Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petitionii[2] for review seeks the reversal of the decision
dated October 29, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 44442, reversing and setting aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23, dated
November 15, 1996, and the resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated February 21, 1997, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City
issued in favor of Camilo Lasola Homestead Patent No. IX-6-40
covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada,
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. On April 28, 1978, the Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22-690 in
his name.
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasas bought the land
from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was the owner of said
land. In 1984, Trabasas discovered that petitioners Carquelo
Omandam and Rosito Itom had occupied the land. Meanwhile, on
July 19, 1987, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent
before the Bureau of Lands and prayed for cancellation of the
OCT. Upon Saysons advice, Trabasas repurchased the land
from Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September
24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a new transfer
certificate of title.
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla
filed a complaint against petitioners for recovery of possession
and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. They alleged that they were the true and
registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom should
vacate it.
Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one
Godofredo Sela who had been in possession for almost twenty
years.
After the parties were duly heard, the Regional Trial Court issued
its decision on November 15, 1993 declaring that neither
and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not
settled the respective rights of public land claimants. xi[11] But
once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of
homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later,
its decision prevails.
In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the
contested area in 1967. His application was granted on May 21,
1968. The Order for the issuance of the patent was issued by the
Bureau of Lands on January 29, 1974 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds
on April 28, 1976. From the three latter dates, no appeal was
made. It was only on July 9, 1987, i.e., 13 years from the date of
the Order directing the issuance of the patent that petitioners
protested the homestead grant with the Bureau of Lands. Despite
the said lapse of time, the Bureau of Lands gave due course to
the protest relying on our ruling in Director vs. Abanillaxii[12] that
the doctrine of indefeasibility of title does not apply when the
grant is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation. From this date,
Lasolas right of possession based on his OCT and eventually
that of respondents were put on issue. In their desire to get
possession of the property, respondents instituted an action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership on April 16, 1990 with
the Regional Trial Court. Said court rendered its decision against
respondents on November 15, 1993. Respondents appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal or on March 23, 1995,
the DENR-Region IX dismissed petitioners protest on the ground
of absence of fraud and misrepresentation committed by
respondents predecessors-in-interest.xiii[13] On October 29,
1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated the decision subject of
this petition in favor of respondents. Petitioners then brought the
instant case to us.
i
ii
iii
iv
vRepublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2326
for
appellants.
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, dismissing appellants' petition for certiorari to review and
set aside the decision of the Director of Lands and the confirmatory decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on a
land dispute between homesteaders.
Complaining against said decision, petitioners alleged that the same was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction, being contrary to the findings in the investigations conducted for the purpose and in which the parties were duly heard, and
based on false assumptions and inferences from another investigation alleged to have been made at an earlier date of which no record
exists and of which petitioners were not even notified, the decision being furthermore the consequence of a fraud and misrepresentation
perpetrated by the opposing party.
The respondents denied the allegation of fraud and grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction and attached to their answer a
copy of each of the challenged decisions.
Without receiving any evidence and merely upon motion of the Solicitor General, the lower court dismissed the petition on the theory
that the decision of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is conclusive upon the courts.
The appeal involves a point of procedure and presents the question of whether or not a case of this nature could be dismissed without
giving plaintiff an opportunity to prove those allegations of his complaint which would justify judicial review of an executive's decision.
This Court has already held that "any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected
by the courts." (Ortua vs. Singson Encarnacion, 59, Phil., 440.) And while the law declares that the decision of that officer in the
disposition of public lands when approved by the head of the department is conclusive "as to questions of fact" (section 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the rule only holds "in the absence of a showing that such a decision was rendered in consequence of
fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence." (Ortua vs. Singson
Encarnacion, supra.) "It certainly was not intended," said this Court in that case, "by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction
of courts all right to review decisions of the Director of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something could not be
done legally." Also to the point is the following pronouncement in an earlier decision:
It is incumbent upon the courts of justice to examine and declare at the instance of the interested party, whether in the
enforcement of any statute there has been any violation of its provisions in order to prevent, in the use of the discretion
commended to the public official authorized to apply the law the commission of abuses detrimental to the citizen whose rights
are expressly insured by the exact fulfillment of the law. (Rojas vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil., 196.)
To bring their case within the orbit of judicial review, petitioners allege that the decision of the Director of Lands as well as that of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources "was a consequence of fraud and misrepresentation of respondents Francisco
Pagaduan and Miguel Alfonso in that in their homestead applications they included the portions which have already been occupied by
petitioners and made it appear that the land applied for was unoccupied when in fact said land was occupied by petitioners;" that the
said Secretary made an erroneous application of section 95 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 in not giving petitioners, as actual occupants
of the land, priority in the acquisition thereof; that he exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion "in deciding the case on
inferences from an alleged investigation in 1934 and on inferences from a mythical survey in 1937, no records of which exist," thus
adjudicating petitioners' case "not on the facts of the inquiry in which they were heard and upon which they have relied for decision;" that
notwithstanding investigations "duly conducted and of record and in which the parties were duly heard and represented, the Director of
Lands on February 5, 1947, with grave abuse of discretion, decided adversely against the petitioners by dismissing their claims and
adjudicating the case on inferences from an investigation allegedly conducted by Public Lands Inspector Miguel Tuason in 1934, no
records of which exist and in which the petitioners were not even notified nor were they made parties, and also on inferences regarding
an alleged survey in 1937 no records of which exist and which in turn is falsely assumed from a blueprint plan copied from an index map
of Sto. Domingo Cadastre."
Briefly stated, petitioners' complaint is that the decisions sought to be reviewed were the consequence of fraud and misrepresentation
and rendered with grave abuse of discretion in that they were based upon fictitious facts or mere inferences from an alleged
investigation in which they were not heard and of which there is no record, and contrary to findings made in other investigations to which
they were parties. These charges, if proved, would, we think, justify judicial intervention. But petitioners were not given an opportunity to
prove them, the lower court, as already stated, having dismissed the petition upon mere motion of the opposing party. This is clear
judicial error which must be corrected.
The lower court held that the decisions sought to be reviewed, copies of which were attached to the answer, are conclusive so that there
is nothing for it to review. It does not appear that petitioners agreed to a judgment on the pleadings or waived their right to present proof.
If a petition to have such decisions set aside on the ground of fraud, grave abuse of discretion, lack of factual basis or proper hearing
could be defeated by the mere presentation of copies of such decisions, unaccompanied by supporting papers or record, before the
petitioner has presented proof to establish those grounds, then the courts might as well close their doors to cases of this kind.
The brief for the respondents charges unreasonable delay (120 days) in taking the matter to the courts after final decision in the
executive branch of the Government. The law, however, does not fix any period for that purpose, and in such case the rule is that the
recourse to the courts may be availed of within a reasonable time. But what is a reasonable time in any given case depends upon the
circumstances of that case, of which proof must be adduced if they are not admitted. There being no such proof or admission, the plea
of laches or unreasonable delay cannot as yet be decided.
In view of the foregoing, the order dismissing the petition for certiorari is revoked and the case remanded to the court below for further
proceedings, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Benguet
&
Atok
vs.
Court
of
Appeals
&
De
La
Rosa
Cruz, J.:
Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up
to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his
own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 69
to
his
children
by
Mamaya
Balbalio
and
Jaime
Alberto,
respectively,
in
1964.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of
Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio
claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of
its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by
Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These
claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not
subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land
sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject
to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the
de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the
sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such rights were
not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to
mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over
the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over
it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the owners of the surface rights and the owners of
the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand,
especially in its practical application.
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The
classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to
be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons.
The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and nonmining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under the law of Karma.
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