http://ips.sagepub.

com/
International Political Science Review
http://ips.sagepub.com/content/21/4/425
The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/0192512100214006
2000 21: 425 International Political Science Review
Bernadette C. Hayes, Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar
Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism in Comparative Perspective

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:

International Political Science Association (IPSA)

can be found at: International Political Science Review Additional services and information for

http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts:

http://ips.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions:
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions:

http://ips.sagepub.com/content/21/4/425.refs.html Citations:

What is This?

- Oct 1, 2000 Version of Record >>

by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism in
Comparative Perspective
BERNADETTE C. HAYES, I AN MCALLI STER, AND DONLEYT. STUDLAR
ABSTRACT. Value change and the feminist movement represent two major
shifts in mass political orientations and behavior in the late twentieth
century. Yet we know little about how these two fundamental changes
relate to one another. This article addresses this question by analyzing
the relationship between postmaterialist values and feminism among 13
advanced industrial democracies, using the 199091 World Values
Survey. The results suggest that both gender and postmaterialist values
are associated with feminism: women and those who adopt a
postmaterialist stance are notably more likely to endorse feminist beliefs
compared to men or materialists. Religion also plays a major role, both
in terms of individual religious self-identity, and in terms of the religious
culture of the country in question. The relations among gender,
postmaterialism, and feminism are complex and deserve more careful
analysis.
Keywords: Attitudes Feminism Gender Postmaterialism Values
Two of the most profound political changes that have occurred in the advanced
democracies in the postwar years have been the emergence of second-wave
feminism and the shift in values towards quality of life concerns. Second-wave
feminism (Randall, 1987) is normally considered to have its origins in the social
and educational changes of the 1950s and 1960s, which moved womens
reproductive and workplace roles into the public policy debate (Rendell, 1985).
This move has resulted in abortion and equal opportunity policies becoming
salient issues in most Western democracies. More generally, the origins of
feminism are to be found in the increased postwar concern for equal social,
economic, and political rights, or what Gans (1968) has termed the equality
revolution.
This feminist emphasis on egalitarianism overlaps with another major postwar
political change in advanced industrial democracies: the rise of postmaterial
International Political ScienceReview (2000), Vol. 21, No. 4, 425439
0192-5121 (2000/10) 21:4, 425439; 014843 2000 I nternational Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
values. Theories of value change argue that as material human needsphysical
survival and safetyare satisfied for the bulk of society, more social needs
affection, self-esteem, and self-expressionassume greater political importance.
Socialization into new values is the basic mechanism of change. Ronald I nglehart
(1977, 1990a) and others have utilized this theory to explain worldwide social and
political changes that have occurred since World War I I , especially in the advanced
industrial democracies. These postmaterialist values have been claimed to lead to
the rise of new social movements concerned with humanistic, quality of life issues,
including peace, human rights, womens rights, and the environment.
Although research on changing political values and new social movements has
proliferated (Mller-Rommel, 1989; Dalton and Kuechler, 1990; Knutsen, 1990), it
has tended to proceed largely independently of work on feminism (Klein, 1987;
Conover, 1988; Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Rinehart, 1992; Togeby, 1995; Hayes,
1997). Although there is often assumed to be a connection between feminism and
postmaterialism, the nature, extent, and strength of that relationship remain
surprisingly under-explored. I n this article we take some tentative steps towards
remedying this gap by examining the relationship between gender,
postmaterialism, and feminism in mass publics in the advanced industrial
democracies.
Gender, Values, and Feminism
To postmaterialist theorists, the connection between values and feminist activity is
straightforward: a shift towards more nonmaterial value concerns due to the
economic security experienced by the generations who became politically
socialized since World War I I has led to feminist sympathies among both men and
women, and hence to the political rise of feminist groups pursuing an equality
agenda. For the most part, however, this linkage has been assumed rather than
demonstrated empirically. For instance, there has been more research on the
relationship of postmaterialism to peace and environmental groups than to
feminist movements (I nglehart, 1977, 1990b, 1995; Nevitte, 1996: 8995).
Feminism presents a particular dilemma for the theorists of postmaterialism
because the concept contains both material and nonmaterial elements (Klein,
1984). Equal opportunity policies are designed to benefit women materially.
Furthermore, one does not have to consider oneself a feminist in order to endorse
such policies (Klein, 1987). I f women are only now reaching levels of physical and
material security that are equal to those of men, and indeed if many women are
failing to reach these levels because of the poverty and insecurity of one-parent
families and the double burden of workplace and domesticity, then we might
expect fewer of them to have postmaterial values.
On the other hand, women in several countries have been found to be less
concerned about defence and security issues than men (Klein, 1984; Shapiro and
Mahajan, 1986; Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Jelen, Thomas and Wilcox, 1994),
contradicting the hypothesis that women should be more materialist than men.
Similarly, the second wave of the feminist movement, by eschewing class issues and
showing a willingness to utilize unconventional methods of political participation,
has displayed all the characteristics of a new social movement; one of the
movements major concerns has been attitudes towards sexuality, including
abortion (I nglehart, 1990a; Golebiowska, 1995).
Overall, the results of the few empirical studies that have been conducted on
426 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
the relationship between postmaterialism and feminism have produced
inconclusive and sometimes contradictory results. I n the most comprehensive
study to date, using 1985 data, Evans (1993) argues that gender issues are neither
part of mass postmaterialist thought nor a separate ideological dimension.
I nstead, he finds that gender equality concerns in education and jobs across five
countriesthe United States, Britain, Germany, I taly, and Australiaare part of
the older, materialist, left-right cleavage. Since his measure of gender concerns is
one that focuses on equal opportunity issues, however, it is not surprising that it is
related to a materialist cleavage.
Steel et al. (1992) find, on the basis of research limited to the metropolitan
areas of Detroit and Toronto, that postmaterialism is positively related to feminism
except for US men. Dalton (1984: 118119) argues that, in West Germany between
1974 and 1980, attitudes towards the womens movement shifted from the old
politics or materialist axis towards the leftist end of the new politics dimension; his
results, however, still show the position of this issue in 1980 to be midway between
both value dimensions. Later crossnational work finds postmaterialists to be
disproportionately represented among supporters of feminist as well as other new
social movements in Europe, Canada, and the United States (Nevitte, 1996: 88).
Similarly confusing results have occurred when the relationship between
gender and postmaterialism has been examined. I n the standard work on
postmaterialism, TheSilent Revolution, Ronald I nglehart (1977: 9093) found that,
although gender was a weak predictor of value types, women were less likely to be
postmaterialist than men except in the United States; he attributed this finding to
the fact that socialization into economic prosperity, and therefore into post-
materialist values, occurred somewhat earlier in the United States than in Europe.
Barnes, Kaase et al. (1979: 335336) similarly found that men were slightly more
postmaterialist than women.
Other studies present challenges to these conclusions. Knutsens (1990) study
of value change in the Nordic countries finds a weak but consistent tendency for
women to be more postmaterialist than men in all except Finland, with the
strongest relationship in Denmark. Togebys (1994) focused study of Denmark, a
country which she argues is on the cutting edge of social change because of its
high rate of womens labor force participation, finds that younger women are
slightly more postmaterialist and inclined toward protest than men. Although
Dalton (1988: 6870; 1996: 7981, 85) argues that generalized protest behavior in
the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany, a phenomenon often
associated with new social movements and changing values, is more likely to occur
among men rather than women, his 1970s data are more supportive than his 1990s
data, which suggests that Togebys findings might not be limited to Denmark. The
limited research conducted thus far on the relationship between gender and
postmaterial values therefore indicates that women are not more postmaterialist
than men, except possibly in the United States and some Nordic democracies,
especially Denmark.
The question of the relationship between gender and feminism also has been
addressed, albeit largely in the United States. Conover (1988) argues that a
feminist consciousness helps women realize their distinctly feminine values and
policy preferences. But later work by Cook and Wilcox (1991) finds only limited
gender differences in feminism. They contend that feminism plays the same role
for men as for women, allowing them to express basically liberal egalitarian views.
Kleins (1987) comparative study of the ten European Union countries also finds
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 427
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
surprisingly few gender differences in feminist concerns. I n the only work on
gender and feminism which also considers postmaterialism, Steel et al. (1992) find
that postmaterialist values are a significant predictor of support for feminism in
Canada and the United States except for US men, where the relationship is
reversed, for example, men of materialist and mixed value orientations are
significantly more likely to support feminist goals.
Since the relationships of gender, postmaterialism, and feminism among mass
publics in advanced industrial democracies remain problematic, we investigate
these phenomena by addressing three main questions. First, is support for
postmaterialism indicative of feminist attitudes? Second, are women more
postmaterialist and feminist than men? And third, controlling for other variables,
what is the multivariate relationship among gender, postmaterialist values, and
feminist attitudes? We examine these questions through a systematic, comparative
analysis of citizens in 13 advanced industrial democracies using survey data
collected in the early 1990s.
Data and Methods
The survey data are from the 199091 World Values Survey (WVS). Although the
WVS has been used for many investigations, heretofore it has not been employed to
analyze gender questions in depth. The WVS was based on national samples in
nearly 50 countries, including both members and non-members of the European
Community, North America, four Latin American countries, Eastern Europe,
societies of the former Soviet Union, one Middle Eastern country, four countries
in Asia, and two African countries (see Abramson and I nglehart, 1995: 97101).
To ensure comparability across countries with similar levels of socioeconomic
development and democratic traditions, we examine respondents surveyed in 13
established democracies: France (n=1002), Britain (n=1484), West Germany
(n=2101), I taly (n=2018), the Netherlands (n=1017), Denmark (n=1030),
Belgium (n=2792), Spain (n=4147), I reland (n=1000), Norway (n=1239),
Sweden (n=1047), Canada (n=1730), and the United States (n=1839).
The major variables are respondents gender, postmaterial values, and feminist
attitudes. Other demographic variables are utilized as controls. This is based upon
the usual causal configuration of these variables; demographic characteristics such
as gender come first, then core values, followed by attitudes. When it comes to the
multivariate analysis, our major concern is the impact of gender and post-
materialism upon feminism since this is the most logical causal sequence.
1
Feminist attitudes are measured by three issues: non-preferential employment
practices for men, the importance of womens labor force participation, and
attitudes toward the womens movement. Respondents who did not reject
preferential male employment practices as well as those who also either did not
believe in the importance of employment practices as a vital source of female
independence and/or failed to support the womens movement are labeled
nonfeminists. Those who rejected male preferential employment practices and
believed in the necessity of employment for a womans independence but who did
not support the womens liberation movement are termed potential feminists.
Finally, individuals who adopted a pro-female stance on all three items are termed
feminists.
2
Across the 13 countries under consideration, just over one-third of men
and women are classified as feminists, and a quarter of both gender groups fall
into the nonfeminist category.
428 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
Although we have only three questions to investigate this complex and
multifaceted phenomenon, this is not a major drawback. First, in the few cross-
national studies where the question of feminist attitudes has been considered,
almost without exception they have operationalized feminist attitudes by a single,
directly comparable measure such as a positive endorsement of the womens
movement, or by a combination of the measures used here (see Wilcox, 1991;
Banaszak and Plutzer, 1993a, b; Lundmark, 1995; Nevitte, 1996: 8488). Second,
even when such individualized or combined measures have been considered, the
relative contribution of feminism either net of, or in combination with, gender in
determining political attitudes has rarely been assessed (Cook and Wilcox, 1991;
Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Hayes, 1997). Our approach is therefore an important
advance on previous research in this area.
Postmaterialist values are assessed by I ngleharts standard four-item battery of
questions (I nglehart, 1990a: 74; Abramson and I nglehart, 1995: 910; Nevitte,
1996). Respondents were asked to select what they believed their countrys two top
goals should be among the following four alternatives: maintaining order in the
nation; giving the people more say in important government decisions; fighting
rising prices; and protecting freedom of speech. Respondents who selected
maintaining order and fighting rising prices are classified as materialists while
those who chose giving the people more say and freedom of speech are
classified as postmaterialists. The remaining combinationsall of which make up
one materialist and one postmaterialist responseare classified as mixed. Previous
comparative research over two decades attests to the generalizability, validity, and
reliability of this measure.
3
Postmaterialist Values and Feminist Attitudes
The theory of value change predicts that some countries should display higher
levels of postmaterialism than others, depending on the childhood experiences of
their citizens. For example, countries that have histories of economic insecurity
and physical threat, as has been the fate of much of mainland Europe, should
have lower levels of postmaterialism than countries that have had more
uninterrupted, positive experiences (De Graaf and Evans, 1996). Equally, we
might expect feminist attitudes to be highest in those countries which have
progressed farthest toward social and economic parity for women, most notably
the Nordic countries. These expectations are tested in Table 1, which reports
variations in postmaterialist values and levels of feminism in 13 advanced
industrial democracies. These are disaggregated by the religious composition of
the country in question since, as we demonstrate later, this has a major impact in
predicting feminist beliefs.
The expectation that postmaterialism will be highest in the countries that have
had least insecurity, economic or physical, in the twentieth century is only partially
borne out by the results in Table 1. Postmaterialists are most numerous in the
Netherlands, which was invaded in both world wars, and are lowest in Norway and
Denmark, which were also occupied during World War I I . However, in just over
half of the countries considered, the number of postmaterialists exceeds the
number of materialists, often by a sizeable margin. I n the Netherlands
postmaterialists outnumber materialists by almost three to one. A similar, though
less dramatic division occurs in France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Canada, and
the United States. Even in the other six nations where postmaterialists do not
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 429
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
outnumber materialists, in all but one case the difference between the two groups
is either small (Britain, Spain, I reland) or exactly equivalent (I taly, Denmark).
While the results do not bear out the prediction that levels of postmaterialism
are dependent upon the national experiences of their populations, post-
materialists constitute an important group within each country. Overall, they
narrowly outnumber materialists, but they are most numerous in countries with
mixed religious populations. Only in Norway do materialists notably outnumber
postmaterialists, by a margin of three to one, confirming Knutsens (1990: 100)
earlier finding that among Nordic countries, the Norwegian population appears
to be decisively more materialist. Thus, in comparison to earlier research findings
(see I nglehart, 1977, 1990a; Abramson and I nglehart, 1995; Dalton, 1988, 1996),
although the vast majority of citizens are still concentrated in the mixed
category, postmaterialists now constitute a notable and growing minority in most
Western democracies.
The second part of Table 1 confirms the prediction that national policies
towards womens equality will be reflected in mass opinion on feminism. The
countries where there is most support for feminism are the Nordic countries
Sweden, Norway, and Denmarkwhich have introduced a wide range of
legislation on equal opportunity issues and where the political parties have been
most interested in integrating gender issues into their policy agendas. Moreover,
430 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
TABLE 1: Postmaterialismand Feminist Attitudes byCountry(percentages).
Postmaterialist values Feminist attitudes
Post- Non- Potential
Country Materialist Mixed materialist feminist feminist Feminist (N)
All Countries 20 58 22 26 40 34 (21 237)
Catholic
Belgium 22 54 24 38 35 27 (2 546)
France 21 54 25 27 40 33 (963)
I taly 24 52 24 34 43 23 (1 945)
I reland 24 57 19 24 42 35 (988)
Spain 24 55 21 29 36 36 (3 759)
Catholic total 23 54 23 31 38 31 (10 201)
Mixed CatholicProtestant
Canada 12 63 26 16 49 35 (1 648)
West Germany 14 57 29 32 33 36 (2 010)
Netherlands 11 55 34 20 48 32 (987)
Mixed total 13 58 29 23 42 35 (4 645)
Protestant
Britain 20 61 19 28 38 33 (1 432)
Denmark 16 68 16 11 45 44 (975)
Norway 29 61 10 14 41 44 (1 200)
Sweden 14 63 23 11 38 51 (1 011)
United States 17 60 23 19 44 37 (1 773)
Protestant total 19 62 18 18 42 40 (6 391)
Source: World Values Survey, 199091.
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
these three countries have the highest proportions of women among their
national elected representatives among all 167 legislatures examined by the I nter-
Parliamentary Union in 1997 (I nter-Parliamentary Union, 1997). They are also the
most solidly Protestant countries among the 13 analyzed here. By contrast, Canada
ranked 21st in the proportion of women among its national legislators, the United
States 41st, and the United Kingdom 50th.
The results also suggest that feminists are more numerous than nonfeminists in
all countries except I taly and Belgium. I n contrast, in Sweden feminists
outnumber nonfeminists by nearly five to one. Pro-feminist attitudes are now
widespread within the advanced industrial democracies; between 23 and 51
percent of citizens in each country can be termed feminists, and a further 33 to 49
percent potential feminists. This is not to deny, however, some notable differences
among countries. As has been found in previous comparative research, citizens in
Belgium still remain the least feminist of any nation, while residents of Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark are among the most supportive of feminist issues (see
Wilcox, 1991; Morgan and Wilcox, 1992). I t is perhaps not surprising that Belgium
and I taly were the last of the 13 countries to grant women formal suffrage.
4
Gender, Feminism, and Postmaterialist Values
As indicated earlier, the results of the few previous studies on the relationship
between gender and postmaterialism have produced contradictory findings. While
some researchers have found that women are less postmaterialist in their values
than men, others have discovered either no gender differences in orientation or
that women are in fact slightly more postmaterialist than men. A similar confusion
exists about the relationship between feminism and postmaterialist values. Despite
the expectations of some scholars, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that
individuals who adopt a pro-feminist stance also manifest a postmaterialist
orientation. To investigate these two issues further, Tables 2 and 3 focus on gender
and feminist differences in postmaterialist values for each of the 13 countries
surveyed.
The results lend some support to the proposition that men are somewhat more
postmaterialist than women, by 5 percentage points among the 13 nations
combined (Table 2). I n just over half the countries surveyed, males were
significantly more likely to hold a postmaterialist orientation than females. This
was the case in five of the European nationsFrance, Germany, I taly, Belgium,
and Spainas well as in Canada and the United States. I t is important to note,
however, that these malefemale differences, while statistically significant, are
small. I n fact, in the seven countries where a statistically significant result did
emerge, the mean difference between men and women did not exceed 6 points.
Furthermore, even when mens overall levels in postmaterialist orientation are
considered, in no case did the range in scores exceed 21 points.
There are significant differences among the nations; the largest differences are
found where Catholicism is the dominant religion while gender differences within
heavily Protestant nations (with the exception of Germany) are confined to North
America. This suggests some lingering effects for differences in socialization of
males and females in Catholic societies, even in the industrialized world I nglehart,
1981; Bashevkin, 1984; Mayer and Smith, 1985). I t may also reflect differing public
policies towards gender issues, since such policies are often shaped by the
religious culture of the country.
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 431
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
The results also show that women are significantly more feminist in orientation
than men in seven of the 13 countries (West Germany, France, I taly, the United
States, Spain, Norway, and Belgium). Once again, however, the differences are
relatively small, averaging only 7 points across this set of countries. There also
appears to be a tendency, not without exceptions, for Catholic-dominated
countries both to have fewer feminists of either sex and for there to be
significantly fewer men than women supporting feminism.
When we turn to the question of feminist differences in postmaterialist values,
the results in Table 3 are unequivocal. As a group, feminists are significantly more
likely to hold postmaterialist values than nonfeminists, and this relationship holds
for all 13 countries. Furthermore, in many cases, the difference in postmaterialist
values between these two groups is marked. For example, in three of the 13
countriesGermany, the Netherlands, and I talythe estimated mean difference
in scores between feminists and nonfeminists were 21, 23, and 24 points,
respectively. Similar, though less dramatic, differences are found in France (19
points), Spain (18 points), Denmark and Sweden (16 points), as well as in
Belgium (15 points). Only in Britain, I reland, and Canada does the difference in
scores between these two groups constitute less than 10 points. The relationship
between feminism and postmaterialism is therefore clear: individuals who hold
feminist attitudes are significantly more supportive of postmaterialist values than
their nonfeminist counterparts.
432 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
TABLE 2. Gender Differences in Postmaterialist Values and Feminist Attitudes byCountry
(mean scores, zero to 100).
Postmaterialist values Feminist attitudes
Country Men Women Men Women
All Countries 54* 49 52* 57
Catholic
Belgium 54* 48 43* 47
France 55 49 48* 57
I taly 53 48 41 48
I reland 48 48 54 57
Spain 51* 45 51* 56
Catholic mean 52* 47 47* 52
Mixed CatholicProtestant
Canada 60* 54 58 61
West Germany 59* 56 45* 59
Netherlands 63 60 57 56
Mixed mean 60* 56 52* 59
Protestant
Britain 50 48 53 52
Denmark 51 48 67 66
Norway 42 39 63* 67
Sweden 55 53 68 71
United States 55* 51 56* 62
Protestant mean 51* 48 60* 62
*Difference from women statistically significant at p<.05.
Source: World Values Survey, 199091
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
A similar finding emerges when potential feminists are considered. I n nine of
the 13 nations there are significant differences between feminists and potential
feminists in relation to value priorities. Although these differences are not as
dramatic as for nonfeminists, ranging from 5 to 15 points on the postmaterialist
scale, again it is both Germany and I taly which are most notable. Whereas the
average difference between these two groups is 15 points in I taly, the German
result is only marginally lower at 14 points. This is in direct contrast to I reland,
Norway, Sweden, and Canada, where no significant differences emerge between
these two groups in value priorities. Thus, for these four latter countries at least,
differences in postmaterialist values remain exclusively restricted to the outlying
categories of feminism and nonfeminism.
The results of these bivariate analyses may be summarized as follows. First, there
is some evidence to suggest that men are more postmaterialist than women.
Although these gender differences remain small and do not extend across all
nations, for the majority of countries, men are significantly more likely to espouse
a postmaterialist orientation than women. Second, as a group, feminists are
substantially more likely to hold postmaterialist values than nonfeminists;
moreover, this pattern also holds even when potential feminists are considered.
The results, then, are unequivocal, even if not particularly strong: individuals who
adopt a feminist stance are significantly more likely to hold a postmaterialist
orientation than others.
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 433
TABLE 3. Differences in Postmaterialist Values byFeminist Attitudes byCountry
(mean scores, zero to 100).
Country Nonfeminist Potential feminist Feminist
All Countries 43* 51* 58
Catholic
Belgium 43* 53* 58
France 42* 52* 61
I taly 41* 50* 65
I reland 44* 48 52
Spain 39* 46* 57
Catholic mean 41* 49* 58
Mixed CatholicProtestant
Canada 51* 58 59
West Germany 48* 55* 69
Netherlands 47* 62* 70
Mixed mean 49* 58* 66
Protestant
Britain 45* 49* 54
Denmark 39* 49* 55
Norway 33* 41 43
Sweden 41* 54 57
United States 47* 52* 57
Protestant mean 43* 49* 53
*Difference from feminists statistically significant at p<.05
Source: World Values Survey, 199091
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
4
3
4
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l

P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l

S
c
i
e
n
c
e

R
e
v
i
e
w

2
1
(
4
)
TABLE 4. Impact of Gender and Postmaterialist Values on Feminist Attitudes
(multinomial logistic regression coefficients).
Feminist vs Non-Feminist Potential Feminist vs Non-Feminist Feminist vs Potential Feminist
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Variables Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE) Est (SE)
Socio-demographic controls
Marital status (married) 0.14** (0.05) 0.15** (0.05) 0.11* (0.05) 0.11* (0.05) 0.25** (0.04) 0.26** (0.04)
Age (years) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.01* (0.00)
Religious identity 0.41** (0.05) 0.44** (0.05) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.41** (0.04) 0.43** (0.04)
Education (years) 0.13** (0.01) 0.14** (0.01) 0.09** (0.01) 0.09** (0.01) 0.04** (0.01) 0.05** (0.01)
Occupation (nonmanual) 0.21** (0.05) 0.26** (0.05) 0.25** (0.05) 0.26** (0.05) 0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04)
Work status (employed) 0.44** (0.06) 0.44** (0.06) 0.13* (0.05) 0.14* (0.05) 0.30** (0.05) 0.31** (0.05)
Country control
(Catholic nations omitted category)
Mixed CatholicProtestant
nations 0.17** (0.06) 0.22** (0.06) 0.20** (0.06) 0.22** (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05)
Protestant nations 0.61** (0.06) 0.58** (0.06) 0.46** (0.06) 0.46** (0.06) 0.15* (0.05) 0.12* (0.05)
Gender (female) 0.53** (0.05) 0.50** (0.05) 0.16** (0.05) 0.14** (0.05) 0.37** (0.04) 0.35** (0.04)
Postmaterialist 0.94** (0.08) 0.38** (0.07) 0.57** (0.06)
Constant 0.53* 0.07 0.60**
Cases correctly predicted (%) 56.2
No. of cases 14480
**Statistically significant at p< .01; * statistically significant at p< .05; standard errors are in parentheses
Source: World Values Survey, 199091.

b
y

g
u
e
s
t

o
n

M
a
r
c
h

5
,

2
0
1
4
i
p
s
.
s
a
g
e
p
u
b
.
c
o
m
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

f
r
o
m

The Impact of Values on Feminism
To what extent do these gender differences in postmaterialist values remain
important in shaping feminist attitudes when the effects of other related variables
such as age, education, and socioeconomic status are taken into account? To
investigate this question, Table 4 presents the results of a multinomial logistic
regression analysis in which values and gender are regressed on feminism together
with a range of socio-political control variables.
5
Two models are estimated, the
first including both gender and values, the second omitting values. The difference
in the coefficients for gender between the two models permits us to estimate the
direct and indirect effect of gender on feminism. Since the bivariate analyses
showed that nonfeminists were most distant from potential and actual feminists,
they are used as the basis for the contrast.
Even after a wide range of individual and aggregate level controls are taken into
account, postmaterial values have a consistently significant impact on feminist
attitudes, as we found in the bivariate results. This is particularly the case in
predicting feminist from nonfeminist attitudes, the most polarized of the three
possible contrasts, but it remains a strong predictor in both of the other two
contrasts, notably in predicting feminist attitudes from potential feminist ones.
Gender is also consistently significant, and remains important regardless of
whether it is treated as a direct effect (as in model 2) or as an indirect effect (as in
model 1). I ndeed, the changes in the coefficients between the two models is
negligible, suggesting that gender has little or no indirect effect via values on
feminist attitudes; the gender effect is almost wholly direct.
This is not to suggest that both gender and values are the only predictors of
feminism. Other significant determinants include age, with younger people being
more feminist in their outlook, as well as having a non-religious identity and being
non-married. The positive socioeconomic influences of educational attainment
and higher occupational status are also significant. However, education stands out
as the most important single predictor and individuals with more education are
notably more likely to support feminist beliefs than their lesser educated
counterparts. Taking the ratio of the parameter estimate to the standard error as a
general indicator of the weight of each of the independent variables, education is
the most important effect, followed by values, gender, and living in a Protestant
country. I ndeed, the last variable underlines the major impact of the religious
culture of the country in which the person lives, even after his or her own religious
feelings have been taken into account.
I n summary, the results of the multivariate analysis suggest that both
postmaterialism and education are the two key variables in distinguishing feminist
attitudes in advanced industrial democracies. Cognitive skills and a particular set
of values, shaped by socialization and early adult experiences, clearly have
important consequences for feminist beliefs. But it is also notable that two other
groups of factors are important. First, involvement in the workforce and higher
occupational status, bringing individuals into direct contact with public policies
designed to ensure gender equality, also helps to shape positive feminist beliefs.
Second, religion has a pervasive influence, both through individual self-identity as
well as via the religious outlook of the country as a whole, reflected, presumably, in
public policies designed to regulate womens role in society.
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 435
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
Conclusion
What do our results suggest in terms of the conflicting findings about the
relationship between gender, postmaterialism, and feminism? The multivariate
findings confirm the important link between all three, particularly the influence
of postmaterial values in shaping feminist beliefs. Although postmaterialist values
are associated with feminist attitudes within the advanced industrial democracies
at a modest level, the relationship exists even when a range of background factors
such as age and socioeconomic attainment are taken into account. Thus,
regardless of country of origin, postmaterialists, or individuals who espouse
postmaterialist values, are significantly more likely to endorse feminist beliefs than
their materialist counterparts.
But there is a significant difference when the relationship between gender and
postmaterialist attitudes is considered. As our results indicate, there is a notable,
though modest, association between gender and postmaterialist values: men are
more likely to support postmaterialist values than women. This is not the case,
however, when the relationship between gender differences in postmaterialist
values and feminist beliefs is considered. Additional analyses which tested for a
significant interaction effect between gender and values on feminist attitudes
suggested no significant difference in findings; postmaterialist men and women do
not differ in their feminist orientations. I n other words, at least as far as feminist
attitudes are concerned, gender differences in postmaterialist values do not
translate into a gender gap in feminist orientations.
Thus, the paradox continues: men are more postmaterialist, women are more
feminist, but neither postmaterialist men nor postmaterialist women are more
supportive of feminism. Postmaterialism and feminism are two value dimensions
only partially linked to each other and to gender. Both of these dimensions, but
especially postmaterialism, still divide the populations of advanced industrial
democracies in several ways. But it would appear that the continuing shift towards
postmaterial values and the equally definite move towards feminism within mass
publics, while interconnected, are not dependent on one another.
Notes
1. A further, practical constraint, is the cross-sectional nature of our data, so that a
comprehensive study of this issue is beyond the scope of this investigation. Without
longitudinal data, currently not available, it is impossible to disentangle the complex
relationship between postmaterial orientations and changes in feminism.
2. Additional cross-tabular analyses confirmed the substantive consistency of these
categories. The vast majority of individuals who supported the womens movement also
rejected male preferential employment practices (77 percent); 73 percent believed in
the necessity of employment for womens independence. As Klein (1987) and Togeby
(1995) point out, however, support for feminist organizations is the most problematical
part of the usual conceptualizations of feminism. I t is not uncommon for people to
support the goals of feminist movements without supporting the organizations
themselves.
3. There also exists a large literature critical of the use of this battery and suggesting the
need for better measures. See Flanagan, 1987; Clarke and Dutt, 1991; Duch and Taylor,
1993; De Graaf and Evans, 1996; Dalton, 1996: 109.
4. I n 1948 and 1946, respectively.
5. The control variables are as follows: marital status (coded 1 for married and 0 for
other), age (number of years), subjective religious identity (coded 1 for religious and 0
436 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
for non-religious or convinced atheist), education (age at which completed full-time
education), occupation (coded 1 for non-manual occupation), and labour force
participation (coded 1 for currently employed and 0 for not currently employed). The
postmaterialism scale has been rescored to range from 0 (materialist) to 1
(postmaterialist). Country has been included as three dummy variables with Catholic
nations, which has the least number of individuals claiming a feminist orientation, the
omitted category of comparison.
References
Abramson, P. and R. I nglehart (1995). Value Change in Global Perspective. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Banaszak, L. and E. Plutzer (1993a). Contextual Determinants of Feminist Attitudes:
National and Subnational I nfluences in Western Europe. American Political Science
Review, 87: 147157.
Banaszak, L. and E. Plutzer (1993b). The Social Bases of Feminism in the European
Community. Public Opinion Quarterly, 57: 2953.
Barnes, S., M. Kaase et al. (1979). Political Action. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Bashevkin, S. (1984). Changing Patterns of Politicization and Partisanship Among Women
in France. British Journal of Political Science, 15: 7596.
Clarke, H. and N. Dutt (1991). Measuring Value Change in Western I ndustrialized
Societies: The I mpact of Unemployment. American Political ScienceReview, 85: 905920.
Conover, P. (1988). Feminists and the Gender Gap. Journal of Politics, 50: 9851010.
Conover, P. and V. Sapiro (1993). Gender, Feminist Consciousness, and War. American
Journal of Political Science, 37: 10791099.
Cook, E. and C. Wilcox (1991). Feminists and the Gender Gap: A Second Look. Journal of
Politics, 53: 11111122.
Dalton, R. (1984). The West German Party System Between Two Ages. I n Electoral Change
in Advanced Industrial Democracies. (R.J. Dalton, S.C. Flanagan and P.A. Beck, eds).
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dalton, R. (1988). Citizen Politics in Western Democracies. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Dalton, R. (1996). Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Western Democracies
(2nd edn). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Dalton, R. and M. Kuechler (eds.) (1990). Challenging thePolitical Order. London: Polity Press.
De Graaf, N. and G. Evans (1996). Why Are the Young More Postmaterialist? A Cross-
National Analysis of I ndividual and Contextual I nfluences on Postmaterial Values.
ComparativePolitical Studies, 28: 608635.
Duch, R. and M. Taylor (1993). Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition. American
Journal of Political Science, 37: 747779.
Evans, G. (1993). I s Gender on the New Agenda? A Comparative Analysis of I nequality
Between Men and Women. European Journal of Political Research, 24: 135158.
Flanagan, S. (1987). Value Change in I ndustrial Societies. American Political ScienceReview,
81: 13131319.
Gans, H. (1968). MoreEquality. New York: Random House.
Golebiowska, E. (1995). I ndividual Value Priorities, Education, and Political Tolerance.
Political Behavior, 17: 2348.
Hayes, B. (1997). Gender, Feminism and Electoral Behaviour in Britain. Electoral Studies,
16: 203216.
I nglehart, M. (1981). Political I nterest I n West European Women: An Historical and
Empirical Comparative Analysis. ComparativePolitical Studies, 14: 299326.
I nglehart, R. (1977). TheSilent Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
I nglehart, R. (1990a). CultureShift. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
I nglehart, R. (1990b). Values, I deology, and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social
Movements. I n Challenging thePolitical Order (R.J. Dalton and M. Kuechler, eds). Oxford:
Polity Press.
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 437
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
I nglehart, R. (1995). Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems
and Subjective Values in 43 Societies. P.S.: Political Scienceand Politics, 28: 5772.
I nter-Parliamentary Union (1997). Men and Women in Parliaments: Making DemocracyWork.
Geneva: I nter-Parliamentary Union.
Jelen, T., S. Thomas and C. Wilcox (1994). The Gender Gap in Comparative Perspective.
European Journal of Political Research, 25: 171186.
Klein, E. (1984). Gender Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Klein, E. (1987). The Diffusion of Consciousness in the United States and Western
Europe. I n The Womens Movements in the United States and Western Europe (M.F.
Katzenstein and C. McClurg Mueller, eds). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Knutsen, O. (1990). Materialist and Postmaterialist Values and Social Structure in the
Nordic Countries. ComparativePolitical Studies, 23: 85104.
Lundmark, C. (1995). Feminist Political Orientations. I n TheImpact of Values (J.W. van
Deth and E. Scarborough, eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mayer, L. and R. Smith (1985). Feminism and Religiosity: Female Electoral Behaviour in
Western Europe. West European Politics, 8: 3849.
Morgan, A. and C. Wilcox (1992). Anti-Feminism in Western Europe 19751987. West
European Politics, 15: 151169.
Mller-Rommel, F. (ed.) (1989). New Politics in Western Europe. Boulder: Westview Press.
Nevitte, N. (1996). TheDeclineof Deference. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press.
Randall, V. (1987). Women and Politics(2nd edn). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rendell, J. (1985). TheOrigins of Modern Feminism. London: Macmillan.
Rinehart, S. (1992). Gender Consciousness and Politics. New York: Routledge.
Shapiro, R. and H. Mahajan (1986). Gender Differences in Policy Preferences: A Summary
of Trends from the 1960s to the 1980s. Public Opinion Quarterly, 50: 4261.
Steel, B.S., R.L. Warner, B. Stieber and N. Lovrich (1992). Postmaterialist Values and
Support for Feminism among Canadian and American Women and Men. Western
Political Quarterly, 45: 339353.
Togeby, L. (1994). The Political I mplications of I ncreasing Numbers of Women in the
Work Force. ComparativePolitical Studies, 27: 211240.
Togeby, L. (1995). Feminist Attitudes in Times of Depoliticization of Womens I ssues.
European Journal of Political Research, 27: 4768.
Wilcox, C. (1991). The Causes and Consequences of Feminist Consciousness Among
Western European Women. ComparativePolitical Studies, 23: 519545.
Biographical Notes
BERNADETTE C. HAYES is Professor of Sociology, Queens University of Belfast. She
has published widely in sociology and political science on gender. ADDRESS:
Department of Sociology and Social Policy, Queens University of Belfast, Belfast
BT7 1NN, United Kingdom. [ e-mail: b.hayes@queens-belfast.ac.uk.]
I AN MCALLI STER is Director of the Research School of Social Sciences, The
Australian National University. His most recent book is How Russia Votes (1997,
with Stephen White and Richard Rose). ADDRESS: Research School of Social
Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia.
[ e-mail: ian.mcallister@anu.edu.au]
DONLEY T. STUDLAR is the Eberly Family Distinguished Professor of Political
Science, West Virginia University. His most recent book is Great Britain: Declineor
Renewal. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, P.O.
Box 6317, Morgantown, WV 265066317, USA. [ e-mail: dstudlar@wvu.edu]
438 International Political ScienceReview 21(4)
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from
Acknowledgements. The 199091 World Values Survey was supplied by the ESRC Data Archive
at the University of Essex. A previous version of this article was presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 29 August1
September 1996. We thank three reviewers for IPSRand Manon Tremblay for their
constructive comments; the usual disclaimer applies. Please address all correspondence to
Donley Studlar.
HAYES ET AL.: Gender, Postmaterialism, and Feminism 439
by guest on March 5, 2014 ips.sagepub.com Downloaded from