DACOYCOY V.

CA, 195 SCRA 641 (1991)

FACTS Jesus Dacoycoy filed before RTC of Antipolo, Rizal a complaint against private respondent
Rufino de Guzman praying for annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of riceland located in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce, and damages. Before summons could be served
on de Guzman, RTC judge ordered counsel for petitioner to confer with respondent trial judge on the
matter of venue. After said conference, RTC dismissed the complaint due to improper venue. RTC
found that petitioners action is a real action as it sought not only the annulment of the deeds of sale
but also recovery of ownership of the riceland which was outside of the RTCs territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioner appealed to IAC which affirmed RTCs order of dismissal.
Petitioner faults the IAC in affirming RTC finding that the venue was improperly laid when de Guzman
has not even answered the complaint nor waived the venue.
HELD Petition granted. The court can not motu proprio dismiss the case on ground of improper venue.
Objections to venue may be waived by the parties. Improper venue does not necessarily divest the
court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Even granting that the action of petitioner is a real action, respondent trial court would still have
jurisdiction over the case, it being a RTC vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.
de Leon: This does not apply in summary procedure cases where the court may motu propio dismiss the
complaint even on the ground of improper venue (SC Resolution 15 October 1991, Sec. 4).
FORTUNE MOTORS V. CA, 178 SCRA 564 (1989)
FACTS Metrobank extended various loans to Fortune which was secured by a real estate mortgage on
the Fortune building and lot in Makati. For failure of Fortune to pay the loans, Metrobank initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notice were served, posted and published, the mortgaged
property was sold at a public auction to Metrobank as the highest bidder.
3days after the expiration of the 1yr redemption period, Fortune filed a complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to
Metrobank was not yet due, publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public
auction, and the price for which the property was sold was shockingly low.
Before summons could be served, Metrobank filed a MtD the complaint on the ground that the venue
of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the subject real property is situated in Makati, therefore
the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in Makati RTC.
MtD was opposed by Fortune alleging that its action is a personal action and that the issue is the
validity of the extrajudicial proceedings so that it may have a new 1yr redemption period.
Manila RTC issued an order reserving the resolution of Metrobanks MtD until after the trial on the
merits as the grounds relied upon by the defendant were not clear and indubitable. Metrobank filed a
MfR but was denied by Manila RTC. Metrobank appealed to CA. CA granted and dismissed the
annulment case without prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue.
HELD An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul
a private sale of real property. Both are actions that affect title and seek recovery of the real property
sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or part thereof lies. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
CLAVECILLA RADIO V. ANTILLON, 19 SCRA 379 (1967)
FACTS New Cagayan Grocery Bacolod Branch sent a message (REURTEL WASHED NOT AVAILABLE
REFINED TWENTY FIFTY IF AGREEABLE SHALL SHIP LATER REPLY) to New Cagayan Grocery CDO
Branch thru Clavecilla Radio Bacolod. Clavecilla Radio Cagayan received the message. However, in
delivering the same to New Cagayan Grocery CDO, the word NOT between the word WASHED and
AVAILABLE was omitted, thus changing entirely the contents and purport of the message and
causing the addressee to suffer damages.
New Cagayan filed a complaint against Clavecilla in the MTC. After service of summons, Clavecilla filed
MtD the complaint on the grounds that it states no cause of action and the venue is improperly laid.
New Cagayan interposed opposition to which Clavecilla filed its rejoinder. Thereafter, MTC judge
Antillon denied MtD for lack of merit.
Clavecilla filed a petition for prohibition and prelim injunction with the CFI praying that judge Antillon
be enjoined from further proceeding with the case on the ground of improper venue. Respondents filed
MtD the petition but was opposed by Clavecilla. CFI held that Clavecilla may be sued in Manila where it
has its principal office or in CDO where it was served with summons thru the branch manager. In other
word, CFI upheld the authority of MTC to take cognizance of the case.
In appealing, Clavecilla contends that the suit against it should be filed in Manila where it holds its
principal office.
HELD The residence of the corporation is the place where its principal office is established. Branch
offices are not residences where it may be sued. The phrase where he (defendant) may be found as
to venue of actions applies only to non-residents. It does not apply to defendants residing in the
Philippines.
YOUNG AUTO V. CA, 223 SCRA 670 (1993)
Facts: Young Auto (YASCO) sold its shares of stock in Consolidated Mktg & Devt Corp (CMDC) to
Roxas. Purchase price 8M, dp 4M check bal 4M in pd checks 1M each. After execution of the
agreement, Roxas took full control of the four markets of CMDC. However YASCO held on to stock
certificates as security pending full payment. First 4M was honored but the four 1M checks were
dishonored. Roxas sold one of the markets to a 3
rd
party. Out of the proceeds, YASCO rcvd 600k
leaving a bal of 3.4M
YASCO filed a complaint against Roxas in Cebu RTC praying that Roxas be ordered to pay the bal or
that full control of the 3 markets be turned over to YASCO. Roxas filed MtD, ground: improper venue.
RTC dismissed MTD.
Roxas appealed to CA. CA ordered dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue.
YASCO appealed to SC.
The Articles of Incorporation of Young Auto Motors stated that its principal office was in Cebu. In its
transactions with Roxas, Young Auto stated in its letterhead that its principal office was in Manila.
Young Auto sued Roxas in Cebu based on such transactions. Roxas files MTD on the ground of improper
venue.
Held: A corporation is a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles
of incorporation. Hence, Cebu was a valid venue for Youngs action.
Escolin: If it was Roxas who filed the case against Young in Pasay City based on the address in the
letterhead, Young would be estopped from objecting on the ground of improper venue.
HERNANDEZ V. DBP, 71 SCRA 290 (1976)
Facts: Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of private respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines in its Legal Department for twenty-one (21) years until his retirement due to illness. On
August 12, 1964, the private respondent awarded to the petitioner a lot in Quezon City by DBP.
Subsequently, DBP refused to accept Hernandezs payment and cancelled the award on the following
grounds: (1) that he has already retired; (2) that he has only an option to purchase said house and lot; (3)
that there are a big number of employees who have no houses or lots; (4) that he has been given his
retirement gratuity; and (5) that the awarding of the aforementioned house and lot to an employee of
the private respondent would better subserve the objective of its Housing Project. Petitioner protested
against the cancellation of the award of the house and lot in his favor and demanded from private
respondent the restoration of all his rights to said award. However, private respondent refused.
Hernandez filed an action to annul the cancellation of the award in Batangas and restoration of
all his rights thereto. DBP filed MTD on ground of improper venue, contending that since the
petitioner's action affects the title to a house and lot situated in Quezon City, the same should have
been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the real property is located and
not in the Court of First Instance of Batangas where petitioner resides.
Held: Hernandez's action is not a real but a personal action. His action is one to declare null and void the
cancellation of the lot and house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said
properties but seeks to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one
which it cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and to accept payment. Such an action is a personal
action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his residence.

LIZARES V. CALAUAG, 4 SCRA 746 (1962)
FACTS: Flaviano Cacnio bought from Dr. Antonio Lizares on installment a parcel of land located in
Sinkang Subd Bacolod City. Cacnio made a downpayment p of Php1,206 bal Php10,858 to be paid in
10yearly installments.
Cacnio received a letter from Lizares demanding payment of arrears in installment payments, interests,
and taxes. Cacnio sent a check to pay the amount due but Lizares returned the check and refused the
tender of payment. Cacnio instituted a civil case in the Rizal CFI praying that Lizares be ordered to
accept the payment being made by him.
Petitioner MtD the complaint due to improper venue for the action affects the title or possession of real
property located in Bacolod. CFI denied MtD holding that it was a personal action. Petitioner appealed
to the CA. CA denied petition.
HELD: An action praying that defendant be ordered "to accept the payment being made" by plaintiff
for the lot which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis from the former, to pay plaintiff
compensatory damages and attorney's fees and to enjoin defendant and his agents from repossessing
the lot in question, is one that affects title to land, and "shall be commenced and tried in the province
where the property or any part thereof lies," because, although the immediate remedy is to compel the
defendant to accept the tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious that this relief is merely the
first step to establish plaintiff's title to real property.
Escolin: In the Bar exams of 1978, Wigberto Taada was the Bar examiner. There was a question using
the facts of Lizares. The consensus was the case should be filed in the place where the property was
located. Taada cited the Hernandez case in ruling that the case should be filed in the residence of the
plaintiff. Eventually, both where considered correct.
de Leon: So where should we side now?
ESUERTE V. CA, 193 SCRA 541 (1991)
FACTS: An action for damages was filed by private respondent Beverly Tan against herein
petitioners Patria Esuerte and Herminia Jayme with Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Private
respondent as plaintiff in the Civil Case is a legal resident of Cebu City. Her parents live there.
However, at the time of her filing of the complaint against petitioners, she was a temporary resident
of Bacolod City. She was then employed with the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital,
Bacolod City, as resident physician. Moreover, the acts complained of were committed in Bacolod
City. The private respondents were all residents of Bacolod City at the time of the bringing of the
action. Though Tan's employment was only temporary there was no showing when this
employment will end.
Issue: WON the case filed in Cebu will prosper.
Held: No.For purposes of venue of personal actions, the venue is to be determined where the plaintiff or
the defendant is actually located. It is actual residence, not legal domicile, which is relevant.
de Leon: The meaning of residence in determining venue of personal actions is the same as
residence in determinng venue of estate proceedings.


CAPATI V. OCAMPO, 113 SCRA 794 (1982)
Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bank for
the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur. He entered into a sub-contract with the
defendant Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City where he undertook to construct the vault walls,
exterior walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the specifications indicated
therein. Defendant further bound himself to complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967. To
emphasize this time frame Ocampo affixed his signature below the following stipulation in bold letters:
TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE 67.
At the back of the contract which reads:
14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Naga.
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June 20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages.
Ocampo (defendant) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was
improperly laid. Capati (plaintiff) filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to
hold the venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely optional to both contracting
parties.
CFI of Pampanga decided that it is an improper venue.
Held: Stipulation as to venue which uses the word may is permissive and does not limit the venue of
the action only to the venue stipulated.
UNIMASTERS V. CA, 267 SCRA (1997)
Stipulation as to venue which uses the word shall is permissive and does not limit the venue of the
action only to the venue stipulated.
Escolin: They should have used the words solely, exclusively, or only. Shall is not enough to
confer exclusive venue with a court.
DIAZ V. ADIONG, 219 SCRA 631 (1993)
Facts:
Filing of answer waives MTD on ground of improper venue.
Escolin: the rules now allow raising the issue of improper venue as an affirmative defense in the answer
even if there was failure to raise it in a motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec. 6).
ENUE OF LIBEL CASE WHERE OFFENDED PARTY IS AN PUBLIC OFFICIAL. From the provision of
Article 360, third paragraph of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 4363, it is clear that an
offended party who is at the same time a public official can only institute an action arising from libel in
two (2) venues: the place where he holds office, and the place where the alleged libelous articles were
printed and first published.
IMPROPER VENUE; MUST BE RAISED IN A MOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO A RESPONSIVE
PLEADING. Unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss prior to a
responsive pleading, the venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid since, for all practical
intents and purposes, the venue though technically wrong may yet be considered acceptable to the
parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been devised.


SWEETLINES V. TEVES, 83 SCRA 361 (1978)
Facts: Boat tickets stipulated that the venue of actions arising out of the tickets should be filed in Cebu
City.
Held: Although venue may be changed or transferred by agreement of the parties in writing, such an
agreement will not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants. Considering
the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would incur to prosecute a claim in
the Cebu City, he would most probably decide not to file the action at all. The condition will thus defeat,
instead of enhance, the ends of justice. On the other hand, Sweetlines has branches or offices in the
respective ports of call of its vessels and can afford to litigate in any of these places. Hence, the filing of
the suit in residence of plaintiff, as was done in the instant case, will not cause inconvience to, much less
prejudice Sweetlines. The stipulation, if enforced, will be subversive of the public good or interest, since
it will frustrate in meritorious cases, actions of passenger claimants outside of Cebu City, thus placing
Sweetlines company at a decided advantage over said persons, who may have perfectly legitimate
claims against it. The said condition should, therefore, be declared void and unenforceable, as contrary
to public policy
Escolin: The SC characterized a contract of adhesion as void for being against public policy.
de Leon: Contrast the rationale in the cases of Sweetlines and Clavecilla re: confusion and untold
inconvenience on the part of defendants.

CALO V. AJAX, 22 SCRA 996 (1968)
Facts: Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendant-appellee Ajax
International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. The transaction was
evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.
According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the same was
found short of 300 ft. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for either completion
of delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of wire rope.
On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 was filed in the
Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have acquired the outstanding
credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International, Inc. Charge Order No. 37071 was among
those included in the assigned account. Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ
of execution issued, against plaintiff Calo
On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed in the Court
of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that the latter either effect
complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be relieved from paying P855.00 and (2)
that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation
Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860 on the
ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to that in Civil Case
No. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. The court a quo sustained the motion and dismissed
the case on the ground that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in
the MTC.

Issue:
Held: Counterclaims that are beyond the jurisdiction of the MTC are not compulsory and are not
waived by the failure to set up before the MTC. The rules allow such counterclaims to be set-up
only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering from him. This means that should the
court find both plaintiff's complaint and defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said
court's jurisdiction) meritorious, it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant
has a bigger credit.
However, any counterclaim set-up in excess of the courts jurisdiction is waived. Failure of
the defendant to set-up such claim does not bar him from filing a separate civil action on the same
claim before the RTC.
de Leon: compare this with the Progressive Development Corp. v. CA, 301 SCRA 637 (1999) which
Escolin said was wrong.

SINGAPORE AIRLINES V. CA, 243 SCRA (1995)
Facts: Rayos was an overseas employee who has a renewed contract with of Aramco. Aramco
reimburses the amounts its returning employees pay for excess baggage. Rayos took a Singapore
Airlines and validly claimed reimbursement. Aramco investigates Rayo for fraudulent claims. Rayo
asked Singapore Airlines to issue a certification. Singapore delays in issuing the certification.
Rayos contract with Aramco was not renewed. Rayo sues Singapore. Singapore blames PAL and files
a 3rd party complaint against PAL. PAL answers that the tampering was Singapores fault. Judge
rules for Rayo on the main case, and for Singapore in the 3rd party complaint. Judgment for Rayo
became final. PAL appeals the 3rd party complaint claiming for the 1st time that Rayo was not
entitled to damages from Singapore because his contract with Aramco was not renewed because of
his unsatisfactory performance.

Held: Judgment for Rayo being final, PAL may not question it. A 3rd-party defendant is allowed to
set up in his answer the defenses which the 3rd-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have
against the original plaintiff's claim. However, he must do so in his 3rd party answer, and not raise
it for the 1st time on appeal. PAL should have raised in its 3rd party answer everything that it may
conceivably interpose by way of its defense, including specific denials of allegations in the main
complaint which implicated it along with Singapore.


Pleadings:

CHAVEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 193 SCRA 282 (1991)
Facts: The RP, through PCGG with the assistance of SG filed with the respondent SB a civil case
against Enrile and among others for alleged illegal activities made by Enrile during the Marcos era.
Enrile filed a motion to dismiss but it was denied. Thereafter, he filed his answer compulsory
counter-claim and cross claim with damages. In the counter-claim, Enrile moved to implead Chavez
and other PCGG officials on the basis that the case filed against him was a harassment suit. The
motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by the Sandiganbayan. The plaintiff filed a motion
to reconsider but the SB denied the same.

Issue: WON the claim against the SG arising from the filing of the alleged harassment suit
constitute a compulsory counter-claim.

Held: A claim for damages based on malice and evident bad faith of a litigants counsel in filing a
case is not a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him. It must be filed as a separate
and distinct civil action for damages against such counsel. A counterclaim is possible to a case filed
by a respondent against a petitioner or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the
counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself. A counterclaim is
possible only against a party to the action.


BULACAN V. TORCINO, 134 SCRA 252 (1985)
Facts: Complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed in
the MTC of Leyte against Torcino. The complaint was signed by a non-lawyer friend of the plaintiff
but was verified by the plaintiff himself. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals before the
RTC and moves to dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff
or by an attorney.

Issue: WON a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be dismissed by the MTC on the
ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member of the bar to sign and file it to him.

Held: The complaint is valid as non-lawyer friends or agent may assist litigants before the MTC.
However, in cases before the RTC, the litigant must be aided by a member of the bar.

Rule 138; Section 34 provides:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted.In the court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with
the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.


ESTOESTA V. CA, 191 SCRA 303 (1990)
Facts: Petitioner-accused was convicted to suffer imprisonment for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner through counsel filed a notice of appeal to the RTC and the judgment was modified as to
the penalty imposing a straight penalty of 11 days. MtD to the RTC was denied. Later, petitioner,
without the assistance of counsel, filed with the CA a motion for extension within which to file a
petition for review on the ground that she has to look for another lawyer and filing thereafter a
motion to withdraw petition for review of an RTC judgment modifying an MTC conviction for slight
physical injuries, in order to apply for probation. Probation was denied on the ground that no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted when the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction. Accused now moves to reconsider the withdrawal and to
reinstate the petition for review because its withdrawal was filed without advice of counsel.

Held: A party can always conduct litigation personally or by an attorney in Courts. If in the process
his cause suffers reverses, he only has himself to blame.






CORTEZ V. CA, 83 SCRA 31 (1978)
Facts: Due to the driver's negligence, a truck owned by Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and driven by Macario
Supan on August 20, 1957, hit and killed Severino Cortez. Judge E. Soriano of the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered a decision ordering defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Macario Supan
to pay solidarily the sum of four thousand pesos as damages to the plaintiffs, the heirs of Severino
Cortez. Defendants Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the
pendency, the Court of First Instance of Manila in Case No. 41549 acquitted Supan of homicide
through reckless imprudence. Because of that acquittal Kuy Guam Kay, Ltd. and Supan filed petition
in the Court of Appeals to re-open Civil Case No. 34092 so that the judgment of acquittal could be
presented in evidence.
On November 17, 1969 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision the judgment of the lower
court in Civil Case No. 34092 with the modification that the amount of damages was increased to
P12,000. A copy of that decision was served on November 21, 1969 on Atty. Joaquin C. Yuseco, the
defendants-appellants' counsel of record. However, Atty. Yuseco returned that copy and informed
the Court by letter that he had ceased to be the lawyer for defendants-appellants Supan and Kuy
Guam Kay, Ltd. The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1970 noted Yuseco's letter and
made the observation that Yuseco had "not filed any formal motion for the withdrawal of his
appearance" in that case.
The decision became final and the writ of execution was issued. Defendant through a new
lawyer filed in the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration and suspension of execution. It
alleged that there was no valid service of the decision upon it. The motion was granted. Plaintiff
filed an appeal from the resolution of August 18, 1970.

Held:
Until counsel of record formally withdraws, court processes may be validly served upon him, even if
his services have in fact been terminated. Service to him, is service to his client, even if he returns
the document served on him to the court.
Requirements for Substitution of Counsel during proceeding
1. written consent of party
2. written consent of attorney to be substituted
3. approval of court




JUREIDINI V. CA, 83 SCRA 90 (1978)

Lawyers' rights to fees from their clients cannot have a standing higher than the rights of the
clients or parties themselves and may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for
disapproving or otherwise holding in abeyance the approval of the compromise agreement, since said
rights can be enforced in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding. A petition for intervention
cannot prevent the approval of a compromise agreement entered into by and between the parties
litigants and the same will be denied where the claim of the intervenor can be properly ventiliated
before the proper court in a separate proceeding.
Escolin: In criminal cases, the accused has a constitutional right to counsel. Hence if his defense
was handled by a fake attorney which resulted in to a conviction, the case should be remanded. The
same is true when it comes to civil cases (Telan v. CA, 1991)


JUREIDINI V. CA, 83 SCRA 90 (1978)
STO. TOMAS UNIVERSITY V. SURLA, 294 SCRA 382 (1998)
KAVINTA V. CASTILLO, JR., 249 SCRA 604 (1995)
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL V. CA, 249 SCRA 389 (1995)
ORTIZ V. CA, 299 SCRA (1998)


Rule 8:
TORIBIO V. BIDIN, 134 SCRA 162 (1985)
BOUGH AND BOUGH V. CANTIVEROS, 40 PHIL 209 (1919)
HIBBERD V. ROHDE, 32 PHIL 476 (1915)
JABALDE V. PNB, 7 SCRA 791 (1963)
CENTRAL SURETY V. CN HODGES, 38 SCRA 159 (1971)
CAPITOL MOTORS V. YABUT, 32 SCRA 1 (1970)


Rule 9
FERRER V. ERICTA, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)
GARCIA V. MATHIS, 100 SCRA 251 (1980)
GABUYA V. LAYUG, 250 SCRA 218 (1995)
CAVILI V. FLORENDO, 154 SCRA 610 (1987)
PACETE V. CARRIAGA, 231 SCRA 321 (1994)
RAMNANI V. CA, 221 SCRA (1993)


Ammended and Suplemental pleadings