Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).

Author: Seth

Facts: Palko was indicted for the crime of first degree murder, but at trial the
jury found him guilty of second degree murder and he was sentenced to life in
prison. The state of Connecticut appealed the ruling pursuant to a state statute
that allowed appeals in criminal cases. The Supreme Court of Errors reversed
the judgment and the state was granted a new trial. This time the jury found
him guilty of murder in the first degree and he was sentenced to death.

Issue(s): Does a state law allowing the state to appeal questions of law, with the
permission of a trial judge, after a jury verdict, and re-try a defendant violate
the 14th amendment of the US Constitution?

Judgment: Affirmed

Holding: No. The Supreme Court held that protection against double jeopardy
as guaranteed by the 5th amendment is not a fundamental right and is not
incorporated to the states via the 14th amendment.

Majority Rational: Justice Cardozo, who authored the majority opinion, held
that there are certain fundamental rights that have been absorbed in the 14th
amendment. Such rights include (1) freedom of speech (2) freedom of the press
(3) free exercise of religion (4) right of peaceful assembly (5) right of one
accused of a crime to have the benefit of counsel, as well as other rights not
mentioned here. According to Cardozo, these rights are fundamental to the
scheme of ordered liberty and have been applied to the states through the due
process clause of the 14th amendment. He further notes that if this case had
been tried by the federal government, than the protection against double
jeopardy would apply. However, since it was tried on behalf of the people of a
state, and double jeopardy is not a fundamental right, it need not apply.

Adamson v. California
2. Facts: Adamson was convicted of murder. During the trial, the state had
commented to the jury on his failure to take the stand.

3. Procedural Posture: Adamson claimed that the conviction violated the 14th
amendment because the states comment amounted to a violation of the 5th
amendments self-incrimination privilege in a federal proceeding.

4. Issue: Whether a states comment at a state criminal trial on the failure of a
defendant to take the stand at trial is a violation of the defendants 5th
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

5. Holding: No.

6. Argument: The 14th amendment incorporates the 5th amendments
privilege against self-incrimination and applies it to the states in the same way
that the 5th amendment applies directly to the federal government.

7. Majority Reasoning: Although the 14th amendments due process clause
guarantees a right to a fair trial in a state criminal trial, there is no ground
under Palko to make the self-incrimination privilege one of the fundamental
rights that is incorporated in the 14th amendment and applied to the states.

8. Dissent Reasoning: [Black] felt that the full incorporation of the bill of rights
into the 14th amendment was the original purpose of the 14th amendment
and the intent of the amendments framers. The history demonstrates that both
those in favor of and against the amendment thought that it was powerful to
forbid the states from depriving a citizen of the protections afforded by the bill
of rights. The process of Twining to expand or contract the applicability of the
bill of rights through the 14th amendment as needed by natural law was
more power than the court was granted by the constitution. Also, the selective
application process of Palko was inconsistent with the historical purpose.

9. Concurrence Reasoning: [Frankfurter] argued that the 14th amendments
due process clause has independent potency apart from the bill of rights. It
does not represent shorthand for the first 8 amendments. However, in
determining which clauses in the first eight amendments are incorporated and
which are not, the judicial interpretation of which are fundamental is too
subjective. The relevant question is whether the ciminal proceedings deprived
the accused of the due process of law.

Duncan v Louisiana
2. Facts: Duncan was convicted of simple battery, which in Louisiana was a
misdemeanor punishable by 2 years imprisonment and a $300 fine.

3. Procedural Posture: Duncan sought trial by jury, but the Louisiana
constitution grants jury trials only in capital punishment or hard labor cases,
so the trial judge denied the request.

4. Issue: Whether the federal constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury
under the 6th amendment, through the 14th amendment in a state criminal
trial where a sentence as long as 2 years may be imposed.

5. Holding: Yes. The 14th amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which, were they to be tried in a federal court, would come
within the 6th amendments guarantee.

6. Argument: The 14th amendment makes the jury trial guarantee of the 6th
amendment applicable to the states in cases where a sentence as long as 2
years may be imposed.

7. Argument: The constitution imposes no duty on a state to guarantee a trial
by jury in a state criminal trial, regardless of the severity of the punishment
available. If the trial by jury is guaranteed in state criminal cases, it will cast
doubt on the integrity of every trial conducted without a jury. Also, if due
process is deemed to include trial by jury, then all past interpretations of the
6th amendment in the federal courts (such as a 12-man jury) would then
become applicable to states, infringing on their ability to experiment.

8. Majority Reasoning: The test for whether a bill of rights right is incorporated
to the states by the 14th amendment is whether that right is a fundamental
right. Although there were prior cases stating in dicta that a right to a trial by
jury was not fundamental to a fair trial, those cases are rejected as being
wrong. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent
oppression by the Government. Although there are other countries that have
fair criminal justice systems, but use no juries, ours is not one of them. The
supporting framework of our criminal justice system relies upon juries for
fairness. It is true that there are some criminal cases that may be tried without
a jury, however, this is not one of them.

9. Concurrence Reasoning: [Black] expressed that he is glad that selective
incorporation has worked since Adamson to incorporate most of the Bill of
Rights guarantees. He goes on to restate his arguments in support of total
incorporation. Namely that the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th
amendment serves to totally incorporate the Bill of Rights because what more
precious privilege can there be that the privilege to claim the protections of our
great Bill of Rights. He criticizes Harlans dissent as being too subjective a
definition of due process.

10. Dissent Reasoning: [Harlan] stated that the due process clause of the 14th
amendment requires that state procedures be fundamentally fair in all
respects, but it does not require jury trials in criminal cases. The historical
evidence demonstrates that the framers of the 14th amendment did not think
that they were incorporating the bill of rights. The proper analysis should be
a gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion to ascertain those
immutable principles of free government. It is improper for the majority to
simply incorporate the jury trial clause jot-for-jot with all of its associated
baggage of federal judicial interpretation. Each case must be analyzed to see
whether it was a fair one.


DC v. Heller

Facts
Handgun possession is banned under District of Columbia (D) law. The law prohibits the registration of handguns and makes it a crime to carry an unregistered
firearm. Furthermore all lawfully owned firearms must be kept unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock unless they are being used for lawful
recreational activities or located in a place of business.
Dick Heller (P) is a special police officer in the District of Columbia. The District refused Hellers application to register a handgun he wished to keep in his home.
Heller filed this lawsuit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia on Second Amendment grounds. Heller sought an injunction against enforcement of
the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement prohibiting the carrying of a firearm in the home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement
insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms within the home.
The District Court dismissed Hellers complaint. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and directed the District Court to enter summary
judgment in favor of the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals construed Hellers complaint as seeking the right to render a firearm operable and carry it in his
home only when necessary for self defense, and held that the total ban on handguns violated the individual right to possess firearms under the Second
Amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue
What rights are protected by the Second Amendment?
Holding and Rule (Scalia)
The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful
purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
Text of the Second Amendment
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

The Court assumes that a license will satisfy Hellers prayer for relief and therefore does not address the constitutionality of the licensing requirement. Assuming
Heller is not otherwise disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District of Columbia must permit him to register his handgun and must issue him
a license to carry it in the home.
Disposition
Affirmed.
Dissent (Stevens)
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the right of the people to maintain a well regulated militia. It was a response to the concern that the power of
Congress to disarm the state militias and create a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to state sovereignty. Neither the text of the Second
Amendment nor the arguments advanced by its proponents evidence the slightest interest by the Framers in limiting any legislatures authority to regulate private
civilian uses of firearms.
There is no indication that the Framers intended to enshrine the common law right of self-defense in the Constitution. The view in Miller that the Second
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but does not curtail the Legislatures power to regulate the nonmilitary use and
ownership of weapons, is both the most natural reading of the Amendments text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adoption. The majority fails
to identify any new evidence supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to limit the power of Congress to regulate civilian uses of weapons.
Dissent (Breyer)
The Second Amendment protects militia-related interests, not self-defense-related interests. Furthermore, the Amendment permits government to regulate the
interests that it serves. Colonial history itself offers important examples of the kinds of gun regulation that citizens would then have thought compatible with the
right to keep and bear arms, including substantial regulation of firearms in urban areas, and regulations that imposed limitations on the use of firearms for the
protection of the home.
Adoption of a true strict scrutiny standard for evaluating gun control regulations would be impossible and I would adopt an interest-balancing inquiry. In applying
this kind of standard the Court normally defers to a legislatures empirical judgment in matters where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and greater
institutional fact finding capacity.
This case is also cited as DC v. Heller. See United States v. Lopez for a constitutional law case brief addressing the constitutionality of gun control legislation
enacted by Congress in exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause.


Munn v. Illinois
Facts of the Case
Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use.
Question
Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment?
Conclusion
Decision: 7 votes for Illinois, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Illinois Warehouse Act of 1871; US Constitution, 14th Amendment
No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when
such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."
Mugler v. Kansas
Facts of the Case
A Kansas law prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Mugler was arrested for making and selling beer. This case was decided together with
Kansas v. Ziebold.
Question
Does the Kansas law violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
According to Harlan, the Kansas prohibition does not infringe on Fourteenth Amendment rights. Though Mugler has an abstract right to make liquor for his own
use, such a right could be conditioned on its effect on others. Here the state legislature may exercise its police powers.

Allgeyer v. Louisiana
Facts of the Case
A Louisiana statute prohibited foreign (out-of-state) insurance corporations from conducting business in Louisiana without maintaining at least one place of
business and an authorized agent in the State. Louisiana implemented the statute as an exercise of its police powers, intending to protect its citizens from deceitful
insurance companies. Allgeyer and Company violated this statute by purchasing insurance from a firm based in the State of New York which did not meet the
requirements of the Louisiana law.
Question
Does the Louisiana law violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause which, according to Allegyer and Company, protects its liberty to enter into
contracts with businesses of its choice?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that the Louisiana statute deprived Allgeyer and Company of its liberty without due process of law as protected by
the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that even though the Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company of New York did not maintain an office or
agent in Louisiana, Allgeyer and Company could still, as it did, enter into a contract with Atlantic Mutual in the state of New York to insure its Louisiana property.
Justice Peckham's opinion makes clear the linkage between an individual's economic liberty and the due process clause.

Lochner v. New York
Facts of the Case
The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day.
Question
Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Lochner, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: NY Bakeshop Act
The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with the freedom of contract, and thus the
Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee. The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for
interfering with liberty by determining the hours of labor.

Zablocki
Facts of the Case
Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in
Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the
ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin
county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Question
Did the Wisconsin statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Decision: 8 votes for Redhail, 1 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection
Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the
majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment as
identified in Griswold v. Connecticut. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who
wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as found in Loving v. Virginia.

Turner v. Safley
Brief Fact Summary. Inmates brought suit over a Missouri Corrections regulation that permitted inmates to marry only with permission of the prison
superintendent and allowed for approval only when compelling reasons exist.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The reason for the rule did not have a reasonable relationship to the goals of the penal system, therefore the prisoners
constitutional right to marriage was violated.

Facts. The Missouri Division of Corrections had regulations permitting inmates to marry only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison,
and allowing for such approval only when there are compelling reasons to do so. Prison officials testified that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of
an illegitimate child where considered compelling. Plaintiff inmates brought a class action suit for injunctive relief and damages.

Issue. Should a different rule apply in a prison forum that does not include marriage as a constitutionally protected right?
If the rule burdens prisoners constitutional rights, should the restriction be tested under a reasonableness standard?

Although the right to marry is subject to substantial restriction for prisoners, the expressions of emotional support and public commitment; the religious
spiritual significance; and the expectation that most inmate marriages will ultimately be consummated remain unaffected by confinement or legitimate
correctional goals.


Moore v. East Cleveland
acts of the Case
East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of
"family" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.
Question
Did the housing ordinance violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Moore, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process
The four justices in the plurality held that the ordinance violated Moore's rights as it constituted "intrusive regulation of the family" without accruing
some tangible state interest. Justice Stevens joined in the judgment and argued that the ordinance was invalid because, by regulating who could live
with Moore, it constituted a taking of property without just compensation.

Michael H

Facts of the Case
Gerald D. was the presumptive father of Victoria D. since she was born to his wife Carole D.. However, Carole had an adulterous partner, Michael H., who
obtained blood tests indicating that he was likely the biological father. When Michael obtained visitation rights in a California state court, Gerald argued that
Michael had no ground under California law to challenge Gerald's paternity since more than two years had passed since Victoria's birth. According to Cal. Evid.
Code 621, the child is "presumed to be a child of the marriage" and another man can only challenge this presumption within two years of birth. The court ruled in
favor of Gerald and canceled Michael's visitation rights. Michael claimed that Code 621 violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by denying him an
opportunity to establish his paternity. A California Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of Code 621.
Question
Does Cal. Evid. Code 621 violate the Due Process Clause by denying a possible biological father the chance to establish his paternity of a child after two years
have passed since the child's birth?
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for Gerald D., 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process
No. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the judgment for a 5-4 court. Based on its analysis of common-law tradition, the plurality opinion found that a possible
biological father does not have a fundamental right to obtain parental rights after the presumptive father has exercised significant responsibility over the child.
Therefore due process protection does not apply. Code 621 was based on common-law precedent which showed "an aversion to declaring children illegitimate"
and supported "the interest in promoting the 'peace and tranquility of States and families.'" Restricting Michael's parental rights achieved this by granting Gerald
the sole responsibility to play the role of Victoria's father.

Lawrence v. TX

Facts of the Case
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man,
Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a
Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute
was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), controlling.
Question
Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex
couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal convictions
for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?
Conclusion
Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process
No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of
Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life
of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.

Cruzan


Nancy Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)
CASE: Parents of woman left in vegetative state after automobile accident sue to force her doctors to stop giving her artifial nutrition and hydration.
FACTS: In 1983, at the age of 26, Nancy Cruzan was in an automobile accident that left her in a persistent vegetative state in which she could not even swallow food or water. Her
prognosis is negative: her condition is expected to worsen over time so that she will never recover signigicant cognitive function. She is kept alive through the aid of artificial nutrition
and hydration, administered through a tube. The state is bearing the costs of her care. After six years, her parents, as her legal guardians, asked the doctors in the state hospital
treating their daughter to remove the tube that keeps her alive, to permit her to die. Upon their refusal, the parents obtained an order from a district court ordering the hospital to
comply with the wishes of the parents and the patient (about a year earlier, Cruzan had apparently told a housemate that, in the event she were sick or significantly debilitated, she
would perfer to die than to face life in a vegetative state). The hospital appealed, and the Missouri Supreme Court overturned the lower court.
HOLDING: State's refusal to terminate artifical nutrition and hydration of a patient in a persistent vegetative state absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes to
withdraw treatment did not violate the patient's right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the state's interest in safeguarding the personal
element in the choice between life or death outweighed the patient's less-than-clear-and-convicing wish to refuse the nutrients and hydration.
RATIONALE:
The Court assumes, without deciding, that the Constitution would grant a competent person the right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the lives of its citizens and in safeguarding against abuse of the decision whether or not to terminate life on the part of
those who act as surrogates for the incompetent.
The heightend burden is properly placed upon the surrogates because the risk of error is greater in that the decision to terminate a life is final.
The type of testimony Cruzan's parents seek to introduce in this case would be excluded, by the parol evidence rule, even in matters in which much less is at stake.
DISSENT: (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun) The dissent emphasizes the hopelessness of Cruzan's condition, that she will never recover and that she will get progressively worse.
They argue that no state interests could possibly outweigh the privacy rights of an individual in Nancy's position and that the heightened evidence requirements upheld by the Court do
little to enhance the accuracy of the incompetent's decision (pointing out that no proof is required to support a finding that the incompetent person would wish to continue treatment.

Washington
Brief Fact Summary. Petitioners appeal the lower court ruling from the State of Washington that held
that the States ban against assisted suicide violated the United States Constitution Fourteenth
Amendment.
gd
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A states ban on assisted suicide does not violate the constitution
Petitioners claim that the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty that extends to a personal choice by a
mentally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted suicide. The lower court held for
Respondents, and Petitioners appeal, contending that the state has an interest in not allowing such
suicide.
Held. No. A states ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Constitution. The history, legal traditions,
and practice of the laws of this nation under the Constitution support criminalizing suicide, whether it is
to end a patients suffering or not. The ban against physician-assisted suicide is reasonable because it
relates to a legitimate state interest because Washington State seeks to preserve human life and also to
uphold the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. Moreover, Washingtons statute seeks to
protect potentially vulnerable individuals who might be pressured into such suicide, such as the poor,
elderly, those disabled from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. This ban also effectively prevents a broader
license to voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Therefore, we hold for Respondents.

Concurrence. Two concurrences were given in this case:
There is no need to address the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally cognizable
interest in obtaining relief from the suffering that they may experience in the last days of their lives,
even if medication given for this purpose hastens death. The difficulties in defining terminal illness and
the risk that a dying patients request to end his or her life might not be fully voluntary justify the
prohibition against assisted suicide that we uphold here.
Our holding is fully consistent with the vigorous debate regarding the morality, legality, and practicality
of physician assisted suicide. There is also room for further debate on the limits that the Constitution
imposes to punish the practice.

Vacco v. Quill
Facts of the Case
Dr. Timothy E. Quill, along with other physicians and three seriously ill patients who have since died, challenged the constitutionality of the New York State's ban
on physician-assisted suicide. New York's ban, while permitting patients to refuse lifesaving treatment on their own, has historically made it a crime for doctors to
help patients commit or attempt suicide, even if patients are terminally ill or in great pain. Following a District Court ruling favoring the State of New York, the
Second Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted New York certiorari.
Question
Did New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by allowing competent terminally ill adults to
withdraw their own lifesaving treatment, but denying the same right to patients who could not withdraw their own treatment and could only hope that a physician
would do so for them
Conclusion
Decision: 9 votes for Vacco, 0 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Equal Protection
No. Employing a rationality test to examine the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that New York's ban was rationally related to the state's
legitimate interest in protecting medical ethics, preventing euthanasia, shielding the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice which might encourage them to end
their lives, and, above all, the preservation of human life. Moreover, while acknowledging the difficulty of its task, the Court distinguished between the refusal of
lifesaving treatment and assisted suicide, by noting that the latter involves the criminal elements of causation and intent. No matter how noble a physician's
motives may be, he may not deliberately cause, hasten, or aid a patient's death.

Oregon legalized physician assisted suicide

Gonzales v. Oregon
- Could not prosecute physicians in accordance with Oregon state
law. Washington, Montana, Massachusetts
- Justices left open possibility that laws upholding physician
assisted suicide may be unconstitutional.
Note 3 pg-494

Procedural Due process- procedures gov must follow before depriving a person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

What is deprivation?
- Mere negligent action by the gov is not enough
- The gov action must be intentional or at least reckless
- The failure of the gov to protect you from private deprivations is
not enough (if someone breaks in and steals you property, is not
the govs problem or deprivation)except if youre in gov custody
or if gov created danger
-

What is liberty, property?
- Liberty- more than just freedom from confinement
- Property- more than stuff you own (like house or car)
Protects education, welfare, social security benefits,
(expectation to receive them)

What procedures does due process require?
- Matthews v. Eldridge 3 part test
Private interest affected by the official action
Notice of reasons
Opportunity to rebut
Equal Protection
- Racial discrimination
- End of reconstruction (period of military rule in the defeated
southern states at the end of the civil war)
-