G.R. No.

L-20442 October 4, 1971

CIRIACO ROBLES, v. YAP WING

FACTS:
Appeal in Forma Pauperis a legal action without having to pay for
court fees or costs due to an indigents lack of financial resources.
taken by Robles from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila dated September 12, 1962, dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Robles was an employee of Yap in its contracting business. On July
6, 1961 at about 1:30 p.m. while Robles was dismantling lumber
brace in the construction of a bodega which Yap undertook to
construct, Yap negligently failed to provide safety measures within
the construction premises, as a result of which a piece of lumber fell
and hit Robles on the head, causing him physical injuries; Robles
was taken to a medical clinic, where he remained unconscious for
several hours; Yap defrayed Robles medical expenses; since then
Robles was unable to work, thereby losing his expected earnings at
an average of P39.00 a week or a total of P2,340.00, more or less,
up to the filing of the complaint; that because of the physical
injuries sustained by Robles due to Yap's negligence, he suffered
mental anguish, anxiety, fright and pain; and that because he was
compelled to hire the services of a lawyer he is entitled to recover
attorney's fees.

ISSUE:
Is the negligence committed by Yap a quasi-delict? No.

RULING:
The suggestion has been made that there is in this case a claim for
moral damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the negligence
of the defendant and that such damages do not come within the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It should be pointed
out first, that the negligence alleged in the complaint consists of the
defendant's failure "to provide safety measures within the
construction premises," the nature of which negligence is precisely
covered by Section 4-A of the same Act, which makes the employer
liable to pay additional compensation (of 50%) to the claimant-
employee for failure "to install and maintain safety appliances, or
take other precautions for the prevention of accident or
occupational disease." Secondly, the alleged negligence was not a
quasi-delict in as much as there was a pre-existing contractual
relation of employer and employee between the parties (Art. 2176,
Civil Code); and in breaches of contract moral damages may be
recovered only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith (Art. 2220), and neither fraud nor bad faith is alleged in the
complaint here. In any event, whether or not such an allegation, in
relation to the breach of a contract of employment by the
employer, resulting in injury to an employee or laborer, would
justify a claim for moral damages and place it within the jurisdiction
of ordinary courts is a question which we do not decide in this case,
not being the issue involved.

FRANCISCO V. ONRUBIA, 46 Phil 327
Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises

FACTS:
In November 1922, Onrubia was driving his car in Calle Ascarraga,
Manila and he run over Anselmo, 9 year old son of Francisco which
led to his sons death. Francisco sued Onrubia for homicide through
reckless imprudence. Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties, the trial
judge rendered judgment, dismissing the case without costs, on the ground
that, the defendant having been acquitted in the criminal case for not having
been guilty of any fault, negligence, or carelessness, no judgment can be
rendered against him for the damages arising from the same facts. Now
Francisco filed a separate civil suit for damages against Onrubia for
P4.5k. Onrubia assailed the civil suit arguing that Francisco did not
reserve the right to file a separate civil case against him. Francisco
grounded the civil suit on Article 1902 which states that Any
person who by an act or omission causes damages to another by his
fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Onrubia is civilly liable.

RULING:
No. In order to establish the civil liability in a criminal case, it is
necessary that the same spring from, or be a consequence of, the
criminal liability, and, therefore, if a defendant is acquitted of a
crime, a judgment, sentencing him to pay a determinate indemnity
by reason of the same crime is not possible. A person, not criminally
liable for a crime or misdemeanor cannot be civilly liable. The full
and complete acquittal of Onrubia implies his innocence of, and
freedom from responsibility for, the crime of which he was accused.
Though there is another provision of the Civil Code (Article 1093)
which states that Those arising from wrongful or negligent acts or
omissions not punishable by law shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter Second of Title Sixteen of this book., and said chapter
contains Article 1902, it is necessary that the negligence or fault in
question be not punished by law. This is not the case in the case at
bar; the negligence complained of in this case is punishable by law,
however, said negligence does not exist on the part of Onrubia.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 118889, 23 March 1998, 287 SCRA 718

FACTS:
This was a two-car collision at dawn. At around 3 o'clock of 21 April
1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising
northward along
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic
accident. The car bearing Plate No. PDG 435 owned by Lydia F.
Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by
Benjamin Jacildone,
while the other car, with Plate No. PCT 792, owned by respondent
FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as
lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon
approaching the
corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the
right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-
Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's license.
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of
its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By
way of
subrogation, 2 it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as
respondent Fortune Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of
FILCAR for quasi-delict before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl- Jensen since
he was no longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion
of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.
On 30 July 1991 the trial court dismissed the case for failure of
petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.
On 31 January 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only
the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently proved but
not that of
respondent FILCAR, petitioner failed to establish its cause of action
for sum of money based on quasi-delict.

ISSUE:
For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on
quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company and,
consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in
driving the rented vehicle?

RULING:
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing To sustain a claim
based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage
suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant;
and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred
by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e.,
fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or
negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of
FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of
Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen
swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the
center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to
Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle
his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein.

PICART v SMITH, 37 Phil 809
Torts and Damages Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

FACTS:
In December 1912, Picart was riding his horse and while they were
on a 75 meter long bridge, he saw Smiths car approaching. Smith
blew his horn thrice while he was still at a distance away because
Picart and his horse were on Smiths lane. But Picart did not move
his horse to the other lane, instead he moved his horse closer to the
railing. Smith continued driving towards Picart without slowing
down and when he was already so near the horse he swerved to the
other lane. But the horse got scared so it turned its body across the
bridge; the horse struck the car and its limb got broken. Picart
suffered injuries which required several days of medical attention
while the horse eventually died.
Appreciable
ISSUE:
Whether or not Smith is negligent.

RULING:
Yes. And so was Picart for planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But Smiths negligence succeeded that of Picart. Smith saw at
a distance when he blew his horn that Picart and his horse did not
move to the other lane so he should have steered his car to the
other lane at that point instead of swerving at the last minute. He
therefore had the last clear chance to avoid the unfortunate
incident. When Smiths car has approached the horse at such
proximity it left no chance for Picart extricate himself and vigilance
on his part will not avert injury. Picart can therefore recover
damages from Smith but such should be proportioned by reason of
his contributory negligence.

AFIALDA v. HISOLE, ET AL., 85 Phil 67
Torts and Damages Liability of possessors or users of animals
Assumption of Risk

FACTS:
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Hisole. On
March 21, 1947, while tending the animals, neither due to his fault
nor force majeure , one of the carabaos gored him to death.
Afialdas sister sued Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, The
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for
any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from
him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage
should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who
may have suffered it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the
carabao which killed Afialda.

RULING:
No. The law uses the term possessor and user of the animal.
Afialda was the caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and paid
to tend for the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the
possessor and the user of the carabao and therefore he is the one
who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to
prevent the animal from causing damage. It would have been
different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury
or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the
animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he
must take the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court
under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act as the
risk involve was one of occupational hazards.

WALTER SMITH & CO. v CADWALLADER GIBSON, 55 Phil 517

FACTS:
A steamer Helen C belonging to Cadwallader struck Smiths old
wharf being moored by its captain in the port of Olutanga,
Zamboanga, partially demolishing it and throwing the lumber piled
thereon in the water. Smith brought suit against Cadwallader for
damages to the wharf and the loss of the lumber. Cadwallader
maintained that Captain Lasa and all the officers of his steamer
were duly licensed and authorized to hold their respective positions
at the time wharf in question collapsed, and that all the members of
the crew had been chosen for their reputed skill in directing and
navigating the steamer carefully and efficiently.

ISSUE:

Is Cadwallader Lumber liable for damages due to negligence?

RULING:
No. The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiffs
wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate
and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that Cadwallader
contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain. This
being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability
against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain
Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court
Cadwallader is therefore absolved from all liability.
as the weight of the 60,000 board feet of lumber piled
thereon, after such slight impact by the steamer against
the dock, might have caused said piles to lean toward that
side.
We are of opinion that this finding is supported by the evidence.
In this connection, it is to be noted that the witness, Dionisio
Pascua (for the plaintiff) testified that the 60,000 board feet
occupied one-fourth of the wharf. In other words, by the testimony
of the plaintiff's witnesses it has been proved that the plaintiff
company piled up on the wharf a quantity of timber which
exceeded its capacity of resistance, because if the whole wharf
had a capacity of 100,000 board feet of timber, one-fourth of it
could sustain one-fourth of that amount, or, about 25,000 board
feet of timber. But it appears that the plaintiff company loaded
60,000 board feet, weighing over 100 tons, within a space
capable of supporting only 25,000 board feet. This must have
helped to bring about the collapse of the wharf on the eastern
side and the consequent sliding down of the timber piled up on
one side.

[G.R. No. L-7801. April 13, 1956.]
Testate Estate of Da. Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano. DOLORES
ALBORNOZ, Petitioner. ELIAS RACELA, claimant-Appellant, vs.
DOLORES ALBORNOZ and JOSE ALBORNOZ, co- special
administrators Oppositors-Appellees.

D E C I S I O N
LABRADOR, J.:
The present appeal refers to two claims presented by Elias Racela
against the estate of the deceased Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano and
which were dismissed by the trial court. The first claim is based on a
supposed sale of one hectare of land for P1,000 executed by the
decedent on July 18, 1933 in favor of the claimant. The second is
based on another supposed sale of another part of the Defendants
land for P1,000 also, in favor of the claimant, made on September
23, 1933. The supposed sales appear in two deeds marked Exhibits
A and B. After the supposed sales were made, the decedent
sold the same parcels of land in 1934 to one Soriano Ballesteros,
who succeeded in registering the deed of sale in his favor. Claimant
attempted to register the deeds executed in his favor but the
decedent opposed registration. So claimant brought a criminal
action against the decedent for estafa (Criminal Case No. 6406 of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte). The court acquitted the
decedent of the charge, a portion of the decision and the dispositive
part thereof is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court believes that Elias Racela has not handed over any
amount of money to Vda. Soriano as payment of the alleged sale of
lands.
Is the claim of Racela that Vda. Soriano awarded him the two
parcels of land entitle him to dispose of such lands? The Court on
the basis of the facts set out above, is of the opinion no land was
sold to Racela.
x x x x x x x x x
"In light of the above facts, the court doubts the truth of the theory
of the charge and, therefore, the decedent is entitled to the benefit
of the doubt. But the court shall not deprive Racela of his right to
bring a civil action against the Vda. Soriano, if he has not been paid
of his fees for services rendered.
After the presentation of the Plaintiff in the court below, the Judge,
upon motion of counsel for the Defendant, dismissed the action in
the following words:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is seen from Exhibit 1 that the criminal action for estafa against
the deceased Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano was founded on Exhibits
A and B and C, the deeds of sale, and the present claim of the
claimant is also founded on the same exhibits with the exception of
Exhibit C which was not presented by the said claimant, having
been substituted by him with his own oral testimony. Therefore, the
inevitable conclusion is that the acquittal of the deceased- accused,
Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano, produces the effect of exemption of
her estafa from any civil liability.
FOR THE FOREGOING, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the
claim of Elias Racela is DISMISSED.
WITHOUT COSTS.
It is against the above judgment that this appeal has been
prosecuted. Claimant-Appellant argues that the judgment of
acquittal in the criminal action was based on reasonable doubt and
therefore it cannot amount to a judicial declaration that the fact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. A study of the
judgment of acquittal in the said criminal action readily discloses
that the decedent did not sell any land to Elias Racela and that the
deeds of sale Exhibits A and B were executed by the decedent in
order to enable Elias Racela to convince the residents of a barrio
that the decedent could freely dispose of his properties. Witness
the following portions of the judgment, Exhibits 1.
"The only question to be resolved in this case is whether the accused
had been sold to Elias Racela the two plots of land that describes the
exhibitos 'A' and 'B' respectively. To resolve this issue, the Court
understands that not only must adhere to the above-mentioned
exhibitos but also to the version of the defense witnesses and the
financial status of the accused.
If it were true that Racela delivered the money amount stated in the
alleged deed of sale, it is not clear how payment was made because
of the words stated in Exhibit B ' and services rendered after the
words ' One Thousand Pesos Philippine Currency, hence reveal that
what Racela paid to Vda Soriano was payment for services
rendered, and not payment of land.
The theory upon which the present claim of Elias Racela is based is
that the deceased sold the parcels of land to Elias Racela and the
latter paid the deceased the price therefor or P2,000. The above-
quoted portions of the decision clearly indicate that no actual sale
was made and that the deeds Exhibits A and B were executed
for another purpose and were, therefore, simulated sales. The
judgment in the criminal action, therefore, contains an express
declaration that the basis of claimants action for P2,000, or the
sales of said parcels of land to the claimant and the receipt by the
decedent therefor for P2,000, did not exist. Claimants action is
barred under section 1 (d), Rule 107, which provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist cralaw ..
In view of the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the
claim of the claimant-Appellant that he had submitted sufficient
evidence to sustain Defendants liability. The judgment appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the claimant.
G.R. No. L-7801. April 13, 1956, 98 Phil 785
Testate Estate of Da. Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano. DOLORES
ALBORNOZ, Petitioner. ELIAS RACELA, claimant-Appellant, vs.
DOLORES ALBORNOZ and JOSE ALBORNOZ, co- special
administrators Oppositors-Appellees.

FACTS:
Elias Racela filed a claim against the estate of the deceased
Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano and which were dismissed by the CFI of
Ilocos Norte. The first claim is based on a supposed sale of one
hectare of land for P1,000 executed by the decedent on July 18,
1933 in favor of the claimant. The second is based on another
supposed sale of another part of the Vda. Sorianos land for P1,000
also, in favor of the claimant, made on September 23, 1933. After
the alleged sales were made, Vda. Soriano sold the same parcels of
land in 1934 to one Soriano Ballesteros, who succeeded in
registering the deed of sale in his favor. Claimant attempted to
register the deeds executed in his favor but the decedent opposed
registration. So claimant brought a criminal action against Vda.
Soriano for estafa. The court acquitted the Vda. Soriano of estafa
and is exempt from any civil liability.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt of Vda. De
Soriano carries with it the extinction of any civil liability?

RULING:
A study on the judgment of acquittal in the said criminal action
disclosed the fact that decedent did not sell any land to Racela, the
deeds of sale were executed by the decedent in order to enable
Racela to convince the residents of Barrio de Biding, Dingras Ilocos
Norte that the decedent can dispose of his properties, clearly
indicate that no actual sale was made and that the deeds were
executed for another purpose and were, therefore, simulated sales.
If it were true that Racela delivered the money amount stated in the
alleged deed of sale, it is not clear how payment was made because
of the words stated in Exhibit B 'and services rendered after the
words ' One Thousand Pesos Philippine Currency, reveal that what
Racela delivered to Vda Soriano was payment for services
rendered, and not payment of land.
The judgment in the criminal action, therefore, contains an express
declaration that the basis of claimants action for P2,000, or the
sales of said parcels of land to the claimant and the receipt by the
decedent therefor for P2,000, did not exist. Claimants action is
barred under section 1 (d), Rule 107, which provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist cralaw ..

BARREDO v GARCIA AND ALMARIO, 73 Phil 607
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability
from Crimes

FACTS:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a
kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos
parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the
owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on
Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that
his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should
have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him. In fact it is
shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared in the records of
the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

RULING:
No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil
action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in
suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action
and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no
property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his
employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed
to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file
a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily
liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a
criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

ZULUETA v PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, 45 SCRA 397

FACTS:
Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendants
plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the
passengers were advised that they could disembark for a stopover
for about 30 minutes. Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal
building but finding it full walked 200 yards away. Upon returning
he told an employee of the defendant that they almost made him
miss the flight because of a defective announcing system. He had a
discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal manager. He
was told that they would open his bags which he refused and he
warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his
bags and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the
plane and left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money
and he was able to leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru
Honolulu and Tokyo after two days. This action was to recover
damages from the defendant.

RULING:
The records amply establish plaintiffs right to recover both moral
and exemplary damages. Indeed, the rude and rough reception
plaintiff received at the hands of Sitton or Captain Zentner when the
latter met him at the ramp (What in the hell do you think you are?
Get on that plane); the menacing attitude of Zentner or Sitton and
the supercilious manner in which he had asked plaintiff to open his
bags (open your bag, and when told that a fourth bag was missing,
I dont give a damn); the abusive language and highly scornful
reference to plaintiffs as monkeys by one of PAN AMs employees
(who turning to Mrs. Zulueta remarked, will you pull these three
monkeys out of here?); the unfriendly attitude, the ugly stares and
unkind remarks to which plaintiffs were subjected, and their being
cordoned by men in uniform as if they were criminals, while plaintiff
was arguing with Sitton; the airline officials refusal to allow plaintiff
to board the plane on the pretext that he was hiding a bomb in his
luggage and their arbitrary and high-handed decision to leave him in
Wake; Mrs. Zuluetas having suffered a nervous breakdown for
which she was hospitalized as a result of the embarrassment, insults
and humiliations to which plaintiffs were exposed by the conduct of
PAN AMs employees; Mrs. Zulueta having suffered shame,
humiliation and embarrassment for the treatment received by her
parents at the airport all these justify an award for moral damages
resulting from mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation thereby suffered by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were awarded Pesos 500,000.00 and moral damages,
Pesos 200,000.00 exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 attorneys
fees and Pesos 5,502.85 actual damages.


AIR FRANCE v CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
FACTS:
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round
trip ticket from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the
Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat
because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.

As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila
granted him moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and
consequently, whether or not he was entitled to the damages
awarded. YES

RULING:
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air
carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the
court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France
could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
business that the company should know whether or not the tickets
it issues are to be honored or not."

Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part
of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France
to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition
but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether
or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly
ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger
whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad faith.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness,
respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be
protected against personal is conduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuse from such employees. Any discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment
fits into the condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose