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Marx's Comments on Animal
Welfare
Ryan Gunderson
Published online: 14 Sep 2011.
To cite this article: Ryan Gunderson (2011) Marx's Comments on Animal Welfare,
Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 23:4, 543-548, DOI:
10.1080/08935696.2011.605286
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2011.605286
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Remarx
Marxs Comments on Animal Welfare
Ryan Gunderson
Karl Marx has been charged by some to have been speciesist or anthropocentric,
radically favoring human emancipation at the expense of animals. This assertion
stems in part from his critical comments concerning animal welfare. This essay
concisely reviews Marxs remarks on animal welfare, arguing that they are a critique
of bourgeois hypocrisy and social reformism and should not be interpreted as
negative comments against concern for animal cruelty itself.
Key Words: Karl Marx, Marxism, Speciesism, Animal Welfare, Animals and Society
In the past two decades within Marxist sociology, political economy, and philosophy, a
reemphasis on Marxian application to ecological understanding and environmental
concern has surfaced. A debate regarding Marxs value in ecosocial critique has
erupted. Not surprisingly, perspectives within this debate are vast and divided.
Viewpoints range from claiming that Marx was entirely anti-ecological and that his
social-ecological outlook corresponded with Stalinist practice, to asserting that Marx
and Engels were the only writers to have developed a science of the kind that is now
needed for an adequate understanding of environmental issues (Dickens 1992, xiv).
(For an overview of the surrounding camps of the Marx-nature debate, see Foster
1999, 3712; for a fair variety of outlooks see Dickens 1992; Benton 1996; OConnor
1998; Burkett 1999; Foster 2000.)
One of the chief criticisms leveled against Marxs supposedly anti-ecological position is
that he was anthropocentric or a speciesist, drastically favoring human freedom at
the expense of animals (for the chief criticisms leveled against Marx, see Foster 2000, 9
10, and for a convincing denunciation of Marxs supposed anthropocentrism, 1620). This
criticism has been articulated from two angles: Marx pronounced an unbridgeable,
antagonistic conceptual and political disparity between humans and animals (Benton
1993; Perlo 2002), and he made negative comments about animal welfare (Eckersley
1996; Best 2006). The former claim has received a fair amount of analysis and critique
ISSN 0893-5696 print/1475-8059 online/11/040543-22
2011 Association for Economic and Social Analysis
RETHINKING MARXISM VOLUME 23 NUMBER 4 (OCTOBER 2011)
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while the latter has remained mostly unexplored, though Marxs comments on animal
welfare illuminate an element of his political ecology. Below, the debate surrounding
Marxs human/animal distinction is briefly reviewed, and the validity and context of
Marxs critical statements about animal welfare are clarified.
Humans and Animals in the 1844 Manuscripts
To begin, I feel that the reader would benefit from a succinct overview of the debate
surrounding Marxs human/animal distinction. Benton (1993) claimed that Marxs
distinction between humans and animals, set forth in The Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx 1964b), constitutes a dualism, or, that Marx believed
humans and animals have mutually exclusive natures. Benton further suggested that
Marxs critique of private property, account of humanitys uniqueness as species-
being, and analysis of estranged labor and its hopeful resolution were grounded in a
fundamental human opposition to animals because he argued that capitalism stunted
human potential to immediate or animal needs and functions (Benton 1993, 23,
26). Others have taken up this position, going so far as to call it an ideological
violence done to animals (Perlo 2002, 304). However, many of the statements made
by Marx were more metaphorical than empirical, and he acknowledged that we, as
humans, share these animal functions, and merely opposes the idea that this is all
there is for human beings (Sztybel 1997, 172). More important, just because Marx
argues that animals live under the dominion of immediate physical need, this carries
no implication that their needs are not to be respected (Wilde 2000, 45). Further,
Sayers has reminded us that the distinction set by Marx between human and animal
productivity can be understood as one of degree (2003, 109). A qualitative distinction
such as Marxs cannot properly be labeled a dualism, and in no way implies a future
political opposition between humans and animals.
Ultimately, I believe the criticisms lobbed at Marx reflect (1) the postmodern
obsession with politically correct and sensitive language clashing with Marxs
sometimes callous style and (2) the fact that many animal liberationists feel
accepting any discontinuity between human and animal inherently degrades the
case for animal liberation. However, Marxs account of human uniqueness as a
reflective and creative labor with capacity for a rational, planned production is the
most adequate clarification of why humans have the potential to one day free
animals. Concurrently, his critique of capitalisms one-sided utilitarian logic of
expansion, profit maximization, and accumulation offers the best explanation of why
animals experience such barbaric amounts of torment under current agricultural
conditions.
Marx on Animal Welfare
To my knowledge, there are only two passages in which Marx critiques animal welfare.
One is found in the first volume of Capital (Marx 1977) and the other in the Manifesto
544 GUNDERSON
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of the Communist Party (Marx and Engels 1978). Both are directed at the Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), the oldest and self-
proclaimed leading animal welfare charity (RSPCA 2010). It should be noted here
that when I refer to animal welfare, it is broadly denoting the praxis of animal
welfarism, when understood as seeking to treat animals compassionately while being
utilized for human use without objecting to human utilization of animals in general.
In other words, it is the ideology of those who accept most current uses of animals,
but seek to minimize their suffering and pain (Jasper and Nelkin 1992, 8). The RSPCA
simply signifies this praxis and, for our purposes, could be replaced by whichever
animal welfare organization one wishes.
Animal Welfare as Bourgeois Hypocrisy
In the first volume of Capital, Marx cited, to some extent, an appeal of a worker to a
capitalist to reduce his working day based on a manifesto of the London building worker
strike of 185960: You may be a model citizen, perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A.,
and you may be in the odour of sanctity as well; but the thing you represent when you
come face to face with me has no heart in its breast. What seems to throb there is my
own heartbeat. I demand a normal working day because, like every other seller, I
demand the value of my commodity (Marx 1977, 343).
The message inherent in the reference to the RSPCA is simple, but should not be
vulgarized. The point is not that the suffering of animals is only a concern of the
bourgeoisie, but instead that the duality that is associated with a capitalist
concerned with animal welfare is inherently hypocritical and ironic. As noted, the
London building workers committee published a manifesto that contained, to some
extent, the plea of our worker. The manifesto alludes, not without irony, to the fact
that the greatest profit-monger among the building masters, a certain Sir M. Peto,
was in the odour of sanctity, meaning, Handsome and good: ancient Greek
expression for an aristocrat (3434). Thus, Marxs reference is inferring that the
bourgeoisie may feign nobility through such means as joining an animal welfare
organization while concurrently exploiting workers. Marxs reconstruction of the
workers appeal can be seen as a class-conscious and less crude precedent to
Nietzsches critique of Voltaire and Schopenhauer, which asserted that they knew
how to disguise [their] hatred of certain things and persons as mercy towards
animals (Nietzsche 2001, 97).
1
Animal Welfare as Social Reformism
The third section of the Manifesto of the Communist Party contains Marx and Engelss
critique of other socialisms, which is split into three subsections: Reactionary
1. On the note of Schopenhauer, Max Horkheimers critical social philosophy, deemed
Schopenhauerian Marxism, has much to offer in the Marxist tradition, as his emphasis on
pity and compassion frequently flows over into mercy toward animals (Vandenberghe 2009, 164).
REMARX 545
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Socialism (1978, 491), Conservative, or Bourgeois, Socialism (496), and Critical-
Utopian Socialism and Communism (497). The second subsection is essentially a
critique of social reformism or socialisms that look to maintain the present status
quo (Draper 1990, 176). In it, Marx and Engels produced a short list of those they
deemed bourgeois socialists: economists, philanthropists, humanitarians, improvers
of the condition of the working class, organizers of charity, members of societies for the
prevention of cruelty to animals, temperance fanatics, hole-and-corner reformers of
every imaginable kind (1978, 496). Again, the underpinning of this list is the emphasis
on social reformists or those who desire the existing state of society minus its
revolutionary and disintegrating elements (496). As construed by Marx and Engels,
animal welfare is inherently reformist as the goal is vaguely to alter existing social
relations while maintaining existing social conditions and social structure, or to want
all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers
necessarily resulting therefrom (496).
To reason that Marx was thus unconcerned with animal suffering under capitalism
because he included members of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals
in his analysis would be as illogical as to claim that he was unconcerned with worker
suffering under capitalism because he included improvers of the condition of the
working class. Reform has never been opposed by Marxists, but reformism*that is,
desiring to improve yet maintain the current social order*always has.
2
The point is
to completely revolutionize and supplant current conditions rather than preserve
these conditions. I see no reason why this should exclude our interactions with
animals.
Conclusion
From these two passing and critical comments concerning animal welfare, it is highly
problematic to conclude that Marx was anthropocentric or a speciesist, or that
he believed concerns for animal cruelty to be a bourgeois matter, as one may
speculate at first glance. Instead, it appears that he is critiquing bourgeois hypocrisy
2. Interestingly, Marxs critique of animal welfare as social reformism is shared by many animal
rightists and liberationists. However, their insistence on individualist lifestyle politics (e.g.,
ethical vegetarianism) and, in more radical corners, direct action and property destruction,
presupposes that the solution to animal subjection can be reached within the constraints of
capitalism. Marxist revolutionary praxis may offer a valuable alternative. If the abolition of
bourgeois private property is the theory of the Communists, what would this mean for
animals if put into practice (Marx and Engels 1978, 484; my emphasis)? I believe Marxs position
can be found in his approving quotation of the peasant revolutionary, Thomas Muntzer, who
declared that it is intolerable that every creature should be transformed into property*the
fishes in the water, the birds of the air, the plants of the earth: the creature too should become
free (quoted in Marx 1964a, 37).
546 GUNDERSON
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and social reformism, not concern for animal cruelty itself. It is much too early for
those interested in human/animal associations to rule out Marxist theory as a
legitimate theoretical and methodological structure to work within or to reject
Marxist revolutionary praxis as a legitimate option for fundamentally improving our
relations with animals. Additionally, Marxists should not continue to avoid the sticky
animal question, as it has been sidestepped even in the reemphasis on Marxist
ecology.
3
References
Benton, T. 1993. Natural relations: Ecology, animal rights and social justice. New
York: Verso.
***, ed. 1996. The greening of Marxism. New York: Guilford.
Best, S. 2006. Rethinking revolution: Animal liberation, human liberation, and the
future of the Left. International Journal of Inclusive Democracy 2 (3).
Burkett, P. 1999. Marx and nature: A red and green perspective. New York: St.
Martins Press.
Dickens, P. 1992. Society and nature: Towards a green social theory. New York:
Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Draper, H. 1990. Karl Marxs theory of revolution. Vol. 4. Critique of other
socialisms. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Eckersley, R. 1996. Socialism and ecocentrism: Toward a new synthesis. In The
greening of Marxism, ed. T. Benton, 27397. New York: Guilford.
Foster, J. B. 1999. Marxs theory of metabolic rift: Classical foundations for
environmental sociology. American Journal of Sociology 105 (2): 366405.
***. 2000. Marxs ecology: Materialism and nature. New York: Monthly Review
Press.
Jasper, J. M., and D. Nelkin. 1992. The animal rights crusade: The growth of a moral
protest. New York: Free Press.
Marx, K. 1964a. On the Jewish question. In Karl Marx: Early writings, ed. T. B.
Bottomore, 140. New York: McGraw-Hill.
*** 1964b. The economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. New York:
International Publishers.
*** 1977. Capital. Vol. 1. New York: Vintage.
Marx, K., and F. Engels. 1978. Manifesto of the Communist party. In The Marx-Engels
reader, ed. R. C. Tucker, 469500. New York: W.W. Norton.
Nietzsche, F. 2001. The gay science. New York: Cambridge University Press.
OConnor, J. 1998. Natural causes: Essays in ecological Marxism. New York: Guilford.
Perlo, K. 2002. Marxism and the underdog. Society and Animals 10 (3): 30318.
3. Recent Marxist ecological writings are some of the most important and exciting works to
come from Marxist thinkers in the past two decades. Unfortunately, the opportunity to assess
and criticize capitals debasement of animals from a Marxist perspective has been almost wholly
ignored. As Perlo has rightly asserted, [t]o read such writers [green Marxists], you might think
that the planet was occupied overwhelmingly by human, vegetable, and mineral forms with only
the occasional (endangered or polluted) animal poking a nose through the shrubbery (2002,
312). This gap in Marxist work may in part stem from the difficult question of moral duties to
animals*the sticky animal question.
REMARX 547
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RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). 2010. About us.
http://www.rspca.org.uk/in-action/aboutus (accessed 22 July 2010).
Sayers, S. 2003. Creative activity and alienation in Hegel and Marx. Historical
Materialism 11 (1): 10728.
Sztybel, D. 1997. Marxism and animal rights. Ethics and the Environment 2 (2): 169
85.
Vandenberghe, F. 2009. A philosophical history of German sociology. New York:
Routledge.
Wilde, L. 2000. The creatures, too, must become free: Marx and the animal/
human distinction. Capital & Class 72: 3753.
The Affective Turn in Pedagogy: The Ecstatic Teacher and
Other Stories
Stephen Tumino
Every year the Modern Language Association of America, which gives (or denies)
legitimacy to ideas and practices in the teaching of the humanities in the United
States (which is then followed in most other institutions abroad), publishes a book
entitled Profession. Profession 2008 is no exception: it is a collection of essays that,
in the name of debating various modes of teaching, produces what is in effect a
coerced consensus*a consensus that, for example, inhibits critique and contesta-
tions of ideas (Rita Felski, Gerald Graff, Peter Brooks), limits experimental modes of
knowledge (Stopping Cultural Studies), and offers empty talk about humanities
and human rights without ever offering a critique that would make it clear that
human rights are essentially rights to own and trade in the free market. Instead
of offering a survey of Profession 2008, I focus on the structure which shapes the
different discourses that explain what is behind the consensus*what I call the
pedagogy of affect.
Key Words: Modern Language Association, Affect, Pedagogy, Humanities, Class
Every year the Modern Language Association of America (MLA), which gives (or denies)
legitimacy to ideas and practices in the teaching of the humanities in the United
States (which is then followed in most other institutions abroad), publishes a book
titled Profession. Profession 2008 is no exception: it is a collection of essays that, in
the name of debating various modes of teaching, produces what is in effect a coerced
consensus*a consensus that, for example, inhibits critique and contestations of
ideas (Rita Felski, Gerald Graff, Peter Brooks), limits experimental modes of
knowledge (Stopping Cultural Studies), and offers empty talk about humanities
and human rights without ever offering a critique that would make it clear that
human rights are essentially rights to own and trade in the free market.
DOI: 10.1080/08935696.2011.605286
548 TUMINO
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