Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power
Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the
said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him,
violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of
the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Lutz vs. Araneta [December 22, 1955, (98 Phil 148)]

Post under case digests, Taxation at Friday, February 24, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940
to stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential
position in the United States market and the imposition of export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his
capacity as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
from the Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of
the Act, alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the
sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance.

Issue: Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.

Held: Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied
with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
sugar industry.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that
very enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar
protection; but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none.

TIO vs VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
PD was also reinforced by PD 1994 which amended the National Internal Revenue Code. The
amendment provides that there shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, that locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to
regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of
videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that
such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Sec 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the
gross receipts payable to the LGUs. Tio countered, among others, that the tax imposition provision is a
rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD embraces only one subject.

HELD: The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express
each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of
the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given a practical rather than
technical construction. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with,
nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and
control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. The express purpose of the PD to include taxation of
the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the uncontrolled distribution of videograms is
evident from Preambles 2 and 5 of the said PD which explain the motives of the lawmakers in presenting
the measure. The title of the PD, which is the creation of the VRB, is comprehensive enough to include
the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to
express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the PD.


G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 -
Elvin PalaoASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO,JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO,
ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G.ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA,
ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON
S.FERRER,

petitioners,vs.

HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and
corn lands not exceeding sevenhectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.
Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit butare occupied by tenants who are actually
cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:No tenant-farmer
in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding
until suchtime as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules andregulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required
under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask theCourt for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing
any right of retention frompersons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in
aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,industrial or other purposes from which they
derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do notfall under its
terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum
dated July 10,1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying
Retention Guide Table), Memorandum CircularNo. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines
of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981(Clarificatory Guidelines on
Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
seriesof 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the
Coverage of their Land holdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to
file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred
from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of theirappeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance
of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done,involves the exercise of discretion which
cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this function isentrusted, as
in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because
they do not own more thanseven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the
rules were intended to cover them also, the saidmeasures are nevertheless not in force because they
have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera As for LOI
474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could nothave
repealed the presidential decree.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not writ of mandamus is the proper remedy
2.Whether or not the Implementing Rules and Regulation was published
3.Whether or not P.D. 27 has been repealed

RULING:
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever
name it was called, had theforce and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the
ways of despots. The important thing is that it wasissued by President Marcos, whose word was law
during that time.But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to
comply with the requirement for publicationas this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera.
Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the CivilCode, they could
not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case.
LOI 474was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)


G.R. No. 4273
VICENTA FABIE Y GUTIERREZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Rosado, Sanz and Opisso for appellees.

WILLARD, J.:

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The city of Manila opposed the granting of the
petition for registration on the ground that the petitioners had included in their plan, upon the south
side of one of the parcels indicated therein, an estero or waterway which was of public use, and it asked
that this waterway be excluded from the petition.

The court below decided that the estero was waterway devoted to public use from its mouth, at point
"L", to the point marked "J" on the plan, a distance, as we understand the plan, of more than 120
meters. As to the remaining part, it held that it was an artificial and not a natural waterway, laid out at
the cost and by the order of the petitioners for the benefit of their property. From the judgment
rendered in accordance with these views the city appealed.

There was evidence tending to support the view taken by the court below as to the artificial character of
a part of the estero. This evidence was not overcome by that introduced by the city. It presented only
two witnesses. One of them, an assistant engineer, testified that the estero was 6 meters wide at the
widest part, without indicating whether this was in that part of the estero which the court called the
natural waterway, or the other part, nor does the rest of his evidence indicate to what part of the estero
he refers. The other witness testified that he had entered the estero by a canoe and had penetrated to
the distance of some 40 or 50 meters, and afterwards returned because he was convinced from the
construction of the estero that it had no outlet. It will be seen that he, therefore, did not reach the point
"J" and did not pass out of that part of the estero which the court conceded to the city.

The appellant claims further that a plan presented by the petitioners, made in 1902 shows upon its face
an estero upon the south side of the land in controversy and that the document marked "Exhibit C,"
which contains a description of the land found in the plan, indicates that the south boundary line is an
estero. This description, as the appellant itself says, in its brief, is very confused, but waiving that point,
the effect of this plan and document as an ordinary admission against the petitioners is not sufficient to
overcome the proof offered at the trial.

It is claimed, moreover, that the petitioners having caused this plan to be made, and the deed, with the
description above mentioned, recorded, they are now estopped from saying there is not a natural water
course upon the south boundary of their land, the city citing in support of its contention section 333 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. This section is in no way applicable to the case. There is no evidence to
show that the city authorities ever saw this plan or this deed, and no evidence to show that they ever, in
reliance upon it, took any action in connection with the estero. It was said in the case of Trinidad vs.
Ricafort (7 Phil. Rep., 449, 453) that

. . . In order to create an estoppel it is necessary to prove not only the conduct of the person sought to
be estopped but also that the person claiming the estoppel knew of such conduct and relied and acted
upon it to his damage.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

32 Phil. 580 (1915)

In re: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The case involves a dual
question one involving the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax in
question and the other relating to the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign,
signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.

The focus of this digest is to highlight the cases latter aspect as correlated to the police power of the
State.

Facts
Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed
upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the
provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the
sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question in no sense constitute a
nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any
persons. Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the
complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard complained of
was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.

Issue
1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Government?

Held

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which
are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not
establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if
the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country,
and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which
encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.
TOMAS VELASCO, LOURDES RAMIREZ, SY PIN, EDMUNDO UNSON, APOLONIA RAMIREZ and LOURDES
LOMIBAO, as component members of the STA. CRUZ BARBERSHOP ASSOCIATION, in their own behalf
and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, City Mayor of Manila, HON. HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, Vice-Mayor and
Presiding Officer of the Municipal Board in relation to Republic Act 4065, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
THE CITY OF MANILA and EDUARDO QUINTOS SR., Chief of Police of the City of Manila, respondents-
appellees.

Leonardo L. Arguelles for respondent-appellant.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the
constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due
process of law.


BAUTISTA VS. JUNIO, digested

GR # L-50908 January 31, 1984 (Constitutional Law Police Power, LOI, No Violation of Equal Protection
Clause)

FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis,
banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and
holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees
of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing
penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified
vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of
undue delegation of legislative power.

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is
violative of certain constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not
ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property
for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the
impounding of a vehicle.

Florentina Lozano vs Judge Antonio Martinez et al

146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable Instruments Law Constitutionality of BP 22

This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila
declared the law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.)
it is violative of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs
freedom of contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.

The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa was
not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only punishes
the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-
existing obligations.

BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state
because of the injury it causes to public interests.

BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The debt
contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to
prison for non-payment of contractual debts.

However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely why the
mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a
valid exercise of police power.

Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following acts:

any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of
the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

And

any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a huge problem.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.

Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and confidence is
the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence
is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become
nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the Congress,
through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation on ex delicto
debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Sangalang v. IAC (G.R. No. 71169. December 22, 1988)

FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the
general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of
said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought
against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential
status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the trial
court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening the
Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

RATIO:

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence
along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a
contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate
exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than
for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.



BLAS F. OPLE
v.
RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE
NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking
of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" on two important constitutional grounds,

viz

:(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers
of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed
the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the
government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with
the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining
its implementation.

Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YES

Rationale:

As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to
sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn
the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308.
The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing
rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se
and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure
its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No.
308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS)
caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and
the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that
wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an
importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right.