#a$ in fact$ he is reaffir*ing and artic!lating an alternative tradition
-ithin the history of .estern *etaphysics that presents a strong notion of ontology b!t
does not propose any ideological *apping or any deter*ination of ends) .hat =ele!#e
develops coincides -ith the liberal vision in its affir*ation of the openness of ends in
de*ocratic society$ b!t it does not for that reason ref!se the tradition of ontological
disco!rse) =ele!#ian being is open to the intervention of political creations and social
beco*ings' 1his openness is precisely the Eprod!cibilityF of being that =ele!#e has
appropriated fro* "cholastic tho!ght) 1he po-er of society$ to translate in "pino#ian
ter*s$ corresponds to its po-er to be affected) 1he priority of the right or the good does
not enter into this conception of openness) .hat is open$ and -hat lin4s the ontological
to the political$ is the e@pression of po-er' the free conflict and co*position of the field
of social forces)
1his open organi#ation of society *!st be disting!ished fro* the vertical str!ct!res of
order) y organi#ation here 5 do not !nderstand any sort of plan or bl!eprint of ho-
social relationships -ill be str!ct!redD on the contrary$ by organi#ation 5 !nderstand a
contin!al process of co*position
-19B-
and deco*position thro!gh social enco!nters on an i**anent field of forces) 1he s4yline
of society is perfectly flat$ perfectly hori#ontal$ in the sense that social organi#ation
proceeds -itho!t any predeter*ined design$ on the basis of the interaction of i**anent
forces$ and can th!s$ in principle$ be thr!st bac4 at any ti*e$ as if by the indefatigable
press!res of gravity$ to its #ero state of e<!ality) Argani#ation carries -ithin itself the
destr!ctive po-er of Machiavelli>s ritorno ai principi) 1his is not to say that social
instit!tions 2or other instances of verticality3 are not for*ed$ b!t that they receive a
strictly i**anent deter*ination$ and th!s re*ain al-ays and co*pletely s!sceptible to
restr!ct!ring$ refor*$ and destr!ction 2in the spirit$ for e@a*ple$ of the Co**!nards$
-ho insisted that all representation be s!bCect to i**ediate revocation3) Dispositifs, or
deploy*ents$ str!ct!re a social order fro* above$ fro* an e@ternal space of
transcendenceD agencements, or asse*blages$ constit!te the *echanis*s of social
organi#ation fro* belo-$ fro* the i**anent social plane) 1he hori#ontality of the
*aterial constit!tion of society p!ts the -eight on practice as the *otor of social
creation) A practical politics of social bodies sets loose the i**anent forces fro* the
strict!res of predeter*ined for*s to discover their o-n ends$ invent their o-n
constit!tion) Ance again$ -e find that the prod!ctivity of social being corresponds to its
prod!cibility) 1he hori#ontal society is the open site that fosters practical creation and
co*position as -ell as destr!ction and deco*position) 1he *odel of this constit!tion is
the general asse*bly$ the absol!te and e<!al incl!sion of the entire i**anent plane'
=e*ocracy$ as "pino#a is fond of saying$ is the absol!te for* of govern*ent)
1he processes of social asse*blage$ of social constit!tion$ are indifferent to the
bo!ndaries posed by individ!alis*D or$ *ore precisely$ the borders of social bodies are
contin!ally s!bCect to change as the practice of asse*blage deco*poses certain
relationships and co*poses others) 1here is no contradiction$ then$ bet-een the
individ!al and the collectiveD the constit!tion of society rests on a different a@is) 1he
process of political asse*blage$ the co*position of Coyf!l social relationships$ *oves
instead bet-een *!ltiplicity and the *!ltit!de) 1he =ele!#ian practice of affir*ation and
Coy$ in other -ords$ is directed to-ard creating social bodies or planes of co*position
that are ever *ore po-erf!l$ -hile they re*ain at the sa*e ti*e open to internal
antagonis*s$ to the real forces of destr!ction and deco*position) Political asse*blage is
certainly an art in that it has to be contin!ally *ade ane-$ contin!ally reinvented) 1he
*!ltit!de is asse*bled thro!gh this practice as a social body defined by a co**on set of
behaviors$ needs$ and desires) 1his is =ele!#e>s -ay of grasping the living force in
society that contin!ally e*erges fro* the dead forces of social order$ C!st li4e Mar@>s
living labor that ref!ses to be s!c4ed dry by the va*-
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pires set in flight by capital) And this <!ality of living is defined both by the po-er to act
and the po-er to be affected' a social body -itho!t organs) 1he co*position or the
constit!tion of the *!ltit!de does not in any -ay negate the *!ltiplicity of social forces$
b!t on the contrary$ raises the *!ltiplicity to a higher level of po-er)
All of this$ ho-ever$ re*ains only the hint of a de*ocratic politicsD -e still have to flesh
o!t its constit!tive *echanis*s -ith concrete social practices) .hat =ele!#e gives !s$ in
effect$ is a general orientation that can s!ggest the paths of f!t!re research into the
conte*porary for*s of social asse*blage) An the political hori#on$ the *!ltiplicity of
social practices and desires presents !s -ith the conditions of co*position or asse*blage)
1his is the field on -hich the process *!st be defined' Asse*blage *!st be p!rs!ed by
bringing together social bodies -ith co*patible internal relationships$ -ith co*posable
practices and desires) 5n the e@isting social practices$ in the affective e@pressions of
pop!lar c!lt!re$ in the net-or4s of laboring cooperation$ -e sho!ld see4 to discern the
*aterial *echanis*s of social aggregation that can constit!te ade<!ate$ affir*ative$
Coyf!l relationships and th!s po-erf!l s!bCective asse*blages) %illing o!t the passage
fro* *!ltiplicity to *!ltit!de re*ains for !s the central proCect for a de*ocratic political
practice)
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,otes
Introduction
1 ) 1his is the arg!*ent$ for e@a*ple$ of "tephen Ho!lgate in Hegel, iet!sche and the
8riticism of 'etaphysics) .e -ill ret!rn to his arg!*ents to consider the* caref!lly
in chapter 9$ ERe*ar4' 1he Res!rgence of &egativity)F
9 ) 5n addition to ?!dith !tler>s Subjects of Desire and "tephen Ho!lgate>s Hegel,
iet!sche and the 8riticism of 'etaphysics, see ,illian Rose$ Dialectic of ihilism,
and ?ohn ,r!*ley$ History and $otality) "adical Historicism from Hegel to
;oucault) %or an acco!nt that does recogni#e a s!ccessf!l r!pt!re fro* the Hegelian
proble*atic in the %rench tho!ght of the 190Bs$ see Michael Roth$ Bno/ing and
History) =ppropriations of Hegel in $/entieth48entury ;rance)
3 ) .e -ill deal -ith the ref!sal of an Eintellect!alistF acco!nt of being and the bases
of a *aterialist ontology at length in ter*s of =ele!#e>s interpretation of the
attrib!tes in "pino#a 2see "ections 3): and 3)73) 5 do not directly confront =ele!#e>s
ontology -ith that of Heidegger$ b!t 5 thin4 posing this <!estion co!ld be very
fr!itf!l and deserves a co*plete st!dy of its o-n) Here 5 hope only to indicate the
general lines of confrontation so as to offer a helpf!l g!idepost and sit!ate =ele!#e>s
approach)
: ) "o*e a!thors have recently beg!n to !se Efo!ndationF and Efo!ndationalis*F to
refer to an idealist conception of the necessary and eternal bedroc4 that !nderlies and
deter*ines the !nfolding of episte*ological$ ontological$ and !lti*ately ethical
develop*ents and Egro!ndingF to refer to a *aterialist and historical conception of
the h!*!s or$ *ore appropriately$ the geological sedi*ent that for*s the conte@t of
o!r conte*porary interventions) Altho!gh this is si*ilar to the concept!al distinction
5 a* referring to$ 5 have reservations abo!t the appropriateness of the ter*s
Efo!ndationF and Egro!nd)F 1he organic *etaphors evo4ed by Egro!ndF carry all the
proble*s of a predeter*ined$ Enat!ralF str!ct!re or order) 2"ee$ for e@a*ple$
=ele!#e and ,!attari>s criti<!e of root str!ct!res in E5ntrod!ction' Rhi#o*e$ F =
$housand Plateaus)3 %!rther*ore$ in the specific conte@t of o!r st!dy$ gro!nd
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*6rund+ plays s!ch a central role in the Hegelian syste* 2see$ for e@a*ple$ Science
of %ogic :::-863 that it is diffic!lt to rec!perate any difference it *ight *ar4 fro*
fo!ndation)
Preliminar !emark
1 ) 5 do not *ean to s!ggest that =ele!#e>s boo4 on H!*e is in so*e -ay incidental) 5
have chosen to ta4e a certain slice across the body of =ele!#e>s -or4 that 5 have
fo!nd partic!larly prod!ctive$ b!t it is by no *eans the only -ay to approach his
-or4) 5 have si*ply done *y best to *a4e =ele!#e>s -or4 *y o-n)
9 ) rian Mass!*i$ to *y *ind the best reader of =ele!#e$ provides !s -ith a pertinent
e@a*ple) 5n his %ore-ord to = $housand Plateaus, Mass!*i is certainly correct to
insist on =ele!#e>s opposition to E"tate philosophy)F Ho-ever$ Mass!*i 2and
ad*ittedly =ele!#e too at ti*es3 tends to e@aggerate the centrality and hege*ony of
E"tate philosophyF in the history of .estern tho!ght' E>"tate philosophy> is another
-ord for the representational thin4ing that has characteri#ed .estern *etaphysics
since PlatoF 2@i3) .estern *etaphysics sho!ld not be characteri#ed in s!ch a
!nivocal *annerD the philosophical tradition contains radical alternatives -ithin it)
As a res!lt of this si*plification$ -e also find the tendency to e@aggerate the
*arginality of the opposing tradition that is dear to =ele!#eD in other -ords$ even if
+!creti!s$ =!ns "cot!s$ "pino#a$ et al) for* a E*inorityF in the sense that they are
partially eclipsed by the conte*porary political-acade*ic hege*ony of E"tate
philosophyF 2Plato$ Hegel$ etc)3$ nonetheless this E*inorityF constit!tes so*e of the
highest and *ost central *o*ents of .estern *etaphysics) My point is that -e
sho!ld not *ini*i#e the coherence and the enor*o!s po-er of this alternative
tradition) 5n any case$ =ele!#e>s opposition to E"tate philosophyF sho!ld not be
conceived as an opposition to .estern philosophy tout court, b!t rather as an
affir*ation of its *ost po-erf!l and *ost l!cid ele*ents) 5t is perhaps beca!se of
this conf!sion that *any in the United "tates *ista4enly regard =ele!#e as a
Epost*odernF thin4er)
3 ) After =ele!#e>s presentation entitled E+a *Qthode de dra*atisationF 21he *ethod
of dra*ati#ation3 before the "ociQtQ franJaise de philosophic$ =ele!#e>s respected
professor %erdinand Al<!iQ charged that by e@cl!sively dra-ing on e@a*ples fro*
biology$ psychology$ and other fields =ele!#e had lost the !nderstanding of the
specificity of properly philosophical disco!rse) =ele!#e -as noticeably h!rt by this
acc!sation and he gave an e*otional$ affectionate response' EVo!r other reproach
to!ches *e even *ore) eca!se 5 believe entirely in the specificity of philosophy
and 5 o-e this conviction to yo! yo!rselfF 21B03) .hat Al<!iQ see*ed to
*is!nderstand is that altho!gh =ele!#e>s e@e*plification *ay be E!nphilosophical$ F
his reasoning and e@planation are p!rely philosophical in the strictest sense)
: ) .e can see this point very clearly in =ele!#e>s relation to =!ns "cot!s' E1here -as
never b!t one ontological proposition' eing is !nivocal) 1here -as never b!t one
ontology$ that of =!ns "cot!s$ -ho gave being one single voice) .e say =!ns
"cot!s beca!se he 4ne- ho- to raise !nivocal being to the highest point of s!btlety$
-itho!t giving in to abstractionF 2Diff#rence et r#p#tition 793) %ro* the point of
vie- of the !nivocity of being$ =ele!#e sees the history of ontology as
f!nda*entally s!pported by the arg!*ents of =!ns "cot!s$ "pino#a$ and &iet#sche
279-013) 1he central point here$ again$ is that =ele!#e is not p!lling a-ay fro*
*etaphysics$ b!t on the contrary reaffir*ing its highest points)
7 ) Readers fa*iliar -ith =ele!#e>s -or4 *ight -ell <!estion the order of *y proposed
evol!tion 2ergson-&iet#sche-"pino#a3 beca!se =ele!#e>s (ergsonism 219003
appeared after iet!sche and Philosophy 219093) .e can see in an early article$
ho-ever$ E+a conception de la diffQrence che# ergsonF 219703$ that *ost of
=ele!#e>s reading of ergson -as established -ell before he t!rned to &iet#sche)
More i*portant$ -e find that =ele!#e>s reading of ergson leads logically to
<!estions that he see4s to resolve in the st!dy of &iet#scheD in t!rn$ the
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reading of &iet#sche reveals <!estions that lead hi* to st!dy "pino#a) 1his is the
traCectory 5 see4 to trace fro* a logic of being to an ethics and finally a politics of
being) 1herefore$ 5 -o!ld C!stify *y proposition of an evol!tionary se<!ence both on
the basis of the historical order of =ele!#e>s consideration of the a!thors and the
logical progression traced by his tho!ght
0 ) /ven -itho!t close e@a*ination$ the *ost general facts of =ele!#e>s biography$
partic!larly the things that he did not do$ indicate his difference fro* nearly all other
*aCor %rench philosophical voices to e*erge fro* his generation' He -as never a
*e*ber of the %rench Co**!nist Party$ he did not attend the e@cl!sive /cole
&or*ale "!pQrie!re$ and he -as never fascinated by the -or4 of Martin Heidegger)
Cha&ter '( )ergsonian *ntolog: "he Positive %ovement of )eing
1 ) Hegel is apparently <!oting here fro* %etter CD fro* "pino#a to ?arig ?elles) 1he
original reads EU!ia ergo fig!ra non ali!d$ <!G* deter*inatio$ Z deter*inatio
negatio estD non poterit$ !t dict!*$ ali!d <!id$ <!G* negatio$ esse)F 1hat Hegel
changes the <!otation to si*plify it for his p!rposes is not a serio!s iss!eD ho-ever$
in his interpretation he co*pletely distorts its "pino#ian *eaning) %or an e@tensive
analysis of Hegel>s *isreading of "pino#a>s Enegativis*$ F see Pierre Macherey$
Hegel ou Spino!a, pp) 1:1ff)
9 ) 1he -or4 of the "cholastics 2fro* Roger acon and =!ns "cot!s to .illia*
Ac4ha* and$ *!ch later$ %rancisco "![re#3 gives central ontological i*portance to
ca!sality and to the prod!ctivity of being) .hat 5 find *ost i*portant in relation to
=ele!#e>s -or4 is the "cholastic *ode of ontological reasoning and the criteria they
establish for being) 1he po-er$ necessity$ perfection$ reality$ and !nivocity of being
are all established thro!gh ca!sal arg!*entsD the divine essence is a prod!ctive
capacity-it e@ists as the first ca!se$ the efficient ca!se of everything) 2Ac4ha* adds
that ,od is not only the efficient b!t also the i**ediate ca!se of everything)3 As
/tienne ,ilson e@plains in relation to =!ns "cot!s$ at the fo!ndation of "cholastic
ontology are the co*ple*entary properties of being' E>ca!sality> and >prod!cibility$ >
or the aptit!des to prod!ce and to be prod!cedF 2%a philosophic au 'oyen =ge 7973)
5n the co!rse of these ontological disc!ssions$ the "cholastics ta4e *etic!lo!s care in
elaborating and observing the principles of ca!sality) "o*e of these principles -ill
prove especially !sef!l in o!r disc!ssion' 213 an effect cannot have *ore perfection
or reality than its ca!seD 293 a thing cannot be the necessary ca!se of so*ething
o!tside itself) %inally$ -hile the efficient ca!se is pri*ary in proofs of the e@istence
of ,od$ the "cholastics in general *aintain the fo!r genres of ca!se inherited fro*
Aristotle 2*aterial$ for*al$ efficient$ and final3 as real ca!ses$ even tho!gh they
change the *eaning of the genres significantly) %or a detailed analysis of the genres
of ca!se see %rancisco "![re#$ Disputaciones metafEsicas, =isp!taci\n ;55$ "ecci\n
555)
3 ) 5t sho!ld co*e as no s!rprise$ of co!rse$ that -e find "cholastic resonances in
=ele!#e>s st!dy of ergson$ given both =ele!#e>s interest in the "cholastics
2partic!larly =!ns "cot!s3 and ergson>s e@tensive 4no-ledge of Aristotle) ergson
-rote his +atin thesis on the concept of place in Aristotle)
: ) 5n "pino#a -e find t-o i*portant *odifications of this "cholastic relationship
bet-een being and ca!sality' 213 ,od is not an !nca!sed first ca!se$ b!t ca!se of
itself$ causa sui; 293 only efficient ca!ses are accepted as real ca!ses) "pino#a
inherits the first change fro* =escartes$ and /tienne ,ilson e@plains clearly ho- this
*odification of "cholastic doctrine is not so *!ch a depart!re as a refine*ent of
"cholastic reasoning that serves to intensify the close relationship bet-een ca!sality
and real being) E5f everything has a ca!se$ ,od has a ca!seD if ,od does not have a
ca!se$ one cannot say that everything has a ca!se$ and conse<!ently one cannot
prove the e@istence of ,od by the principle of ca!sality 1his is -hy the Cartesian
proof$ instead of being the proof of a first ca!se that has no ca!se$ is the proof of a
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first ca!se that is ca!se of itselfD for the "cholastic ,od of pure action he s!bstit!tes
the ,od that is causa sui that -ill later be grasped by "pino#aF 2Discours de la
m#thode, ,ilson edition 3983) 1he second *odification that -e find in "pino#a$ the
reCection of the for*al and final ca!ses$ is directed against =escartes) "ee Ethics
5P3:-30 and 5Appendi@) 2%or an e@planation of abbreviations in references to
"pino#a>s -or4s$ see chapter 3$ note :)
7 ) =!ns "cot!s defines a basic division bet-een causae per se that are essentially
ordered and causae per accidens that are accidentally ordered) "ee Philosophical
7ritings, p) :B)
0 ) =ele!#e>s disc!ssion i*plicitly sets !p a f!nda*ental division in the philosophical
tradition that appears historically as a progressively *ore radical antagonis*
bet-een Platonis* and Aristotelianis*) An one side$ Hegel inherits the errors of
Platonic ontology and e@aggerates the*$ ta4ing the* to their e@tre*e) An the other
side$ the "cholastics and ergson contin!ally perfect the Aristotelian logic of being)
1he ro!gh o!tline of the history of philosophy s!ggested here$ then$ has one a@is
fro* Plato to Hegel and another a@is oriented in an altogether different direction
fro* Aristotle to the "cholastics to ergson)
8 ) 5t *ay see* at this point that the real antagonis* bet-een ergson and Hegel
resides not so *!ch in the clai*s for the states of being 2deter*inateness and
difference3$ b!t in the processes that p!rport to achieve the* 2deter*ination and
differentiation3) 1his line of reasoning co!ld lead !s to say that ergson is adopting
Hegel>s ends b!t criti<!ing his *eans) Ho-ever$ this atte*pt to disting!ish process
fro* achieved state is a distortion of both Hegel and ergson) As -e noted earlier$ in
Hegel the state of deter*inateness is not only fo!nded by a process of negation$ b!t
it is constit!ted by the contin!al *ove*ent of this dyna*ic) "i*ilarly$ ergson>s
difference refers not to a static <!idditas b!t to a contin!o!s *ove*ent in ti*e) oth
Hegel and ergson present philosophies of ti*e in -hich no effective distinction can
be *ade bet-een state and process)
6 ) .e -ill co*e bac4 to this Ee@plosive internal force that life carries -ithin itself>
beca!se this notion is !nclear at this point) =ele!#e often invo4es the ergsonian
int!ition in this sa*e conte@t$ b!t that concept does not clarify the sit!ation for !s)
.e sho!ld note at this point$ ho-ever$ that this obsc!re notion constit!tes a central
point in ergson>s syste*$ as the dyna*ic of the artic!lation of being) 5t is precisely
at this point that &iet#schean -ill to po-er and "pino#ian conatus co*e into play in
the later st!dies)
9 ) Hegel notes that in ety*ological ter*s deter*inate being *Dasein+) *eans being-
there$ being in a certain placeD b!t$ Hegel contin!es$ the idea of space here is
irrelevant 2Science of %ogic 11B3) 5t is te*pting to give significance to the ,er*an
ety*ology and e@plain =ele!#e>s !sage on this basis' =eter*inate being or Dasein
relates to space and *ar4s differences of degree$ -hile the Eindeter*inateF being of
differentiation relates to ti*e and *ar4s differences of nat!re) Ho-ever$ as -e have
already seen$ =ele!#e credits the Hegelian Dasein of the dialectic -ith neither
differences of nat!re nor differences of degree' Hegelian being re*ains an
abstraction)
1B ) 1his criti<!e of the possible e@ists already in =ele!#e>s early period of ergson
st!dy in the 197Bs$ altho!gh at this point he only *a4es a distinction bet-een the
possible and the virt!al$ not bet-een the real and the act!al 2EergsonF 966-693) 1he
co*plete for*!lation co*es in the second ergson period$ and it is repeated in
e@actly the sa*e ter*s in E+a *Qthode de dra*atisationF 286-893 and in Diff#rence
et r#p#tition 2909-803) 1he criti<!e of the possible is directed to-ard =escartes and
ta4es a slightly different for* in E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a 23B-31$ 36-
39$ 199-903) .e -ill ret!rn to these passages later)
11 ) My point is certainly not to prove that =ele!#e has derived his arg!*ent fro* the
"cholastics) .e can e<!ally -ell attrib!te the "cholastic resonances to ergson and
his interest in Aristotle) .hat is i*portant$ ho-ever$ is that -e can !nderstand this
point in =ele!#e>s arg!*ent *ore clearly -hen -e 4eep in *ind the "cholastic
arg!*ents or ones -ith si*ilar concerns)
-190-
19 ) Here -e can finally *a4e sense of ergson>s !se of Edeter*inateF and
Eindeter*inate)F Posed in a Hegelian conte@t they have a co*pletely different
*eaning) Vet the gap bet-een these t-o ter*inological registers reveals a serio!s
iss!e that has not been ade<!ately treated) 5n one sense$ =ele!#e>s being *!st be
Edeter*inateF in that being is necessary$ <!alified$ sing!lar$ and act!al) 5n the other
sense$ ho-ever$ =ele!#e>s being *!st be Eindeter*inateF in that being is contingent
and creative) "o*e of =ele!#e>s *ost cherished ter*s-s!ch as !nforeseeable
*impr#visible+, !nti*ely *intempestif+, and event *#v#nement+-insist on this point)
13 ) 1he role of the for*al distinction in =!ns "cot!s is to *ediate the !nity and the
*!ltiplicity$ the !niversal and the individ!al$ on t-o separate planes) "ee ,ilson$ %a
philosophic au 'oyen =ge, pp) 799ff) =ele!#e -ill !se the conception of the real
distinction in "pino#a to criti<!e the for*al distinction of =!ns "cot!s in
E,pressionism in Philosophy) Spino!a, pp) 03-07)
1: ) At this point in his -or4 =ele!#e finds in ergsonian fabulation only an
e@planation of obligation and the negation of h!*an creativity) 5n so*e of his later
-or4s$ partic!larly the boo4s on cine*a$ he reinterprets Efable-*a4ingF or
Econfab!lationF in a *ore positive light) 5n fact$ in a recent intervie- -ith Antonio
&egri$ =ele!#e s!ggests that -e sho!ld go bac4 to this ergsonian concept to
develop a notion of social constit!tion' EUtopia is not a good concept' there is rather
a >confab!lation> co**on to people and to art) Ane o!ght to ta4e !p the ergsonian
notion of confab!lation and give it a political *eaningF 2E+e devenir rQvol!tionnaire
et les crQations politi<!esF 1B73)
17 ) 5t is precisely this final section of (ergsonism that irritated the %rench ergson
co**!nity) +ater$ in the ERe*ar4$ F -e -ill consider the revie- of Madeleine
arthQle*y-Mada!le in %es #tudes bergsoniennes in -hich she foc!ses on this
section and obCects$ Eergson is not &iet#scheF 219B3) Ane *ight -ell as4 of *y
reconstr!cted evol!tion of =ele!#e>s tho!ght$ .hy does (ergsonism not f!lly
incorporate the &iet#schean the*es and go beyond the*P A response -o!ld have to
agree -ith arthQle*y-Mada!le that ergson is not &iet#scheD even tho!gh
=ele!#e>s interpretative strategy involves a high degree of selectivity$ he -ill never
stretch one doctrine to confor* to another)
10 ) A central passage in this regard is =ele!#e>s description of Callicles> attac4 on la-
in relation to &iet#sche' E/verything that separates a force fro* -hat it can do he
calls la-) +a-$ in this sense$ e@presses the tri!*ph of the -ea4 over the strong)
&iet#sche adds' the tri!*ph of reaction over action) 5ndeed$ everything -hich
separates a force is reactive as is the state of a force separated fro* -hat it can do)
/very force -hich goes to the li*it of its po-er is$ on the contrary$ active) 5t is not a
la- that every force goes to the li*it$ it is even the opposite of a la-F 2iet!sche and
Philosophy 76-793) 1his is ho- &iet#sche>s conception of po-er can be read as a
po-erf!l antiC!ridicis*) .e -ill ret!rn to this passage later) %or an e@planation of
the distinction bet-een jus and le, in "pino#a$ see Antonio &egri$ $he Savage
=nomaly, pp) 90ff)
Cha&ter +( ,ietzschean #thics: From #fficient Power to an #thics of Affirmation
1 ) 1his is one e@a*ple in -hich =ele!#e appears a little over#ealo!s in his attac4 on
Hegel) E5f one considers the ense*ble of the history of philosophy$ one -o!ld search
in vain for a philosophy that co!ld proceed by the <!estion >U!>est-ce <!eP> NMaybe
Hegel$ *aybe there is only Hegel$ precisely beca!se his dialectic$ being a dialectic of
the e*pty and abstract essence$ is not separated fro* the *ove*ent of the
contradictionF 2E+a *Qthode de dra*atisationF 993) 5n the disc!ssion follo-ing this
presentation$ %erdinand Al<!iQ chastised =ele!#e on this acco!nt' E5 regret the
reCection$ a bit too fast$ of the <!estion >U!>est-ce <!eP$ >
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and 5 cannot accept -hat yo! say$ inti*idating !s a bit$ at the beginning$ that is$ that
no philosopher has posed this <!estion$ e@cept HegelF 21B:3) Al<!iQ arg!es$ rightly 5
believe$ that Hegel cannot be singled o!t so easily and that *any philosophers 2Plato$
+eibni#$ Hant$ etc)3 have e*phasi#ed the <!estion EU!>est-ce <!ePF in vario!s
degrees and in diverse conte@ts)
9 ) 5n this &iet#schean conte@t$ =ele!#e presents the arg!*ent as if it -ere part of an
attac4 on ca!sality itselfD b!t it is not diffic!lt to bring this bac4 to the notion of the
internal ca!se developed earlier in the ergson section) 5ndeed$ the arg!*ent
beco*es clearer if -e read it as an affir*ation of internal ca!se rather than an attac4
on ca!sality tout court) 5 -o!ld arg!e$ f!rther$ that &iet#sche>s entire pole*ic against
ca!sality co!ld be read prod!ctively as a pole*ic against the e@ternal ca!se and an
affir*ation of the internal ca!se) %or an e@a*ple of &iet#sche>s arg!*ent$ see
$/ilight of the Idols, E1he %o!r ,reat /rrors$ F pp) :8-7:)
3 ) .ith this pole*ical proposition of efficient po-er$ =ele!#e is participating in a
long philosophical tradition) 1he !lti*ate so!rce$ perhaps$ can be fo!nd in Aristotle>s
distinction bet-een potential being and act!al being in 'etaphysics, oo4 7)
Ho-ever$ this arg!*ent can be fo!nd in vario!s for*s thro!gho!t the *aterialist
tradition$ fro* Ac4ha* to Mar@) 5n fact$ "pino#a>s distinction bet-een potestas and
potentia, -hich plays s!ch a central role in Antonio &egri>s reading$ correlates very
closely -ith &iet#sche>s !sage of slave po-er and *aster po-er) %or an e@planation
of this distinction in &egri>s interpretation of "pino#a$ see *y fore--ord to $he
Savage =nomaly, E1he Anato*y of po-er$ F pp) @i-@vi)
: ) 1his eval!ation of the t-o nat!res of po-er is one ele*ent that brings =ele!#e>s
&iet#sche very close to "pino#a' Ey virt!e and po-er 0potentia1 5 *ean the sa*e
thingF 2Ethics 5(=63)
7 ) Mario 1ronti observes that precisely -hat is lac4ing in Hegel>s *aster-slave
dialectic is the <!estion of val!e) 1his is -hy Mar@ needs to co*bine a criti<!e of
Hegel -ith a criti<!e of Ricardo to arrive at his notion of labor val!e 25perai e
capitale 133-:33)
0 ) E1here is certainly in the a!thor a son of resent*ent -ith respect to Hegelian
philosophy that so*eti*es allo-s hi* to -rite penetrating passages$ b!t so*eti*es$
too$ threatens to *isg!ide hi*F 2E&iet#sche et la philosophicF 3733) .ahl is
certainly correct in pointing to this danger) =ele!#e>s defense rests on his
develop*ent of a nondialectical opposition$ -hich -o!ld not be a ressentiment, b!t a
p!re aggression)
8 ) HoCIve>s reading is perhaps the p!rest version of a personalist interpretation of the
confrontation bet-een the *aster and the slave' EA h!*an-individ!al co*es face to
face -ith a h!*an-individ!alF 2Introduction to the "eading of Hegel 1B3)
6 ) 5 can i*agine an arg!*ent by -hich Hegel co!ld be defended against the charge
that slave contents are being attrib!ted to essence here$ b!t the reading of this
passage as an affir*ation of labor as essence is so -idespread in the Hegelian
tradition that 5 thin4 it is -orth considering this point)
9 ) &iet#sche and Mar@ are !nited precisely on a "pino#ian proposition' 1he essence of
being is po-er 2Ethics 5P3:3) Ane *ight -ell obCect at this point that in *y arg!*ent
&iet#sche and Mar@ are not attac4ing essence per se$ b!t s!bstit!ting one essence for
another) 1his is tr!e) 5 -o!ld *aintain that C!st as &iet#sche>s arg!*ents against
ca!sality sho!ld be read as arg!*ents against the e@ternal ca!sality in favor of the
internal ca!se$ the attac4 on essence is the attac4 on an e@ternal for* of essence) 1he
-ill to po-er is the essence of being) 5n effect$ charges of Eessentialis*F are def!sed
in the conte@t of both Mar@ and &iet#sche) 5t is tr!e that each relies on a notion of
essence$ b!t in both cases it is a historical$ *aterial$ living essence$ a s!perficial
essence that has nothing to do -ith the ideal$ transcendental str!ct!res that are
!s!ally the iss!e of EessentialistF arg!*ents)
1B ) 1he Eref!sal of -or4F -as not only a slogan b!t also one of the central analytical
categories of 5talian Mar@is* in the si@ties and seventies) ?!st as Mar@ discovered
s!rpl!s val!e as the general ter* that envelops the vario!s for*s of e@ploitation
2rent$ profit$ etc)3$ the Ere-
-196-
f!sal of -or4F is the general ter* that co*prehends the vario!s for*s of proletarian
resistance$ be it constr!ctive or destr!ctive$ individ!al or collective' e*igration$ *ass
e@od!s$ -or4 stoppage$ organi#ed stri4es$ sabotage$ and so on) .e sho!ld be very
clear$ ho-ever$ that the ref!sal of -or4 is not the negation of prod!ctivity or
creativityD rather$ it is the ref!sal of a relationship of e@ploitation) 5n the ter*s of the
tradition$ it is the affir*ation of proletarian prod!ctive force and the denial of
capitalist relations of prod!ction)
11 ) 5n regards to the the*e of the attac4 on essence and the Coy of destr!ction$ the
connections bet-een &iet#sche and +enin are profo!nd) %or an e@planation of
+enin>s !se of the phrase Ethe art of ins!rrection$ F see Antonio &egri$ %a fabbrica
della strategia, pp) 06ff)
19 ) 1here is certainly a -ide variety of differing acco!nts of -hat >06 -as$ and -hat it
sho!ld have been) 1he reason 5 thin4 that :ogliamo tutto best serves o!r p!rposes
here is that it gives direct e@pression to the desires of the -or4ers in action better
than any other so!rce 5 have fo!nd) 5n any case$ even if 5 -ere to hold that this
acco!nt is e@e*plary of the events of >06$ 5 -o!ld not clai* that it is representative) 5
sho!ld also point o!t that C!st as it is a partic!lar reading of &iet#sche that -e are
follo-ing$ one defined by =ele!#e>s selection$ it is also a partic!lar interpretation of
Mar@$ that of 5talian operaismo 2-or4eris*3 as e@pressed by a!thors s!ch as Mario
1ronti and Antonio &egri) =ele!#e finds resonances -ith the -or4 of 1ronti in his
st!dy of %o!ca!ltD see ;oucault, p) 1::$ note 96 and p) 17B$ note :7)
13 ) Pierre Hlosso-s4i develops this idea of a selective ontology along different lines in
his spectac!lar analysis$ iet!sche et le cercle vicieu,) "ee$ in partic!lar$ the chapter
entitled E+e cercle vicie!@ en tant <!e doctrine selective$ F pp) 188-9:9)
1: ) ?ean .ahl ad*ires =ele!#e>s for*!lation of the -ill to nothingness as the ratio
cognoscendi of the -ill to po-er in general and the affir*ation of the eternal ret!rn
as its ratio essendi, b!t he finds it so*e-hat inappropriate for the &iet#schean
conte@t' E!t isn>t this e@posQ of &iet#sche>s tho!ght perhaps too "cholastic in
appearancePF 2E&iet#sche et la philosophicF 3863) .ahl is certainly right to note that
=ele!#e is bringing in an ele*ent e@ternal to &iet#sche>s tho!ght$ b!t$ as 5 hope 5
have already sho-n$ reference to the "cholastics can help bring to light the
ontological gro!nding of &iet#sche>s tho!ght 2in the analysis of po-er$ of -ill$ and
of ca!sality3)
17 ) H!gh 1o*linson translates Epo!voir d>Rtre affectQF as Ecapacity to be affected)F
ECapacityF is a very poor choice beca!se the Epo!voir d>Rtre affectQF does not i*ply
any possibility$ b!t rather is al-ays act!al)
10 ) 5 !se E-ill$ F Eappetite$ F and EdesireF here according to their "pino#ian definitions)
.ill is conatus -ith respect to the *ind$ and appetite is conatus -ith respect to the
*ind and the body) =esire is appetite together -ith conscio!sness of the appetite)
"ee Ethics 555P9")
Cha&ter .( $&inozian Practice: Affirmation and /o
1 ) Altho!gh this -or4 has had a *!ch s*aller general a!dience than =ele!#e>s other
readings in the history of philosophy$ his interpretation of "pino#a has revol!tioni#ed
"pino#a st!dies) Along -ith the reading of +o!is Alth!sser 2developed by Pierre
Macherey and /tienne alibar3$ =ele!#e>s -or4 is the *aCor infl!ence to have
e*erged in %rench "pino#a st!dies in the last thirty years) 1he %rench tradition is
very rich) Aside fro* =ele!#e and the Alth!sserians$ so*e of the *aCor t-entieth-
cent!ry fig!res -ho constit!te this tradition are %erdinand Al<!iQ$ "ylvain Sac$ and
Martial ,!ero!lt) .e -ill have a*ple opport!nity to dra- on their readings in the
co!rse of o!r st!dy)
9 ) &iet#sche recogni#ed that he had a spirit!al co*panion in "pino#a) He -rote to his
friend %ran# Averbec4' E5 a* !tterly a*a#ed$ !tterly enchanted) 5 have a precursor,
and -hat a prec!rsorX 5 hardly 4ne- "pino#a' that 5 sho!ld have t!rned to hi* C!st
no/, -as inspired by >instinct)> NMy loneso*eness$ -hich$ as on very high
*o!ntains$ often *ade it hard for
-199-
*e to breathe and *ade *y blood r!sh o!t$ is no- at least a t-oso*enessF 2Postcard
to Averbec4$ ?!ly 3B$ 1661$ in $he Portable iet!sche 993)
3 ) 5n a letter to +Qon r!nschvicg$ ergson -rote' EAne co!ld say that every
philosopher has t-o philosophies' his o-n and that of "pino#aF 2Ecrits et paroles
7683) An ac!te analysis of the co**on the*es in the t-o philosophers is presented
by "ylvain Sac in E+es thI*es spino#istes dans la philosophie de ergson)F "ee also
Rose-Marie MossQ-astide$ Eergson et "pino#a$ F -hich dra-s heavily on
ergson>s co!rses at the CollIge de %rance) 1he *ost significant the*e that =ele!#e
chooses not to treat$ both in ergson and "pino#a$ is that of religion and *ysticis*)
oth Sac and MossQ-astide consider this a f!nda*ental aspect of the "pino#a-
ergson relationship)
: ) .e -ill !se the conventional abbreviated notation for referring to "pino#a>s -or4s)
A stands for a@io*$ C for corollary$ = for de*onstration$ =ef for definition$ P for
proposition$ and " for scholi!*) Ro*an n!*erals are !sed to refer to the five parts
of the Ethics, and Arabic n!*erals to denote proposition or scholi!* n!*bers) 1h!s$
Ethics 5P6"9 refers to Ethics, Part 5$ proposition 6$ scholi!* 9)
7 ) 5 !se EdifferenceF and EdistinctionF as if they -ere interchangeable here beca!se
they see* to fill the sa*e role in =ele!#e>s tho!ght) .e *ight as4 o!rselves$
ho-ever$ if an i*portant n!ance co!ld be discerned bet-een the t-o ter*s) 5t *ay
be$ in fact$ that the co**on !sage of EdifferenceF i*plies an other or e@ternal ca!se$
and therefore$ EdistinctionF -o!ld be a better ter* for defining the sing!larity of
being) .e sho!ld 4eep in *ind$ of co!rse$ the t-o separate conte@ts' ergson>s !se
of difference derives pri*arily fro* biology and Mechanicis*$ -hile consideration
of distinctions in "pino#a *!st be lin4ed first to =escartes$ and then to the
"cholastics)
0 ) Ance -e pose the co**on thesis of the sing!larity of being in ergson and
"pino#a$ -e have to ac4no-ledge -hat is co**only held to be the i*portant
difference' E.hile "pino#a>s philosophy is a philosophy of necessity$ ergson>s
philosophy is a philosophy of contingencyF 2Sac$ E+es thI*es spino#istesF 1903)
Any st!dent of the history of philosophy -o!ld point o!t$ along -ith Sac$ that
"pino#a is an Eabsol!te deter*inist$ F -hile ergson constr!cts an ontology based on
E!nforeseeable ne-ness)F 5 a* very s!spicio!s$ ho-ever$ of this traditional
opposition) 5n =ele!#e>s -or4$ as in that of "pino#a$ -e find that the conventional
distinctions bet-een necessity and contingency$ bet-een deter*ination and
creativity$ are effectively s!bverted)
8 ) =ele!#e>s insistence on the the*atic of e@pression constit!tes a pole*ic against
se*iology on ontological gro!nds) A syste* of signs does not recogni#e being as a
prod!ctive dyna*icD it does not help !s !nderstand being thro!gh its ca!sal
genealogy) 1he Eabsent ca!se$ F -hich s!pports *!ch of the %rench str!ct!ralist and
se*iological disco!rse in the si@ties$ denies a positive ontological fo!ndation) 5n
contrast$ a theory of e@pression see4s to *a4e the ca!se present$ to bring !s bac4 to
an ontological fo!ndation by *a4ing clear the genealogy of being)
6 ) An the relationship bet-een =!ns "cot!s and "pino#a$ =ele!#e *a4es one of his
rare forays into philosophical historiography 203-083) 5t is !nli4ely$ he notes$ that
"pino#a -o!ld have read =!ns "cot!s directlyD ho-ever$ thro!gh ?!an de Prado$
-ho is certain to have read =!ns "cot!s$ "pino#a co!ld have received a "cotist
acco!nt of !nivocity and the for*al distinction) =ele!#e then sets this a@is of
tho!ght$ =!ns "cot!s-"pino#a$ against its ene*y a@is$ "![re#-=escartes) 1he lines of
battle are !nivocity$ i**anence$ and e@pression 2in =!ns "cot!s and "pino#a3
vers!s e<!ivocity$ e*inence$ and analogy 2in "![re# and =escartes3) As al-ays$
=ele!#e>s ideas abo!t the history of philosophy are very s!ggestive$ b!t$ fro* the
philological or historiographic point of vie-$ not f!lly developed) %or an e@planation
of the theory of the for*al distinction in =!ns "cot!s$ see /tienne ,ilson$ %a
philosophie au 'oyen =ge, pp) 799ff)
-13B-
9 ) Al<!iQ presents a definition of "pino#is* as the synthesis of Cartesian science and
*athe*atics -ith Renaissance nat!ralis*)
1B ) Martial ,!ero!lt presents a thoro!gh history of this controversy) "ee Spino!a, vol)
1$ pp) 7B$ :96-01) ,!ero!lt clearly s!pports an obCectivist interpretation)
11 ) According to ,!ero!lt$ Hegel>s interpretation is Ethe inspiration of a -hole line of
co**entators -ho$ fro* the beginning of the nineteenth cent!ry to today$ have
contin!ed to *aintain a co**on interpretationF 25$ :003) "ee also pp) :09-06)
19 ) "ee (incent =esco*bes$ 'odern ;rench Philosophy, for an analysis of the
do*inant lines of %rench philosophy d!ring these years)
13 ) EParallelis*F is not "pino#a>s ter*$ b!t rather is introd!ced by +eibni#>s
interpretation) Many have contended that it is not appropriate to apply this ter* to
"pino#a>s tho!ght) "ylvain Sac$ for e@a*ple$ obCects to the !se of the ter*
Eparallelis*F to describe the relation bet-een the "pino#ian attrib!tes' E5t is not a
correspondence nor a parallelis* bet-een the *ental and the physiological$ neither a
ter*-to-ter* correspondence nor a correspondence of the -holesF 2%'id#e de vie 90-
983) Sac arg!es that the attrib!tes are not parallel$ b!t instead are s!bstantially
identical$ vie-ed fro* different perspectives) %or this reason$ it is i*portant that
=ele!#e not clai* an e<!ality of correspondence$ b!t an e<!ality of principle) ,iven
this n!ance$ it is not clear that Sac>s obCection -o!ld ade<!ately address =ele!#e>s
interpretation)
1: ) Antonio &egri poses forcef!lly the proble* of the attrib!tes as a proble* of
organi#ation 2$he Savage =nomaly 73ff)3) 1he ontological order that they constit!te
presents a being that is prefor*ed$ an ideal constr!ction) 1his is the reason$ &egri
arg!es$ that the attrib!tes *!st drop o!t of the disc!ssion -hen "pino#a develops
to-ard practical and political concerns) =ele!#e$ ho-ever$ see*s to be either
!na-are of$ or !nconcerned -ith$ this proble*)
17 ) .e -ill see that$ altho!gh =ele!#e elo<!ently proposes this ontological parallelis*$
he fails to apply it to its f!llest at a cr!cial point in the investigation$ -hen practice
e*erges on the terrain of constit!tion)
10 ) "pecial diffic!lties are presented for *y thesis by the reappearance of the attrib!tes
in Part ( of the Ethics) &egri *aintains that this reappearance is d!e to the fact that
"pino#a drafted different sections of Part ( d!ring different periods$ that Part (
contains resid!es of the pantheistic !topia of "pino#a>s early -or4 2109ff)3) My
=ele!#ian proposal s!ggests a different e@planation) 5 -o!ld *aintain that "pino#a>s
effort in Part ( to rise fro* the second to the third type of 4no-ledge$ to rise to the
idea of ,od$ re<!ires a ne- spec!lative *o*ent$ a ret!rn to the earlier *ode of
research) 1he ret!rn to "pino#a>s ;orschung brings -ith it all of its scientific
instr!*ents$ incl!ding the attrib!tes)
18 ) 5n Spino!a's $heory of $ruth, 1ho*as Mar4 gives a thoro!gh acco!nt of Anglo-
A*erican and analytic interpretations of "pino#a>s episte*ology) Mar4 e@plains that
the traditional approach 2?oachi*$ "t!art Ha*pshire$ Alisdair Mac5ntyre$ etc)3 poses
"pino#a against a correspondence theory of tr!th and in favor of a Ecoherence
theoryF -here tr!th is defined as coherence -ithin the orderly syste* that constit!tes
reality) Mar4 arg!es$ ho-ever$ that "pino#a is better sit!ated in the *!ch older
episte*ological tradition of tr!th as being' E5f -e -ish to see "pino#a>s theory of
tr!th in its historical setting$ -e *!st contrast the correspondence vie- not -ith
coherence$ b!t rather -ith theories of >tr!th of being> or >tr!th of things>' ontological
tr!thF 2673) According to Mar4$ this theory of ontological tr!th sit!ates "pino#a in
the Platonic tradition in line -ith Plotin!s$ Ansel*$ and "t) A!g!stine) =ele!#e>s
reading is consistent -ith Mar4>s to a certain point$ b!t the cr!cial factor is that Mar4
does not recogni#e$ as =ele!#e does$ the central relationship bet-een tr!th and
po-er) Ance the <!estion of tr!th beco*es also a <!estion of po-er$ "pino#a>s
episte*ology tends to-ard a practical episte*ology) 1herefore$ =ele!#e>s reading
sit!ates "pino#a>s Eontological tr!thF not in the Platonic$ b!t the &iet#schean$
tradition)
-131-
16 ) A given idea of a circle *ay be clear and distinct$ b!t it re*ains inade<!ate !nless
it e@presses the path of its o-n prod!ction) An ade<!ate idea of a circle *ight$ for
e@a*ple$ involve the idea of a fi@ed radi!s rotated aro!nd a central pointD it
e@presses its ca!se) A *ore i*portant and co*ple@ e@a*ple -o!ld be the idea of
C!stice' An ade<!ate idea of C!stice -o!ld have to e@press the *eans by -hich -e
-o!ld prod!ce or constr!ct s!ch an ideaD it -o!ld involve an entire genealogy of
ideas that res!lt in this idea)
19 ) E.hen a n!*ber of bodiesNare so constrained by other bodies that they lie !pon
one another$ or if they *oveNthat they co**!nicate their *otions to each other in a
certain fi@ed *anner$ -e shall say that those bodies are !nited -ith one another and
that they all together co*pose one body or 5ndivid!alF 2Ethics 55P13=ef3)
9B ) %or an e@tended disc!ssion of the "pino#ian conception of the *!ltit!de$ see
Antonio &egri$ $he Savage =nomaly 2168-9B$ 19:-91B3)
-139-
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