THEORY

No Neg Fiat 2AC

Negative fiat is a voting issue

1. No resolutional basis - the aff has fiat for purposes of affirming the resolution. The negatives burden is
to negate that action.

2. Ground destroys affirmative ground to argue whether or not plan is a good idea no one could
possibly say that the aff should just go away and only think about disadvantages

3. Kills Education the neg can research one CP and use nothing else the entire year, disincentivizing
specific case research
Word PICs Bad 2AC
Word PICs are a voting issue
Steals aff ground we cant argue directly against the counterplans action, because its the same as plan.
No literature No one writes defenses of singular words in a vacuum, but rather in the context of the plan
offense defense negates the ability to get offense
Inflates trivial net benefits non-unique, non-literature based blog indicts of a word become round-winners
Disads and kritiks check they can run a disad and uniqueness CP and kritik with an alternative of the
word in question
Destroy education
Sanford F. SCHRAM, Associate Professor of Political Science at Macalester College, former Visiting Professor at the La
Follette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin and Visiting Affiliate at the Institute for Research on Poverty at
the University of Wisconsin, 1995 [Discourses of Dependency: The Politics of Euphemism, Words of Welfare: The Poverty of
Social Science and The Social Science of Poverty, Published by The University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0816625778, p. 34-35]
The politics of renaming highlights the relationships of discourse to structure and ideology to power.87
The limits of euphemisms suggest that these renamings often reinforce a broader, institutionalized, and
structural context that is supported through the daily actions of aligned groupings exercising power to
effect outcomes consistent with their interests. Yet the power plays reinforcing prevailing structures also
operate to encourage selected interpretations of a wide variety of acts of signification. These structures
help create a social logic that constrains interpretation of even the most imaginative of renamings.
Whereas the structural conditions that constrain policy discourse are themselves discursively constituted,
they in turn produce [end page 34] material constraints that limit notions of what is feasible and practical
under the existing arrangements. Therefore, displacing the self-sufficiency of the breadwinner will not
on its own make dependents more worthy. Even if bread itself is shown in good part, if not the whole
loaf, to be symbolic, that will not by itself lead people to eat some other symbol. Gaining leverage for
political change involves appreciating not just how material structures can be denaturalized. Political
change comes with also appreciating how material practices serve to constrain seriously the extent to
which discursive moves will have any tractability in public settings. Only when the power plays
supporting such structural conditions are resisted can alternative discursive moves gain political
salience.88 Action to improve the lives of poor people involves instituting changes in institutional
practices so that people will be motivated to think more inclusively or be willing to entertain the idea that
it is rational for them as well-meaning, if not self-interested, individuals to promote the well-being of
marginal groups. The existing institutional infrastructure currently works against such thinking.

One-Word PICs Bad 2AC

One-word PICs are a voting issue
Interpretation: Neg can run PICs that exclude more than one word
Steals aff ground we cant argue directly against the counterplan, because its the same as plan. We cant
debate against our own advocacy
Topical counterplan is topical, means that it affirms the resolution and you vote affirmative, negative gets all
non-resolutional ground which is mathematically superior to resolution breadth
Inflates trivial net benefits the neg could counterplan do plan minus one penny with the net benefit of a
penny saved is a penny earned. This makes normally irrelevant issues round-winners, which destroys case-
focused education.
Infinitely regressive theres always another part of plan the neg could sever out of or modify to get a net
benefit we cant predict them all, and as soon as we research one they move onto another, so the aff can never
be prepared.
Not real world - Bills are amended, not rejected based on a singular flaw
Disads check they can run a disad to the mechanism included in the plan, solves back ground claims
Case
Lets do some line by line before some ext of the scenarios we answer each things on Case
Firstly lifting the Embargo doesnt not pressure Cuba towards fast changes as suggested in their , the
McCaskill evidence firstly , is quite evident of how the gradual approach is being taken , but lets turn
them :
Cubas government will collapse in 2014 several factors make it inevitable
Snchez 13 (Yoani Snchez is the Havana-based author of the blog Generation Y and the recently published book Havana Real. This article was translated by Mary Jo Porter.
January 02, 2013, "Midnight in Havana: Will the Cuban government fall in 2013?", http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2013/01/midnight_in_havana_will_the_cu.html-
http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2013/01/midnight_in_havana_will_the_cu.html,accessed:10/21/13,JW)

It's increasingly obvious that the biological clock of the Cuban government -- a slow and agonizing
journey of the hands that has lasted 54 years -- is closing in on midnight. Every minute that passes brings
obsolescence a little nearer. The existence of a political system should not be so closely linked to the
youth or decrepitude of its leaders, but in the case of our island, both ages have come to be the same
thing. Like a creature made in the image and likeness of a man -- who believes himself to be God --
Cuba's current political model will not outlive its creators. Every decision made over the past five
decades, every step taken in one direction or another, has been marked by the personalities and
decisions of a handful of human beings -- two of them in particular. One, Fidel Castro, 86, has been
convalescing for six long years in a place few Cubans could find on a map. Although in the last five years
Fidel's brother Ral, 81, has installed some younger faces in the administrative and governmental
apparatus, the most important decisions remain concentrated in the hands of octogenarians. (Ral's
successor, Jose Ramon Machado, is 82.) Like a voracious Saturn devouring his children, the principal
leaders of the revolution have not allowed any favored sons to overshadow them. The last to be ousted
due to the paranoia of the Castro brothers were Vice President Carlos Lage, a figure who enjoyed
popular sympathy, and the foreign minister Felipe Perez Roque. Both might have made promising
successors, but were accused by Fidel Castro himself as having been "addicted to the honey of power"
and removed from their positions in 2009. Their own selfishness has left Cuban leaders without a plan
for succession and time has run out to develop it, at least one not sincerely committed to continuing
along the path set by old men dressed in olive green. For Ral, the picture is worrisome, and he has
declared that "time is short" to ready the generation that will replace him and his comrades. In 2013, he
will be forced to accelerate this process, and his obvious desperation about the future is contributing to
the ideological weakening and the loss of whatever popular support the Castro regime still enjoys.
Meanwhile, Castro's tentative economic reforms are also contributing to the loss of control over the
population. Together, the expansion of the private sector, the imposition of taxes, the distribution of
land leases to farmers, and the authorization of cooperatives in businesses other than agriculture, are
gradually reducing the state's influence in the daily life of Cubans. Ral may see these as a desperation
move to jumpstart the Cuban economy, but one consequence will be the diminished ideological
commitment of the people to a government that provides fewer and fewer subsidies and benefits. Every
step the authorities take in the direction of greater flexibility is like pointing a loaded gun at their own
temples. A system based on keeping every tiny aspect of our national life under tight control cannot
maintain itself when some of these bonds are loosened. Reform is the death of the status quo and
maneuvers to guarantee financial survival by opening the system to private capital are a death sentence
written in advance. The year 2013 will be a decisive one in Cuba's move from economic centralism to
the fragmentation of production, from absolute verticality to its dismantling. Those who cease to
receive their salaries from a state institution and come to support their families through self-
employment will undoubtedly gain more political autonomy. Despite the best efforts of the political
police, the opposition today is more energized than it has been since the so-called Black Spring of 2003 -
- when 75 regime opponents were rounded up, most sentenced to long prison terms. Although 2012
closed with the unfortunate loss of Oswaldo Paya, the leading figure of the Christian Liberation
Movement, other faces are beginning to gain prominence. The number of activists is increasing -- and
they are bringing fresh, modern ideas to the struggle. An emerging community of alternative bloggers
and performance artists is blending social criticism into its creations, and increasingly bold musicians are
using the lyrics of hip hop and reggaeton to narrate a reality far removed from the official discourse.
Meanwhile, alternative information networks, including Twitter and other social networks via mobile
phones, are helping to break the state's monopoly on opinion and to communicate the truth about what
is happening on our island to the rest of the world. The aging of the nomenklatura, the growing
opposition, and the expansion of the private sector are not the only influences that will weaken the
system in 2013. The worsening health of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chvez is a catalyst for collapse. In the
absence of his great patron -- and provider of subsidized petroleum -- in Caracas, Ral will have to speed
up economic reforms even more quickly to spur growth, further weakening the Communist Party's
authority. The emergence of their Venezuelan acolyte was a godsend to the Castros, who lost their
original benefactor with the collapse of Soviet communism. But there doesn't appear to be another
country on the horizon willing to shoulder the burden of 42,000 square miles and its 11 million
inhabitants. U.S. President Barack Obama will also have a part to play. If the United States finally lifts --
or softens -- its decades-long embargo, it may give the government a temporary financial respite. But on
the other hand, such a move would also take away the Castro regime's favorite political excuse for its
economic failures. The country's sad state could no longer be blamed on our neighbor to the north. It
would be a hard ideological blow. Given all these factors, it's difficult to see how The System can survive
the coming year, much less ensure its long-term viability. But it's worth noting that the regime in Havana
has long demonstrated its skill in surviving even the most unfavorable predictions. After all, the Cuban
economy has been in a state of crisis for the last 20 years. One could even say that our leaders find
tension soothing and perform better under emergency conditions than under prosperity. Material needs
can also serve to paralyze people who must spend hours waiting for a bus or standing on line to buy a
couple of pounds of chicken instead of organizing.
If then taking the gradual approach in the status quo cause Cuba to become a failed state ,and how
the aff is shortening the apporach
State failure causes global disease and WMD conflict
Bill Emmott 3, Editor-in-Chief of The Economist, 2003, 20:21 Vision, pp. 265-266, 277-278
There are other self-serving reasons to be worried about inequality and its handmaiden, poverty. One is that a
poorer country is more likely to have weak political and social institutions, which are then more likely to
collapse into chaos or civil war. That is especially likely when the country is poor in terms of the direct
economic activity of its citizenry but is nevertheless home to some valuable natural resources, such as the
diamonds of Sierra Leone. Forces within, and forces from outside, are liable to fight to get their hands on those
resources. Chaos and civil war are essentially local troubles that need not affect the rest of the world, but they are
liable to draw in neighbors, risking a wider regional conflict as countries or factions vie to exploit the
vacuum left in the collapsing state. Poorer, unstable countries are also likely to harbor and to foster two other
ills: disease and terrorism. Disease may well contribute to poverty rather than being a consequence of it, but it
is also the case that a poor country is likely to lack the infrastructure as well as money to be able to deal
with epidemic diseases such as the human irumunodeficiency virus that causes AIDS, or Ebola, and
those diseases might then be able to spread across other borders. The danger of terrorism is more obvious:
discontented, otherwise hopeless people may wish to take out their sense of grievance on the luckier rich, and
will be likely to find plenty of willing recruits for dangerous or even suicidal terrorist missions. The terrorist
attacks on 11 September 2001 confirm this only indirectly, since the terrorists concerned were neither poor nor
hopeless. But they and their followers did, it seems, feel that Islamic countries in general were poor and lacking in
hope, following centuries of humiliation at the hands of the West. And the argument applies directly to
Afghanistan: if that country had not been dirt-poor, it would have been unlikely to have acted as a host to the al-
Qaeda terrorists. Rich countries can give rise to terrorism too, even without the separatist movements found in the
Basque Country and Northern Ireland; Germany had its Baader-Meinhof gang in the 1970s, Italy its Red Brigades,
and even America had the Symbionese Liberation Front. But they have not been numerous enough to pose a
danger to their governments or to any other country. Poverty and despair act as a more powerful recruiting
sergeant for terrorists than do mere alienation or beliefs in anarchism. Other people worry about inequality
because of a fear of war: the fear that countries which feel that they are unable to advance their living
standards and sense of power by conventional economic means may be tempted to use military
methods as a shortcut. As a general proposition, this argument is unconvincing, for a poorer country is also
often militarily weak, though that still made the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact countries a formidable enemy to NATO
during the cold war. By and large, however, the rich will always be able to defeat poor countries in anything other
than a guerrilla warand such fighting methods may be common in civil wars or m wars of liberation, but they do
not put other countries themselves in physical danger, except from terrorism. But in some circumstances this
argument may hold good. North Korea, for example, has long used the threat of military attack either on its
southern compatriot, or on Japan or the United States, as a means by which to blackmail the rich. Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990 in order to grab its oil as well as merely to make a territorial point. Inequality, in other words,
may lead to an increase in the number of unpredictable dictators slightly euphemistically known as rogue
states (even more euphemistically known, by America's State Department, as "states of concern"). These rogues
have become more dangerous as technology has advanced sufficiently to make long-range missiles cheap enough
to buy and develop, and to use as a threat. They could become extremely deadly if any obtain the means to
develop and deploy nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

CONDITIONALITYS A VOTER:
1. STRATEGY SKEW ALLOWS NEG TO CROSS APPLY ARGUMENTS ON OTHER FLOWS UNDERMINES AFFS ABILITY TO UTILIZE BEST OFFENSE AND SEVERS ABILITY TO STRAIGHT TURN BECAUSE COUNTERPLAN CAPTURES
OFFENSE
2. ARGUMENTIVE IRRESPONSIBILITY UNDERMINES ADVOCACY SKILLS BY ALLOWING NEG TO GO FOR WHICHEVER ADVOCACY IS LEAST COVERED
3. INTERPRETATION: NEGATIVE CAN READ ALL DISPOSITIONAL - SOLVES YOUR OFFENSE STRAIGHT TURNING MEANS THEYRE FORCED TO GO FOR IT WHILE STILL ALLOWING SUBSTANTIAL NEG FLEX
4. INTERPRETATION: NEGATIVE GETS ONE CONDITIONAL ADVOCACY LETS THEM GET AWAY WITH ENOUGH ABUSE TO WIN

Next on their Miller Evidence , that does not interact with the 1AC because we are not increasing
federal funding we are increasing interdialogue and gaining access of Cuba Biotechnology , and of how
then we are advocating for American legal acess towards the Cuban Biotech , not the Federal
Government
On their Rass evidence lets put the evidence of what postdates that
1.Evenson07 which gives better warrants of what the plan is advocating and how the better Biotech is
in Cuba and also how their Rass is only towards one clinical trial , meanwhile we are advocating for a
whole shift .
Next answering their Turn on Cuban Biotech causes Bioterrorism ;firstly the Aff prevents this because
of how in the Failed State these Condtions are possible for the Bioterrorist
The Blazquez evidence is postdate by the Bailey evidence by months , which then is
indicating the slightest change , and also of how then interaction and we easily also
solve for bioterrorism because of how then the United State influence will take out
the influence of these terrorist ,and how then we also solve for this .
Soft Power:
Multipolarity is good for then : preventing these as are advantage is suggesting
because of how firstly its prevention of CBW Chemical Warfare is prevented , and
Unilaterism
Now answering the Turn : Firstly lets give more reasons , firstly prefer the ideas of
Multilaterislism is because of how Sustaining hegemony undermines multipolarity it
makes conflict more likely and causes mass proliferation.
Nuscheler 01 Director of the Institute for Development and Peace at the Gerhard Mercator University, Duisburg, and Deputy Chair of
the Development and Peace Foundations Executive Committee [Franz Nuscheler, Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism Cooperation vs. Hegemony
in Transatlantic Relations, http://www.inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/documents/pp16_engl.pdf. January 2001]

Risks and counterproductive effects of unilateralism A Brzezinski-style plea for a superpower politics
ignores or overlooks some counterproductive effects that are mitigated only by the fact that the
international community is closer to a tolerably functioning structure of worldwide cooperation than
Brzezinski was willing to perceive, the US being, if need be, prepared to accept multilateralismthough
only if need be, and then at terms defined by the US. First , the Pax Americana is a shaky peace order,
more wish and claim than actual potential. The superpower is incapable of keeping or making peace
throughout the world. Many global conflicts cannot be solved by military action. Peacekeeping too must
be organized on a multilateral basis, because the militarily overpowerful hegemon is neither able nor
the debacle of Somalia still in mindwilling to intervene wherever anarchy threatens to prevail. On the
contrary: the hegemon is less and less willing to play the role of the world policeman whenever the
interests at stake are not its own vital interests. Such world regions of lesser interest include, above all,
Subsaharan Africa. Second , the talk of the unipolar superpower fuels anti-Americanism throughout
the better part of the world and cannot fail to provoke resistance. An imprudent display of superiority
just about inevitably leads to the formation of anti -hegemonic alliances. The NATO allies are also
reluctant to accept a hegemon that calls for obedience. Russia and China are resisting its claim to world
leadership, and are already forging an alliance. Nor were threats of sanctions enough to prevent India
and Pakistan from conducting their nuclear weapons tests. Asianism, which is not without its prophets
in Japan as well, bears anti-Western and in particular anti-American undertones. Third , hegemony
runs counter to cooperation , above all when the hegemon seeks to use the existing power differentials
to achieve its interests and increase its own advantages at the expense of the mutual benefit. While it
can afford not to give in and not to have to learn, since it is less vulnerable than its outpowered negotiating partners, this
inability to learn harbors the seeds of the end of its superiority, as the history of the rise and fall of
empires (Paul Kennedy) teaches us. Fourth , the USs claim to world leadership means that it must go on with
high arms spending, and the funds needed can be mobilized only at the expense of urgently required
social reforms and infrastructure investment. Paul Kennedy's warning that the costs of securing power
overburden empires has not at all been rendered obsolete by world history. Many observers already
regard the mighty USA as a weakened giant that will be unable to use a policy of sheer power to hold
its own in the long run. Fifth , huge stockpiles of arms for use in securing hegemonic power not only
conjure up the possibility of an arms race , this striving for global hegemony by means of military
omnipotence and omnipresence is also heading back into a world-historical atavism. Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1966)
situates thinking of this kind in a pre-democratic epoch in that it is in no way compatible with the
outward self-projection of a developed democracy. Even worse: the thinking and the deeds of a world power that
sees itself as the realm of light inevitably influence the thought and action patterns of rising great
powers: This is the master summoning spirits that he is unable to rein in with the powers at his disposal. Sixth , international law, the
foundation of civilized international relations comes about not on the basis of hegemonic dictates but
through consensus and persuasion. The hegemon loses its claim to moral authority by refusing to abide
by important international treaties. Only by accepting the norms of a global rule of law can it demand
the same of rogue states. Claims to world political leadership rest not only on power but on authority
and legitimacy as well. Recommendation: Unilateralism is blocking the development of a multilateral
architecture of global governance. It is not only detrimental to a culture of cooperation, it is also costly.
Cooperation and burden-sharing save political and financial expenses. And global problems can no
longer be solved by a powerful hegemon. United States refusal to cooperate provokes other countries to
refuse their cooperation in dealing with problems that affect the hegemon itself. Yet the willingness to
cooperate is given only when all negotiating partners can expect a fair reconciliation of interests. It
would therefore be in the enlightened self-interest of the US to put more of its trust in partnerly
cooperation, in this way reducing the resistance that any hegemonic claim to leadership inevitably
entails.
Breaks the nuclear taboo between major powers.
Gusterson 7 (Hugh Gusterson, professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University, expertise in nuclear culture,
Nuclear terrorism: Correcting the future 6/4/07)

We already know the narrative frame that will be put around the smoking ruins of a U.S. city by the
national security apparatus and conservatives. We saw it starting on September 12, 2001. We will be
told we were attacked because we have not militarized our society enough, and the attack will be used
to justify more military spending, new military actions abroad, and further sacrifice of civil liberties at
home. When you live so deep inside militarism that you cannot see outside it, military solutions become
a reflex reaction--even to problems that militarism caused. The poison becomes the cure. If you think
the post-9/11 smorgasbord of Abu Ghraib, illegal domestic wiretapping, and attacks on media and
academic critics were bad, wait 'til you see what happens after a city goes missing. Our task is to create a
counternarrative that joins the dots in a different way. Anti-nuclear activists did this in the 1980s. The
bumper-sticker version of their counternarrative was "end the race or end the race." They recoded each
development in the arms race not as a move toward further security, but as one step closer to
Armageddon. What we need now is a broadly disseminated public narrative that foresees a nuclear
terrorist attack while connecting it to different dots. If the so-called realists tell a naive, utopian story
about a world in which we can sleep safely alongside vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons and enriched
uranium as long as we wiretap enough people and build enough radiation detectors, "our" story will be
about shortsighted leaders who sought security in stockpiling weapons that could only endanger the U.S.
public as they leaked into new hands, and who lacked the imagination to drastically reduce the numbers
of these weapons once the Cold War ended. This story builds to its climax with each squandered
opportunity--the failure of the Baruch Plan in the 1940s, the insistence on building the H-bomb over the
protests of Oppenheimer and others, the failure to end nuclear testing in the 1960s and again in the
1980s, the indifference to Russia after Mikhail Gorbachev, and the lack of seriousness about dismantling
the infrastructure of the arms race in the 1990s. Our story, lodged in the crevices of public discourse,
builds to "we warned you" when the attack comes and points the finger at leaders who, treating
commitments to disarmament as hollow pieties, were too vain to see that every weapon eventually
escapes its owners' control. The meaning of epochal events is never foreordained. After Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, many assumed that the use of nuclear weapons in war would continue. They advocated civil
defense at home and preemptive strikes on the Soviets abroad. Instead, in part due to the strenuous
efforts of the scientists who founded the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the response that prevailed,
uneasily, was "never again"--a response, more deeply ingrained with each year of nuclear non-use, that
led to what security specialists call the "nuclear taboo." Even if Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not lead to
the renunciation of nuclear weapons, they did make it possible for national leaders to back away from
normalizing the use of these weapons in war. Those who play with fire get burned by it. If the next
Hiroshima should be in the United States, will we be like the battered spouse who goes back for more, or
will we reconsider our tumultuous love affair with nuclear weapons?

B. Miscalc.
Layne 06- Christopher Layne is Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University. (Fall
2006, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment, Vol. 31, No. 2) SA
In a unipolar world, however, balance of threat theory is less useful. The greater the concentration of
power in the international system, the more dangerous it becomes to make determinations of threat
based on intentions rather than capabilities. Unipolarity substantially erases the distinction between
balancing against threat versus balancing against power, because the threat inheres in the very fact that
hard-power capabilities are overconcentrated in the hegemons favor. As Colin Elman suggests, It is
possible that, when states are approaching capabilities of hegemonic proportions, those resources alone
are so threatening that they drown out distance, offense-defense, and intentions as potential negative
threat modifiers. The consequences of guessing wrong about a hegemons intentions are likely to be far
worse in a unipolar system than in a multipolar system. Precisely because unipolarity means that other
states must worry primarily about the hegemons capabilities rather than its intentions, the ability of the
United States to reassure others is limited by its formidableand unchecked capabilities, which
always are at least a latent threat to other states. This is not to say that the United States is powerless to
shape others perceptions of whether it is a threat. But doing so is difficult because in a unipolar world,
the burden of proof is on the hegemon to demonstrate to others that its power is not threatening. Even
in a unipolar world, not all of the other major powers will believe themselves to be threatened (or to be
equally threatened) by the hegemon. Eventually, however, some are bound to regard the hegemons
power as menacing. For example, although primacists assert that U.S. hegemony is nonthreatening
because U.S. power is offshore, this manifestly is not the case. On the contrary, in Europe, East Asia,
and the Middle East, American power is both onshore (or lurking just over the horizon in the case of East
Asia) and in the faces of Russia, China, and the Islamic world. Far from being an offshore balancer that is
stopped by water from dominating regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, the United States has
acquired the means to project massive military power into, and around, Eurasia, and thereby to
establish extraregional hegemony in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
C. Escalation of small powers.
Monteiro 11 [Nuno P. Monteiro - is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University; Unrest Assured
Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful; http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064+
RahulNambiar

After correcting for these two limitations, it becomes clear that unipolarity possesses much potential for conflict. Contrary to what Wohlforth
argued, unipolarity is not a system in which the unipole is spared from any conflicts and major powers
become involved only in peripheral wars. Instead, a unipo- lar system is one that provides incentives for
recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars
among major and minor powers. That is the central prediction of my theory. To be sure, the unique historical character of the
current unipolar era makes the task of building a general theory of unipolarity difacult. Particularly, it re- quires great care in distinguishing
between those features of the postCold War world that are intrinsic to a unipolar system and those that stem from speciac aspects of
contemporary international politics. Two points deserve mention. First, my theory of conflict in unipolarity is robust to changes in military
technology. Still, some such changes would mean the end of unipolarity. At one end of the scale, some scholars argue that the
widespread possession of equalizing technologies such as nuclear weapons would turn all minor powers
into major powers and decrease the use of the unipoles power-projection ca- pabilities in ways that
might invalidate the label of unipolarity.113 At the other end of the scale, should the unipole develop a splendid arst-strike
capability against all other statesan unlikely prospect, no doubtits relative power would increase, perhaps replacing anarchy with
hegemony.114 Both of these developments would mean that my theory no longer applies. Second, my argument is robust to changes in the
geographical conaguration of the distribution of power. Were a future unipolar era to feature a continen-tal, rather
than an offshore, unipole, the paths to conflict described above would still apply. A continental unipoles
inability to disengage from its neigh- bors might increase the proportion of conflict in which it will be
involved at the expense of conflicts between others, but the conflict-producing mecha- nisms would
remain the same\

We answered and gave more reasoning towards going aff

On the SQUO evidence cross apply the inherency evidence on how then LA realtions are hurt by the
Embargo and also how are Fesler evidence first is of how Cuba is uniquely key
Now some more : Resolving the Cuba conflict restores U.S. hemispheric relations and its
credibility
David A. Perez, Spring, 10, JD Yale Law School, currently serving as The Legal Advisor to the State Department, America's
Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv.
Latino L. Rev. 187, JT//JEDI
There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional
difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United
States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington
must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader.
Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy
and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions
that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's
greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace
not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so
great to begin with.

Consult Brazil
Perm do the CP, then the plan , does not trigger the net benefit because of how ,
The net benefit to the perm is the turn of the net benefits impact
. War with China inevitable-

A. Economic competition

Mearsheimer 05 [John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, CLASH OF THE TITANS, Jan/Feb,
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034.pdf]

China cannot rise peacefully, and if it continues its dramatic economic growth over the next few decades, the
United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.
Most of Chinas neighbors, including India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, and Vietnam, will likely join with the United
States to contain Chinas power.

B. All recent Chinese actions prove- US experts were consistently wrong

Nyquist, renowned expert in geopolitics and international relations, 05, [JR Geopolitical Global Analyst Recent China Revelations Weekly
Column July 1] [ct] [2]

Chinas war preparations are deliberate, and the implications should not be passed over lightly. China is a highly secretive country,
like all communist countries. The objective of communism is world revolution, the overthrow of global capitalism, the destruction of
the free market, the elimination of the international bourgeoisie and the disarming of the United States. We should be puzzled, indeed, if
Chinese policy did not follow the communist line (however deviously). Given all this, it is difficult to account for the dismissive
attitude of U.S. intelligence experts when regarding Chinese intentions. The China problem is a serious one.
The people of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America should unite, said Chairman Mao in 1964. The people of all continents
should unite and so form the broadest united front to oppose the U.S. imperialist policies of aggression and war and to defend world peace.
In terms of todays peace movement, Maos sentiments are up-to-date. They are, I think, a founding inspiration. The supposed death of
communism may have eliminated a few soiled terms, but not the main idea. The label on old hatreds may be changed, but the
content remains the same. And because America is asleep, and the market is buzzing with Chinese goods, the
U.S. government has turned a blind eye. The truth about China is worse than inconvenient. It is painful. So a special context has
been devised for dismissing inconvenient facts. This context is inculcated at graduate schools, think tanks and in government. The context for
understanding international affairs must not admit the existence of a coordinated, secretive and dangerous combination of countries motivated to
overthrow the United States. In other words, the existence of a communist bloc cannot be admitted. And Chinas role within this bloc above
all must be rated as a crackpot notion. And yet, the existence of something identical to the old communist bloc whatever we choose to call it
is indicated by actions across the board by Russia, the East European satellite countries, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and China.
Some ideas fall from fashion. But truth is always true, fashion or not. U.S. experts failed to connect the dots regarding Chinas
development of a long-range cruise missile, a new attack submarine, new ground-to-air missiles, a new anti-
ship missile (for sinking U.S. aircraft carriers) and more. China is preparing for war against the United States,
specifically. As absurd as it sounds to the economic optimists who think trade with China guarantees peace,
the U.S. and China are bound to collide. Anyone who thinks otherwise doesnt have a sense of history, doesnt understand
communist thinking or the overall policy Beijing has consistently followed since 1949. Communist countries periodically experiment
with capitalism, they always seek trade with the West, and they always sink the money and technology they
gain thereby into a military buildup. Ultimately, they dont care about the prosperity of their people, the state
of the national infrastructure, personal or press freedom.








2. War is better now than later-

Cross Apply the Multilat/Hemphseric Realtion as a Solvency Defict towards the Net Benefit because
of how then are attempts to stop Unilat , is the only we to solve for the n.b

Maintaining hegemony causes transition conflicts the US will attempt to hold on
Layne 08 - Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public
Service at Texas A&M University, international relations theorist *Christopher Layne, Chinas Challenge to U.S. Hegemony Current History,
January 2008, pages 14-18, http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf / Alisa Yang]
Chinas rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the power transition
effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the
position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international peaceful rise, an ascending China
inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a
reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others fears of growing Chinese power
and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when
China is catching up to the United States. Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead
to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington
chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-
American conflict is virtually certain, because u s grand strategy has incorporated the logic of
anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, strangling the
baby in the crib by attacking a rising challenger preventivelythat is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarilyhas always been
a tempting strategic option.


Bandow 09 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute; former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan,
author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire *Doug Bandow, Chinas Military Rise
means end of U.S. hegemony? Korea Times 5/5/09,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10175]
One suspects it means accepting American military hegemony in East Asia something with which
Beijing isn't likely to agree.The Chinese military buildup so far has been significant but measured. "The
People's Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed
for protracted wars of attrition on its periphery against high-tech adversaries," explains the Pentagon.
Moreover, China's "armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies,
including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are
changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region."

US primacy ensures conflict with China
Layne 07 Visiting Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute
*Christopher American Empire: A Debate (p 75)+

So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of
primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United
States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American
primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a
rising China. As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security
order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for
future tensionor worseexists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American
primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlashwith China in the vanguardin the form of
counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to
China's rise.

Third- turn- nanotech-
A. China is modernizing to develop nano weapons to use against the US- this
outweighs nuclear war

Navrozov 07 [Lev, the winner of the Albert Einstein Prize for outstanding intellectual achievements, and more than twenty of his articles are
in the United States Congressional Record. He is also president of the nonprofit Center for the Survival of Western Democracies, Nanotech and
Sun Tzu: China's secret weapons?, Sept 3, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/lev8_31.asp]

In 1945, the ultimate super weapon was the atom bomb. I am interested in the ultimate super-weapon of today, since if there is any
chance that the development of it will succeed, this is the weapon the dictatorship of China has been developing to
annihilate the free West at a blow (or make it surrender unconditionally). The goal of eliminating the source of subversion is too
important for the dictatorship of China to be deterred by financial losses or a possibility of a failure. Recall that 100,000 riots or protests occur
every year in China, and the dictatorship may be overthrown (recall Tiananmen with its replica of the Statue of Liberty) unless it annihilates or
subjugates the free West.
In his e-mail of Aug. 20, my reader Richard Mross says:
Your articles about China and recent history are interesting, and very informative and chilling. I am convinced that China is vigorously
pursuing post-nuclear superweapons and Im sure they are successfully hiding this from the West. But why
then are they also spending so much money on conventional weapons like aircraft carriers, missiles,
submarines?
First of all, my reader may notice that while developing atom bombs, which made Japan surrender
unconditionally, the United States continued to produce conventional weapons.
This is human nature: the fear of having all eggs in one basket. But there is probably something else in the case of China. My
reader has no doubt seen the Pentagons annual reports on the growth of Chinas military power. The reports are reassuring. China, a backward country, is
trying to modernize itself and thus become more like the most technologically advanced country the Pentagon
can imagine: the USA. But imagine that the Pentagon discovers that China spends nothing on visible
weapons. Surely even the Pentagon may become suspicious.
Speaking of the United States, let me take molecular nano super weapons as an example of a scientific vision. Eric Drexler wrote his volume on
nanotechnology in 1986, and in 2007 I received on the Internet its 20th anniversary edition updated and expanded (630 pages). If
successfully developed, this scientific vision could be the ultimate super weapon of today. The molecular nano
weapona growing cloud advancing to its target and consisting of molecules acting as artificial microbes or
viruses, capable of multiplying and destroying everything in their path, including their targets. On p. 355 of the
2007 edition of his study, Drexler states
A [nuclear] bomb can only blast things, but nanomachines and AI [artificial intelligence], can be used to
infiltrate, seize, change, and govern a territory of a world.










China War Good 1NC

B. Nanoweapon use outweighs nuclear war, causes prolif, and destroys the
biosphere
TREDER AND PHOENIX, 8 (Mike , Executive Director of CRN, BS Biology, University of Washington, Research Fellow with the
Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, a consultant to the Millennium Project of the American Council for the United Nations
University AND Chris Phoenix, CRNs Director of Research, has studied nanotechnology for more than 15 years. BS, Symbolic Systems, MS,
Computer Science, Stanford University. Center For Responsible Nanotechnology, Dangers of Molecular Manufacturing, Last Updated Feb 7,
http://www.crnano.org/dangers.htm)
Nanotech weapons would be extremely powerful and could lead to a dangerously unstable arms race. Molecular
manufacturing raises the possibility of horrifically effective weapons. As an example, the smallest insect is about 200 microns; this creates a plausible size estimate for a nanotech-built
antipersonnel weapon capable of seeking and injecting toxin into unprotected humans. The human lethal dose of botulism toxin is about 100
nanograms, or about 1/100 the volume of the weapon. As many as 50 billion toxin-carrying devices
theoretically enough to kill every human on earthcould be packed into a single suitcase. Guns of all sizes would be far
more powerful, and their bullets could be self-guided. Aerospace hardware would be far lighter and higher performance; built with minimal or no metal, it would be much harder to spot on radar.
Embedded computers would allow remote activation of any weapon, and more compact power handling would allow greatly improved robotics. These ideas barely scratch the surface of what's
possible. An important question is whether nanotech weapons would be stabilizing or destabilizing. Nuclear weapons, for example, perhaps can be credited with preventing major wars
since their invention. However, nanotech weapons are not very similar to nuclear weapons. Nuclear stability stems from at least four factors. The most obvious is the massive
destructiveness of all-out nuclear war. All-out nanotech war is probably equivalent in the short term, but nuclear weapons also have a high long-term cost
of use (fallout, contamination) that would be much lower with nanotech weapons. Nuclear weapons cause indiscriminate
destruction; nanotech weapons could be targeted. Nuclear weapons require massive research effort and industrial
development, which can be tracked far more easily than nanotech weapons development; nanotech weapons can be
developed much more rapidly due to faster, cheaper prototyping. Finally, nuclear weapons cannot easily be
delivered in advance of being used; the opposite is true of nanotech. Greater uncertainty of the capabilities of
the adversary, less response time to an attack, and better targeted destruction of an enemy's visible resources
during an attack all make nanotech arms races less stable. Also, unless nanotech is tightly controlled, the number of nanotech nations in the world
could be much higher than the number of nuclear nations, increasing the chance of a regional conflict blowing up. Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice-Chairman (ret.), U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
an address at the 1995 Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology said: "Military applications of molecular manufacturing have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically
change the balance of power." An excellent essay by Tom McCarthy (unaffiliated with CRN) explores these points in more detail. He discusses the ways that nanotechnology can
destabilize international relations: molecular manufacturing will reduce economic influence and interdependence, encourage targeting of
people as opposed to factories and weapons, and reduce the ability of a nation to monitor its potential enemies. It may also, by enabling many
nations to be globally destructive, eliminate the ability of powerful nations to "police" the international arena. By making small groups self-sufficient, it can encourage the breakup of existing
nations. Collective environmental damage is a natural consequence of cheap manufacturing, as are health risks. (MORE) Molecular manufacturing allows the cheap creation of incredibly
powerful devices and products. How many of these products will we want? What environmental damage will they do? The range of possible damage is vast, from personal low-flying supersonic
aircraft injuring large numbers of animals to collection of solar energy on a sufficiently large scale to modify the planet's albedo and directly affect the environment. Stronger materials will allow
the creation of much larger machines, capable of excavating or otherwise destroying large areas of the planet at a greatly accelerated pace. It is too early to tell whether there will be economic
incentive to do this. However, given the large number of activities and purposes that would damage the environment if taken to extremes, and the ease of taking them to extremes with molecular
manufacturing, it seems likely that this problem is worth worrying about. Some forms of damage can result from an aggregate of individual actions, each almost harmless by itself. Such damage
is quite hard to prevent by persuasion, and laws frequently don't work either; centralized restriction on the technology itself may be a necessary part of the solution. Finally, the extreme
compactness of nanomanufactured machinery will tempt the use of very small products, which can easily turn into nano-litter that will be hard to clean up and may cause health problems. Grey
goo was an early concern of nanotechnology. When nanotechnology-based manufacturing was first proposed, a concern arose that tiny manufacturing systems might run
amok and 'eat' the biosphere, reducing it to copies of themselves. In 1986, Eric Drexler wrote, "We cannot afford certain
kinds of accidents with replicating assemblers." More recent designs by Drexler and others make it clear, though, that replicating assemblers will not be used
for manufacturingnanofactories will be much more efficient at building products, and a nanofactory is nothing like a 'grey goo' robot. Grey goo would entail five capabilities integrated into
one small package. These capabilities are: Mobility the ability to travel through the environment; Shell a thin but effective barrier to keep out diverse chemicals and ultraviolet light; Control
a complete set of blueprints and the computers to interpret them (even working at the nanoscale, this will take significant space); Metabolism breaking down random chemicals into simple
feedstock; and Fabrication turning feedstock into nanosystems. A nanofactory would use tiny fabricators, but these would be inert if removed or unplugged from the factory. The rest of the
listed requirements would require substantial engineering and integration. Grey goo won't happen by accident, but eventually could be developed on purpose. Although grey goo has essentially
no military and no commercial value, and only limited terrorist value, it could be used as a tool for blackmail. Cleaning up a single grey goo outbreak would be quite expensive and might require
severe physical disruption of the area of the outbreak (atmospheric and oceanic goos deserve special concern for this reason). Another possible source of grey goo release is irresponsible
hobbyists. The challenge of creating and releasing a self-replicating entity apparently is irresistible to a certain personality type, as shown by the large number of computer viruses and worms in
existence. We probably cannot tolerate a community of "script kiddies" releasing many modified versions of goo. Development and use of molecular manufacturing poses absolutely no risk of
creating grey goo by accident at any point. However, goo type systems do not appear to be ruled out by the laws of physics, and we cannot ignore the possibility that the five stated requirements
could be combined deliberately at some point, in a device small enough that cleanup would be costly and difficult. Drexler's 1986 statement can therefore be updated: We cannot afford
criminally irresponsible misuse of powerful technologies. Having lived with the threat of nuclear weapons for half a century, we already know that. We wish we could take grey goo off CRN's
list of dangers, but we can't. It eventually may become a concern requiring special policy. Grey goo will be highly difficult to build, however, and non-replicating nano-weaponry may be
substantially more dangerous and more imminent. NOTE: In June 2004, Eric Drexler and Chris Phoenix published a new paper on "Safe Exponential Manufacturing", which puts the perceived
grey goo threat into perspective. Too little or too much regulation can result in unrestricted availability. Uncontrolled availability of nanofactory technology can result from either insufficient or
overzealous regulation. Inadequate regulation would make it easy to obtain and use an unrestricted nanofactory. Overzealous regulation would create a pent-up demand for nanotech products,
which if it gets strong enough, would fund espionage, cracking of restricted technology, or independent development, and eventually create a black market beyond the control of central
authorities (nanofactories are very smugglable). Note that sufficiently abusive or restrictive regulation can motivate internal espionage; at least one atomic spy in the US was idealistically
motivated. Uncontrolled availability of molecular manufacturing greatly increases many of the dangers cited above.
Competing nanotech programs increase the danger. The existence of multiple programs to develop molecular
manufacturing greatly increases some of the risks listed above. Each program provides a separate opportunity for the technology to be stolen or
otherwise released from restriction. Each nation with an independent program is potentially a separate player in a nanotech
arms race. The reduced opportunity for control may make restrictions harder to enforce, but this may lead to greater efforts to impose harsher restrictions. Reduced control also makes it
less likely that a non-disruptive economic solution can develop.

China War Good 1NC

3. No risk of your impacts as long as we fight before China overtakes us,
well win easily-
A. One Trident submarine can deal with the entire Chinese arsenal 7 times
over

Godwin 2K, Prof Intl Affairs National War College, visiting Prof at Chinese National Defense University, 2k (Paul HB Washington Journal
of Modern China. China's Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2000/godwinpaper.htm)

Although definitely a menacing capability, China confronts approximately 8,000 U.S. strategic weapons deployed on 575
ICBMs, 102 strategic bombers, and 17 SSBN. A single Trident-armed U.S. SSBN carries 24 multiple-warhead
missiles capable of delivering 144 extremely accurate weapons. Thus, just one American SSBN can carry
more than seven times the total number of warheads carried on all of Chinas D-5 ICBMs -- and at a much
higher degree of readiness. Deterrence under these conditions would seem to be assured.




THE PIC
Perm Do both : Literally no reason that the world of the 1AC cannot exist with the PIC , first make them
when substantial change , and firstly we are changing the then


As well Springboard perm : Their no reason

Springboard Perm
Perm: Vote Aff & use the Plan as a Springboard for Kritical Discussion; voting us down
intimidates others from advocating offense against the Kritik. That proposes this mindset that
the Alternative is perfect; however, in reality, when we encounter dangerous problems that
pose a threat to the Alt, we will be unable to repent them. Therefore, use the hypothetical
world of Debate to test the Kritik on all fronts & to bring about new Kritical discussions. If you
think theres no problems, that means no discussion; devils advocate required, otherwise,
discussion & the Solvency fades away.
Btw just view the
The radical politics of the alt is a romantification of resistance - dooming alt solvency
to mental masturbation
Sparke 08 (Matthew Sparke published may of 2008 Political geography political geographies of globalization
III: resistance * Department of Geography, Box 353550, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98105, USA
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/230709084/13EE75FEC2A14F99E92/1?accountid=1
4667 BRW)
From the broad themes of neocolonial dominance and neoliberal governance that formed the foci of my two previous reports (Sparke, 2004;
2006), this review of recent work on the political geographies of globalization turns to the still wider and more
contested terrain of resistance. Whereas the neo in both neocolonial and neoliberal invited reflections on questions of historical
change and continuity, there is no obvious neologism qualifying the various forms of resistance that have
emerged in relation to contemporary globalization. This is a telling irony. Critical claims about the forms of
dominance and governance associated with global integration are frequently met with complaining calls
to complicate the critiques with attention to resistance. Yet in the rush to refer to the r-word the category itself is too
often left uncomplicated. Questions about the significance of resistant agency, its geo-historical reach, limits,
conditions, organization and impact are all often unanswered at the very same time as the rhetoric of resistance
obscures the objects against which resistant agents are said to resist. While the basic idea of resistance rests on notions of people
pushing back, the allure of the r-word itself can in this way ironically become a regulative pull that
disciplines critics: a pull, in other words, away from examining the messy middle grounds where control and opposition, structure and
agency, hegemony and counter-hegemonic action, are all variously mediated. This problem of pull can be usefully ascribed to
the romance of resistance. It is a romance that is initiated by assumptions about autonomous action and
animated by diverse forms of idealism; a romance that ultimately imagines agency in the existential and
ageographical terms of some seminal and heroically universalized human spirit, and thus a romance that
also tends to pre-empt empirical research with metaphorical moves that make descriptions of socio-
economic forces, racial and sexual subjectifi cation, or even just everyday life seem somehow beside the
point (for a related queer critique of the romance of community, see Joseph, 2002).

fragmentation turn

Localization of geographies makes fragments views of situations makes correct
interpretation impossible
Johnston, 07 PhD, University of Bristol, UK (R.J. Johnston, 24 Feb 2007 Australian geography seen from afar: through a glass darkly
Australian Geographer, 28:1, 29-37)
The argument advanced here represents the currently divided academic world. Because most of us work in
very small fragments of that world, and neither our teaching nor our research encourages wide exploration
beyond the confines of our particular interests and their borderlands with the relevant fragments of other disciplines, we
do not see large pictures . To most of us there is no such thing as geography, other than as a vaguely
defined discipline to which we are attached as much for political and economic (that is, job security) reasons
as for intellectual ones. We have no overview, no appreciation in any detail of what is being done in 'our discipline' outside 'my
fragment'. Not surprisingly, therefore, few geographers working outside Australia have a clear, coherent view of
Australian geographers' current concerns. And there is nothing peculiarly Australian about that situation: it applies everywhere,
even within British geography and between the 'big two'British and North American geography (as illustrated by Stoddart's 1996 comments
on Richards and Wrigley 1996).




Politics
Theory on it
Fiat Takes Out The Link Good 2AC

Fiat takes out the link fiat is instantaneous, means political capital isnt expanded because the
plan is introduced and passed by a nondescript vote count the second the judge votes aff.

Inherency proves plan cant be enacted in status quo alternative interpretations justify one
senator doesnt vote aff, either aff is able to leverage attitude shifts making it popular or we cant
fiat our plan. Politics is bad discourages case-specific research and encourages reliance on stale
generics
Intrinsicness Good 2AC

DA is not intrinsic to affirmative policymaker can do both DA and plan at the same time

A. Alternative destroys all aff ground plan has never been implemented, means theres no
literature to provide a political focus for the plan in comparison to the disad

B. Justifies senator wont vote for plan debate is a counter-factual inherency proves plan cant
be passed right now, so we cant leverage fiat power if he gets blamed

C. Destroys politics - bad generic disad that discourages case debate and favors large squads with
generic backfiles
Now onto answering the politics disad itself
Uniqueness indcitness means that firstly that the uniqueness evidence is from two months ago
Are N/U postdates the Uniqueness by at least a month , accept this as the thumper
towards politics
Tides shifted even the Isreal American Lobby group realizes
Stoil 3/14/14(http://www.timesofisrael.com/us-iranian-lobby-tide-has-turned-against-sanctions/, US
Iranian lobby tide has turned against sanctions)
aNIAC, which represents Iranian American interests, said that it is pleased that Congress is not
passing sanctions or measures that will restrict negotiators, and argued that the new political reality
in Washington is that there is overwhelming support for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff with Iran and
efforts to undermine negotiations have proven unsuccessful.

That other DA


firstly case o/w

a. Scientific Diplomacy how does Case interact with the arguements
b. how we are politicizing science , we are opening doors, not changing the tide
c. If you give weight towards teis argument , it only hurts solvency on the Biotech advantage
CP
1. Sharknado Really but LOL love it

1. They dont hit the trigger for Dedev , because of how firstly three trillion dollars
doesnt trigger the crash firstly .
2. Perm Do both no reason to do both
3. On the Dedev , if we dedev firstly that hurts the people and cause people more unlikely to see any
film because they have no cash and the technology will never occur

So double turn :
Either we dedevlop , and the upcoming depression does not allow us to watch the shark awareness
movie because of lack of technology and also the lack of anything to watch the movie , or then we cant
dedevlop because of the need of shark awareness

Cross apply neg fiat theory dont evaluate an Neg FIAT arg , intill they prove they also get FIAT