Lighthouse Macro Report - 2014 - June

Lighthouse Investment Management
Macro Report - US Economic Indicators - June 2014 Page 1

Macro Report

Economic Indicators - USA
June 2014



Contents
Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
Lighthouse Recession Probability Index........................................................................................................ 4
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 5
Fed Funds Rate ............................................................................................................................................ 10
Crude Oil ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
Construction: Building Permits ................................................................................................................... 12
Employment: Non-Farm Payrolls ................................................................................................................ 13
Employment: Establishment versus Household Survey ............................................................................. 14
Employment: Jobs Gained/Lost .................................................................................................................. 15
Employment: Initial and Revised Non-Farm Payrolls .................................................................................. 16
Employment: Full Time ............................................................................................................................... 17
Employment: Population, Labor Force, Employees .................................................................................... 18
Employment: Labor Force Participation Rate ............................................................................................. 19
Employment: Unemployment..................................................................................................................... 20
Recessions: Employment ............................................................................................................................ 21
Recessions: Real Disposable Income .......................................................................................................... 22
Recessions: Consumer Spending ................................................................................................................ 23
Consumer Confidence: University of Michigan Survey ............................................................................... 24
Consumer Confidence: Conference Board Survey ...................................................................................... 25
Credit: Total Outstanding ............................................................................................................................ 26
Credit: Bank Loans and Leases .................................................................................................................... 27
Retail Sales: Nominal .................................................................................................................................. 28
Retail Sales: Real ......................................................................................................................................... 29
Retail Sales: Real per-capita ........................................................................................................................ 30
Retail Sales: Excluding Autos ...................................................................................................................... 31
Retail Sales: Online...................................................................................................................................... 32
Manufacturing: Hours Worked ................................................................................................................... 33
Weekly Earnings .......................................................................................................................................... 34
Manufacturing: Orders ............................................................................................................................... 35
Orders: Capital Goods ................................................................................................................................. 36
Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries ............................................................................................................ 37
Energy: Consumption .................................................................................................................................. 38
Energy: Production...................................................................................................................................... 39
Transportation: Miles Traveled ................................................................................................................... 40
Transportation: Gasoline Consumption ...................................................................................................... 41
Income: Real Disposable Income per Capita .............................................................................................. 42
Inflation: Consumer & Producer Prices....................................................................................................... 43
Inflation Drivers .......................................................................................................................................... 44
Inflation Expectations ................................................................................................................................. 48



Summary

The "Good":
Better-than-expected April Employment report (+217k)
Further improvement in retail sales growth
Stronger core capital goods orders
Better real disposable income growth
The "Bad":
Q1 GDP growth revised to -2.9% (never happened outside a recession)
Single-family building permits fell 2% below level a year ago
Real retail sales per capita have still not reached the level seen in March 2006
No improvement in Labor Force Participation Rate
Noticeable pick-up in inflation, especially food

CONCLUSION: The probability for recession is low. However, economic growth remains weak. What
would the Fed do if the economy re-entered a recession? It's balance sheet already exceeds $4 trillion,
or 25% of GDP. On top of that, inflation finally seems to pick up (possibly hurting consumers).


Lighthouse Recession Probability Index

The latest recession probability stands at 0%
Probabilities will slightly change as Industrial Electricity Usage data becomes available with a 2-
month time lag


Introduction
Recessions are bad for company profits and hence stock prices. Knowing when an economic slow-down
looms can give important clues about asset class selection.
In the US, the beginning and the end points of recessions are declared by the NBER (National Bureau of
Economic Research). The NBER defines recessions as a "significant decline in economic activity spread
across the economy" (not, as often believed, as two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth).
The NBER takes it's time to date the beginning and the end of a down-turn; it announced the beginning
of the last recession (December 2007) only on December 1, 2008 - one year later. By that time, the S&P
500 Index had fallen from 1,575 points to 741. Similarly, the end of the recession in June 2009 was
announced on September 20, 2010 - more than one year later. By that time, the S&P 500 had already
soared from 940 points to 1,142.
Waiting for the NBER to declare beginning and end of recessions would have led to inferior investment
results (the NBER is correct in taking it's time, since many economic indicators are being revised multiple
times as preliminary data gets updated).
Traditional leading indicators include values such as the stock market and the slope of the yield curve.
However, the stock market does not seem very good at anticipating recessions, as the S&P 500 index
marked an all-time high in mid-October 2007, a mere six weeks before the most severe recession of the
last 8 decades began.
The yield curve has historically been a very good warning sign of recessions, as the Federal Reserve Bank
was forced to increase short-term rates in order to cool an overheating economy (thereby triggering a
recession). However, with short-term interest rates near zero for the foreseeable future, the yield curve
could only invert if long-term yields dipped into negative territory. While not entirely impossible
(negative yields for up to 2 year maturities have been observed in German, Swiss, Danish and other
government bond markets) it is very unlikely to happen in US Treasuries. Therefore, the slope of the US
yield curve is unlikely to give any hints about a recession occurring under ZIRP (zero-interest-rate-
policy).
Indicators published by other institutions, such as ECRI (Economic Cycle Research Institute), are
proprietary and not transparent, giving investors only the choice to "believe-it-or-leave-it".
The Conference Board Leading Indicator includes questionable values such as the S&P 500 Index, the
slope of the US yield curve and M2 money supply (which we have found to have little correlation with
economic cycles).
As most recessions last rarely longer than a year, the economy usually had already exited a recession by
the time the NBER declared it to be in one.


Revisions to GDP growth render it useless for investment purposes; On August 28, 2008 (already 8
months into the "great recession"), Q2 2008 GDP growth was revised upwards from an initial +1.9% to
+3.3%, triggering a 2% stock market rally. Later, growth was revised down to 1.3%, with the following
quarters delivering -3.7%, -9.2% and -5.4% (quarter-on-quarter, annualized). The S&P 500 Index didn't
regain the level attained that day for another 2 1/2 years.
Finding a reliable indicator for identifying recessions "real-time" would already be a great improvement
over waiting for the NBER.
Over the past 50 years, every recession was easily explained by two factors: oil and the Fed.

Unfortunately, this does not have to be the case going forward. Due to impotence of monetary policy at
the lower zero bound and rapidly increasing government debt the Fed might not be able to raise rates in
the foreseeable future. A recession might hence happen without prior tightening by the Fed.
We looked at many indicators from every angle; most had to be smoothed to cancel out short-term
"noise" in order to prevent false signals (we use 3-months moving averages).
Some indicators do not reveal useful signals unless you look at decline from recent peaks. Other data
needs to be trend adjusted (number of miles driven, for example, benefits from rising number of cars
and population).
The table on the following page shows indicators we have tested. Our criteria:
false positives (calling for a recession when there was none)
false negatives (missed a recession)
confidence it will work in the future and
lead / lag time


No two recessions are the same. Trigger levels can be too strict (missing some recessions) or too lose
(giving too many false positives). We therefore created a range. The lower ("strict") boundary is the level
necessary to avoid false positives; the upper ("lenient") boundary is the level necessary to catch all
recessions. A high-quality indicator will have a narrow range, and recessions will be called with high
confidence. An indicator at the upper boundary will be awarded a 50% probability, increasing towards
100% at the lower boundary.
The overall "Lighthouse Recession Probability Indicator" (LRPI) is a weighted mean of individual
indicators. High confidence and timeliness of signal have been awarded higher weights (maximum: 3)
then those with low confidence or tardiness (minimum: 1). On the following page you see the LRPI since
1971, predicting every recession (assumed once 40%-50% probability is exceeded).
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis publishes a recession probability indicator by Chauvet / Piger
(black line). It is based on four inputs (non-farm payrolls, industrial production, real personal income and
real manufacturing and trade sales). However, the most recent data point for Chauvet/Piger is usually
three months old, while LRPI is constantly updated (1 months old data).
You can see that LRPI shows first warnings signs much earlier than Chauvet/Piger.
In a recent response to a blog post, Chauvet clarified their indicator calls for a recession only "after
exceeding 80% for a couple of months". Additionally, their indicator is "smoothed" as the raw data can
reach 70% (2003/4) without being followed by a recession. Their indicator initially showed a recession
probability of 20% for August 2012, only to be revised down to 1.7% six months later.





Verification of LRPI:
We set 40% as threshold for the LRPI to indicate a buy (recession probability <40%) or sell (>40%) signal.
Transactions have been done at the monthly closing price of the S&P 500 following the month for which
the signal occurred (in order to accommodate time lag):

An investor using the LRPI as a trading tool would have suffered only one loss of 7% (August 1980) while
avoiding the dot-com crash (2001) and the 'great recession' (2008-2009). The system creates no
unnecessary churn. While the control group ('buy-and-hold') would have created a higher return (with
higher volatility) this might be due to the test period coinciding with one of the longest bull markets in
history (1982-2000).

Annex: LRPI Components
Please find charts for all contributors to the LRPI on the following pages.


Fed Funds Rate

The US central bank ("Fed") increased interest rates ahead of each of the last 9 recessions. The black line
shows the absolute level of the Fed Funds rate; the blue line the increase from the prior post-recession
low. An increase between 2 and 4.5 percentage points from the previous low preceded every recession
since 1954.
Recessions are shaded in gray. Yellow dots indicate the beginning of a recession; green dots the end.
The absolute level (black line) is usually on the right-hand scale, while percentage changes (blue line) are
on the left-hand scale. Negative absolute numbers should be ignored as they are merely needed for
better formatting.
This indicator has a double weighting in the Lighthouse Recession Probability Indicator.



Crude Oil

An increase in the price of crude oil of 75% to 100% preceded five out of the last six recessions.
Close call in March 2011 and February 2012.
Currently not a red flag.
Crude oil would have to rise above $113/barrel in order to trigger an early warning.
This indicator has a triple weighting in the LRPI



Construction: Building Permits

Want to build a house? Need a permit! Any decline in permits of 25%+ from prior peak and you can bet
on a recession. Missed the one in 2001 though. 2011 was a close call. Absolute level still below 1990/91
recession lows (despite US population growth from 250m then to 317m in 2014).
Multi-family housing (rentals) permits are soaring while single-family permits (owners) are declining.
This indicator has a triple weighting in the LRPI. Currently no red flag.



Employment: Non-Farm Payrolls

The number of people on "payroll", or employed, is a good proxy for the health of the economy. You can
see the long "valleys" of lost payrolls after recent recessions compared to earlier ones. A decline of more
than 1% from previous peak payroll level indicates a recession. There have been no misses and no false
positives; even the "tricky" back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1982 have been called correctly by this
indicator. The payroll report, also known as Establishment Survey, is based on a sample of 145,000
businesses and government agencies. The "Current Population Survey" (aka Household Survey, next
page) consists of a sample of 60,000 households (leads to similar results over time, but is more volatile).
Does counting jobs reflect the actual picture of the economy? Only 47% of all working-age Americans
have full-time jobs. Since 2007, six million full-time jobs have been lost, but 2.5 million part-time jobs
gained. Part-time jobs often come without "benefits" such as health insurance. From peak employment
(Q1 2008) to Q1 2010 1.2 million "higher-" wage jobs (median hourly wage $21-54) have been lost; in
the subsequent 2 years only 0.8 million have been recreated. While almost 4 million mid-wage jobs
($14-21) have been lost, only 0.9m have reappeared. Among lower wage jobs ($7-$14), 1.3 million have
been lost, but 2 million gained. This indicator has a triple weighting in the LRPI.


Employment: Establishment versus Household Survey

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) uses the average of the Establishment and
Household Survey in order to determine recessions.

According to the Establishment Survey, job growth accelerated after disappointing in December and
January. Average monthly growth over the past 12 months rose to 198k.
According to the Household Survey, average monthly employment growth over the past 12 months
fell to 158k (from 166k).


Employment: Jobs Gained/Lost

Current monthly payroll growth is stable.
The margin of error for monthly payroll data from the Establishment Survey is around 100,000,
and revisions can be up to 300,000.
The current trend is not pointing towards a recession.



Employment: Initial and Revised Non-Farm Payrolls

This chart shows monthly changes in employment as initially reported (black dotted line), the
revised number (thick black line) and the difference between the two (green/red chart, right-hand
scale).
During the last recession (we didnt know we were in one yet), monthly employment numbers were
revised downwards by up to 273,000.
In Q3 2008, revisions were -159k, -190k and -273k (that was before Lehman had happened).
In recent months, positive revisions have become smaller.
The BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) approximates the impact of start-ups / dying businesses on
employment by simply ignoring both, assuming they cancel each other out. This obviously leads to
initial underreporting of job losses in a recession. A benchmark revision occurs once a year (in
March) to update the data.


Employment: Full Time

The overall employment picture may be misleading. During recessions, higher paying full-time
jobs are usually being replaced with part-time jobs.
Part-time jobs come without healthcare benefits, forcing employees to cover their own medical
expenses (leaving less money for consumption).
Recent data show decent growth for the number of full-time employees:



Employment: Population, Labor Force, Employees

5-year growth of population, working age population, labor force and employment is slowing.
The unemployment rate is helped by high number of drop-outs from the labor force.
Last month saw a decent decline of number of people not in the labor force:



Employment: Labor Force Participation Rate

The US unemployment rate has declined thanks to a drop in the Labor Force Participation Rate
(people with jobs relative to people who could potentially work). Many have exhausted their
unemployment benefits, have left the workforce and are not counted as unemployed.

Large numbers have applied for disability insurance, removing those folks permanently from the
labor market (as opposed to unemployment, which usually is temporary).
Economic growth depends on decent increases in employment and real incomes; both measures
are showing only meager growth.


Employment: Unemployment

Less than half of the US population (49%) is in the labor force, and 45.5% are employed
The share of population not in the labor force (children, home makers, discouraged workers,
disability, retired) keeps rising, especially since the 'great recession'
An ageing population explains only part of the observation. The number of people on disability
insurance increased by 2.5 million since 2008. Expiration of unemployment benefits might have
motivated some to apply for disability insurance. In contrast to unemployment, disability is
permanent, meaning those folks have left the labor force for good.
Since 2007, the number of people not in the labor force has increased by 13 million to over 90
million, leading to less tax revenues and higher transfer payments from the government.
Elevated drop-outs from the labor force lead to under-reporting of the unemployment rate. Without
those drop-outs from the labor force, the unemployment rate would be at 14.7% (instead of 6.3% as
reported).


Recessions: Employment

The recovery of employment after the 2008/9 financial crisis has been the slowest among the
past 6 recessions
In May 2014, employment finally exceeded the level at the onset of the recession (= 100) after a
record-long 77 months
Taking earlier recessions as a template, employment should currently be about 10% (or 14
million jobs) higher



Recessions: Real Disposable Income

Real disposable income has recovered at the slowest pace compared to earlier recessions
Compared to an average of the past 5 recessions, income should be at around 10%, or $1.7
trillion, higher



Recessions: Consumer Spending

Consumer spending in the current recovery is significantly weaker than in the past
"Never underestimate the US consumer" was an often-preached slogan during the 1990's and
early 2000's. However, the most recent recovery is marked by a disappointing development of
consumer spending.
If earlier recoveries are a guide, consumer spending should be between 20% ($2.2 trillion) and
33% ($3.6 trillion) higher.
Per-capita consumer spending is even slower, as the population has grown from 303 to 317
million (4.7%) since the beginning of the recession.



Consumer Confidence: University of Michigan Survey

The University of Michigan, together with Thompson-Reuters, conducts more than 500
telephone interviews twice a month to gauge consumer sentiment, with a reference point from
1964 set to 100. A preliminary mid-month survey is followed up by a final one towards the end
of the month.
The indicator had one false positive (2005) and one miss (1981; the 1980-1981 recessions were
back-to-back, so let's not be too harsh about that). A decline of 25%+ from previous peak
indicates a recession. 2011 was a close call. This indicator has a triple weighting in the LRPI and
does currently not deliver a warning.



Consumer Confidence: Conference Board Survey

The Conference Board, an independent business membership and research association,
conducts a survey of consumer confidence by mailing out surveys to more than 3,000 randomly
selected households. The cut-off date for a preliminary number is the 18th of the months. The
final number includes all surveys returned after that date.
The indicator had two false positives (1992, 2003), but it did catch all recessions including the
ones in 1981/2 and 2001 (difficult for a lot of other indicators). 2011 was a "close call". This
indicator has a double weighting in the LRPI and currently does not raise any red flags.



Credit: Total Outstanding

Most recessions have been accompanied by a reduction in the growth of debt. But debt never shrunk,
Until, for the first time in 60 years, debt actually shrunk in 2009. A reduction of only 2% caused a
massive recession. I have included the 1987 stock market crash (red triangle). Economic growth is
dependent on credit growth. Unfortunately, data becomes available only once every quarter, with the
latest data often many months old. We had to exclude this measure from LRPI to ensure timeliness,
however present it here for informational purposes:

Q2'09 saw the peak of TCMDO relative to GDP (374%). Year-over-year growth peaked in Q3'07 at 10.6%,
just as the S&P 500 hit its previous all-time-high of 1,575 points.


Credit: Bank Loans and Leases

Since 1971, growth of loans and leases below 2% has been associated with recessions
Securitization and shadow banking might be able to mitigate the effects of slowing bank lending
Commercial lending has picked up further in recent weeks, mainly due to business loans
We have not yet incorporated this data into our recession indicator


Retail Sales: Nominal

For the LRPI, we have replaced this indicator with "real retail sales" (see next page). Nominal
retail sales include inflation, and hence say little about volume growth.
Retail sales growth reversed the slowing trend established since last November; April was
revised upwards:

This indicator has exited the red warning area but needs to be watched closely.


Retail Sales: Real

No recession signal currently; this indicator has a triple weight in the LRPI
Real retail sales growth weakened in Q4 and Q1, but is recovering since March:

This indicator remains close to warning level and needs to be watched closely.



Retail Sales: Real per-capita

Real per-capita retails sales are still 5% below their pre-recession peak
Growth weakened in Q4 and Q1, but is recovering since March:

No recession signal (yet)



Retail Sales: Excluding Autos

Monthly auto sales, at over $80bn (20% of total retail sales), continue to benefit from very low
interest rates, abundant credit and deep-subprime used-car loans. Excluding auto sales, retail
sales growth looks 'recessionary' (see above).
In Q4 2012, 45% of all car financings were subprime (FICO score <660)



Retail Sales: Online

Online retail sales (Amazon, etc) are growing faster than overall retail sales and have reached
almost $40bn a month
This corresponds to around 15% of retail sales excluding autos and foods (things that you
probably wouldn't buy online)
Online retail sales suffer large setbacks in recessions. This is probably due to the discretionary
nature of products sold (mostly consumer electronics etc)



Manufacturing: Hours Worked

Companies prefer to reduce employee's working hours rather than firing them straight away
A drop in average weekly working hours in the manufacturing sector of 2% or more indicates a
recession (except for 1996); the indicator carries a double weight in the LRPI

Weekly hours reached a new record high
Currently no recession warning



Weekly Earnings

Average weekly earnings by private employees continue to grow slowly
Growth bounced up a bit in March and April after the slowest pace since last recession:



Manufacturing: Orders

The Institute for Supply Management (ISM) regularly asks company executives about orders,
sales, inventories etc. A level of 50 indicates "unchanged" (economy stagnates).
This indicator delivered one false positive (1989) and carries a double weighting in the LRPI.

The ISM Survey currently does not yield a warning sign.
However, the index dropped 13.2 points in January - the second-largest drop in over 40 years
(the chart above uses a 3-months moving average). It bears a watchful eye.



Orders: Capital Goods

Defense and aircraft orders are lumpy and distort trends, so we exclude them here. We have
"medium" confidence in this indicator due to limited historic data. The "red zone" has been set
at -5% to 0%. The indicator carries a single weight in LRPI. Currently no warning sign.
Defense and aircraft orders are more than twice as much as the core

Growth in core capital goods orders picked up in April and May


Manufacturing: Supplier Deliveries

Multiple false positives (1985, 1989, 1995, 1998, 2005) muddy the water. Therefore, this
indicator has been slapped with "low" confidence and a corresponding single weighting.

The current reading suggests modest growth in manufacturing supplier deliveries.



Energy: Consumption

If you run a business you need electricity. Weather can have an impact as electricity use in the
US peaks in summer due to air conditioning. If electricity usage drops by 1% or more, it's a
recession
Limited historic data, but no misses and no false positives

Current data puts the likelihood of recession at 100%
"Electricity usage" carries a single weighting in the LRPI



Energy: Production

Electricity production should be linked to economic growth. This indicator, unfortunately, had
many false positives (1983, 1992, 1997, 2006), so confidence is "medium"; recent data revisions
of up to 2.5% magnitude dent confidence further. Setting the trigger lower than -0.5% would
eliminate false positives, but make you also miss some recessions.

Electricity production has recovered from a steep drop in 2012
This indicator carries a single weighting in the LRPI



Transportation: Miles Traveled

The US population grows by 2.25m people (0.7%) per annum, so traffic increases constantly. If total
miles driven grow less than 0.1% versus its own trend, you are likely to be in a recession (the
unemployed drive less).
The 2001 recession was missed. This indicator says we had a recession in 2011 (which is theoretically
possible - we might not know it yet). The prolonged decline in miles traveled since 2007 is puzzling; the
decline being deeper than the back-to-back recession 1980/81. Online shopping, car pooling and work-
from-home jobs might have contributed to this trend. A recent poll indicated young Americans are less
keen on acquiring a driver's license than one or two decades ago.
Unfortunately, data is made available only with a time lag of three months. This, combined with lower
confidence, made us exclude this indicator from the LRPI. In March, historic data has been revised going
back for years, denting confidence in this indicator further.


Transportation: Gasoline Consumption

Cars need gas, and gas needs to be delivered to gas stations; inventory effects are unlikely
because of high turnover
"Low" confidence because of false positive (1996) and limited historic data
The harsh decline in 2012 is puzzling (recovered since then)
Some US cities are upgrading their public bus fleet onto natural gas, potentially contributing to
the decline in gasoline consumption
This indicator is currently giving 0% likelihood of recession
This indicator is related to "miles driven", confirming trends on one hand, but being redundant on the
other. It has therefore been excluded from LRPI.



Income: Real Disposable Income per Capita

Income growth recovered at bit after a drop in December:

Given low growth of real incomes, consumption can grow only if consumers dip into savings
(difficult if no savings present) or take on additional debt
The stagnation of real incomes is the main reason for slow economic growth in the US
In December, real disposable income and real disposable income per capita fell below their level
seen twelve months earlier. This has usually occurred only in recession, and is a huge warning
sign. However, December 2012 was boosted by tax-related dividend payments (hence
December 2013 suffered from base-effect).


Inflation: Consumer & Producer Prices

Core consumer price inflation accelerated slightly
The CRB commodity price index has increased 11% so far in 2014
The Fed is trying to generate inflation (to boost nominal GDP) by devaluating the dollar (in
order to import inflation via rising import prices) - so far unsuccessfully
If oil prices soared and the dollar tanked, inflation could quickly get out of hand



Inflation Drivers

In order to understand inflation we have to look at the most important drivers of CPI:
41% housing (shelter, heating, electricity, furnishing)
16% transportation (cars, gasoline, maintenance)
15% food and beverage (eat at home, restaurants)
"OER", or owner-occupied rent, is the dominant part of housing. The data is sampled by asking home
owners what they think their house would fetch if someone wanted to rent it. So it is complete guess-
work by mostly non-economists. However, it is probably fair to assume that rising house prices and
property taxes will lead to increased estimates of OER.



Inflation drivers:

Over the past 3 months, headline inflation accelerated to 3.3%, core inflation to 2.8%
Price increases for food accelerated markedly in recent months
Gasoline went from negative to positive impact on headline inflation
Rent and OER are slightly accelerating, too
Medical Care costs are rising faster (+2.8%) than at the beginning of the year (+2.1%)


Macro Report - US Economic Indicators

Severe California drought likely to

100% of California under severe to exceptional drought co
agricultural produce (in $ terms) in the US. It produces more than 90% (!) of all of the following crops
produce in entire US: Artichokes, Broccoli, Cauliflower, Celery, Garlic, Tomatoes for processing (
ketchup), Almonds, Apricots, Strawberries, Figs, Kiwi, Lemons, Nectarines, Olives, Peaches, Pistachios,
Plums, Walnuts. It is also the largest US producer of rice (which obviously needs lots of water).
Reasons why US inflation might be over
Owner-occupied rent is a non-cash item that home owners do not spend
prices might therefore lead to increased CPI numbers due to increased rent estimates by owners.
On the other hand, property and school taxes
mortgage costs are not included in CPI calculation (they are not assumed to be 'consumption'.
Reasons why US inflation might be under
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses "hedonic quality adjustments" in calcula
mainly in apparel and electronics
improve, the BLS takes that as a price decline. The sub
example, fell from 100 (1982-84) to 8.4, i
happen).
ndicators - June 2014
likely to drive up US food prices further:
100% of California under severe to exceptional drought conditions. CA is by far the biggest producer of
produce in entire US: Artichokes, Broccoli, Cauliflower, Celery, Garlic, Tomatoes for processing (
chup), Almonds, Apricots, Strawberries, Figs, Kiwi, Lemons, Nectarines, Olives, Peaches, Pistachios,
Reasons why US inflation might be over-estimated:
cash item that home owners do not spend. A strong increase in home
increased CPI numbers due to increased rent estimates by owners.
On the other hand, property and school taxes (which have been going up significantly
Reasons why US inflation might be under-estimated:
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses "hedonic quality adjustments" in calcula
mainly in apparel and electronics. If the price of an item remains the same, but the
improve, the BLS takes that as a price decline. The sub-index for information technology, for
84) to 8.4, indicating a 92% price decline (which, of course, did not
Page 46

nditions. CA is by far the biggest producer of
produce in entire US: Artichokes, Broccoli, Cauliflower, Celery, Garlic, Tomatoes for processing (->
chup), Almonds, Apricots, Strawberries, Figs, Kiwi, Lemons, Nectarines, Olives, Peaches, Pistachios,
. A strong increase in home
increased CPI numbers due to increased rent estimates by owners.
significantly) as well as
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses "hedonic quality adjustments" in calculating inflation,
. If the price of an item remains the same, but the quality / features
index for information technology, for
ndicating a 92% price decline (which, of course, did not


Shadow Stats (www.shadowstats.com by John Williams) publishes an 'alternate' measure of
inflation, based on unchanged BLS methodology used prior to 1980. He arrives at a current inflation
rate of around 10%:

While certain skepticism with BLS methodology might be warranted, I doubt that actual inflation
since 2000 has been hovering around 8-10%. Over the past 14 years, nominal US GDP has increased
roughly 60% (from $10trn to $17trn), or less than 4% per annum. Therefore, real GDP would have
had to decline by 4% every year over the past 14 years, or around 40%. It is highly unlikely such a
development would not severely impact employment (or the entire financial system).


Inflation Expectations

Real yield = nominal yield minus inflation. Resolving the equation for inflation you get:
inflation = nominal yield minus real yield
The break-even rate of inflation is the rate at which it does not matter if you bought Treasury
bonds or TIPS. The chart shows implied inflation rates for the next 5 (red), 10 (blue) and 30
(black) years. The "expected" rate of inflation is not a forecast; it may or may not come true
(market expectations change). The stock market is, at times, highly correlated to changes in the
expected rate of inflation. Inflation expectations have increased over the past month:



Any questions or feedback welcome.
Alex.Gloy@LighthouseInvestmentManagement.com
Disclaimer: It should be self-evident this is for informational and educational purposes only and shall not be
taken as investment advice. Nothing posted here shall constitute a solicitation, recommendation or
endorsement to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument. You shouldn't be surprised that
accounts managed by Lighthouse Investment Management or the author may have financial interests in any
instruments mentioned in these posts. We may buy or sell at any time, might not disclose those actions and
we might not necessarily disclose updated information should we discover a fault with our analysis. The
author has no obligation to update any information posted here. We reserve the right to make investment
decisions inconsistent with the views expressed here. We can't make any representations or warranties as to
the accuracy, completeness or timeliness of the information posted. All liability for errors, omissions,
misinterpretation or misuse of any information posted is excluded.
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All clients have their own individual accounts held at an independent, well-known brokerage company (US)
or bank (Europe). This institution executes trades, sends confirms and statements. Lighthouse Investment
Management does not take custody of any client assets.

Lighthouse Macro Report - 2014 - June

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Macro Report - US Economic Indicators - June 2014 Page 1

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