Caleb Kruse

Ethics of Collective Action

Second Paper Version


Favorability of Small Groups in Collective Action when Jointness of Supply is
Considered

In our interconnected world, commons problems have become increasingly
pertinent. Although situations involving a shared resource were initially thought to end in
failure without privatization government intervention
1
, society seems to have the
capability to manage these resources independently. In particular, the work of Elinor
Ostrom is notable for espousing the ideals that a tightly interacting group can resolve
these scenarios on their own should certain conditions be met. These ideas have been
well received, and appear to hold true in real world scenarios, yet it still seems quite
difficult to solve these problems without private property or outside actors. What then is
the key to developing a solution where a group acts collectively to preserve the well
being of society?
In this paper I analyze contrasting opinions on the most fundamental variable
controlling community involvement. I will describe the viewpoint of Mancur Olson, who
espoused group size as the most defining characteristic, and compare it against Pamela
Oliver and Gerald Marwells theory that the price/use structure of a public good is
paramount. Oliver & Marwell wrote their 1988 paper titled The Paradox of Group Size

1
Forster Garret Hardin was the first to coin the term The Tragedy of the Commons to
describe the outcome of a publicly maintained resource. While the ideas were largely
recapitulations of the works of Thomas Malthus, William Lloyd, and John Locke, the
paper vaulted the commons concept back into academic consciousness.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243-1248.
in Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II
2
, to resolve contradictory
findings on the impacts of group size on likelihood of collective action. Empirical
analysis had shown that group size is the most important variable for inspiring
contribution towards a collective action solution. Traditionally, this was seen as an
outcome of needing a minimum group size (a critical mass) to start a movement. It was
thought that with a larger population, there were simply more people to select from in
order to form the necessary core group.
Standing opposed to this idea was most theory related to the topic at the time
specifically Mancur Olson's 1965 work, Logic of Collective Action
3
. Here, Olson
proposed that large groups fail while small groups succeed. Garrett Hardin himself
described this discontinuity as the most controversial issue in the contemporary
literature on collective action. As stated by Oliver & Marwell, When theory conflicts
with empirical research, the problem usually lies with the theory. Thus, they sought to
deconstruct Olsons argument and propose alternative theory to unify what we see
empirically. In this paper, I will briefly present Olsons arguments for small groups, and
then analyze Oliver & Marwells alternative theory of group size and collective action.
In this debate, Oliver & Marwell start their argument by defining a public good as
a resource that cannot be withheld from any member of a group. This is followed by the
definition that the relevant group is any collection of individuals who has a positive
interest in that public good. Olson separates groups into three distinct categories based on
size. First is a small, or privileged group. Here, there is enough personal interest in a

2
Oliver, Pamela E., and Gerald Marwell. "The Paradox of Group Size in Collective
Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. II." American Sociological Review (1988): 1-8.
3
Olson, Mancur. The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of group.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.
public good such that an individual will provide some amount himself. A good example
of this would be the benefit of creating an asteroid defense system. Although one nations
production of the system would benefit all other nations, the amount of good is high
enough that one country is not deterred by the idea of free riders. The next classification
is that of a moderately sized group. In this group, a user cannot provide a significant
portion of the good himself, but can provide some impact on the provisioning level of
that good. Take a traditional commons example of fishing in this case. A fisherperson
will not be able to fully influence the stock size, but by reducing their fishing intensity
they may allow the fish population to increase. Finally, and most interestingly, is the
large group. In this system, no individual can make a noticeable impact on the
provisioning or well-being of the public good. Thus, it is Olsons argument that no
rational member of a large group would ever contribute to the provisioning of a resource
because they would see no meaningful benefit. Pollution of the environment is an
example of a public good with a large member group where the members have little
incentive to limit their emissions.
From these definitions and scenarios, Olson came to the conclusion that smaller
groups are more likely to overcome challenges of public goods. It makes rational sense as
presented, but does not hold empirically, where we see that large groups contribute more
readily to the provisioning and protection of a public good. How then should we resolve
this schism? Rather than group size being the key variable in collective action problems,
Oliver & Marwell propose that it is important to evaluate the economic nature of public
good. They describe goods based upon their level of jointness of supply, a term
referring to how much benefit a user receives from a good in relation to its cost. A good
with high jointness of supply costs the same regardless of how many people benefit from
it. Common examples of this type of good are the use of bridges and benefits from border
defense. In these scenarios, the cost of the good is independent of the number of people
who use it. In contrast to these goods with high jointness of supply are classic private
goods whose cost is proportional to the number of users who enjoy them. These goods
are described as having zero jointness of supply. Oliver & Marwell believe that this is the
key to collective action, and it is unaddressed by Olson.
Fundamental to this argument is that the relevant cost of collective action is borne
by the collective actors. It is not the cost of the end result that is the barrier, but rather the
cost of initial action. For example, the cost of cleaning pollution is roughly proportional
to the number of polluters, but the initial barrier to surpass in order to mandate pollution
management is the cost of lobbying congress to enact a resolution. In this example, and in
the case of most governmental policy, there is quite high jointness of supply.
Oliver & Marwell agree that Olsons arguments about group size apply only when
the jointness of supply is zerowhere the cost of a good is proportional to the number
who benefit from that good. In this scenario, if more people will gain from the purchase
of a public good, then the expected value that an individual will gain from their actions
decreases with an increase in group size. However, few collective action scenarios have
zero jointness of supply. Alternatively, there is a situation with pure jointness of supply,
where a larger group is more likely to pursue a project, as the group grows larger as the
number of people who benefit grows. For example, building a bridge is a public good
where the benefit increases as the number of users increase. Olson would say that as the
number of potential users of the bridge grows, the likelihood of any one of them taking
action would decrease as their benefit as a proportion of the population declines. Oliver
& Marwell argue that while proportional benefit decreases, the overall gains of
contributing towards this public good are the key as this is a high jointness of supply
good.
In this paradigm, rather than group size alone dictating the level of action, it
instead depends on two alternative factors. Whether the goods cost function
approximates the jointness of supply, and whether the group and size of contribution is
heterogeneously distributed. If these conditions are met, then there will be a positive
effect on collective action as the size of the group increases. Already we have seen how a
good with high jointness of supply is beneficial, but the importance of heterogeneity
within a group is also prominent. Take for example a project whose overall cost is $125.
In a homogenous group with an average contribution of $5 it will take 25 individuals
before a goal is reached. However, if we normally distribute the benefits received from
the item and as a result, the contributions from a group, we see that as group size
increases so do the chances of having a benefactor who will disproportionally contribute.
In Oliver & Marwells analysis, the number of individuals required to contribute the
necessary funds in this example declines by five members to 20 if the group consists of
100 members, and 17 out of a group with 1,000 individuals. Thus, heterogeneous
population distributions are quite important, especially when the initial costs are quite
high.
Prima facie, these ideas of heterogeneity and a cost function approximating the
jointness supply provide a reasonable alternative to group size as a criterion for
evaluating the likelihood of generating collective action, and, would provide a theoretical
explanation for the empirical actions of large groups. However, before accepting these
features as prominent new tenets of collective action theory, we must try them more
rigorously. Let us first examine how Olson might respond to these arguments.
The focus of my rebuttal is on the statement that even if a community members
contributions are too small to make an individual difference, they will still contribute if
the overall benefit is large enough, and the cost of that action approximates the benefit
received when factoring in jointness of supply. Already, Oliver & Marwell concede that
for a good with zero jointness of supply (a classic private good), Olsons argument
endorsing the favorability of small groups holds true. Thus, we are only looking at a
situation in which the good has a high jointness of supply. In this scenario, Oliver &
Marwells argument can be summed up in the statement, Individuals will provide the
good if their own benefit from the good outweighs its cost. This means that group size is
irrelevant. Instead, if there is enough benefit, then action will be favorable.
The entire argument is based upon this seemingly simple economic premise.
However, it does not address the problem at the heart of the collective action dilemma.
Even if the benefit to me were large, the idea that another member of society may benefit
from my contribution without paying a cost would cripple the likelihood of action. I can
play a prisoners dilemma game with the rest of society, hoping that they front the cost
for this good whose cost does not increase with the user load. The theory does not help
resolve this question. Instead it simply endorses a larger group, as it is more likely to find
a member who is willing to pay the cost.
This argument, in the opinion of an Olson-and-small-group defender, simply
approaches collective action as a lottery. The more people that are in a group, the greater
chance that there will be enough community oriented members willing to pay the cost.
When looking at the argument this way, one step removed from all the discussion of
jointness of supply and heterogeneity of a group, the argument seems to be considerably
weaker at providing a model for group size and collective action. At this point in the
development of Oliver & Marwells argument, there seems to be no reason to believe that
members of a large group where contributions do not make a noticeable difference would
be more likely to act than a small group with an interest in the collective good.
In fact, it can even be argued that the members of the large group that Oliver &
Marwell seek are simply a small group in a larger population, returning favorability to the
side of Olson. Looking back at the uncontested definition of a small group, we see that it
is a group in which some individual may have enough interest in the collective good to
provide some level of it himself. Olson might say that by preferring a large group
insofar as it is more likely to find members who will contribute, you are actually seeking
a small group to kick-start the collective action.
How then would Oliver & Marwell respond, and can we look to their ideas as a
model for the influence of group size on collective action? In defense of large group size,
the strongest evidence is that empirically they are inclined to act collectively. Even if
Olsons argument seems to hold theoretically, it does not seem to be true in practice. I am
not enough of a social scientist to effectively critique the methodology of results of the
empirical tests, so they will be accepted as a given.
To address the raised concern, one of the strongest lines of reasoning is that the
response is largely semantic rather than descriptive. If the outcome of a large group is a
small subset of individuals with an interest in the public good, this does not defeat Oliver
& Marwell, but actually could buoy their case. What we are trying to develop is a model
for collective action in order to put necessary structures for this action in place within
society. With this in mind, even if we classify the small subset of actors a small group,
the argument that a group of dedicated people is more likely to be found within a larger
body still stands.
This is why they emphasize the importance of group heterogeneity. Both sides of
this argument agree that there needs to be a set of people who are interested enough in a
good to provide some of it themselves. In a large and diverse group, it is more likely for a
collective outcome to be achieved because the range of contributions will be more
diverse. It would be more likely to have a portion of members who have a greater interest
in the public good sufficient to contribute himself. The main function of the Oliver &
Marwell paper is to resolve the conflict of whether large or small groups are more likely
to act collectively. In this case, it seems like a larger group is once again more likely to
act collectively.
Oliver & Marwells response seems to be sufficient. From the outset, we should
be inclined to support their point of view, as it more closely holds to the empirical
evidence. While Olsons argument seems to make sense from an intuitive standpoint, it
seems that when jointness of supply is not zero, and especially when it is high, we should
prefer a larger group to enact a collective solution. In the end, it seems like Oliver &
Marwells argument holds more weight in the real world. In the case of a high jointness
of supply public good, a larger group will likely contain the necessary portion of society
invested in the good. Furthermore, with the arguments of group heterogeneity holds quite
a bit of weight that cannot be addressed by Olson and the small-group side. Thus, Oliver
& Marwell seem to have made a strong case. When approaching a collective action
problem among a group, rather than analyzing the group size, we should determine the
heterogeneity among the group when the good maintains a high level of jointness of
supply.
How then should we apply this knowledge to find real-world collective solutions?
The complexity of the problem does not diminish in any way with if we know the precise
role of group size. However, we are able to more carefully target groups and problems
with a demographic suited to contributing to a public good. Oliver & Marwells emphasis
on the importance of heterogeneity within groups is also relevant. Rather than targeting
the main set of actors who have the most invested or largest personal stake in the issue,
we should seek to increase the number of users who may receive a larger benefit from a
collective outcome.
If we are able to use the lessons learned from the conflict between Olson and
Oliver & Marwell, and continue to characterize collective action, then we will continue to
make progress towards solving these complex issues that are a defining feature of our
globalized time.