1NC Politics

Clean Debt Ceiling vote will pass

BLOOMBERG 9 20 13 Senate Budget Chief Sees Republican Yield on Debt
Lifting, http://wwwbloo!be"gco!/news/#$13%$&%1&/senate%budget%chief%sees%
"epublican%'ield%on%debt%liftinght!l
Republicans see(ing to cu"b )"esident Ba"ac( *ba!a+s health%ca"e law p"obabl' will capitulate
to de!ands f"o! De!oc"ats to enact a ,clean- bill "aising the nation+s debt ceiling , the
Senate+s top De!oc"atic budget w"ite" said
,. see no deals on the debt ceiling,- Senato" )att' /u""a' of 0ashington state, who leads the Budget Co!!ittee, said in
an inte"1iew on Bloo!be"g 2ele1ision+s ,)olitical Capital with 3l 4unt- ai"ing this wee(end
,2he downside of not pa'ing ou" bills is ou" c"edit%"ating tan(s,- /u""a' said ,2hat affects e1e"' fa!il', e1e"' business, e1e"'
co!!unit' .t affects /ain St"eet .t affects 0all St"eet-
/u""a' said she also e5pects Republicans to "elent on thei" de!ands fo" st"ipping spending f"o! *ba!a+s
health plan as pa"t of action on a spending bill needed to (eep the go1e"n!ent "unning afte" Sept 3$
Republicans led b' 4ouse Spea(e" 6ohn Boehne" of *hio ha1e clashed with *ba!a o1e" the debt ceiling, with
the law!a(e"s de!anding changes to spending p"og"a!s as a condition of "aising the 7189 t"illion fede"al
bo""owing li!it
Republicans ,will co!e togethe" with so!e !ish!ash polic' of e1e"'thing in the bag the'+1e e1e"
p"o!ised- to anti%ta5 2ea )a"t' acti1ists, though , they havent been able to get the votes for
anything yet ,- said /u""a', 8#, fou"th%"an(ing De!oc"at in the Senate+s leade"ship
Plan kills Obamas agenda
KRINER 10 Assistant professor of political science at Boston Universit
:Douglas L ;"ine", ,3fte" the Rubicon: Cong"ess, )"esidents, and the )olitics of 0aging
0a"-, page #98%99<
*ne of the !echanis!s b' which cong"essional opposition influences p"esidential cost%benefit
calculations is b' sending signals of 3!e"ican disunit' to the ta"get state /easu"ing the effects of such cong"essional signals on
the calculations of the ta"get state is alwa's difficult .n the case of ."a= it is e5ceedingl' so, gi1en the lac( of data on the non%state
insu"gent acto"s who we"e the t"ue ,ta"get- of the 3!e"ican occupation afte" the fall of the 4ussein "egi!e Si!ila"l', in the absence
of a"chi1al docu!ents, such as those f"o! the Reagan )"esidential Lib"a"' p"esented in chapte" >, it is all but i!possible to !easu"e
the effects of cong"essional signals on the ad!inist"ation+s pe"ceptions of the !ilita"' costs it would ha1e to pa' to achie1e its
ob?ecti1es !ilita"il'
B' cont"ast !easu"ing the do!estic political costs of cong"essional opposition , while still difficult,
is at least a t"actable endea1o" Chapte" # posited two p"i!a"' pathwa's th"ough which cong"essional
opposition could "aise the political costs of sta'ing the cou"se !ilita"il' fo" the p"esident First.
high-profile congressional challenges to a use of fo"ce can affect "eal o" anticipated public
opinion and b"ing popula" p"essu"es to bea" on the p"esident to change cou"se Second,
cong"essional opposition to the p"esident+s conduct of !ilita"' affai"s can compel him to spend
considerable political capital in the military arena to the detriment of other major
items on his programmatic agenda *n both of these di!ensions, cong"essional opposition to the wa" in ."a=
appea"s to ha1e had the p"edicted effect
Losing authority would embolden the GOP on the debt ceiling
ight
!EEKING AL"#A 9 10 13 :,S'"ia Could @pend Debt Ceiling Aight-
http://see(ingalphaco!/a"ticle/18BC$B#%s'"ia%could%upend%debt%ceiling%fight<
@nless )"esident *ba!a can totall' change a "eluctant publicDs pe"ception of anothe" /iddle%Easte"n conflict, it see!s unli(el' that he
can get #1B 1otes in the 4ouse, though he can p"obabl' still s=uea( out 8$ 1otes in the Senate 2his defeat would be totall'
unp"ecedented as a )"esident has ne1e" lost a !ilita"' autho"iFation 1ote in 3!e"ican histo"' 2o
fo"bid the Co!!ande"%in%Chief of his p"i!a"' powe" "ende"s hi! all but i!potent 3t this
point, a "ebuff f"o! the 4ouse is a 89G%9>G p"obabilit'
. "each this p"obabilit' b' loo(ing within the whip count . assu!e the 18C decla"ed HnoH 1otes will sta' in the HnoH colu!n 2o get to
#1B, *ba!a needs to win o1e" 1&3 of the #CC undecided, a ga"gantuan tas( 0ithin the HnoH colu!n, the"e a"e 139 Republicans
@nde" a best case scena"io, Boehne" could co""al >$ H'esH 1otes, which would "e=ui"e *ba!a to pic( up 18B of the #$$ De!oc"ats,
BCG /an' of these De!oc"ats "ode to powe" because of thei" opposition to ."a=, which !a(es it difficult fo" the! to suppo"t !ilita"'
conflict 2he onl' wa' to gene"ate nea" unani!it' a!ong the undecided De!oc"ats is if the' choose to suppo"t the )"esident
I"ecogniFing the political "a!ifications of a defeatJ despite pe"sonal !isgi1ings 2he idea that all undecided De!oc"ats can be
con1inced of this a"gu!ent is "elati1el' sli!, especiall' as the"e a"e few 1otes to lose .n the best case scena"io, the 4ouse could "each
##3%##> 1otes, ba"el' enough to get it th"ough @nde" the wo"st case, the"e a"e onl' 1>$ 1otes Ki1en the lopsided natu"e of the
b"ea(down, the chance of 4ouse passage is about one in fou"
0hile a failu"e in the 4ouse would put action against S'"ia in li!bo, . ha1e felt that the !a"(et has o1e"stated the i!pact of a st"i(e
the"e, which would be li!ited in natu"e Rathe", in1esto"s should focus on the p"ofound "ipple th"ough the
powe" st"uctu"e in 0ashington, which would g"eatl' i!pact i!pending battles over
spending and the debt ceiling Cu""entl', the go1e"n!ent loses spending autho"it' on Septe!be" 3$ while it hits the
debt ceiling b' the !iddle of *ctobe" /a"(ets ha1e gene"all' felt that 0ashington will once again
st"i(e a last%!inute deal and a1e"t total catast"ophe Aailu"e in the S'"ian 1ote could change this Ao" the
Republicans to beat *ba!a on a )"esidentDs st"ength Ifo"eign !ilita"' actionJ, the' will
li(el' be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues. @ntil now,
consensus has been that the two sides would co!p"o!ise to fund the go1e"n!ent at se=ueste" le1els
while passing a 71 t"illion stand%alone debt ceiling inc"ease 4owe1e", the "ight wing of Boehne"Ds caucus has been pushing fo" !o"e,
including anothe" 71 t"illion in spending cuts, defunding of *ba!aca"e, and a one 'ea" dela' of the indi1idual !andate 3l"ead',
Conse"1ati1e )3Cs ha1e begun ai"ing ad1e"tise!ents, u"ging a debt ceiling fight o1e" *ba!aca"e With the President
rendered hapless on S'"ia, they will become even more vocal about thei" ha"dline
"esolution, setting us up for a showdown that will "i1al #$11Ds debt ceiling fight
. cu""entl' belie1e the two sides will pass a sho"t%te"! continuing "esolution to (eep the go1e"n!ent open,
and then the K*) will wage a !assi1e fight o1e" the debt ceiling 0hile *ba!a will be wea(ened, he will be
unwilling to unde"!ine his !a?o" achie1e!ent, his healthca"e law .n all li(elihood, both sides will dig in thei" "especti1e
t"enches, unwilling to st"i(e a deal, essentiall' in a ga!e of chic(en .f the 4ouse bloc(s S'"ian action, it will ta(e 3!e"ica
as close to a default as it did in #$11 Based on the !a"(et action then, we can e5pect !assi1e 1olatilit' in the final da's of the
showdown with the Dow falling >$$ points in one session in #$11 3s !a"(ets panic(ed o1e" the potential fo" a @S default, we saw
a !assi1e "is(%off t"ade, !o1ing f"o! e=uities into 2"easu"ies . thin( the"e is a significant chance we see so!ething si!ila" this late
Septe!be" into *ctobe" 2he S'"ian 1ote has !a?o" i!plications on the powe" of *ba!a and the
fa"%"ight when it co!es to thei" willingness to fight o1e" the debt ceiling .f the S'"ian "esolution fails, the
debt ceiling fight will be e1en wo"se, which will send e=uities lowe" b' upwa"ds of 1$G
.n1esto"s !ust be p"epa"ed fo" this Hblac( swanH e1ent Loo(ing bac( to 3ugust #$11, stoc(s that pe"fo"!ed the best we"e di1idend
pa'ing, less%c'clical co!panies li(e Le"iFon ILMJ, 0al%/a"t I0/2J, Coca%Cola I;*J and /cDonaldDs I/CDJ while high beta
na!es li(e Netfli5 INALOJ and Boeing IB3J we"e c"ushed .n1esto"s also floc(ed into t"easu"ies despite default "is( while du!ping
lowe" =ualit' bonds as sp"eads widened 2he flight to safet' helped t"easu"ies despite @S go1e"n!ent issues . thin( we a"e li(el' to
see a si!ila" !o1e this ti!e 3ssu!ing the"e is a S'"ian HnoH 1ote, . would begin to "oll bac( !' long e5posu"e in the stoc( !a"(et
and "eallocate funds into t"easu"ies as . belie1e 'ields could d"op bac( towa"ds #>$G 0ithin the stoc( !a"(et, . thin( the less%
c'clical na!es should outpe"fo"!, !a(ing utilities and consu!e" staples !o"e att"acti1e Ao" !o"e tactical t"ade"s, . would conside"
bu'ing puts against the SP) >$$ and loo( towa"d sho"ting highe"%beta and defense stoc(s li(e Boeing and Loc(heed /a"tin IL/2J .
also thin( lowe" =ualit' bonds would suffe" as sp"eads widen, !a(ing funds li(e 6N; 1ulne"able Con1e"sel', gold IKLDJ should
benefit f"o! the fea" t"ade . would also li(e to add"ess the potential that Cong"ess does not 1ote down the S'"ian "esolution Ai"st,
news has b"o(en that Russia has p"oposed S'"ia tu"n o1e" its che!ical stoc(pile .f S'"ia
we"e to ag"ee IS'"ia said it was willing to conside"J, the @S would not ha1e to st"i(e, canceling the
congressional vote 2he p"oposal can be found he"e . st"ongl' belie1e this is a dela'ing tactic "athe" than a se"ious effo"t
.n #$$>, Lib'a began to tu"n o1e" che!ical weaponsQ it has 'et to co!plete the hand%off Re!o1ing and dest"o'ing che!ical weapons
is an e5ceptionall' challenging and dange"ous tas( that would ta(e 'ea"s, not wee(s, !a(ing this deal see! un"ealistic, especiall'
because a cease%fi"e would be "e=ui"ed a"ound all che!ical facilities 2he idea that a cease%fi"e could be !aintained fo" !onths,
essentiall' allowing 3ssad to sta' in office, is ha"d to ta(e se"iousl' . belie1e this is a dela'ing tactic, and Cong"ess will ha1e to 1ote
within the ne5t two wee(s 2he final possibilit' is that De!oc"ats bac( thei" )"esident and ba"el' "a! the S'"ia "esolution th"ough .
thin( the e5t"e!e "is( of a full%blown debt stand%off to dissipate 4owe1e", Boehne" has p"o!ised a st"ong fight
o1e" the debt li!it that the !a"(et has la"gel' igno"ed . do belie1e the fight would still be wo"se than
the !a"(et anticipates but not out"ight disast"ous 3s such, . would not initiate sho"t positions, but . would t"i!
so!e longs and !o1e into less c'clical stoc(s as the "is( would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to so!e d"a!a not no d"a!a
Re!e!be", in politics everything is connected S'"ia is not a stand%alone issue .ts "esolution will i!pact the
powe" st"uctu"e in 0ashington 3 failed 1ote in Cong"ess is likely to make the debt ceiling fight
even worse , spoo(ing !a"(ets, and th"eatening default on @S obligations unless anothe" last
!inute deal can be st"uc(
Destroys the global economy
$A%I$!ON 9 1& 13 co%founde" and co%host of )lanet /one', a co%p"oduction of
the NY2 and N)R :3da! Da1idson, *u" Debt to Societ',
http://wwwn'ti!esco!/#$13/$&/1>/!agaFine/ou"%debt%to%societ'ht!lR
pagewantedSallPT"S1P<
2he Dail' 2"easu"' State!ent, a public accounting of what the @S go1e"n!ent spends and "ecei1es each da', shows how !one'
"eall' wo"(s in 0ashington *n 3ug #9, the go1e"n!ent too( in 7#& !illion in "epaid ag"icultu"al loansQ 79> !illion in custo!s and
dutiesQ 73B !illion in the "epa'!ent of 23R) loansQ so!e 731$ !illion in ta5esQ and so fo"th 2hat sa!e da', the go1e"n!ent also
had bills to pa': 7#C9 !illion in 1ete"ans%affai"s p"og"a!sQ 7#> billion to /edica"e and /edicaidQ 71> billion each to the
depa"t!ents of Education and Defense B' the close of that 2uesda', when all the spending and the ta5ing had been co!pleted, the
go1e"n!ent paid out nea"l' 78 billion !o"e than it too( in
2his is the definition of a deficit, and it illust"ates wh' the go1e"n!ent needs to bo""ow !one' al!ost e1e"'
da' to pa' its bills *f cou"se, all that dail' bo""owing adds up, and we a"e "apidl' app"oaching
what is called the O%Date U the da', so!ewhe"e in the ne5t si5 wee(s, when the go1e"n!ent, b' law,
cannot bo""ow anothe" penn' Cong"ess has i!posed a st"ict li!it on how !uch debt the fede"al go1e"n!ent can
accu!ulate, but fo" nea"l' &$ 'ea"s, it has "aised the ceiling well befo"e it was "eached But since a la"ge nu!be" of 2ea )a"t'%
aligned Republicans ente"ed the 4ouse of Rep"esentati1es, in #$11, "aising that debt ceiling has beco!e a
!atte" of fie"ce debate 2his su!!e", 4ouse Republicans ha1e p"o!ised, in Spea(e" 6ohn
Boehne"+s wo"ds, ,a whale of a fight- befo"e the' "aise the debt ceiling U if the' e1en "aise it at all
.f the debt ceiling isn+t lifted again this fall, so!e se"ious financial decisions will ha1e to be
!ade )e"haps the go1e"n!ent can s(i!p on its fo"eign aid o" fu"lough all of N3S3, but e1entuall' the big%tic(et ite!s, li(e Social
Secu"it' and /edica"e, will ha1e to be cut 3t so!e point, the go1e"n!ent won+ t be able to pa' inte"est on its
bonds and will ente" what+s (nown as so1e"eign default , the ultimate national financial
disaster achie1ed b' count"ies li(e Mi!babwe, Ecuado" and 3"gentina Iand now K"eeceJ .n the case of the @nited States,
though, it won+t be an isolated national c"isis .f the 3!e"ican go1e"n!ent can+t stand
behind the dolla", the wo"ld+s bench!a"( cu""enc', then the global financial s'ste! will
1e"' li(el' ente" a new e"a in which the"e is !uch less t"ade and !uch less econo!ic g"owth .t
would be, b' !ost accounts, the la"gest self-imposed financial disaster in histo"'
Nea"l' e1e"'one in1ol1ed p"edicts that so!eone will blin( befo"e this disaste" occu"s Yet a
s!all nu!be" of 4ouse Republicans Ione political anal'st told !e it+s no !o"e than #$J appea" willing to
see what happens if the debt ceiling isn+t "aised U at least fo" a bit 2his could be used as
le1e"age to fo"ce De!oc"ats to d"asticall' cut go1e"n!ent spending and eli!inate )"esident *ba!a+s signatu"e health%ca"e%"efo"!
plan .n fact, Rep"esentati1e 2o! )"ice, a Keo"gia Republican, told !e that the whole p"oble! could be a1oided if the p"esident
ag"eed to d"asticall' cut spending and lowe" ta5es Still, it is ha"d to put this act of ga!e theo"' into
histo"ic conte5t )lent' of count"ies U and so!e cities, li(e Det"oit U ha1e defaulted on thei" financial obligations, but onl'
because thei" go1e"n!ents "an out of !one' to pa' thei" bills No wealth' count"' has e1e" 1olunta"il'
decided U in the !iddle of an econo!ic "eco1e"', no less U to default 3nd the"e+s ce"tainl' no "eco"d of
that happening to the count"' that cont"ols the global "ese"1e cu""enc'
Li(e !an', . assu!ed a self%i!posed @S debt c"isis !ight unfold li(e !ost in1olunta"' ones
.f the debt ceiling isn+t "aised b' O%Da', . figu"ed, the wo"ld+s in1esto"s would begin to see 3!e"ica as an
unstable in1est!ent and "ush to sell thei" 2"easu"' bonds 2he @S go1e"n!ent, despe"ate to hold
on to in1est!ent, would then "aise inte"est "ates fa" highe", hu"tling up "ates on c"edit ca"ds, student loans,
!o"tgages and co"po"ate bo""owing U which would effecti1el' put a cla!p on all t"ade and spending
2he @S economy would collapse fa" wo"se than an'thing we+1e seen in the past se1e"al 'ea"s
.nstead, Robe"t 3uwae"te", head of bond in1esting fo" Langua"d, the wo"ld+s la"gest !utual%fund co!pan',
told !e that the collapse might be more insidious ,You (now what happens when the !a"(et
gets upsetR- he said ,2he"e+s a flight to =ualit' .n1esto"s bu' 2"easu"' bonds .t+s a bit pe"1e"se- .n othe"
wo"ds, if the @S co!es within shouting distance of a default Iwhich 3uwae"te" is confident won+t
happenJ, the worlds investors U absent a safe" alte"nati1e, gi1en the "ecent fates of the eu"o and the 'en U !ight
actuall' bu' e1en !o"e 2"easu"' bonds .ndeed, inte"est "ates would fall and the bond !a"(ets would soa"
0hile this possibilit' !ight not sound so bad, it+s "eall' fa" !o"e da!aging than the apocal'ptic one .
i!agined Rathe" than "esulting in a sudden c"isis, failu"e to "aise the debt ceiling would lead to a
slow bleed Scott /athe", head of the global po"tfolio at )i!co, the wo"ld+s la"gest p"i1ate bond fund, e5plained that
while go1e"n!ents and institutions !ight go on a @S%bond bu'ing f"enF' in the wa(e of a debt%
ceiling panic, the' would e1entuall' "ecogniFe that the @S go1e"n!ent was not going th"ough
an odd, te!po"a"' bit of insanit' 2he' would e1entuall' conclude that it had beco!e
pe"!anentl' less "eliable /athe" i!agines institutional in1esto"s and go1e"n!ents tu"ning to a
bas(et of cu""encies, putting thei" sa1ings in a !i5 of @S, Eu"opean, Canadian, 3ust"alian and 6apanese bonds *1e" the
cou"se of decades, the @S would lose its uni=ue "ole in the global econo!'
2he @S benefits eno"!ousl' from its status as global reserve currency and safe
haven *u" inte"est and !o"tgage "ates a"e lowe"Q co!panies a"e able to bo""ow !one' to finance thei" new p"oducts !o"e
cheapl' 3s a "esult, the"e is !uch !o"e econo!ic acti1it' and !o"e wealth in 3!e"ica than the"e would be othe"wise .f that
status e"odes , the @S econo!'+s pea(s will be lowe" and "ecessions deepe" Q futu"e gene"ations
will ha1e fewe" ?ob oppo"tunities and suffe" !o"e when the econo!' falte"s 3nd, /athe" points out, no other country
would benefit from mericas diminished status 0hen 'ou !a(e the base "is(%f"ee asset !o"e "is(',
the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier
Global nuke wars
Ke'p 10UDi"ecto" of Regional St"ategic )"og"a!s at 2he Ni5on Cente", se"1ed in the
0hite 4ouse unde" Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the p"esident fo" national secu"it'
affai"s and senio" di"ecto" fo" Nea" East and South 3sian affai"s on the National Secu"it'
Council Staff, Ao"!e" Di"ecto", /iddle East 3"!s Cont"ol )"o?ect at the Ca"negie
Endow!ent fo" .nte"national )eace :Keoff"e' ;e!p, #$1$, The East Moves West: India,
China, and Asias Growing Presence in the Middle East, p #33%C<
2he second scena"io, called /a'he! and Chaos, is the opposite of the fi"st scena"ioQ e1e"'thing that can go w"ong does go w"ong
2he wo"ld econo!ic situation wea(ens "athe" than st"engthens , and .ndia, China, and 6apan
suffe" a !a?o" "eduction in thei" g"owth "ates , fu"the" wea(ening the global econo!' 3s a
"esult, ene"g' de!and falls and the p"ice of fossil fuels plu!!ets, leading to a financial
c"isis fo" the ene"g'%p"oducing states, which a"e fo"ced to cut bac( d"a!aticall' on
e5pansion p"og"a!s and social welfa"e 2hat in tu"n leads to political un"est: and nu"tu"es
diffe"ent "adical g"oups, including, but not li!ited to, .sla!ic e5t"e!ists 2he inte"nal stabilit' of so!e
count"ies is challenged , and the"e a"e !o"e ,failed states- /ost se"ious is the collapse of the
de!oc"atic go1e"n!ent in )a(istan and its ta(eo1e" b' /usli! e5t"e!ists , who then ta(e
possession of a la"ge nu!be" of nuclea" weapons 2he dange" of wa" between .ndia and
)a(istan inc"eases significantl' ."an, alwa's wo""ied about an e5t"e!ist )a(istan, e5pands and weaponiFes
its nuclea" p"og"a! 2hat fu"the" enhances nuclea" p"olif e"ation in the /iddle East, with
Saudi 3"abia, 2u"(e', and Eg'pt ?oining .s"ael and ."an as nuclea" states @nde" these
ci"cu!stances, the potential fo" nuclea" te""o"is! inc"eases, and the possibilit' of a nuclea"
te""o"ist attac( in eithe" the 0este"n wo"ld o" in the oil%p"oducing states !a' lead to a
fu"the" de1astating collapse of the wo"ld econo!ic !a"(et, with a tsuna!i%li(e i!pact on
stabilit' .n this scena"io, !a?o" dis"uptions can be e5pected, with di"e conse=uences fo"
two%thi"ds of the planet+s population
1NC !
"sing national security to #ustiy restraints on the e$ecutive is
sel%deeating& 'ecurity discourse consolidates
authoritarian politics&
3FiF RANA Law at Co"nell 11 :,0ho Decides on Secu"it'R- Co"nell Law Aacult'
0o"(ing )ape"s, )ape" B9, http://schola"shiplawco"nelledu/clsopsTpape"s/B9 p 1%9<
2oda' politicians and legal schola"s "outinel' in1o(e fea"s that the balance between libe"t' and
secu"it' has swung d"asticall' in the di"ection of go1e"n!ent+s coe"ci1e powe"s .n the post%
Septe!be" 11 e"a, such wo""ies a"e so co!!onplace that in the wo"ds of one co!!entato", ,it has beco!e pa"t of the d"in(ing wate"
of this count"' that the"e has been a t"ade%off of libe"t' fo" secu"it'-1 3cco"ding to ci1il libe"ta"ians, cent"aliFing e5ecuti1e powe" and
"e!o1ing the legal const"aints that inhibit state 1iolence Iall in the na!e of heightened secu"it'J !ean the stead' e"osion of both
popula" delibe"ation and the "ule of law Ao" 6e"e!' 0ald"on, cu""ent p"actices, f"o! coe"ci1e inte""ogation to
te""o"is! su"1eillance and di!inished detainee "ights, p"o1ide go1e"n!ent the abilit' not onl' to inti!idate e5te"nal
ene!ies but also inte"nal dissidents and legiti!ate political opponents 3s he w"ites, ,0e ha1e to wo""' that the 1e"' !eans gi1en to
the go1e"n!ent to co!bat ou" ene!ies will be used b' the go1e"n!ent against its ene!ies-# Especiall' disconce"ting fo" !an'
co!!entato"s, e5ecuti1e ?udg!entsUdue to fea"s of infilt"ation and secu"it' lea(sUa"e often cloa(ed in sec"ec' 2his lac( of
t"anspa"enc' unde"!ines a co"e 1alue of de!oc"atic decision!a(ing: popula" sc"utin' of go1e"n!ent action 3s @S Ci"cuit 6udge
Da!on ;eith fa!ousl' decla"ed in a case in1ol1ing sec"et depo"tations b' the e5ecuti1e b"anch, ,De!oc"acies die behind closed
doo"s 0hen go1e"n!ent begins closing doo"s, it selecti1el' cont"ols info"!ation "ightfull' belonging to the people Selecti1e
info"!ation is !isinfo"!ation-3 .n the 1iew of no less an establish!ent figu"e than Neal ;at'al, now the )"incipal Deput' Solicito"
Kene"al, such secu"it' !easu"es t"ansfo"! the cu""ent p"esidenc' into ,the !ost dange"ous b"anch,-
one that ,subsu!es !uch of the t"ipa"tite st"uctu"e of go1e"n!ent-C 0idesp"ead conce"ns with the go1e"n!ent+s secu"it'
inf"ast"uctu"e a"e b' no !eans a new pheno!enon .n fact, such 1oices a"e pa"t of a si5t'%'ea" histo"' of
"efo"! ai!ed at li!iting state Ipa"ticula"l' presidential! discretion and p"e1enting li(el' abuses 0hat is
"e!a"(able about these "efo"! effo"ts is that, e1e"' gene"ation, c"itics a"ticulate the sa!e basic an5ieties
and p"esent virtually identical procedural solutions 2hese p"ocedu"al solutions focus
on enhancing the institutional st"ength of both Cong"ess and the cou"ts to "ein in the
unita"' e5ecuti1e 2he' eithe" p"o!ote new statuto"' sche!es that codif' legislati1e
"esponsibilities o" call fo" g"eate" cou"t acti1is! 3s ea"l' as the 1&C$s, Clinton Rossite"
a"gued that onl' a clea"l' established legal f"a!ewo"( in which Cong"ess en?o'ed the
powe" to decla"e and te"!inate states of e!e"genc' would p"e1ent e5ecuti1e t'"ann' and
"ights 1iolations in ti!es of c"isis> 3fte" the ."an%Cont"a scandal, 4a"old ;oh, now State Depa"t!ent
Legal 3d1ise", once !o"e "aised this app"oach, calling fo" passage of a National Secu"it'
Cha"te" that e5plicitl' enu!e"ated the powe"s of both the e5ecuti1e and the legislatu"e, p"o!oting g"eate" balance between the
b"anches and e5plicit const"aints on go1e"n!ent action8 /o"e "ecentl', B"uce 3c(e"!an has defended the need fo" an
,e!e"genc' constitution- p"e!ised on cong"essional o1e"sight and p"ocedu"all' specified p"actices9 3s
fo" inc"eased ?udicial 1igilance, 3"thu" Schlesinge" a"gued nea"l' fo"t' 'ea"s ago, in his se!inal boo( 2he .!pe"ial
)"esidenc' I1&93J, that the cou"ts ,had to "eclai! thei" own dignit' and !eet thei" own
"esponsibilities- b' abandoning defe"ence and b' offe"ing a !eaningful chec( to the political b"anchesB 2oda', Law"ence
2"ibe and )at"ic( Kud"idge once !o"e i!agine that, b' p"o1iding a powe"ful 1oice of dissent, the
cou"ts can pla' a c"itical "ole in balancing the b"anches 2he' w"ite that ad?udication can ,gene"ate:<U
e1en if la"gel' Io", at ti!es, onl'J in elo=uent and cogentl' "easoned dissentUan apt language fo" potent c"iticis!-& 2he hopeU
"etu"ned to b' constitutional schola"s fo" decadesUhas been that b' c"eating clea" legal guidelines fo" secu"it' !atte"s and b'
inc"easing the "ole of the legislati1e and ?udicial b"anches, go1e"n!ent abuse can be ste!!ed Yet despite this "efo"!ist
belief, p"esidential and !ilita"' prerogatives continue to e"pand e1en when the cou"ts
o" Cong"ess inte"1ene .ndeed, the ulti!ate "esult has p"i!a"il' been to entrench further
the system of discretion and centrali#ation .n the case of cong"essional legislation If"o! the #$$ standb'
statutes on the boo(s to the postSepte!be" 11 and ."a= 0a" 3utho"iFations fo" the @se of /ilita"' Ao"ce to the Detainee 2"eat!ent
3ct and the /ilita"' Co!!issions 3ctsJ, this has often entailed Cong"ess self%consciousl' pla'ing the "ole of ?unio" pa"tne"U
butt"essing e5ecuti1e p"actices b' p"o1iding its own constitutional i!p"i!atu" to the! 2hus, "athe" than "olling bac( secu"it'
p"actices, g"eate" cong"essional in1ol1e!ent has tended to fu"the" st"engthen and inte"naliFe e!e"genc' no"!s within the o"dina"'
ope"ation of politics1$ 3s ?ust one e5a!ple, the @S3 )32R.*2 3ct, while no doubt cont"o1e"sial, has been "enewed b' Cong"ess a
"e!a"(able ten consecuti1e ti!es without an' !eaningful cu"tail!ents11 Such "ealities unde"sco"e the do!inant
d"ift of secu"it' a""ange!ents, a drift unhinde"ed b' schola"l' suggestions and "efo"!
initiati1es .ndeed, if an'thing, toda'+s schola"ship finds itself !i"ed in an a"gu!entati1e loop,
"e%p"esenting inade=uate "e!edies and see!ingl' incapable of "ecogniFing past failu"es
0hat e5plains both the pe"sistent e5pansion of the fede"al go1e"n!ent+s secu"it'
f"a!ewo"( as well as the inabilit' of ci1il libe"ta"ian solutions to cu"b this e5pansionR .n
this a"ticle . a"gue that the cu""ent "efo"! debate igno"es the b"oade" ideological conte"t that
shapes how the balance between libe"t' and secu"it' is st"uc( .n pa"ticula", the 1e"' !eaning
of secu"it' has not "e!ained static but "athe" has changed d"a!aticall' since 0o"ld 0a" .. and the
beginning of the Cold 0a" 2his shift has p"incipall' conce"ned the basic =uestion of who decides
on issues of wa" and e!e"genc' 3nd as the following pages e5plo"e, at the cente" of this shift has
been a t"ansfo"!ation in legal and political ?udg!ents about the capacit' of citiFens to
!a(e info"!ed and (nowledgeable decisions in secu"it' do!ains Yet, while unde"l'ing assu!ptions
about popula" (nowledgeUits st"engths and li!itationsUha1e pla'ed a (e' "ole in shaping secu"it' p"actices in each e"a of 3!e"ican
constitutional histo"', this "ole has not been e5plo"ed in an' sustained wa' in the schola"l' lite"atu"e 3s an initial effo"t to delineate
the "elationship between (nowledge and secu"it', . will a"gue that th"oughout !ost of the 3!e"ican e5pe"ience,
the do!inant ideological pe"specti1e saw secu"it' as g"ounded in p"otecting citiFens f"o!
th"eats to thei" p"ope"t' and ph'sical well%being Iespeciall' those th"eats posed b' e5te"nal wa"fa"e and do!estic insu""ectionJ
D"awing f"o! a philosophical t"adition e5tending bac( to 6ohn Loc(e, politicians and thin(e"sU"anging f"o! 3le5ande" 4a!ilton
and 6a!es /adison at the founding to 3b"aha! Lincoln and Roge" 2ane'U!aintained that !ost citiFens unde"stood the fo"!s of
dange" that i!pe"iled thei" ph'sical safet' 2he a1e"age indi1idual (new that secu"ing collecti1e life was in his o" he" own inte"est,
and also (new the institutional a""ange!ents and p"actices that would fulfill this pa"a!ount inte"est 3 widesp"ead
(nowledge of secu"it' needs was p"esu!ed to be e!bedded in social e5pe"ience,
indicating that citiFens had the s(ill to ta(e pa"t in de!oc"atic discussion "ega"ding how best to
p"otect p"ope"t' o" to "espond to fo"!s of e5te"nal 1iolence 2hus the =uestion of who decides was answe"ed decisi1el' in fa1o" of the
gene"al public and those institutionsUespeciall' !a?o"ita"ian legislatu"es and ?u"iesU!ost closel' bound to the public+s wishes 0hat
!a"(s the p"esent !o!ent as distinct is an inc"easing "epudiation of these assu!ptions about sha"ed and gene"al social (nowledge
2oda' the do!inant app"oach to secu"it' p"esu!es that conditions of !ode"n co!ple5it'
I!a"(ed b' heightened bu"eauc"ac', institutional specialiFation , global inte"dependence,
and technological de1elop!entJ !ean that while p"otection f"o! e5te"nal dange" "e!ains
a pa"a!ount inte"est of o"dina"' citiFens, these citiFens "a"el' possess the capacit' to
pu"sue such ob?ecti1es ade=uatel' Rathe" than 1iewing secu"it' as a !atte" open to popula" unde"standing
and collecti1e assess!ent, in wa's both s!all and la"ge the p"e1ailing concept sees th"eat as sociologicall' co!ple5 and as
re$uiring elite modes of e"pertise .nsulated decision%!a(e"s in the e5ecuti1e b"anch, a"!ed with the specialiFed
s(ills of the p"ofessional !ilita"', a"e assu!ed to be best e=uipped to !a(e sense of co!plicated and often conflicting info"!ation
about safet' and self%defense1# 2he "esult is that the othe" b"anches Ulet alone the public w"it la"ge
U face a p"ofound legiti!ac' deficit whene1e" the' call fo" t"anspa"enc' o" see( to
challenge p"esidential disc"etion Not su"p"isingl', the tendenc' of p"ocedu"al "efo"! effo"ts
has been to place g"eate" decision%!a(ing powe" in the othe" b"anches and then to watch
those b"anches delegate such power back to the very same e"ecutive bodies 4ow did
the go1e"ning, e5pe"tise%o"iented concept of secu"it' gain such theo"etical and
institutional do!inance and what alte"nati1e fo"!ulations e5ist to challenge its
ideological sup"e!ac'R .n offe"ing an answe" to these =uestions, . begin in )a"t .. b' e5a!ining the p"incipal philosophical
alte"nati1es that e5isted p"io" to the e!e"gence of toda'+s app"oach, one of which g"ounded ea"l' 3!e"ican thought on secu"it' issues
. "efe" to these alte"nati1es in the 3nglo%3!e"ican t"adition as b"oadl' V4obbesian+ and VLoc(ean+ and de1elop the! th"ough a close
"eading of the two thin(e"s+ accounts of secu"it' Ao" all thei" inte"nal diffe"ences, what is notewo"th' fo" !' pu"poses is that each
app"oach "e?ected the ideaUpe"1asi1e at p"esentUthat the"e e5ists a basic di1ide between elite unde"standing and !ass unce"taint' .n
othe" wo"ds, 6ohn Loc(e and e1en 2ho!as 4obbes Ifa!ous as the philosophe" of absolutis!J p"esented accounts of secu"it' and self%
defense that . a"gue we"e no"!ati1el' !o"e de!oc"atic than the cu""ent f"a!ewo"( )a"t ... will then e5plo"e how the Loc(ean
pe"specti1e in pa"ticula" too( constitutional "oot in ea"l' 3!e"ican life, focusing especiall' on the 1iews of the founde"s and on the
intellectual and legal cli!ate in the !id nineteenth centu"' .n )a"t .L, . will continue b' detailing the stead' e!e"gence beginning
du"ing the New Deal of ou" p"e1ailing idea of secu"it', with its e!phasis on p"ofessional e5pe"tise and insulated decision%!a(ing
2his discussion highlights the wo"( of )endleton 4e""ing, a political scientist and polic'!a(e" in the 1&3$s and 1&C$s who co%w"ote
the N ational S ecu"it' 3 ct of 1&C9 and pla'ed a c"itical "ole in t'ing notions of elite
specialiFation to a new language of V national security + )a"t L will then show how 4e""ing+s Vnational
secu"it'+ 1ision inc"easingl' beca!e inte"naliFed b' ?udicial acto"s du"ing and afte" 0o"ld 0a" .. . a"gue that the e!ble!atic figu"e
in this de1elop!ent was Sup"e!e Cou"t 6ustice Aeli5 A"an(fu"te", who not onl' defended secu"it' e5pe"tise but actuall' sought to
"edefine the 1e"' !eaning of de!oc"ac' in te"!s of such e5pe"tise Ao" A"an(fu"te", the ideal of an Vopen societ'+ was one p"e!ised
on !e"itoc"ac', o" the belief that decisions should be !ade b' those whose natu"al talents !a(e the! !ost capable of "eaching the
technicall' co""ect outco!e 3cco"ding to A"an(fu"te", the "ise of secu"it' e5pe"tise !eant the
welco!e sp"ead of !e"itoc"atic co!!it!ents to a c"itical and co!ple5 a"ena of
polic'!a(ing .n this discussion, . focus especiall' on a se"ies of A"an(fu"te" opinions, including in E5 pa"te
Wui"in I1&C#J, 4i"aba'ashi 1 @nited States I1&C3J, ;o"e!atsu 1 @nited States I1&CCJ, and Youngstown Steel P
2ube Co 1 Saw'e" I1&>#J, and connect these opinions to conte!po"a"' cases such as 4olde" 1 4u!anita"ian Law )"o?ect I#$1$J
Ainall', b' wa' of conclusion, . note how toda'+s secu"it' conceptUno"!ati1el' sustained b' A"an(fu"te"+s ?udg!ents
about !e"it and elite autho"it'Ushapes cu""ent discussions o1e" th"eat and fo"eign polic' in wa's
that often inhibit "athe" than p"o!ote actual secu"it' . then end with so!e "eflections on what would be
"e=ui"ed to alte" go1e"ning a""ange!ents 3s a final int"oducto"' note, a cla"ification of what . !ean b' the te"! Vsecu"it'+ is in o"de"
Despite its continuous in1ocation in public life, the concept "e!ains slippe"' and su"p"isingl' unde"%theo"iFed 3s 6e"e!' 0ald"on
w"ites, ,3lthough we (now that Vsecu"it'+ is a 1ague and a!biguous concept, and though we should suspect that its 1agueness is a
sou"ce of dange" when tal( of t"ade%offs is in the ai", still the"e has been little o" no atte!pt in the lite"atu"e of legal and political
theo"' to b"ing an' so"t of cla"it' to the concept-13 3s a gene"al !atte", secu"it' "efe"s to p"otection f"o! those th"eats that i!pe"il
su"1i1alUboth of the indi1idual and of a gi1en societ'+s collecti1e institutions o" wa' of life 3t its b"oadest, these th"eats a"e
!ultidi!ensional and can "esult f"o! pheno!ena as wide%"anging as en1i"on!ental disaste"s o" food sho"tages 2hus, political
acto"s with di1e"gent ideological co!!it!ents defend the often co!peting goals of
social secu"it', econo!ic secu"it', financial secu"it', collecti1e secu"it', hu!an secu"it',
food secu"it', en1i"on!ental secu"it', and Uthe granddaddy of them all U national
security But fo" !' pu"poses, when in1o(ed without an' !odifie" the wo"d Vsecu"it'+ "efe"s to !o"e specific =uestions of
co!!on defense and ph'sical safet' 2hese =uestions, e!phasiFing issues of wa" and peace, a"e la"gel' cote"!inous with what
A"an(lin Delano Roose1elt fa!ousl' "efe""ed to in his ,Aou" A"eedo!s- State of the @nion 3d"esss as ,the f"eedo! f"o! fea"-:
na!el' ensu"ing that citiFens a"e p"otected f"o! e5te"nal and inte"nal acts of ,ph'sical agg"ession-1C 2his definitional choice is
!eant to se"1e two connected theo"etical ob?ecti1es Ai"st, as a conceptual !atte" it is i!po"tant to (eep the te"!
secu"it' anal'ticall' separate f"o! Vnational secu"it'+ Ua ph"ase ubi=uitous in cu""ent legal and political debate
0hile on the face of it, both te"!s !ight appea" s'non'!ous, !' clai! in the following pages is that Vnational
secu"it'+ is in fact a "elati1el' no1el concept, which e!e"ged in the !id twentieth centu"' as a pa"ticula"
1ision of how to add"ess issues of co!!on defense and pe"sonal safet' 2hus national
secu"it' e!bodies onl' one of a nu!be" of co!peting theo"etical and histo"ical
app"oaches to !atte"s of e5te"nal 1iolence and wa"fa"e Second, and "elatedl', it has beco!e a t"uis! in
political philosoph' that the concept of libe"t' is plu"al and !ultifaceted1> .n othe" wo"ds, diffe"ent ideals of libe"t' p"esuppose
distinct 1isions of political life and possibilit' Yet fa" less attention has been paid to the fact that secu"it' is si!ila"l' a plu"al concept,
e!bod'ing di1e"gent assu!ptions about social o"de"ing .n fact, co!peting notions of secu"it'Ub' offe"ing
diffe"ent answe"s to the =uestion of ,who decidesR-Ucan be !o"e o" less co!patible with
de!oc"atic ideals .f an'thing, the p"oble! of the conte!po"a"' !o!ent is the dominance of
a security concept that s'ste!aticall' challenges those sociological and no"!ati1e
assu!ptions "e=ui"ed to sustain popular involvement in !atte"s of th"eat and safet'
National security rame #ustiies e$tinction in the name o saving
human lie&
$illon 9(U/ichael, @ni1e"sit' of Lancaste" :*ctobe" C, 1&&8, ,)olitics of Secu"it':
2owa"ds a )olitical )hilosoph' of Continental 2hought-<
2he wa' of sha"pening and focusing this thought into a p"ecise =uestion is fi"st p"o1ided, howe1e", b' "efe""ing bac( to AoucaultQ fo"
who! 4eidegge" was the philosophe" *f all "ecent thin(e"s, Aoucault was a!ongst the !ost co!!itted to the tas( of w"iting the
histo"' of the p"esent in the light of the histo"' of philosoph' as !etaph'sics C 2hat is wh', when fi"st thin(ing about the p"o!inence
of secu"it' in !ode"n politics, . fi"st found Aoucault+s !ode of =uestioning so sti!ulating 2he"e was, it see!ed to !e, a
pa"allel to be d"awn between what he saw the technolog' of disciplina"'
powe"/(nowledge doing to the bod' and what the p"inciple of secu"it' does to politics
0hat t"uths about the hu!an condition, he the"efo"e p"o!pted !e to as(, a"e thought to be sec"eted in secu"it'R 0hat wo"( does
secu"ing secu"it' do fo" and upon usR 0hat powe"%effects issue out of the "egi!es of t"uth of secu"it'R
.f the t"uth of secu"it' co!pels us to secu"e secu"it', wh', how and whe"e is that g"ounding co!pulsion g"oundedR 4ow was it
that see(ing secu"it' beca!e such an insistent and "elentless Iinte"Jnational p"eoccupation
fo" hu!an(indR 0hat so"t of p"o?ect is the pu"suit of secu"it', and how does it "elate to othe" !ode"n hu!an conce"ns and
ente"p"ises, such as see(ing f"eedo! and (nowledge th"ough "ep"esentati1e%calculati1e thought, technolog' and sub?ectificationR
3bo1e all, how a"e we to accountUa!ongst all the !anifest cont"adictions of ou" cu""ent Iinte"Jnational s'ste!s of secu"it':
which inca"ce"ate "athe" than libe"ate Q "adicall' endange" "athe" than !a(e safeQ and
engende" fea" "athe" than c"eate assu"anceUfo" that te"!inal pa"ado5 of ou" !ode"n Iinte"Jnational politics of
secu"it' which Aoucault captu"ed so well in the =uotation that heads this chapte" > 3 te"!inal pa"ado5 which not
onl' sub1e"ts its own p"edicate of secu"it', !ost spectacula"l' b' "ende"ing the futu"e of
te""est"ial e5istence conditional on the st"ategies and calculations of its h'b"id "egi!e of
so1e"eignt' and go1e"n!entalit', but which also see!s to fu"nish a new p"edicate of global
life, a new e5pe"ience in the conte5t of which the political has to be "eco1e"ed and to which it !ust then add"ess itself: the
globalisation of politics of secu"it' in the global e5tension of nihilis! and technolog', and the ad1ent of the real
prospect of human species e"tinction
(lternative)Challenge to conceptual ramework o national
security& Only our alternative displaces the source o
e$ecutive overreach& Legal restraint without conceptual
change is utile&
3FiF RANA Law at Co"nell 11 :,0ho Decides on Secu"it'R- Co"nell Law Aacult'
0o"(ing )ape"s, )ape" B9, http://schola"shiplawco"nelledu/clsopsTpape"s/B9 p C>%>1<
2he p"e1alence of these continuities between A"an(fu"te"+s 1ision and conte!po"a"' ?udicial a"gu!ents "aise se"ious conce"ns with
toda'+s conceptual f"a!ewo"( Ce"tainl', A"an(fu"te"+s "ole du"ing 0o"ld 0a" .. in defending and p"o!oting a nu!be" of infa!ous
?udicial decisions highlights the potential abuses e!bedded in a legal discou"se p"e!ised on the speciall'%situated (nowledge of
e5ecuti1e officials and !ilita"' pe"sonnel 3s the e5a!ple of 6apanese inte"n!ent d"a!atiFes, too st"ong an assu!ption of e5pe"t
unde"standing can easil' allow elite p"e?udicesUand with it state 1iolenceUto "un "a!pant and unconst"ained Ao" the p"esent, it hints
at an ob1ious =uestion: 4ow s(eptical should we be of cu""ent asse"tions of e5pe"tise and, indeed, of the
dominant security framework itself R *ne clai!, "epeated especiall' in the wa(e of Septe!be" 11, has
been that "ega"dless of no"!ati1e legiti!ac', the p"e1ailing secu"it' conceptUwith its
account of uni=ue (nowledge, insulation, and hie"a"ch'Uis si!pl' an unavoidable conse=uence of
e5isting global dange"s E1en if 4e""ing and A"an(fu"te" !a' ha1e been w"ong in p"inciple about thei" answe" to the =uestion ,who
decides in !atte"s of secu"it'R- the' ne1e"theless we"e "ight to belie1e that co!ple5it' and ende!ic th"eat !a(e it i!possible to
defend the old Loc(ean sensibilit' .n the final pages of the a"ticle, . e5plo"e this basic =uestion of the deg"ee to which ob?ecti1e
conditions ?ustif' the conceptual shifts and offe" so!e initial "eflections on what !ight be "e=ui"ed to li!it the go1e"n!ent+s
e5pansi1e secu"it' powe"s L. C*NCL@S.*N: 24E *)ENNESS *A 24RE32S 2he ideological transformation
in the !eaning of secu"it' has helped to gene"ate a !assi1e and la"gel' sec"et
inf"ast"uctu"e of o1e"lapping e5ecuti1e agencies , all tas(ed with gathe"ing info"!ation and (eeping the
count"' safe f"o! pe"cei1ed th"eats .n #$1$, 2he 0ashington )ost p"oduced a se"ies of a"ticles outlining the buildings, pe"sonnel, and
co!panies that !a(e up this hidden national secu"it' appa"atus 3cco"ding to ?ou"nalists Dana )"iest and
0illia! 3"(in, the"e e5ist ,so!e 1#91 go1e"n!ent o"ganiFations and 1&31 p"i1ate co!panies- ac"oss
1$,$$$ locations in the @nited States, all wo"(ing on ,counte"te""o"is!, ho!eland secu"it', and intelligence-1B$ 2his appa"atus is
especiall' concent"ated in the 0ashington, DC a"ea, which a!ounts to ,the capital of an alte"nati1e geog"aph' of the @nited
States-1B1 E!plo'ed b' these hidden agencies and bu"eauc"atic entities a"e so!e B>C,$$$ people Iapp"o5i!atel' 1> ti!es as
!an' people as li1e in 0ashington itselfJ who hold topsec"et clea"ances1B# 3s )"iest and 3"(in !a(e clea", the !ost elite of those
with such clea"ance a"e highl' t"ained e5pe"ts, "anging f"o! scientists and econo!ists to "egional specialists ,2o do what it does, the
NS3 "elies on the la"gest nu!be" of !athe!aticians in the wo"ld .t needs linguists and technolog' e5pe"ts, as well as c"'ptologists,
(nown as Vc"ippies+-1B3 2hese p"ofessionals cluste" togethe" in neighbo"hoods that a"e a!ong the wealthiest in the count"'Usi5 of
the ten "ichest counties in the @nited States acco"ding to Census Bu"eau data1BC 3s the e5ecuti1e of 4owa"d Count', Li"ginia, one
such co!!unit', decla"ed, ,2hese a"e so!e of the !ost b"illiant people in the wo"ld 2he' de!and good schools and a high
=ualit' of life-1B> School e5cellence is pa"ticula"l' i!po"tant, as education holds the (e' to sustaining ele1ated p"ofessional and
financial status ac"oss gene"ations .n fact, so!e schools a"e e1en ,adopting a cu""iculu! that will teach students as 'oung as 1$
what (ind of lifest'le it ta(es to get a secu"it' clea"ance and what (ind of beha1io" would dis=ualif' the!-1B8 2he i!plicit ai! of
this cu""iculu! is to ensu"e that the child"en of NS3 !athe!aticians and Defense Depa"t!ent linguists can one da' succeed thei"
pa"ents on the ?ob .n effect, what )"iest and 3"(in detail is a st"i(ing illust"ation of how secu"it' has t"ansfo"!ed f"o! a !atte" of
o"dina"' ?udg!ent into one of elite s(ill 2he' also unde"sco"e how this t"ansfo"!ation is bound to a "elated set of de1elop!ents
"ega"ding social p"i1ilege and statusUde1elop!ents that would ha1e been welco!e to A"an(fu"te" but deepl' disillusioning to
B"ownson, Lincoln, and 2ane' Such changes highlight how one+s p"ofessional standing inc"easingl' d"i1es who has a "ight to !a(e
(e' institutional choices Lost in the p"ocess, howe1e", is the longstanding belief that issues of
wa" and peace a"e funda!entall' a do!ain of co!!on ca"e, !a"(ed b' de!oc"atic intelligence
and sha"ed "esponsibilit' Despite such de!oc"atic conce"ns, a la"ge pa"t of what !a(es toda'+s do!inant
secu"it' concept so co!pelling a"e two pu"po"tedl' ob?ecti1e sociological clai!s about
the natu"e of !ode"n th"eat 3s these clai!s unde"gi"d the cu""ent secu"it' concept, b' wa' of a conclusion . would li(e
to assess the! !o"e di"ectl' and, in the p"ocess, indicate what the' suggest about the p"ospects fo" an' futu"e "efo"! 2he fi"st clai!
is that global inte"dependence !eans that the @S faces near continuous threats f"o! ab"oad 6ust as
)ea"l 4a"bo" p"esented a ph'sical attac( on the ho!eland ?ustif'ing a "e1ised f"a!ewo"(, the 3!e"ican position in the wo"ld since has
been one of pe"!anent insecu"it' in the face of new, e=uall' ob?ecti1e dange"s 3lthough toda' these th"eats no longe" co!e f"o!
!enacing totalita"ian "egi!es li(e NaFi Ke"!an' o" the So1iet @nion, the' nonetheless c"eate of wo"ld of chaos and instabilit' in
which 3!e"ican do!estic peace is i!pe"iled b' decent"aliFed te""o"ists and agg"essi1e "ogue states1B9 Second, and "elatedl',
the ob?ecti1e co!ple5it' of !ode"n th"eats !a(es it i!possible fo" o"dina"' citiFens to
co!p"ehend full' the causes and li(el' conse=uences of e5isting dange"s 2hus, the best
"esponse is the fu"the" ent"ench!ent of 4e""ing+s national security state , with the @S pe"!anentl'
!obiliFed !ilita"il' to gathe" intelligence and to co!bat ene!ies whe"e1e" the' st"i(eUat ho!e o" ab"oad 3cco"dingl', !ode"n
legal and political institutions that p"i1ilege e5ecuti1e autho"it' and insulated decision!a(ing a"e si!pl' the necessa"' conse=uence of
these e5te"nall' gene"ated c"ises Rega"dless of these t"ade%offs, the secu"it' benefits of an e!powe"ed p"esidenc' Ione a"!ed with
countless sec"et and public agencies as well as with a t"ul' global !ilita"' footp"intJ1BB g"eatl' outweigh the costs Yet, although
these sociological 1iews ha1e beco!e co!!onplace, the conclusions that 3!e"icans should d"aw about secu"it' "e=ui"e!ents a"e not
nea"l' as clea" cut as the con1entional wisdo! assu!es .n pa"ticula", a close" e5a!ination of conte!po"a"' a"gu!ents about
ende!ic dange" suggests that such clai!s a"e not ob?ecti1e empirical judgments but "athe" a"e
sociall' co!ple5 and politically infused interpretations .ndeed, the openness of e5isting ci"cu!stances to
!ultiple inte"p"etations of th"eat i!plies that the p"esu!pti1e need fo" sec"ec' and cent"aliFation is not self%e1ident 3nd as
unde"sco"ed b' high p"ofile failu"es in e5pe"t assess!ent, clai!s to secu"it' e5pe"tise a"e the!sel1es "iddled with
ideological presuppositions and sub?ecti1e biases 3ll this indicates that the gulf between elite (nowledge and la'
inco!p"ehension in !atte"s of secu"it' !a' be fa" less e5tensi1e than is o"dina"il' thought .t also !eans that the =uestion of who
decidesUand with it the issue of how de!oc"atic o" insula" ou" institutions should beU"e!ains open as well Clea"l' technological
changes, f"o! ai"powe" to biological and che!ical weapons, ha1e shifted the natu"e of 3!e"ica+s position in the wo"ld and its
potential 1ulne"abilit' 3s has been widel' "e!a"(ed fo" nea"l' a centu"', the oceans alone cannot gua"antee ou" pe"!anent safet'
Yet, in t"uth the' ne1e" full' ensu"ed do!estic t"an=uilit' 2he nineteenth centu"' was one of nea" continuous 1iolence, especiall'
with indigenous co!!unities fighting to p"otect thei" te""ito"' f"o! e5pansionist settle"s1B& But e1en if technological shifts !a(e
doo!sda' scena"ios !o"e chilling than those faced b' 4a!ilton, 6effe"son, o" 2ane', the !e"e e5istence of these scena"ios tells us
little about thei" li(elihood o" how best to add"ess the! .ndeed, these latte" secu"it' ?udg!ents a"e ine1itabl' pe"!eated with
sub?ecti1e political assess!ents, assess!ents that ca""' with the! p"ee5isting ideological points of 1iewUsuch as "ega"ding how
!uch "is( constitutional societies should accept o" how inte"1entionist states should be in fo"eign polic' .n fact, f"o! its e!e"gence
in the 1&3$s and 1&C$s, suppo"te"s of the !ode"n secu"it' concept ha1eUat ti!es unwittingl'U"eaffi"!ed the political "athe" than
pu"el' ob?ecti1e natu"e of inte"p"eting e5te"nal th"eats .n pa"ticula", co!!entato"s ha1e "epeatedl' noted the lin( between the idea of
insecu"it' and 3!e"ica+s post%0o"ld 0a" .. position of global p"i!ac', one which toda' has onl' e5panded following the Cold 0a"
.n 1&81, none othe" than Senato" 6a!es 0illia! Aulb"ight decla"ed, in te"!s "e!iniscent of 4e""ing and A"an(fu"te", that secu"it'
i!pe"ati1es !eant that ,ou" basic constitutional !achine"', ad!i"abl' suited to the needs of a "e!ote ag"a"ian "epublic in the 1Bth
centu"',- was no longe" ,ade=uate- fo" the ,#$th% centu"' nation-1&$ Ao" Aulb"ight, the d"i1ing i!petus behind the need to ?ettison
anti=uated constitutional p"actices was the i!po"tance of sustaining the count"'+s ,p"ee!inen:ce< in political and !ilita"' powe"-1&1
Aulb"ight held that g"eate" e5ecuti1e action and wa"%!a(ing capacities we"e essential p"ecisel' because the @nited States found itself
,bu"dened with all the eno"!ous "esponsibilities that acco!pan' such powe"-1&# 3cco"ding to Aulb"ight, the @nited States had both
a "ight and a dut' to supp"ess those fo"!s of chaos and diso"de" that e5isted at the edges of 3!e"ican autho"it' 2hus, "athe" than
being pu"el' ob?ecti1e, the 3!e"ican condition of pe"!anent dange" was itself deepl' tied to
political calculations about the i!po"tance of global primacy 0hat gene"ated the condition of
continual c"isis was not onl' technological change, but also the belief that the @nited States+ own Vnational
secu"it'+ "ested on the successful p"o?ection of powe" into the inte"nal affai"s of fo"eign
states 2he (e' point is that "ega"dless of whethe" one ag"ees with such an unde"l'ing p"o?ect, the 1alue of this p"o?ect is ulti!atel'
an open political =uestion 2his suggests that whethe" distant c"ises should be 1iewed as gene"ating insecu"it' at ho!e is si!ila"l' as
!uch an inte"p"etati1e ?udg!ent as an e!pi"icall' 1e"ifiable conclusion1&3 2o app"eciate the open natu"e of secu"it' dete"!inations,
one need onl' loo( at the p"esentation of te""o"is! as a p"incipal and o1e""iding dange" facing the count"' 3cco"ding to the State
Depa"t!ent+s 3nnual Count"' Repo"ts on 2e""o"is!, in #$$& ,:t<he"e we"e ?ust #> @S nonco!batant fatalities f"o! te""o"is!
wo"ldwide- Isi5teen ab"oad and nine at ho!eJ1&C 0hile the fea" of a te""o"ist attac( is a legiti!ate conce"n, these nu!be"sUwhich
ha1e been consistent in "ecent 'ea"sUplace the g"a1it' of the th"eat in pe"specti1e Rathe" than a condition of ende!ic dange"U
"e=ui"ing e1e"inc"easing sec"ec' and cent"aliFationUsuch facts a"e pe"fectl' consistent with a "eading that 3!e"icans do not
face an e"istential crisis Ione p"esu!abl' co!pa"able to )ea"l 4a"bo"J and actuall' en?o' "elati1e secu"it' .ndeed, the
disconnect between nu!be"s and "esou"ces e5pended, especiall' in a ti!e of p"ofound econo!ic insecu"it',
highlights the political choice of polic'!a(e"s and citiFens to pe"sist in inte"p"eting fo"eign
e1ents th"ough a 0o"ld 0a" .. and ea"l' Cold 0a" lens of permanent threat .n fact, the continuous alte"ation
of basic constitutional 1alues to fit Vnational secu"it'+ ai!s highlights ?ust how ent"enched 4e""ing+s old 1ision of secu"it' as p"e%
political and foundational has beco!e, "ega"dless of whethe" othe" inte"p"etations of the p"esent !o!ent !a' be e=uall' co!pelling
.t also unde"sco"es a telling and often igno"ed point about the natu"e of !ode"n secu"it' e5pe"tise, pa"ticula"l' as "ep"oduced b' the
@nited States+ !assi1e intelligence inf"ast"uctu"e 2o the e5tent that political assu!ptionsUli(e the cent"alit' of global
p"i!ac' o" the 1iew that instabilit' ab"oad necessa"il' i!plicates secu"it' at ho!eUshape the interpretative
approach of e5ecuti1e officials, what passes as ob?ecti1e secu"it' e5pe"tise is itself inte"twined with contested clai!s about
how to 1iew e5te"nal acto"s and thei" !oti1ations 2his !eans that while !ode"n conditions !a' well be co!ple5, the conclusions of
the p"esu!ed e5pe"ts !a' not be s'ste!aticall' less liable to sub?ecti1e bias than ?udg!ents !ade b' o"dina"' citiFens based on
publicl' a1ailable info"!ation .t fu"the" unde"sco"es that the =uestion of who decides cannot be fo"eclosed in ad1ance b' si!pl'
asse"ting defe"ence to elite (nowledge .f an'thing, one can a"gue that the p"esu!pti1e gulf between elite awa"eness and suspect !ass
opinion has gene"ated its own 1e"' d"a!atic political and legal pathologies .n "ecent 'ea"s, the count"' has witnessed a 1a"iet' of
secu"it' c"ises built on the basic failu"e of Ve5pe"tise+1&> 3t p"esent, pa"t of what obscu"es this fact is the 1e"' cultu"e of sec"et
info"!ation sustained b' the !ode"n secu"it' concept 2oda', it is co!!onplace fo" go1e"n!ent officials to lea( secu"it' !ate"ial
about te""o"is! o" e5te"nal th"eat to newspape"s as a !ethod of shaping the public debate1&8 2hese Vopen+ sec"ets allow g"eate"
public access to elite info"!ation and e!bod' a cent"al and "outine inst"u!ent fo" inco"po"ating !ass 1oice into state decision%
!a(ing But this !ode of popula" in1ol1e!ent co!es at a (e' cost Sec"et info"!ation is gene"all' t"eated as wo"th' of a highe" status
than info"!ation al"ead' p"esent in the public "eal!Uthe sha"ed collecti1e info"!ation th"ough which o"dina"' citiFens "each
conclusions about e!e"genc' and defense Yet, oftenti!es, as with the lead up to the ."a= 0a" in #$$3, although the actual content of
this sec"et info"!ation is flawed,1&9 its status as sec"et !as(s these p"oble!s and allows polic'!a(e"s to cloa( thei" positions in
added autho"it' 2his "ealit' highlights the i!po"tance of app"oaching secu"it' info"!ation with fa"
g"eate" collective skepticismQ it also !eans that secu"it' ?udg!ents !a' be !o"e V4obbesian+U!a"(ed funda!entall' b'
episte!ological unce"taint' as opposed to 1e"ifiable factUthan polic'!a(e"s ad!it .f both ob?ecti1e sociological clai!s at the cente"
of the !ode"n secu"it' concept a"e the!sel1es p"ofoundl' contested, what does this !ean fo" "efo"! effo"ts that see( to "ecalib"ate the
"elationship between libe"t' and secu"it'R 3bo1e all, it indicates that the cent"al p"oble! with the p"ocedu"al
solutions offe"ed b' constitutional schola"sUe!phasiFing new statutory frameworks o"
greater judicial assertivenessUis that the' mistake a =uestion of politics fo" one of law
.n othe" wo"ds, such schola"s igno"e the e5tent to which go1e"ning p"actices a"e the p"oduct of background
political judgments about th"eat , de!oc"atic (nowledge, p"ofessional e5pe"tise, and the
necessit' fo" insulated decision%!a(ing 2o the e5tent that 3!e"icans a"e con1inced that
the' face continuous dange" f"o! hidden and potentiall' li!itless assailantsUdange" too co!ple5 fo" the a1e"age
citiFen to co!p"ehend independentl'Uit is inevitable that institutions I"ega"dless of legal "efo"!
initiati1esJ will ope"ate to cent"aliFe powe" in those hands p"esu!ed to en?o' !ilita"' and
secu"it' e5pe"tise 2hus, an' systematic effo"t to challenge the cu""ent f"a!ing of the
"elationship between secu"it' and libe"t' !ust begin b' challenging the underlying
assumptions about (nowledge and secu"it' upon which legal and political a""ange!ents
"est 0ithout a sustained and public debate about the 1alidit' of secu"it' e5pe"tise, its suppo"ting
institutions, and the b"oade" legiti!ac' of sec"et info"!ation, the"e can be no substantive shift in ou"
constitutional politics 2he p"oble! at p"esent, howe1e", is that no popula" base e5ists to "aise these =uestions @nless such
a base e!e"ges, we can e5pect ou" p"e1ailing secu"it' a""ange!ents to beco!e e1e" !o"e ent"enched
1NC *ar Powers D(
0a"ti!e will fo"ce *ba!a to "esist 2he int"actable battle c"eates a national di1e"sion
and i!pai"s !ilita"' wa"ti!e decisions
Lo)el *U)"ofesso" of Law X @ni1e"sit' of )ittsbu"gh :6ules Lobel, ,Conflicts Between the Co!!ande" in Chief and Cong"ess:
Concu""ent )owe" o1e" the Conduct of 0a",- *hio State Law 6ou"nal, Lol 8&, #$$B, pg 3&1<
2he c"itical difficult' with a conte5tual app"oach is its inhe"ent a!biguit' and lac( of cla"it', which tends to sha"pl' shift the balance
of powe" in fa1o" of a st"ong )"esident acting in dis"ega"d of cong"essional will Ao" e5a!ple, the application of the Aeld!an and
.ssacha"off test as(ing whethe" the congressional restriction !a(es "ealistic sense in the !ode"n wo"ld would
'ield no cohe"ent sepa"ation of powe"s answe" if applied to the cu""ent 3d!inist"ation+s
conf"ontation with Cong"ess .t would undoubtedl' embolden the President to ignore
%ongresss strictures 2he )"esident +s ad1iso"s would a"gue that the /cCain 3!end!ent+s ban on
c"uel and inhu!ane t"eat!ent, o" A.S3+s "e=ui"e!ent of a wa""ant, does not !a(e "ealistic sense in the
conte5t of the conte!po"a"' "ealities of the wa" on te""o" in which we face a shadow', "uthless nonstate
ene!' that has no "espect fo" laws o" ci1iliFed conduct, a conclusion hotl' disputed b' those opposed to the )"esident+s policies
Aocusing the debate o1e" whethe" Cong"ess has the powe" to cont"ol the t"eat!ent of detainees on the )"esident+s clai! that the
!ode"n "ealities of wa"fa"e "e=ui"e a pa"ticula" app"oach will !e"ge the sepa"ation of powe"s in=ui"' of who has the powe" with the
political dete"!ination of what the polic' ought to be Such an app"oach is li(el' to encou"age the )"esident
to ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments whene1e" he o" she belie1es that
a statute does not !a(e "ealistic senseUthat is, when it conflicts with a polic' the
)"esident e!b"aces >3
2he conte5tual app"oach has a ,Fone of twilight- =ualit' that 6ustice 6ac(son suggested in Youngstown >C *ften constitutional
no"!s !atte" less than political "ealitiesUwartime reality often favors a strong
President who will overwhelm both Cong"ess and the cou"ts 0hile it is ce"tainl' co""ectU as
6ac(son notedUthat neithe" the Cou"t no" the Constitution will p"ese"1e sepa"ation of powe"s whe"e Cong"ess is too politicall' wea(
to asse"t its autho"it', a fluid conte5tual app"oach is an in1itation to )"esidents to push be'ond the
constitutional bounda"ies of thei" powe"s and ignore legislative enactments that seek to
restrict their wartime authority
/o"eo1e", anothe" substantial p"oble! with a conte5tual app"oach in the wa" powe"s conte5t is that the ?udicia"' is
unli(el' to "esol1e the dispute >> 2he pe"sistent "efusal of the ?udicia"' to ad?udicate the
constitutionalit' of the 0a" )owe"s Resolution st"ongl' suggests that cou"ts will often "efuse to
inte"1ene to "esol1e disputes between the )"esident and Cong"ess o1e" the
constitutionalit' of a statute that a )"esident clai!s i!pe"!issibl' inte"fe"es with he"
conduct of an ongoing wa" >8 2his "esult lea1es the political b"anches to engage in a n
intractable dispute o1e" the statute+s constitutionalit' that saps the nations energy,
diverts focus f"o! the political issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law
3dditionall', in wa"ti!e it is often i!po"tant fo" issues "elating to the e5e"cise of wa" powe"s
to be "esol1ed =uic(l' )"o!pt action is not usuall' the fo"te of the ?udicia"'
.f, howe1e", a constitutional consensus e5ists o" could be consolidated that Cong"ess has the autho"it' to chec( the )"esident+s conduct
of wa"fa"e, that consensus !ight help e!bolden futu"e Cong"esses to asse"t thei" powe" Such a consensus !ight also help p"e1ent the
crisis, chaos, and stalemate that !a' "esult when the two b"anches asse"t co!peting
constitutional positions and , as a p"actical !atte", ?udicial "e1iew is una1ailable to "esol1e the
dispute
/o"eo1e", the adoption of a conte5tual, "ealist app"oach will undermine rather than aid the
cooperation and compromise between the political b"anches that is so essential to
success in wartime .n theo"', an unclea", a!biguous di1ision of powe" between the b"anches that lea1es each b"anch
unce"tain of its legal autho"it' could fu"the" co!p"o!ise and coope"ation 4owe1e", modern social science research
suggests that the opposite occu"s >9 Each side in the dispute is li(el' to g"asp onto aspects o"
facto"s within the a!biguous o" co!ple5 "ealit' to suppo"t its own self%se"1ing position
2his self-serving bias ha"dens each side+s position and allows the dispute to drag on , as
has happened with the ongoing, un"esol1ed dispute o1e" the constitutionalit' of the 0a" )owe"s
Resolution )g C$9%C$&
'talemate creates an antiwar congressional coalition that guts
our commitment to (ghanistan
Lie)er'an 10U.ndependent De!oc"atic senato" f"o! Connecticut :6oseph . Leibe"!an, ,Bac( to a Bipa"tisan Ao"eign
)olic',- 0all St"eet 6ou"nal, No1e!be" 18, #$1$, pg http://tin'u"lco!/!>F8#3w<
2his 'ea"Ds !idte"! elections !a"(ed the fi"st ti!e since &/11 that national secu"it' was not a !a?o" conside"ation fo" 3!e"ican
1ote"s But it is p"ecisel' in the "eal! of fo"eign polic' and national secu"it' that we !a' ha1e the g"eatest
oppo"tunities fo" bipa"tisan cooperation between )"esident *ba!a and "esu"gent Republicans in
Cong"ess
SeiFing these oppo"tunities will "e=ui"e both pa"ties to b"ea( out of a dest"ucti1e c'cle that has ent"apped the! since the end of the
Cold 0a" and caused the! to depa"t f"o! the p"incipled inte"nationalist t"adition that lin(ed De!oc"atic p"esidents li(e 2"u!an and
;enned' with Republican p"esidents li(e Ni5on and Reagan
Du"ing the 1&&$s, too !an' Republicans in Cong"ess "efle5i1el' opposed )"esident ClintonDs policies in the Bal(ans and elsewhe"e
Li(ewise, du"ing the fi"st decade of the #1st centu"', too !an' De!oc"ats ca!e to 1iew the post%&/11 e5e"cise of 3!e"ican powe"
unde" )"esident Bush as a !o"e p"essing dange" than the genuine ene!ies we faced in the wo"ld
2he la"ge" t"uth was that the fo"eign polic' p"actices and ideals of both )"esident Clinton and Bush we"e within the !ainst"ea! of
3!e"ican histo"' and 1alues 3nd if one can see th"ough the fog of pa"tisanship that has continued to cho(e 0ashington since
)"esident *ba!a was elected in #$$B, the sa!e is t"ue of the new ad!inist"ation as well
)"esident *ba!a has !o1ed to the inte"nationalist cente" on se1e"al (e' issues of national secu"it' 3lthough
both pa"ties a"e hesitant to ac(nowledge it, the sto"' of the *ba!a ad!inist"ationDs fo"eign polic' is as !uch
continuit' as change f"o! the second te"! of the Bush ad!inist"ationUf"o! the su"ge in 3fghanistan to the
"eautho"iFation of the )at"iot 3ct, and f"o! d"one st"i(es against al Waeda to a long%te"! co!!it!ent to
."a=
Republicans ha1e also sta'ed lo'al to the inte"nationalist policies the' suppo"ted unde"
)"esident Bush 0hen the' ha1e c"iticiFed the *ba!a ad!inist"ation, it has "eflected this wo"ld1iewUa"guing that the 0hite 4ouse
has not been co!!itted enough in its p"osecution of the wa" in 3fghanistan o" done enough to defend hu!an "ights and de!oc"ac' in
places li(e ."an and China
2he c"itical =uestion now, as we loo( fo"wa"d to the ne5t two 'ea"s, is whethe" this con1e"gence of the
two pa"ties towa"ds the inte"nationalist cente" can be sustained and st"engthened 2he"e
a"e th"ee national secu"it' p"io"ities whe"e such a consensus is urgently needed
2he fi"st is the wa" in 3fghanistan 2o his c"edit, )"esident *ba!a last Dece!be" co!!itted !o"e than
3$,$$$ additional t"oops to 3fghanistan as pa"t of a co!p"ehensi1e counte"insu"genc' ca!paign, despite
opposition within the De!oc"atic )a"t'
4a1ing ?ust "etu"ned f"o! 3fghanistan, . a! inc"easingl' confident that the tide the"e is tu"ning in ou" fa1o", with g"owing signs of
!ilita"' p"og"ess But as Ken Da1id )et"aeus, the top @S co!!ande" in 3fghanistan, has wa"ned, success will co!e neithe" =uic(l'
no" easil', and the"e is still !uch tough fighting ahead .t is all but ce"tain that no !o"e than a s!all nu!be" of @S fo"ces will be able
to withd"aw "esponsibl' in 6ul' #$11, and that success in 3fghanistan is going to "e=ui"e a long-term
commitment b' the @S be'ond this date
Sustaining political suppo"t fo" the wa" in 3fghanistan the"efo"e will inc"easingl' "e=ui"e )"esident
*ba!a and Republicans in Cong"ess to stand togethe" Aailu"e to sustain this bipa"tisan
alliance "uns the "is( that an alternative coalition will fo"! in Cong"ess, between
antiwar &emocrats and isolationist 'epublicans 2hat would be the single greatest
political threat to the success of the wa" effo"t in 3fghanistan, which "e!ains c"itical to
ou" secu"it' at ho!e
(ghanistans uture will be determined by decisions made
during "' withdrawal& ( botched withdrawal destabili+es
Pakistan, uels (ghani reprisal murders and encourages
-ussian adventurism&
Miller 12U)"ofesso" of .nte"national Secu"it' 3ffai"s P Di"ecto" fo" the 3fghanistan%)a(istan p"og"a! X National Defense
@ni1e"sit' :)aul D /ille" IAo"!e" Di"ecto" fo" 3fghanistan on the National Secu"it' Council staff unde" )"esidents Bush and
*ba!aJ, ,.t+s Not 6ust 3l%Waeda: Stabilit' in the /ost Dange"ous Region,- 0o"ld 3ffai"s 6ou"nal, /a"ch%3p"il #$1#, pg
http://tin'u"lco!/lnplsb9<
.n fact, the wa" is onl' now ente"ing its cul!inating phase, indicated b' the willingness of both
@S and 2aliban officials to tal( openl' about negotiations, so!ething pa"ties to a conflict do onl' when
the' see !o"e benefit to stopping a wa" than continuing it 2hat !eans the wars ultimate outcome is likely
to be decided by the decisions, battles, and bargaining of the ne"t year or so 3nd its
outco!e will ha1e huge i!plications fo" the futu"e of @S national secu"it' .n tu"n, that !eans
the collective decision to ignore the war and its conse=uences is foolish at best, dange"ous at wo"st 0hile
3!e"icans ha1e lost inte"est in the wa", the wa" !a' still ha1e an inte"est in 3!e"ica Now is the ti!e, !o"e than ten 'ea"s
into the effo"t, to "e!ind ou"sel1es what is at sta(e in 3fghanistan and wh' the @nited States !ust
secu"e lasting stabilit' in South 3sia
.t was, of cou"se, al%Waeda+s attac( on the @S ho!eland that t"igge"ed the inte"1ention in 3fghanistan, but wa"s, once sta"ted, alwa's
in1ol1e b"oade" conside"ations than those p"esent at the fi"ing of the fi"st shot 2he wa" in 3fghanistan now affects
all of 3!e"ica+s inte"ests ac"oss South 3sia : Pakistans stability and the secu"it' of its
nuclea" weapons, ()*s credibility , relations with +ran and 'ussia , t"ansnational d"ug%
t"affic(ing netwo"(s, and !o"e 3!e"ica lea1es the ?ob in 3fghanistan unfinished at its pe"il
2he cho"us of 1oices in the 0ashington polic' establish!ent calling fo" withd"awal is g"owing loude" .n "esponse to this p"essu"e,
)"esident *ba!a has pledged to withd"aw the su"ge of thi"t' thousand @S t"oops b' Septe!be" #$1#Ufaste" than @S !ilita"'
co!!ande"s ha1e "eco!!endedUand full' t"ansition leade"ship fo" the count"'+s secu"it' to the 3fghans in #$13 2hese decisions
!i""o" the an5ieties of the electo"ate: fift'%si5 pe"cent of 3!e"icans su"1e'ed "ecentl' b' the )ew Resea"ch Cente" said that the @S
should "e!o1e its t"oops as soon as possible
But it is not too late fo" *ba!a Iwho, afte" all, ca!paigned in #$$B on the i!po"tance of
3fghanistan, po"t"a'ing it as ,the good wa"- in co!pa"ison to ."a=J to "efo"!ulate @S st"ateg' and goals in
South 3sia and e5plain to the 3!e"ican people and the wo"ld wh' an ongoing co!!it!ent to
stabiliFing 3fghanistan and the "egion, howe1e" unpopula", is nonetheless necessa"'
2he 3fghanistan Stud' K"oup, a collection of schola"s and fo"!e" polic'!a(e"s c"itical of the cu""ent inte"1ention, a"gued in #$1$
that al%Waeda is no longe" in 3fghanistan and is unli(el' to "etu"n, e1en if 3fghanistan "e1e"ts to chaos o" 2aliban "ule .t a"gued that
th"ee things would ha1e to happen fo" al%Waeda to "eestablish a safe ha1en and th"eaten the @nited States: ,1J the 2aliban !ust seiFe
cont"ol of a substantial po"tion of the count"', #J 3l Waeda !ust "elocate the"e in st"ength, and 3J it !ust build facilities in this new
Vsafe ha1en+ that will allow it to plan and t"ain !o"e effecti1el' than it can toda'- Because all th"ee a"e unli(el' to happen, the Stud'
K"oup a"gued, al%Waeda al!ost ce"tainl' will not "eestablish a p"esence in 3fghanistan in a wa' that th"eatens @S secu"it'
.n fact, none of those th"ee steps a"e necessa"' fo" al-,aeda to "egain its safe ha1en and th"eaten 3!e"ica 2he g"oup could
"etu"n to 3fghanistan e1en if the 2aliban do not ta(e bac( cont"ol of the count"' .t couldUand p"obabl' wouldU
find safe ha1en the"e if 3fghanistan "elapsed into chaos o" ci1il wa" /ilitant g"oups, including al%
Waeda offshoots, ha1e g"a1itated towa"d othe" failed states, li(e So!alia and Ye!en, but 3fghanistan "e!ains
especiall' te!pting, gi1en the netwo"(+s fa!ilia"it' with the te""ain and local
connections No" does al%Waeda, which was ne1e" nu!e"icall' o1e"whel!ing, need to "etu"n to 3fghanistan ,in st"ength- to be
a th"eat 2e""o"ist ope"ations, including the attac(s of #$$1, a"e t'picall' planned and ca""ied out b' 1e"' few people 3l%Waeda+s
"esilience, the"efo"e, !eans that stabiliFing 3fghanistan is, in fact, necessa"' e1en fo" the !ost basic @S wa" ai!s 2he inte"national
co!!unit' should not withd"aw until the"e is an 3fghan go1e"n!ent and 3fghan secu"it' fo"ces with the will and capacit' to den'
safe ha1en without inte"national help
Setting aside the possibilit' of al%Waeda+s "ee!e"gence, the @nited States has othe" i!po"tant inte"ests in the "egion as
wellUnotabl' p"e1enting the 2aliban f"o! gaining enough powe" to destabiliFe neighbo"ing
)a(istan, which, fo" all its "ecent defiance, is officiall' a longstanding 3!e"ican all' I.t signed two !utual defense t"eaties with
the @nited States in the 1&>$s, and )"esident Bush designated it a !a?o" non%N32* all' in #$$CJ -tate failure in
Pakistan b"o(e"ed b' the 2aliban could !ean "egional chaos and a possible loss of control
of its nuclear weapons )"e1enting such a catast"ophe is clea"l' a 1ital national inte"est of the @nited States and cannot be
acco!plished with a few d"ones
3la"!ingl', )a(istan is edging towa"d ci1il wa" 3 collection of !ilitant .sla!ist g"oups, including al%Waeda, 2eh"i(%e 2aliban
)a(istan I22)J, and 2eh"i(%e NafaF%e Sha"iat%e /oha!!adi I2NS/J, a!ong othe"s, a"e fighting an insu"genc' that has escalated
d"a!aticall' since #$$9 ac"oss ;h'be" )a(htun(hwa, the Aede"all' 3d!iniste"ed 2"ibal 3"eas, and Baluchistan 3cco"ding to the
B"oo(ings .nstitution+s )a(istan .nde5, insu"gents, !ilitants, and te""o"ists now "egula"l' launch !o"e than one hund"ed and fift'
attac(s pe" !onth on )a(istani go1e"n!ent, !ilita"', and inf"ast"uctu"e ta"gets .n a so fa" fec(less and ineffectual "esponse, )a(istan
has deplo'ed nea"l' one hund"ed thousand "egula" a"!' soldie"s to its weste"n p"o1inces 3t least th"ee thousand soldie"s ha1e been
(illed in co!bat since #$$9, as !ilitants ha1e been able to seiFe cont"ol of whole towns and dist"icts 2ens of thousands of )a(istani
ci1ilians and !ilitantsUthe distinction between the! in these a"eas is not alwa's clea"Uha1e been (illed in dail' te""o" and
counte"te""o" ope"ations
2he two insu"gencies in 3fghanistan and )a(istan a"e lin(ed Defeating the 3fghan 2aliban
would gi1e the @nited States and )a(istan !o!entu! in the fight against the )a(istani
2aliban 3 2aliban ta(eo1e" in 3fghanistan , on the othe" hand, will gi1e new st"ength to the
)a(istani insu"genc' , which would gain an all' in ;abul, safe ha1en to t"ain and a"! and
f"o! which to launch attac(s into )a(istan, and a huge !o"ale boost in seeing thei" co!pat"iots win
powe" in a neighbo"ing count"' )a(istan+s collapse o" fall to the 2aliban is Iat p"esentJ unli(el', but the i!plications of that scena"io
a"e so di"e that the' cannot be igno"ed E1en sho"t of a collapse, inc"easing chaos and instabilit' in
)a(istan could gi1e co1e" fo" te""o"ists to inc"ease the intensit' and scope of thei" ope"ations, pe"haps e1en to
achie1e the che"ished goal of steal ing a nuclear weapon
3lthough ou" wa" the"e has at ti!es see!ed "e!ote, 3fghanistan itself occupies c"ucial geog"aph' Situated between ."an and
)a(istan, bo"de"ing China, and within "each of Russia and .ndia, it sits on a c"oss"oads of 3sia+s g"eat powe"s 2his is wh' it has,
since the nineteenth centu"', been ho!e to the so%called K"eat Ka!eUin which the @S should continue to be a pla'e"
2wo othe" pla'e"s, Russia and ."an, a"e agg"essi1e powe"s see(ing to establish hege!on' o1e" thei" neighbo"s ."an is see(ing to build
nuclea" weapons, has an elite !ilita"' o"ganiFation Ithe Wuds Ao"ceJ see(ing to e5po"t its .sla!ic Re1olution, and uses the te""o"
g"oup 4eFbollah as a p"o5' to bull' neighbo"ing count"ies and th"eaten .s"ael Russia unde" Lladi!i" )utin is see(ing to "eestablish its
sphe"e of influence o1e" its nea" ab"oad, in pu"suit of which it Ip"obabl'J c'be"%attac(ed Estonia in #$$9, in1aded Keo"gia in #$$B,
and has continued effo"ts to sub1e"t @("aine
."an owned !uch of 3fghan te""ito"' centu"ies ago, and continues to sha"e a si!ila" language, cultu"e, and "eligion with !uch of the
count"' .t !aintains e5tensi1e ties with the 2aliban, 3fghan wa"lo"ds, and opposition politicians who !ight "eplace the co""upt but
0este"n%o"iented ;a"Fai go1e"n!ent Building a stable go1e"n!ent in ;abul will be a s!all step in the la"ge" ca!paign to li!it
2eh"an+s influence
Russia "e!ains hea1il' in1ol1ed in the Cent"al 3sian "epublics .t has wo"(ed to oust the @nited States f"o! the ai" base at /anas,
;'"g'Fstan .t "e!ains inte"ested in the huge ene"g' "ese"1es in ;aFa(hstan and 2u"(!enistan Russia !a' be wa"' of significant
in1ol1e!ent in 3fghanistan p"ope", unwilling to "epeat the So1iet @nion+s epic blunde" the"e But a @S withd"awal f"o!
3fghanistan followed b' ;abul+s collapse would li(el' embolden 'ussia to assert its
influence !o"e agg"essi1el' elsewhe"e in Cent"al 3sia o" Easte"n Eu"ope, especiall' in
the @("aine
3 @S depa"tu"e f"o! 3fghanistan will also continue to "esonate fo" 'ea"s to co!e in the st"ength and pu"pose of N32* E1e"'
3!e"ican p"esident since 4a""' 2"u!an has affi"!ed the cent"alit' of the 3tlantic 3lliance to @S national secu"it' 2he wa" in
3fghanistan unde" the N32*%led .nte"national Secu"it' 3ssistance Ao"ce I.S3AJ, the 3lliance+s fi"st out%of%a"ea ope"ation in its si5t'%
'ea" histo"', was going poo"l' until the @S t"oop su"ge E1en with the li!ited success that followed, allies ha1e co!plained that the
bu"den in 3fghanistan has been dist"ibuted une1enl' So!e, li(e the B"itish, Canadians, and )oles, a"e fighting a shooting wa" in
;andaha" and 4el!and, while othe"s, li(e the Lithuanians and Ke"!ans, a"e doing peace(eeping in Kho" and ;unduF 2he poo"
co!!and and cont"olUsplit between fou" "egional cente"sUleft decision!a(ing slow and poo"l' coo"dinated fo" !uch of the wa"
.S3A+s st"ateg' was onl' cla"ified in #$$B and #$$&, when Kene"als Da1id /c;ie"nan and Stanle' /cCh"'stal finall' de1eloped a
!o"e cohe"ent ca!paign plan with counte"insu"genc'%app"op"iate "ules of engage!ent
3 bad end in 3fghanistan could ha1e dire conse$uences for the tlantic lliance ,
lea1ing the o"ganiFation+s futu"e, and especiall' its credibility as a deterrent to 'ussia,
in $uestion .t would not be i""ational fo" a Russian obse"1e" of the wa" in 3fghanistan to
conclude that if N32* cannot !a(e tough decisions , field effecti1e fighting fo"ces, o"
dist"ibute bu"dens e1enl', it cannot defend .urope 2he @nited States and Eu"ope must
prevent that outcome by salvaging a credible result to its operations in fghanistan
Uone that both pe"suades Russia that N32* is still a fighting alliance and p"ese"1es the
o"ganiFation as a pilla" of @S national secu"it'
Ao" so!e c"itics, o"ganiFing @S g"and st"ateg' a"ound the possible appea"ance of Russian tan(s ac"oss the Aulda Kap is the pe"fect
e5a!ple of gene"als continuing to fight the last wa" Ao" the!, the p"i!a"' th"eat to @S national secu"it' co!es f"o! te""o"ists,
insu"genc', state failu"e, ecological disaste", infectious pande!ic disease, c'be" attac(s, t"ansnational c"i!e, pi"ac', and gangs
But if that 1iew of the wo"ld is "ight, it is all the !o"e "eason to "e!ain engaged in 3fghanistan, because it is the epicente" of the new,
as'!!et"ic, t"ansnational th"eats to the @S and allied national secu"it' E1en those who den' al%Waeda could "egain safe ha1en in
3fghanistan cannot den' how !uch powe", and capacit' fo" da!age, the d"ug lo"ds ha1e ac=ui"ed the"e .n so!e 'ea"s the' ha1e
cont"olled wealth e=ui1alent to fift' pe"cent of 3fghanistan+s KD) and p"oduced in e5cess of ninet' pe"cent of the wo"ld+s he"oin
2oda', thei" p"oducts feed Eu"ope+s ende!ic he"oin p"oble!, and the wealth this t"ade gene"ates has done !uch to unde"!ine nine
'ea"s of wo"( building a new and legiti!ate go1e"n!ent in ;abul .n thei" =uest fo" !a"(et sha"e, the d"ug lo"ds will e5pand whe"e1e"
the"e is de!and fo" thei" p"oduct o" potential to g"ow a secu"e suppl', al!ost ce"tainl' sta"ting in )a(istan, whe"e the t"ade was
cente"ed in the 1&B$s 0he"e the d"ug lo"ds go, state failu"e, along with its acco!pan'ing chaos and as'!!et"ic th"eats, will follow,
as the 1iolence and ana"ch' cu""entl' w"ac(ing pa"ts of /e5ico suggest .!agine the Aede"all' 3d!iniste"ed 2"ibal 3"eas as a failed
na"co%state with the p"ofits funding the "e1i1al of al%Waeda o" its !an' te""o" offshoots
South 3sia+s na"cotics%s!uggling ca"tels a"e dange"ousl' close to seiFing cont"ol of an enti"e state and using it to unde"!ine law,
o"de", and stabilit' ac"oss an enti"e "egion 2he popp' and he"oin (ingpins a"e fabulousl' wealth' and powe"fulQ the' oppose @S
inte"ests, wea(en @S allies, and a"e head=ua"te"ed in 3fghanistan Defeating the! is a 1ital inte"est of the @nited States
2he allied !ission in 3fghanistan also ai!s to encou"age the g"owth of de!oc"ac' So!e c"inge at the 1e"' thought of
de!oc"atiFation being a pa"t of @S fo"eign polic', so disc"edited is the idea, fo" so!e, b' the ."a= 0a", b' the endu"ing co""uption of
the 3fghan go1e"n!ent, and b' neoconse"1ati1es+ supposed naY1etZ and a""ogance in assu!ing that this pa"t of the wo"ld would 'ield
so easil' to de!oc"atic "efo"! But foste"ing de!oc"ac' is still a 1ital 3!e"ican national secu"it' inte"est 4owe1e" daunting the
e5pe"ience of t"'ing to g"ow de!oc"ac' in hostile soil !a' be, it is nonetheless t"ue that genuine de!oc"atic change b"ings stabilit'
De!oc"acies tend to all' and t"ade with each othe"Q the' see the wo"ld in si!ila" wa's, and settle disputes peacefull' Sp"eading
de!oc"ac' dec"eases the f"e=uenc' of wa", c"eates potential allies, widens Fones of stabilit', and as a conse=uence !a(es 3!e"ica
safe" 2his is wh' we da"e not gi1e up on de!oc"ac' p"o!otion in South 3sia
2he p"ocess of t"ansitioning to de!oc"ac' is ha"d, ti!e%consu!ing, and e1en "is('Uit can te!po"a"il' inc"ease the chances of
instabilit' as the e5pe"ience in ."a=, a!ong othe" "ecent e5a!ples, has shown 2he difficulties of de!oc"atiFation a"e pa"ticula"l' well
d"a!atiFed b' e1ents in 3fghanistan, which has held fou" elections in ten 'ea"s that ha1e not !ade the count"' stable o" the
go1e"n!ent honest Continued inefficienc' and co""uption has unde"!ined 3fghans+ confidence in the go1e"n!entUalthough not
thei" belief in the idea of de!oc"ac'Uwith p"edictable "esults on 1ote" tu"nout
2he"e is nothing ine1itable about de!oc"ac'+s success, as neoconse"1ati1es appea"ed to belie1e afte" the fall of the So1iet @nion, the
2aliban, o" the Baathist "egi!e in ."a= But the"e is also nothing ine1itable about its failu"e, as "ealists ha1e a"gued in
the 'ea"s since these e1ents De!oc"acies "e=ui"e longe" ti!e lines than an electo"al c'cle o" deplo'!ent ti!etable, and the' "e=ui"e
secu"it' and institutional capacit', not ?ust elections
3fghanistan will not beco!e a !odel of de!oc"ac' within the fo"eseeable futu"e, than(s to pe"sistent p"oble!s of insecu"it',
co""uption, and po1e"t' But the oppo"tunit' fo" so!e fo"! of "ough de!oc"ac' in 3fghanistan is
"eal )olling consistentl' shows that 3fghans welco!e g"eate" accountabilit' and
"ep"esentation in thei" go1e"n!ent 2hei" !ain co!plaint is not that ;abul is too de!oc"atic, but that it is not
de!oc"atic enough, failing to follow the "ules of de!oc"atic fai" pla' 2hat gi1es the @nited States the oppo"tunit'
to continue to encou"age genuinel' local effo"ts to build a new de!oc"ac' th"ough
capacit' building, technical assistance, and t"aining p"og"a!s Ki1en the choice between planting
de!oc"atic seeds toda' and accepting a t'"ann' i!posed b' a !ino"it', the @nited States should choose the fo"!e" e1e"' ti!e
Ainall', the @nited States should "e!ain in1ol1ed in 3fghanistan to p"e1ent the "ee!e"gence of a hu!anita"ian catast"ophe .f
;abul collapses , ci1il wa" will al!ost ce"tainl' e"upt and , at ba"e !ini!u!, the wa"lo"ds will
"eestablish thei" b"utal fiefdo!s Du"ing 3fghanistan+s ci1il wa"s, f"o! 1&&# to #$$1, wa"lo"ds at the head of
secta"ian !ilitias "egula"l' co!!itted wa" c"i!es, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing, as the 3fghan .ndependent 4u!an Rights Co!!ission, 4u!an Rights 0atch, and the @N ha1e well docu!ented
2he 2aliban a!assed a long "eco"d of !assac"ing ci1ilians and ta"geting the 4aFa"a fo" ethnic cleansing, notabl' at /aFa"%i%Sha"if in
1&&B, Robata( )ass in #$$$, and Ya(awlang in #$$1 But thei" c"i!es we"e not uni=ueQ .ttihad%e%.sla!i, fo" e5a!ple, was accused of
ethnic cleansing against the 4aFa"a du"ing a battle in the 0est ;abul neighbo"hood of 3fsha" in 1&&3 3nd if the 2aliban
ta(e powe" o1e" pa"t o" all of 3fghanistan, reprisal murders against suppo"te"s of the
;a"Fai go1e"n!ent, including pe"haps whole tribes , a"e li(el' to be widesp"ead and swift,
especiall' against women and religious minorities
1NC OLC CP
.e$t/ .he Oice o Legal Counsel should determine that the
0$ecutive 1ranch lacks the legal authority or targeted
killing as a irst resort outside +ones o active hostilities
.he CP is competitive and solves the case)OLC rulings do not
actually remove authority but nevertheless hold binding
precedential value on the e$ecutive&
2"e1o" 0 2orrison, *ctobe" 3414 )"ofesso" of Law, Colu!bia Law School ,S23RE DEC.S.S .N 24E *AA.CE *A
LEK3L C*@NSEL,- Colu!bia Law Re1iew, 11$ Colu! L Re1 1CCB, Le5is
*n the othe" hand, an *LC that sa's H'esH too often is not in the clientDs long%"un
inte"est nC& Li"tuall' all of *LCDs clients ha1e thei" own legal staffs, including the 0hite
4ouse CounselDs *ffice in the 0hite 4ouse and the gene"al counselDs offices in othe"
depa"t!ents and agencies 2hose offices a"e capable of answe"ing !an' of the da'%to%da'
issues that a"ise in those co!ponents 2he' t'picall' tu"n to *LC when the issue is sufficientl'
cont"o1e"sial o" co!ple5 Iespeciall' on constitutional =uestionsJ that so!e e5te"nal
1alidation holds special 1alue n>$ Ao" e5a!ple, when a depa"t!ent conf"onts a difficult o" delicate
constitutional =uestion in the cou"se of p"epa"ing to e!ba"( upon a new p"og"a! o" cou"se of action that "aises difficult o" politicall'
sensiti1e legal =uestions, it has an inte"est in being able to point to a c"edible sou"ce affi"!ing
the :[1C8#< legalit' of its actions n>1 2he in%house legal ad1ice of the agenc'Ds gene"al
counsel is unli(el' to ca""' the sa!e weight n># 2hus, e1en though those offices !ight possess the e5pe"tise
necessa"' to answe" at least !an' of the =uestions the' cu""entl' send to *LC, in so!e conte5ts the' will not ta(e that cou"se because
a H'esH f"o! the in%house legal staff is not as 1aluable as a H'esH f"o! *LC But that 1alue depends on *LC !aintaining its "eputation
fo" se"ious, e1enhanded anal'sis, not !e"e ad1ocac' n>3
2he "is(, howe1e", is that *LCDs clients will not inte"naliFe the long%"un costs of ta5ing *LCDs integ"it' 2his is in pa"t because the full
!easu"e of those costs will be sp"ead ac"oss all of *LCDs clients, not ?ust the client agenc' now befo"e it 2he p"og"a! whose legalit'
the client wants *LC to "e1iew, in cont"ast, is li(el' to be so!ething in which the client has an i!!ediate and palpable sta(e
/o"eo1e", the 1e"' fact that the agenc' has co!e to *LC fo" legal ad1ice will often !ean it thin(s the"e is :[1C83< at least a
plausible a"gu!ent that the p"og"a! is lawful .n that ci"cu!stance, the agenc' is unli(el' to see an' p"oble! in a H'esH f"o! *LC
Still, it would be an o1e"state!ent to sa' that *LC "is(s losing its client base e1e"' ti!e it
conte!plates sa'ing HnoH *ne "eason is custo! .n so!e a"eas, the"e is a longstanding
t"adition % "ising to the le1el of an e5pectation % that ce"tain e5ecuti1e actions o" decisions
will not be ta(en without see(ing *LCDs ad1ice *ne e5a!ple is *LCDs bill co!!ent p"actice, in which it
"e1iews legislation pending in Cong"ess fo" potential constitutional conce"ns .f it finds an' se"ious p"oble!s, it w"ites the! up and
fo"wa"ds the! to the *ffice of /anage!ent and Budget, which co!bines *LCDs co!!ents with othe" officesD polic' "eactions to the
legislation and gene"ates a coo"dinated ad!inist"ation position on the legislation n>C 2hat position is then t'picall' co!!unicated to
Cong"ess, eithe" fo"!all' o" info"!all' 0hile no statute o" "egulation !andates *LCDs pa"t in this p"ocess, it is a deepl' ent"enched,
b"oadl' accepted p"actice 2hus, although so!e within the E5ecuti1e B"anch !ight find it f"ust"ating when *LC "aises constitutional
conce"ns in bills the ad!inist"ation wants to suppo"t as a polic' !atte", and although the p"ecise te"!s in which *LCDs constitutional
conce"ns a"e passed along to Cong"ess a"e not enti"el' in *LCDs cont"ol, the"e is no "ealistic p"ospect that *LC would e1e" be cut out
of the bill co!!ent p"ocess enti"el' Ent"enched p"actice, then, p"o1ides *LC with so!e !easu"e of p"otection f"o! the p"essu"e to
please its clients
But the"e a"e li!its to that p"otection /ost fo"!al *LC opinions do not a"ise out of its bill co!!ent p"actice, which !eans !ost a"e
the p"oduct of a !o"e t"ul' 1olunta"' choice b' the client to see( *LCDs ad1ice 3nd as suggested abo1e, although the E5ecuti1e
B"anch at la"ge has an inte"est in *LCDs c"edibilit' and integ"it', the p"ese"1ation of those 1i"tues gene"all' falls to *LC itself *LCDs
nonlitigating function !a(es this all the !o"e t"ue 0he"eas, fo" e5a!ple, the Solicito" Kene"alDs ai! of p"e1ailing befo"e the Sup"e!e
Cou"t li!its the e5tent to which she can p"ofitabl' pu"sue an e5t"e!e agenda inconsistent with cu""ent doct"ine, *LC faces no such
i!!ediate const"aint 0hethe" *LC hono"s its oft%asse"ted co!!it!ent to legal ad1ice based on its best 1iew of the law depends
la"gel' on its own self%"est"aint
# Ao"!al Re=uests, Binding 3nswe"s, and Lawful 3lte"nati1es % *1e" ti!e, *LC has de1eloped p"actices and
policies that help !aintain its independence and c"edibilit' Ai"st, befo"e it p"o1ides a
w"itten opinion, n>> *LC t'picall' "e=ui"es that the "e=uest be in w"iting f"o! the head o"
gene"al counsel of the "e=uesting agenc' , that the "e=uest be as specific and conc"ete as
possible, and that the agenc' p"o1ide its own w"itten :[1C8C< 1iews on the issue as pa"t of
its "e=uest n>8 2hese "e=ui"e!ents help const"ain the "e=uesting agenc' 3s(ing a high%"an(ing
!e!be" of the agenc' to co!!it the agenc'Ds 1iews to w"iting, and to p"esent legal a"gu!ents in fa1o" of those 1iews, !a(es it !o"e
difficult fo" the agenc' to p"ess e5t"e!e positions
Second, as noted in the .nt"oduction, n>9 *LCDs legal ad1ice is t"eated as binding within the
E5ecuti1e B"anch until withd"awn o" o1e""uled n>B 3s a fo"!al !atte", the bindingness of
the 3tto"ne' Kene"alDs Io", in the !ode"n e"a, *LCDsJ legal ad1ice has long been
unce"tain n>& 2he issue has ne1e" "e=ui"ed fo"!al "esolution, howe1e", because b'
longstanding t"adition the ad1ice is t"eated as binding n8$ *LC p"otects that t"adition
toda' b' gene"all' "efus ing to p"o1ide ad1ice if the"e is an' doubt about whethe" the
"e=uesting entit' will follow it n81 2his gua"ds against Had1ice%shopping b' entities
willing to abide onl' b' ad1ice the' li(e H n8# /o"e b"oadl', it helps ensu"e that *LCDs answe"s !atte" 3n
agenc' displeased with *LCDs ad1ice cannot si!pl' igno"e the ad1ice 2he agenc' !ight :[1C8>< const"ue an' a!biguit' in *LCDs
ad1ice to its li(ing, and in so!e cases !ight e1en as( *LC to "econside" its ad1ice n83 But the settled p"actice of
t"eating *LCDs ad1ice as binding ensu"es it is not si!pl' igno"ed
.n theo"', the 1e"' bindingness of *LCDs opinions c"eates a "is( that agencies will a1oid
going to *LC in the fi"st place, "el'ing eithe" on thei" gene"al counsels o" e1en othe" e5ecuti1e b"anch offices to the
e5tent the' a"e pe"cei1ed as !o"e li(el' to p"o1ide welco!e answe"s 2his is onl' a !odest "is( in p"actice,
howe1e" 3s noted abo1e, legal ad1ice obtained f"o! an office othe" than *LC %
especiall' an agenc'Ds own gene"al counsel % is unli(el' to co!!and the sa!e "espect as
*LC ad1ice n8C .ndeed, because *LC is widel' 1iewed as Hthe e5ecuti1e b"anchDs chief legal
ad1iso" ,H n8> an agenc'Ds decision not to see( *LCDs ad1ice is li(el' to be 1iewed b'
outside obse"1e"s with s(epticis! , especiall' if the in%house ad1ice app"o1es a p"og"a! o" initiati1e of doubtful
legalit'
*LC has also de1eloped ce"tain p"actices to soften the blow of legal ad1ice not to a
clientDs li(ing /ost significantl', afte" concluding that a clientDs p"oposed cou"se of action is unlawful, *LC f"e=uentl'
wo"(s with the client to find a lawful wa' to pu"sue its desi"ed ends n88 3s the *LC Kuidelines put
it, Hwhen *LC concludes that an ad!inist"ation p"oposal is i!pe"!issible, it is app"op"iate fo" *LC to go on to suggest !odifications
that would cu"e the defect, and *LC should stand "ead' to wo"( with the ad!inist"ation to c"aft lawful alte"nati1esH n89 2his is a
c"itical co!ponent of *LCDs wo"(, and distinguishes it sha"pl' f"o! the cou"ts .n addition to
Hp"o1iding a !eans b' which the e5ecuti1e b"anch law'e" can cont"ibute to the abilit' of the popula"l'%elected )"esident and his
ad!inist"ation to achie1e i!po"tant polic' goals,H n8B in !o"e inst"u!ental te"!s the p"actice can also
"educe the "is( of ga!ing b' *LCDs clients 3nd that, in tu"n, helps p"ese"1e the
bindingness of *LCDs opinions n8&
:[1C88< 2o be su"e, *LCDs opinions a"e t"eated as binding onl' to the e5tent the' a"e not displaced b' a highe" autho"it' 3
subse=uent ?udicial decision di"ectl' on point will gene"all' be ta(en to supe"sede *LCDs wo"(, and alwa's if it is f"o! the Sup"e!e
Cou"t *LCDs opinions a"e also sub?ect to H"e1e"salH b' the )"esident o" the 3tto"ne'
Kene"al n9$ Such "e1e"sals a"e "a"e, howe1e" 3s a fo"!al !atte", Dawn 6ohnsen has
a"gued that Hthe )"esident o" atto"ne' gene"al could lawfull' o1e""ide *LC onl' pu"suant
to a good faith dete"!ination that *LC e""ed in its legal anal'sis 2he )"esident would
1iolate his constitutional obligation if he we"e to "e?ect *LCDs ad1ice solel' on polic'
g"oundsH n91 Solel' is a (e' wo"d he"e, especiall' fo" the )"esident 3lthough his oath of office obliges hi! to uphold the
Constitution, n9# it is not ob1ious he would 1iolate that oath b' pu"suing policies that he thin(s a"e plausibl' constitutional e1en if he
has not concluded the' fit his best 1iew of the law .t is not clea", in othe" wo"ds, that the )"esidentDs oath co!!its hi! to see(ing and
adhe"ing to a single best 1iew of the law, as opposed to an' "easonable o" plausible 1iew held in good faith Yet e1en assu!ing the
)"esident has so!e space he"e, it is ha"d to see how his oath pe"!its hi! to "e?ect *LCDs ad1ice solel' on polic' g"ounds if he
concludes that doing so is indefensible as a legal !atte" n93 So the )"esident needs at least a plausible legal
basis fo" :[1C89< disag"eeing with *LCDs ad1ice, which itself would li(el' "e=ui"e so!e
othe" sou"ce of legal ad1ice fo" hi! to "el' upon
2he 0hite 4ouse CounselDs *ffice !ight see! li(e an ob1ious candidate But despite
"ecent speculation that the siFe of that office du"ing the *ba!a 3d!inist"ation !ight
"eflect an intention to use it in this fashion, n9C it continues to be 1i"tuall' unhea"d of fo"
the 0hite 4ouse to "e1e"se *LCDs legal anal'sis Ao" one thing, e1en a deepl' staffed 0hite
4ouse CounselDs *ffice t'picall' does not ha1e the ti!e to pe"fo"! the (ind of "esea"ch
and anal'sis necessa"' to p"oduce a c"edible basis fo" "e1e"sing an *LC opinion n9> Ao"
anothe", as with atte!pts to "el' in the fi"st place on in%house ad1ice in lieu of *LC, an'
"e1e"sal of *LC b' the 0hite 4ouse Counsel is li(el' to be 1iewed with g"eat s(epticis!
b' outside obse"1e"s .f, fo" e5a!ple, a cong"essional co!!ittee de!ands to (now wh' the E5ecuti1e B"anch thin(s a
pa"ticula" p"og"a! is lawful, a "esponse that "elies on the conclusions of the 0hite 4ouse Counsel is unli(el' to suffice if the
co!!ittee (nows that *LC had ea"lie" concluded othe"wise Rightl' o" w"ongl', the 0hite 4ouse CounselDs anal'sis is li(el' to be
t"eated as an e5e"cise of political will, not dispassionate legal anal'sis )ut anothe" wa', the sa!e "easons that lead the
0hite 4ouse to see( *LCDs legal ad1ice in the fi"st place % its "eputation
fo" :[1C8B< p"o1iding candid , independent legal ad1ice based on its best 1iew of the law %
!a(e an out"ight "e1e"sal highl' unli(el' n98
*f cou"se, the 0hite 4ouse CounselDs *ffice !a' well be in f"e=uent contact with *LC on an issue *LC has been as(ed to anal'Fe,
and in !an' cases is li(el' to !a(e it abundantl' clea" what outco!e the 0hite 4ouse p"efe"s n99 But that is a !atte" of p"esenting
a"gu!ents to *LC in suppo"t of a pa"ticula" position, not disca"ding *LCDs conclusion when it co!es out the othe" wa' n9B2he
0hite 4ouse is not ?ust an' othe" client, and so the natu"e of % and "is(s posed b' % co!!unications between it and *LC on issues
*LC is anal'Fing dese"1e special attention . ta(e that up in )a"t ... n9& /' point at this stage is si!pl' that the p"ospect of
lite"al "e1e"sal b' the 0hite 4ouse is "e!ote and does not !eaningfull' th"eaten the
effecti1e bindingness of *LCDs decisions
2andatory publishing re5uirements prevent OLC deerral to
presidential pressure)can be sel%imposed)avoids 'OP
concerns with congressional intererence&
Ross L *einer, Aeb"ua"' 3446 6D /a' #$$& X Keo"ge 0ashington @ni1e"sit' Law School ,24E *AA.CE *A LEK3L
C*@NSEL 3ND 2*R2@RE: 24E L30 3S B*24 3 S0*RD 3ND S4.ELD,- 24E KE*RKE 03S4.NK2*N L30 REL.E0,
99 Keo 0ash L Re1 >#C, Le5is
2he 2o"tu"e /e!o e5posed se"ious deficiencies in how the *LC ope"ates Ao" two 'ea"s,
inte""ogato"s we"e gi1en e""oneous legal ad1ice "ega"ding to"tu"e, with two ad1e"se "esults Ai"st, 3!e"ican inte""ogato"s beha1ed in
wa's cont"a"' to t"aditional 3!e"ican 1alues, possibl' leading in pa"t to the 3bu Kh"aib scandal n1C9 and to a decline in 3!e"ican
"eputation a"ound the globe n1CB Second, agents on the :[>C&< f"ontlines we"e gi1en ad1ice that, if followed, !ight be the basis fo"
p"osecution one da' n1C& /o"e i!po"tantl', when the 2o"tu"e /e!o was lea(ed to the public, it
e5posed the *LC to cha"ges of acting as an enable" to the e5ecuti1e b"anch 6ohn Yoo, the
autho" of the 2o"tu"e /e!o, was (nown as HD" YesH fo" his abilit' to autho" !e!os asse"ting e5actl' what the Bush 3d!inist"ation
wanted to hea" n1>$ 2o ensu"e that this situation does not "epeat itself in the futu"e, it is c"itical
fo" changes to be i!ple!ented at the *LC b' !andating publication and inc"easing
o1e"sight
3 /andated )ublishing
*ne e5planation fo" the 2o"tu"e /e!o and its e""oneous legal a"gu!ents was the *LC
autho"sD belief that the /e!o would "e!ain sec"et fo"e1e" 0hen he wo"(ed in the *LC,
4a"old ;oh was often told that we should act as if e1e"' opinion !ight be :sic< so!e da'
be on the f"ont page of the New Yo"( 2i!es 3l!ost as soon as the :2o"tu"e /e!o< !ade it to the f"ont page of
the New Yo"( 2i!es, the 3d!inist"ation "epudiated it, de!onst"ating how ob1iousl' w"ong the opinion was n1>1
Au"the"!o"e, 6a!es B Co!e', a Deput' 3tto"ne' Kene"al in the *LC, told colleagues upon his depa"tu"e f"o! the *LC that the'
would all be Hasha!edH when the wo"ld e1entuall' found out about othe" opinions that a"e still classified toda' on enhanced
inte""ogation techni=ues n1># 2his suggests that *LC law'e"s, ope"ating in "elati1e obscu"it', felt
so!ewhat p"otected b' the gene"al 1eil of sec"ec' su""ounding thei" opinions
:[>>$< Ao" !an' opinions, so!e of which a"e al"ead' published on the *LCDs 0eb site, n1>3 this will not be a cont"o1e"sial
p"oposition )ublication has th"ee ad1antages : I1J accessibilit' Q I#J letting people see the
factual p"edicate on which an opinion is basedQ and I3J eli!inating peopleDs abilit' to
st"ip an *LC opinion of nuance in fa1o" of sa'ing H*LC sa's we can do itH n1>C ;oh p"o1ides
a telling illust"ation of the p"oble!s associated with the absence of !andated publishing as he found an *LC opinion placed in the
2e""ito"ial Sea 6ou"nal that was c"itical to a case he was t"'ing on behalf of a g"oup of 4aitians see(ing to ente" the @nited
States n1>> 4e was inc"edulous that on a !atte" Hof such conse=uence,H n1>8 he lite"all' had to be luc(' to find the opinion n1>9
Sec"ec' in go1e"n!ent facilitates abuse, and nowhe"e is the need fo" t"anspa"enc' !o"e
i!po"tant than the *LC, whose opinions a"e binding on the enti"e e5ecuti1e b"anch .n a
telling e5a!ple, on 3p"il #, #$$B, the Bush 3d!inist"ation declassified a second 2o"tu"e /e!o n1>B .n eight'%one pages, 6ohn Yoo
p"esented legal a"gu!ents that effecti1el' allowed !ilita"' inte""ogato"s ca"te blanche to abuse p"isone"s without an' fea" of
p"osecution n1>& 0hile the /e!o was classified at the Hsec"etH le1el, it is clea" that the"e was no st"ategic "ationale fo" classif'ing it
be'ond a1oiding public sc"utin' n18$ 3cco"ding :[>>1< to 6 0illia! Leona"d, the nationDs top classification o1e"sight official f"o!
#$$#%#$$9, H2he"e is no info"!ation contained in this docu!ent which gi1es an ad1antage to the ene!' 2he onl' possible "ationale
fo" !a(ing it sec"et was to (eep it f"o! the 3!e"ican peopleH n181
2o add"ess this p"oble!, the *LC should be "e=ui"ed to publish all of its opinions , with a
few li!ited e5ceptions 6ohn A ;enned' once said, H2he 1e"' wo"d Dsec"ec'D is "epugnant in a f"ee and open
societ'H n18# 6ustice )otte" Stewa"t, in New Yo"( 2i!es Co 1 @nited States, n183 laid out the inhe"ent dange"s of sec"ec' in the
"eal! of fo"eign affai"s:
. should suppose that !o"al, political, and p"actical conside"ations would dictate that a 1e"' fi"st p"inciple of that wisdo! would be an
insistence upon a1oiding sec"ec' fo" its own sa(e Ao" when e1e"'thing is classified, then nothing is classified, and the s'ste!
beco!es one to be dis"ega"ded b' the c'nical o" the ca"eless, and to be !anipulated b' those intent on self%p"otection o" self%
p"o!otion . should suppose, in sho"t, that the hall!a"( of a t"ul' effecti1e inte"nal secu"it' s'ste! would be the !a5i!u! possible
disclosu"e, "ecogniFing that sec"ec' can best be p"ese"1ed onl' when c"edibilit' is t"ul' !aintained n18C
2he p"oposal to "e=ui"e the *LC to publish its opinions has been ad1ocated b' !an',
including fo"!e" heads of the *LC n18> :[>>#<
1 )"ocess fo" Classification
.n ce"tain situations, an opinion !a' ha1e to "e!ain confidential fo" national secu"it'
pu"poses , but !echanis!s can be designed to deal with this scena"io Ai"st, in o"de" to
dee! a !e!o"andu! classified as a !atte" of national secu"it', anothe" agenc' in the
e5ecuti1e b"anch with e5pe"tise on the sub?ect should be "e=ui"ed to sign off on such a
classification 2he 2o"tu"e /e!o e5posed an instance of the *LC acting sec"eti1el' not onl' fo" national secu"it' pu"poses, but
also because it (new the 2o"tu"e /e!o could not withstand sc"utin' n188 2hus, onl' opinions dealing with
ope"ational !atte"s that gi1e aide to the ene!' should be classified *pinions that consist
solel' of legal "easoning on =uestions of law clea"l' would not pass that test
.f the"e is a disag"ee!ent between those in the *LC who choose to classif' so!ething and those in the othe" e5ecuti1e agenc' who
belie1e it should be published, then the decision should be sent bac( to the *LC to "e1iew the potential fo" publishing a "edacted
1e"sion of the opinion Ao" e5a!ple, conside" a !e!o f"o! the *LC on the diffe"ent inte""ogation techni=ues allowable unde" the
law 0hile it would be ha"!ful fo" the *LC to publish specific acti1ities, and thus ale"t the count"'Ds ene!ies as to inte""ogation
tactics, publishing the legal anal'sis that gi1es the )"esident this autho"it' would not be ha"!ful )ublishing would "esto"e legiti!ac'
to the wo"( the *LC is doing and help "e!o1e the taint the 2o"tu"e /e!o has left on the office
# E5ceptions
2he"e a"e a few necessa"' e5ceptions to a "ule "e=ui"ing publication, and the fo"!e" *LC
atto"ne's who w"ote a se"ies of guidelines fo" the *LC a"e clea" on the!:
*"dina"il', *LC should hono" a "e=uesto"Ds desi"e to (eep confidential an' *LC ad1ice
that the p"oposed e5ecuti1e action would be unlawful, whe"e the "e=uesto" then does not
ta(e the action Ao" *LC "outinel' to "elease the details of all conte!plated action of
dubious legalit' !ight dete" e5ecuti1e b"anch acto"s f"o! see(ing *LC ad1ice at
sufficientl' ea"l' stages in polic' fo"!ation n189
:[>>3< 2his "easoning ste!s di"ectl' f"o! the atto"ne'%client p"i1ilege and the need fo"
cando" in go1e"n!ent .t is i!pe"ati1e that the e5ecuti1e b"anch see( info"!ation on potential action that !a' o" !a' not
be legal Io" constitutionalJ, and this t'pe of in=ui"' should not be discou"aged 2his e5ception is onl' to be applied
when the )"esident does not go ahead with the polic' in =uestion .f the *LC we"e to opine that
so!ething is illegal o" unconstitutional, and the )"esident we"e to dis"ega"d that ad1ice and p"oceed with the action an'wa', this t'pe
of opinion should be !ade public n18B
.f the *LC tells a )"esident he can igno"e a statute, and the )"esident follows that ad1ice, that opinion should be a1ailable to the
public *ne of the foundations of 3!e"ican go1e"nance is that nobod' is abo1e the lawQ ad1ice that a statute should not be enfo"ced
cont"adicts this !a5i! 2he 2o"tu"e /e!o asse"ted that 1iolations of @S law would p"obabl' be e5cused b' ce"tain defenses,
including necessit' and self%defense n18& 3dditionall', the 2o"tu"e /e!o a"gued that HCong"ess can no !o"e inte"fe"e with the
)"esidentDs conduct of the inte""ogation of ene!' co!batants than it can dictate st"ategic o" tactical decisions on the
battlefieldH n19$ 2he *LC thus told the )"esident that he does not ha1e to enfo"ce an' cong"essional statutes that inf"inge on his
Co!!ande" in Chief powe" Ao" both the pu"poses of good go1e"n!ent and accountabilit', this t'pe of clai! should be !ade in
public, "athe" than in sec"et, so 3!e"icans (now how the )"esident is inte"p"eting the laws
3 *1e"sight of Sec"et *pinions
.nc"eased o1e"sight at the *LC is !ost i!po"tant fo" opinions that a"e classified as sec"et
pu"suant to the abo1e p"ocedu"es, and a"e unli(el' to e1e" be hea"d in a cou"t of law 3cco"ding to fo"!e" *LC
atto"ne's:
2he absence of a litigation th"eat signals special need fo" 1igilance: .n ci"cu!stances in which ?udicial o1e"sight of e5ecuti1e b"anch
action is unli(el', the )"esident % and b' e5tension :[>>C< *LC % has a special obligation to ensu"e co!pliance with the law,
including "espect fo" the "ights of affected indi1iduals and the constitutional allocation of powe"s n191
4ow can o1e"sight be ensu"edR
Ai"st, !e!os that a"e both sec"et and unli(el' to be hea"d in cou"t !ust be "e1iewed b'
othe"s with an e5pe"tise in the field .n #$$#, the"e we"e two !a?o" issues with the *LC:
fi"st, al!ost nobod' outside a g"oup of fi1e atto"ne's was allowed to "ead the sec"et
opinions, n19# and second, the"e was a lac( of e5pe"tise in the office on !atte"s of national
secu"it' n193 3s Kolds!ith late" confessed, H. e1entuall' ca!e to belie1e that :the i!!ense sec"ec' su""ounding these
!e!o"anda< was done :not fo" confidentialit', but< to cont"ol outco!es in the opinions and !ini!iFe "esistance to the!Hn19C
Ao" opinions that a"e classified as sec"et, at least one othe" legal depa"t!ent in the fede"al
go1e"n!ent, with a si!ila" le1el of e5pe"tise, should be as(ed to "e1iew a sec"et opinion
in o"de" to ta(e a :[>>>< substanti1e loo( at the legal wo"( in =uestion 3cco"ding to 6ac(
Kolds!ith, this p"ocess was t"aditionall' how things wo"(edQ n19> when the Bush
3d!inist"ation sta"ted Hpushing the en1elope,H n198 howe1e", nea"l' all outside opinion
was shut out unde" the guise of p"e1enting lea(s n199 .t is now appa"ent that the conce"n ste!!ed !o"e f"o!
a fea" of ob?ections than f"o! the national secu"it' conce"n of a lea( n19B Based on the declassification of the 2o"tu"e /e!o, along
with the subse=uent declassification of anothe" !e!o on to"tu"e, n19& the"e was no national secu"it' pu"pose fo" (eeping the !e!os
sec"et
2he "eason an outside "e1iew of !e!os labeled as classified is i!po"tant is that in ti!es of c"isis, p"ope" o1e"sight !echanis!s need
to be in place .t is in ti!es of e!e"genc' when the count"' is !ost 1ulne"able to decisions that it !ight late" "eg"et n1B$ Based on the
legal "easoning e5posed in both the 2o"tu"e /e!o and the "eleased Yoo opinion f"o! /a"ch #$$3, it is "easonable to su"!ise that
othe" opinions w"itten in the afte"!ath of Septe!be" 11 a"e si!ila"l' flawed n1B1 Cu""entl', the"e a"e a nu!be" of classified
!e!o"anda that ha1e been "efe"enced in declassified *LC opinions, but ha1e ne1e" been declassified the!sel1es n1B# 0hat these
!e!o"anda asse"t, and whethe" )"esident Bush decided to follow the!, a"e cu""entl' un(nown .n a "ecentl' declassified opinion,
howe1e", the"e is a footnote indicating that the Aou"th 3!end!entDs p"otection against un"easonable sea"ches and seiFu"es is not
applicable to do!estic !ilita"' ope"ations "elated to the wa" on te""o"n1B3 Because this would be a no1el asse"tion :[>>8< of
autho"it', the 3!e"ican public should be able to e1aluate the !e"its of such a legal a"gu!ent
Diffe"ent agencies of go1e"n!ent ha1e pe"sonnel with diffe"ent e5pe"tise, so it will be incu!bent upon those in the *LC to dete"!ine
which depa"t!ent, and which indi1idual in the depa"t!ent, has the "e=ui"ed secu"it' clea"ance and (nowledge to "e1iew an opinion
2hus, when an opinion has been dee!ed classified, befo"e it can be fo"wa"ded outside of the *LC, it would ha1e to go to anothe"
agenc' fo" app"o1al
2he =uestion that the "e1iewe" should ha1e to answe" is whethe" the wo"( he o" she is anal'Fing is an Haccu"ate and honest app"aisal
of applicable lawH n1BC .f it is, then the"e is no p"oble! with the opinion, and the second agenc' will sign off on it .f it is not, then
the "e1iewe" should p"epa"e a !ino"it' "epo"t 0hat is !ost c"itical is that both the 3tto"ne' Kene"al and the )"esident % who !ight
not be an atto"ne' % unde"stand e5actl' what thei" law'e"s a"e sa'ing Ao" a cont"o1e"sial decision, it should not be sufficient fo"
so!eone in the *LC li(e 6ohn Yoo to w"ite an inaccu"ate legal !e!o that asse"ts one thing, while the law and p"ecedent sa' anothe",
with the e1entual decision!a(e" % the )"esident % onl' 1iewing the flawed opinion 2he !ino"it' "epo"t will se"1e two pu"poses: fi"st,
it will encou"age law'e"s to a1oid d"essing up a shodd' opinion in HlegaleseH to !a(e it loo( legiti!ate when in "ealit' it is notQ and
second, it will ensu"e that the opinion t"ul' is a full and fai" accounting of the law
2he !ost i!po"tant b'%p"oduct f"o! !andated "e1iew of sec"et opinions will be that
law'e"s in the *LC will no longe" be able to hide behind a wall of total
confidentialit' n1B> Rathe" than acting as if the *LC is abo1e the law and answe"able to
no one, the (nowledge that e1e"' classified opinion will be "e1iewed b' so!eone with an
e5pe"tise in the field should gi1e pause to an' *LC atto"ne' who lac(s independence and
se"1es as a 'es%!an fo" the )"esident
:[>>9<
B /echanis!s fo" .!ple!enting Changes
1 Self%.!posed b' E5ecuti1e
2he easiest wa' to i!ple!ent such a change in *LC "e=ui"e!ents would be fo" the
)"esident to i!pose the! on the *LC 2he *LCDs autho"it' ste!s f"o! the 3tto"ne'
Kene"al, who has delegated so!e of his powe" to the *LC n1B8 2he 3tto"ne' Kene"al is in
the e5ecuti1e b"anch, which !eans that the )"esident has the autho"it' to o"de" these
changes
.t is unli(el' that the e5ecuti1e b"anch would self%i!pose const"aints on the *LC, because E5ecuti1es f"o! both pa"ties ha1e
histo"icall' e5hibited a st"ong desi"e to p"otect the le1e"s of powe" n1B9*ne of the "easons law'e"s at the *LC we"e able to w"ite
docu!ents li(e the 2o"tu"e /e!o without an'one ob?ecting was because the "esults we"e in line with what the Bush 3d!inist"ation
wanted to hea" n1BB 2hus, it was unli(el' that the Bush 3d!inist"ation would !a(e an' changes du"ing its final 'ea" in office, and as
it tu"ned out, the Bush 3d!inist"ation ended on 6anua"' #$, #$$&, without !a(ing an' changes
Ne1e"theless, in light of the *)RDs publicl' announced in1estigation of the *LCDs
conduct, n1B& and the "elease of anothe" 6ohn Yoo !e!o"andu! on to"tu"e, n1&$ the lac( of
o1e"sight at the *LC could co!e to the fo"ef"ont of the publicDs attention n1&1 2hus, it is
possible that th"ough public p"essu"e, )"esident Bush could be pe"suaded to !andate
these changes hi!self n1&#
# Cong"essional /andate
3lte"nati1el', Cong"ess could step into the 1oid and legislate 3n' potential
cong"essional inte"fe"ence, howe1e", would be f"aught with sepa"ation of powe"s
conce"ns, which would ha1e to be dealt with di"ectl' Ai"st, the )"esident is entitled to ad1ice f"o! his ad1iso"s n1&3 Second, a
g"eat deal of defe"ence is owed to the )"esident when he is ope"ating in the field of
fo"eign affai"s n1&C 3n' atte!pt b' Cong"ess to li!it eithe" of these two powe"s will !ost
li(el' be !et with "esistance n1&>
'olvency
.heir restriction is a smokescreen and will not be enorced
N+eli)e ,U)"ofesso" of Law X No"thweste"n @ni1e"sit' :6ide NFelibe, ,3"e Cong"essionall' 3utho"iFed 0a"s )e"1e"seR-
Stanfo"d Law Re1iew, Lol >&, #$$9<
2hese assu!ptions a"e all =uestionable 3s a p"eli!ina"' !atte", the"e is no t !uch causal evidence that suppo"ts
the institutional const"aints logic 3s 1a"ious co!!entato"s ha1e noted, Cong"essDs ba"( with "espect
to wa" powe"s is often !uch g"eate" than its bite Significantl', s(eptics li(e Ba"ba"a 4inc(le' suggest that an'
notion of an acti1ist Cong"ess in wa" powe"s is a !'th and !e!be"s of Cong"ess will
often use the smokescreen of Hs'!bolic "esolutions , inc"ease in "oll calls and length' hea"ings, :and<
addition of "epo"ting "e=ui"e!entsH to c"eate the illusion of congressional participation in fo"eign polic'D
$ .ndeed, e1en those co!!entato"s who suppo"t a !o"e agg"essi1e "ole fo" Cong"ess in initiating
conflicts ac(nowledge this p"oble!,H but suggest that it could be fi5ed b' ha1ing Cong"ess enact !o"e specific
legislation about conflict ob?ecti1es and i!ple!ent new tools fo" !onito"ing e5ecuti1e beha1io" du"ing wa"ti!e 1#
Yet, e1en if Cong"ess we"e e=uipped with bette" institutional tools to const"ain and !onito"
the )"esidentDs !ilita"' initiati1es, it is not clea" that it would significantly alter the current
war powers landscape 3s 4o"n and Shepsle ha1e a"gued elsewhe"e: H:N<eithe" specificit' in
enabling legislation no" pa"ticipation b' inte"ested pa"ties is necessa"il' opti!al o" self%
fulfillingQ the"efo"e, they do not ensure agent compliance @lti!atel', the"e !ust be so!e
enfo"ce!ent featu"e %a c"edible co!!it!ent to punish 2hus, no !atte" how !uch well%intentioned
and specific legislation Cong"ess passes to inc"ease cong"essional o1e"sight of the )"esidentDs !ilita"' initiati1es,
it will come to naught if !e!be"s of Cong"ess lac( institutional incenti1es to !onito"
and const"ain the )"esident Ds beha1io" in an inte"national c"isis
La"ious cong"essional obse"1e"s ha1e highlighted electoral disincentives that !e!be"s of
Cong"ess !ight face in const"aining the )"esident Ds !ilita"' initiati1es 1C *the"s ha1e
point ed to !o"e institutional obstacles to cong"essional asse"ti1eness in fo"eign "elations, such as collective action
problems 1> Kene"all', law!a(ing is a de!anding and g"ueling e5e"cise .f one assu!es that !e!be"s of Cong"ess
a"e often obsessed with the p"ospect of "eelection , 18 then such !e!be"s will tend to focus
their scarce resources on district-level concerns and hesitate to second%guess the
)"esidentDs "esponse in an inte"national c"isis 19 E1en if !e!be"s of Cong"ess could !a"shal
the "esou"ces to challenge the )"esidentDs agenda on national issues, the pa'off in electo"al te"!s
!ight be t"i1ial o" non%e5istent .ndeed, in the case of the )"esidentDs !ilita"' initiati1es
whe"e the median voter is likely to defer to the e"ecutive b"anchDs ?udg!ent, the electo"al
pa'off fo" !e!be"s of Cong"ess of const"aining such initiati1es !ight actuall' be
negati1e .n othe" wo"ds, "ega"dless of how e5plicit the g"ant of a constitutional "ole to
Cong"ess in fo"eign affai"s !ight be, few !e!be"s of Cong"ess a"e willing to !a(e the
pe"sonal sac"ifice fo" the g"eate" institutional goal 2hus, unless a g"and "efo"!e" is able to
twea( the s'ste! and !a(e cong"essional asse"ti1eness an electo"all' palatable option in wa"
powe"s, calls fo" g"eate" cong"essional pa"ticipation in wa" powe"s a"e li(el' to fall on
deaf ears )g &1#%&13
President will not abide& Congress will inevitably all in line
Bell -U)"ofesso" of )olitical Science X Randolph%/acon College :Lau"en Cohen Bell, ,Aollowing the Leade"s o" Leading the
Aollowe"sR 2he @S )"esidentDs Relations with Cong"ess,- 6ou"nal of Legislati1e Studies, Su!!e"/3utu!n, #$$C, Lol 1$ .ssue #/3,
pg 1&3%#$><
3s noted aho1e 3"ticle . of the Constitution g"ants to the Cong"ess the sole autho"it' to !a(e decla"ations of wa" 4owe1e", the
p"esident has the powe" to co!!and @S !ilita"' pe"sonnel based on the p"o1isions of
rticle ++ *1e" the cou"se of @S histo"', the c o!!ande"% in% c hief powe" has been inte"p"eted to
pe"!it p"esidents to co!!it t"oops to a"eas of conflict e1en in the absence of a formal
declaration of war 2oda', fo"!al decla"ations of wa" a"e the e5ception "athe" than the "uleQ
sepa"ation of powe"s e5pe"t Louis Aishe" notes that th"ough 1&&1 onl' fi1e wa"s had e1e"
been decla"ed and that Hin onl' one Ithe 0a" of 1B1#J did !e!be"s of Cong"ess actuall' debate the !e"its of ente"ing into
hostilitiesDD\ 3s Sa!uel ;e!ell and Ka"' 6acohson note: H:S6ince 1&B& @S a"!ed fo"ces ha1e been al!ost continuousl' engaged
so!ewhe"e in the wo"ldDD\
2his was not alwa's the case Aishe" points out that the"e is e1idence of p"esidential "est"aint with "ega"d to wa"%!a(ing b' "elating
the sto"' of )"esident K"o1e" Cle1eland I1BB>%B&Q 1B&3%&9J, who "efused to !obilise t"oops fo" a conflict with Cuba despite Cong"essD
intention to decla"e wa" .n Aishe"Ds account, Cle1eland told the Cong"ess: D. will not !obiliFe the a"!' . happen to (now that we
can bu' the island of Cuba f"o! Spain fo" 71$$,$$$,$$$, and a wa" will cost 1astl' !o"e than that and will entail anothe" long list of
pensione"s .t would be an out"age to decla"e wa"DD\ Yet, in the !ode! histo"' of p"esidential%cong"essional
"elations, it is !uch !o"e f"e=uentl' the p"esident who has !obilised 3!e"ican t"oops
without consultation with the Cong"ess and in the absence of a fo"!al decla"ation of wa" 3nd it is clea" that e1en
when we conside" Cle1elandDs actions, the p"esident has been fa" !o"e i!po"tant to the conduct of 3!e"ican fo"eign polic' than the
Cong"ess
2his ci"cu!stance led, in the afte"!ath of the wa" in Lietna!, to cong"essional passage of the 0a" )owe"s Resolution in 1&93 2he
0a" )owe"s Resolution I0)RJ was an atte!pt to const"ain p"esidential disc"etion with "ega"d to co!!itting t"oops o1e"sees Section
3 of the 0)R "e=ui"es that D2he p"esident in e1e"' possible instance shall consult with Cong"ess befo"e int"oducing @nited States
3"!ed Ao"ces into hostilities o" into situations whe"e i!!inent in1ol1e!ent in hostilities is clea"l' indicated b' the ci"cu!stancesHD
Section C of the 0)R gi1es the p"esident CB hou"s to p"o1ide a "epo"t to both Cha!be"s of the Cong"ess detailing the "eason fo"
co!!itting t"oops, the autho"it' unde" which he co!!itted the! and his p"ediction conce!ing the du"ation of the t"oopsD engage!ent
ab"oadD\ *nce the p"esident has info"!ed the Cong"ess of the co!!it!ent of t"oops, and in the e1ent that the Cong"ess does not
decla"e wa", the 0)R "e=ui"es the p"esident to end the engage!ent within 8$ da's, with the possibilit' of an additional 3$ da'sD
co!!it!ent in the e1ent that the p"esident ce"tifies to the Cong"ess that the additional ti!e is necessa"'\[[ 3cco"ding to the
Cong"essional Resea"ch Se"1ice ICRSJ, the "esea"ch b"anch of the Lib"a"' of Cong"ess, since the 0a" )owe"s Resolution was enacted
o1e" )"esident Richa"d / Ni5onDs 1&93 1eto, it has been in1o(ed on 1$9 occasions Ito #3 6ul' #$$3J\D Aigu"e # illust"ates both the
absolute nu!be" of ti!es as well as the "ate of each p"esidentDs e5e"cise of wa" powe"s 3s Aigu"e # de!onst"ates, the "ate of 0a"
)owe"s Resolution uses has continuall' inc"eased since it too( effect in 1&9C
3 "eading of the 0)R would see! to cla"if' the "elationship between Cong"ess and the p"esident with "ega"d to the e5e"cise of
national wa" powe"s 3 close "eading would also suggest that the p"esident and Cong"ess sha"e wa"%!a(ing powe" Yet no
p"esident has e1e" "ecognised the 0)R as a const"aint on his abilit' to !o1e 3!e"ican
a"!ed fo"ces a"ound the globe o" (eep the! in place as long as necessa"' /o"eo1e",
presidents rarely abide by the provisions of the Resolution that "e=ui"e thei" consult ation
with the Cong"ess 3s CRS "esea"che" Richa"d A K"i!!ett notes, Dthe"e has been 1e"' little consultation
with Cong"ess unde" the Resolution when consultation is defined to !ean see(ing ad1ice p"io" to
a decision to int"oduce t"oopsD\H 3nd while the Cong"ess has, f"o! ti!e to ti!e,
e5p"essed its sense that t"oops should be withd"awn f"o! conflicts o" engage!ents
ab"oad, in t"uth the Cong"ess has "elati1el' few options for dealing with a president that
1iolates the 0)R .ndeed, as the late p"esidenc' schola" 3a"on 0ilda1s(' notes, the Cong"ess is !uch
less li(el' to challenge p"esidentsH fo"eign polic' actions than it is willing to challenge
p"esidentsH do!estic polic' actionsD\D\ 2his is because p"esidents o1e"see an eno"!ous
national secu"it' appa"atus and because the constituents "ep"esented b' !e!be"s of
Cong"ess "a"el' hold st"ong opinions on !atte"s of fo"eign polic' 3s a "esult,
cong"essional challenges to 1iolations of the 0)R consist !ostl' of holding o1e"sight
hea"ings and passing s'!bolic "esolutions DD[ /o"eo1e", once t"oops a"e co!!itted ab"oad
Cong"ess al!ost always falls in line with the presidents vision of the scope of the
conflict and the need fo" a !ilita"' p"esence 2he !e!be"s of Cong"ess beco!e reluctant
to challenge a president who has t"oops on the g"ound and t'picall' ac=uiesce to the
p"esident+s wishes when it co!es to p"o1isions fo" suppo"t .n this wa', the p"esident is
able to e5e"cise so!e leadership over the %ongress , whose !e!be"s gene"all' find it
politicall' e"pedient to follow the president on !atte"s pe"taining to the !ilita"' o" the
conduct of 3!e"icaDs "elations with othe" count"ies )g #$$%#$#
1NC (. .errorism
)he risk of nuclear terrorism is vanishingly small --- terrorists must succeed at each of twenty plus
stages --- failing at one means #ero risk.
/ueller 012 I6ohn, 0ood' 4a'es Chai" of National Secu"it' Studies at the /e"shon Cente" fo" .nte"national Secu"it' Studies and
a )"ofesso" of )olitical Science at 2he *hio State @ni1e"sit', 3B f"o! the @ni1e"sit' of Chicago, /3 and )hD X @CL3,
Atomic Obsession Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. O/for0 Universit "ress. Accesse0 1
E'or2
LIKELIHOOD In his thoughtful, influential, and well-argued 2004 book, Nulear !erroris"# !he $lti"ate %re&entable 'atastro(he)
a work Niholas Kristof of the New *ork !i"es finds +terrif,ing+)-raha" Allison relae0 3is 4consi0ere0 5607'ent4 t3at 4on
t3e c6rrent pat3. a n6clear terrorist attac8 on A'erica in t3e 0eca0e a3ea0 is 'ore li8el t3an not94 #e repeate0 t3at
5607'ent in an article p6)lis3e0 t:o ears later;al)eit :it3o6t re06cin7 t3e ter'inal interval to co'pensate;an0 3e 3a0
pres6'a)l relie0 on t3e sa'e inspira<tional 'ec3anis' in 199& to pre0ict= 4In t3e a)sence of a 0eter'ine0 pro7ra' of
action. :e 3ave ever reason to anticipate acts of n6clear terroris' a7ainst A'erican tar7ets )efore t3is 0eca0e is o6t941 #e
3as >6ite a )it of co'pan in 3is perpet6all alar'in7 concl6sions9 In 200?. UN A')assa0or @o3n
Ne7roponte 5607e0 t3ere to )e a 4a 3i73 pro)a)ilit4 t3at :A@55n t:o ears al<Bae0a :o6l0
atte'pt an attac8 6sin7 a n6clear or ot3er :eapon of 'ass 0estr6ction9 C3en so'e *& forei7n
polic e/perts :ere polle0 ) <!enator Ric3ar0 L67ar in 200- an0 200&. t3e concl60e0 on aver<a7e t3at t3ere
:as a 29 percent li8eli3oo0 a n6clear e/plosion :o6l0 occ6r so'e:3ere in t3e :orl0 :it3in t3e ne/t ten ears .
an0 t3e over:3el'in7l anticipate0 t3at t3is :o6l0 li8el )e carrie0 o6t ) terrorists. not ) a
7overn'ent9 An0 in 200,. p3sicist Ric3ar0 Gar:in p6t t3e li8eli3oo0 of a n6clear e/plosion on an A'erican or E6ropean
cit ) terrorist or ot3er 'eans at 20 percent per ear. :3ic3 :o6l0 :or8 o6t to *, percent over a ten<ear perio092 In late
200*. after :or8in7 for si/ 'ont3s an0 intervie:in7 'ore t3an 2&0 people. a con7ressionall 'an0ate0 tas8 force. t3e
Do''ission on t3e "revention of Ceapons of Mass $estr6ction "roliferation an0 Eerroris' Fpossi)l 8no:n as
DO"COM$"AE to its frien0s2 iss6e0 its report. portento6sl entitle0 Corl0 at Ris89 It le0 ) e/pressin7 t3e
)elief t3at 46nless t3e :orl0 co''6nit acts 0ecisivel an0 :it3 7reat 6r7enc. it is 'ore li8el t3an
not t3at a :eapon of 'ass 0estr6ction :ill )e 6se0 in a terrorist attac8 so'e:3ere in t3e :orl0 ) t3e
en0 of 201?94 Alt3o673 t3e report is caref6l to reass6re its rea0ers t3at it 0oes not inten0 to fri73ten t3e' a)o6t t3e c6rrent
state of terroris' an0 :eapons of 'ass 0estr6ction. it faile0 'isera)l in t3at a0'ira)le 7oal al'ost i''e0iatel9
Representative Ellen Ea6sc3er F$<Dalif92. c3air:o'an of t3e !trate7ic Gorces !6)co''ittee of t3e #o6se Ar'e0 !ervices
Do''ittee. proclai'e0 s3ortl after t3e report :as iss6e0. t3at it 4scare0 t3e pants off of 'ost of 6s94? In its 0ire forecast.
t3e reportHs p3raseolo7 ec3oes. of co6rse. AllisonHs for'6lation of 200-. an0 t3is 'a o:e so'et3in7 to t3e fact t3at 3e :as
one of t3e co''issionHs nine 'e')ers9 E3ere are a co6ple of 0ifferences. 3o:ever9 In AllisonHs earlier ren0erin7. )a0 t3in7s
3appen onl if :e sta on 4t3e c6rrent pat394 E36s. s3o6l0 )a0 t3in7s fail to occ6r. t3is 3app res6lt co6l0 )e ta8en as proof
t3at :e so'e3o: 'ana7e0 so'e:3ere alon7 t3e line to alter o6r pat3. an0 :3o. pra. :ill )e a)le e/actl to 0esi7nate :3at a
4c6rrent pat34 act6all is For :as2I E3e co''ission. in star8 contrast. clai's )a0 t3in7s are li8el to 3appen 46nless t3e
:orl0 co''6nit acts 0ecisivel an0 :it3 7reat 6r7enc4 so'et3in7. e/perience s677ests. t3at is ne/t to i'possi)le9 On t3e
ot3er 3an0. t3e co''ission artf6ll )roa0ens its 0efinition of )a0 t3in7s fro' AllisonHs 4acts of n6clear terroris' a7ainst
A'erican tar7ets4 to t3e 6se of a 4:eapon of 'ass 0estr6ction4 ) terrorists 4so'e<:3ere in t3e :orl094 As one critic points
o6t. t3ere is certainl a 7oo0 c3ance t3at so'eone so'e:3ere :ill release so'e 7er's. 8illin7 fe:. if an. or. as ins6r7ents
3ave 0one in Ira>. ineffect6all lace t3e occasional )o') :it3 c3lorine9 Alt3o673 no nor'al person :o6l0 consi0er eit3er act
to constit6te 4'ass 0estr6ction.4 t3e report can. strictl spea8in7. clai' vin0ication9 Act6all. t3e report is on even safer
7ro6n09 A 'an in Roc8for0. Illinois. :3o p6rc3ase0 so'e )o76s 3an0 7rena0es fro' an GBI infor'ant :it3 t3e intent to
0etonate t3e' at a local s3oppin7 'all. 3as )een convicte0 of atte'ptin7 to 6se :eapons of 'ass 0estr6ction 6n0er la:s t3at
creativel 0efine 3an0 7rena0es to )e :eapons of 'ass 0estr6ction9- Even t3ose :3o 0eci0e0l 0isa7ree with such
sca"'%sounding. if so'e:3at el6sive. pro7nostications a)o6t n6clear terroris' often co'e o6t see'in7
li(e the' !o"e o" less ag"ee9 In 3is Ato'ic Ba+aar. Cillia' Lan7e:iesc3e spen0s a 7reat 0eal of ti'e an0 effort assessin7 t3e
process ) 'eans of :3ic3 a terrorist 7ro6p co6l0 co'e 6p :it3 a )o')9 Unli8e Allison;an0. for t3at 'atter. t3e
consi0era)le )6l8 of accepte0 opinion U3e concl60es t3at it 4re'ains ver. ver 6nli8el .tDs a possibilit',
but unli(el'H 3lso: E3e )est infor'ation is t3at no one 3as 7otten an:3ere near t3is9 I 'ean. if o6 loo8
caref6ll an0 practicall at t3is process. o6 see t3at it is an enor'o6s 6n0erta8in7 f6ll of ris8s for t3e :o6l0<)e terrorists9
An0 so far t3ere is no p6)lic case. at least 8no:n. of an apprecia)le a'o6nt of :eapons<7ra0e #EU J3i73l enric3e0
6rani6'K 0isappearin79 An0 t3atHs t3e first step9 If o6 0onHt 3ave t3at. o6 0onHt 3ave ant3in79 E3e first of t3ese )ol0 an0
6nconventional 0eclarations co'es fro' a )oo8 0isc6ssion telecast in @6ne 200, on D<!"AN an0 t3e secon0 fro' an inter<
vie: on National "6)lic Ra0io9 @607'ents in t3e )oo8 itself. 3o:ever. :3ile consistent :it3 s6c3 concl6sions. are e/presse0
'ore a')i76o6sl. even col= 4at t3e e/tre'e is t3e possi)ilit. entirel real. t3at one or t:o n6clear :eapons :ill pass into
t3e 3an0s of t3e ne: stateless 76errillas. t3e 5i3a0<ists. :3o offer none of t3e retaliator tar7ets t3at 3ave so far 6n0erlain t3e
n6clear peace4 or 4if a :o6l0<)e n6clear terrorist calc6late0 t3e o00s. 3e :o6l0 3ave to a0'it t3at t3e are stac8e0
a7ainstLffen.4 )6t t3e are 4not i'possi)le94& E3e previo6s c3apter arrae0 a len7t3 set of o)stacles confront<= v .M in7 t3e
:o6l0<)e ato'ic terrorist;often 'a8in7 6se in t3e process of Lan7e:lesc3eHs e/cellent reportin79 E3ose :3o :arn a)o6t t3e
li8eli3oo0 of a terrorist )o') conten0 t3at a terrorist 7ro6p co6l0. if often :it3 7reat 0iffic6lt. s6r'o6nt eac3 o)stacle;t3at
0oin7 so in eac3 case is. in Lan7e:iesc3eHs p3rase. 4not i'possi)le94( B6t it is vital to point o6t t3at. :3ile it 'a )e 4not
i'possi)le4 to s6r'o6nt eac3 in0ivi06al step. t3e li8eli3oo0 t3at a 7ro6p co6l0 s6r'o6nt a series of t3e' co6l0 >6ic8l
approac3 i'possi)ilit9 If t3e o00s are 4stac8e0 a7ainstH t3e terrorists. :3at are t3eI Lan7e<:iesc3eHs
0isc6ssion. as :ell as ot3er 'aterial. 3elps 6s eval6ate t3e 'an :as s6c3 a >6est;in 3is :or0s.
4an enor'o6s 6n0erta8in7 f6ll of ris8s4; co6l0 fail9 E3e o00s. in0ee0. are stac8e0 a7ainst t3e
terrorists. per3aps 'assivel so In fact. t3e li8eli3oo0 a terrorist 7ro6p :ill co'e 6p :it3 an
ato'ic )o') see's to )e vanishingly small 3RR3Y.NK 24E B3RR.ERS Ass6'in7 terrorists 3ave so'e
0esire for t3e )o') Fan ass6'ption >6es<tione0 in t3e ne/t c3apter2. f6lfill'ent of t3at 0esire is o)vio6sl anot3er
'atter9 Even t3e ver alar'e0 Matt3e: B6nn an0 Ant3on Cier conten0 t3at t3e ato'ic terroristsH tas8 4:o6l0
clearl )e a'on7 t3e 'ost 0iffic6lt tpes of attac8 to carr o6t4 or 4one of t3e 'ost 0iffic6lt 'issions a
terrorist 7ro6p co6l0 3ope to tr4 B6t. stresses t3e DIAHs Geor7e Eenet. a terrorist ato'ic )o') is 4possi)le4 or 4not )eon0
t3e real' of possi)ilit94 In 3is e/cellent 0isc6ssion of t3e iss6e. Mic3ael Levi a)l catalo76es a :i0e arra of
0iffic6lties confrontin7 t3e :o6l0<)e ato'ic terrorist. a0roitl points o6t t3at 4terrorists '6st
s6ccee0 at ever sta7e, )6t t3e 0efense nee0s to s6ccee0 onl once ,H sensibl' wa"ns against p"eoccupation with wo"st%
case scena"ios, and pointedl' fo"!ulates H/u"ph'Ds Law of Nuclea" 2e""o"is!: 0hat can go w"ong !ight go w"ongH Ne1e"theless, he
holds nuclea" te""o"is! to be a Hgenuine possibilit',H and concludes that a good defensi1e st"ateg' can !e"el' Htilt the odds in ou"
fa1o"H9 3cco"dingl', it 'i73t )e 6sef6l to ta8e a sta) at esti'atin7 56st 3o: 40iffic6lt4 or 4not
i'possi)le4 t3e ato'ic terroristsH tas8. in a77re7ate. is; t3at is. 3o: far fro' t3e frin7e of t3e 4real' of
possi)ilit4 it 'i73t )e. 3o: 47en6ine4 t3e possi)ilities are. 3o: tilte0 t3e o00s act6all are9 After all. lots of t3in7s
are 4not i'possi)le94 It is 4not i'possi)le4 t3at t3ose le7en0ar 'on8es :it3 tpe:riters co6l0
event6all o6tp6t !3a8espeare9* Or it is 4not i'possi)le4;t3at is. t3ere is a 47en6ine possi)ilit4;t3at a
colli0in7 'eteor or co'et co6l0 0estro t3e eart3. t3at %la0i'ir "6tin or t3e Britis3 co6l0 0eci0e one
'ornin7 to la6nc3 a fe: n6clear :eapons at O3io. t3at an 6n0er:ater volcano co6l0 er6pt to
ca6se a civili+ation<en0in7 ti0al :ave. or t3at Osa'a )in La0en co6l0 convert to @60ais', decla"e
hi!self to be the /essiah, an0 fl in a 7a77le of 'afioso 3it 'en fro' Ro'e to 3ave 3i'self p6)licl
cr6cifie099 As s677este0. 'ost 0isc6ssions of ato'ic terroris' 0eal in a rat3er piece'eal fas3ion :it3 t3e s6)5ect;foc6sin7
separatel on in0ivi06al tas8s s6c3 as proc6rin7 #EU or asse')lin7 a 0evice or transportin7 it9 #o:ever. as t3e Gil'ore
Do''ission. a special a0visor panel to t3e presi0ent an0 Don7ress. stresses. settin7 off a n6clear 0evice capa)le of
pro06cin7 'ass 0estr6ction presents 4#erc6lean c3allen7es,H re>6irin7 t3at a :3ole series of steps be
acco!plished= o)tainin7 eno673 fissile 'aterial. 0esi7nin7 a :eapon 4t3at :ill )rin7 t3at 'ass to7et3er in a
tin fraction of a secon04 an0 fi76rin7 o6t so'e :a to 0eliver t3e t3in79 An0 it e'p3asi+es t3at t3ese
'erel constit6te 4t3e 'ini'6' re>6ire'ents H If eac3 is not f6ll 'et. t3e res6lt is not si'pl a less
po:erf6l :eapon. )6t one t3at canHt pro06ce an si7nificant n6clear iel0 at all or canHt )e 0elivere0910
Gollo:in7 t3is perspective. an approac3 t3at see's appropriate is to catalo76e t3e )arriers t3at '6st )e overco'e ) a
terrorist 7ro6p in or0er to carr o6t t3e tas8 of pro06cin7. transportin7. an0 t3en s6ccessf6ll 0etonatin7 an i'provise0
n6clear 0evice. an e/plosive t3at. as Allison ac8no:le07es. :o6l0 )e 4lar7e. c6')erso'e. 6nsafe. 6nrelia)le. 6npre0icta)le.
an0 inefficient94 Ea)le 1?91 atte'pts to 0o t3is. an0 it arras so'e 20 of t3ese; all of :3ic3 '6st )e s6r'o6nte0 ) t3e
ato'ic aspirant9 Act6all. it :o6l0 )e >6ite possi)le to co'e 6p :it3 a lon7er list= in t3e interests of 8eepin7 t3e catalo76e of
36r0les 0o:n to a reasona)le n6')er. so'e of t3e entries are act6all collections of tas8s an0 co6l0 )e 0ivi0e0 into t:o or
t3ree or 'ore9 Gor e/a'ple. n6')er & on t3e list re>6ires t3at 3eiste0 3i73l enric3e0 6rani6' )e neit3er a sca' nor part of
a stin7 nor of ina0e>6ate >6alit 06e to insi0er inco'petence. )6t t3is 36r0le co6l0 as rea0il )e ren0ere0 as t3ree separate
ones9 In conte'platin7 t3e tas8 )efore t3e'. :oi/ftls)e ato'ic terrorists effectivel '6st 7o t3ro673 an e/ercise t3at loo8s
'6c3 li8e t3is9 If an0 :3en t3e 0o so. t3e are li8el to fin0 t3e prospects 0a6ntin7 an0 accor0in7l 6ninspirin7 or even
ter'inall 0ispiritin79 4
Onl ca6ses s'all<scale 0estr6ction9
M6eller N10 I6ohn, 0ood' 4a'es Chai" of National Secu"it' Studies at the /e"shon Cente" fo" .nte"national Secu"it' Studies and
a )"ofesso" of )olitical Science at 2he *hio State @ni1e"sit', 3B f"o! the @ni1e"sit' of Chicago, /3 and )hD X @CL3, Atomic
Obsession !"clear Alarmism #rom $iroshima to Al%&aeda, *5fo"d @ni1e"sit' )"ess, 3ccessed X E!o"'J
.n the ensuing decades, !assi1e e5agge"ations of the ph'sical effects of nuclea" weapons ha1e been 1e"'
!uch t3e r6le 0o"ds li(e Hli=uidate,H Hannihilate,H and H1apo"iFe,H not to !ention H3"!ageddonH and
Hapocal'pse,H ha1e been co!!onl' applied in scena"ios whe"e those so"ts of e5t"e!e cha"acte"iFations a"e
si!pl' not sound 3s with *ppenhei!e" in 1&C8, it "e!ains a 'assive overstate'ent to confidentl' insist ,
as the p"o!inent fo"eign polic' anal'st 6oseph Ci"incione docs toda', that Ha nuclea" &/11 would dest"o' an
enti"e cit',H o" to conclude with Robe"t Kallucci that a single te""o"ist ato! bo!b would be capable of
,oblite"ating a la"ge po"tion of a cit'H No" is it co""ect to casuall' asse"t , as ?ou"nalist Law"ence Scott
Sheets does, that an ato!ic bo!b of the siFe e5ploded at 4i"oshi!a Io" s!alle"J could, in the hands of
te""o"ists, H8ill 'illions of peopleHH 3nd defense anal'st B"ian 6en(ins is Ip"esu!abl' (nowingl'J
engaging in "athe" e5t"a1agant h'pe"bole when he sa's that 3!e"icaDs Haweso!e nuclea" a"senalH du"ing
the cold wa" could ha1e Hdest"o'ed the planetH But his audito"s a"e li(el' to ta(e hi! lite"all', and the' a"e
li(el' to do so as well fo" Ci"incione when he asse"ts that the wo"ldDs "e!ain%a"senal of #8,$$$ nuclea"
weapons is enough Hto dest"o' the planet se1e"al ti!es o1e"H B' cont"ast, as one ph'sicist points out, Hthe
la"gest bo!b that has e1e" been e5ploded an'whe"e was si5t' !egatons , and that is one<t3o6san0t3 t3e
force of an ea"th=ua(e , one%thousandth the fo"ce of a hu""icaneH
(o risk of 3.-.-'ussian war 4 'ussia knows the 3.-. is infinitely more powerful and that it
couldnt be a threat.
Ban0o: 0* IDoug, fo"!e" senio" fellow at the Cato .nstitute and fo"!e" colu!nist with
Cople' News Se"1ice, 3/,2u"ning China into the Ne5t Big Ene!'-
http://wwwantiwa"co!/bandow/Ra"ticleidS1#C9#J
.n fact, 3!e"ica "e!ains a !ilita"' colossus 2he Bush ad!inist"ation has p"oposed spending 7>1> billion ne5t 'ea"
on the !ilita"'Q !o"e, ad?usted fo" inflation, than at an' ti!e since 0o"ld 0a" .. 2he @S accounts fo" "oughl' half
of the wo"ldDs !ilita"' outla's 0ashington is allied with e1e"' !a?o" indust"ialiFed state e5cept China and Russia
3!e"icaDs a1owed ene!ies a"e a pitiful few: Bu"!a, Cuba, S'"ia, LeneFuela, ."an, No"th ;o"ea 2he @S go1e"n!ent could dest"o'
e1e"' one of these states with a flic( of the p"esidentDs w"ist Russia has beco!e "athe" contentious of late, but
that ha"dl' !a(es it an ene!' /o"eo1e", the idea that /oscow could "ea"!, "econ=ue"
the nations that once we"e pa"t of the So1iet @nion o" co!!unist satellites, o1e""un
0este"n Eu"ope, and then attac( the @S without an'one in 3!e"ica noticing the th"eat
along the wa' is , well, a pa"anoid fantas' !o"e e5t"e!e than the usual science fiction
plot 2he Leninist 4u!pt'%Du!pt' has fallen off the wall and e1en a bunch of fo"!e"
;KB agents a"enDt going to be able to put hi! bac( togethe"
(o impact. +ncentives for cooperation overwhelm confrontation.
Mar8e0onov N9 ISe"gei, 4eads the Dept of .nte"ethnic )"oble!s .nstitute of )olitical
and /ilita"' 3nal'sis I/oscowJ, Russian )olitics and Law, ,2he VAi1e%D'a 0a"+
)"eli!ina"' Results and Conse=uences- C9:3, /a'%6uneJ
)a"ado5ical as it !a' sound, the N32* bloc too( !uch !o"e const"ucti1e and cautious
app"oaches Ithan the @nited StatesJ towa"d Russia Recent e1ents ha1e shown that we should not identif' the No"th
3tlantic alliance with the @nited States 3ll the decla"ations !ade b' N32* Sec"eta"'%Kene"al 6aap de 4oop Scheffe" and N32*
spo(es!an 6a!es 3ppathu"ai we"e !uch !o"e politicall' co""ect than the a"gu!ents p"epa"ed b' "ep"esentati1es of the @S State
Depa"t!ent Ao" the sa(e of co!pa"ison, . p"o1ide he"e ?ust two e5a!ples Du"ing a 1isit to 2bilisi on 18 Septe!be", the N32*
sec"eta"'%gene"al decla"ed that it was not pa"t of his o"ganiFation+s b"ief ,to ?udge Russia-
3t the sa!e ti!e, /atthew B"'Fa, @S deput' assistant sec"eta"' of state :fo" Eu"opean and Eu"asian affai"s< Ithe des( office" in
cha"ge of the cu""ent ad!inist"ation+s Caucasus polic'J p"oposed to stop coope"ating with Russia "ega"ding the ;a"aba(h settle!ent
th"ough the *SCE /ins( K"oup until the /ed1ede1Sa"(oF' plan was co!pletel' i!ple!ented /eanwhile, the Russian p"opaganda
!achine, igno"ing the positi1e !essages f"o! N32* Ifo" instance, its position on 3fghanistanJ, identified the position of the enti"e
bloc Ifa" f"o! p"o%Russian but not so una!biguous as the 3!e"ican app"oachJ with the 1iews held b' @S leade"s .n gene"al, in
3ugustSepte!be" #$$B Russian diplo!ats and politicians, instead of focusing on ,di1iding the 0est,- beca!e ca""ied awa' b'
de!oniFing it, which ob?ecti1el' helped /i(heil Saa(ash1ili b' dist"acting the attention of Eu"opean politicians f"o! the agg"essi1e
a!bitions of the Keo"gian p"esident .n an' case, the con1entional ,0est- Ipe"sonified b' 1a"ious count"ies, blocs, and st"uctu"esJ is
not "ead' fo" a new ,cold wa"- against Russia /o"eo1e", if the South Caucasus is "ecogniFed as a Fone of /oscow+s ,special
inte"ests- I!oti1ated, abo1e all, b' the secu"it' p"oble!s in the Russian SouthJ, ou" count"' would "educe its anti%0este"nis!, which
is cu""entl' in de!and 2oda', a new ,cold wa"- is not possible 2hat is anothe" "esult of ,hot
3ugust- Between the Russian Aede"ation and the 0est, the"e a"e no ideological
diffe"ences : /oscow was not e5po"ting socialis! to South *ssetia and 3b(haFia and was
not defending an'bod'+s d'nastic inte"ests the"e *f cou"se, the"e a"e essential diffe"ences in
the inte"p"etation of national inte"ests, and so!e ste"eot'pes and phobias of the past still pe"sist
2he"e a"e, howe1e", !uch !o"e se"ious challenges than these: the situation in 3fghanistan and
Cent"al 3sia, the p"oble!s of ."an and No"th ;o"ea, ene"g', and inte"national te""o"is!, which "e=ui"e ?oint effo"ts and
in p"inciple cannot be "esol1ed without !utual pa"ticipation 3ll this gi1es us hopes, albeit wea(, that a sea"ch
fo" gene"al "ules go1e"ning the wo"ld o"de" will soon begin
U9!9 < R6ssia n6clear :ar :ill )e li'ite0
Oelric3 0& % Lice )"esident fo" St"ategic Secu"it' p"og"a!s X Aede"ation of 3!e"ican
Scientists
:.1an *el"ich IAo"!e" p"ofesso" of ph'sics X 2echnical @ni1e"sit' of /unich and
Ao"!e" p"e%docto"al Resea"ch 3ssociate at Law"ence Li1e"!o"e National
Labo"ato"'J,,/issions fo" Nuclea" 0eapons afte" the Cold 0a",- 2he Aede"ation of
3!e"ican Scientists, *ccasional )ape" No 3, 6anua"' #$$><
0hat has not happened since the end of the Cold 0a" is a "ecalib"ation of ou" dete""ence
"e=ui"e!ents based on the changes in the sta(es 2he Cold 0a" anal'ses of nuclea" wa"s
too( little "ega"d of what the wa" !ight ha1e been about, i!plicitl' assu!ing it would be
about national su"1i1al and wo"ld leade"ship 2oda' the sta(es a"e , o1e"all, !uch s!alle"
.ndeed, it is nea"l' i!possible to con?u"e up e1en h'pothetical a"eas of conflict between
the @nited States and Russia with sta(es "e!otel' co!pa"able to those of th e Cold 0a"
o" e1en a c"isis that could "ationall' ?ustif' nuclea" weapons 0he"e the sta(es a"e high
fo" e5a!ple, the ongoing tension between .sla!ic funda!entalis! and the 0est the "ole
of nuclea" "etaliation is li!ited )g ##%#3
1NC (. Norms
$e<escalation an0 7lo)al 0eterrence<<<)est e'pirical cases prove no conflict 0espite
3ei73tene0 tensions. insta)ilit. an0 re7ional t3reats
Eerrill 9. !e!be" of St"ategic Studies .nstitute ISS.J since *ctobe" #$$1Q Kene"al Douglas /ac3"thu" )"ofesso" of
National Secu"it' 3ffai"sQ /iddle East Nonp"olif anal'st fo" the .nte"national 3ssess!ents Di1ision of the Law"ence
Li1e"!o"e National Labo"ato"' ILLNLJQ Lisiting )"ofesso" at the @S 3i" 0a" CollegeQ fo"!e" facult' !e!be" at *ld
Do!inion @ni1e"sit'Q "eti"ed @S 3"!' Rese"1e lieutenant colonel and Ao"eign 3"ea *ffice" I/iddle EastJQ published
in nu!e"ous acade!ic ?ou"nalsQ pa"ticipated in the /iddle Easte"n 3"!s Cont"ol and Regional Secu"it' I3CRSJ 2"ac(
# tal(s, which a"e pa"t of the /iddle East )eace )"ocessQ se"1ed as a !e!be" of the !ilita"' and secu"it' wo"(ing
g"oup of the Ba(e"/4a!ilton ."a= Stud'Q holds a B3 f"o! Califo"nia State )ol'technic @ni1e"sit'Q /3 f"o! the
@ni1e"sit' of Califo"nia, Ri1e"side, both in )olitical ScienceQ holds a )hD in .nte"national Relations f"o! Cla"e!ont
K"aduate @ni1e"sitUI0 3nd"ew 2e""ill, Escalation and int"awa" dete""ence Du"ing li!ited wa"s in the !iddle east,- Septe!be"
#$$&, http://wwwst"ategicstudiesinstitutea"!'!il/pdffiles/pub&C1pdfJ
2he nu!be" of decla"ed nuclea" powe"s has e5panded significantl' in the last #$ 'ea"s to include
)a(istan, .ndia, and No"th ;o"ea 3dditionall', othe" powe"s such as ."an a"e al!ost ce"tainl' st"i1ing fo" a
nuclea" weapons capabilit' while a nu!be" of count% "ies in the de1eloping wo"ld possess
o" see( bio logical and che!ical weapons .n this !ilieu, a cent"al pu"pose of this !onog"aph b'
0 3nd"ew 2e""ill is to "ee5a!ine two ea"lie" conflicts fo" insights that !a' be "ele1ant fo"
ongoing dange"s du"ing li!ited wa"s in1ol1ing nations possessing che!ical o" biological weapons o"
e!e"ging nuclea" a"senals Decision%!a(e"s f"o! the @nited States and othe" count"ies !a' ha1e to
conside" the ci"cu!stances unde" which a s!alle" and wea(e" ene!' will use nuclea"
weapon s o" othe" !ass dest"uction weapons So!e of D" 2e""ill+s obse"1ations !a' be pa"ticula"l' useful fo" polic'!a(e"s
dealing with futu"e c"ises in1ol1ing de1eloping nations that possess weapons of !ass dest"uction I0/DJ 3lthough it is possible that
the @nited States could be a pa"t' to such a conflict, an' c"isis in1ol1ing nuclea" weapons states is e5pected to be of inhe"ent conce"n
to 0ashington, e1en if it is not a co!batant D" 2e""ill has e5a!ined two i!po"tant Mi0 dle East e"n
wa"s 2hese conflicts a"e the 1& 93 3"ab% .s"aeli 0a" and the 1& &1 Kulf 0a" 2his !onog"aph
!a' be pa"ticula"l' 1aluable in p"o1iding "eade"s, including senio" !ilita"' and political
leade"s, with a discussion of the i!plications of these histo"ical case studies in which
0/D %a"!ed nations !a' ha1e se"iousl' consi0ere0 thei" use )6t 6lti'atel 0i0 not
resort to t3e' Both of these wa"s we"e fought at the con1entional le1el, although the
p"ospect of .s"ael using nuclea" weapons I1&93J, Eg'pt using biological weapons I1&93J, o" ."a=
using che!ical and biological weapons I1&&1J we"e of se"ious conce"n at 1a"ious points du"ing the
fighting 2he p"ospect of a @S wa" with 0/D%a"!ed opponents Isuch as occu""ed in 1&&1J "aises
the =uestion of how escalation can )e controlle0 in such ci"cu!stances and what a"e the !ost li(el' wa's
that int"awa" dete""ence can b"ea( down 2his !onog"aph will conside" wh' efforts at escalation control an0
intra:ar 0eterrence :ere s6ccessf6l in the two case studies and assess the points at which these effo"ts we"e
unde" the !ost intensi1e st"ess that !ight ha1e caused the! to fail D" 2e""ill notes that int"awa" dete""ence is
alwa's difficult and usuall' based on a 1a"iet' of facto"s that no co!batant can cont"ol in
all ci"cu!stances of an ongoing conflict 2he St"ategic Studies .nstitute is pleased to offe" this !onog"aph as a
cont"ibution to the national secu"% it' debate on this i!po"tant sub?ect as ou" nation continues to g"apple with a 1a"iet' of p"oble!s
associated with the p"olife"ation of nuclea", biological, and che!ical weapons 2his anal'sis should be especiall' useful to @S
st"ategic leade"s and intelli% gence p"ofessionals as the' see( to add"ess the co!plicated inte"pla' of facto"s "elated to "egional secu"it'
issues and the suppo"t of local allies 2his wo"( !a' also benefit those see(ing g"eate" unde"standing
of long "ange issues of /iddle Easte"n and global secu"it' 0e hope this wo"( will be of benefit to
office"s of all se"1ices as well as othe" @S Ko1e"n!ent officials in1ol1ed in !ilita"' planning, and that it !a' cause the! to
"econside" so!e of the instances whe"e int"awa" dete""ence see!ed to wo"( well but !a' ha1e done so b' a !uch close" !a"gin than
futu"e planne"s can co!fo"tabl' accept .n this "ega"d, D" 2e""ill+s wo"( is i!po"tant to unde"standing the
lessons of these conflicts which !ight ot3er:ise )e for7otten or oversi'plifie0
3dditionall', an unde"standing of the issues in1ol1ed with t3ese earlier case st60ies
!a' be 6sef6l in f6t6re circ6'stances whe"e the @ nited S tates !a' see( to 0eter
:arti'e CM$ use b' potential ad1e"sa"ies such as ."an o" No"th ;o"ea 2he two case studies !a' also point out the inhe"ent
difficulties in doing so and the need to ente" into conflict with these states onl' if one is p"epa"ed to accept the st"ong possibilit' that
an' effo"ts to cont"ol escalation ha1e a good chance of b"ea(ing down 2his unde"standing is pa"ticula"l' i!po"tant in a wa"ti!e
en1i"on!ent in which all pa"ties should "ationall' ha1e an inte"est in cont"olling escalation, but !a' ha1e t"ouble doing so due to both
s'ste!ic and wa"ti!e !ispe"ceptions and !ista(es that disto"t co!!unications between ad1e"sa"ies and !a' cause funda!ental
!isunde"standings about the natu"e of the conflict in which these states !a' find the!sel1es e!b"oiled
(o global escalation
$er. 02 )hD in /ilita"' and /iddle Easte"n 4isto"' f"o! the @ni1e"sit' of London
and fo"!e" p"ofesso" at the Ro'al /ilita"' 3cade!' Sandhu"st and *5fo"d @ni1e"sit'
IKw'nne, Wueen+s Wua"te"l', ,2he co!ing wa"-, Dece!be", =uestiaJ
3ll of this indicates an e5t"e!el' dange"ous situation, with !an' 1a"iables that a"e i!possible to assess full' But the"e is one
co!fo"ting "ealit' he"e: this will not beco!e 0o"ld 0a" ... Not long ago, wa"s in the /iddle East alwa's
went to the b"in( 1e"' =uic(l', with the 3!e"icans and So1iets deepl' in1ol1ed on
opposite sides , b"istling thei" nuclea" weapons at one anothe" 3nd fo" =uite so!e ti!e we li1ed on the
b"in( of obli1ion But that is o1e" 0o"ld 0a" ... has been cancelled , and . donDt thin( we could pu!p it up
again no !atte" how ha"d we t"ied 2he connections that once tied /iddle Easte"n conf"ontations to a
global conf"ontation in1ol1ing tens of thousands of nuclea" weapons ha1e all been
undone 2he East%0est Cold 0a" is finished 2he t"ul' dange"ous powe"s in the wo"ld toda' a"e the indust"ialiFed count"ies in
gene"al 0e a"e the ones with the "esou"ces and the technolog' to chu"n out weapons of !ass dest"uction li(e sausages But the good
news is: we a"e out of the business
)he plan wouldnt solve drone prolif --- countries would perceive secrecy and
hypocrisy as a rubber stamp
'ona 15 .-abor /ona, international legal diretor at Hu"an /ights 0irst, 1!he %ro-/ule
of Law 2rgu"ent 2gainst a 3Drone 'ourt,45 !he Hill, 0ebruar, 26, 2078,
htt(#99thehill:o"9blogs9ongress-blog9;udiial92<=047-the-(ro-rule-of-law-argu"ent-
against-a-drone-ourt>
2 1drone ourt5 would be un;ust beause the (ro(osed target would be unable to a((ear
and "ake the ase for (reser&ing his life: 2 seret ;udiial (roess in whih the right to
life is at stake but the owner of that life has no sa, is an affront both to 2"erian &alues and
international legal (rini(les:
?hile doing "uh har", a 1drone ourt5 would do little , if an,, good: @u((orters like the idea
beause it a((ears to (ro&ide so"e hek on the %resident4s sereti&e eAerise of this lethal
unilateral (ower : But what ;udge would risk (re&enting the intere(tion of a terroristC ?hat4s "ore likel, is that
the drone ourt would be a rubber sta"(, reating onl, the a((earane, not the realit,, of
;ustie:
In warti"e, the (resident "a, authoriDe killing of "e"bers of ene", ar"ed fores or an,one else diretl, (artii(ating in hostilities:
In an unon&entional war suh as this one, where the definition of the 1ene", 5 and its 1ar"ed
fores5 isn4t alwa,s lear, the (resident needs to dislose how he defines that ene", and
deter"ines who is a "e"ber of its ar"ed fores or otherwise (artii(ating in its fight against the $nited @tates, so that we an ha&e
so"e assurane he4s not killing the wrong (eo(le: 2 seret ourt would ha&e no s(eial eA(ertise in "aking
that deter"ination :
Outside an ati&e ar"ed onflit, the legal standards are different# a sus(et an be targeted for death onl, if he (oses an 1i""inent
threat5 to hu"an life that annot be thwarted b, non-lethal "eans: Here a 1drone ourt5 would be es(eiall,
useless: ?e wouldn4t want the "ilitar, to ha&e to ;u"( through ;udiial hoo(s to thwart a
trul, i""inent attak: If the threat is i""inent, there is, b, definition, no ti"e to seek ;udiial re&iew, and if there is ti"e,
the threat is, b, definition, not i""inent:
But a 1drone ourt5 would be worse than ineffeti&e# it would har" national seurit,: !hroughout the
1war on terror,5 (oliies that offend international law , inluding the broad so(e of the go&ern"entEs
lai"ed authorit, to kill, ha&e inhibited allies fro" sharing essential intelligene with the $nited
@tates and da"aged the ountr,4s re(utation as a beaon on hu"an rights: secret court would only reinforce
the perception that the 3nited -tates concocts its own secret rules while insisting that
other countries follow the international public ones.
(o reverse casual modeling internal link --- we cant reverse the precedent that has
already been set
6oot 11 .FaA Boot, Geane G: Kirk(atrik @enior 0ellow in National @eurit, @tudies at
the 'ounil on 0oreign /elations in New *ork, leading "ilitar, historian and foreign-
(oli, anal,st, 1?e 'annot 2fford to @to( Drone @trikes,5 'o""entar, FagaDine,
Otober H, 2077, htt(#99www:o""entar,"agaDine:o"9207797090H9drone-ar"s-rae9>
!he New *ork !i"es engages in so"e sare-"ongering toda, about a drone ar"s rae: @ott
@hane notes orretl, other nations suh as 'hina are building their own drones and in the future $:@:
fores ould be attaked b, the"Iour fores will not ha&e a "ono(ol, on their use fore&er: 0air enough, but he goes further,
suggesting our urrent use of drones to target terrorists will bakfire#
If 'hina, for instane, sends killer drones into KaDakhstan to hunt "inorit, $ighur
Fusli"s it auses of (lotting terroris", what will the $nited @tates sa,C ?hat if India uses
re"otel, ontrolled raft to hit terroris" sus(ets in Kash"ir, or /ussia sends drones
after "ilitants in the 'auasusC 2"erian offiials who (rotest will likel, find their own eAa"(le thrown bak at
the":
1!he (roble" is that we4re reating an international nor"5 ) asserting the right to strike (ree"(ti&el, against those we sus(et of
(lanning attaks, argues Dennis F: -or"le,, a senior researh fellow at the $ni&ersit, of %ittsburgh and author of Fissile
'ontagion, who has alled for tougher eA(ort ontrols on 2"erian drone tehnolog,: 1!he o(,atting is what I worr, about "ost:5
!his is a fa"iliar tro(e of liberal ritis who are alwa,s lai"ing we should forego 1J5 wea(ons s,ste" or
a(abilit,, otherwise our ene"ies will ado(t it too: ?e ha&e heard this with regard to ballisti "issile defense, ballisti "issiles,
nulear wea(ons, he"ial and biologial wea(ons, land "ines, eA(loding bullets, and other fearso"e wea(ons: @o"e ha&e e&en
suggested the $:@: should ab;ure the first use of nulear wea(onsIand ut down our own arsenalIto enourage si"ilar restraint fro"
Iran:
)he argument falls apart rather $uickly because it is founded on a false premise7
that other nations will follow our e"ample. In (oint of fat, Iran is hell-bent on getting
nulear wea(ons no "atter what we doK 'hina is hell-bent on getting drones K and so forth:
?hether and under what iru"stanes the, will use those wea(ons re"ains an o(en LuestionIbut there is little reason to
think self-restraint on our (art will be "athed b, eLual self-restraint on theirs : Is %akistan
a&oiding nuking India beause we ha&en4t used nulear wea(ons sine 7H4=C Hardl,: !he reason is that India has a (owerful nulear
deterrent to use against %akistan: If there is one lesson of histor, it is a strong deterrent is a better u(holder of (eae than is unilateral
disar"a"entIwhih is what the New *ork !i"es i"(liitl, suggests:
I"agine if we did refrain fro" drone strikes against al-MaedaIwhat would be the onseLueneC
If we were to sto( the strikes, would 'hina reall, deide to take a softer line on $ighurs
or /ussia on 'hehen se(aratistsC !hat see"s unlikel, gi&en the &iiousness those states
alread, e"(lo, in their battles against ethni se(aratistsIwhih at least in /ussia4s ase alread,
inludes the sus(eted a ssassination of 'hehen leaders abroad: ?hat4s the differene between sending a hit tea" and
sending a droneC
?hile a deision on our (art to sto( drone strikes would be unlikel, to alter /ussian or
'hinese thinking, it would ha&e one i""ediate onseLuene# al-Maeda would be
strengthened and ould regenerate the abilit, to attak our ho"eland: Drone strikes are
the onl, effeti&e wea(on we ha&e to o"bat terrorist grou(s in (laes like %akistan or *e"en where
we don4t ha&e a lot of boots on the ground or a lot of oo(eration fro" loal authorities: ?e annot afford to gi&e the"
u( in the &ain ho(e it will enourage disar"a"ent on the (art of ditatorial states:
(o impact --- drones are ineffective and theres no incentive for them be used on a
wide-scale --- theyll be easily countered even if they are with limited escalation
8ewis 11 .Fihael ?: Lewis, (rofessor of international law and the law of war at Ohio
Northern $ni&ersit, @hool of Law, for"er Na&, fighter (ilot, and oauthor of 3!he ?ar
on !error and the Laws of ?ar# 2 Filitar, %ers(eti&e,4 1$nfounded Drone 0ears,5 Los
2ngeles !i"es, Otober 76, 2077, htt(#99artiles:lati"es:o"920779ot9769o(inion9la-oe--
lewis-drones-20777076>
2l"ost sine the $nited @tates began using the un"anned aerial &ehiles known as drones, their use has drawn ritiis": !he
latest ritiis", whih has reei&ed onsiderable attention in the wake of the drone strike on 2nwar 2wlaki, is that
2"eriaEs use of drones has s(arked a new international ar"s rae :
?hile it is true that so"e other nations ha&e begun de&elo(ing their own un"anned aerial
&ehiles, the eAtent of the alar" is un;ustified: Fuh of it rests on ",ths that are easil, dis(elled:
F,th 7# Drones will be a threat to the $ nited @tates in the hands of other nations: Drones are
sur&eillane and ounter-terroris" toolsK the, are not effective weapons of on&entional
warfare : !he un"anned aerial &ehiles are slow and e"tremely vulnerable to e&en basi air
defense s,ste"s, illustrated b, the fat that a $:@: sur&eillane drone was shot down b, a 7H60s-era FI--2= @o&iet fighter
o&er IraL in 2002: Foreo&er, drones are de(endent on onstant tele"etr, signals fro" their
ground ontrollers to re"ain in flight: @uh signals an be easil, ;a""ed or disru(ted,
ausing the drone to fall fro" the sk,: ItEs e&en (ossible that a (art, sending stronger signals ould take ontrol of the drone: !he
drones, therefore, ha&e li"ited usefulness : 2nd ertainl, an, drone fl,ing o&er the $:@: while being ontrolled b,
a foreign nation ould be easil, deteted and either destro,ed or a(tured:
F,th 2# !errorists ould effeti&el, use drones to strike targets that are otherwise safe: !hough it would be (referable if terrorist
grou(s did not aLuire drones, the tehnolog, reLuired to su((ort the" is not (artiularl, ad&aned: If organiDations suh as 2l Maeda
were intent on aLuiring the tehnolog,, the, (robabl, ould: One of the reasons 2l Maeda "a, not ha&e s(ent the ti"e and resoures
neessar, to do so is that drones would be of li"ited &alue: In addition to being &er, &ulnerable to e&en basi air defense s,ste"s,
drones reLuire a great deal of logistial su((ort: !he, ha&e to be launhed, reo&ered and ontrolled fro" a reasonabl, large and
seure (er"anent failit,: ?here&er 2l MaedaEs drones landed would i""ediatel, beo"e a target:
It is true that a s"all, hand-launhed drone a(able of deli&ering a s"all warhead o&er a reasonabl, short distane ould be, like radio-
ontrolled "odel air(lanes, launhed in a (ubli (ark or other o(en area and flown to a target se&eral "iles awa,: Howe&er, the
a"ount of eA(losi&es that suh a drone an arr, is &er, li"ited .at "ost a few (ounds> and (ales in o"(arison to the a"ount of
eA(losi&es that an be deli&ered b, a &ehile or e&en a suiide bo"ber: It see"s likel, that terrorist grou(s will ontinue to deli&er
their eA(losi&es b, &ehile or suiide bo"ber:
F,th 8# !he $:@: use of drones in ases suh as the 2wlaki killing in *e"en ser&es to legiti"iDe their
use b, 'hina or /ussia: International law (laes the sa"e restritions on the use of
drones that it (laes on an, other use of "ilitar, fore: !he $:@: used a drone on *e"eni territor, to kill 2wlaki beause it was
gi&en (er"ission to do so b, the *e"eni go&ern"ent, and beause 2wlaki was an ati&e "e"ber of an 2l Maeda affiliate who had
re(eatedl, been in&ol&ed in o(erations designed to kill 2"erians at ho"e and abroad: ?ith suh (er"ission, the $:@: ould instead
ha&e e"(lo,ed s(eial fores or a on&entional airstrike:
Nu"erous o""entators ha&e suggested that $:@: drone use legiti"iDes /ussian drone use
in 'hehn,a or 'hinese drone use against the $ighurs: If 'hina or /ussia were faing
genuine threats fro" 'hehen or $ighur se(aratists, the, "ight be allowed under
international law to use drones in neighboring states if those states ga&e the" (er"ission
to do so: Howe&er, gi&en the fat that 'hehen se(aratists delared an end to ar"ed
resistane in 200H, and that the greatest onern /ussians urrentl, ha&e with 'hehn,a
is with the la&ish subsidies that /ussia is urrentl, (ro&iding it, the likelihood of ar"ed
/ussian drones o&er 'hehn,a see"s remote at best.
Likewise, there is no $ighur se(aratist organiDation that e&en re"otel, rese"bles 2l
Maeda : $ighur unrest has taken the for" of u(risings in $ru"Li and other areas, si"ilar to the !ibetan
unrest of a few ,ears ago: !he 'hinese eli"inated suh unrest with wides(read arrests and disa((earanes, whih raised serious
hu"an rights onerns: But there has been no ti"e in whih $ighur o((osition has "et the
threshold established b, international law that would allow for the use of ar"ed drones in res(onse to
$ighur ations:
It is i"(ortant to reogniDe drones for what the, are# slow, relati&el, low-teh anti-
terroris" tools that would be of li"ited use on "ost "odern battlefields and are (artiularl,
unsuited to use b, terrorist organiDations:
plans modeling restricts )urkish strikes on 9urdish militants
'oberts 15 .Kristin /oberts, News Editor for National Gournal, F:2: in seurit, studies
fro" -eorgetown $ni&ersit,, 1?hen the ?hole ?orld Has Drones,5 !he National
Gournal, Farh 22, 2078, htt(#99www:national;ournal:o"9"agaDine9when-the-whole-
world-has-drones-20780827>
H,(erboleC 'onsider this# Iran, with the a((ro&al of Da"asus, arries out a lethal strike on anti-@,rian fores inside @,riaK /ussia
(iks off "ilitants ta"(ering with oil and gas lines in $kraine or -eorgiaK !urke, ar"s a $:@:-(ro&ided %redator to kill
9urdish militants in northern +ra$ who it belie&es are planning attacks along the
border. Label the targets as terrorists, and in eah ase, !ehran, Fosow, and 2nkara "a, (oint
toward ?ashington and sa,, we learned it by watching you. In %akistan, *e"en, and 2fghanistan:
!his is the unintended onseLuene of 2"erian drone warfare: 0or all of the attention (aid to the drone
(rogra" in reent weeks)about 2"erians on the target list .there are none at this writing> and the eAeuti&e branh4s
legal authorit, to kill b, drone outside war Dones .thin, b, offiials4 own (ri&ate ad"ission>)what goes undisussed is
?ashington4s deliberate failure to establish lear and de"onstrable rules for itself that would at "ini"u" reate a globall, rele&ant
standard for delineating between legiti"ate and rogue uses of one of the "ost aweso"e "ilitar, robotis
a(abilities of this generation:
P99 resurgence threatens (orthern +ra$ and collapses regional stability
%lark 2: .%err, 'lark, Lieutenant 'olonel, $@ 2r",, $:@: 2r", ?ar 'ollege,
1/eassessing $:@: National @eurit, @trateg,# the Kurdistan ?orker4s %art, .%KK>,5
@trateg, /esearh %ro;et, htt(#99www:dti:"il9gi-bin9-et!/DoC
2DN2D246<7H6OLoationN$2OdoN-et!/Do:(df>
!he %KK is a reogniDed terrorist organiDation b, the $:@: and the international o""unit,: It ontinues to threaten
regional stability in northern +ra$ through terrorist actions, and through its assoiations with
transnational ri"inal organiDations, it now threatens eono"i stabilit, in Euro(e: 'urrent $@- (oli, against the
%KK is ahie&ing short-ter" goals with !urke,K howe&er, ahie&ing long-ter" regional stabilit, will reLuire the
eli"ination of %KK terrorist a(abilities and their known links to terrorist transnational
ri"inal organiDations: Both %resident Bush and the !urkish %ri"e Finister want to eli"inate the %KK: In order to
o"(l, with %resident Bush4s (oli,, senior (oli, "akers will need to reassess their strategies and take a "ore o""itted (osition to
eradiate the %KK: 2s stated in the reo""endation, the i"(le"entation of an International %KK !askfore .I%KK!0> with the
authorit, to i"(le"ent (oli, and ations using the ele"ents of national and "ulti-national (ower ould effeti&el, eli"inate the
%KK as a terrorist and transnational ri"inal threat: !he I%KKI!0 would de"onstrate $:@: resol&e and o""it"ent to allies on a
global sale: !he N@@ .2006> states, !he fight "ust be taken to the ene",, to kee( the" on the run: !o sueed in our own efforts, we
need the su((ort and onerted ation of friends and allies: ?e "ust ;oin with others to den, the terrorists what the,
need to sur&i&e# safe ha&en, finanial su((ort, and the su((ort and (rotetion that ertain nation-states historiall, ha&e gi&en
the":P7 B, effeti&el, s,nhroniDing national and international interagen, resoures and assets, the I%KK!0 will frature, delink
and deresoure the %KK, thus, eli"inating the %KK threat to regional stabilit, and global eono"i orru(tion: !his effort (ri"aril,
uses soft (ower to sueed against the %KK: Filitar, in&ol&e"ent .hard (ower> would be li"ited to @O0 units with uniLue irregular
warfare a(abilities to use against the %KK: 2s the Honorable 'olin %owell .2004> stated, 12s the %resident "ade lear on Fa, 7,
2008, we use all the tools of di(lo"a,, law enfore"ent, intelligene, and finaneQ:!he use of fore has been I and re"ains I our
last resort:5P2 0or the (ast se&eral "onths, the !urkish "ilitar, has onduted both air and li"ited ground attaks against %KK
targets, but this will not eli"inate the %KK: It "a, ha&e so"e affet towards fraturing the %KK, but these ations will not delink or
deresoure their efforts: !urke, is onerned about Kurdish autono", and the situation with the %KK onl, fuels aggression: B,
i"(le"enting aggressi&e di(lo"a, through @' and an effeti&e IO a"(aign, the I%KK!0 ould build allianes and "edia su((ort
against the %KK: Filitaril,, the use of @O0 ould restrit terrorist "o&e"ents and redue a(abilities through %KK interdition:
Eono"is and finane would build and strengthen regional eono"ies while disru(ting %KK finane "ethods: Intelligene would
ontinue to su((ort all ele"ents of national and international (ower to disru(t the %KK (ower base: 0inall,, the use of
law enfore"ent an interdit and arrest those onduting transnational ri"inal ati&ities to su((ort the %KK, while training regional
Kurds in hek(oint seurit, o(erations at border rossings: !here are a ",riad of tasks to oordinate for I%KK!0 su((ort to sueed:
One suessful the !urkish go&ern"ent would ha&e to ree&aluate its go&ern"ental and "ilitar, (oli, onerning troo(s on the
northern IraL border: @tabilit, and seurit, ould again gain "o"entu": 2dditionall,, interditing the %KK4s abilit, to "anage their
legal and illegal funding strea"s would restore a sense of assurane to our Euro(ean allies: 2 threat to Euro(ean eono"ies is a threat
to $@ eono"ies: %owell .2004> o""ented, 1E&er,one knows 2"eria and Euro(e needs eah other:::5P8 @ituational threats, like
those (osed b, the %KK, are beo"ing "ore (re&alent within the 27st entur,: If regional stabilit,, seurit,, and growth are to
ontinue then the $@- needs to align its (oliies and strategies internationall, to ahie&e effeti&e results: 'hiarelli with @"ith .2006>
noted, 1In the inreasing interonneted, interde(endent, and dangerous world we li&e in, the $:@: annot assu"e that it will be able to
retreat fro" other nations4 (roble"s for &er, long:5P4 !his is beo"ing e&ident regarding the !urke,, K/-, IraL, and %KK situation
in northern IraL: 2lthough the $@ National @eurit, @trateg, is lear onerning $:@: desires to eli"inate terroris", what is not lear
in ter"s of (oli, is the le&el of $:@: inter&ention: +n order to retain regional stability within northern
+ra$ and reaffir" allianes the $@- needs to reassess its strategies, inrease the le&el of inter&ention, and e"(lo, all its ele"ents of
(ower against the %KK: 2s a future onern to $@- (oli, "akers and i"(ortane to Kurdish issues, 2liDa Farus .2006> noted,
1!he risis in IraL and tensions o&er (otential Kurdish se(aratist interests there undersore that the region4s so"e 2<
"illion Kurds will long re"ain a soure of instabilit, for the go&ern"ents that rule the" and the western
(owers that tr, to influene e&ents there:5P=
;lobal nuclear war
%orsi 2< .Gero"e, %h:D: in %olitial @iene I Har&ard $ni&ersit,, 1?ar with Iran is
I""inent5, ?orld Net Dail,, 7-<, htt(#99www:worldnetdail,:o"9news9artile:as(C
2/!I'LERIDN=8PPH>
If a broader war breaks out in IraL, Ol"ert will ertainl, fae (ressure to send the Israel "ilitar,
into the -aDa after Ha"as and into Lebanon after HeDbollah: If that ha((ens, it will onl, be a "atter of ti"e
before Israel and the $:@: ha&e no hoie but to in&ade @,ria: !he IraL war ould Luikl, s(in into a
regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines read, to launh an air and "issile strike on Iran that
ould inlude tatial nulear wea(ons: ?ith /ussia read, to deli&er the S7 billion !O/ F-7 surfae-to-air "issile
defense s,ste" to Iran, "ilitar, leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attak Iran: Now that /ussia and 'hina ha&e in&ited Iran to
;oin their @hanghai 'oo(eration %at, will /ussia and 'hina sit b, idl, should the $:@: look like we are winning a
wider regional war in the Fiddle EastC If we get "ore dee(l, in&ol&ed in IraL, 'hina "a, ha&e their
"o"ent to go after !aiwan one and for all: 2 broader regional war ould easil, lead into a third
world war, "uh as ?orld ?ars I and II began:
Plans modeling restricts %hinese strikes on 3ighur separatists
6ergen and 'owland 1= .%eter Bergen, 'NN National @eurit, 2nal,st, Gennifer
/owland, @(eial to 'NN, 12 Dangerous New ?orld of Drones,5 'NN News, Otober
<, 2072, htt(#99www:nn:o"920729709079o(inion9bergen-world-of-drones>
But without an international fra"ework go&erning the use of drone attaks, the $ nited @tates
is setting a dangerous precedent for other nations with its aggressi&e and sereti&e drone
(rogra"s in %akistan and *e"en, whih are ai"ed at sus(eted "e"bers of al Maeda and their allies:
Gust as the $:@: go&ern"ent ;ustifies its drone strikes with the argu"ent that it is at war
with al Maeda and its affiliates, one ould i"agine that India in the not too distant future "ight launh suh attaks
against sus(eted terrorists in Kash"ir, or %hina might strike 3ighur separatists in western 'hina, or
Iran "ight attak Baluhi nationalists along its border with %akistan:
&rone strikes are key --- suppresses >injiang separatist violence and instability
.rickson and -trange 15 .2ndrew Erikson, assoiate (rofessor at the Na&al ?ar
'ollege, 2ssoiate in /esearh at Har&ard $ni&ersit,Es 0airbank 'entre, 2ustin @trange,
researher at the Na&al ?ar 'ollegeEs 'hina Fariti"e @tudies Institute, graduate student
at The;iang $ni&ersit,, 1'hina Has Drones: Now How ?ill it $se !he"C5 0oreign
2ffairs, Fa, 2H, 2078, htt(#99www:nation"ulti"edia:o"9o(inion9'hina-has-drones-
Now-how-will-it-use-the"-802060H=:ht"l>
*et there is a reason wh, the $nited @tates has e"(lo,ed drones eAtensi&el, des(ite do"esti and international ritiis"# it is
"uh easier and hea(er to kill terrorists fro" abo&e than to tr, to root the" out through
long and eA(ensi&e ounterinsurgen, a"(aigns: @o"e si"ilar hallenges loo" on 'hinaEs horiDon:
?ithin 'hina, Bei;ing often onsiders (rotests and violence in the resti&e border regions, suh as >injiang and
!ibet, to onstitute terroris": It would (resu"abl, onsider ordering (reision strikes to
suppress an, future violenc e there. E&en if suh strikes are o(erationall, (rudent, 'hinaEs
leaders understand that the, would da"age the ountr,Es i"age abroad, but the, (rioritise internal stabilit, abo&e
all else: Do"esti sur&eillane b, drones is a different issueK there should be few barriers to its a((liation in what is alread, one
of the worldEs "ost hea&il, (olied soieties: 'hina "ight also be willing to use stealth drones in foreign airs(ae without
authorisation if the risk of detetion were low enoughK it alread, de(lo,s intelligene-gathering shi(s in the eAlusi&e eono"i Dones
of Ga(an and the $nited @tates, as well as in the Indian Oean:
)he impact is %hinese nuclear terrorism
Ferguson and Potter, ? ) (resident of the 0ederation of 2"erian @ientists, for"er
(ro;et diretor of the Inde(endent !ask 0ore on $:@: Nulear ?ea(ons %oli, at the
'ounil on 0oreign /elations, ad;unt (rofessor in the seurit, studies (rogra" at
-eorgetown $ni&ersit,, for"er sientist-in-residene at the Fontere, Institute4s 'enter
for Non(roliferation @tudies, winner of the 2008 /obert @: Landauer Leture 2ward fro"
the Health %h,sis @oiet,, onsultant for Oak /idge National Laborator,, @andia
National Laboratories, and the National Nulear @eurit, 2d"inistration, for"er (h,sial
sientist in the Offie of the @enior 'oordinator for Nulear @afet, at the $:@:
De(art"ent of @tate, o-hair"an of the $:@:-Ga(an Nulear ?orking -rou(, F:2: and
%h:D: in (h,sis fro" Boston $ni&ersit,, 2ND, @a" Nunn and /ihard Lugar %rofessor
of Non(roliferation @tudies and 0ounding Diretor of the Ga"es Fartin 'enter for
Non(roliferation @tudies at the Fontere, Institute of International @tudies, "e"ber of the
'ounil on 0oreign /elations, "e"ber of the International 2d&isor, Board of the 'enter
for %oli, @tudies in /ussia .'harles D: and ?illia" ':, 1!he 0our 0aes of Nulear
!erroris"5, Nulear !hreat Initiati&e, Fontere, Institute, 'enter for Non(roliferation
@tudies, 2004, htt(#99;effre,fields:net94269@ite9Blog9800P6208-7<2'-40'6-HE0D-
26'8270PD'<DRfiles9anal,sisR4faes:(df>
'hina has been graduall, "oderniDing its nulear arsenal: Howe&er, at this ti"e, it is unlear whether
this "oderniDation (rogra" will in- rease or derease seurit, risks that terrorists "ight
eA(loit: ?hile "ore 'hinese nulear wea(ons "ight "ean "ore o((ortunities for theft , a
"oderniDed fore "ight inor(orate "ore u(-to-date seurit, (roe- dures: Isolated storage and trans(ortation
links ould (ose inreased risks for an, nation4s nulear wea(ons seurit, (rogra": 'hina is be-
lie&ed to asse"ble nulear warheads at a nu"ber of nulear failities, and the Lo( Nur test site "a, ontain a storage
failit, for 'hinese nulear wea(ons .although it is (robabl, unused, sine 'hina has not tested a nulear wea(on
sine 7HHP>:=P Lo( Nur is re"otel, loated in northwest Jin;iang (ro&ine, where nationalist9se(aratist
organiDations ha&e been a"(aigning for autono", fro" Bei;ing: 2lthough Jin;iang se(aratist grou(s ha&e
not o(enl, eA(ressed interest in aLuiring nulear wea(ons, so"e re(orts ha&e alleged that $ighur se(aratists "a, ha&e
stolen radioati&e soures fro" Lo( Nur in 7HH8:=6 It is diffiult to offer an o&erall assess"ent of the seurit, of
'hina4s nulear ar"s against terrorists beause Bei;ing has a long-standing (ra- tie of not (ublishing sensiti&e infor"ation: In
addition, 'hina shows little onern .at least o(enl,> that nuclear terrorism can occur on
'hinese soil: ?hile this lak of onern "a, be ;ustified, the 'hinese go&ern"ent still has to fator in
seurit, threats (osed b, Jin;iang se(aratists and other grou(s that "a, engage in terroris" in
'hina: Nonetheless, the do"inant role of the 'hinese 'o""unist %art, and its seurit, a(- (aratus in 'hinese soiet,, and the
li"ited (resene of terrorist grou(s in 'hina, a((ear to redue substantiall, the danger that a terrorist or- ganiDation "ight gain ontrol
of an intat nulear wea(on in that ountr,: