G.R. No.

166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST !o"#$"%& AAS'S(
1
O))I*+RS,-+-B+RS SA-SON S.
AL*ANTARA, +D .IN*+NT S. ALBANO, RO-+O R. ROBISO, R+N+ B. GOROSP+ /01
+D2IN R. SANDO.AL, petitioners,
vs.
3ON. *+SAR .. PURISI-A, 40 54s 6/7/64t& /s S$6"$t/"& o! )40/06$, 3ON. GUILL+R-O L.
PARAYNO, 'R., 40 54s 6/7/64t& /s *o##4ss4o0$" o! t5$ Bu"$/u o! I0t$"0/% R$8$0u$, /01 3ON.
ALB+RTO D. LINA, 40 54s */7/64t& /s *o##4ss4o0$" o! Bu"$/u o! *usto#s, respondents.
D + * I S I O N
*ORONA, J.9
This petition for prohibition
1
seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic
Act (RA) 933
!
(Attrition Act of !"").
RA 933 #as enacted to optimi$e the revenue%generation capabilit& and collection of the 'ureau of
(nternal Revenue ('(R) and the 'ureau of )ustoms ('*)). The la# intends to encourage '(R and
'*) officials and emplo&ees to e+ceed their revenue targets b& providing a s&stem of re#ards and
sanctions through the creation of a Re#ards and (ncentives ,und (,und) and a Revenue -erformance
.valuation 'oard ('oard).
3
(t covers all officials and emplo&ees of the '(R and the '*) #ith at least
si+ months of service, regardless of emplo&ment status.
/
The ,und is sourced from the collection of the '(R and the '*) in e+cess of their revenue targets for
the &ear, as determined b& the 0evelopment 'udget and )oordinating )ommittee (0'))). An&
incentive or re#ard is taken from the fund and allocated to the '(R and the '*) in proportion to their
contribution in the e+cess collection of the targeted amount of ta+ revenue.

The 'oards in the '(R and the '*) are composed of the 1ecretar& of the 0epartment of ,inance
(0*,) or his2her 3ndersecretar&, the 1ecretar& of the 0epartment of 'udget and 4anagement (0'4)
or his2her 3ndersecretar&, the 0irector 5eneral of the 6ational .conomic 0evelopment Authorit&
(6.0A) or his2her 0eput& 0irector 5eneral, the )ommissioners of the '(R and the '*) or their
0eput& )ommissioners, t#o representatives from the rank%and%file emplo&ees and a representative
from the officials nominated b& their recogni$ed organi$ation.
7
.ach 'oard has the dut& to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and
release of the ,und8 (!) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
emplo&ees #hose revenue collection falls short of the target8 (3) terminate personnel in accordance
#ith the criteria adopted b& the 'oard8 (/) prescribe a s&stem for performance evaluation8 () perform
other functions, including the issuance of rules and regulations and (7) submit an annual report to
)ongress.
9
The 0*,, 0'4, 6.0A, '(R, '*) and the )ivil 1ervice )ommission ()1)) #ere tasked to
promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 933,
:
to be approved b& a ;oint
)ongressional *versight )ommittee created for such purpose.
9
-etitioners, invoking their right as ta+pa&ers filed this petition challenging the constitutionalit& of RA
933, a ta+ reform legislation. The& contend that, b& establishing a s&stem of re#ards and incentives,
the la# <transform=s> the officials and emplo&ees of the '(R and the '*) into mercenaries and bount&
hunters< as the& #ill do their best onl& in consideration of such re#ards. Thus, the s&stem of re#ards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionall& mandated dut& of these officials
and emplo&ees to serve the people #ith utmost responsibilit&, integrit&, lo&alt& and efficienc&.
-etitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the s&stem of re#ards and incentives onl& to officials
and emplo&ees of the '(R and the '*) violates the constitutional guarantee of e?ual protection. There
is no valid basis for classification or distinction as to #h& such a s&stem should not appl& to officials
and emplo&ees of all other government agencies.
(n addition, petitioners assert that the la# undul& delegates the po#er to fi+ revenue targets to the
-resident as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. @hile 1ection 9(b) and (c) of RA 933
provides that '(R and '*) officials ma& be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target b& at least 9.A, the la# does not, ho#ever, fi+ the revenue targets to be achieved.
(nstead, the fi+ing of revenue targets has been delegated to the -resident #ithout sufficient standards. (t
#ill therefore be eas& for the -resident to fi+ an unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss
'(R or '*) personnel.
,inall&, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of po#ers. @hile the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the la#, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the la#.
(n their comment, respondents, through the *ffice of the 1olicitor 5eneral, ?uestion the petition for
being premature as there is no actual case or controvers& &et. -etitioners have not asserted an& right or
claim that #ill necessitate the e+ercise of this )ourtBs Curisdiction. 6evertheless, respondents
ackno#ledge that public polic& re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case.
The& assert that the allegation that the re#ard s&stem #ill breed mercenaries is mere speculation and
does not suffice to invalidate the la#. 1een in conCunction #ith the declared obCective of RA 933, the
la# validl& classifies the '(R and the '*) because the functions the& perform are distinct from those
of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. 4oreover, the la# provides a sufficient
standard that #ill guide the e+ecutive in the implementation of its provisions. Dastl&, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the la# enhances, rather than violates, separation of po#ers.
(t ensures the fulfillment of the legislative polic& and serves as a check to an& over%accumulation of
po#er on the part of the e+ecutive and the implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the )ourt finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionalit& in favor of RA 933, e+cept as
shall hereafter be discussed.
A6tu/% */s$ A01 R47$0$ss
An actual case or controvers& involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of Cudicial adCudication.
1"
A closel& related re?uirement is ripeness, that is, the ?uestion
must be ripe for adCudication. And a constitutional ?uestion is ripe for adCudication #hen the
governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
11
Thus,
to be ripe for Cudicial adCudication, the petitioner must sho# a personal stake in the outcome of the case
or an inCur& to himself that can be redressed b& a favorable decision of the )ourt.
1!
(n this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a Cudicial controvers& b& the
mere enactment of the la# even #ithout an& further overt act,
13
petitioners fail either to assert an&
specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate an& direct adverse effect of the la# on them. The&
are unable to sho# a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an inCur& to themselves. *n this
account, their petition is procedurall& infirm.
This not#ithstanding, public interest re?uires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised b&
petitioners. The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of
constitutionalit& in favor of the la#. And #here an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have
infringed the )onstitution, it becomes not onl& the right but in fact the dut& of the Cudiciar& to settle the
dispute.
1/
A66ou0t/:4%4t& o!
Pu:%46 O!!46$"s
1ection 1, Article 11 of the )onstitution statesE
1ec. 1. -ublic office is a public trust. -ublic officers and emplo&ees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them #ith utmost responsibilit&, integrit&, lo&alt&, and
efficienc&, act #ith patriotism, and Custice, and lead modest lives.
-ublic office is a public trust. (t must be discharged b& its holder not for his o#n personal gain but for
the benefit of the public for #hom he holds it in trust. '& demanding accountabilit& and service #ith
responsibilit&, integrit&, lo&alt&, efficienc&, patriotism and Custice, all government officials and
emplo&ees have the dut& to be responsive to the needs of the people the& are called upon to serve.
-ublic officers enCo& the presumption of regularit& in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessaril& obtains in favor of '(R and '*) officials and emplo&ees. RA 933 operates on the basis
thereof and reinforces it b& providing a s&stem of re#ards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging
the officials and emplo&ees of the '(R and the '*) to e+ceed their revenue targets and optimi$e their
revenue%generation capabilit& and collection.
1
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrar& is re?uired to rebut it. (t cannot be overturned
b& mere conCecture or denied in advance (as petitioners #ould have the )ourt do) speciall& in this case
#here it is an underl&ing principle to advance a declared public polic&.
-etitionersB claim that the implementation of RA 933 #ill turn '(R and '*) officials and emplo&ees
into <bount& hunters and mercenaries< is not onl& #ithout an& factual and legal basis8 it is also purel&
speculative.
A la# enacted b& )ongress enCo&s the strong presumption of constitutionalit&. To Custif& its
nullification, there must be a clear and une?uivocal breach of the )onstitution, not a doubtful and
e?uivocal one.
17
To invalidate RA 933 based on petitionersB baseless supposition is an affront to the
#isdom not onl& of the legislature that passed it but also of the e+ecutive #hich approved it.
-ublic service is its o#n re#ard. 6evertheless, public officers ma& b& la# be re#arded for e+emplar&
and e+ceptional performance. A s&stem of incentives for e+ceeding the set e+pectations of a public
office is not anathema to the concept of public accountabilit&. (n fact, it recogni$es and reinforces
dedication to dut&, industr&, efficienc& and lo&alt& to public service of deserving government
personnel.
(n United States v. Matthews,
19
the 3.1. 1upreme )ourt validated a la# #hich a#ards to officers of the
customs as #ell as other parties an amount not e+ceeding one%half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the la#s against smuggling. )iting Dorsheimer v. United States,
1:
the 3.1. 1upreme )ourt
saidE
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and re#ard their $eal and
industr& in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade pa&ment of duties and ta+es.
(n the same vein, emplo&ees of the '(R and the '*) ma& b& la# be entitled to a re#ard #hen, as a
conse?uence of their $eal in the enforcement of ta+ and customs la#s, the& e+ceed their revenue
targets. (n addition, RA 933 establishes safeguards to ensure that the re#ard #ill not be claimed if it
#ill be either the fruit of <bount& hunting or mercenar& activit&< or the product of the irregular
performance of official duties. *ne of these precautionar& measures is embodied in 1ection : of the
la#E
1.). :. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the B! and the BO". # The
officials, e+aminers, and emplo&ees of the ='(R> and the ='*)> #ho violate this Act or #ho are
guilt& of negligence, abuses or acts of malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to e+ercise
e+traordinar& diligence in the performance of their duties shall be held liable for an& loss or
inCur& suffered b& an& business establishment or ta+pa&er as a result of such violation,
negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to e+ercise e+traordinar& diligence.
+;u/% P"ot$6t4o0
.?ualit& guaranteed under the e?ual protection clause is e?ualit& under the same conditions and among
persons similarl& situated8 it is e?ualit& among e?uals, not similarit& of treatment of persons #ho are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the obCect to be accomplished.
19
@hen things
or persons are different in fact or circumstance, the& ma& be treated in la# differentl&. (n $ictoriano v.
Eli%alde !ope &or'ers( Union,
!"
this )ourt declaredE
The guarant& of e?ual protection of the la#s is not a guarant& of e?ualit& in the application of
the la#s upon all citi$ens of the =1>tate. (t is not, therefore, a re?uirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against ine?ualit&, that ever& man, #oman and child should be
affected alike b& a statute. .?ualit& of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merel& as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding
them. (t guarantees e?ualit&, not identit& of rights. T5$ *o0st4tut4o0 1o$s 0ot "$;u4"$ t5/t
t540gs <5465 /"$ 14!!$"$0t 40 !/6t :$ t"$/t$1 40 %/< /s t5oug5 t5$& <$"$ t5$ s/#$. T5$
$;u/% 7"ot$6t4o0 6%/us$ 1o$s 0ot !o":41 14s6"4#40/t4o0 /s to t540gs t5/t /"$ 14!!$"$0t. It
1o$s 0ot 7"o54:4t %$g4s%/t4o0 <5465 4s %4#4t$1 $4t5$" 40 t5$ o:=$6t to <5465 4t 4s 14"$6t$1 or
b& the territor& #ithin #hich it is to operate.
The e?ual protection of the la#s clause of the )onstitution allo#s classification. )lassification
in la#, as in the other departments of kno#ledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because the& agree #ith one another in certain particulars. A la# is not
invalid because of simple ine?ualit&. The ver& idea of classification is that of ine?ualit&, so that
it goes #ithout sa&ing that the mere fact of ine?ualit& in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionalit&. A%% t5/t 4s "$;u4"$1 o! / 8/%41 6%/ss4!46/t4o0 4s t5/t 4t :$ "$/so0/:%$, <5465
#$/0s t5/t t5$ 6%/ss4!46/t4o0 s5ou%1 :$ :/s$1 o0 su:st/0t4/% 14st406t4o0s <5465 #/>$ !o"
"$/% 14!!$"$06$s, t5/t 4t #ust :$ g$"#/0$ to t5$ 7u"7os$ o! t5$ %/<? t5/t 4t #ust 0ot :$
%4#4t$1 to $@4st40g 6o014t4o0s o0%&? /01 t5/t 4t #ust /77%& $;u/%%& to $/65 #$#:$" o! t5$
6%/ss. This )ourt has held that t5$ st/01/"1 4s s/t4s!4$1 4! t5$ 6%/ss4!46/t4o0 o" 14st406t4o0 4s
:/s$1 o0 / "$/so0/:%$ !ou01/t4o0 o" "/t4o0/% :/s4s /01 4s 0ot 7/%7/:%& /":4t"/"&.
(n the e+ercise of its po#er to make classifications for the purpose of enacting la#s over matters
#ithin its Curisdiction, the state is recogni$ed as enCo&ing a #ide range of discretion. (t is not
necessar& that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. 6either is it necessar& that the classification be made #ith mathematical nicet&. Fence,
legislative classification ma& in man& cases properl& rest on narro# distinctions, for the e?ual
protection guarant& does not preclude the legislature from recogni$ing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as the& ma& appear.
!1
(emphasis supplied)
The e?ual protection clause recogni$es a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrar&.
!!
@ith respect to RA 933, its e+pressed
public polic& is the optimi$ation of the revenue%generation capabilit& and collection of the '(R and the
'*).
!3
1ince the subCect of the la# is the revenue% generation capabilit& and collection of the '(R and
the '*), the incentives and2or sanctions provided in the la# should logicall& pertain to the said
agencies. 4oreover, the la# concerns onl& the '(R and the '*) because the& have the common
distinct primar& function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of
ta+es, customs duties, fees and charges.
The '(R performs the follo#ing functionsE
1ec. 1:. )he B*rea* of nternal !even*e. G The 'ureau of (nternal Revenue, #hich shall be
headed b& and subCect to the supervision and control of the )ommissioner of (nternal Revenue,
#ho shall be appointed b& the -resident upon the recommendation of the 1ecretar& =of the
0*,>, shall have the follo#ing functionsE
(1) Ass$ss /01 6o%%$6t /%% t/@$s, !$$s /01 65/"g$s /01 /66ou0t !o" /%% "$8$0u$s 6o%%$6t$18
(!) .+ercise dul& delegated police po#ers for the proper performance of its functions and
duties8
(3) -revent and prosecute ta+ evasions and all other illegal economic activities8
(/) .+ercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units8 and
() -erform such other functions as ma& be provided b& la#.
!/

+++ +++ +++ (emphasis supplied)
*n the other hand, the '*) has the follo#ing functionsE
1ec. !3. )he B*rea* of "*stoms. G The 'ureau of )ustoms #hich shall be headed and subCect to
the management and control of the )ommissioner of )ustoms, #ho shall be appointed b& the
-resident upon the recommendation of the 1ecretar&=of the 0*,> and hereinafter referred to as
)ommissioner, shall have the follo#ing functionsE
(1) *o%%$6t 6usto# 1ut4$s, t/@$s /01 t5$ 6o""$s7o0140g !$$s, 65/"g$s /01 7$0/%t4$s8
(!) A66ou0t !o" /%% 6usto#s "$8$0u$s 6o%%$6t$18
(3) .+ercise police authorit& for the enforcement of tariff and customs la#s8
(/) -revent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds #ithin all ports of
entr&8
() 1upervise and control e+ports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and
aircrafts in all ports of entr&8
(7) Administer all legal re?uirements that are appropriate8
(9) -revent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its
Curisdiction8
(:) .+ercise supervision and control over its constituent units8
(9) -erform such other functions as ma& be provided b& la#.
!
+++ +++ +++ (emphasis supplied)
'oth the '(R and the '*) are bureaus under the 0*,. The& principall& perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through #hich the 1tate e+ercises one of its great inherent functions G
ta+ation. (ndubitabl&, such substantial distinction is germane and intimatel& related to the purpose of
the la#. Fence, the classification and treatment accorded to the '(R and the '*) under RA 933 full&
satisf& the demands of e?ual protection.
U01u$ D$%$g/t4o0
T#o tests determine the validit& of delegation of legislative po#erE (1) the completeness test and (!) the
sufficient standard test. A la# is complete #hen it sets forth therein the polic& to be e+ecuted, carried
out or implemented b& the delegate.
!7
(t la&s do#n a sufficient standard #hen it provides ade?uate
guidelines or limitations in the la# to map out the boundaries of the delegateBs authorit& and prevent
the delegation from running riot.
!9
To be sufficient, the standard must specif& the limits of the
delegateBs authorit&, announce the legislative polic& and identif& the conditions under #hich it is to be
implemented.
!:
RA 933 ade?uatel& states the polic& and standards to guide the -resident in fi+ing revenue targets and
the implementing agencies in carr&ing out the provisions of the la#. 1ection ! spells out the polic& of
the la#E
1.). !. Declaration of +olicy. G (t is the polic& of the 1tate to optimi$e the revenue%generation
capabilit& and collection of the 'ureau of (nternal Revenue ('(R) and the 'ureau of )ustoms
('*)) b& providing for a s&stem of re#ards and sanctions through the creation of a Re#ards
and (ncentives ,und and a Revenue -erformance .valuation 'oard in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and emplo&ees to e+ceed their revenue targets.
1ection / <canali$ed #ithin banks that keep it from overflo#ing<
!9
the delegated po#er to the
-resident to fi+ revenue targetsE
1.). /. !ewards and ncentives ,*nd. G A Re#ards and (ncentives ,und, hereinafter referred to
as the ,und, is hereb& created, to be sourced from the collection of the '(R and the '*) in
e+cess of t5$4" "$s7$6t48$ "$8$0u$ t/"g$ts o! t5$ &$/", /s 1$t$"#40$1 :& t5$ D$8$%o7#$0t
Bu1g$t /01 *oo"140/t40g *o##4tt$$ DB**(, in the follo#ing percentagesE
.+cess of )ollection of the
.+cess the Revenue Targets
-ercent (A) of the .+cess )ollection to
Accrue to the ,und
3"A or belo# G 1A
4ore than 3"A G 1A of the first 3"A plus !"A of the
remaining e+cess
The ,und shall be deemed automaticall& appropriated the &ear immediatel& follo#ing the &ear
#hen the revenue collection target #as e+ceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal &ear.
R$8$0u$ t/"g$ts s5/%% "$!$" to t5$ o"4g40/% $st4#/t$1 "$8$0u$ 6o%%$6t4o0 $@7$6t$1 o! t5$
BIR /01 t5$ BO* !o" / g48$0 !4s6/% &$/" /s st/t$1 40 t5$ Bu1g$t o! +@7$014tu"$s /01
Sou"6$s o! )40/0640g B+S)( su:#4tt$1 :& t5$ P"$s41$0t to *o0g"$ss. The '(R and the
'*) shall submit to the 0')) the distribution of the agenciesB revenue targets as allocated
among its revenue districts in the case of the '(R, and the collection districts in the case of the
'*).
+++ +++ +++ (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection e+pected respectivel& of the '(R
and the '*) for a given fiscal &ear as approved b& the 0')) and stated in the '.1, submitted b& the
-resident to )ongress.
3"
Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solel& on the
-resident as it also undergoes the scrutin& of the 0')).
*n the other hand, 1ection 9 specifies the limits of the 'oardBs authorit& and identifies the conditions
under #hich officials and emplo&ees #hose revenue collection falls short of the target b& at least 9.A
ma& be removed from the serviceE
1.). 9. +owers and ,*nctions of the Board. # The 'oard in the agenc& shall have the follo#ing
po#ers and functionsE
+++ +++ +++
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for "$#o840g !"o# s$"846$ o!!464/%s /01 $#7%o&$$s
<5os$ "$8$0u$ 6o%%$6t4o0 !/%%s s5o"t o! t5$ t/"g$t :& /t %$/st s$8$0 /01 / 5/%! 7$"6$0t
7.5A(, <4t5 1u$ 6o0s41$"/t4o0 o! /%% "$%$8/0t !/6to"s /!!$6t40g t5$ %$8$% o! 6o%%$6t4o0 as
provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this Act, su:=$6t to 6484% s$"846$ %/<s,
"u%$s /01 "$gu%/t4o0s /01 6o#7%4/06$ <4t5 su:st/0t48$ /01 7"o6$1u"/% 1u$ 7"o6$ssE
-rovided, That the follo#ing e+emptions shall appl&E
1. @here the district or area of responsibilit& is ne#l&%created, not e+ceeding t#o &ears
in operation, as has no historical record of collection performance that can be used as
basis for evaluation8 and
!. @here the revenue or customs official or emplo&ee is a recent transferee in the middle
of the period under consideration unless the transfer #as due to nonperformance of
revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue targetsE -rovided, ho#ever, That
#hen the district or area of responsibilit& covered b& revenue or customs officials or
emplo&ees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about b& natural calamities
or force ma-e*re or economic causes as ma& be determined b& the 'oard, termination
shall be considered onl& after careful and proper revie# b& the 'oard.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance #ith the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraphE
-rovided, That such decision shall be immediatel& e+ecutor&E -rovided, further, That t5$
/77%46/t4o0 o! t5$ 6"4t$"4/ !o" t5$ s$7/"/t4o0 o! /0 o!!464/% o" $#7%o&$$ !"o# s$"846$ u01$"
t54s A6t s5/%% :$ <4t5out 7"$=u146$ to t5$ /77%46/t4o0 o! ot5$" "$%$8/0t %/<s o0
/66ou0t/:4%4t& o! 7u:%46 o!!46$"s /01 $#7%o&$$s, su65 /s t5$ *o1$ o! *o01u6t /01 +t546/%
St/01/"1s o! Pu:%46 O!!46$"s /01 +#7%o&$$s /01 t5$ A0t4BG"/!t /01 *o""u7t P"/6t46$s
A6t8
+++ +++ +++ (emphasis supplied)
)learl&, RA 933 in no #a& violates the securit& of tenure of officials and emplo&ees of the '(R and
the '*). The guarantee of securit& of tenure onl& means that an emplo&ee cannot be dismissed from
the service for causes other than those provided b& la# and onl& after due process is accorded the
emplo&ee.
31
(n the case of RA 933, it la&s do#n a reasonable &ardstick for removal (#hen the revenue
collection falls short of the target b& at least 9.A) #ith due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficienc& and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinar& action under civil service la#s.
3!
The action
for removal is also subCect to civil service la#s, rules and regulations and compliance #ith substantive
and procedural due process.
At an& rate, this )ourt has recogni$ed the follo#ing as sufficient standardsE <public interest,< <Custice
and e?uit&,< <public convenience and #elfare< and <simplicit&, econom& and #elfare.<
33
(n this case,
the declared polic& of optimi$ation of the revenue%generation capabilit& and collection of the '(R and
the '*) is infused #ith public interest.
S$7/"/t4o0 O! Po<$"s
1ection 1! of RA 933 providesE
1.). 1!. .oint "on/ressional Oversi/ht "ommittee. G There is hereb& created a ;oint
)ongressional *versight )ommittee composed of seven 4embers from the 1enate and seven
4embers from the Fouse of Representatives. The 4embers from the 1enate shall be appointed
b& the 1enate -resident, #ith at least t#o senators representing the minorit&. The 4embers from
the Fouse of Representatives shall be appointed b& the 1peaker #ith at least t#o members
representing the minorit&. After the *versight )ommittee #ill have approved the implementing
rules and regulations ((RR) it shall thereafter become f*nct*s officio and therefore cease to
e+ist.
The ;oint )ongressional *versight )ommittee in RA 933 #as created for the purpose of approving
the implementing rules and regulations ((RR) formulated b& the 0*,, 0'4, 6.0A, '(R, '*) and
)1). *n 4a& !!, !""7, it approved the said (RR. ,rom then on, it became f*nct*s officio and ceased to
e+ist. Fence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the e+ecutive function of implementing and
enforcing the la# ma& be considered moot and academic.
This not#ithstanding, this might be as good a time as an& for the )ourt to confront the issue of the
constitutionalit& of the ;oint )ongressional *versight )ommittee created under RA 933 (or other
similar la#s for that matter).
The scholarl& discourse of 4r. ;ustice (no# )hief ;ustice) -uno on the concept of congressional
oversight in Macalintal v. "ommission on Elections
3/
is illuminatingE
"oncept and bases of con/ressional oversi/ht
'roadl& defined, t5$ 7o<$" o! o8$"s4g5t $#:"/6$s /%% /6t484t4$s u01$"t/>$0 :& *o0g"$ss to
$05/06$ 4ts u01$"st/0140g o! /01 40!%u$06$ o8$" t5$ implementation o! %$g4s%/t4o0 4t 5/s
$0/6t$1. *%$/"%&, o8$"s4g5t 6o06$"0s post-enactment #$/su"$s u01$"t/>$0 :& *o0g"$ss9 /(
to #o04to" :u"$/u6"/t46 6o#7%4/06$ <4t5 7"og"/# o:=$6t48$s, :( to 1$t$"#40$ <5$t5$"
/g$064$s /"$ 7"o7$"%& /1#404st$"$1, 6( to $%4#40/t$ $@$6ut48$ </st$ /01 14s5o0$st&, 1( to
7"$8$0t $@$6ut48$ usu"7/t4o0 o! %$g4s%/t48$ /ut5o"4t&, /01 1( to /ss$ss $@$6ut48$
6o0!o"#4t& <4t5 t5$ 6o0g"$ss4o0/% 7$"6$7t4o0 o! 7u:%46 40t$"$st.
The po#er of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative po#er itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic s&stem of government. + + + + + + +
+ +
*ver the &ears, )ongress has invoked its oversight po#er #ith increased fre?uenc& to check the
perceived <e+ponential accumulation of po#er< b& the e+ecutive branch. '& the beginning of
the !"
th
centur&, )ongress has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authorit& to the
e+ecutive branch and the administrative agencies. )ongress, thus, uses its oversight po#er to
make sure that the administrative agencies perform their functions #ithin the authorit&
delegated to them. + + + + + + + + +
"ate/ories of con/ressional oversi/ht f*nctions
The acts done b& )ongress purportedl& in the e+ercise of its oversight po#ers ma& be divided
into three categories, namel&E scr*tiny, investi/ation and s*pervision.
a. Scr*tiny
)ongressional scr*tiny implies a lesser intensit& and continuit& of attention to
administrative operations. (ts primar& purpose is to determine econom& and efficienc& of
the operation of government activities. (n the e+ercise of legislative scrutin&, )ongress
ma& re?uest information and report from the other branches of government. (t can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agenc& involved.
+++ +++ +++
b. "on/ressional investi/ation
@hile congressional scrutin& is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that
are readil& available, con/ressional investi/ation involves a more intense di//in/ of
facts. The po#er of )ongress to conduct investigation is recogni$ed b& the 19:9
)onstitution under section !1, Article H(, +++ +++ +++
c. Le/islative s*pervision
The third and most encompassin/ form b& #hich )ongress e+ercises its oversight po#er is thru
legislative supervision. <1upervision< connotes a continuing and informed a#areness on the part
of a congressional committee regarding exec*tive operations in a given administrative area.
@hile both congressional scrutin& and investigation involve in?uir& into past exec*tive branch
actions in order to influence future e+ecutive branch performance, con/ressional s*pervision
allows "on/ress to scr*tini%e the exercise of dele/ated law0ma'in/ a*thority, and permits
"on/ress to retain part of that dele/ated a*thority.
"on/ress exercises s*pervision over the exec*tive a/encies thro*/h its veto power. t typically
*tili%es veto provisions when /rantin/ the +resident or an exec*tive a/ency the power to
prom*l/ate re/*lations with the force of law. )hese provisions re1*ire the +resident or an
a/ency to present the proposed re/*lations to "on/ress, which retains a 2ri/ht2 to approve or
disapprove any re/*lation before it ta'es effect. 1uch legislative veto provisions usuall& provide
that a proposed regulation #ill become a la# after the e+piration of a certain period of time,
onl& if )ongress does not affirmativel& disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Dess
fre?uentl&, the statute provides that a proposed regulation #ill become la# if )ongress
affirmativel& approves it.
S*pporters of le/islative veto stress that it is necessar& to maintain the balance of po#er
bet#een the legislative and the e+ecutive branches of government as it offers la#makers a #a&
to delegate vast po#er to the e+ecutive branch or to independent agencies #hile retaining the
option to cancel particular e+ercise of such po#er #ithout having to pass ne# legislation or to
repeal e+isting la#. The& contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountabilit& as it
provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. *ne proponent
thus e+plainsE
(t is too late to debate the merits of this delegation polic&E the polic& is too deepl&
embedded in our la# and practice. (t suffices to sa& that the comple+ities of modern
government have often led )ongress%#hether b& actual or perceived necessit&% to
legislate b& declaring broad polic& goals and general statutor& standards, leaving the
choice of polic& options to the discretion of an e+ecutive officer. )ongress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the Cudgment of parties #ho ma& or
ma& not have participated in or agreed #ith the development of those aims.
)onse?uentl&, absent safeguards, in man& instances the reverse of our constitutional
scheme could be effectedE )ongress proposes, the .+ecutive disposes. *ne safeguard, of
course, is the legislative po#er to enact ne# legislation or to change e+isting la#. 'ut
#ithout some means of overseeing post enactment activities of the e+ecutive branch,
)ongress #ould be unable to determine #hether its policies have been implemented in
accordance #ith legislative intent and thus #hether legislative intervention is
appropriate.
(ts opponents, ho#ever, critici%e the le/islative veto as u01u$ $06"o/65#$0t u7o0 t5$
$@$6ut48$ 7"$"og/t48$s. The& urge that /0& 7ostB$0/6t#$0t #$/su"$s u01$"t/>$0 :& t5$
%$g4s%/t48$ :"/065 s5ou%1 :$ %4#4t$1 to s6"ut40& /01 408$st4g/t4o0? /0& #$/su"$ :$&o01
t5/t <ou%1 u01$"#40$ t5$ s$7/"/t4o0 o! 7o<$"s gu/"/0t$$1 :& t5$ *o0st4tut4o0. The&
contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the -residentBs veto
authorit& and intrusion into the po#ers vested in the e+ecutive or Cudicial branches of
government. -roponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation of po#ers as it
prevents the e+ecutive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much po#er.
The& submit that reporting re?uirements and congressional committee investigations allo#
)ongress to scrutini$e onl& the e+ercise of delegated la#%making authorit&. The& do not allo#
)ongress to revie# e+ecutive proposals before the& take effect and the& do not afford the
opportunit& for ongoing and binding e+pressions of congressional intent. (n contrast, legislative
veto permits )ongress to participate prospectivel& in the approval or disapproval of
<s*bordinate law< or those enacted b& the e+ecutive branch pursuant to a delegation of authorit&
b& )ongress. The& further argue that legislative veto <is a necessar& response b& )ongress to
the accretion of polic& control b& forces outside its chambers.< (n an era of delegated authorit&,
the& point out that legislative veto <is the most efficient means )ongress has &et devised to
retain control over the evolution and implementation of its polic& as declared b& statute.<
(n mmi/ration and 3at*rali%ation Service v. "hadha, t5$ U.S. Su7"$#$ *ou"t "$so%8$1 t5$
8/%414t& o! %$g4s%/t48$ 8$to 7"o84s4o0s. The case arose from the order of the immigration Cudge
suspending the deportation of )hadha pursuant to I !//(c)(1) of the (mmigration and
6ationalit& Act. The 3nited 1tates Fouse of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the
suspension pursuant to I !//(c)(!) authori$ing either Fouse of )ongress, b& resolution, to
invalidate the decision of the e+ecutive branch to allo# a particular deportable alien to remain
in the 3nited 1tates. The immigration Cudge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement
the Fouse order and the alien #as ordered deported. The 'oard of (mmigration Appeals
dismissed the alienBs appeal, holding that it had no po#er to declare unconstitutional an act of
)ongress. The 3nited 1tates )ourt of Appeals for 6inth )ircuit held that the Fouse #as #ithout
constitutional authorit& to order the alienBs deportation and that I !//(c)(!) violated the
constitutional doctrine on separation of po#ers.
*n appeal, the 3.1. 1upreme )ourt declared I !//(c)(!) unconstitutional. But t5$ *ou"t s54$1
/</& !"o# t5$ 4ssu$ o! s$7/"/t4o0 o! 7o<$"s and instead held that the provision violates the
presentment clause and bicameralism. (t held that the one%house veto #as essentiall& legislative
in purpose and effect. As such, it is subCect to the procedures set out in Article ( of the
)onstitution re?uiring the passage b& a maCorit& of both Fouses and presentment to the
-resident. + + + + + + + + +
T#o #eeks after the "hadha decision, the )ourt upheld, in memorandum decision, t#o lo#er
court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the 6atural 5as -olic& Act of 199:
and the ,ederal Trade )ommission (mprovement Act of 19:". ,ollo#ing this precedence, lo#er
courts invalidated statutes containing legislative veto provisions although some of these
provisions re?uired the approval of both Fouses of )ongress and thus met the bicameralism
re?uirement of Article (. (ndeed, some of these veto provisions #ere not even e+ercised.
3
(emphasis supplied)
(n Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the po#er of congressional oversight and
considering the nature and po#ers of a constitutional bod& like the )ommission on .lections, the )ourt
struck do#n the provision in RA 91:9 (The *verseas Absentee Hoting Act of !""3) creating a ;oint
)ongressional )ommittee. The committee #as tasked not onl& to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of the said la# but also to revie#, revise, amend and approve the (RR promulgated b&
the )ommission on .lections. The )ourt held that these functions infringed on the constitutional
independence of the )ommission on .lections.
37
@ith this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessaril& constitutes an encroachment on the e+ecutive po#er to implement la#s nor
undermines the constitutional separation of po#ers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic s&stem of government. (t ma& in fact even enhance the separation of po#ers as
it prevents the over%accumulation of po#er in the e+ecutive branch.
Fo#ever, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment <be&ond the legislative sphere,< the
)onstitution imposes t#o basic and related constraints on )ongress.
39
(t ma& not vest itself, an& of its
committees or its members #ith either e+ecutive or Cudicial po#er.
3:
And, #hen it e+ercises its
legislative po#er, it must follo# the <single, finel& #rought and e+haustivel& considered, procedures<
specified under the )onstitution,
39
including the procedure for enactment of la#s and presentment.
Thus, an& post%enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutin& and
investigation. (n particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the follo#ingE
(1) scrutin& based primaril& on )ongressB po#er of appropriation and the budget hearings
conducted in connection #ith it, its po#er to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard b& either of its Fouses on an& matter pertaining to their departments and its po#er of
confirmation
/"
and
(!) investigation and monitoring
/1
of the implementation of la#s pursuant to the po#er of
)ongress to conduct in?uiries in aid of legislation.
/!
An& action or step be&ond that #ill undermine the separation of po#ers guaranteed b& the )onstitution.
Degislative vetoes fall in this class.
Degislative veto is a statutor& provision re?uiring the -resident or an administrative agenc& to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a la# to )ongress #hich, b& itself or through a
committee formed b& it, retains a <right< or <po#er< to approve or disapprove such regulations before
the& take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an in#ard%turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutin& and investigation) to an agenc& to #hich )ongress has b& la# initiall& delegated broad
po#ers.
/3
(t radicall& changes the design or structure of the )onstitutionBs diagram of po#er as it
entrusts to )ongress a direct role in enforcing, appl&ing or implementing its o#n la#s.
//
)ongress has t#o options #hen enacting legislation to define national polic& #ithin the broad hori$ons
of its legislative competence.
/
(t can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the e+ecutive branch
the responsibilit& for making necessar& managerial decisions in conformit& #ith those standards.
/7
(n
the latter case, the la# must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions #hen it leaves the
hands of the legislature.
/9
Thus, #hat is left for the e+ecutive branch or the concerned administrative
agenc& #hen it formulates rules and regulations implementing the la# is to fill up details
(supplementar& rule%making) or ascertain facts necessar& to bring the la# into actual operation
(contingent rule%making).
/:
Administrative regulations enacted b& administrative agencies to implement and interpret the la#
#hich the& are entrusted to enforce have the force of la# and are entitled to respect.
/9
1uch rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute
"
and are Cust as binding as if the& have been #ritten in the
statute itself. As such, the& have the force and effect of la# and enCo& the presumption of
constitutionalit& and legalit& until the& are set aside #ith finalit& in an appropriate case b& a competent
court.
1
)ongress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, ma& not pass upon their legalit& b&
subCecting them to its stamp of approval #ithout disturbing the calculated balance of po#ers
established b& the )onstitution. (n e+ercising discretion to approve or disapprove the (RR based on a
determination of #hether or not the& conformed #ith the provisions of RA 933, )ongress arrogated
Cudicial po#er unto itself, a po#er e+clusivel& vested in this )ourt b& the )onstitution.
*o0s41$"$1 O7404o0 o!
-". 'ust46$ D/0t$ O. T40g/
4oreover, the re?uirement that the implementing rules of a la# be subCected to approval b& )ongress
as a condition for their effectivit& violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the
rule on presentment.
!
1ection 1, Article H( of the )onstitution statesE
1ection 1. T5$ %$g4s%/t48$ 7o<$" s5/%% :$ 8$st$1 40 t5$ *o0g"$ss o! t5$ P54%47740$s <5465
s5/%% 6o0s4st o! / S$0/t$ /01 / 3ous$ o! R$7"$s$0t/t48$s, e+cept to the e+tent reserved to the
people b& the provision on initiative and referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Degislative po#er (or the po#er to propose, enact, amend and repeal la#s)
3
is vested in )ongress
#hich consists of t#o chambers, the 1enate and the Fouse of Representatives. A valid e+ercise of
legislative po#er re?uires the act of both chambers. )orrollaril&, it can be e+ercised neither solel& b&
one of the t#o chambers nor b& a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validit& of
a legislative veto, both a single%chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto
are invalid.
Additionall&, 1ection !9(1), Article H( of the )onstitution providesE
1ection !9. (1) +8$"& :4%% 7/ss$1 :& t5$ *o0g"$ss s5/%%, :$!o"$ 4t :$6o#$s / %/<, :$
7"$s$0t$1 to t5$ P"$s41$0t. (f he approves the same, he shall sign it, other#ise, he shall veto it
and return the same #ith his obCections to the Fouse #here it originated, #hich shall enter the
obCections at large in its ;ournal and proceed to reconsider it. (f, after such reconsideration, t#o%
thirds of all the 4embers of such Fouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
#ith the obCections, to the other Fouse b& #hich it shall like#ise be reconsidered, and if
approved b& t#o%thirds of all the 4embers of that Fouse, it shall become a la#. (n all such
cases, the votes of each Fouse shall be determined b& yeas or nays, and the names of the
members voting for or against shall be entered in its ;ournal. The -resident shall communicate
his veto of an& bill to the Fouse #here it originated #ithin thirt& da&s after the date of receipt
thereof8 other#ise, it shall become a la# as if he had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
.ver& bill passed b& )ongress must be presented to the -resident for approval or veto. (n the absence
of presentment to the -resident, no bill passed b& )ongress can become a la#. (n this sense, la#%
making under the )onstitution is a Coint act of the Degislature and of the .+ecutive. Assuming that
legislative veto is a valid legislative act #ith the force of la#, it cannot take effect #ithout such
presentment even if approved b& both chambers of )ongress.
(n sum, t#o steps are re?uired before a bill becomes a la#. ,irst, it must be approved b& both Fouses of
)ongress.
/
1econd, it must be presented to and approved b& the -resident.

As summari$ed b&
;ustice (sagani )ru$
7
and ,r. ;oa?uin 5. 'ernas, 1.;.
9
, the follo#ing is the procedure for the approval
of billsE
A bill is introduced b& an& member of the Fouse of Representatives or the 1enate e+cept for
some measures that must originate onl& in the former chamber.
The first reading involves onl& a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral
b& the 1enate -resident or the 1peaker to the proper committee for stud&.
The bill ma& be <killed< in the committee or it ma& be recommended for approval, #ith or
#ithout amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. (f there are other
bills of the same nature or purpose, the& ma& all be consolidated into one bill under common
authorship or as a committee bill.
*nce reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. (t is at this stage that the bill
is read in its entiret&, scrutini$ed, debated upon and amended #hen desired. The second reading
is the most important stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are
distributed at least three da&s before the third reading. *n the third reading, the members merel&
register their votes and e+plain them if the& are allo#ed b& the rules. 6o further debate is
allo#ed.
*nce the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, #here it #ill also undergo the
three readings. (f there are differences bet#een the versions approved b& the t#o chambers, a
conference committee
:
representing both Fouses #ill draft a compromise measure that if
ratified b& the 1enate and the Fouse of Representatives #ill then be submitted to the -resident
for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled #hen printed as finall& approved b& the )ongress, thereafter authenticated
#ith the signatures of the 1enate -resident, the 1peaker, and the 1ecretaries of their respective
chambersJ
9

)he +resident(s role in law0ma'in/.
The final step is submission to the -resident for approval. *nce approved, it takes effect as la#
after the re?uired publication.
7"
@here )ongress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the la# it has enacted pursuant to
sufficient standards established in the said la#, the la# must be complete in all its essential terms and
conditions #hen it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it ma& be deemed to have left the hands of
the legislature #hen it becomes effective because it is onl& upon effectivit& of the statute that legal
rights and obligations become available to those entitled b& the language of the statute. 1ubCect to the
indispensable re?uisite of publication under the due process clause,
71
the determination as to #hen a
la# takes effect is #holl& the prerogative of )ongress.
7!
As such, it is onl& upon its effectivit& that a
la# ma& be e+ecuted and the e+ecutive branch ac?uires the duties and po#ers to e+ecute the said la#.
'efore that point, the role of the e+ecutive branch, particularl& of the -resident, is limited to approving
or vetoing the la#.
73
,rom the moment the la# becomes effective, an& provision of la# that empo#ers )ongress or an& of
its members to pla& an& role in the implementation or enforcement of the la# violates the principle of
separation of po#ers and is thus unconstitutional. 3nder this principle, a provision that re?uires
)ongress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a la# after it has alread& taken effect
shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allo#s )ongress or its members to overturn an&
directive or ruling made b& the members of the e+ecutive branch charged #ith the implementation of
the la#.
,ollo#ing this rationale, 1ection 1! of RA 933 should be struck do#n as unconstitutional. @hile there
ma& be similar provisions of other la#s that ma& be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the
)ourt refrains from invalidating them #holesale but #ill do so at the proper time #hen an appropriate
case assailing those provisions is brought before us.
7/
The ne+t ?uestion to be resolved isE #hat is the effect of the unconstitutionalit& of 1ection 1! of RA
933 on the other provisions of the la#K @ill it render the entire la# unconstitutionalK 6o.
1ection 13 of RA 933 providesE
1.). 13. Separability "la*se. G (f an& provision of this Act is declared invalid b& a competent
court, the remainder of this Act or an& provision not affected b& such declaration of invalidit&
shall remain in force and effect.
(n )atad v. Secretary of the Department of Ener/y,
7
the )ourt laid do#n the follo#ing rulesE
The /eneral r*le is that #here part of a statute is void as repugnant to the )onstitution, #hile
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, ma& stand and be enforced.
The presence of a separabilit& clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature
intended separabilit&, rather than complete nullit& of the statute. To Custif& this result, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature #ould have enacted it b& itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionall&
enact the other. .nough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, #hich
carries out the legislative intent. + + +
The exception to the /eneral r*le is that #hen the parts of a statute are so mutuall& dependent
and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to #arrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a #hole, the nullit& of one part #ill
vitiate the rest. (n making the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected #ith one
another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a #hole and #ould not have
enacted it if one part is void, in #hich case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other
provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall #ith them.
The separabilit& clause of RA 933 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach an&
invalid provision from the other provisions so that the latter ma& continue in force and effect. The valid
portions can stand independentl& of the invalid section. @ithout 1ection 1!, the remaining provisions
still constitute a complete, intelligible and valid la# #hich carries out the legislative intent to optimi$e
the revenue%generation capabilit& and collection of the '(R and the '*) b& providing for a s&stem of
re#ards and sanctions through the Re#ards and (ncentives ,und and a Revenue -erformance
.valuation 'oard.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to
enforce or implement e+isting la# pursuant to a valid delegation. The (RR of RA 933 #ere published
on 4a& 3", !""7 in t#o ne#spapers of general circulation
77
and became effective 1 da&s thereafter.
79
3ntil and unless the contrar& is sho#n, the (RR are presumed valid and effective even #ithout the
approval of the ;oint )ongressional *versight )ommittee.
23+R+)OR+, the petition is hereb& PARTIALLY GRANT+D. 1ection 1! of RA 933 creating a
;oint )ongressional *versight )ommittee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the la#
is declared UN*ONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and .OID. The constitutionalit& of the
remaining provisions of RA 933 is UP3+LD. -ursuant to 1ection 13 of RA 933, the rest of the
provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORD+R+D.