G.R. No.

129029 April 3, 2000

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES a! ROSARIO P. "Y #$or %&r'&l$ a! o (&%al$
o$ )%& *ior' +aria L,i'a, Fra-i' E!.ar!, Fra-i' +ar/ a! Fra-i' Ra$a&l, all
',ra*&! "01, respondents.
PAR"O, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision
1
of the Court of
Appeals
2
affirming the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court,
3
as follows:
IN I!" #$ T%! $#&!'#IN', (udgment is here)* rendered
dismissing the appeals interposed )* )oth accused and &e*es
Truc+ing Corporation and affirming the ,ecision and -upplemental
,ecision dated .une /, 1002 and #cto)er 2/, 1002 respectivel*.
-# #&,!&!,.
1
The facts are as follows:
#n #cto)er 12, 1030, 4rovincial 4rosecutor 4atricio T. ,urian of Isa)ela filed with the
&egional Trial Court, Isa)ela, 5ranch 10, Caua*an an amended information charging
&omeo ,unca * de Tumol with rec+less imprudence resulting in dou)le homicide and
damage to propert*, reading as follows:
That on or a)out the 22th da* of .une, 1030, in the 6unicipalit* of
Caua*an, 4rovince of Isa)ela, 4hilippines, and within the (urisdiction
of this %onora)le Court, the said accused )eing the driver and person7
in7charge of a Trailer Truc+ Tractor )earing 4late No. N2A73/8
registered in the name of &afael &e*es Truc+ing Corporation, with a
load of 2,222 cases of empt* )ottles of )eer grande, willfull*,
unlawfull* and feloniousl* drove and operated the same while along
the National %ighwa* of 5aranga* Tagaran, in said 6unicipalit*, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without ta+ing the necessar*
precautions to prevent in(uries to persons and damage to propert*,
causing )* such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said
trailer truc+ to hit and )ump a Nissan 4ic+7up )earing 4late No. 55'7
098 driven )* $eliciano 5alcita and $rancisco ,*, .r., : 4ac;uing,
due to irreversi)le shoc+, internal and e<ternal hemorrhage and
multiple in(uries, open wounds, a)rasions, and further causing
damages to the heirs of $eliciano 5alcita in the amount of
4122,222.22 and to the death of $rancisco ,*, .r.= : 4ac;uing and
damages to his Nissan 4ic+7>p )earing 4late No. 55'7098 in the
total amount of 42,222,222.22.
C#NT&A&? T# @A".
Caua*an, Isa)ela, #cto)er 12, 1030.
A-gd.B $A>-T# C. CA5ANTAC
Third Assistant 4rovincial 4rosecutor
>pon arraignment on #cto)er 23, 1030, the accused entered a plea of not guilt*. #n the
same occasion, the offended parties A&osario 4. ,* and minor children and Angelina 6.
5alcita and minor son 4aoloB made a reservation to file a separate civil action against
the accused arising from the offense charged.
9
#n Novem)er 20, 1030, the offended
parties actuall* filed with the &egional Trial Court, Isa)ela, 5ranch 10, Caua*an a
complaint against petitioner &afael &e*es Truc+ing Corporation, as emplo*er of driver
&omeo ,unca * de Tumol, )ased onquasi delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the
heirs of $eliciano 5alcita Athe driver of the other vehicle involved in the accidentB. The
private respondents opted to pursue the criminal action )ut did not withdraw the civil
case quasi ex delicto the* filed against petitioner. #n ,ecem)er 19, 1030, private
respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and manifested that the* would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action.
/
%owever, the* did not withdraw the separate civil action )ased on quasi
delict against petitioner as emplo*er arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.
8
>pon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated )oth criminal and civil cases
and conducted a (oint trial of the same.
The facts, as found )* the trial court, which appear to )e undisputed, are as follows:
The defendant &afael &e*es Truc+ing Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the )usiness of transporting )eer products for
the -an 6iguel Corporation A-6C for -hortB from the latterCs -an
$ernando, 4ampanga plant to its various sales outlets in @uDon.
Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truc+ trailer descri)ed
a)ove driven )* &omeo ,unca * Tumol, a dul* licensed driver. Aside
from the CorporationCs memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to
ph*sicall* inspect their vehicles )efore each trip A!<h. 19, pars. 1 E
9B, the -6CCs Traffic Investigator7Inspector certified the
roadworthiness of this "hite Truc+ trailer prior to .une 22, 1030
A!<h. 18B. In addition to a professional driverCs license, it also
conducts a rigid e<amination of all driver applicants )efore the* are
hired.
In the earl* morning of .une 22, 1030, the "hite Truc+ driven )*
,unca left Tuguegarao, Caga*an )ound to -an $ernando, 4ampanga
loaded with 2,222 cases of empt* )eer F'randeF )ottles. -eated at the
front right seat )eside him was $erdinand ,omingo, his truc+ helper
AFpahinanteF in 4ilipinoB. At around 1:22 oCcloc+ that same morning
while the truc+ was descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Caua*an, Isa)ela, it approached a damaged
portion of the road covering the full width of the truc+Cs right lane
going south and a)out si< meters in length. These made the surface of
the road uneven )ecause the potholes were a)out five to si< inches
deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As
narrated )* $erdinand ,omingo, )efore approaching the potholes, he
and ,unca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the
opposite direction. The* used to evade this damaged road )* ta+ing
the left lance )ut at that particular moment, )ecause of the incoming
vehicle, the* had to run over it. This caused the truc+ to )ounce
wildl*. ,unca lost control of the wheels and the truc+ swerved to the
left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, ,uncaCs vehicle
rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the
road and clim)ed a ridge a)ove said shoulder where it finall* stopped.
Asee !<h. A79, p. 3, recordB. The Nissan was severel* damaged A!<hs.
A78, A73, A70 and A711, pp. 0711 recordB, and its two passengers,
namel*: $eliciano 5alcita and $rancisco ,*, .r. died instantl* A!<h.
A710B from e<ternal and internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures
App. 19 and 1/, recordB.
$or the funeral e<penses of $rancisco ,*, .r. her widow spent
4/91,3/2.22 A!<h. I73B. At the time of his death he was 19 *ears old.
%e was the 4resident and Chairman of the 5oard of the ,*namic
"ood 4roducts and ,evelopment Corporation A,"4CB, a wood
processing esta)lishment, from which he was receiving an income of
412,222.22 a month. A!<h. ,B. In the Articles of Incorporation of the
,"4C, the spouses $rancisco ,*, .r. and &osario 4ereD ,* appear to
)e stoc+holders of 12,222 shares each with par value of 4122.22 per
share out of its outstanding and su)scri)ed capital stoc+ of /2,222
shares valued at 4/,222,222.22 A!<hs. G71 E 1275B. >nder its 1033
Income Ta< &eturns A!<h. .B the ,"4C had a ta<a)le net income of
483,100.32 A!<h. .B. $rancisco ,*, .r. was a @a -alle >niversit*
graduate in 5usiness Administration, past president of the 4asa*
.a*cees, National Treasurer and 4resident of the 4hilippine .a*cees in
1081 and 108/, respectivel*, and "orld ice74resident of .a*cees
International in 1080. %e was also the recipient of numerous awards
as a civic leader A!<h. CB. %is children were all stud*ing in prestigious
schools and spent a)out 4132,222.22 for their education in 1033 alone
A!<h. %71B.
As stated earlier, the plaintiffsC procurement of a writ of attachment of
the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal )* the Court of
Appeals. It was shown that on ,ecem)er 2/, 1030, ,eput* -heriff
!dgardo Ha)at of the &TC at -an $ernando, 4ampanga, attached si<
units of Truc+ Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at
-an $ernando, 4ampanga. These vehicles were +ept under 4C guard
)* the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to
operate them. %owever, on ,ecem)er 23, 1030, the Court of Appeals
dissolved the writ Ap. 32, recordB and on ,ecem)er 20, 1030, said
-heriff reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were ta+en )*
the defendantCs representative, 6elita 6anapil A!<h. #, p. 31, recordB.
The defendantCs general 6anager declared that it lost 421,222.22 per
da* for the non7operation of the si< units during their attachment Ap.
31, t.s.n., Natividad C. 5a)aran, proceedings on ,ecem)er 12, 1002B.
3
#n .une /, 1002, the trial court rendered a (oint decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"%!&!$#&!, in view of the foregoing considerations (udgment is
here)* rendered:
1. $inding the accused &omeo ,unca * de Tumol guilt* )e*ond
reasona)le dou)t of the crime of ,ou)le %omicide through &ec+less
Imprudence with violation of the 6otor ehicle @aw A&ep. Act No.
113/B, and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntar* surrender without an* aggravating circumstance to offset
the same, the Court here)* sentences him to suffer two A2B
indeterminate penalties of four months and one da* of arresto
mayor as minimum to three *ears, si< months and twent* da*s as
ma<imum= to indemnif* the %eirs of $rancisco ,*. .r. in the amount
of 43,222,222.22 as compensator* damages, 41,222,222.22 as moral
damages, and 41,232,222.22 as funeral e<penses=
2. #rdering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 5r. 107121 to pa* the
defendant therein actual damages in the amount of 431,222.22= and
3. #rdering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5r. 107
121.
No pronouncement as to costs.
-# #&,!&!,.
Caua*an, Isa)ela, .une /, 1002.
A-gd.B A&T!6I# &. A@IIA
&egional Trial .udge
0
#n -eptem)er 3, 1002, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the (oint
decision.
12
#n the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion
of the (oint decision so as to hold petitioner su)sidiaril* lia)le for the damages awarded
to the private respondents in the event of insolvenc* of the accused.
11
#n #cto)er 2/, 1002, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the
dispositive portion )* inserting an additional paragraph reading as follows:
2:A I #rdering the defendant &e*es Truc+ing Corporation
su)sidiaril* lia)le for all the damages awarded to the heirs of
$rancisco ,*, .r., in the event of insolvenc* of the accused )ut
deducting therefrom the damages of 431,222.22 awarded to said
defendant in the ne<t preceding paragraph= and . . .
12
#n Novem)er 12, 1002, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of
appeal from the supplemental decision.
13
,uring the pendenc* of the appeal, the accused (umped )ail and fled to a foreign
countr*. 5* resolution dated ,ecem)er 20, 1001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
11
#n .anuar* /, 1008, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that
of the trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of this decision.
19
#n .anuar* 31, 1008, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended
decision.
1/
#n April 21, 1008, the Court of Appeals denied petitionerCs motion for reconsideration
for lac+ of merit
18
%ence, this petition for review.
13
#n .ul* 21, 1008, the Court re;uired respondents to comment on the petition within ten
A12B da*s from notice.
10
#n .anuar* 28, 1003, the -olicitor 'eneral filed his comment.
22
#n April 13, 1003, the
Court granted leave to petitioner to file a repl* and noted the repl* it filed on 6arch 11,
1003.
21
"e now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.
4etitioner raises three A3B grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, )oil
down to two A2B )asic issues, namel*:
1. 6a* petitioner as owner of the truc+ involved in
the accident )e held su)sidiaril* lia)le for the
damages awarded to the offended parties in the
criminal action against the truc+ driver despite the
filing of a separate civil action )* the offended
parties against the emplo*er of the truc+ driverJ
2. 6a* the Court award damages to the offended
parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a
civil action against the emplo*er of the truc+ driver=
and in amounts e<ceeding that alleged in the
information for rec+less imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to propert*J
22
"e grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the
cases to the trial court for determination of the civil lia)ilit* of petitioner as emplo*er of
the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delictore7opened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved part* has the choice )etween A1B an action to enforce
civil lia)ilit* arising from crime under Article 122 of the &evised 4enal Code= and A2B a
separate action for quasi delict under Article 218/ of the Civil Code of the 4hilippines.
#nce the choice is made, the in(ured part* can not avail himself of an* other remed*
)ecause he ma* not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused.
23
This is the rule against dou)le recover*.1wphi1.nt
In other words, Fthe same act or omission can create two +inds of lia)ilit* on the part of
the offender, that is, civil lia)ilit* ex delicto, and civil lia)ilit* quasi delictoF either of
which Fma* )e enforced against the culprit, su)(ect to the caveat under Article 2188 of
the Civil Code that the offended part* can not recover damages under )oth t*pes of
lia)ilit*.F
21
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages
against petitioner as emplo*er of the accused, )ased on quasi delict, under Article 218/
of the Civil Code of the 4hilippines. 4rivate respondents sued petitioner &afael &e*es
Truc+ing Corporation, as the emplo*er of the accused, to )e vicariousl* lia)le for the
fault or negligence of the latter. >nder the law, this vicarious lia)ilit* of the emplo*er is
founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is e<pressed in Article 218/ in relation to Article 2132 of the Civil Code,
which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to )e instituted )* the in(ured
part* against the emplo*er for an act or omission of the emplo*ee and would necessitate
onl* a preponderance of evidence to prevail. %ere, the lia)ilit* of the emplo*er for the
negligent conduct of the su)ordinate is direct and primar*, su)(ect to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the emplo*ee. The enforcement of the
(udgment against the emplo*er in an action )ased on Article 218/ does not re;uire the
emplo*ee to )e insolvent since the nature of the lia)ilit* of the emplo*er with that of the
emplo*ee, the two )eing statutoril* considered (oint tortfeasors, is solidar*.
29
The
second, predicated on Article 123 of the &evised 4enal Code, provides that an emplo*er
ma* )e held su)sidiaril* civill* lia)le for a felon* committed )* his emplo*ee in the
discharge of his dut*. This lia)ilit* attaches when the emplo*ee is convicted of a crime
done in the performance of his wor+ and is found to )e insolvent that renders him una)le
to properl* respond to the civil lia)ilit* ad(udged.
2/
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. &afael &e*es Truc+ing
Corporation, as emplo*er of the accused who has )een ad(udged guilt* in the criminal
case for rec+less imprudence, can not )e held su)sidiaril* lia)le )ecause of the filing of
the separate civil action )ased on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to
file, and the su)se;uent filing of the civil action for recover* of civil lia)ilit*, the same
was not instituted with the criminal action. -uch separate civil action was for recover*
of damages under Article 218/ of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
28
4ursuant to the provision of &ule 111, -ection 1, paragraph 3 of the 1039 &ules of
Criminal 4rocedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the criminal action,
reserved the right to file the separate civil action, the* waived other availa)le civil
actions predicated on the same act or omission of the accused7driver. -uch civil action
includes the recover* of indemnit* under the &evised 4enal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, and 31 of the Civil Code of the 4hilippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
23
The intention of private respondents to proceed primaril* and directl* against petitioner
as emplo*er of accused truc+ driver )ecame clearer when the* did not as+ for the
dismissal of the civil action against the latter )ased onquasi delict.
Conse;uentl*, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused
civill* lia)le, and petitioner7emplo*er of the accused su)sidiaril* lia)le for damages
arising from crime Aex delictoB in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed
a separate civil action against the emplo*er )ased on quasi delict resulting in the waiver
of the civil action ex delicto.
It might )e argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case
withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver AaccusedB and
manifested that the* would pursue the civil lia)ilit* of the driver in the criminal action.
%owever, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier
made )ecause private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner
)ased on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of &ule 111, -ection 1, paragraph 3
of the 1039 &ules on Criminal 4rocedure is clear that the reservation to file or the filing
of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other availa)le civil actions arising from
the same act or omission of the accused. &ule 111, -ection 1, paragraph 2 enumerated
what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or filing, and one of
which is the civil indemnit* under the &evised 4enal Code. &ule 111, -ection 1,
paragraph 3 of the 1039 &ules on Criminal 4rocedure specificall* provides:
A waiver of an* of the civil actions e<tinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, an* of said civil
actions separatel* waives the others.
The rationale )ehind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits )etween the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender. The restrictive
phraseolog* of the section under consideration is meant to cover all +inds of civil
actions, regardless of their source in law, provided that the action has for its )asis the
same act or omission of the offender.
20
%owever, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it,
)ased on quasi delict, ma* )e held lia)le thereon. Thus, the trial court grievousl* erred
in dismissing plaintiffCs civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial courtCs decision. >nfortunatel* private respondents did not appeal from such
dismissal and could not )e granted affirmative relief.
32
The Court, however, in e<ceptional cases has rela<ed the rules Fin order to promote their
o)(ectives and assist the parties in o)taining (ust, speed*, and ine<pensive determination
of ever* action or proceedingF
31
or e<empted Fa particular case from the operation of
the rules.F
32
Invo+ing this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the
criminal case and in dismissing the civil action. Apparentl* satisfied with such award,
private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. %owever,
petitioner did appeal. %ence, this case should )e remanded to the trial court so that it
ma* render decision in the civil case awarding damages as ma* )e warranted )* the
evidence.
33
"ith regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was
improper )ecause the civil action for the recover* of civil lia)ilit* was waived in the
criminal action )* the filing of a separate civil action against the emplo*er. As
enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,
31
Fcivil indemnit* is not part of the penalt* for the
crime committed.F The onl* issue )rought )efore the trial court in the criminal action is
whether accused &omeo ,unca * de Tumol is guilt* of rec+less imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to propert*. The action for recover* of civil lia)ilit* is not
included therein, )ut is covered )* the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
emplo*er of the accused truc+7driver.
In this case, accused7driver (umped )ail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus,
the (udgment convicting the accused )ecame final and e<ecutor*, )ut onl* insofar as the
penalt* in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action
was invalid )ecause of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void )ecause the
action for recover* of the civil lia)ilit* arising from the crime has )een waived in said
criminal action.
"ith respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action e<ceeded the
amount of damages alleged in the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At an*
rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case )ecause )* virtue of
the reservation of the right to )ring a separate civil action or the filing thereof, Fthere
would )e no possi)ilit* that the emplo*er would )e held lia)le )ecause in such a case
there would )e no pronouncement as to the civil lia)ilit* of the accused.
39
As a final note, we reiterate that Fthe polic* against dou)le recover* re;uires that onl*
one action )e maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is )rought
against the emplo*ee or against his emplo*er.
3/
The in(ured part* must choose which of
the availa)le causes of action for damages he will )ring.
38
4arentheticall*, the trial court found the accused Fguilt* )e*ond reasona)le dou)t of the
crime of ,ou)le %omicide Through &ec+less Imprudence with violation of the 6otor
ehicle @aw A&ep. Act No. 113/BF. There is no such nomenclature of an offense under
the &evised 4enal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused Fto
suffer two A2B indeterminate penalties of four A1B months and one A1B da* of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to three A3B *ears, si< A/B months and twent* A22B da*s of prision
correccional, as ma<imum.F This is erroneous )ecause in rec+less imprudence cases, the
actual penalt* for criminal negligence )ears no relation to the individual willfull crime
or crimes committed, )ut is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.
33
>nfortunatel*, we can no longer correct this (udgment even if erroneous, as it is,
)ecause it has )ecome final and e<ecutor*.
>nder Article 3/9 of the &evised 4enal Code, criminal negligence Fis treated as a mere
;uasi offense, and dealt with separatel* from willful offenses. It is not a ;uestion of
classification or terminolog*. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished= in
negligence or imprudence, what is principall* penaliDed is the mental attitude or
condition )ehind the act, the dangerous rec+lessness, lac+ of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. 6uch of the confusion has arisen from the common use of
such descriptive phrase as Fhomicide through rec+less imprudenceF, and the li+e= when
the strict technical sense is, more accuratel*, Frec+less imprudence resulting in
homicideF= or Fsimple imprudence causing damages to propert*F.F
30
There is need, therefore, to rectif* the designation of the offense without distur)ing the
imposed penalt* for the guidance of )ench and )ar in strict adherence to precedent.
"%!&!$#&!, the Court '&ANT- the petition and -!T- A-I,! the amended
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA7'.&. C& No. 11113, promulgated
on .anuar* /, 1008, and the (oint decision of the &egional Trial Court, Isa)ela, 5ranch
10, Caua*an, in Criminal Case No. 5r. 107311 and Civil Case No. 5r. 107121, dated
.une /, 1002.
IN @I!> T%!&!#$, the Court renders (udgment as follows:
A1B In Criminal Case No. 5r. 107311, the Court declares the accused &omeo ,unca * de
Tumol guilt* )e*ond reasona)le dou)t of rec+less imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to propert*, defined and penaliDed under Article 3/9, paragraph 2 of the
&evised 4enal Code, with violation of the automo)ile law A&.A. No. 113/, as amendedB,
and sentences him to suffer two A2B indeterminate penalties of four A1B months and one
A1B da* ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to three A3B *ears, si< A/B months and twent* A22B
da*s of prision correccional, as ma<imum,
12
without indemnit*, and to pa* the costs,
and
A2B In Civil Case No. 5r. 107121, the Court orders the case re7opened to determine the
lia)ilit* of the defendant &afael &e*es Truc+ing Corporation to plaintiffs and that of
plaintiffs on defendantCs counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
-# #&,!&!,.
G.R. No. 119221 April 23, 1994
SAN IL"EFONSO LINES, INC., a! E"UAR"O 5A6IER, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS #T%ir)&&)% "i7i'io1 a! PIONEER INSURANCE a!
SURETY CORPORATION,respondents.

+ARTINE8, J.:
At around 3:32 in the afternoon of .une 21, 1001, a To*ota @ite Ace an )eing driven
)* its owner Annie >. .ao and a passenger )us of herein petitioner -an Ildefonso @ines,
Inc. Ahereafter, -I@IB figured in a vehicular mishap at the intersection of .ulia argas
Avenue and &odrigueD @anuDa Avenue in 4asig, 6etro 6anila, totall* wrec+ing the
To*ota van and in(uring 6s. .ao and her two A2B passengers in the process.
A criminal case was thereafter filed with the &egional Trial Court of 4asig on
-eptem)er 13, 1001 charging the driver of the )us, herein petitioner !duardo .avier,
with rec+less imprudence resulting in damage to propert* with multiple ph*sical
in(uries.
A)out four A1B months later, or on .anuar* 13, 1002, herein private respondent 4ioneer
Insurance and -uret* Corporation A4I-CB, as insurer of the van and su)rogee, filed a
case for damages against petitioner -I@I with the &egional Trial Court of 6anila,
see+ing to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance polic* as
well as other damages, totaling 49/1,922.22 A4191,222.22 as actualKcompensator*
damages= 492,222.22 as e<emplar* damages= 492,222.22 as attorne*Cs fees= 412,222.22
as litigation e<penses= and 4922.22 as appearance fees.B
1
"ith the issues having )een (oined upon the filing of the petitionersC answer to the
complaint for damages and after su)mission )* the parties of their respective pre7trial
)riefs, petitioners filed on -eptem)er 13, 1002 a 6anifestation and 6otion to -uspend
Civil 4roceedings grounded on the pendenc* of the criminal case against petitioner
.avier in the 4asig &TC and the failure of respondent 4I-C to ma+e a reservation to file
a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied )* the 6anila &egional
Trial Court in its #rder dated .ul* 21, 1003,
2
ruling thus:
Answering the first ;uestion thus posed, the court holds that plaintiff
ma* legall* institute the present civil action even in the a)sence of a
reservation in the criminal action. This is so )ecause it falls among the
ver* e<ceptions to the rule cited )* the movant.
It is true that the general rule is that once a criminal action has )een
instituted, then civil action )ased thereon is deemed instituted together
with the criminal action, such that if the offended part* did not reserve
the filing of the civil action when the criminal action was filed, then
such filing of the civil action is therefore )arred= on the other hand, if
there was such reservation, still the civil action cannot )e instituted
until final (udgment has )een rendered in the criminal action=
5ut, this rule A-ection 2, &ule 111, &evised &ules of CourtB is su)(ect
to e<emptions, the same )eing those provided for in -ection 3 of the
same rule which states:
-ec. 3. "hen civil action ma* proceed
independentl*. I In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 31 and 218/ of the Civil Code of the
4hilippines, the independent civil action which was
)een reserved ma* )e )rought )* the offended part*,
shall proceed independentl* of the criminal action,
and shall re;uire onl* a preponderance of evidence.
5esides, the re;uirement in -ection 2 of &ule 111 of the former &ules
on Criminal 4rocedure that there )e a reservation in the criminal case
of the right to institute an independent civil action has )een declared
as not in accordance with law. It is regarded as an unauthoriDed
amendment to our su)stantive law, i.e., the Civil Code which does not
re;uire such reservation. In fact, the reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action has )een deleted from -ection 2, &ule 111 of
the 1039 &ules on Criminal 4rocedure, in consonance with the
decisions of this Court declaring such re;uirement of a reservation as
ineffective. A5onite vs. Hosa, 1/2 -C&A 132B.
$urther, the Court rules that a su)rogee7plaintiff ma* institute and
prosecute the civil action, it )eing allowed )* Article 2228 of the Civil
Code.
After their motion for reconsideration of said .ul* 21, 1003 #rder was denied,
petitioners elevated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was,
however, referred to pu)lic respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. #n $e)ruar*
21, 1009, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered )* respondent court,
upholding the assailed 6anila &egional Trial Court #rder in this wise:
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminall* prosecuted and found guilt* or
ac;uitted, provided that the offended part* is not allowed Aif the
tortfeasor is actuall* charged also criminall*B, to recover damages on
)oth scores, and would )e entitled in such eventualit* onl* to the
)igger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
var*.
To su)ordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution I whether it )e conviction or
ac;uittal I would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear in(unction in Art. 31, that this action ma*
proceed independentl* of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter.
In Yault !hil. vs. "#, the -upreme Court said:
!ven if there was no reservation in the criminal case
and that the civil action was not filed )efore the
filing of the criminal action )ut )efore the
prosecution presented evidence in the criminal
action, and the (udge handling the criminal case was
informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil
action is even far )etter than a compliance with the
re;uirement of an e<press reservation that should )e
made )* the offended part* )efore the prosecution
presented its evidence.
The purpose of this rule re;uiring reservation is to prevent the
offended part* from recovering damages twice for the same act or
omission.
-u)stantial compliance with the reservation re;uirement ma*,
therefore, )e made )* ma+ing a manifestation in the criminal case that
the private respondent has instituted a separate and independent civil
action for damages.
#ft7repeated is the dictum that courts should not place undue
importance on technicalities when )* so doing su)stantial (ustice is
sacrificed. "hile the rules of procedure re;uire adherence, it must )e
remem)ered that said rules of procedure are intended to promote, not
defeat, su)stantial (ustice, and therefore, the* should not )e applied in
a ver* rigid and technical sense.
%ence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of said
respondent court (udgment was denied.
The two A2B crucial issues to )e resolved, as posited )* petitioners, are:
1B If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action )ased on quasi-
delict under Article 218/ of the Civil Code )e filed if no reservation was made in the
said criminal caseJ
2B Can a su)rogee of an offended part* maintain an independent civil action during the
pendenc* of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent
civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private
complainant is activel* participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned
criminal caseJ
"e rule for petitioners.
#n the chief issue of FreservationF, at the fore is -ection 3, &ule 111 of the &ules of
Court which reads:
-ec. 3. "hen civil action ma* proceed independentl*. I In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 31 and 218/ of the Civil Code of the
4hilippines, the independent civil action which has )een reserved ma*
)e )rought )* the offended part*, shall proceed independentl* of the
criminal action, and shall re;uire onl* a preponderance of evidence.
There is no dispute that these so7called Findependent civil actionsF )ased on the
aforementioned Civil Code articles are the e<ceptions to the primac* of the
criminal action over the civil action as set forth in -ection 2 of &ule
111.
3
%owever, it is easil* deduci)le from the present wording of -ection 3 as
)rought a)out )* the 1033 amendments to the &ules on Criminal 4rocedure I
particularl* the phrase F. . . which has been reservedF I that the FindependentF
character of these civil actions does not do awa* with the reservation
re;uirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua
non )efore an* of these independent civil actions can )e instituted and
thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the
criminal action. That this should now )e the controlling procedural rule is
confirmed )* no less than retired .ustice .ose ?. $eria, remedial law e<pert and
a mem)er of the committee which drafted the 1033 amendments, whose
learned e<planation on the matter was aptl* pointed out )* petitioners, to wit:
The 1033 amendment e<pands the scope of the civil action which his
deemed impliedl* instituted with the criminal action unless waived,
reserved or previousl* instituted. . . .
>nder the present &ule as amended, such a civil action includes not
onl* recover* of indemnit* under the &evised 4enal Code and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 31 of the Civil Code of the
4hilippines, )ut also damages under Article 218/ of the said code. . . .
#)(ections were raised to the inclusion in this &ule of quasi-
delicts under Article 218/ of the Civil Code of the 4hilippines.
%owever, in view of Article 2188 of the said code which provides that
the offended part* ma* not recover twice for the same act or omission
of the accused, and in line with the polic* of avoiding multiplicit* of
suits, these o)(ections were overruled. In an* event, the offended part*
is not precluded from filing a civil action to recover damages arising
from quasi-delict )efore the institution of the criminal action, or from
reserving his right to file such a separate civil action, (ust as he is not
precluded from filing a civil action for damages under Articles 32, 33
and 31 )efore the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving
his right to file such a separate civil action. It is onl* in those cases
where the offended part* has not previousl* filed a civil action or has
not reserved his right to file a separate civil action that his civil action
is deemed impliedl* instituted with the criminal action.
It should )e noted that while it was ruled in #bella vs. $arave A98
-C&A 12/B that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil
action is not necessar*, such a reservation is necessary under the
amended rule. %ithout such reservation& the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action& unless previously waived
or instituted. A!mphasis ours, .ustice .ose ?. $eria L&et.M, 1033
Amendments to the 1039 &ules on Criminal 4rocedure, a pamphlet,
pu)lished )* Central @aw)oo+ 4u)lishing Co., Inc., 4hilippine @egal
-tudies, -eries No. 3, 97/B.
3
-haring the same view on the indispensa)ilit* of a prior reservation is 6r. .ustice
$lorenD ,. &egalado, whose anal*sis of the historical changes in &ule 111 since the
10/1 &ules of Court is e;uall* illuminating. Thus,
1. >nder &ule 111 of the 10/1 &ules of Court, the civil lia)ilit*
arising from the offense charged was impliedl* instituted with the
criminal action, unless such civil action was e<pressl* waived or
reserved. The offended part* was authoriDed to )ring an independent
civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 31 and
2188 of the Civil Code provided such right was reserved.
In the 1039 &ules on Criminal 4rocedure, the same &ule 111 thereof
reiterated said provision on the civil lia)ilit* arising from the offense
charged. The independent civil actions, however, were limited to the
cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 and 31 of the Civil Code,
o)viousl* )ecause the actions contemplated in Articles 31 and 2188 of
said Code are not lia)ilities ex-delicto. $urthermore, no reservation
was re;uired in order the civil actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 31
ma* )e pursued separatel*.
2. The present amendments introduced )* the -upreme Court have the
following nota)le features on this particular procedural aspect, vi':
a. The civil action which is impliedl* instituted with the criminal
action, )arring a waiver, reservation or prior institution thereof, need
not arise from the offense charged, as the phrase Farising from the
offense chargedF which creates that ne<us has )een specificall*
eliminated.
). The independent civil actions contemplated in the present &ule 111
include the quasi-delicts provided for in Art. 218/ of the Civil Code,
in addition to the cases provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 31 thereof. It is
necessar*, however, that the civil lia)ilit* under all the said articles
arise Ffrom the same act or omission of the accused.F (urthermore& a
reservation o) the right to institute these separate civil actions is
again required otherwise& said civil actions are impliedly instituted
with the criminal action& unless the )ormer are waived or )iled ahead
o) the criminal action. A!mphasis supplied.B
9
In fact, a deeper reading of the F?a+ult 4hils. vs. CAF case
:
relied upon )* respondent
court reveals an ac+nowledgment of the reservation re;uirement. After recogniDing that
the civil case instituted )* private respondent therein &o* Camaso Arepresented )* his
father ,avid CamasoB against petitioner ?a+ult 4hils. Athe owner of the motorc*cle that
sideswiped &o* Camaso, onl* five *ears old at the time of the accidentB and @arr*
-alvado Athe driver of the motorc*cleB during the pendenc* of the criminal case against
-alvado for rec+less imprudence resulting to slight ph*sical in(uries, as one )ased on
tort, this Court said:
The civil lia)ilit* sought arising from the act or omission of the
accused in this case is a quasi-delict as defined under Article 218/ of
the Civil Code as follows:
<<< <<< <<<
*he a)orecited rule Lreferring to the amended -ection l, &ule
111M requiring& such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 218/ of the Civil Code arising from the same act
or omission of the accused Aemphasis suppliedB.
5ut what prompted the Court to validate the institution and non7suspension of
the civil case involved in F?a+ultF was the peculiar facts attendant therein.
Thus,
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without
previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted be)ore the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal
action& and the +udge handling the criminal case was in)ormed
thereo)& then the actual filing of the civil action is even far )etter than
a compliance with the re;uirement of an e<press reservation that
should )e made )* the offended part* )efore the prosecution presents
its evidence.
The distinct factual scenario in F?a+ultF simpl* does not o)tain in this case. No
satisfactor* proof e<ists to show that private respondent 4I-CCs damage suit was
instituted )efore the prosecution presented its evidence in the criminal case pending in
the 4asig &egional Trial Court. Neither is there an* indication that the (udge presiding
over the criminal action has )een made aware of the civil case. It is in this light that
reliance on the F?a+ultF case is indeed misplaced.
Now that the necessit* of a prior reservation is the standing rule that shall govern the
institution of the independent civil actions referred to in &ule 111 of the &ules of Court,
past pronouncements that view the reservation re;uirement as an FunauthoriDed
amendmentF to su)stantive law I i.e., the Civil Code, should no longer )e controlling.
There must )e a renewed adherence to the time7honored dictum that procedural rules are
designed, not to defeat, )ut to safeguard the ends of su)stantial (ustice. And for this
no)le reason, no less than the Constitution itself has mandated this Court to promulgate
rules concerning the enforcement of rights with the end in view of providing a
simplified and ine<pensive procedure for the speed* disposition of cases which should
not diminish, increase or modif* su)stantive rights.
2
$ar from altering su)stantive
rights, the primar* purpose of the reservation is, to )orrow the words of the Court in
FCaNos v. 4eraltaF:
4
. . . to avoid multiplicit* of suits, to guard against oppression and
a)use, to prevent dela*s, to clear congested doc+ets, to simplif* the
wor+ of the trial court= in short, the attainment of (ustice with the least
e<pense and ve<ation to the parties7litigants.
Clearl* then, private respondent 4I-C, as su)rogee under Article 2228 of the Civil
Code,
9
is not e<empt from the reservation re;uirement with respect to its damages suit
)ased on quasi-delict arising from the same act or ommission of petitioner .avier
complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent 4I-C merel* stepped into the
shoes of 6s. .ao Aas owner of the insured To*ota vanB, then it is )ound to o)serve the
procedural re;uirements which 6s. .ao ought to follow had she herself instituted the
civil case.
"%!&!$#&!, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated $e)ruar* 21, 1009 and the &esolution dated April 3, 1009 den*ing the motion for
reconsideration thereof are here)* &!!&-!, and -!T A-I,!. The
F6ANI$!-TATI#N AN, 6#TI#N T# ->-4!N, CII@ 4&#C!!,IN'-F filed )*
petitioners is '&ANT!,.
-# #&,!&!,.
G.R. No. 139403 F&(r,ar0 :, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY ; RO"OLFO RO+AN, petitioners,
vs.
+AR5ORIE NA6I"A", H&ir' o$ )%& La)& NICANOR NA6I"A" ; PRU"ENT
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
, ! C I - I # N
6ITUG, J.:
The case )efore the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 28 April 2222 and 12 #cto)er 2222, respectivel*, in CA7'.&.
C No. /2822, entitled F6ar(orie Navidad and %eirs of the @ate Nicanor Navidad vs.
&odolfo &oman, et. al.,F which has modified the decision of 11 August 1003 of the
&egional Trial Court, 5ranch 2//, 4asig Cit*, e<onerating 4rudent -ecurit* Agenc*
A4rudentB from lia)ilit* and finding @ight &ail Transit Authorit* A@&TAB and &odolfo
&oman lia)le for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
#n 11 #cto)er 1003, a)out half an hour past seven oOcloc+ in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drun+, entered the !,-A @&T station after purchasing a Fto+enF
Arepresenting pa*ment of the fareB. "hile Navidad was standing on the platform near the
@&T trac+s, .unelito !scartin, the securit* guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation )etween the two apparentl* ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started
or who, )etween the two, delivered the first )low or how Navidad later fell on the @&T
trac+s. At the e<act moment that Navidad fell, an @&T train, operated )* petitioner
&odolfo &oman, was coming in. Navidad was struc+ )* the moving train, and he was
+illed instantaneousl*.
#n 23 ,ecem)er 1001, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent 6ar(orie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against .unelito !scartin, &odolfo
&oman, the @&TA, the 6etro Transit #rganiDation, Inc. A6etro TransitB, and 4rudent
for the death of her hus)and. @&TA and &oman filed a counterclaim against Navidad
and a cross7claim against !scartin and 4rudent. 4rudent, in its answer, denied lia)ilit*
and averred that it had e<ercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
securit* guards.
The @&TA and &oman presented their evidence while 4rudent and !scartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
!scartin was negligent in his assigned tas+. #n 11 August 1003, the trial court rendered
its decision= it ad(udged:
F"%!&!$#&!, (udgment is here)* rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants 4rudent -ecurit* and .unelito !scartin ordering the latter to pa* (ointl* and
severall* the plaintiffs the following:
FaB 1B Actual damages of 411,332.22=
2B Compensator* damages of 4113,922.22=
3B Indemnit* for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of 492,222.22=
F)B 6oral damages of 492,222.22=
FcB Attorne*Os fees of 422,222=
FdB Costs of suit.
FThe complaint against defendants @&TA and &odolfo &oman are dismissed for lac+ of
merit.
FThe compulsor* counterclaim of @&TA and &oman are li+ewise dismissed.F
1
4rudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. #n 28 August 2222, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision e<onerating 4rudent from an* lia)ilit* for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the @&TA and &oman (ointl* and
severall* lia)le thusl*:
F"%!&!$#&!, the assailed (udgment is here)* 6#,I$I!,, )* e<onerating the
appellants from an* lia)ilit* for the death of Nicanor Navidad, .r. Instead, appellees
&odolfo &oman and the @ight &ail Transit Authorit* A@&TAB are held lia)le for his
death and are here)* directed to pa* (ointl* and severall* to the plaintiffs7appellees, the
following amounts:
aB 411,332.22 as actual damages=
)B 492,222.22 as nominal damages=
cB 492,222.22 as moral damages=
dB 492,222.22 as indemnit* for the death of the deceased= and
eB 422,222.22 as and for attorne*Os fees.F
2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as *et
)oarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had alread* e<isted when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to )e after pa*ing the fare and getting
the corresponding to+en therefor. In e<empting 4rudent from lia)ilit*, the court stressed
that there was nothing to lin+ the securit* agenc* to the death of Navidad. It said that
Navidad failed to show that !scartin inflicted fist )lows upon the victim and the
evidence merel* esta)lished the fact of death of Navidad )* reason of his having )een
hit )* the train owned and managed )* the @&TA and operated at the time )* &oman.
The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present e<pert evidence to
esta)lish the fact that the application of emergenc* )ra+es could not have stopped the
train.
The appellate court denied petitionersO motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 12
#cto)er 2222.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court= viD:
FI.
T%! %#N#&A5@! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- '&A!@? !&&!, 5?
,I-&!'A&,IN' T%! $IN,IN'- #$ $ACT- 5? T%! T&IA@ C#>&T
FII.
T%! %#N#&A5@! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- '&A!@? !&&!, IN $IN,IN' T%AT
4!TITI#N!&- A&! @IA5@! $#& T%! ,!AT% #$ NICAN#& NAI,A,, .&.
FIII.
T%! %#N#&A5@! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- '&A!@? !&&!, IN $IN,IN' T%AT
&#,#@$# &#6AN I- AN !64@#?!! #$ @&TA.F
3
4etitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual
findings of the trial court )* holding them lia)le on the )asis of a sweeping conclusion
that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome.
4etitioners would insist that !scartinOs assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to
fall on the trac+s, was an act of a stranger that could not have )een foreseen or
prevented. The @&TA would add that the appellate courtOs conclusion on the e<istence
of an emplo*er7emplo*ee relationship )etween &oman and @&TA lac+ed )asis )ecause
&oman himself had testified )eing an emplo*ee of 6etro Transit and not of the @&TA.
&espondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of
carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the @&T station
and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctl* held @&TA and
&oman lia)le for the death of Navidad in failing to e<ercise e<traordinar* diligence
imposed upon a common carrier.
@aw and (urisprudence dictate that a common carrier, )oth from the nature of its
)usiness and for reasons of pu)lic polic*, is )urdened with the dut* of e<ercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safet* of passengers.
1
The Civil Code, governing the lia)ilit*
of a common carrier for death of or in(ur* to its passengers, provides:
FArticle 1899. A common carrier is )ound to carr* the passengers safel* as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of ver* cautious persons, with
a due regard for all the circumstances.
FArticle 189/. In case of death of or in(uries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have )een at fault or to have acted negligentl*, unless the* prove that the*
o)served e<traordinar* diligence as prescri)ed in articles 1833 and 1899.F
FArticle 1890. Common carriers are lia)le for the death of or in(uries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the formerOs emplo*ees, although such
emplo*ees ma* have acted )e*ond the scope of their authorit* or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
FThis lia)ilit* of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that the* e<ercised all
the diligence of a good father of a famil* in the selection and supervision of their
emplo*ees.F
FArticle 18/3. A common carrier is responsi)le for in(uries suffered )* a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrierOs emplo*ees through the e<ercise of the diligence of a good father of a
famil* could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.F
The law re;uires common carriers to carr* passengers safel* using the utmost diligence
of ver* cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.
9
-uch dut* of a common
carrier to provide safet* to its passengers so o)ligates it not onl* during the course of the
trip )ut for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where the* ought to )e
in pursuance to the contract of carriage.
/
The statutor* provisions render a common
carrier lia)le for death of or in(ur* to passengers AaB through the negligence or wilful
acts of its emplo*ees or )B on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or
of strangers if the common carrierOs emplo*ees through the e<ercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
8
In case of such death or in(ur*, a
carrier is presumed to have )een at fault or )een negligent, and
3
)* simple proof of
in(ur*, the passenger is relieved of the dut* to still esta)lish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or of its emplo*ees and the )urden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
in(ur* is due to an unforeseen event or to force ma(eure.
0
In the a)sence of satisfactor*
e<planation )* the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to
the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would )e that it has )een at
fault,
12
an e<ception from the general rule that negligence must )e proved.
11
The foundation of @&TAOs lia)ilit* is the contract of carriage and its o)ligation to
indemnif* the victim arises from the )reach of that contract )* reason of its failure to
e<ercise the high diligence re;uired of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safet* of passengers, a carrier ma* choose to hire its own
emplo*ees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
underta+e the tas+. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsi)ilities under the contract of carriage.
-hould 4rudent )e made li+ewise lia)leJ If at all, that lia)ilit* could onl* )e for tort
under the provisions of Article 218/
12
and related provisions, in con(unction with Article
2132,
13
of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the emplo*erOs lia)ilit* is
negligence or fault on the part of the emplo*ee. #nce such fault is esta)lished, the
emplo*er can then )e made lia)le on the )asis of the presumption (uris tantum that the
emplo*er failed to e<ercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its emplo*ees. The lia)ilit* is primar* and can onl* )e negated )* showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the emplo*ee, a factual matter that has not
)een shown. A)sent such a showing, one might as+ further, how then must the lia)ilit*
of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, )e descri)edJ It would )e solidar*. A contractual o)ligation can )e )reached )*
tort and when the same act or omission causes the in(ur*, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa a;uiliana, Article 2101
11
of the Civil Code can well
appl*.
19
In fine, a lia)ilit* for tort ma* arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which )reaches the contract.
1/
-tated differentl*, when an act which constitutes a )reach
of contract would have itself constituted the source of a ;uasi7delictual lia)ilit* had no
contract e<isted )etween the parties, the contract can )e said to have )een )reached )*
tort, there)* allowing the rules on tort to appl*.
18
&egretta)l* for @&T, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded )* the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that Fthere is nothing to lin+ A4rudentB to the death of Nicanor ANavidadB, for the reason
that the negligence of its emplo*ee, !scartin, has not )een dul* proven < < <.F This
finding of the appellate court is not without su)stantial (ustification in our own review of
the records of the case.
There )eing, similarl*, no showing that petitioner &odolfo &oman himself is guilt* of
an* culpa)le act or omission, he must also )e a)solved from lia)ilit*. Needless to sa*,
the contractual tie )etween the @&T and Navidad is not itself a (uridical relation )etween
the latter and &oman= thus, &oman can )e made lia)le onl* for his own fault or
negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untena)le. Nominal
damages are ad(udicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has )een violated or
invaded )* the defendant, ma* )e vindicated or recogniDed, and not for the purpose of
indemnif*ing the plaintiff for an* loss suffered )* him.
13
It is an esta)lished rule that
nominal damages cannot co7e<ist with compensator* damages.
10
<HEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is A$$I&6!, with
6#,I$ICATI#N )ut onl* in that AaB the award of nominal damages is ,!@!T!, and
A)B petitioner &odolfo &oman is a)solved from lia)ilit*. No costs.
-# #&,!&!,.
G.R. No. 134123 +ar-% 12, 2002
+IN"E= RESOURCES "E6ELOP+ENT, petitioner,
vs.
EPHRAI+ +ORILLO, respondent.
PANGANI>AN, J.:
Attorne*Os fees cannot )e granted simpl* )ecause one was compelled to sue to protect
and enforce oneOs right. The grant must )e proven )* facts= it cannot depend on mere
speculation or con(ecture 77 its )asis must )e stated in the te<t of the decision.
T%& Ca'&
5efore us is a 4etition for &eview under &ule 19 of the &ules of Court, assailing the
6arch 2/, 1000 ,ecision
1
of the Court of Appeals ACAB in CA7'& C No. 1/0/8. The
dispositive portion of the challenged ,ecision reads as follows:
F"%!&!$#&!, the appealed decision is A$$I&6!, with 6#,I$ICATI#N
that the legal interest to )e paid on the rentals of 48/,222.22 and costs of repair
in the amount of 4132,892.22 is si< A/PB percent per annum from .une 22,
1001, the date of the decision of the court a quo to the date of its finalit*.
Thereafter, if the amounts ad(udged remain unpaid, the interest rate shall )e
twelve A12PB percent per annum from the date of finalit* of the decision until
full* paid.F
2
T%& Fa-)'
The factual antecedents of the case are summariDed )* the CA in this wise:
F#n $e)ruar* 1001, a ver)al agreement was entered into )etween !phraim
6orillo and 6inde< &esources Corporation A6IN,!Q for )revit*B for the
lease of the formerOs / < / ten7wheeler cargo truc+ for use in 6IN,!QOs
mining operations in 5ina*)a*, 5igaan, -an Teodoro, #riental 6indoro, at the
stipulated rental of R4322.22 per hour for a minimum of eight hours a da* or a
total of 42,122.22 dail*.O 6IN,!Q had )een pa*ing the rentals until April 12,
1001.1wphi1.nt
F>n+nown to 6orillo, on April 11, 1001, the truc+ was )urned )* unidentified
persons while it was par+ed unattended at -itio Aras, 5igaan, -an Teodoro,
#riental 6indoro, due to mechanical trou)le. The findings of the 6indoro
#riental Integrated National 4olice in their investigation report read:
R3. #n 121229% April 1001, 6r Ale<ander &o<as, pro(ect coordinator
of 6IN,!Q 6ININ' C#&4. reported to this office that on the
morning of 12 April 1001 while he was supposed to report for his
"or+ at their office at -itio Ti)on)on, 5igaan, -an Teodoro, #riental
6indoro, he < < < noticed that their hired / < / Ten wheeler Cargo
Truc+ temporaril* par+ed at -itio Aras, 5igaan, -an Teodoro, #riental
6indoro for aplha !ngine Trou)le was )urned on the night of April
11, 1001 )* still unidentified person.
R< < < < < < < < <
R9. < < < 5ased also on the facts gathered and incident scene searched
it was also found out that said / < / Ten "heeler Cargo Truc+ was
)urned )* means of using coconut leaves and as a result of which said
/ < / was totall* )urned e<cluding the engine which was partiall*
damaged )* still undetermined amount.O
F>pon learning of the )urning incident, 6orillo offered to sell the truc+ to
6IN,!Q )ut the latter refused. Instead, it replaced the vehicleOs )urned tires
and had it towed to a shop for repair and overhauling.
F#n April 19, 1001, 6orillo sent a letter to 6r. Arni Is)erg, the $inance
6anager of 6IN,!Q, thru 6r. &amoncito 'oDar, 4ro(ect 6anager, proposing
the following:
R< < < < < < < < <
RI have written to let *ou +now that I am entrusting to *ou the said
vehicle in the amount of 4289,222.22 which is its cost price. I will not
charge *our compan* for the encum)rance of 48/,322S since *ou
used it as m* friendl* gesture on account of the unforeseen adversit*.
RIn view of the tragic happening, I am as+ing *ou to pa* us, in a wa*
which will not )e hard for *ou to settle to pa* us in four installment
monthl* as follows:
R$irst pa*ment 7 April 29K01 4L1M92,222.22
R-econd pa*ment 7 6a* 19K01 92,222.22
RThird pa*meAnBt 7 .une 19K01 92,222.22
R$ourth pa*meAnBt 7 .ul* 19K01 29,222.22
T#TA@ 4289,222.22
RI promise to relin;uish all the necessar* documents upon full
pa*ment of said account.
R< < < < < < < < <
FThrough 6r. 'oDar, 6IN,!Q responded )* a handwritten letter to his cousin
6alou Awife of !phraim 6orilloB, e<pressing their reservations on the a)ove
demands due to their tight financial situation. %owever, he made the following
counter offers:
RaB 4a* the rental of the / < / truc+ AactualB in the amount
of 48/,222.22.
R)B &epair and overhaul the truc+ on our own e<penses and=
RcB &eturn it to *ou on AA1B good running condition after repair.O
F6orillo replied on April 13, 1001, A1B that he will relin;uish to 6IN,!Q the
damaged truc+= A2B that he is amena)le to receive the rental in the amount
of 48/,222.22= and A3B that 6IN,!Q will pa* fift* thousand pesos
A492,222.22B monthl* until the )alance of 4289,222.22 is full* paid. It is
noteworth* that e<cept for his acceptance of the proffered 48/,222.22 unpaid
rentals, 6orilloOs stand has virtuall* not )een changed as he merel* lowered
the first pa*ment on the 4289,222.22 valuation of the truc+ from 4192,222.22
to492,222.22.
FThe parties had since remained intransigent and so on August 1001, 6orillo
pulled out the truc+ from the repair shop of 6IN,!Q and had it repaired
elsewhere for which he spent the total amount of 4132,892.22.F
3
ACitations
omittedB
R,li? o$ )%& Trial Co,r)
After evaluating the evidence adduced )* )oth parties, the &egional Trial Court A&TCB
found petitioner responsi)le for the destruction or loss of the leased / < / truc+ and
ordered it to pa* respondent A1B 48/,222 as )alance of the unpaid rental for the / < /
truc+ with interest of 12 percent from .une 22, 1001 Athe rendition of the (udgmentB up
to the pa*ment of the amount= A2B 4132,892 representing the costs of repair and overhaul
of the said truc+, with interest rate of 12 percent until full* paid= and A3B 422,222 as
attorne*Os fees for compelling respondent to secure the services of counsel in filing his
Complaint.
R,li? o$ )%& Co,r) o$ App&al'
The appellate court sustained the &TCOs finding that petitioner was not without fault for
the loss and destruction of the truc+ and, thus, lia)le therefor. The CA said:
FThe )urning of the su)(ect truc+ was impossi)le to foresee, )ut not impossi)le
to avoid. 6IN,!Q could have prevented the incident )* immediatel* towing
the truc+ to a motor shop for the needed repair or )* having it guarded da* and
night. Instead, the appellant (ust left the vehicle where its transfer case )ro+e
down. The place was a)out twelve A12B +ilometers awa* from the camp site of
the appellant corporation and was sparsel* populated. It was guarded onl*
during da*time. It sta*ed in that place for two A2B wee+s until it was )urned on
April 11, 1001 while its transfer case was )eing repaired elsewhere. It was onl*
after it had )een )urned that the appellant had it towed to a repair shop.
FThe appellant LrespondentM was thus not free from fault for the )urning of the
truc+. It misera)l* failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against it.
Neither did it rescind the lease over the truc+ upon its )urning. #n the contrar*,
it offered to pa* 48/,222.22 as rentals. It did not also complete the needed
repair. %ence, the appellee was forced to pull out the truc+ and had it repaired
at his own e<pense. -ince under the law, the Rlessee shall return the thing
leased, upon the termination of the lease, (ust as he receive it, Rthe appellant
stands lia)le for the e<penses incurred for the repair in the aggregate amount
of 4132,892.22.F
1
Nevertheless, the appellate court modified the ,ecision of the trial court. The 12 percent
interest rate on the48/,222 rentals and the 4132,892 repair costs, imposed )* the &TC,
was changed )* the CA to / percent per annum from .une 22, 1001 to the date of
finalit* of the said ,ecision= and 12 percent per annum thereafter, if the amounts
ad(udged would remain unpaid from such date of finalit* until the rentals and the repair
costs were full* paid. It affirmed the award of attorne*Os fees.
%ence, this 4etition.
9
I'',&'
In its 6emorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the CourtOs consideration:
F1.1. "hether or not the Court of Appeals gravel* erred in finding that
petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against it
considering that the facts show, as admitted )* the respondent, that the )urning
of the truc+ was a fortuitous event.
F1.2. "hether or not the Court of Appeals gravel* erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court finding petitioner lia)le to pa* unpaid rentals and cost
of repairs.
F1.3. "hether or not the Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court finding petitioner lia)le to pa* attorne*Os fees.F
/
T%i' Co,r)@' R,li?
The 4etition is partl* meritorious= the award of attorne*Os fees should )e deleted.
Fir') I'',&A
Petitioners Negligence
4etitioner claims that the )urning of the truc+ was a fortuitous event, for which it should
not )e held lia)le pursuant to Article 1181
8
of the Civil Code. 6oreover, the letter of
respondent dated April 19, 1001, stating that the )urning of the truc+ was an
Funforeseen adversit*,F was an admission that should e<culpate the former from
lia)ilit*.
"e are not convinced. 5oth the &TC and the CA found petitioner negligent and thus
lia)le for the loss or destruction of the leased truc+. True, )oth parties ma* have suffered
from the )urning of the truc+= however, as found )* )oth lower courts, the negligence of
petitioner ma+es it responsi)le for the loss. "ell7settled is the rule that factual findings
of the trial court, particularl* when affirmed )* the Court of Appeals, are )inding on the
-upreme Court. Contrar* to its allegations, petitioner has not ade;uatel* shown that the
&TC and the CA overloo+ed or disregarded significant facts and circumstances that,
when considered, would alter the outcome of the disposition.
3
Article 1//8 of the Civil
Code
0
holds lessees responsi)le for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless
the* prove that it too+ place without their fault.
Fortuitous Event
In order for a fortuitous event to e<empt one from lia)ilit*, it is necessar* that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct that ma* have occasioned the loss.
12
An act of
'od cannot )e invo+ed to protect a person who has failed to ta+e steps to forestall the
possi)le adverse conse;uences of such a loss. #neOs negligence ma* have concurred
with an act of 'od in producing damage and in(ur* to another= nonetheless, showing
that the immediate or pro<imate cause of the damage or in(ur* was a fortuitous event
would not e<empt one from lia)ilit*. "hen the effect is found to )e partl* the result of a
personOs participation 77 whether )* active intervention, neglect or failure to act 77 the
whole occurrence is humaniDed and removed from the rules applica)le to acts of 'od.
11
This often7invo+ed doctrine of Ffortuitous eventF or Fcaso )ortuitoF has )ecome a
convenient and eas* defense to e<culpate an o)ligor from lia)ilit*. To constitute a
fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: AaB the cause of the unforeseen
and une<pected occurrence or of the failure of the de)tor to compl* with o)ligations
must )e independent of human will= A)B it must )e impossi)le to foresee the event that
constitutes the caso )ortuito or, if it can )e foreseen, it must )e impossi)le to avoid= AcB
the occurrence must )e such as to render it impossi)le for the de)tor to fulfill
o)ligations in a normal manner= and AdB the o)ligor must )e free from an* participation
in the aggravation of the in(ur* or loss.
12
Article 1181 of the Civil Code states that no person shall )e responsi)le for a fortuitous
event that could not )e foreseen or, though foreseen, was inevita)le. In other words,
there must )e an e<clusion of human intervention from the cause of in(ur* or loss.
13
A review of the records clearl* shows that petitioner failed to e<ercise reasona)le care
and caution that an ordinaril* prudent person would have used in the same situation.
"itness Ale<ander &o<as testified how petitioner fell short of ordinar* diligence in
safeguarding the leased truc+ against the accident, which could have )een avoided in the
first place. 4ertinent portions of his testimon* are reproduced hereunder:
FATT?. AC!&#N
T Now, this 5aranga* Aras where the / < / truc+ had transmission trou)le,
how far is it from the camp site of the defendant corporationJ
A@!QAN,!& &#QA-
A Twelve A12B +ilometers, more or less, sir.
T Is this 5aranga* Aras populatedJ
A Not so man*, sir.
T The place where the / < / truc+ had transmission trou)le, how far is the
nearest house from itJ
A 4erhaps three hundred meters, sir.
T And how man* houses are within the three hundred meter radius from
the place where the truc+ had engine trou)leJ
A Ten, more or less, in scattered.
T ?ou said that after hauling several sand to )e used in the camp site the /
< / truc+ had transmission trou)le, what did the compan* do after the truc+ had
that engine trou)leJ
A $or at least two wee+s the truc+ was installed in the place where the said
truc+ had engine trou)le.
T 6eaning in 5aranga* ArasJ
A ?es, sir.
T "as there an* guard in that place )* the compan* during the time that
the truc+ was in that placeJ
A ?es, sir, during da*time )ut at nighttime, there was no guard.
T "hat happened to that / < / truc+J
A In the month of 6arch, 1001, the compan* dismissed thirteen A13B to
seventeen A18B emplo*ees and these emplo*ees came from 5aranga*s Aras,
5otolan, Calsapa, Camatis and Ti)on)on and on Aril 11, 1001, the / < / truc+
was )urned.
T %ow did *ou come to +now that the / < / truc+ was )urned on April 11,
1001J
A I together with m* daughter, I met the service of the compan* near the
#&6!C# and I was informed )* the 4ro(ect !ngineer that the / < / truc+ was
)urned, so, we returned to -an Teodoro and have the incident )lottered at the
police station.
T Aside from that, what other action did *ou underta+e in connection with
the )urning of the / < / truc+J
A "hen we were at the police station, the 4ro(ect 6anager of the compan*
arrived and from the police station we proceeded to the place where the / < /
truc+ was )urned and the 4ro(ect 6anager too+ pictures of the / < / truc+.
T Now, did *ou come to +now who was responsi)le or who were
responsi)le for the )urning of the / < / truc+J
A The responsi)le is the 6inde< &esources ,evelopment Corporation, and
as far as I +now, the persons who actuall* )urned the said / < / truc+ were the
dismissed emplo*ees of the 6inde< &esources ,evelopment Corporation.
T These dismissed emplo*ees of the corporation, wh* were the* emplo*ed
)* the corporationJ
A 5ecause we have to ma+e a road going to the mining site and in the
process of opening the road these dismissed emplo*ees happened to )e the
owners of the land where the road will pass, so, we paid the land. The
corporation li+ewise gave (o)s to the owners of the land.F
11
As can )e gleaned from the foregoing testimon*, petitioner failed to emplo* reasona)le
foresight, diligence and care that would have e<empted it from lia)ilit* resulting from
the )urning of the truc+. Negligence, as commonl* understood, is that conduct that
naturall* or reasona)l* creates undue ris+ or harm to others. It ma* )e a failure to
o)serve that degree of care, precaution or vigilance that the circumstances (ustl*
demand=
19
or to do an* other act that would )e done )* a prudent and reasona)le person,
who is guided )* considerations that ordinaril* regulate the conduct of human affairs.
1/
S&-o! I'',&A
Unpaid Rentals and Cost of Repairs
4etitioner proceeds to argue that Fit should )e deemed to have alread* paid the unpaid
rentals in the amount of48/,222.22,F and that it should not )e made to pa* the 4132,892
repair and overhaul costs. Nothing in the records, not even in the documentar* evidence
it presented, would show that it alread* paid the aforesaid amounts. In fact, it see+s to
avoid pa*ment of the rental )* alleging that respondent alread* condoned it in his letter
dated April 19, 1001. %owever, a perusal of the letter would show that his offer not to
charge petitioner for the 48/,222 rental was premised on the condition that it would )u*
the truc+.
18
6oreover, the &TC )ased the 48/,222 rental and the costs of repair and overhaul on
!<hi)it F5,F wherein Chito 'oDar, the 4ro(ect 6anager of 6inde< &esources
,evelopment Corporation, proposed through a letter dated April 18, 1001, the
following: A1B to pa* the 48/,222 rental, A2B to repair the truc+ at the e<pense of
petitioner, and A3B to return the truc+ in good running condition after the repair.
@i+ewise, the nonpa*ment of the said amount was corro)orated )* &o<as thus:
FT ,uring that time when the / < / truc+ was alread* )urned and when *ou
went to the 4etron 'asoline -tation to inform plaintiff a)out the )urning, was
the plaintiff paid an* amount for the rental of the / < / truc+J
A: 5efore the )urning of the / < / truc+, the plaintiff 6orillo was alread*
paid partiall* and there was a )alance of 48/,222.22.F
13
The 4132,892 repair and overhaul costs was correctl* granted )* the lower courts.
Article 1//8 of the Civil Code holds the lessee responsi)le for the deterioration or loss
of the thing leased. In addition, Article 1//9 of the same Code provides that Fthe lessee
shall return the thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, (ust as he received it,
save what has )een lost or impaired )* the lapse of time, or )* ordinar* wear and tear,
or from an inevita)le cause.F
Courts )egin with the assumption that compensator* damages are for pecuniar* losses
that result from an act or omission of the defendant. %aving )een found to )e negligent
in safeguarding the leased truc+, petitioner must shoulder its repair and overhaul costs to
ma+e it servicea)le again. -uch e<penses are dul* supported )* receipts= thus, the award
of 4132,892 is definitel* in order.
T%ir! I'',&A
Attorneys Fees
"e find the award of attorne*Os fees to )e improper. The reason which the &TC gave 77
)ecause petitioner had compelled respondent to file an action against it 77 falls short of
our re;uirement in ,cott "onsultants and Resource -evelopment v. "#&
10
from which
we ;uote:
FIt is settled that the award of attorne*Os fees is the e<ception rather than the
rule and counselOs fees are not to )e awarded ever* time a part* wins suit. The
power of the court to award attorne*Os fees under Article 2223 of the Civil
Code demands factual, legal, and e;uita)le (ustification= its )asis cannot )e left
to speculation or con(ecture. "here granted, the court must e<plicitl* state in
the )od* of the decision, and not onl* in the dispositive portion thereof, the
legal reason for the award of attorne*Os fees.F
6oreover, a recent case
22
ruled that Fin the a)sence of stipulation, a winning part* ma*
)e awarded attorne*Os fees onl* in case plaintiffOs action or defendantOs stand is so
untena)le as to amount to gross and evident )ad faith.F
Indeed, respondent was compelled to file this suit to vindicate his rights. %owever, such
fact )* itself will not (ustif* an award of attorne*Os fees, when there is no sufficient
showing of petitionerOs )ad faith in refusing to pa* the said rentals as well as the repair
and overhaul costs.
21
<HEREFORE, the 4etition is DENED, )ut the assailed CA ,ecision
is !"DFED )* DE#E$N% the award of attorne*Os fees. Costs against petitioner.
SO OR"ERE".
G.R. No. 193144 5,& 19, 2009
+ON"RAGON LEISURE AN" RESORTS CORPORATION, 4etitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ASIAN >ANK CORPORATION, FAR EAST >ANK
AN" TRUST CO+PANY, a! UNITE" COCONUT PLANTERS
>ANK, &espondents.
, ! C I - I # N
BUISU+>ING, J.:
In its "ECISION
1
dated 6arch 12, 2222, the Court of Appeals in CA7'.&. -4 No.
/1218 dismissed the petition for certiorari filed )* 6ondragon @eisure and &esorts
Corporation against the Or!&r
2
dated 6arch 0, 2222, of the &egional Trial Court of
Angeles Cit*, 5ranch /1, in Civil Case No. 0928. @i+ewise, in its &esolution dated .ul*
3, 2222, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
#n $e)ruar* 23, 1001, 6ondragon International 4hilippines, Inc. A6I4IB, 6ondragon
-ecurities Corporation A6-CB and herein petitioner entered into a lease agreement with
the Clar+ ,evelopment Corporation AC,CB for the development of what is now +nown
as the 6imosa @eisure !state.
To help finance the pro(ect, petitioner, on .une 32, 1008, entered into an #mni)us @oan
and -ecurit* Agreement
3
Ahereafter #mni)us AgreementB with respondent )an+s for a
s*ndicated term loan in the aggregate principal amount of >-U226. >nder the
agreement, as amended on .anuar* 10, 1000,
1
the proceeds of the loan were to )e
released through advances evidenced )* promissor* notes to )e e<ecuted )* petitioner
in favor of each lender7)an+, and to )e paid within a si<7*ear period from the date of
initial advance inclusive of a one *ear and two ;uarters grace period.
To secure the repa*ment of the loan, petitioner pledged in favor of respondents
>-U226 worth of 6I4I shares of stoc+s= assigned, transferred and delivered all rights,
title to and interest in the pledged shares= and assigned )* wa* of securit* its leasehold
rights over the pro(ect and all the rights, title, interests and )enefits in, to and under an*
and all agreements in connection with the pro(ect.
#n .ul* 3, 1008, petitioner full* availed of and received the full amount of the
s*ndicated loan agreement. 4etitioner, which had regularl* paid the monthl* interests
due on the promissor* notes until #cto)er 1003, thereafter failed to ma+e pa*ments.
Conse;uentl*, on .anuar* / and $e)ruar* 9, 1000, written notices of default,
acceleration of pa*ment and demand letters were sent )* the lenders to the petitioner.
Then on August 28, 1000, respondents filed a complaint, doc+eted as Civil Case No.
0928, for the foreclosure of leasehold rights against petitioner.
4etitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: A1B a
condition precedent for the filing of the complaint has not )een complied with andKor the
instant complaint failed to state a cause of action, or otherwise the filing was premature=
A2B the certification of non7forum shopping appended to the complaint was fatall*
defective since one of the plaintiffs, >C45, deli)eratel* failed to mention that it had
previousl* filed another complaint= and A3B plaintiffs had engaged in forum shopping in
filing the instant complaint.
The trial court denied the motion and ruled as follows:
. . .
After a careful stud* of the arguments of the parties, this court finds that the motion to
dismiss is without merit. As correctl* pointed out )* the plaintiffs under par. /.21, the
)orrower defaults when interests due at stated maturit* are not paid and the lenders are
authoriDed to accelerate an* amount pa*a)le under the loan agreements. #ne of the
conse;uences of such default is the foreclosure of collaterals. This is the action ta+en )*
the herein plaintiffs7lenders.
This court also finds the alleged )orce ma+eure )aseless. The same are not those
provided for under -ec. 1, Article 11 of the loan agreement.
As to the allegation of forum shopping, the herein parties Asian 5an+ Corporation and
$ar !ast 5an+ and Trust Compan* are not parties to this case in 0912 AsicB. The su)(ect
matter of Civil Case No. 0928 is not the same with the su)(ect matter in Civil Case No.
0912.
"herefore, premises considered, the motion to dismiss is denied. The defendant is given
19 da*s from receipt hereof within which to file its answer andKor responsive pleading.
-# #&,!&!,.
9
4etitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order and argued that the complaint is
premature, since it had not )een validl* declared in default.
/
The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration. -easona)l*, petitioner filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
5efore the appellate court, petitioner reiterated its arguments in its motion to dismiss
)efore the trial court, including the failure of the respondents to attach the )oard
resolutions authoriDing them to file the complaint.
8
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the su)se;uent motion for
reconsideration. %ence, this appeal )* certiorari
3
imputing the following errors:
I
T%! &!-4#N,!NT7A44!@@!! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- C#66ITT!, A -!&I#>-
!&&#& #$ @A" AN, ACT!, "IT% '&A! A5>-! #$ ,I-C&!TI#N
A6#>NTIN' T# @ACG #& !QC!-- #$ .>&I-,ICTI#N IN &>@IN' T%AT T%!
C#64@AINT IN CII@ CA-! N#. 0928 C#64@I!, "IT% T%! 6AN,AT#&?
&!T>I&!6!NT- #$ C!&TI$ICATI#N #$ N#N7$#&>6 -%#44IN'.
II
T%! &!-4#N,!NT7A44!@@!! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- C#66ITT!, A -!&I#>-
!&&#& #$ @A" AN, ACT!, "IT% '&A! A5>-! #$ ,I-C&!TI#N
A6#>NTIN' T# @ACG #& !QC!-- #$ .>&I-,ICTI#N IN N#T &>@IN' T%AT
A C#N,ITI#N 4&!C!,!NT $#& T%! $I@IN' #$ T%! C#64@AINT IN CII@
CA-! N#. 0928 %A- N#T 5!!N C#64@I!, "IT%, #& T%AT IT I-
#T%!&"I-! 4&!6AT>&!, AN,K#& T%AT IT $AI@- T# -TAT! A CA>-! #$
ACTI#N A'AIN-T 4!TITI#N!&7A44!@@ANT.
III
T%! &!-4#N,!NT7A44!@@!! C#>&T #$ A44!A@- C#66ITT!, A -!&I#>-
!&&#& #$ @A" AN, ACT!, "IT% '&A! A5>-! #$ ,I-C&!TI#N
A6#>NTIN' T# @ACG #& !QC!-- #$ .>&I-,ICTI#N IN N#T &>@IN' T%AT
&!-4#N,!NT7A44!@@!! 5ANG-, IN $I@IN' T%! C#64@AINT IN CII@
CA-! N#. 0928, ,!@I5!&AT!@? !N'A'!, IN $#&>6 -%#44IN'.
0
In )rief, three issues are presented for resolution, namel*, A1B "as the certificate of non7
forum shopping defectiveJ A2B ,id respondents engage in forum shoppingJ and A3B ,o
respondents have a cause of action against the petitionerJ
#n the first issue, petitioner asserts that the verification and certificate of forum
shopping were defective )ecause there was no proof as to the authorit* of the signatories
to file the complaint. 4etitioner avers that >C45 &esolution 13738, which was onl*
presented in the Court of Appeals, merel* authoriDed the signator* to Fappear, act for, or
otherwise represent the )an+ in all (udicial, ;uasi7(udicial or administrative hearings or
incidents, including pre7trial conference, and in connection therewith, to do an* and all
of the following acts and deedsVF and clearl* pertains to a pending proceeding.
&espondents, on the other hand, contend that the lac+ of authorit* of the persons who
verified and certified the complaint was neither raised in the motion to dismiss nor in the
motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. The* aver that the verification and
certification of non7forum shopping contained a statement )* the persons who signed it
that the* had )een so authoriDed )* the )oard of directors of their respective
corporations.
Considering the su)missions of the parties, we are constrained to agree with the
respondentsO contention. The trial court did not err in den*ing the motion to dismiss.
The issue concerning the signatoriesO authoriDation was never raised )efore it. @i+ewise,
the appellate court did not err in refusing to ta+e cogniDance of the issue, since the
parties did not raise it )eforehand. Issues not raised in the trial court cannot )e raised for
the first time on appeal.
12
#n the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent >C45 engaged in forum
shopping since it earlier instituted an action for foreclosure of mortgage andKor
collection, doc+eted as Civil Case No. 0912.
11
This claim, in our view, is untena)le. A
comparison of the two complaints would show its utter lac+ of merit.
Civil Case No. 0912 pertains to an #mni)us Credit and -ecurit* Agreement e<ecuted )*
and )etween the petitioner and respondent >C45 on Novem)er 23, 1009. This is
separate and distinct from the #mni)us Agreement involved in Civil Case No. 0928.
6oreover, respondents Asian 5an+ and $ar !ast 5an+ are not among the parties to Civil
Case No. 0912.
As pointed out )* the Court of Appeals, forum shopping e<ists when )oth actions
involve the same transactions, with the same essential facts and circumstances= and
where identical causes of actions, su)(ect matter and issues are raised. The test to
determine the e<istence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or whether a final (udgment in one case will amount to res +udicata in
another.
12
The re;uisites in order that an action ma* )e dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia are AaB the identit* of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest
in )oth actions= A)B the identit* of rights asserted and relief pra*ed for, the relief )eing
founded on the same facts= and AcB the identit* of the two cases such that (udgment in
one, regardless of which part* is successful, would amount to res +udicata in the
other.
13
-uch re;uisites are not present in this controvers*.
#propos the third issue, petitioner contends the su)(ect o)ligation of the instant case is
not *et due and demanda)le )ecause the #mni)us Agreement allows a full si<7*ear term
of pa*ment. !ven if it failed to pa* some installments, petitioner insists it is not in
default )ecause respondents merel* sent collection and demand letters, )ut failed to give
the written notice of default re;uired under their agreement. 6oreover, petitioner avers
that the provisions on default in the #mni)us Agreement have )een rendered
inapplica)le and unenforcea)le )* fortuitous events, namel* the Asian economic crisis
and the closure of the 6imosa &egenc* Casino, which was petitionerOs primar* source
of revenues.1avvphi1.'w.
&espondents counter that the #mni)us Agreement defines, as an event of default, the
failure of petitioner to pa* when due at stated maturit*, )* acceleration or otherwise,
an* amount pa*a)le under the loan documents. -ince petitioner is also re;uired to pa*
interest, respondents posit that non7pa*ment thereof constituted a clear and
unmista+a)le case of default. &espondents add that the* had properl* advised the
petitioner that it had )een declared in default, referring to the .anuar* / and $e)ruar* 9,
1000 letters as their compliance with the notice re;uirement.
#n this issue, we are una)le to agree with the petitioner.
-ection 2.2/ AaB of 4art 5 of the #mni)us Agreement provides that the )orrower shall
pa* interest on the advances outstanding from time to time on each interest pa*ment
date, while -ection / of 4art A reads
/.21 E7&)' o$ "&$a,l)
!ach of the following events shall constitute an !vent of ,efault under this #mni)us
Agreement:
AaB 4a*ment ,efault W The 5#&&#"!& defaults in the pa*ment when due at stated
maturit*, )* acceleration or otherwise, of an* amount pa*a)le under the @oan
,ocuments.
11
. . .
Clearl*, under the foregoing provisions of the Agreement, petitioner ma* )e validl*
declared in default for failure to pa* the interest. As a conse;uence of default, the
unpaid amount shall earn default interest,
19
and the respondent7)an+s have four
alternative remedies without pre(udice to the application of the provisions on collaterals
and an* other steps or action which ma* )e adopted )* the ma(orit* lender.
1/
The four remedies are alternative, with the right of choice given to the lenders, in this
case the respondents. >nder Article 1221 of the Civil Code, the choice shall produce no
effect e<cept from the time it has )een communicated. This is the reason wh* a written
notice is re;uired under -ection /.22 of the #mni)us Agreement.
In the present case, we find that written notices were sent to the petitioner )* the
respondents. The notices clearl* indicate respondentsO choice of remed*: to accelerate
all pa*ments pa*a)le under the loan agreement. #n .anuar* /, 1000, respondents
notified petitioner that it was in default, and demanded pa*ment of the stated amount
within five da*s from receipt of the letter, otherwise all outstanding availments of the
>-U226 term loan together with interests and other sum pa*a)le shall )e declared due
and demanda)le.
18
The letter clearl* indicated the choice of remed* )* the respondents,
pursuant to the #mni)us Agreement.
!ven though su)se;uent demand is waived )* the petitioner in -ection /.22 of 4art 5 of
the #mni)us Agreement, on $e)ruar* 9, 1000, the respondents nevertheless actuall*
made their demand in writing for the pa*ment of the principal plus interest and penalt*
charges due on or )efore $e)ruar* 23, 1000, with e<press notice that the* would ta+e all
legal remedies availa)le to protect the interests of their clients.
13
Clearl*, respondents
have more than complied with the re;uirement concerning notice to the petitioner.
It should )e noted that the agreement also provides that the choice of remed* is without
pre(udice to the action on the collaterals. Thus, respondents could properl* file an action
for foreclosure of the leasehold rights to o)tain pa*ment for the amount demanded.
4etitionerOs claim, that the respondents could not )e held in default )ecause of a
fortuitous event, is untena)le. -aid event, the Asian financial crisis of 1008, is not
among the fortuitous events contemplated under Article 1181
10
of the Civil Code. To
e<empt the o)ligor from lia)ilit* for a )reach of an o)ligation )* reason of a fortuitous
event, the following re;uisites must concur: AaB the cause of the )reach of the o)ligation
must )e independent of the will of the de)tor= A)B the event must )e either unforeseea)le
or unavoida)le= AcB the event must )e such as to render it impossi)le for the de)tor to
fulfill his o)ligation in a normal manner= and AdB the de)tor must )e free from an*
participation in, or aggravation of the in(ur* to the creditor.
22
As pointed out )* the respondents, the loan agreement was entered into on .une 32,
1008, or when the Asian economic crisis had alread* started. 4etitioner, as a long
esta)lished corporation, should have )een well aware of the economic environment at
that time, *et it still too+ the ris+ to e<pand operations. @i+ewise, the closure of the
6imosa &egenc* Casino was not an unforeseea)le or unavoida)le event, in the conte<t
of the contract of lease )etween petitioner and C,C. !ver* )usiness venture involves
ris+s. &is+s are not unforeseea)le= the* are inherent in )usiness.
"orth* of note, ris+ is an e<ception to the general rule on fortuitous events. >nder the
law, these e<ceptions are: A1B when the law e<pressl* so specifies= A2B when it is
otherwise declared )* the parties= and A3B when the nature of the o)ligation re;uires the
assumption of ris+s.
21
"e find that in the #mni)us Agreement, the parties e<pressl*
agreed that an* enactment, official action, act of war, act of nature or other )orce
ma+eure or other similar circumstances shall in no wa* affect the o)ligation of the
)orrowers to ma+e pa*ments.
22
In sum, the appellate court did not err in dismissing petitionerOs action for certiorari and
in den*ing the motion for reconsideration. It committed no reversi)le error, much less
an* grave a)use of discretion amounting to lac+ or e<cess of (urisdiction, contrar* to
petitionerOs contentions.
<HEREFORE, the appeal is "ENIE" for lac+ of merit. The ,ecision dated 6arch
12, 2222 and the &esolution dated .ul* 3, 2222 of the Court of Appeals in CA7'.&. -4
No. /1218 are here)* AFFIR+E".
Costs against petitioner.
SO OR"ERE".
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
4ursuant to -ection 13, Article III of the Constitution, it is here)* certified that the
conclusions in the a)ove ,ecision were reached in consultation )efore the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the CourtOs ,ivision.
HILARIO G. "A6I"E, 5R.
Chief .ustice
G.R. No. 12:349 5,l0 10, 1994
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 5UANITA "E 5ESUS 6"A. "E "I+AANO, E+ERITA
"I+AANO, RE+E"IOS "I+AANO, CONSOLACION "I+AANO a!
+ILAGROS "I+AANO, respondents.

PURISI+A, J.:
4etition for review under &ule 19 of the &ules of Court see+ing to set aside the
,ecision
1
promulgated on .ul* 31, 100/, and &esolution
2
dated -eptem)er 12, 100/ of
the Court of Appeals
3
in CA7'.&. No. 11122, entitled F.uanita de .esus vda. de
,imaano, et al. vs. -outheastern College, Inc.F, which reduced the moral damages
awarded )elow from 41,222,222.22 to 4222,222.22.
3
The &esolution under attac+
denied petitionerCs motion for reconsideration.
4rivate respondents are owners of a house at 32/ College &oad, 4asa* Cit*, while
petitioner owns a four7store* school )uilding along the same College &oad. #n #cto)er
11, 1030, at a)out /:32 in the morning, a powerful t*phoon F-alingF hit 6etro 6anila.
5uffeted )* ver* strong winds, the roof of petitionerCs )uilding was partl* ripped off and
)lown awa*, landing on and destro*ing portions of the roofing of private respondentsC
house. After the t*phoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destro*ed )uilding was
conducted )* a team of engineers headed )* the cit* )uilding official, !ngr. .esus @.
&e*na. 4ertinent aspects of the latterCs &eport
9
dated #cto)er 13, 1030 stated, as
follows:
9. #ne of the factors that ma* have led to this calamitous event is the
formation of the )uilding in the area and the general direction of the
wind. -ituated in the peripheral lot is an almost >7shaped formation of
17store* )uilding. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerl*
direction, the general formation of the )uilding )ecomes a )ig funnel7
li+e structure, the one situated along College &oad, receiving the
heaviest impact of the strong winds. %ence, there are portions of the
roofing, those located on )oth ends of the )uilding, which remained
intact after the storm.
/. Another factor and perhaps the most li+el* reason for the dislodging
of the roofing structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said
trusses to the roof )eams. The 1K2C diameter steel )ars em)edded on
the concrete roof )eams which serve as truss anchorage are not )olted
nor nailed to the trusses. -till, there are other steel )ars which were
not even )ent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all
to the roof )eams.
It then recommended that Fto avoid an* further loss and damage to lives, lim)s
and propert* of persons living in the vicinit*,F the fourth floor of su)(ect school
)uilding )e declared as a Fstructural haDard.F
In their Complaint
:
)efore the &egional Trial Court of 4asa* Cit*, 5ranch 118, for
damages )ased on culpa aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their
house rendered the same uninha)ita)le, forcing them to sta* temporaril* in othersC
houses. And so the* sought to recover from petitioner 4118,11/.22, as actual damages,
41,222,222.22, as moral damages, 4322,222.22, as e<emplar* damages and
4122,222.22, for and as attorne*Cs fees= plus costs.
In its Answer, petitioner averred that su)(ect school )uilding had withstood several
devastating t*phoons and other calamities in the past, without its roofing or an* portion
thereof giving wa*= that it has not )een remiss in its responsi)ilit* to see to it that said
school )uilding, which houses school children, facult* mem)ers, and emplo*ees, is Fin
tip7top conditionF= and furthermore, t*phoon F-alingF was Fan act of 'od and therefore
)e*ond human controlF such that petitioner cannot )e answera)le for the damages
wrought there)*, a)sent an* negligence on its part.
The trial court, giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that su)(ect
school )uilding had a Fdefective roofing structure,F found that, while t*phoon F-alingF
was accompanied )* strong winds, the damage to private respondentsC houses Fcould
have )een avoided if the construction of the roof of LpetitionerCsM )uilding was not
fault*.F The dispositive portion of the lower courtCs decision
2
reads, thus:
"%!&!$#&!, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders (udgment
AsicB in favor of the plaintiff AsicB and against the defendants, AsicB
ordering the latter to pa* (ointl* and severall* the former as follows:
aB 4118,11/.22, as actual
damages, plus litigation e<penses=
)B 41,222,222.22 as moral
damages=
cB 4122,222.22 as attorne*Cs fees=
dB Costs of the instant suit.
The claim for e<emplar* damages is denied for the reason that the
defendants AsicB did in a wanton fraudulent, rec+less, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as errors,
4
that:
I
T%! T&IA@ C#>&T !&&!, IN %#@,IN' T%AT T?4%##N
F-A@IN'F, A- AN ACT #$ '#,, I- N#T FT%! -#@! AN,
A5-#@>T! &!A-#NF $#& T%! &I44IN'7#$$ #$ T%! -6A@@
4#&TI#N #$ T%! &##$ #$ -#>T%!A-T!&NC- $#>& A1B
-T#&!? -C%##@ 5>I@,IN'.
II
T%! T&IA@ C#>&T !&&!, IN %#@,IN' T%AT FT%!
C#N-T&>CTI#N #$ T%! &##$ #$ ,!$!N,ANTC- -C%##@
5>I@,IN' "A- $A>@T?F N#T"IT%-TAN,IN' T%!
A,6I--I#N T%AT T%!&! "!&! T?4%##N- 5!$#&! 5>T
N#T A- '&A! A- T?4%##N F-A@IN'F "%IC% I- T%!
,I&!CT AN, 4&#QI6AT! CA>-! #$ T%! INCI,!NT.
III
T%! T&IA@ C#>&T !&&!, IN A"A&,IN' ACT>A@ AN,
6#&A@ ,A6A'!- A- "!@@ A- ATT#&N!?C- $!!- AN,
@ITI'ATI#N !Q4!N-!- AN, C#-T- #$ ->IT T# ,I6AAN#-
"%!N T%!? %A! N#T INC>&&!, ACT>A@ ,A6A'!- AT
A@@ A- ,I6AAN#- %A! A@&!A,? -#@, T%!I&
4&#4!&T?, AN INT!&!NIN' !!NT T%AT &!N,!&- T%I-
CA-! 6##T AN, ACA,!6IC.
I
T%! T&IA@ C#>&T !&&!, IN #&,!&IN' T%! I-->ANC! #$
T%! "&IT #$ !Q!C>TI#N IN-4IT! #$ T%! 4!&$!CTI#N #$
-#>T%!A-T!&NC- A44!A@ "%!N T%!&! I- N#
C#64!@@IN' &!A-#N $#& T%! I-->ANC! T%!&!T#.
As mentioned earlier, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial
courtCs disposition )* reducing the award of moral damages from 41,222,222.22 to
4222,222.22. %ence, petitionerCs resort to this Court, raising for resolution the issues of:
1. "hether or not the award of actual damages LsicM to respondent
,imaanos on the )asis of speculation or con(ecture, without proof or
receipts of actual damage, LsicM legall* feasi)le or (ustified.
2. "hether or not the award of moral damages to respondent
,imaanos, with the latter having suffered, actual damage has legal
)asis.
3. "hether or not respondent ,imaanos who are no longer the owner
of the propert*, su)(ect matter of the case, during its pendenc*, has the
right to pursue their complaint against petitioner when the case was
alread* moot and academic )* the sale of the propert* to third part*.
1. "hether or not the award of attorne*Cs fees when the case was
alread* moot academic LsicM legall* (ustified.
9. "hether or not petitioner is lia)le for damage caused to others )*
t*phoon F-alingF )eing an act of 'od.
/. "hether or not the issuance of a writ of e<ecution pending
appeal, ex-parte or without hearing, has support in law.
The pivot of in;uir* here, determinative of the other issues, is whether the damage on
the roof of the )uilding of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling
portions of the school )uildingCs roof ripped off )* the strong winds of t*phoon
F-alingF, was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous eventJ If so, petitioner
cannot )e held lia)le for the damages suffered )* the private respondents. This
conclusion finds support in Article 1181 of Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1181. !<cept in cases e<pressl* specified )* the law, or when it is
otherwise declared )* stipulation, or when the nature of the o)ligation
re;uires the assumption of ris+, no person shall )e responsi)le for
those events which could not )e foreseen, or which, though foreseen,
were inevita)le.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso )ortuito is found in the !artidas which
defines it as Fan event which ta+es place )* accident and could not have )een
foreseen.F
9
!scriche ela)orates it as Fan une<pected event or act of 'od which could
neither )e foreseen nor resisted.F
10
Civilist Arturo 6. Tolentino adds that FLfMortuitous
events ma* )e produced )* two general causes: A1B )* nature, such as earth;ua+es,
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and A2B )* the act of man, such as an armed
invasion, attac+ )* )andits, governmental prohi)itions, ro))er*, etc.F
11
In order that a fortuitous event ma* e<empt a person from lia)ilit*, it is necessar* that
he )e free from an* previous negligence or misconduct )* reason of which the loss ma*
have )een occasioned.
12
An act of 'od cannot )e invo+ed for the protection of a person
who has )een guilt* of gross negligence in not tr*ing to forestall its possi)le adverse
conse;uences. "hen a personCs negligence concurs with an act of 'od in producing
damage or in(ur* to another, such person is not e<empt from lia)ilit* )* showing that
the immediate or pro<imate cause of the damages or in(ur* was a fortuitous event. "hen
the effect is found to )e partl* the result of the participation of man I whether it )e
from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act I the whole occurrence is here)*
humaniDed, and removed from the rules applica)le to acts of 'od.
13
In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of
the investigating team that su)(ect school )uildingCs roofing had Fno sufficient
anchorage to hold it in position especiall* when )attered )* strong winds.F 5ased on
such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and ad(udged it lia)le for
damages to private respondents.
After a thorough stud* and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court )elieves
otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings )* the trail court,
especiall* when affirmed )* the appellate court, are )inding and conclusive upon this
Court.
13
After a careful scrutin* of the records and the pleadings su)mitted )* the
parties, we find e<ception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the
evidence proffered.
There is no ;uestion that a t*phoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence
which ma* )e foreseen )ut is unavoida)le despite an* amount of foresight, diligence or
care.
19
In order to )e e<empt from lia)ilit* arising from an* adverse conse;uence
engendered there)*, there should have )een no human participation amounting to a
negligent act.
1:
In other words= the person see+ing e<oneration from lia)ilit* must not
)e guilt* of negligence. Negligence, as commonl* understood, is conduct which
naturall* or reasona)l* creates undue ris+ or harm to others. It ma* )e the failure to
o)serve that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances (ustif*
demand,
12
or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasona)le man, guided
)* considerations which ordinaril* regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do.
14
$rom these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent,
such that if it were not, the damage caused to private respondentsC house could have
)een avoidedJ
At the outset, it )ears emphasiDing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the )urden of proving the e<istence of fault or negligence causative of his
in(ur* or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must )e affirmativel* esta)lished )*
competent evidence,
19
not merel* )* presumptions and conclusions without )asis in
fact. 4rivate respondents, in esta)lishing the culpa)ilit* of petitioner, merel* relied on
the aforementioned report su)mitted )* a team which made an ocular inspection of
petitionerCs school )uilding after the t*phoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection
is one )* means of actual sight or viewing.
20
"hat is visual to the e*e through, is not
alwa*s reflective of the real cause )ehind. $or instance, one who hears a gunshot and
then sees a wounded person, cannot alwa*s definitel* conclude that a third person shot
the victim. It could have )een self7inflicted or caused accidentall* )* a stra* )ullet. The
relationship of cause and effect must )e clearl* shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted
to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitionerCs school )uilding.
4rivate respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said
school )uilding were deficient and defective. Neither did the* prove an* su)stantial
deviation from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did the* conclusivel*
esta)lish that the construction of such )uilding was )asicall* flawed.
21
#n the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents,
cit* )uilding official .esus &e*na, that the original plans and design of petitionerCs
school )uilding were approved prior to its construction. !ngr. &e*na admitted that it
was a legal re;uirement )efore the construction of an* )uilding to o)tain a permit from
the cit* )uilding official Acit* engineer, prior to the passage of the 5uilding Act of
1088B. In li+e manner, after construction of the )uilding, a certification must )e secured
from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupanc* of the edifice. %aving
o)tained )oth )uilding permit and certificate of occupanc*, these are, at the ver*
least, prima )acie evidence of the regular and proper construction of su)(ect school
)uilding.
22
$urthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted )* t*phoon
F-alingF, the same cit* official gave the go7signal for such repairs I without an*
deviation from the original design I and su)se;uentl*, authoriDed the use of the entire
fourth floor of the same )uilding. These onl* prove that su)(ect )uilding suffers from no
structural defect, contrar* to the report that its F>7shapedF form was Fstructurall*
defective.F %aving given his un;ualified imprimatur, the cit* )uilding official is
presumed to have properl* performed his duties
23
in connection therewith.
In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who
testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of su)(ect school )uilding
were regularl* underta+en. 4etitioner was even willing to present its maintenance
supervisor to attest to the e<tent of such regular inspection )ut private respondents
agreed to dispense with his testimon* and simpl* stipulated that it would )e
corro)orative of the vice presidentCs narration.
6oreover, the cit* )uilding official, who has )een in the cit* government service since
1081, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding an* defect on the same
structure has ever )een lodged )efore his office prior to the institution of the case at
)ench. It is a matter of (udicial notice that t*phoons are common occurrences in this
countr*. If su)(ect school )uildingCs roofing was not firml* anchored to its trusses,
o)viousl*, it could not have withstood long *ears and several t*phoons even stronger
than F-aling.F
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the
(udgment of the appellate court. "e thus hold that petitioner has not )een shown
negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school )uilding in
;uestion and that t*phoon F-alingF was the pro<imate cause of the damage suffered )*
private respondentsC house.
"ith this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondentsC claim for actual and
moral damages as well as attorne*Cs fees must fail.
23
4etitioner cannot )e made to
answer for a purel* fortuitous event.
29
6ore so )ecause no )ad faith or willful act to
cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.
4rivate respondents failed to adduce ade;uate and competent proof of the pecuniar* loss
the* actuall* incurred.
2:
It is not enough that the damage )e capa)le of proof )ut must )e
actuall* proved with a reasona)le degree of certaint*, pointing out specific facts that
afford a )asis for measuring whatever compensator* damages are )orne.
22
4rivate
respondents merel* su)mitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof
their su)(ect )uilding. "hat is more, whether the Fnecessar* repairsF were caused
#N@? )* petitionerCs alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school )uilding, or
included the ordinar* wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential ;uestion that
remains indetermina)le.
The Court deems unnecessar* to resolve the other issues posed )* petitioner.
As regards the si<th issue, however, the writ of e<ecution issued on April 1, 1003 )* the
trial court is here)* nullified and set aside. 4rivate respondents are ordered to reim)urse
an* amount or return to petitioner an* propert* which the* ma* have received )* virtue
of the enforcement of said writ.
"%!&!$#&!, the petition is '&ANT!, and the challenged ,ecision is &!!&-!,.
The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 8311 )efore the trial court a
quo is ordered ,I-6I--!, and the writ of e<ecution issued on April 1, 1003 in said
case is -!T A-I,!. Accordingl*, private respondents are #&,!&!, to return to
petitioner an* amount or propert* received )* them )* virtue of said writ. Costs against
the private respondents.
-# #&,!&!,.
/arvasa& ".0.& Rom