Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Assailed before Us is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed
in toto the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-
478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep
with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a
ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into.
3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)
4
of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in
the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her
husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She
went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil. net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,
5
Marcelo Mendoza
6
and Fernando Ramos
7
in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.
8
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark
other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since
the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN
9
of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked
and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs
10
of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another
jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He
said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was
riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a
grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine
Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped
the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go
to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case
and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]
11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for
the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.
12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.
13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court,
we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda.
De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko
Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.
15

In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision
16
of the Court
of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge
17
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,
18
Marcelo Mendoza
19
and Fernando Ramos
20
should not be admitted in evidence for failure
of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130
21
to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former
case.
22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for
a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.
23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies
of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document
is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.
24
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.
25

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same
were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.
26
Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence
the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in
the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not
be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused
be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in
relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of
the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,
27
this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
28
admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion
that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial
of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to
object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find
such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.
29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how
the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
based on, quasi-delict.
30
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-
described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway
heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving
the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.
353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was
forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side
on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe
valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by
pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless
imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus
No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"
31

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the
bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his
having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.
x x x x
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.
32

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.
34
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.
35

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there
is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In
this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code.
36
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case
37
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
Supreme Court.
38
Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
39

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has
this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would
be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it
was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also
apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of
Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how
the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was
mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the
collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that
his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement
should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would
be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before
giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh.
14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly
head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake
another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
place.
x x x x
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very
fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.
40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
41
Under Article 2180
42
of the New Civil Code, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.
44

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
45
it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended
for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of
its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In
regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does
not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack
of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the
rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI.
46
How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI
know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to
all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
jeep.
47
As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,
must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.
48
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.
49
The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00.
50
The
award of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by
law.
51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the
award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages
shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J .:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its
own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil
liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one
single decision that has become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March
29, 2000
2
and the March 27, 2001
3
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
orderedDISMISSED."
4

The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
5

The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years,
nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his
death, plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for
one year at P2,500.00 a month,P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato
Torres, and the further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum ofP237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three
years at P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages and P200,000.00 as attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her
death, the sum ofP22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as
medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and
the further sum of P100,000.00 for moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors
fees ofP170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an
additional indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity
of her limbs, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as
loss of income, andP25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical
expenses, P800.00 for loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as
actual damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital
expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as
moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines,P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income
and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van,
the amount ofP250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked
vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had
become final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant
jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of
appeal filed in behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment
of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of
appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of
the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG
moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the ground that the OSGs authority
to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was however denied
per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss."
6
(Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee,
the employers subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA,
then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included
in the civil liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.
7

The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."
8

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner
contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The
former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped
bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may
do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.
9
Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe
penalty.
10
On the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their
right to civil liability. If the accused has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.
11

Appeal by the Accused Who J umps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal."
12

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.
Unless they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their
right to seek judicial relief.
13

Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to
one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this
wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial,
but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him
and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be
dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure]. x x x"
14

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction
of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against
them.
15
While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal.
16

Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before
it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become final and executory.
17

Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons
or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall
have been committed by them or their employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that
such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing
him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which
reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x x x x x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in
a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.
18
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the
basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.
19

It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and
allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in
Articles 32,
20
33,
21
34
22
and 2176
23
of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent"
of any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such
revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in
the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.
24

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -
- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.
25

This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that "[e]very
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
26

Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to
pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which
was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability
of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the
accuseds employer did not interpose an appeal."
27
Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in
which the employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking,
they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
28
Although in substance
and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in
the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double J eopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its
Appellants Brief
29
filed with the CA and from its Petition
30
before us, both of which claim that the trial
courts finding of guilt "is not supported by competent evidence."
31

An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is
then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant.
32
This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of
conviction.
33
Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the
lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
34

If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open
to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial
court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to
appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right
against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court
below final.
35
Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have
waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v.
Ang Gioc
36
ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x."
37

By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in
a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach
of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option.
38
Such conduct is intolerable and
does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
39

Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the
proper authorities becomes final and executory.
40

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the
accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in
the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of J udgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings
of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,
41
Alvarez v. CA
42
and Yusay v. Adil
43
do
not apply to the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these
cases to take part in the criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its
employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these
leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of
the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its
accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated
civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency.
44
The provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the
judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.
45
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the
judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.
46
In effect and implication,
the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.
47

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.
48
By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer
not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.
49

Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former
are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the
discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency.
50

The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination
must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;
51
and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with
due notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its
participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees
conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be
the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its
accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the
accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity
for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose
liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason
of his flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the
imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to
be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal
negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction
of the employee and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out
not only his primary civil liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal
negligence.
52

It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
53
It is
merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.
54
Hence, the legal requirements must
be strictly complied with.
55

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded.
56
Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be
tolerated.
57
In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have
to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those
cases.
58

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
59

In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings
before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process. It might have
lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
60
In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It
has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer
is engaged in some kind of industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful
act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from
the admissions of petitioner that "[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila,
a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioners driver,Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x."
61
Neither does petitioner dispute that
there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J .:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego
1
insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia
2
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is
only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed
"en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal
de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco,
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment"
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to
be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if
we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be
faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And,
as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in
a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case
3
was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,
4
People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
al.
5
and People of the Philippines v.Satorre
6
by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar
7
andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals
8
ruled differently. In the former, the
issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his
estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal
act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the
accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
9
requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted
as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.
10
departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency
of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the
names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases
11
raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego;
in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely
anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due
to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.
12
One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted
as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty
to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia
Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.
13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as
it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court
of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86,
14
are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property."
15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for
the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could
be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to
in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before
the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111
16
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator
17
of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala
18
where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses
for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than
those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
19
Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.


































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J .:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a
minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he
was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which
is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-
adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered
by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE
CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT,
AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR
RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a
copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed
was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of
the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same
given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.).
1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in
a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in
a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for
this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902
of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly
liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.)
3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import
of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage
to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed
out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime
under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or
private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his
counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from
the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of
the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or
"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as
clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.
4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without
the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
5
On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation
does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial
action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it
that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.










FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129282. November 29, 2001]
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
ECCI), petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA
VILLEGAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The Case
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative,
Inc. (DMPI-ECCI) seeks the annulment of the order
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 20, granting the motion for reconsideration of respondent Eriberta Villegas, and
thus reversing the previous dismissal of Civil Case No. CV-94-214.
The Facts
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa
[2]
against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to
account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas
entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of petitioner.
Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint
[3]
against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner
DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the
same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the following
grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts,
and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping as required by
Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91.
[4]

On December 12, 1996, the trial court issued an order
[5]
dismissing Civil Case No. CV-94-
214. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
[6]
of the order.
On February 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order
[7]
granting respondents motion for
reconsideration, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.
[8]

The Issues
The issues raised are: (1) whether the plaintiffs failure to attach a certification against
forum shopping in the complaint is a ground to dismiss the case;
[9]
and, (2) whether the civil case
could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of
the civil action.
The Courts Ruling
On the first issue, Circular No. 28-91
[10]
of the Supreme Court requires a certificate of non-
forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994
[11]
by extending the requirement to all
initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Villegas failure to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping in her complaint
did not violate Circular No. 28-91, because at the time of filing, the requirement applied only to
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
[12]
Likewise, Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 is inapplicable for the reason that the complaint was filed on March 29, 1994,
three days before April 1, 1994, the date of effectivity of the circular.
[13]

On the second issue, as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first
is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the
victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in
nature.
[14]

Thus, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
[15]
This is the law
governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil
liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential
damages.
[16]

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the commission
of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the
criminal action or is separately instituted.
Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000, provides that:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. [Emphasis
supplied]
Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that
After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal
action. [Emphasis supplied]
However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed.
Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
[17]

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and
waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may
be prosecuted separately even without a reservation.
[18]

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.
The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil
actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case.
Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
[19]

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the
fraud commited against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed
independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the order dated
February 21, 1997.
[20]

No costs. SO ORDERED.

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1984 May
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 129
G.R. No. L-39999, Padilla et al. v.
CA, 129 SCRA 558
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
May 31, 1984
G.R. No. L-39999
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE
FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Sisenando Villaluz, Sr. for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondent.
, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which
reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the
crime of grave coercion on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal
ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the complainants
as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC,
ROBERTO ROSALES, VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO,
and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION,
committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo,
Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does,
by confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority
of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located
at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other
massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions:
Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to
pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in
the amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly
and severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher
Villanoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino
and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their
criminal participation in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
contended that the trial court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the
evidence. According to the petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the
clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was
a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the
demolition of the complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the
market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five
months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged
the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages,
P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay
jointly and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the
defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil
liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion
was committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the
law into their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as
evidence on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING
PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY
AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED
ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT
WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION
THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING
THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS'
PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER
6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT
CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF
ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, TO PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the
criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the
defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed
upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the
return of the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but
must be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount (People v.
Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623;
People v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v.
Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not
because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no
dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and
other instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were
acquitted because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly
constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be
employed against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar.
...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of
these offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The
information under which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either
threats or malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by
means of threats', it does not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is
entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made
to enter into trial upon a valid information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual
damages suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss
of some of their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev.
Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In
the instant case, the fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of
the stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by
the accused. And since there is no showing that the complainants have reserved or
waived their right to institute a separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied
institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers
exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words,
the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in
Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act
or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused and, where
provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as a
crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these
two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. For instance, in
cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the
Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. - In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the
person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only
when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not
exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil.
558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and
malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil
liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would
not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led
to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of
the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a
declaration that the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist.
The civil action barred by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not bar a civil action
filed against an accused who had been acquitted in the criminal case if the criminal
action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other than the commission of
the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case
at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a
proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not
authorized nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and
regulations. (Republic v. Bello,120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established
in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been
accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the
serious implications of perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge of the
entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil
action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced
by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing
that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his
policemen, forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside
the store of Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the
goods were taken out from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio
Vergara. Since then up to the trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out
from the store nor the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time
complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some
members of his police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and
hammers, demolished the stall of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and
after having first inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them
brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the
Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise thus taken away, the latter
refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants
Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate
what they considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and
in fact. The couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which
allowed them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a
nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of
the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban,
pursuant to the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an
inventory of the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier
cited, that "when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may be instituted." According to some scholars, this
provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by
a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following
the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the
accused on reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative
answer to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct
and separate actions, and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil
action, or one based on quasi-delict or other independent civil action, and of
presenting the same evidence: (b) save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the
prosecution of the civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of
the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of permitting the
reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict, or quasi-delict, or other
independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of
the Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the
civil action based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate
action, and therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To
dismiss the civil action upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of
any other civil action, would likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable
doubt without any significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are
distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry
and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same
proceedings damages against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt.
Such doctrine must recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions,
the nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of
a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and that the injured party is
entitled to damages not because the act or omission is punishable but because he was
damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-
289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to
grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The
Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no statement that
such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering
damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of
acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can
stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear
showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a
provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the
victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act may be accorded the justice which he
seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent
of the legislator that they could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult
for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation by making a separate civil action
mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from
civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has
given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was
due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the
criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result
of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for
the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established
or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully
terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may,
of course, choose to file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil
action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err
in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.




























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili for petitioner.
Bengzon Villegas and Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SANCHEZ, J .:
The Court of First Instance of Manila
1
sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome,
these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,
2
the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,
the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat
would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.
3

1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings"
4
of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all
the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based".
5
This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based";
6
and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it".
7

A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack.
8
The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn.
9
A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence
10
presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved".
11
This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A
decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long
as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is
no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence
for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires".
12
Indeed,
"the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere
fact that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into
consideration or even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own
testimony", would not vitiate the judgment.
13
If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony
of each witness for, or each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that
the court has overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence.
14
At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an
issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it.
15

Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon".
16
They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue".
17
A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties."
18

2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
19
That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business
of this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact.
20

With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut".
21

And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was
no guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to
make arrangements upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation.
We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like
defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to
honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it
allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it
issues are to be honored or not.
22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention,
thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question.
Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and
defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
x x x x x x x x x
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-
1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for,
a first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong.
23

We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court.
24
Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court
of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error".
25
We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court.
26

If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in
the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such
is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which
the Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and
was entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight.
27
We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner.
28
Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue".
29
And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat
and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager".
30
Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral
damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;
31
and that the decision of the Court of
Appeals fails to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this
issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of
Europe with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan
American World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila.
32

x x x x x x x x x
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
33

x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that
there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein.
34
The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of
the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man;
35
and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required.
36
On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither.
37

The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white
man. Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him
when all the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked
out as the one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and
indignity of being ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the
white man the improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the
more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat.
We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the
testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning
of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for
first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of
the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19,
1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The
defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white
man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid
and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules
of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does
find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first
class" seat because the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man".
38

It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."
39

And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that
he was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a
"white man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the
"first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the
corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him.
40

5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law.
41
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
42

6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation.
43
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.
44

Thus, "Where a steamship company
45
had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected."
46
And this, because, although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort".
47
And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad
train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the
train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic,"
48
and
the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.1awphl. nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by
the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and
she said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind.
That is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note
anything there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough
leg room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there.
He told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony.
49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible.
49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died
down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae.
50
For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant".
51
The
utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.
52
It thus escapes the
operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner."
53
The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.
54

9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given.
55
We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court.
56
The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give
our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.
57

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.





























FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003]
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,
vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD
& PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs
of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which has modified
the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig
City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on
account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening,
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing
a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who,
between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie
Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that
it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security
guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and
Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned
task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of
P50,000.00;
b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
d) Costs of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack
of merit.
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.
[1]

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the
appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees,
the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees.
[2]

The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have
then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already
existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed
to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to
link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to
show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely
established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by
the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by
Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes
could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the
appellate court; viz:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY
DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR
NAVIDAD, JR.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA.
[3]

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence
and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of
a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a
common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins
assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act
of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA
would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis
because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended
that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad
paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that
the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common
carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature
of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.
[4]
The Civil
Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
[5]
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long
as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage.
[6]
The statutory provisions render a
common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
[7]
In case of such death or injury,
a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and
[8]
by simple
proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault
or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.
[9]
In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,
[10]
an
exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.
[11]

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its
obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In
either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only
be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176
[12]
and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180,
[13]
of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for
the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made
liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how
then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an
independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same
act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the
other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194
[14]
of the Civil Code can well apply.
[15]
In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.
[16]
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said
to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
[17]

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of
the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the
Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor
(Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has
not been duly proven x x x. This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself
is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from
liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is
not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can
be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is
untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by him.
[18]
It is an established rule that nominal damages
cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
[19]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is
DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.








Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS A. LUNA and CLARITA S. LUNA, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
Some time in October 1986, private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a
FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig
Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S.
Luna.
In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In order to replace the
lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security
procedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the
principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
On 06 October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and
another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the
lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who promptly had it verified
through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis
was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this
incident.
In a letter, dated 11 October 1988, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from
FEBTC the payment of damages. Adrian V. Festejo, a vice-president of the bank, expressed the
bank's apologies to Luis. In his letter, dated 03 November 1988, Festejo, in part, said:
In cases when a card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the
necessary action to avert its unauthorized use (such as tagging the card as hotlisted), as it is
always our intention to protect our cardholders.
An investigation of your case however, revealed that FAREASTCARD failed to inform you
about its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Bank's Credit Card
Department did not consider the possibility that it may have been you who was presenting
the card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident occurred).
1

Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that
private respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, Food and Beverage
Manager of the Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the credibility of private respondent had
never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by Festejo.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988, filed a complaint for
damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings, rendered a decision
ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b) P50,000.00
exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC has come to this
Court with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.
2
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
3
Exceptionally, in a contract
of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault
(which is presumed
4
) of the common carrier.
5

Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can
sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents.
Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross
as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad
faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
6

We are not unaware of the previous rulings of this Court, such as in American Express International,
Inc., vs.Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 209) and Bank of Philippine Islands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court(206 SCRA 408), sanctioning the application of Article 21, in relation
to Article 2217 and Article 2219
7
of the Civil Code to a contractual breach similar to the case at bench.
Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus,
even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of contract, its
application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith.
Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that
clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code
authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud
or bad faith.
Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, in his ponencia in Fores vs. Miranda
8
explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be
discarded. We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil.
523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599; Necesito, et al. vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23]
4023), that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of
the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which
provide as follows:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud
(dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term
"analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the
damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual
relations between the parties."
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in
the death of a passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil. 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider,
September 11, 1958). But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that
where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice
or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of
such malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award
moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the
part of the defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the
law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
xxx xxx xxx
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong
doing and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored
(Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference
was in the mind of the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages
to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross
as to amount to malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is
not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier's employees.
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for
breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles on tort
9
even
where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant (Phil. Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil. Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air France vs.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it
can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort
independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of a
contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually
bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents'
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or
omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a separate cause of action or as an
independent actionable tort.
The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by the
appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are intended to serve as an example or as correction for
the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages (Art. 2229,
Civil Code; seePrudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, 148 SCRA 440; Lopez vs. Pan American
World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). In criminal offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art. 2230, Civil Code). In quasi-
delicts, such damages are granted if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross
negligence as to approximate malice (See Art. 2231, Civil Code; CLLC E.G. Gochangco Workers
Union vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655; Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778).
In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant is found
to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil
Code; PNB vs. Gen. Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449).
Given the above premises and the factual circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as
arduous to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below (see De Leon vs. Court of
Appeals, 165 SCRA 166).
Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221
of the Civil Code providing thusly:
Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where the court deems such recovery to be just and
equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate
court in allowing the award thereof by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is given due course. The appealed decision is MODIFIED by
deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents; in its stead, petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of nominal
damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR
LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J .:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady
of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake,
were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of
petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando
Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction
by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on
the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent corporation's motion to
dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No,
TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued
on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as
the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that
"criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action."
2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision
4
affirming the questioned order of the trial court.
5
A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.
6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action.
7
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
8
The
nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but the body of the
pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities,
pleadings as well as remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims.
9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial
highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement
culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal,
also constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening
which was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks
fence which separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves
as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the
same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year
after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which
utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected
galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ...
10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to
wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
11

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of
damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio,
12
the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party
who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be
liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject
of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa
aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil
Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury
or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or
omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law"
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary.
13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain ...
14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals,
15
this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
16
the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no
logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the
independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay
City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.
SO ORDERED.

































FIRST DIVISION

JEROME CASTRO, G.R. No. 180832
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

July 23, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J .:


This petition for review on certiorari
[1]
emanated from the complaint for
grave oral defamation
[2]
filed by Albert P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.

The facts follow.

On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans
son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his
disciplinary probation.
[3]
Upon Tans request, RIS reconsidered its decision but
imposed non-appealable conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from
participating in the graduation ceremonies.

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed)
for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of
1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code
[4]
against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal
of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After
investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS code violation point system allowed the
summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in
law). The system therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it.
[5]


Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit
Justin Albert without any condition.
[6]
Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and
participate in the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent
at RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he was
contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their personal capacities,
including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.

Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him
that Tan was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before
they hung up, petitioner told Ching:

Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats
dangerous.

Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him
was dangerous.

Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21, 2003.

On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60
[7]
under the
following Information:

That on or about the 13
th
day of March, 2003 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate intent of
bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor, disrepute
and contempt, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
speak and utter the following words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching:
OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE
CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN], THATS
DANGEROUS.

and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a
dangerous person. Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking to Tan
was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioners statement
shocked him as it portrayed him as someone capable of committing undesirable
acts. He added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he
filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed.

For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite
the latters complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing
with Ching (whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few
days after RIS 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never
said or insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-examination,
however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of Chings statement.

The MeTC found that Chings statements in her affidavit and in open court
were consistent and that she did not have any motive to fabricate a false statement.
Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will
against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC
was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he
uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and
professional reputation.

In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation:
[8]


WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused,
Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance to Article
358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1 month and 1
day of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as maximum.


On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of
the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity between the parties, it found
petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on
August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that
prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground.
[9]


On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the RTC.
[10]
It
contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded
petitioners offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated
the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory
statement against Tan.

The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found petitioner guilty only
of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision.
[11]


Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
[12]
Hence, this
recourse.

Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the
petition for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the
RTC misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached
when the RTC acquitted him.

We grant the petition.

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
[13]
This constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court which provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or in information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

x x x x x x x x x

Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before
a competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and
(5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
[14]
Thus, an
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy.
[15]


The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,
[16]
when there was mistrial.
In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari
establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case.
[17]


The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this
reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of
petitioners statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral
defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the
RTCs erroneous evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.

What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those
involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a
petition for certiorari, cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings.
[18]
Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65
petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those
involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion).
[19]


Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking
cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the
RTC.
[20]
We therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of
the Civil Code
[21]
:

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

x x x x x x x x x

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;

x x x x x x x x x


Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model
for the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
[22]


WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007
decision and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 98649 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED.
Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral defamation as defined and
penalized in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111127 July 26, 1996
MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, INC.,
AMYLINE ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V. QUE, JR., ICLI
CORDOVA, ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO, RICHARD BAUTISTA,
JOCELYN GARCIA, YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE, EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO
NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O. LOPES, JULIUS CAESAR, GARCIA,
ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C. CLAVO, ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-MARA,
TERESITA REGALA, MELINDA TORRES, MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA CABATINGAN, MARA
NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS PLATA, MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MORTIZ, LIZA MAYO,
CARLOS RANARIO, ROSAMARIA T. RADOC and BERNADETTE FERRER, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
in CA-GR No. 28245,
dated September 30, 1992, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 58, ordering petitioners jointly and severally to pay damages to private respondent
Amyline Antonio, and its resolution which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a 1982 model Mazda minibus. They
used the bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired in 1981, after trying him out for
two weeks, His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica's College in Malate,
Manila.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF)
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from
Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private respondent paid petitioners the
amount of P3,000.00.
The group was scheduled to leave on November 2, 1984, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. However,
as several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of
Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the
minibus.
The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, sot hat petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first
trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Baay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At
11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to
east direction, which he described as "siete." The road was slippery because it was raining, causing
the bus, which was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder.
The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus
Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of
impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its
front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the
bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came down by a wooden seat which came off after
being unscrewed. It took three persons to safely remove her from this portion. She was in great pain
and could not move.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the
bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road. He said that he saw the curve when he
was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it
was too late.
The Lingayen police investigated the incident the next day, November 3, 1984. On the basis of their
finding they filed a criminal complaint against the driver, Porfirio Cabil. The case was later filed with
the Lingayen Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00 for the damage
to the latter's fence. On the basis of Escano's affidavit of desistance the case against petitioners
Fabre was dismissed.
Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case in the RTC of Makati, Metro Manila.
As a result of the accident, she is now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from
the waist down. During the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence
regarding the cost of her treatment and therapy. Immediately after the accident, she was taken to the
Nazareth Hospital in Baay, Lingayen. As this hospital was not adequately equipped, she was
transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives. An
x-ray was taken and the damage to her spine was determined to be too severe to be treated there.
She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the Philippine General Hospital and later to the Makati
Medical Center where she underwent an operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
In its decision dated April 17, 1989, the trial court found that:
No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly checked for travel to a long
distance trip and that the driver was properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendants
which ultimately resulted to the accident subject of this case.
Accordingly, it gave judgment for private respondents holding:
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline Antonio
were the only ones who adduced evidence in support of their claim for damages, the Court is
therefore not in a position to award damages to the other plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against defendants Mr. &
Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines and said defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs
the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees;
6) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline Antonio but
dismissed it with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that they failed to prove their respective
claims. The Court of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner Cabil failed to exercise due
care and precaution in the operation of his vehicle considering the time and the place of the
accident. The Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were themselves presumptively negligent.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE NEGLIGENT.
II. WHETHER OF NOT PETITIONERS WERE LIABLE FOR THE
INJURIES SUFFERED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
III WHETHER OR NOT DAMAGES CAN BE AWARDED AND IN
THE POSITIVE, UP TO WHAT EXTENT.
Petitioners challenge the propriety of the award of compensatory damages in the amount of
P600,000.00. It is insisted that, on the assumption that petitioners are liable an award of
P600,000.00 is unconscionable and highly speculative. Amyline Antonio testified that she was a
casual employee of a company called "Suaco," earning P1,650.00 a month, and a dealer of Avon
products, earning an average of P1,000.00 monthly. Petitioners contend that as casual employees
do not have security of tenure, the award of P600,000.00, considering Amyline Antonio's earnings, is
without factual basis as there is no assurance that she would be regularly earning these amounts.
With the exception of the award of damages, the petition is devoid of merit.
First, it is unnecessary for our purpose to determine whether to decide this case on the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual or on the theory of quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana as both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held, for although
the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature," nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort."
2
In either case, the question is whether the bus driver,
petitioner Porfirio Cabil, was negligent.
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus,
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we
regard as final and conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by
Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and as a consequence, the road was slippery, and
it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead.
However, it is undisputed that Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead.
3
By then it was too late for him
to avoid falling off the road. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabil's first
one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony
4
that
the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at
50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Considering the foregoing the fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark,
that he drove his bus at 50 kilometers an hour when even on a good day the normal speed was only
20 kilometers an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and
should be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that
his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervisions of their
employee.
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a
professional driver's license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications,
experience and record of service.
5
Due diligence in supervision, on the other hand, requires the
formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and issuance of proper instructions as
well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
6

In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not
consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only, from their homes to the St.
Scholastica's College in Metro Manila.
7
They had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They
had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as
whether he could remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were
irrelevant to his qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La
Union was his first. The existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an employer.
8

Petitioners argue that they are not liable because (1) an earlier departure (made impossible by the
congregation's delayed meeting) could have a averted the mishap and (2) under the contract, the
WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip. Neither of these contentions hold water.
The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the
cause of the accident. With respect to the second contention, it was held in an early case that:
[A] person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to which he
wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from
a collision between the automobile and a train, caused by the negligence or the automobile driver.
9

As already stated, this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not
have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them. As this Court has held:
10

Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully
avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from
a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately
refrained from making such distinctions.
As common carriers, the Fabres were found to exercise "extraordinary diligence" for
the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee. As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the former's employees although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
The same circumstances detailed above, supporting the finding of the trial court and of the appellate
court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify findings them
guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
Secondly, we sustain the award of damages in favor of Amyline Antonio. However, we think the
Court of Appeals erred in increasing the amount of compensatory damages because private
respondents did not question this award as inadequate.
11
To the contrary, the award of P500,000.00
for compensatory damages which the Regional Trial Court made is reasonable considering the contingent
nature of her income as a casual employee of a company and as distributor of beauty products and the
fact that the possibility that she might be able to work again has not been foreclosed. In fact she testified
that one of her previous employers had expressed willingness to employ her again.
With respect to the other awards, while the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals do
not sufficiently indicate the factual and legal basis for them, we find that they are nevertheless
supported by evidence in the records of this case. Viewed as an action for quasi delict, this case falls
squarely within the purview of Art. 2219(2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases
of quasi delict. On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage, the award
of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabil's gross negligence
amounted to bad faith.
12
Amyline Antonio's testimony, as well as the testimonies of her father and
copassengers, fully establish the physical suffering and mental anguish she endured as a result of the
injuries caused by petitioners' negligence.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees was also properly made. However, for the
same reason that it was error for the appellate court to increase the award of compensatory
damages, we hold that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral damages and reduce
the award of attorney's fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in whose favor the awards were
made, have not appealed.
13

As above stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals can be sustained either on the theory of quasi
delict or on that of breach of contract. The question is whether, as the two courts below held,
petitioners, who are the owners and driver of the bus, may be made to respond jointly and severally
to private respondent. We hold that they may be. In Dangwa Trans. Co. Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,
14
on facts similar to those in this case, this Court held the bus company and the driver jointly
and severally liable for damages for injuries suffered by a passenger. Again, in Bachelor Express,
Inc. v. Court of
Appeals
15
a driver found negligent in failing to stop the bus in order to let off passengers when a fellow
passenger ran amuck, as a result of which the passengers jumped out of the speeding bus and suffered
injuries, was held also jointly and severally liable with the bus company to the injured passengers.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another
vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo,
16
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
1
7 and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
18
the
bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latters' heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability
was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals,
19
thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner] springs
from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56
Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of
the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Some members of the Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances
they are liable on quasi-delict.
20

It is true that in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
21
this Court exonerated the
jeepney driver from liability to the injured passengers and their families while holding the owners of the
jeepney jointly and severally liable, but that is because that case was expressly tried and decided
exclusively on the theory of culpa contractual. As this Court there explained:
The trial court was therefore right in finding that Manalo (the driver) and spouses Mangune and
Carreon (the jeepney owners) were negligent. However, its ruling that spouses Mangune and
Carreon are jointly and severally liable with Manalo is erroneous. The driver cannot be held jointly
and severally liable with carrier in case of breach of the contract of carriage. The rationale behind
this is readily discernible. Firstly, the contract of carriage is between the carrier is exclusively
responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such breach be due to the negligence of his driver
(see Viluan v. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21477-81, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).
22

As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this case and her coplaintiffs did not stake out their
claim against the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much less on that of breach of
contract alone. After all, it was permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action and join as
many parties as may be liable on such causes of action
23
so long as private respondent and her
coplaintiffs do not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the cases is the intent of the
plaintiff there to recover from both the carrier and the driver, thus, justifying the holding that the carrier
and the driver were jointly and severally liable because their separate and distinct acts concurred to
produce the same injury.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to award
of damages. Petitioners are ORDERED to PAY jointly and severally the private respondent Amyline
Antonio the following amounts:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the reasonable amount of loss of earning capacity of plaintiff Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) 25% of the recoverable amount as attorney's fees; and
6) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.




















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION


G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.


MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and
awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for
breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then
a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of
about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the
back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal
third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the
fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in
the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months
and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the
contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of
liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to
Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that
Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed
the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of
Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would
be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails
the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the
owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and,
therefore, the principle ofres judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case
No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage
caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable
on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
2
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts.
1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and
his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate
the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the
safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for
the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose,
and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the
highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging
or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating
capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which
the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension
seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many
victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers
assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's
contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
inevitable.
3
This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor
did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.
4
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding
two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without
basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that
school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that
school year. She testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major
in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she
cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic
Surgeon also certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She
likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education as her major subject,
because "my left leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the
injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a
breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.
5
As an
exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases
in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
6

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding
by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by
Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.



































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975
PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-appellees.
Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.
Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J .:
Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order
dated October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil
case 1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.
In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and
driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles)
struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The
impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a
result of which he died.
Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the
Court of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay
Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court (criminal
case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo
Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and dismissing the complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned.
With costs against the defendant Romeo Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted
Punzalan, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the accused
has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)
After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This
proved futile; the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the
same court against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the
provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1)
bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action.
Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss
on the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas
questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to
this Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.
The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5,
1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability
arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.
The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In
construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal
implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences
must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the
court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances.
It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly
its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said
judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful
study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances,
would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of
the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the
corresponding indemnity therefor.
Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs)
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended
party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission.
In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil
Code, which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any
inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their
subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by
Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter
application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo
returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity
awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double
recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court notes that the same
judge * tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and
circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when he rendered judgment in
the criminal action.
In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a
quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas
to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary
award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the
determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or
"gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatever. The substance of such
statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances,
makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the
civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by
including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to adopt the
same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case
1158-O.
There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal
portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting
from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous
and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must
surely have a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more
interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other
interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.
It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy
that extreme degree of care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for
dispute, debate or interpretation.
We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against
Robles whose concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O,
subsists.
ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case
1079-O is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
conformably with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to costs.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 114841-42 August 23, 1995
ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARLITO D. CASTILLO, HEIRS OF CRISTETA CASTILLO and
CORNELIO CASTILLO,respondents.

REGALADO, J .:
Assailed in this appeal by certiorari is the judgment
1
of respondent appellate court rendered in CA-G.R
CV Nos. 29976-77, which affirmed with modifications the judgment of the trial court by increasing the
award of damages to herein private respondents. While the increased awards could arguably have been
justified, it was the inaction of private respondents that now militate against the same.
Sometime in 1982, petitioner company commenced the construction of a steel fabrication plant in the
Municipality of Bauan, Batangas, necessitating dredging operations at the Batangas Bay in an area
adjacent to the real property of private respondents.
As an offshoot of said dredging operations, an action for damages against herein petitioner Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. was filed by Carlito D. Castillo which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 10276, and another action by Cristeta Castillo for herself and as guardian of Cornelio
Castillo, docketed as Civil Case No. 10696.
On August 19, 1985, the above-mentioned cases were consolidated, as the plaintiffs therein
intended to present common evidence against defendant,
2
by reason of the virtual identity of the
issues involved in both cases.
Private respondents alleged that during the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard,
petitioner's personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land belonging
to private respondents without their consent. These heavy equipment damaged big portions of
private respondents' property which were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without
paying any rent therefor, nor does it appear from the records that such use of their land was with the
former's conformity.
Private respondents further alleged that as a result of the dredging operation of petitioner company,
the sea silt and water overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Consequently, the said
property which used to be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production and each
averaging an annual net harvest of 75 cavans, could no longer be planted with palay as the soil
became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture.
3

Petitioner company denied all the allegations of private respondents and contended that its
personnel and equipment had neither intruded upon nor occupied any portion of private respondents'
landholdings. The alleged sea silt with water, according to petitioner was due to the flood brought by
the heavy rains when typhoon "Ruping" hit and lashed the province of Batangas in 1982.
4

On September 6, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision with this fallo:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant:
1) To pay Carlito Castillo the sum of P65,240.00 plus legal interest from the time of the filing
of his complaint;
2) To pay the heirs of Cristeta Castillo the sum of P32,630.00 plus legal interest from the
time of the filing of her complaint;
3) To pay Cornelio Castillo the sum of P47,490.00 with legal interest from the time of the
filing of his complaint;
4) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as exemplary damages;
5) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 each as attorney's fees;
6) To pay the costs of suit.
5

Dissatisfied with said judgment, petitioner company appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 29,
1994, respondent court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with the following modifications:
Ordering defendant-appellant to pay:
1. Carlito Castillo the following amounts:
a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P56,290.00 with
legal interest from the time of the finality of this decision until
the same shall have been fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of this suit.
2. Cornelio Castillo the following sums:
a) Compensatory damages in the amount of P255,401.25
with legal interest from the time of the finality of this decision
up to the time the amount is fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of this suit;
3. Cristeta Castillo the following amount(s):
a) Compensatory damages of P249,815.62 with legal interest
from the time this decision becomes final until the amount is
fully paid;
b) Exemplary damages of P10,000.00;
c) Attorney's fees of P10,000.00; and
d) Costs of suit.
6

Petitioner company is now before us, arguing for nullification or, at least, partial modification of
respondent court's judgment on the bases of the following assignment of errors:
I
That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals exercised its judicial power and discretion
in a most arbitrary, capricious and whimsical manner by awarding against the petitioner,
unconscionable, unreasonable and excessive damages clearly not warranted under Articles
20 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
II
That grave and patent abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial power constitute a
ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari . . .
III
That the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code
which states that: "the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant" when it condemned the petitioner as a result of its dredging operations, to
pay private respondents not only the expected total amount of profits the latter would have
derived from the expected sale of their palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from
the half hectare agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of
their said entire landholdings.
7

The evidence on record indubitably support the findings of the trial and appellate courts that
petitioner company is liable for the destruction of the property of herein private respondents and
consequently entitle the latter to an award of the damages prayed for. Such conclusions and findings
of fact by the lower courts are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for
strong and cogent reasons, none of which, however, obtain in the case at bar. The fact that the
appellate court adopted the findings of the trial court, as in this case, makes the same binding upon
the Supreme Court, for the factual findings of said appellate court are generally binding on the latter.
For that matter the findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, and which are supported by substantial
evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme Court.
8

Hence, on this aspect of its recourse, petitioner cannot expect a reversal since it is a basic rule that
only questions of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases thus brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited
to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it.
9
It is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh such evidence all over again. Its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have
been committed by the lower court. Barring a showing that the factual findings complained of are totally
devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for the Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties.
10

However, this Court finds that respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in
increasing the amount of damages awarded to private respondents by the court a quo.
Respondent appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the judgment of the trial court
by increasing the award of damages in favor of private respondents who, in the first place, did not
interpose an appeal therefrom. This being the case, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication made by the lower court. As to them, the judgment of the court below may be said to
have attained finality.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who has not himself appealed
cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision
of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed. He can assign errors on
appeal if such are required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. Such assigned
errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on
other grounds, but not for the purpose of modifying the judgment in the appellee's favor and giving
him other affirmative reliefs.
11

WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED with
regard to the amount of damages awarded to private respondents and the awards of the trial court
on this matter are hereby reinstated for that purpose. In all other respects, the decision of
respondent court is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.