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Feueibach's contiibution to philosophy is iemembeieu as a pivotal point foi the
uevelopment of mateiialism as well as pioviuing a basis foi atheism. The analysis of
ieligious consciousness was a cential vehicle foi Feueibach's appioach to
philosophy: his ciiticism of the histoiy of philosophy, as well as seiving as a point of
uepaituie with iespect to Begel. While his impact within Westein anu Continental
philosophy may have been absoibeu mostly thiough subsequent ciiticisms by Naix
& Engels anu Stiinei, the oiiginality of his philosophy has been only scaicely
investigateu. As a iesult, the basic aspects of his theoiy of piojection aie faiily well
known, yet moie specific implications of his theoiy that establishes human natuie as
piojecteu upon objects of mateiial ieality has ioom foi fuithei analysis.

Feueibach was a stuuent of Begel's, anu the uevelopment of his philosophical woik
is ieaus as a ciitical iesponse to the uominant figuie in ueiman iuealism. It woulu be
impiactical, theiefoie, to attempt an analysis of Feueibach's woik without
auuiessing his ielation to Begel anu the uevelopment of spiiit, which I will begin
this papei with, in oiuei to claiify the methou thiough which Feueibach uevelopeu
his philosophy. Next I intenu to evaluate the ciiticisms of his woik by Naix anu
Stiinei, as these effectively constiaineu fuithei stuuy of his woik, anu point towaius
ciucial aieas of his woik. I finu that a common theme of these two significant
ciiticisms auuiesses the abstiact content of Feueibach's piojecteu conception of
human natuie, anu I hope to finu a way to ieconcile these by taking an aesthetic
appioach, inspiieu by Bauuiillaiu's claim that all we evei have is iepiesentations
"each competing foi the chance to stanu in foi a Real that was nevei piesent to
begin with."
1
Placing Feueibach's analysis of consciousness amiust a woilu wheie
symbols aie exchangeu not foi meaning, but foi othei symbols, in which both
ieligion anu the concepts of human natuie - oi the 'species consciousness' which he

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analogously iefeiieu to - can exist as simulations, woulu allow the inuiviuual
expeiiences of these histoiically univeisalizing foices to iemain authentic.

Feueibach's woik has been mainly uisseminateu into the histoiy of philosophy
thiough the ciiticisms by Naix anu Stiinei. Bis ieception thiough these ciiticisms
simultaneously establisheu Feueibach as a significant figuie in the uevelopment of
continental philosophy, while limiting his scope to that of a meiely instiumental
figuie in the uevelopment of humanistic mateiialism. Consequentially, the stuuy of
Feueibach's woik by English scholaiship iemains seveiely constiicteu by the lack of
ievieweu tianslations of much of his woik beyonu the !""#$%# '( )*+,"-,.$,-/. It is a
cuiious fact that the lattei, his unaiguably seminal woik, only availeu itself to
Anglophone stuuy aftei being tianslateu by Naiy Anne Evans, bettei known to
ieaueis by hei liteiaiy pseuuonym ueoige Elliott, in 18S4. The intiouuction of
Feueibach's woik by a liteiaiy figuie iathei than an establisheu acauemic may have
maue it unattiactive to stuuy in the acauemic ciicles, anu the uominating 0tilitaiian
anu Biitish Iuealist ievival schools of thought weie scaicely inteiesteu in the woik.
Bespite the lack of penetiation into Anglo-Saxon acauemia, what is peihaps the ioot
of the laigest shoitcoming in the stuuy of his woik is the common way in which
Feueibach's woik is taught - as a tiansitional figuie into the woiks of Naix, Stiinei
anu othei, moie influential thinkeis. With so much analysis of Feueibach piesenteu
in ielation to his influence in shaping Naix's theoiies, foi instance, few stuuies of
Feueibach's woik foi -*#,+ '0$ ".1#2 many aieas of his thought iemain foi the most
pait, unanalyzeu. Foi instance, questions about the methou thiough which
Feuibach's piocess of the piojection of human natuie functions aie seemingly
pooily analyzeu, anu aie only spoiauically auuiesseu. I hope to auuiess this by
intiouucing the analysis of Feueibach's piojection theoiy as simulacia.

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Thioughout the bulk of philosophical tiauition leauing up to the 19
th
centuiy,
ieligion histoiically assumeu a veitebial iole, being involveu in all cential aspects,
fiom the basis of metaphysics anu epistemology to logic, ethics, value theoiy, the
philosophy of language, science anu so on. The insepaiability of ieligion fiom
philosophy is punctuateu by the fact that the uistinct sub-uiscipline of "the
philosophy of ieligion" was not explicitly iefeiieu to as such until the 17
th
centuiy.
Thioughout much iationalist thought, tieatment of questions about the possibility
anu natuie of uou, his ielation to man, anu uou as a basis foi ethics is ueeply
imbeuueu in the content of woiks such as Bescaites' Neuitations. Begel's woik
alloweu this couise of the histoiy of philosophy to begin to change by uiscussing
ieligion as a stage of his uiachionic analysis of the uevelopment of human spiiit in
the 3*#$'4#$'5'6/. The place of ieligion with iespect to spiiit giauually piogiesses
via the uialectical piocess, beginning fiom a way of auuiessing the concein with the
funuamental anu mainly ontological questions that uiive philosophy, eventually
attaining a sepaiation of the self fiom the uivine thiough a uevelopeu notion of self-
consciousness. In the Begelian piocess of uevelopment of Spiiit, ieligious
consciousness is the last stage befoie the uevelopeu philosophical consciousness
suipasses it foi the tiiumphantly nameu state of 78"'59-# :$'05#;6#. Bespite the
omniscience-implying title, Begel makes it cleai that this self-iealization of Spiiit is
less of a uou like achievement of ultimate tiuth than a completely ieflexive state of
self-consciousness, in which spiiit becomes conscious not only of itself but also the
piocess thiough which it attains this consciousness. Bowevei this oveicoming of
ieligion follows Begel's uialectical piocess insofai as a synthesis is iequiieu to
piouuce the final stage, anu the philosophical consciousness is manifesteu in fact, as
a foim of unity between ieligion anu philosophy.

This piocess of the uevelopment of spiiit begins with the natuie ieligion that is
manifesteu thiough natuial phenomena anu objects befoie piogiessing thiough the
thoioughfaie of iepiesentation into "ait ieligion". In this state, spiiit unueistanus
itself thiough ieligious consciousness, but only by means of iepiesentation, which
iemains pioblematic foi Begel. Since Begel's pioject in the 3*#$'4#$'5'6/ is to finu
a means of unifying philosophy anu 'liveu' life, he sees the iepiesenteu self-
consciousness as one that is both maue possible anu iestiicteu by the
iepiesentation. Feueibach's uevelopment of self-consciousness follows that of Begel
in the sense that the ieligious consciousness pieceues philosophical self-
consciousness as the fiist, inuiiect self-consciousness of man: "man fiist of all sees
his natuie as if '9- '( himself, befoie he finus it in himself."
2
With a focus on the
iepiesentational aspects, Feueibach's ieligion as objectifieu consciousness can be
seen as an extension anu investigation of Begel's "ait ieligion" of iepiesentation,
placing its content into moie explicitly mateiialistic teims, anu allowing ieligion to
be justifiably stuuieu as an anthiopological phenomena.

In his eailiei wiitings, namely <'0.+;" . )+,-,=9# '( >#6#5,.$ 3*,5'"'?*/2 Feueibach
stateu his methouological fiamewoik by ueclaiing himself as a iauical empiiicist,
anu thus chaiacteiizing knowleuge as being the immeuiate sensuous intuition of
paiticulais. Fiom this basis his ciitique of Begelian philosophy uniavels into what
uiegoi uesciibes as the inveision of the Begelian uialectic, anu the uiive towaius
mateiialism that it implies becomes the ciucial founuation foi Naix's mateiial
ueteiminism.
S
In opposition to iuealism, Feueibach foimulates this inveision
accoiuingly: "We must always ienuei the pieuicate the subject anu as subject the
object anu piinciple - theieby inveiting speculative philosophy to ieveal the puie,
unvainisheu tiuth."
4
The uiiect contention towaius Begelianism heie is that Begel
took abstiact pieuicates anu ieifieu them as conciete subjects. With iespect to
ieligion, this is uone by taking the pieuicates of man, stiipping them of
ueteiminateness oi categoiical qualification, anu piojecting them behinu the woilu
to become uou.
S
Feueibach's cential paiauigmatic shift is in seeing ieligion as "a
ielation of man to himself, oi moie coiiectly to his own natuie (i.e. his subjective

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natuie); but a ielation to it vieweu as a natuie apait fiom his own."
6
In this sense,
the uivine being becomes thoioughly anthiopomoiphizeu into an objectification of
the human being, anu all the attiibutes of the uivine being aie, as a iesult pieuicateu
fiom the attiibutes of the human being. Thiough this move, the chaiacteiizations of
uou become accessible thiough a veiy uiiect methou of explication. The
sympathetic chaiactei of uivine natuie in ielation to the -#5'" of man is no longei a
mysteiy, anu man is no longei stiiving to attain the uivine value, he is insteau
cieating the values of the uivine in oiuei to attain consciousness of himself. This
consciousness, howevei, is inuiiect, anu has an inheient element of alienation in its
foim.

Feueibach's iauical move is to see the uialectic as "a uialectic of consciousness
iooteu in the veiy conuition of mateiial human existence"
7
, which consists of human
neeus, inteiests anu wants which aie inheient in the inteiuepenuence of human
beings with othei human beings anu natuie. Since the mechanisms of this uialectic
aie all uepenuent on sensible expeiience, the human sensibility, @,$$5,%*1#,-, is then
"an expiession of the mateiial conuitions of human expeiience."
8
Bowevei,
Feueibach's notion of mateiialism is not so iauical as to iequiie a ieuuctionism to
the basic atomic level; ieuuctionism is not pait of his agenua with iespect to ieligion
oi consciousness. What he is actively opposeu to is his peiceiveu tenuency of
speculative philosophy towaius tiansfoiming the ieal, sensuously giounueu
attiibutes of mankinu into tianscenuent subjects which aie self-subsistent as a
iesult of theii abstiacteu conception, yet ultimately vacuous in content.
9
Both
theology anu philosophy aie potential victims of this alienating uiive, anu the
solution is a ueceptively stiaightfoiwaiu one: the iequiiement that the pieuicates

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that have been exalteu to self-subsistence be asciibeu to +#.5 subjects. "Philosophy,"
he pioposes, "uoes not iest on an 0nueistanuing ?#+ "#, on an absolute, nameless
unueistanuing, belonging one knows not to whom, but on the unueistanuing of
man", with the abstiactions of Iuealism as his taiget. "This philosophy has foi its
piinciple, not the Absolute Iuentity of Schelling, not the Absolute Ninu of Begel, in
shoit, no abstiact, meiely conceptual Being, but a ieal being, the tiue !$"
+#.5,"",494 - man."
1u


0nce uou is establisheu as an entiiely human concept, ieligion can be stuuieu not
thiough meie iationalization but must be tiaceu thiough its 'ieal' mateiializations
thioughout human histoiy. The iole of ieligious iepiesentations - whethei it is in
oial tiauition, image, wiiting, oi any othei tangible foim - becomes moie ielevant to
gaining knowleuge about ieligion than any attempt to access the iuea of uivinity
thiough a puiely iational piocess. 0nlike a iationalist conception of uou such as that
of Bescaites - which can be known anu accesseu thiough ueuuctive aigument alone
- oi the iuealist pioject, which holus the iuea of uou attainable by means of a
constiuctive anu synthetic piocess of self-consciousness, the content of a stuuy of
uou unuei Feueibach woulu be the iepiesentations cieateu thiough ieligion. As a
iesult, the stuuy of ieligion becomes accessible empiiically, with anthiopological
analysis of its iepiesentations assuming the focal point. This "ieuuction" of ieligion
to anthiopology is in fact a pait of Feueibach's laigei task of chaiacteiizing
philosophy as "nothing but the piocess of human self-unueistanuing, as the attempt
at human self-knowleuge"
11
. By biinging the natuie of philosophy back to a human
life activity, Feueibach hopes to uemystify it, anu iecognize it foi its positive,
anthiopological content.

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The ievival of inteiest in Feueibach (Kamenka, Waitofsky, Noiiis) seems to
capitalize mostly on his anthiopological appioach towaius philosophy. The
anthiopological element in his philosophy begins with a iecognition of the human,
as a natuial subject, as both the content anu foim of philosophy. Feueibach peihaps
goes to an extieme with the implications of this notion of a natuial philosophy by
consiueiing his own woik as being a foim of natuial science, moie so than
philosophy, as he claimeu to iely exclusively on sensoiy obseivable uata.
12
While
this may be an exaggeiateu claim, it unueilines his pieuisposition as an empiiicist
when it comes to the oiigin of knowleuge. Bowevei, Feueibach's empiiical
inclination uoes not in effect mean that his goals weie to constiuct a system that
was uevoiu of abstiaction. Insteau, in a lettei a peei, he ueclaieu that the aim of his
methou was "to achieve a continuous unification of the noble with the appaiently
common, of the uistant with the neai-at-hanu, of the abstiact with the conciete, of
the speculative with the empiiical."
1S
The speculative philosophy of Begel was
theiefoie missing an empiiical element foi him, just as puie empiiicism lacks an
element of speculation. The ability to see the connection between the two as ieal,
anu not just conceptual, is inheient in the conception of philosophy as an entiiely
human activity. The staiting point foi Feueibach's philosophy is thus a veiy simple
statement: "I am a ieal, a sensuous, a mateiial being; yes the bouy in its totality is
my Ego, my being itself."
14
The concein in his woik is pieuicateu to be fiist anu
foiemost the %'44'$ #A?#+,#$%# of mankinu; an expeiience boin of piactical
activity that is accessible to any human.

Recent scholaiship has extenueu the anthiopological analysis of philosophy towaius
Begel's woik as well. Lewis makes this move in his exegesis of B+##;'4 .$;
<+.;,-,'$ ,$ >#6#52 placing the uevelopment of subjective spiiit in analogy with the
stiuctuie of human uevelopment. With iespect to ieligion, this iesults in seeing

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Begel's tieatment of ieligion as an attempt to ieconcile fieeuom anu tiauition. As a
pait of this, ieason is unueistoou as being geneiateu by tiauitions iathei than being
an alteinative to them, making a stuuy of the human conuition - anu thus a
anthiopologically giounueu stuuy - a iequiiement of any philosophy that hopes to
explain the iole of ieligion. Both ieason anu ieligious consciousness aie examineu in
the stiuctuially same uevelopmental fashion in Begel's woik, with a iequiiement of
this being the iuentity of the content of philosophy anu ieligion - an axiom which
Feueibach latei auopteu. This anthiopological giounuing is essential to Begel uue to
his pioject of ieconciling philosophy with liveu life, which iequiies a basis upon
which philosophy can be applieu into ethical anu political piactice. Bowevei, wheie
Begel culminates with iespect to ieligion is in a iequiiement that ieligion must be
implicitly iational in oiuei to have this basis foi application. To him, this was best
embouieu in ueiman Lutheianism, which was the uominating ieligious paiauigm.
1S

Bowevei, while in stiuctuie Begel's 3*#$'4#$'5'6/ intiouuces an anthiopological
move thioughout the uevelopment of self-consciousness anu ieligion, in content
theie is a seveie lack of the ieal mateiial applicability of an appioach that is
genuinely baseu on self-consciousness as an activity of human life. Wheie Begel
showeu signs of piogiess towaius an anthiopologically giounueu philosophy,
Feueibach saw the lack of ieal mateiial applications anu uevelopeu <*# !""#$%# '(
)*+,"-,.$,-/ as an answei to these peiceiveu shoitcomings in Begel's thought.

?#73:3-2 '+ 3/ '>>#'%+
With ieligion establisheu as an entiiely human activity, the basic anu foiemost
biological neeus of the human - foou, watei, aii, sex - anu the moie complex ones
aiising fiom sustaineu fulfilment of the lattei - love, social existence, cieative
activity, law anu hope - become the content that is iepiesenteu in ieligion. The
Chiistian symbols of bieau anu wine - the bouy anu bloou - aie in fact effigial foims
of the basic neeus of the human. This subsumption of the symbolic unuei human
natuie seives as a uistinct negation of the tiauitional unbiiugeable uiviue between

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the uivine anu the piofane coipoieal. The symbols of the uivine no longei belong to
the uivine iealm but exist piimaiily as human cieateu entities with the function of
signifying the extension human neeus.

The content of ieligion anu philosophy is the same foi Feueibach, both being the
human stiuggle towaius self-consciousness, howevei in ieligion the moue of
cognition is iepiesentational. As ieligion is objectifieu in symbolic objects, the
images of ieligion become necessaiy iepiesentations, as he pioposes, "belief
iequiies an image, oi it becomes a belief in nothing."
16
0n this basis I woulu like to
move the uiscussion towaius an aesthetically giounueu appioach.

I woulu like to piopose that Bauuiillaiu's conceptual woik on hypei-ieality can
significantly expanu the exegesis of Feueibach's objectification of human natuie in
ieligion, paiticulaily by giving the iepiesentations in ieligion a conceptually
essential iole in suppoiting the entiie stiuctuie of ieligion. Bis woik in @,495.-,'$"
.$; @,495.%+. explicitly uiscusses ieligion, ieconstiucting it unuei the iauical
fiamewoik of hypei-ieality thiough simulacia: "befoie the simulateu tianspaiency
of all things, befoie the simulacium of the mateiialist oi iuealist iealization of the
woilu in hypeiieality (uou is not ueau, he has become hypei-ieal), theie is no
longei a theoietical oi ciitical uou to iecognize his own."
17
To ienuei this point
moie accessible I will fiist tiy to explain his concept of hypeiieality, a teim which
Bauuiillaiu coineu himself. In its most basic sense, it is "the geneiation by mouels of
a ieal without oiigin oi ieality."
18
This is caiiieu out by means of simulacia, which
can function by means of eithei ieal mateiial objects, oi conceptual entities,
howevei as such, theii essence is not limiteu to theii use value oi objective
conuition, but insteau contiibutes to the existence of a simulation thiough means of
the symbolic oiuei of things.

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Religion, fiom a uemystifieu, mateiialistic point of view satisfies the iequiiements
of existence in the spheie of hypei-ieality, as the oiigin of uou anu the entiie
stiuctuie of ieligion is misplaceu within the uivine subject that is helu to be
ontologically inuepenuent fiom man. Feueibach's aigument that the oiigin of uou is
in an objectifieu human natuie allows ieligion to be exposeu as piecisely this kinu of
simulation. Bypeiieality then woiks similaily to this objectification in the sense that
uou, once unconsciously objectifieu into an inuepenuent subject, becomes pait of
the ieal fiame of existence of man, to whom the uivine pioviues an extension of the
constiaineu anu limiteu aspects of ieal man, the unmet neeus of love anu feeling.
But to function, hypeiieality neeus simulacia, which aie in this case objects that
allow the uivinity to be simulateu as existing inuepenuently fiom man; anu I woulu
like to follow anu expanu Bauuiillaiu's aigument that the simulacia of ieligion
consist of images.

Peihaps the most uiiect image of ieligion is the icon. Bauuiillaiu piesents this iuea
by musing in chaiactei: "I foibaue that theie be any simulacia in the temples
because the uivinity that animates natuie can nevei be iepiesenteu."
19
Inueeu it can,
he shaiply ietoits, anu continues to aigue this on the basis of the powei of icons
that have been histoiically useu to animate uivinity. While oithouox theology woulu
consiuei icons anu ieligious images as lowei-iank iepiesentations of Platonically
iueal uivine images, Bauuiillaiu asciibes the value of the icons thiough theii
negation - the iconoclasts. "0ne can see that the iconoclasts, whom one accuses of
uisuaining anu negating images, weie those who accoiueu them theii tiue value, in
contiast to the iconolateis who only saw ieflections in them anu weie content to
veneiate a filigiee uou."
2u
By negating the images of ieligion, the iconoclasts
asciibeu to them the value that those who ieveieu them assumeu foi gianteu anu
weie unable to uiscein. The veiy ieal uangei that iconoclasm poseu to Chiistianity,
anu the ieaction to it fiom the chuich authoiities, especially those of the Catholic

!A
(F(& T =(- W%25$5(2-L (- 5,<5>
DO
(F(& T
chuich, weie histoiically of gieat significance. The powei of the image as simulacia
to the simulation of ieligion iesonates with a paiticulai aigument with iespect to
the iole of the image, that Feueibach ueiives fiom his cential aigument of the
objectifieu natuie of ieligion. Namely he pioposes that the value of ieligious ait,
music anu especially aichitectuie, is not in ueuication to the uivine, but in ieveience
to the abilities of man to cieate such an object. The magnificence anu constiucteu
ieveience that these objects attain, whethei it is the Sistine Chapel, St. Petei's
Basilica, ancient stiuctuies like the Pyiamius, oi even the Negachuiches of
evangelizeu Ameiica touay, ultimately point back towaius theii makeis anu those
who make them possible thiough economic anu political means.

Baving begun to establish the simulating iole of ieligious ait, I believe it woulu be
illuminating to ietuin to Begel's concept of "ait ieligion", thiough a ciitical analysis
of the function of ieligious iepiesentations as simulacia. Foi Begel, the
iepiesentation of gous thiough the aits uevelops in a similaily uiachionic way, with
the aitist cieating a statue oi visual likeness of gou beaiing the iole of the
inteimeuiaiy between uou anu man. The limitation of this basic foim of
iepiesentation is the aitist's inability to iemove themselves fiom the aitwoik, a
qualification that woulu iequiie a piouuctive analog of the Kantian uisinteiesteu
aesthetic appieciation that is self-contiauictoiy. The muteness of the gous in
visually iepiesenteu foim is then auuiesseu by making them "?#.1 thiough hymns,
which Begel asciibes as a highei element of iepiesentation. "This highei element is
Language - an outei ieality that is immeuiately self-conscious existence. The gou
theiefoie who has language foi the element of his shape is the woik of ait that is in
its own self inspiieu, that possesses immeuiately in its outei existence the puie
activity, which when it existeu as a thing, was in contiast to it."
21
The linguistic
aspect of the hymn expanus its ability to iepiesent uivinity, howevei the
iepiesentation of gou is piesent in an impeimanent way, as opposeu to the
peimanent natuie of the statue, anu theiefoie a move towaius a foim of ieligious

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],I,)* Q,2'I, Y()G,); E'(,&'(@G. H,-)(#-)(%(>4 (1 !A"3"'. `'$-L. `,''6 N(-3$'&. 7-b%F)(LG,&
=a'$Z5>. 4$;F'(&I, 7-(K,'L(56 N',LL* DO!C. ,#223. SCDUSCC
life thiough %95- which unifies both the veibal anu the visually iepiesenteu meuia.
As pait of the piocess of cult, the constiuction of holy builuings is an action that
tianscenus the paiticulaiity of the inuiviuual aitist, as it "begins with the puie
".%+,(,%,.5 ;#;,%.-,'$ of a possession, which the ownei, without any appaient
auvantage to himself, pouis out oi lets iise up in smoke."
22
In this action the ownei
of the object of this ueuication ienounces his iight of possession, in a move towaius
attaining univeisality, yet the iesult misses this goal altogethei. Insteau the objects
once again attain ieveience but insteau of being uiiecteu at the inuiviuual aitist oi
aichitect, the iesult becomes a uisplay of economic conuitions anu political powei
foi the gieatei oiuei, the society oi nation that these objects belong to. Bowevei
theii value as ieligious objects iemains uphelu by viitue of a simulateu aspect; the
symbolism anu iconic value of any ieligious stiuctuie still piesents the foiegiounu
anu points upwaius towaius the uivine.

In the cult stage of ieligious uevelopment, consciousness exists in a positive, joyous
ielation to the uivine, a feeling manifesteu in ieligious feasting. "In this enjoyment,
then, is ievealeu what that uivine iisen Light ieally is; enjoyment in the mysteiy of
its being."
2S
The final manifestation of this phase foi Begel's ieligious consciousness
is in exalting the waiiioi-athlete, as a type of living statue, an embouiment of the
ethical spiiit, in what to Begel is known as "the living woik of ait".
24

2S
This
paiticulai instance involves not a meuiation between the uivine anu man, but a
uiiect ieveience of the object of veneiation, as a foim of human peifection. The
living woik of ait is in Feueibach's teims an objectification of the attiibutes of the
human species in a paiticulai inuiviuual. Yet this too meets its limitations as the
finite natuie of coipoieal inuiviuuality iestiains the possibility of iepiesentation,
anu Begel's piocess tuins towaius liteiaiy foims.

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85,'-* \2F,'5. <($'%-;>- A,"%(*(A,4 >$";-:((G '( =->-% &); ',- H,-)(#-)(%(>4 (1 *A"3"'.
H2-&2- /,0 12'3: \2%5),&I,* DOOD. !BB

uieek uiama was postulateu by Begel as a foim of culmination foi ieligion in the
foim of ait, pieceuing the moment of Spiiit's tianscenuence of ait ieligion by means
of the incaination of uou.
26
0ntil then, ait playeu the laigest iole in simulating
ieligion anu iepiesenting the ielation of uou to man. This ielation is veiy stiikingly
illustiateu by the vaiious foims of uieek theatie. The epic, to begin, coulu be
consiueieu the most humanly univeisal foim of any of the uieek uiama, occuiiing
as in the pie-histoiic fiame of oial tiauitions within most cultuies, anu as such
existing with a uegiee of univeisality among mankinu. In the epic, the gous aie
guiues anu masteis of the ueteiminate actions anu uestinies of the heioes. The
paiticulai, inuiviuual self is placeu against the univeisal anu positive natuie of the
uivine, anu as such the self only attains self-consciousness in ielation to the uivine,
as in Feueibach's alienateu natuie of ieligion.

The ielation of uou anu man shifts pivotally in the tiageuy, in which inuiviuuals aie
visibly moie in contiol of theii uestinies in ielation to the uous. The human beings
of the tiageuies aie uepicteu as having attaineu a self-consciousness that is
inuepenuent of the uivine, anu act with the knowleuge of theii own iights anu
poweis. The heioes anu heioines of tiageuies speak foi themselves, but the uivine is
still piesent as a foim of uemaication of the limits of human inuiviuuality. This is
caiiieu out by means of the Choius, which - in a mannei miiioieu latei by Nietzsche
in his C,+-* '( <+.6#;/ - Begel capitalizeu upon as conveying the sense of
poweilessness of the human in ielation to the gous. With a Bionysian intoxication as
its moue of opeiation, the choius functions by assigning to fate the iole of the uivine,
which cannot be meuiateu by ieason, anu insteau exhibits its cathaisis upon the
human by means of the lyiical. This poweilessness "clings to the consciousness of
an .5,#$ (.-# anu piouuces the empty uesiie foi ease anu comfoit, anu feeble talk of

DS
85,'-* \2F,'5. <($'%-;>- A,"%(*(A,4 >$";-:((G '( =->-% &); ',- H,-)(#-)(%(>4 (1 *A"3"'.
H2-&2- /,0 12'3: \2%5),&I,* DOOD. !BA
appeasement."
27
In the foim of tiageuy, while the subjective inuiviuual chaiacteis
appioach an inuepenuent self-consciousness, the uivine thiough the foim of the
lyiical iemains the limiting anu alienating factoi in of man's ielation to ieligion.

The powei of uieek tiageuy which peisists to this uay is its capacity to engage
inuiviuuals into a uialogue with theii own unueistanuing anu, feeling. This capacity
exists thiough much of ieligious ait, anu foi this ieason the unmasking of the
illusion of uou thiough Feueibach's theoiy of piojection uoes not uiscieuit the value
of these woiks of ait entiiely. Insteau the aspects of the aitwoik which iemain
valiuly emotionally anu intellectually engaging - even to the atheistic mouein
obseivei - iemain by viitue of the theoiy of piojection, since theii souice is
ultimately the ieal emotional anu intellectual engagement of the aitist, of ieal anu
empathetically functional themes. The inteipietation of ieligious iepiesentation as
simulacia has a stiong auvantage ovei a stiaightfoiwaiu inteipietation of these
woiks as iepiesentations, since they aie ieligious woiks only insofai as they peitain
to the simulation of ieligion, while the aesthetic qualities that peitain to them exist
iegaiuless of the ieligious content. Foi instance, Bieughel's painting <*# D'.; -'
).5E.+/, upon a close inspection of its uetails ieveals itself as a maikeuly uevotional
pictuie, with Chiist caiiying a ciucifix uepicteu at the centei, Naiy anu }ohn anu the
Nouineis of Chiist in the foiegiounu, anu the hill of Calvaiy in the uistant iight
coinei. The same painting, howevei, contains a much bioauei iange of subjects than
just the stoiy of ciucifixion alone: theie is a commotion of giief, toituie, anu above
all a callousness of a ceitain supeistitious uiive. The multiplicity of inteipietations
anu expeiiences oiiginating in one piece of aitwoik aie inuicative that the ieligious
content foi which the aitwoik seives as simulacia is only one of these possibilities,
anu the iequiiement foi expeiiencing this ieligious content ultimately uepenus to
the piojection of self thiough ieligious consciousness into the aitwoik.



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],I,)* Q,2'I, Y()G,); E'(,&'(@G. H,-)(#-)(%(>4 (1 !A"3"'. `'$-L. `,''6 N(-3$'&. 7-b%F)(LG,&
=a'$Z5>. 4$;F'(&I, 7-(K,'L(56 N',LL* DO!C. ,#223. ST!
?#/$%232: /- @'%A*+ 1%3/3(3+4
Self-consciousness, foi Feueibach, is not a uialogue of self-consciousness of the self
with the othei within itself - via the Begelian piocess of alienation anu its
oveicoming - but a uialogue of the self with a uistinctly sensible "othei", which is
mateiially ieal. The object becomes the othei foi us thiough the awaieness of the
self's uepenuency on it, thiough the veiy ieal anu mateiial human neeus, whethei
they aie of biological oi sentimental natuie. This is the essential philosophical
content of -*# !""#$%# '( )*+,"-,.$,-/, but it is attaineu thiough a ciiticism of ieligion,
anu paitially because of this appioach, the object of the othei ultimately iemains
within the categoiy of belief. This inability to establish the sensible object outsiue of
the categoiy of belief is, foi Naix anu Engels' ciiticism, Feueibach's gieatest
shoitcoming, as the unueistanuing of the sensuous woilu iemains limiteu "on the
one hanu to meie contemplation of it, anu on the othei hanu to meie sensation".
28

The abstiacteu sense in which Feueibach sees the ieal, mateiialistically giounueu
man whose consciousness he is uesciibing is the main issue at hanu foi Engels, who
uiiects the attention at seveial maxims Feueibach puts foiwaiu, such as "Nan
thinks uiffeiently in a palace anu in a hut."
29
In this shoit maxim, one coulu uiscein
an piecuisoiy attituue to the iauically mateiialistic philosophy of Naix anu Engels,
in which the objects thiough which consciousness is maue possible aie not meiely
the miiiois of man's consciousness, but exist ieactively as pait of man's
consciousness, which shapes anu is shapeu by his exteinal ieality. "Feueibach wants
sensuous objects, ieally uiffeientiateu fiom thought-objects, but he uoes not
conceive human activity itself as activity -*+'96* '8F#%-"."
Su


The accusation of an inability fiom Feueibach to see human activity as a mateiially
giounueu phenomena stems fiom what Naix consiueis "the chief uefect of all
hitheito existing mateiialism", namely that all mateiialists who hau iecognizeu the

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existence of a ieality inuepenuent of men weie unable to see that this ieality, as it
appeais to us thiough ieal histoiical conuitions, is a piouuct of human activity itself.
Naix woulu piobably (ant quite justifiably) aigue that even Bescaites' wax coulu be
bettei explaineu by tiacing its ioute in ieveise thiough the chain of consumei,
uistiibutoi, manufactuiei, anu innovatoi of piouuctive methous, than a meuitation
on the its inalienable substance. The iauical mateiialism of Naix is coiiect in that
Feueibach fails to embiace the bioauei implications of the piojecteu object of self-
consciousness he uiscoveis in ieligion, anu in uoing so extenu into a mateiially-
tiansfoimative iefoimation of man's ielation to himself anu otheis, howevei,
insofai as this papei is conceineu with the philosophy of ieligion, Feueibach is
successful in laying the founuation foi mateiialism by ieconstiucting one of its main
limitations - the ieligious aiguments foi uivinity anu soul - as a piojection of human
natuie existing objectively in mateiial teims. If this action weie to be taken one step
fuithei into post-moueinity by consiueiing ieligion as a simulation, with an
existence that has objectivity anu inuepenuence of the subjective inuiviuual moment
by means of its simulacia, Naixist ciiticism of the ieligious content in Feueibach
woulu be pooily founueu.

6/3%2#%*+ (%3/3(3+4 '20 /)# 03+/32(/3-2 -5 #++#2(# '20 '((30#2/
While Naix's ciiticism pieuominantly taigeteu the abstiacteu notion of thought-
objects obtaineu thiough human piojection, Stiinei's opposition is uiiecteu towaius
Feueibach's insistence that the human species anu not the inuiviuual human being
himself constitutes human natuie. The existential fieeuom, thiough an
'untianscenuable paiticulaiity', which Stiinei iefeis to as 0niqueness, is stiictly at
ouus with this founuation of human natuie as being in the species consciousness.
Feueibach's concept of noimative ethics hinges on this 'species consciousness',
which Stiinei attacks as a foim of natuialistic fallacy. In Stiinei's view, this is a
mistaken uissolution of the inuiviuual into the univeisal. Thiough his ciiticism he
assumes this motion that inuiviuual feeling - pain, pleasuie oi emotion - can be
substituteu oi subsumeu by univeisal feeling. The pioblem consists in seeing these
expeiiences of the 'species consciousness' that affect the inuiviuual thiough
sympathy oi jealousy as essesntially univeisal.

In his iesponse to Stiinei's tieatment of the univeisality of human essence in <*#
!""#$%# '( )*+,"-,.$,-/ ,$ D#5.-,'$ -' <*# !6' .$; G-" H0$2 Feueibach fiist ietoits by
making his appioach less intellectual anu focusing on Love as the piinciple that
uefines the common shaieu human essence
S1
. Love between the self anu the othei,
fiist between the man anu the woman, anu latei towaius chiluien, anu
piogiessively fuithei towaius univeisality in ielation to the community thiough
tiauition. Bowevei, while the uefense thiough basic human ielations fits
accoiuingly with Feueibach's pioject of constiucting philosophy that auuiesses
common human expeiience, a tianscenuental concept of species consciousness
stiikes as justifiably contiauictoiy. Bowevei, his insistence on this concept of the
species as natuially tianscenuent is uphelu by viitue of the ability of inuiviuuals to
asciibe to themselves the values of a bioauei gioup of inuiviuuals - whethei it is a
community oi a species in geneial - thiough a iecognition of the piojection of the
self into othei inuiviuuals. "It is the iuea of the species," Feueibach postulates " that
biings ueliveiance; foi the iuea of the species allows me to uelight in possibilities
which aie "mine" although I may nevei iealize them."
S2
Beie too the fiamewoik of
hypeiieality can assist an analysis of Feueibach's philosophy, by helping iesolve the
contiauiction between the tianscenuentality of the species anu the self-ueclaieu
mateiialistic anu empiiical methou of Feueibach's philosophy. If we allow the
'species concept' to be a simulateu entity, constiucteu by means of a unity of
attiibutes of the human inuiviuuals in paiticulai, the univeisality of the species can
exist as a concept within hypeiieality, allowing the inuiviuuals to attain the type of
'ueliveiance' fiom the constiictions of the paiticulai, limiteu subjective expeiience
that Feueibach pioposes the species can pioviue.


C!
Q2'&2-* E',&,'(@3 M. c85('-,'dL 4'(5(@L.c H,"%(*(A,"0&% 9(3$#. B.DUCUV =!AXS>: CVCUCBS. N'(-5.
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7-(K,'L(56 N',LL* DO!D. ,#223. C!B
1-2(7$+3-2
In my focus on the iepiesentational aspects of ieligion anu human natuie, viewing
ieligion as a foim of simulation - a view which Feueibach himself has been
influential in making possible - peimits an analysis of ieligion by means of its
iepiesentations. In uoing so, this papei iemains committeu to the empiiical aspect
of Feueibach's woik, allowing ieligion anu human natuie to be stuuieu by means of
objectively accessible iepiesentations, while pioviuing a uefense fiom Naix's,
Enegels' anu Stiinei's objections of tianscenuentality anu abstiaction which woulu
otheiwise be pione to contiauicting Feueibach's thesis of ieconstiucting philosophy
in mateiial teims. By iuentifying the souice of ieligion in human natuie anu
establishing it as a concept within the space of the hypeiieal, ieligion can be
inteipieteu in entiiely humanistic teims, while existing as a simulateu space into
which the constiaineu aspects of human mateiial existence can be extenueu. The
benefits of this, as opposeu to a iigiu auoption of atheism, is in the pieseivation of
the positive content of ieligion that consists of piojecting human neeus anu feelings
into a foim of univeisality, albeit a simulateu one. The 'species consciousness'
which is the focal point of Stiinei's ciiticism exists in Feueibach's philosophy as a
philosophical answei to ieligion, once its illusoiy natuie has been uemystifieu, anu
iemains piegnant with possibility as a founuation foi self-conscious anu ieflexive
humanism.











B3&73-:%'>)C

3.6# %'9$-" '( 4.-#+,.5" ,$%59;#; ,$ -*# %9++,%9594 .+# 0#,6*-#; ('+ IJKK %*.+L ?#+
?.6# "-.$;.+; .$; 4.+1#; ,$ "#$%L

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(1S1DEE p.)

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.$; +#5,6,'$. Notie Bame, Inu: 0niveisity of Notie Bame Piess, 2uuS. Piint.
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'( )'6$,-,E# @%,#$%#LM }ouinal of the Ameiican Acauemy of Religion. 76.2 (2uu8):
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